Case type: Application by both parties for a vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Mr Xuarez and Ms Vitela (both pseudonyms) had been involved in court proceedings in relation to parenting orders for over 10 years (-). The father had filed 19 separate Applications in a Case between 11 April 2012 and 16 November 2017 (), which were all dismissed, and Notices of Appeal in relation to the dismissals (). Both the mother and the father filed applications for a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Issues: Whether the Court should make the vexatious proceedings order against the mother or the father or both.
Decision and Reasoning: The application made by the mother was granted, while the application by the father was dismissed. An order was made prohibiting Mr Xuarez from instituting proceedings against Ms Vitela or any of her legal representatives and dismissing all extant applications ().
Justice Carew at  cites Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy & Gargan (No 2)  FCA 398 to set out 11 principles to consider when making an order in relation to vexatious litigants. Applying the principles to the father’s conduct, Carew J highlighted the facts that most of the applications were instituted without reasonable grounds, the father sought orders that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make, and the repetitive nature of the applications amounted to an abuse of process (). It was noteworthy that in 2010, the father was declared a vexatious litigant in another court, in relation to proceedings where the father stalked the mother’s former legal representative (). These facts justified the order being made against the father.
Proceedings: Application relating to the admissibility of evidence and application as to whether the rules of evidence ought to apply in a Family Court hearing.
Facts: On the first day of a four day hearing, counsel for the applicant (the mother) sought leave to tender voice recordings and transcripts that had been made without the knowledge of the father. Under s 7 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), it is unlawful to record private conversations without the consent of the parties to that conversation unless the recording of the conversation falls within one of the exceptions in s 7(2) and (3).
Reasoning/Decision: First, McClelland J held that both the voice recordings and the transcripts were admitted in evidence under s 7(3) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (the recordings were reasonably necessary to protect the applicant’s lawful interests) and, in the alternative, under s 138 of the Evidence Act (the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence that had been obtained improperly).
McClelland J noted the ‘floodgates’ caution from senior counsel for the father i.e. that there was a danger of parties to a marital relationship experiencing difficulties surreptitiously recording their partner. However, in this regard, His Honour stated that his decision was very much one based on the facts of the case, including the allegations that the father had maintained a charming public face but had engaged in conduct within the family home that was alleged to have constituted family violence in terms of the provisions of s 4AB of the FLA. His Honour also had regard to the potential difficulty of obtaining evidence of family violence when it occurs behind closed doors without any witnesses present other than the perpetrator and victim. Further, His Honour noted that the recordings and transcript would be directly relevant to the issue of credibility as to whether family violence occurred in the proceedings (see -).
Notwithstanding the findings above, senior counsel for the father submitted that the Court ought to exclude the voice recordings (permitting the inclusion of the typed transcript) because the danger of the evidence being unfairly prejudicial to the father outweighed its probative value (s 135 Evidence Act). This was because the mother had knowledge and control of the recording and the circumstances in which the conversation occurred and was recorded. McClellan J dismissed this argument and held the voice recordings were admissible. This could be a matter for cross-examination by the father: Huffman & Gorman (No. 2). Further, His Honour noted submissions from counsel for the applicant and counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer that an important aspect of the evidence contained in the tapes was not simply what was said but how it was said. This was relevant to whether the father’s behaviour could be modelled or mimicked by the children and whether the parenting abilities of the primary carer had been compromised as a result of the content and tone of the communication (s 69ZN of the FLA) (see -).
Second, McClelland J held that the rules of evidence were to be applied in respect to the issues of the events on 10 September 2013 (these events were the subject of criminal proceedings) and to the issue as to whether the father made threats to the children or to the mother in respect to the children (s 69ZT(3)). For the remainder of the issues, the rules of evidence would not apply (s 69ZT(1) and (2)) and His Honour would therefore have the discretion to consider the probative value of such evidence. His Honour stated, ‘evidence in relation to the question of family violence will have to be established clearly, and matters of opinion put in appropriate context and given appropriate weight, depending upon who was expressing the opinion and on what basis, and the establishment of the necessary background facts’ (see -).
Proceedings: Numerous applications including an application to discharge the ICL.
Facts: The mother and the father separated in 2009.There were three children of their relationship. In 2012, a final parenting order was made with the consent of the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL). There was continued conflict between the parents. Numerous applications were considered by the court in this case in particular, an application brought by the father to discharge the ICL.
Issues: Whether the ICL had been negligent and demonstrated bias towards the mother?
Reasoning/Decision: The application was dismissed. Forest J referred to his previous discussion (in Dean & Susskind  FamCA 897 at -) of the principles applicable to such an application:
The role is to be discharged independently and professionally, but it is not inconsistent with that duty for an ICL to make submissions to the Court that particular findings of fact, supported by the evidence, be made or that particular evidence be preferred over other evidence, or that a particular course of action be taken by the Court. It is also beyond doubt that an ICL’s duty to advance what he or she independently considers is in the best interests of the children in the case, does not require the ICL to slavishly follow what the children might want or what either one or both of the parents consider is in the best interests of the children.
I consider it to be accepted principle that a court should be slow to remove or discharge an ICL simply where one party complains, in an unsubstantiated way, about the ICL because they do not like or accept the position being taken by the ICL overall or in respect of any particular aspect of the conduct of the case by the ICL. 
It will, in my opinion, be a matter of considering the evidence presented on each application for the removal of an ICL to determine if it demonstrates sufficient lack of objectivity and professionalism on the part of the ICL such as to justify his or her discharge. The mere appearance of partiality to a particular party’s position will not necessarily suffice to warrant the ICL’s removal. 
Parents, particularly in high conflict parenting litigation, must understand that as part of his or her role, the ICL may legitimately and responsibly say things that are challenging and confronting to the parent in respect of his or her views about parenting and the best interests of his or her children in the particular circumstances of the case, but that does not necessarily mean that the ICL is not acting in accordance with his or her duty in the case’. 
The father submitted a number of facts as evidence of bias. First, the ICL sought the appointment of a new, female report writer (Ms C). The father argued that the ICL failed to give him an opportunity to argue against Ms C’s appointment and, by retaining Ms C, evidenced ‘significant gender bias’ by removing ‘the only male person within our entire court process’. The fact that the ICL disagreed with the father on the issue of appointing a new family report writer, as she was entitled to do, did not prove that the ICL failed to adequately consider the father’s argument. Further, the selection of a report writer alone, who happened to be female, did not demonstrate or prove gender bias (see -).
Second, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated negligence or bias against him because she would not give him a copy of her instructions to the report writer. Forrest J noted that there is nothing in the Federal Circuit Court Rules or the Family Court Rules that obliges an ICL to provide copies of her instructions to an expert retained by her to each of the parents. Further, the father did not actually request the ICL to provide him with a copy of her instructions; he instead asked whether he would receive a copy of the instructions to which the ICL replied ‘you don’t see the letter of instruction’. In these circumstances, the ICL had not demonstrated negligence or bias that warranted her disqualification (see -).
Third, on the day of the interviews for the report, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated bias in directing the waiting arrangements in her office for the parents and children. Forrest J held that, at the interim stage, where the evidence invited a number of possible findings that could not be made without cross-examination of deponents, he was not in a position to say that the ICL had acted in a way that warranted her immediate discharge (see -).
Finally, the father asserted that the ICL was incompetent as well as negligent and biased against him. Forrest J was not persuaded by the father’s evidence and held that (see -):
‘It is most certainly not the case that where a parent might be able to point to a mistake made by an ICL that the Court will necessarily accede to an application by that parent to discharge that ICL. The authorities I have discussed clearly disclose that significantly more than that is required’.
Proceedings: Application for final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had one child together. During the relationship, the mother alleged that the father often forced her to have non-consensual sex with him. The parties separated and the mother obtained a DVO against the father. The mother initiated proceedings seeking parenting orders and over the next four years a number of parenting orders were made and amended. However, after an incident at handover, the wife formed the belief the husband would abduct or remove the child from her care, and she attacked the father whilst in a dissociative state. She was convicted of unlawful wounding and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, and immediately released on probation.
The applicant father sought orders for sole parent responsibility for the child, who would live with him and spend supervised weekend and school holiday time with the mother. He argued that the mother presented an unacceptable risk of sexual, physical and emotional harm to the child (the mother suffered sexual abuse as a child). At the time of these proceedings, the father was committed to stand trial on six charges of rape of the mother and one charge of grievous bodily harm against the mother.
The mother sought orders, supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, that she have sole parental responsibility for the child, who would live with her and spend no time, nor have any contact or communication with the father. She later amended her orders and sought to include provision for a card or letter for her birthday and for Christmas. The mother sought no contact as she believed any continued interaction between her and the father in relation to the child, was likely to adversely affect her capacity to parent the child.
Issue/s: What parenting order was in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made providing for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child and sole custody of the child, and for the father’s access and communication with the child to be limited to postal correspondence twice a year until the child turned eighteen. His Honour also made a vexatious litigant order against the father, restraining him from bringing further proceedings without leave of the court.
In relation to making a no contact order, his Honour stated that it is a serious matter that a child neither spend time with nor communicate with a parent. Accordingly, such orders ought to be restricted to cases where the outcome is plainly mandated in the best interests of the child, and no other regime of orders is appropriate or workable. Three scenarios were considered in which ‘no contact’ orders had been made in the past. First, these orders are commonly employed where the Court is satisfied that a parent poses an unacceptable risk of harm to a child. Second, ‘no contact’ orders have been made where the other parent entertained a genuine, but not necessarily reasonable, belief that such a risk of harm existed (on the basis of protecting the child from the consequences of that parent’s belief): Re Andrew. Finally, this approach was taken one step further in Sedgley & Sedgley where the Court held that while the welfare of the child may require some continuity of contact with the non-custodial parent, the need for peace and tranquillity in the custodial parent’s household may be a more compelling need for the child. However, a Court would only cut the relationship between the child and parent on such a ground with considerable hesitation (see -).
The best interest considerations in s 60CC let the court to determine the child live with her mother. His Honour accepted that by time the child turned 12 she would likely come into conflict with the father and was at real risk of harm from his coercive, controlling, dominating and self-serving personality traits (see -). Further, the father was to have no contact with the child except for a card/letter at Christmas and on the child’s birthday. It was found that the father deliberately calculated his interaction with the mother with a view to destabilising her mental health conditions, and even the smallest opportunity for debate or conflict with the mother would be seized upon by the father. If the mother was required to continue to interact with the father in any form of co-parenting, there was a substantial risk that she will either attempt to kill herself, attempt to kill the father, or both.
It was ultimately decided that the prospect and magnitude of the risk of harm to the child if her mother was required to maintain contact with the father far outweighed any benefit the child would obtain by a continuation of any time or communication with her father. It was held that the best interests of the child lay with making a no contact order.
In relation to family violence, his Honour was satisfied that on occasion the father had engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with the mother. However, it was both unnecessary and undesirable to make a finding regarding the father’s conduct in relation to the criminal offence of rape (see -). However, the father’s controlling and domineering behaviour was considered and had bearing on the court’s decision for no contact (see -).
Note: this case was confirmed on appeal, see Theophane & Hunt and Anor  FamCAFC 87.
Proceedings: Parenting orders and vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Over many years, the mother and the 12 year old child experienced harassment, physical violence and stalking behaviour by the father. The father had little or no insight into the impact of his behaviour on the child. This was the third final parenting hearing. The current proceedings were brought about by the father in circumstances where the application was doomed to fail. Seeing the profound impact of these fresh proceedings on her mother, the child resolved that she no longer wanted to see or communicate with her father. Benjamin J was satisfied that the views were her own.
Reasoning/Decision: In making parenting orders, Benjamin J noted that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s 61DA of the Act did not apply because there were reasonable grounds to believe here that the father had perpetrated family violence. This family violence included the father’s entrenched pattern of behaviour (referred to by a psychologist), the father’s stalking behaviour, the verbal abuse, harassment and the assaults by him on the child. Further, shared parental responsibility could not effectively operate given the views of the child, the approach adopted by the father and the impact upon the mother. Accordingly, Benjamin J made an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child (see -). Benjamin J also made an order that the child spend no time with the father and have no communication with the father (see -).
Benjamin J made a vexatious proceedings order prohibiting the father from instituting further proceedings without leave. This order was made under s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). At , His Honour noted that the fundamental differences between the old section (s118) and s 102QB were: (1) the test was no longer a court having frivolous or vexatious proceedings before it but rather whether or not there was a history of a person having frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings; and (2) Vexatious proceedings were now defined by statute in s 102Q(1).
To make an order under s 102QB(2), Benjamin J noted at  that a two part threshold test needs to be met, namely:
Applying this test, Benjamin J proceeded in three parts. First, His Honour determined a number of proceedings initiated by the father constituted vexatious proceedings on the facts (see -). Second, His Honour held that the proceedings amounted to the father ‘frequently’ instituting and conducting vexatious proceedings. In making this determination, Benjamin J noted that the test of ‘frequently’ was used as opposed ‘habitually and persistently’. The term ‘frequently’ is a relative term and is to be considered in the context of the facts of an individual case and, in this case, in the context of the litigation between these parties. This test was said to be satisfied on the facts (see -).
Finally, with the threshold being met, Benjamin J considered whether to exercise the discretion set out in s 102QB(2) of the Act and make a vexatious proceedings order. His Honour noted that a vexatious proceedings order must be considered in the context where there is a need to balance the serious step of restricting a person from commencing proceedings against the need to protect the mother and the child from the constant impact of litigation. In the circumstances, a vexatious proceeding was made (see -).
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and the father, who both had compromised mental health: the mother diagnosed as Bipolar and the father also being previously diagnosed as Bipolar, had two children together. Both children had intellectual and developmental disabilities. The parties separated and reconciled several times before final separation, with the mother obtaining Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders (ADVO) on a number of occasions. The father breached one of these orders in February 2010 by breaking into the mother’s home and assaulting the mother. He was charged and spent time in a psychiatric facility. The mother formed a relationship with another man (‘the stepfather’). In 2011, one of the children went temporarily missing in a National Park under the care of the father, the father deliberately sent photographs of his penis to the mother, and one of the children told the mother that the father swore at her. Contact ceased between the father and the children and the mother received victim’s compensation in relation to domestic violence by the father. Proceedings were commenced in relation to the parenting of the children.
Issue/s: It was agreed that the mother and the stepfather would have parental responsibility for the children. However, some of the remaining issues were –
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made giving the mother and stepfather equal shared parental responsibility for the children, giving the father no parental responsibility, making provision for the children to live with the mother and stepfather and to have no contact with the father, restraining the father from approaching the children, their school and residence and the parents from discussing proceedings with or near the children.
The Court found that the s 61DA presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply as the father engaged in family violence. Further, in relation to the children’s best interests, including consideration of the evidence about family violence, the Court determined that in any case the presumption would be rebutted on the evidence. It was held that any further contact between the father and the mother would destabilise the mother and prevent her from being able to adequately care for the children (see -). Additionally, on this basis, it was ordered that the father spend no time with either child (see -).
Loughnan J also made a number of orders restraining the father from communicating with the children or the mother or stepfather. These orders were necessary for the physical and mental protection of the mother, especially in light of the evidence of family violence. However, Loughnan J ordered that, if required, the father communicate with the step-father through a post office box and be notified if the family relocated from the region (see -).
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The parties separated and made consensual arrangements for the care of their child. In June 2012, the father detained the child citing a belief that the child had been sexually abused by the mother’s partner. Subsequently the mother, having happened upon the child and the father’s partner, attempted to detain the child herself. This resulted in an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) being made against the mother in favour of the father’s partner. It applied to the child and the father as well as they lived with Ms E.
The mother refuted the allegation of sexual abuse but her relationship with her partner had ended and the mother acceded to an order precluding any future contact between the child and her former partner. The father then contended that the mother’s deteriorated emotional state constituted a further risk of harm to the child and militated against the child’s return to live with the mother.
Issue/s: What orders regarding the residence of the child and shared parental responsibility were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court was persuaded to make an order for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, consistent with their mutual wish, the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s suggestion and the Family Consultant’s recommendation (see -). His Honour ordered that it was in the child’s best interests to live predominately with the mother. Although both parents were equally capable of meeting the child’s intellectual needs, he considered that the mother was better able to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs (see ). The child was to spend substantial and significant time with the father (see , -).
The parenting orders were inconsistent with the existing family violence order, as the AVO prohibited the mother from approaching and contacting the child or the father. Although the order made an exception for contact that occurred pursuant to the Act, it was only for the restricted purpose of ‘counselling, conciliation, or mediation’. It was noted that where the terms of the parenting and family violence order were inconsistent, the parenting order should take precedence to facilitate communication between the parents regarding the child and to ensure the child was exchanged for periods of contact (see -).
Proceedings: Application for property orders.
Facts: The parties married and lived together for 19 months. They had one child. The husband contributed the bulk of the capital to the marriage and was on a far superior income. The wife had cared for the child since separation, nearly eight years prior. During the marriage, the husband perpetrated family violence against the wife on five occasions, over a period of 15 months. This caused the wife to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The wife claimed the family violence made her contributions in the role of homemaker and parent significantly more arduous. The husband had financially supported the wife and the child during the period since separation.
Issue/s: Whether the court should make a Kennon style adjustment in the property settlement proceeding?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court referred to the Full Court in Kennon where the principles regarding family violence making contributions more arduous lie. The Full Court’s further refinement of the Kennon principles in Spagnardi & Spagnardi was also noted (see -.
The Court discussed the approach regarding family violence in property proceedings as broken down into three steps: (1) Make findings of fact about one party’s conduct; (2) (If applicable) make findings about the physical or psychological effect of the conduct on the other party; and (3) Make findings of fact about the effect of the conduct of one party upon contributions made by the other party. It was also noted that it could not be assumed in a particular case that an effect on a party’s condition automatically means there is an effect upon the party’s contributions. At trial, the wife had to establish to the judge’s satisfaction a connection between any proven family violence in the case and the contributions she made (see ).
On the facts, Watts J first concluded that the wife’s contributions in the role of homemaker and parent during the period over which the violence took place were made significantly more arduous by the violence of the husband. Second, while His Honour also held that the wife’s role as parent post-separation was made significantly more arduous by the family violence during co-habitation, His Honour observed that it was more difficult to make such an assessment. The wife did experience apprehension and heightened emotion around dealing with the husband’s time with the child after the separation. However, the effect of violence on contributions was not constant over the previous eight years, with the wife’s post-traumatic stress disorder having significantly dissipated (see -). Accordingly, it was appropriate to increase the wife’s assessed contributions by 25 per cent for the duration of the relationship and by 5 per cent post separation to take account of the effect of the husband’s conduct on the mother (see .
Proceedings: Nullity application.
Facts: Ms Kreet (the wife), an Australian born woman, married Mr Sampir (the husband) on June 2009 in India. She travelled to India with her parents believing she was going to marry her Australian boyfriend, Mr U. Upon arrival, her parents confiscated her passport and was introduced to Mr Sampir. Her father told her that he would have Mr U’s sisters and mother kidnapped and raped if she refused to marry Mr Sampir. Under duress, the wife married Mr Sampir and submitted his Australian visa application to the authorities. She returned to Australia, resumed her relationship with Mr U and withdraw her sponsorship of the respondent’s visa application. She obtained an indefinite Intervention Order against her father.
Issue/s: Whether the marriage was void?
Reasoning/Decision: Section 23B(1)(d) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) states that a marriage is void if ‘the consent of either parties is not real consent because: (i) it was obtained by duress or fraud; (ii) that party is mistaken as to the identity of the other party or as to the nature of the ceremony performed; or (iii) that party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
While the legislation does not define duress in the context of a marriage, Cronin J found that ‘there was no reason to give it any other meaning than that which is normally known to the law. It must be oppression or coercion to such a degree that consent vanishes: In the Marriage of S (1980) FLC 90-820’ (see ).
Cronin J was satisfied that ‘the wife’s physical state at the time of the ceremony was such that she was physically and mentally overborne. Her consent was not real because it was obtained by duress’ (see ).
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father of the two children subject to the parenting proceedings was convicted of three offences involving child pornography.
Issue/s: What parenting orders were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, it contains observations relevant to risk assessment. The Court held that an allegation of potential risk of harm ought not to divert the court from the central task of assessing the best interests of the children. At  Murphy J quoted from an article by psychiatrist and barrister, Mahendra, who stated that risk assessment in any situation involves, in essence, asking the following questions:
Proceedings: Orders sought by consent for supervised and unsupervised time with the father
Facts: The parties had two children. There was a history of violent and abusive conduct by the father against the mother and one of the children (including that he bit the child as a baby). This resulted in a number of periods of separation and reconciliation, with a number of Apprehended Violence Orders being brought against and breached by the father (see -, -). The father also regularly smoked cannabis (see -). In April 2001, the mother left the family residence without notice, taking the children with her. At the hearing, the parties attempted settlement. The parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer proposed consent orders for children to progress from supervised to unsupervised to block periods of time with the father, who would give undertakings regarding his conduct, discipline of the children, substance use and participation in an anger management course.
Issue/s: What orders were appropriate in the best interests of the children?
Decision and Reasoning: Moore J declined to make the consent orders as proposed as the untested evidence raised concerns for the judge that the orders may not be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the judge made orders by consent for supervised contact only. The allegations against the father indicated him to be a violent and abusive person who represented a high risk of harm to the well-being of the mother and a high risk of harm to his children.
While Her Honour acknowledged that the parents’ consent to arrangements about their children is a powerful, and in most cases a deciding, factor, consent does not displace the obligation of the Court to make orders that are in the best interests of children (see ). Moore J also expressed her concern that the Independent Children’s Lawyer would provide support for the proposed consent orders in the face of behaviour that had the potential to place the children in serious jeopardy and in light of orders that would give no protection whatsoever to the children (see ).
Proceedings: Contact orders.
Facts: The parents had two children together (B and E) and the mother had another son from a previous relationship (D). The children had witnessed violence by the father against their mother, siblings and extended family. The father had several convictions for assault against the mother and one against D, and had been subject to AVOs. After separation, B and E lived with the father, with interim orders made for the mother to have contact with the children. At trial, the parties agreed that B and E should live with the mother but a number of issues were left to be determined. At hearing, a counsellor gave evidence that both children displayed concerning behaviours consistent with early onset and repetitive physical violence.
Issue/s: One of the issues was what contact should the children have with the father?
Reasoning/Decision: On the evidence, the Court held that it was in the children’s best interest that all but in the very short term they should have no contact with the father. Orders were made to reduce contact over the space of 12 months to minimise the distress that could be caused to the children by immediate complete separation (see -). The Court held that the father’s abusive behaviour presented a ‘multi-faceted danger for the children’ including danger of injury as well as “fear, insecurity & vigilance”. It was held there was a risk of the children learning behaviour from the father which would affect their future interactions e.g. the daughter accepting abuse as part of life and the son believing violence is acceptable. See -.
Facts: The case concerned the custody of two children aged four and two. The wife alleged that the husband had been physically and verbally violent towards her on a number of occasions.
Issue/s: What is the relevance of family violence in custody, guardianship and access matters?
Decision and Reasoning: The court accepted that the relevance of family violence will vary according to the nature of the proceedings.
Chisholm J went on to consider the relevance of family violence in proceedings relating to children. His Honour considered at  that although it is ‘not the objective of the law in custody and similar proceedings to punish wrongdoers or to provide compensation or redress for victims’, family violence is by no means irrelevant. His Honour held that ‘[family violence] is to be taken into account if it is relevant to the determination of the child’s welfare, which is the paramount consideration’. The standard of proof is the civil standard on the balance of probabilities. However, the conduct of a parent is relevant in custody matters only to the extent that it relates to the welfare of the children.
Where violence is directed at the children themselves, or occurs in the presence of the children, it is obviously and directly relevant to their welfare (see ). However, other forms of violence could also be relevant to the welfare of the children such as violence affecting the custodial parent, threats, etc. The Court must assess the nature and extent of the harm in light of the evidence and findings before them. See .
The Court also stated that it may be possible for the court to decline to make findings in relation to family violence, where it could determine the case without reference to them.
Proceedings: Interim custody application
Facts: Parties married in 1978 and separated under one roof in March 1993. There are 2 children of the marriage aged 13 and 9 at the hearing. There was corroborated evidence of violence perpetrated by the father on the mother. The husband was convicted of assault upon the wife earlier in the same year of the hearing. He was “ordered not to assault, molest or interfere with” the mother. Regardless of these orders he continued to contact the mother and make threats to her and her family. The husband also verbally abused and belittled the mother in front of the children during the marriage. There were also multiple occasions of physical abuse throughout the marriage. Since separation the husband had given the 13 year old daughter Rohypnol and shared a bed with her. He was advised by the Department of Community Services not to do this. Also post separation, the father took out a life insurance policy for the mother. The mother moved from the matrimonial home to her mother’s house in June 1993. The children remained with the father.
Issues: In light of the father’s history of domestic violence and threats, what interim arrangements should be made for the care of the children?
Reasoning/Decision: Due to the violence of the father, the Court held that he was a risk to the children both physically and developmentally (he is an “inappropriate role model”). It was held that the children were to remain in the former matrimonial home to “preserve stability for the children and for their safety” and their mother was to have interim care of the children. The father was restrained from coming within 2 miles of the home due to “serious concerns as to the safety of the wife and the children”.