Walpole & Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] FamCAFC 65 (25 March 2020) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Fatal strangulation’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of family and domestic violence’ – ‘Intolerable situation’ – ‘Non’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Issue: Application for leave to appeal, application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence.
Grounds:
•
The primary judge erred in the application of the grave risk of physical or psychological harm defence (Ground 1);
•
The primary judge erred in the finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship (Ground 2);
•
The judge erred by assuming that the current protection orders in New Zealand would remain in place (Ground 3);
•
The intolerable situation defence applies (raised by the Court).
Facts: The appellant fled New Zealand with the assistance of New Zealand Police with her two children, in mid-2019 she believed the children’s father posed a real risk to her and the children. The father had an extensive criminal history which demonstrated "a pattern of increasingly serious charges against the father (not all of which resulted in convictions), domestic violence offences and breaches of bail and parole" [29]. The mother gave evidence of her intention to remain separated from the father but argued that the extensive history of repeated reconciliations between them meant the court should not have accepted that her intention to remain separated would ensure the children’s safety if they were returned to New Zealand. The father invoked the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the ‘Abduction Convention’) to secure the children’s return [1]. The application for recovery was made by the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the "Central Authority" under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) ("the Regulations"), an Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) was appointed and argued at first instance against the Hague Convention Application being granted, but the judge accepted the mother’s evidence she would not resume cohabitation with the father and the application was granted. The mother sought leave to appeal and applied to lead more evidence of the father’s criminal history and family violence history. The ICL did not participate in the application for leave to appeal despite the order for their participation remaining on foot.
Judgment: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed on basis of the intolerable situation defence (not raised as a ground of appeal but by the Court).
Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 contended that the primary judge erred in finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship. This error was based on the judge’s acceptance "of the mother’s evidence that she had permanently separated from the father and had taken necessary steps to keep him away from her and the children" [51]. In support of these contentions, the mother submitted that the primary judge should have considered her history of separation and reconciliation with the father and instead concluded that it was thus unsafe to assume she would cooperate with attempts to keep her and the children safe. The Court noted that this position was inconsistent with the evidence submitted by the appellant at trial and concluded that "given the manner the case was run at trial" the grounds could not succeed [534].
Ground 3 contended that the primary judge erred in assuming that the protection orders against the father in New Zealand would remain in place. As the mother did not submit as part of her case at trial that she would agree to the father’s application to discharge these protections orders being granted, nor was there evidence that the father’s application had any prospect of success, the third ground was "not made good" [55].
Ryan, Aldridge and Watt JJ all, in separate judgements, granted leave and allowed the appeal after considering the intolerable situation defence under reg 16(3) of the Family Law (Child Abduction) Regulations 1986 (Cth). It was noted that the father’s previous convictions and violence, the pattern of parental separation and reconciliation, and the totality of the circumstances in which the children would find themselves if they were to return to New Zealand were unsafe and intolerable [63].
Ryan and Aldridge JJ criticised the role of the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the Central Authority in pursuing the matter: [78] ‘We have been troubled by what occurred in this case and it is timely to mention the importance of adherence to Model Litigant guidelines. The NSW Guidelines, which apply to the Central Authority, requires more than merely acting honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules. Essentially, the guidelines require that the Central Authority acts with complete propriety and in accordance with the highest professional standards. Relevantly, this includes not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the state or an agency knows to be true.’
[79] ‘In this case, the application disclosed the father’s final term of imprisonment in NSW. Even though the Requesting Authority knew that the father was permanently banned from Australia, had effectively been deported and had lived in New Zealand for many years, it would seem that no attempt was made to establish his criminal antecedents or the involvement (if any) of child protection agencies in New Zealand in relation to his other children. The same applies in NSW. To be fair, the Requesting Authority and the Central Authority disclosed the mother’s application for a protection order and thereby flagged that, on the mother’s case, serious risk issues arose.’
[80] ‘It is our understanding that systems are in place in NSW which enable the Central Authority to access/request information from the NSW Police. We assume New Zealand operates in the same fashion. Thus, the Requesting Authority and Central Authority were able to examine and present the father’s complete criminal history and an entire set of COPS records. Instead, it was left to the mother and the ICL to gather records from New Zealand and domestically. It is no small thing to obtain records from abroad, particularly when time constraints are tight. Fortunately, the mother was granted legal aid, but, what we ask, if she was not? How would this young mother on social security benefits have managed to place this vitally important evidence before the court? The prospect that she would not have been able to do so is obvious.’
Stringer & Nissen (No. 2) [2019] FamCAFC 185 (23 October 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Failure to consider evidence relevant to the child's best interests’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relocation’
Case type: Appeal against interim parenting orders as to with whom the child, X, should live.
Facts: The parties separated in 2015 when X was around 6 months old. In 2015, the parties entered into a parenting plan. In early 2019, the mother and X moved from Town A to live in Sydney. The mother did not tell the father she was leaving Town A because she was afraid of what he might do to her or X, and said that, during the relationship, the father was aggressive and abusive towards her. After leaving Town A, the parties made arrangements for X to spend time with the father until March 2019. At the end of that time, the father refused to return the child to the mother. The primary judge ordered that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility of X and that if the mother returns to live in Town A, then X will live with her, but that if the mother does not return to Town A, then X will live with the father. At the heart of the Court’s decision was the denunciation of the mother’s unilateral decision to move away from Town A.
Issue: Whether it was in the best interests of X to live with his mother in Sydney or with his father in Town A?
Held: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia allowed the appeal against the orders of the primary judge. Their Honours found that the primary judge did not engage in a careful consideration of the evidence, as he failed to take into account the mother’s evidence that she did not tell the father she was moving because she feared him. The Full Court was also perplexed as to why the father’s unilateral decision not to return X to his mother was not denounced in the same way as the mother’s unilateral decision to relocate without telling the father. The Full Court also found that the primary judge misapprehended the nature and extent of the family violence and misapplied legal principles.
At [45], the Court found:
“The allegations of family violence, together with the mother’s concern as to the father’s alcohol abuse were matters on which she relied to demonstrate that it would not be in the child’s best interests to live with the father and his Honour ignored a fundamental integer of the mother’s case which was that there was a risk to the child from being exposed to family violence. The orders she sought for time would however, provide for the maintenance of the child’s relationship with the father while he remained living with his mother. His Honour’s approach was erroneous in principle and to the facts.”
Keating & Keating [2019] FamCAFC 46 (21 March 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Property settlement’
Case type: Appeal.
Facts: The husband was a tradesman and operated a business, called the Keating Group, through a complex trust and corporate structure. The Group traded throughout the marriage, and since the parties separated in 2010, the husband managed and operated it. Its value and dramatic increase in the husband’s director loan account to the Group were key issues in the proceedings. The primary judge separated the parties’ property into 2 pools: non-superannuation assets and property and liability, and superannuation. The non-superannuation property was worth $1,784,854; however as a result of the husband’s indebtedness to the Group and expenses associated with a failed taxation minimisation scheme, liabilities exceeded assets by $804,805. The husband’s and wife’s contributions were assessed at 70% and 30% respectively. Their superannuation contributions were assessed as equal. No adjustment was made under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The wife was ordered to retain her personal possessions, her bank account, car and $12,000 previously received by way of partial property settlement. She also received a superannuation split of $119,000 and 50% of any payment received as a result of a pending class action relating to the tax scheme. The husband retained the Group, which had an annual turnover of $4 million and which provided him with a superior standard of living. He remained personally liable for his loan account and debts due in relation to the tax minimisation scheme.
The wife alleged that she was subject to family violence at the hands of the husband during and after their relationship. Her evidence included that the husband broke her nose, beat her on an overseas trip until she passed out, and that she suffered serious bruising and broken ribs. The primary judge dismissed all incidents of violence towards the wife except that which resulted in her broken wrist, apparently because her evidence was uncorroborated ([41]).
Issue: The wife appealed the property settlement orders on 7 grounds. Relevant grounds of appeal include that:
•
The primary judge failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions and to sufficiently engage with the wife’s case (Grounds 1 and 5).
•
The wife claimed an adjustment, which the primary judge refused to make, arising from family violence under the ‘Kennon’ principles (Ground 4).
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the property order.
Grounds 1 and 5.
At [23]-[24], Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ held –
‘[H]is Honour went no further than to say that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme was unsuccessful…The issue was whether she knew of and supported the husband’s investment in the scheme to the extent that she should shoulder half of the resulting debt. In the result, his Honour’s decision to fix both parties with responsibility for the debt was made ‘…because [the debt] actually exists…’
‘His Honour’s finding that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme failed falls considerably short of engagement with the reasons why the wife said she ought not to be fixed with joint responsibility for the debt. The same applies to the finding that the debt ‘actually exists’. Although parties would ordinarily be expected to take the good with the bad, there was no active engagement by the primary judge with the wife’s case that the husband should bear sole responsibility for the debt and why.’
Given the primary judge’s failure to engage with the wife’s case on these matters, the Court held that Grounds 1 and 5 had been established.
Ground 4.
The wife argued that she was exposed to significant family violence by her husband during and after the relationship. She sought an adjustment under the principle in Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 where it was held that family violence, which is demonstrated to have a significant adverse impact upon one party’s contributions to a marriage, is a relevant consideration to the assessment of contributions within section 79. According to the Court in Kennon, it is necessary to adduce evidence to prove the incidence and effect of domestic violence, and to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the parties’ capacity to ‘contribute’ under section 79(4) ([37]). The Court in Kennon also stated that family violence will be relevant if the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party ([36]).
However, at [33] the Full Court held –
‘The fact that the wife gave evidence of family violence during periods when the parties were separated and after they separated for the last time ought not to have minimised the significance of her evidence of that which occurred during the relationship.’
The Court went on to state that Kennon should not be interpreted as laying down a precise rule that ‘post-separation family violence to a spouse who seeks to continue to contribute to the welfare of the family as a parent is irrelevant’. The reference to ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi & Spagnardi [2003] FamCA 905 appeared ‘to elevate the need for an evidentiary nexus or ‘discernible impact’ between the conduct complained of and its effect on the party’s ability to make relevant contributions, requiring expert or actuarial evidence of the effect of the violence.’ Their Honours stated that perhaps the use of the word ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi was ‘infelicitous’ when in truth, the Court ‘was merely reinforcing the need for there to be an evidentiary nexus between the conduct complained of and the capacity (and or effort expended) to make relevant contributions’ ([39]). Their Honours also affirmed the well-settled view that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted ([42]).
The Court could not conclusively determine whether the primary judge’s decision not to make a ‘Kennon’ type adjustment was wrong due to the absence of a transcript ([43]). While Kennon appears to remain sound law, its considerations apply to ‘a relatively narrow band of cases’ ([67]).
Atkinson v Atkinson [2017] FamCAFC 266 (13 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Alleged false allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Recovery order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Father’s appeal against interim parenting orders, including a recovery order.
Facts: The mother applied for, and was granted, a recovery order for the return of the child after the father failed to return the child to the mother following fortnightly weekend contact. The father argued that the mother physically abused the child and the mother alleged that the father engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse such as to constitute family violence by persistent allegations that the mother physically abused the child.
Issue: Whether the primary judge erred in failing to appoint a single expert before making a recovery order.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed. Interim orders that the child reside with the mother.
In finding that the primary judge did not err in failing to appoint a single expert before making interim orders including a recovery order after the father retained the child Ryan J noted (Johnston and Thackray JJ agreeing):
[49] …the mother’s application was for a recovery order after the father retained the child. The application demanded a prompt response and in my view an adjournment for in all probability many months would not have been in the best interests of the child.
Ralton and Ralton [2017] FamCAFC 182; (7 September 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Application of domestic and international human rights law under the family law act 1975 (cth)’ – ‘Bias’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘No merit’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Unsuccessful application for stay of proceedings’ – ‘Weight of evidence’
Matter: Mother’s appeal against parenting orders that the children B and C reside with the father, he have sole parental responsibility and the mother have limited supervised contact, to progress to alternate weekends and half the school holidays.
Facts: Earlier orders made in 2010 had provided for the children to reside with the mother and have contact with the father. In 2014 and 2015 the children only spent time with the father intermittently. B, in particular, became reluctant to spend time with the father, and in 2016 twice avoided contact by running away from school. The trial judge found that the children were “at risk of longer-term psychological harm in the mother’s household” and would not have any real relationship with their father if they remained in the mother's care [4]. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (‘ICL’) supported the father’s position.
Grounds: The mother’s grounds of appeal were “difficult to follow and understand” and her submissions “did not seek to explain why the primary judge erred but were rather a lengthy and detailed assertion of wrongdoing by his Honour.
Decision: ICL granted leave to appear. No error established and appeal and applications in an appeal dismissed. Mother to pay the father’s costs of the appeal.
Parental alienation was considered in circumstances where the mother appealed against parenting orders on the basis that orders had been made with insufficient consideration of the alleged family violence of the father and the expert witnesses were biased (the Full Court - Bryant CJ, Strickland & Aldridge JJ).
[187] The primary judge was at pains to avoid the use of labels such as “parental alienation” or “enmeshment”. Speaking of the Associate Professor’s evidence, which included a discussion of these concepts, his Honour said:
The issues that he raises with respect to the concept of alienation as a syndrome are well set out in the literature. However, to become focused upon the academic discussion of alienation and whether or not it is a syndrome – and it seems clear that it is not – becomes more of a distraction than anything in this individual case. What is necessary in this case is a careful analysis of the evidence of the parties, the circumstances confronting these two children in each of the households and the behaviours exhibited in order to ascertain what is going to be in their best interests. (quoting from the primary judgment at [70])
[192] … There is therefore no need for us to consider whether or not the evidence justified a finding of parental alienation or enmeshment or whether or not they are valid concepts.
Saska & Radavich [2016] FamCAFC 179 (1 September 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Definition of family violence in section 4ab’ – ‘Key statutory provisions in the family law act’ – ‘Meaning of ‘family violence’’ – ‘Mother a family member by operation of section 4(1ab)’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Section 61da’ – ‘Whether mother a member of the family of the father within the meaning of section 4ab’
Proceedings: Appeal - parenting orders.
Facts: The trial judge made final parenting orders which included an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child of the mother and the father. In making these orders, the trial judge found that the father’s behaviour towards the mother amounted to ‘family violence’ within the meaning of s 4AB of the Family Law Act. As a result of this family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility for the child in s 61DA of the Act did not apply: s 61DA(1). Further, even if the presumption had applied, the trial judge held that it would still not have been in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility: s 61DA(4). The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in finding that the father’s behaviour towards the mother constituted family violence within the meaning of s 4AB(1) because the mother was not ‘a member of the [father’s] family’ as defined in s 4(1AB). Accordingly, the trial judge erred in finding that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted because the father had not engaged in family violence: s 61DA(2)(b).
•
The trial judge erred in finding in the alternative that the presumption was rebutted because equal shared parental responsibility was not in the best interests of the child: s 61DA(4).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court held that the father’s appeal was always doomed to fail because it rested on a misconceived interpretation of s 4(1AB) of the Act. Relevant to the proceedings, the combined effect of s 4(1AB)(e) and s 4(1AC) was that the child was a member of the father’s and a member of the mother’s family. It was never in issue in the proceedings that the mother resided with the child at the material times, the child being a member of the father’s family. Thus, by operation of subparagraph (h) of s 4(1AB), the mother was a member of the father’s family. Further, within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of s 4(1AB) each of the mother and the father, respectively and alternatively, ‘is or has been a member of the family of a child of [the other]’. Accordingly, the father had engaged in family violence against ‘a member of his family’ (see [17]-[24]).
The father’s contention that the trial judge erred in rebutting the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility because the father had committed family violence was therefore dismissed. As demonstrated above, the contention that there was no family violence in this case because the mother was not a member of the father’s family was based on an erroneous reading of the Act.
Additionally, while the trial judge was correct to apply s 61DA(2) and conclude that the presumption did not apply, it was also well within her discretion to conclude that even if the presumption had applied, it would have been rebutted in the child’s best interests: s 61DA(4).
The father also argued that the mother wasn’t fearful, and so the finding of family violence was erroneous. For this argument to be effective, the words of s 4AB(1) would need to be read conjunctively, not disjunctively, as the section is worded. The family member being ‘fearful’ is one possible manifestation of family violence, but is not necessary to make a finding of family violence.
Salah & Salah [2016] FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100 (17 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Ignoring allegations of family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Treatment of issues of family violence’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: At the contested interim hearing, the mother made allegations of significant family violence perpetrated by the father in the presence of the children. In light of this and one of the children’s epilepsy and developmental delay, she sought an order directing the father’s care of the children to be supervised by another adult. The father disputed the allegations of family violence. In making interim parenting orders, the trial judge said (see [23]-[27]):
‘The evidence lead [sic] as to alleged family violence made by each parent is not capable of sustaining a finding at this interim stage of proceedings. In circumstances of conjecture given no other evidence. The presumption for equal shared [parental] responsibility is still applicable.
[…]
Findings with respect to whether either party perpetrated family violence cannot be made at this interim stage given the conflicted evidence. The civil standard of proof is met by neither.
As such and for the same reasons the need for the father’s time with the children to be either in the “presence of” or “supervised by” another adult is not made out’.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made several errors of principle in considering the issues of family violence namely, His Honour erred in his consideration of the family violence issues, failed to have regard to s 61DA(3) of the Act and failed to follow the legislative pathway in his determination of the interim issues.
2.
The trial judge failed to take into account relevant facts.
3.
The trial judge failed to give adequate reasons for his determination.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. The Court noted at [36] that, ‘[i]t is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial’.They continued at [39]-[40]:
‘In SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, the majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) said:
…Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
The trial judge here faced just that challenge. His Honour, when confronted with significant allegations of violence was required to do more than merely note the contention (or “conjecture”) and not to “simply ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue” (see SS v AH)’.
The Court held that while the trial judge was correct in stating that, at that point, he could not make findings on the disputed allegations, he erred by ignoring the allegations of family violence and finding that the presumption of equal shared responsibility applied. His Honour further erred in his treatment of the allegations of family violence by suggesting with that comment ‘given no other evidence’ that the mother’s allegations required corroboration or objective support and erred in incorrectly referring to the civil standard of proof (see [41]-[45]). Grounds two and three were also successful for similar reasons (see [60],[65]).
Holsworth & Holsworth [2016] FamCAFC 98 (9 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the trial judge could not make findings on allegations of family violence until the evidence was properly tested at trial’
Proceedings: Appeal of interim procedural orders in relation to parenting proceedings
Facts: The parties reached agreement in November 2010 that the children live with the mother and spend time with the father. Almost a year later the mother was “psychiatrically unwell” and the children began to live with the father and spend time with the mother. After many years of litigation, including the appointment of an ICL, one child had returned to live with the mother and was to spend time with the father. The matter was listed for trial and an updated family report was ordered.
One ground of appeal was that “[t]he trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mother’s evidence of family violence and did not accept the mother’s evidence of it because she had not produced “third party evidence”.
Issues: In the context of apprehended bias, was the trial judge correct in not determining issues of family violence at an interim hearing?
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court found that the mother’s assertions regarding the trial judge’s consideration of the evidence of family violence were “unsupported by the transcript”. In addition, her Honour was correct in not making findings “until such time as the evidence had been tested” – something which would happen at the final hearing of the matter. Despite the grounds purportedly being a challenge to the trial judge’s “failure to recuse herself”, it was apparent to the Full Court that they were really a complaint that the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence, including that of family violence, at the interim stage of proceedings.
The appeal was dismissed.
Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71 (5 May 2015) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Family reports’ – ‘Findings of fact in relation to allegations of family violence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weight on the expert evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and property orders
Facts: There is one child of the marriage. The parties married in 2002 and separated in late 2008/ early 2009, continuing to live under the same roof until November 2009. The mother claimed that up until November 2004 she was the primary carer for the child and the father worked. In November 2004 the mother went back to work and the father became the primary care-giver for the child. The child had health issues which would require visits to the hospital. The father consulted medical practitioners about the child’s weight and would weigh the child after time in the mother’s care. Around “September 2009 the husband arranged for ongoing surveillance of the wife”. In October the mother became aware of the surveillance and asserted stress and digestive issues as a result. This also affected the child. A consultant psychiatrist provided a Family Report to the Court on 9 January 2011. This report included discussion of risk associated with physical violence during the marriage in addition to the conflict and hostility between the parties in association with the child’s medical issues. It also included risk to the child in regards to the father’s obsession with “health and welfare”.
Issues: Whether the judge erred in attributing significant weight to the family report.
Whether the judge should have made a finding in relation to family violence.
Reasoning/Decision: Despite the father having opportunity to cross-examine the report writer at trial, and opportunity to raise his concerns about the report with the writer, and opportunity for the father to submit to the judge that the report be given little weight, no such cross-examination was forthcoming at trial, and no like submission was made to the trial judge. It was determined that not only was the judge entitled to rely on the expert report as he did, the father was not entitled to make his complaint about its handling to the appeal court.
In the “background facts” of the judgment the trial judge discussed allegations of family violence made by the mother but made no finding that the violence, as alleged, had occurred. The trial judge was not in error by not making findings – “A court need only determine those facts that are necessary for the determination of the issues between the parties”.
Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, Magistrate Coates made interim parenting orders. The father unsuccessfully appealed against those interim orders (see Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011)).
Subsequently, final orders were made providing that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time for two hours per fortnight with the father. The order for supervised time was for an indefinite duration (see Slater & Light [2011] FMCAfam 1021 (22 September 2011 ) ([1]).
Magistrate Coates’ orders turned on a finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of emotional harm to the children ([2]). The emotional harm was said to take the form of imposing on the children negative views of their mother, alienating the children from their mother and a chaotic regime for the children ([22]).
Issues: Whether Magistrate Coates erred in:
•
finding that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children; and
•
ordering supervised time of an indefinite duration ([2], [29]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially allowed. The Court held that the Magistrate did not err in finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children ([69]). This conclusion was open on the psychiatric reports
However, the Court found that the Magistrate erred in ordering an indefinite supervision order, when this was not requested by either the mother or the Independent Children’s Lawyer ([69]-[70]).
The issue of the time and the circumstances in which the father should spend time with the children be remitted for rehearing by a Federal Magistrate other than Federal Magistrate Coates (see Order 3).
McGregor v McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507; [2012] FamCAFC 69 (28 May 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Failure to properly admit academic opinions as evidence’ – ‘Information sharing’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Parties unaware of use of material’ – ‘Reliance upon academic literature as basis for orders’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders and property orders.
Facts: Prior to the trial, the three children of the relationship lived with the father. In parenting and property proceedings, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the father had been physically and verbally aggressive to the mother and that the father had alienated the children from the mother. The Federal Magistrate accordingly made orders for the children to live with their mother. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Magistrate referred extensively to external literature. The father appealed against this decision.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to accord the husband natural justice/procedural fairness because the husband was not given the opportunity to cross-examine, respond to or introduce contrary evidence in relation to a number of academic opinions relied upon by the magistrate in reaching his decision.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was upheld and the matter remitted for hearing. The Full Court held that the Federal Magistrate placed considerable reliance on the academic literature on the topic of alienation of children. None of it was introduced into evidence as opinion evidence, and accordingly no consideration was made by the Federal Magistrate as to whether to exclude the evidence and, if not, to consider what weight to give it. Accordingly, none of this evidence was able to be tested by the father nor was it the subject of submissions or contrary evidence. There was therefore a failure to afford the father natural justice and procedural fairness (see [118]-[121]).
Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18 (10 February 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Where the court was not persuaded that the learned federal magistrate erred in his approach to the wife's claim for a 'kennon type adjustment'’ – ‘Where undisturbed findings of fact made by the learned federal magistrate amply supported the conclusion he reached in relation to this issue’ – ‘Whether the learned federal magistrate impermissibly relied upon extrinsic material and failed to accord the parties procedural fairness’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and property orders.
Facts: The parties had twins. Serious incidents of family violence occurred during their relationship and after separation. At the hearing of the trial, the father was in prison having been convicted of aggravated assault on the mother. Mother granted sole parental responsibility and the children to live with her. The father was to have supervised time (these orders were interim). Property – 25% adjustment re Kennon.
Issues: In making findings regarding family violence and its effect on the mother and children, did his Honour impermissibly take account of extraneous material? Did his Honour err in making a “Kennon type adjustment”?
Decision/Reasoning: The Court held that despite including reference to the mother’s conduct in the courtroom when faced with the father and the discussion about a report, the passages of which were included and relied upon in Re: L (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334, a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division). They were on the public record and so “materially different from matters appearing in reports” which have not yet undergone judicial consideration. While this alone does not guarantee that procedural fairness is achieved in circumstances where the parties were not on notice about the report and did not have opportunity to cross-examine accordingly, the Full Court held that “anything said in Re: L was not necessary to establish the relevance of the findings” made by the Federal Magistrate.
Regarding the property settlement and the “Kennon type adjustment”, the Full Court found that while it represented the “top of the range” it did not “exceed the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion”. Regarding the violence that was perpetrated post-separation, the Full Court held it was correctly included by the Federal Magistrate and was a relevant consideration in determining whether the mother’s contributions as a whole were more arduous.
Wolfe & Director-General, Department of Human Services [2011] FamCAFC 42 (4 March 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’
Matter: Hague Convention return order appeal.
Facts: The mother unsuccessfully opposed the father’s application for return of the children to New Zealand. There were ongoing parenting proceedings between the mother and father in New Zealand, where the mother conceded the children had been habitually resident for their whole lives. The current New Zealand orders (made following a hearing in which the mother alleged the father had abused the children and been violent towards her) provided that the children reside with the mother and have one and a half hours contact with the father each weekend. The mother’s new partner was violent towards her and the children were exposed to that violence. The mother fled New Zealand and returned to her native Australia after leaving her new partner. She gave evidence that the children were fearful to return to New Zealand due to concerns about her new partner.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Bryant CJ, Finn and May JJ noted the first instance judge’s comments with approval:
“[i]n part, she relied on her own refusal to establish that a return of the children would place them in an intolerable situation”. Her Honour disposed of this aspect of the mother’s case by saying, correctly, in our view, that “[i]t is well established that, ordinarily, the objects of the Convention should not be frustrated by a parent’s refusal to return with children to their country of habitual residence”. [32]
Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Psychiatric report’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, the Federal Magistrates Court made interim parenting orders. The effect of these orders was to allocate parental responsibility for the children solely to the mother, require the children to live with the mother and require the children to spend weekly supervised time with the father at a contact centre. The orders were made pending the preparation of a psychiatric report on the risk the father presented to the children. These orders radically altered previous arrangements, as the Federal Magistrate was concerned about the need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm that would arise from them being exposed or subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children (a) for the father’s time to be supervised and (b) to significantly reduce the time they spent with the father.
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate had erred by allocating parental responsibility solely to the respondent.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the first ground of appeal, the Court held, amongst other findings, that if evidence of abuse or family violence is adduced at trial, the Court is obliged to deal with it. The Court must always critically assess the evidence placed before it in determining the issue (see [46]). It was also noted that a finding of family violence may be made in the absence of a Form 4 Notice.
The Court held that it was clearly open on the evidence for the Federal Magistrate to find that family violence had been perpetrated by the appellant.
In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellant contended that the Federal Magistrate relied upon erroneous finding of family violence to then improperly find that the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. The Court dismissed this argument by again noting that the finding of family violence was open to the Federal Magistrate (see [64]-[69]).
Note: final orders were subsequently made, but the finding of family violence was not affected (see Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013)).
Vasser & Taylor-Black [2010] FamCAFC 36 (11 March 2010) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Re F: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother from parenting orders that challenged part of the process followed and some of the rulings made during the conduct of the trial. On the final day of the hearing, the self-represented mother sought to tender a 52 page document in response to the report of an expert witness.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that trial judge failed to provide the mother with procedural fairness in not ascertaining the reason behind the preparation of this document and in not advising her that she may wish to seek legal advice before tendering the particular document, contrary to the litigants in person guidelines: Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed as the mother here was not the victim of unfairness. Although this appeal did not relate to family violence, the Court relevantly observed that the Litigant in Person Guidelines were no more than guidelines.
See Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Amador & Amador (2009) 43 Fam LR 268; [2009] 43 FamCAFC 196 (3 November 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Determining allegations in relation to family violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Requirement of corroboration’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties met online and were married in Belgrade. Their child, who had autism, was born in Belgrade. The mother and the son came to live in Australia with the father when the child was 20 months old. The parties subsequently separated, with the mother alleging that the father had perpetrated domestic violence and sexual assault against her. The father denied these allegations. In 2008, a Federal Magistrate made orders granting the mother sole parental responsibility for the child. The mother was also permitted to relocate to Serbia with the child and the father’s contact time with the child was reduced from weekly to possible annual contact. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Federal Magistrate erred in accepting the mother’s uncorroborated evidence that domestic violence and sexual assault was perpetrated by the father on the mother.
Reasoning/Decision: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. In dismissing this ground of appeal, the Court held that a positive finding may be made on the evidence of the victim without corroborating evidence. See [79].
The Court expressed concern at the manner in which the Federal Magistrate had expressed a finding of insufficient evidence re family violence. They were concerned that the Federal Magistrate had felt in some way constrained by law in being able to make a positive determination in relation to allegations of violence even if the evidence had satisfied her on the requisite standard that the violence occurred as alleged. See [95]-[96].
Oakley & Cooper [2009] FamCAFC 133 (30 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Full court referred to, and discussed, the best practice principles for use in parenting disputes when family violence or abuse is alleged’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Whether the federal magistrate erred by giving insufficient weight to issues of family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders
Facts: The parties were together for approximately 7 years, separating in March 2006 – there were 2 children of the relationship. The mother had 6 children from previous relationships. The Federal Magistrate described their relationship as “extremely volatile”, ending in an incident of domestic violence. The Federal Magistrate made findings inter alia: that the parties were unable to effectively communicate with each other due to them being “aggressive, provocative … show[ing] a lack of maturity and complete absence of child focus”; that the mother used physical discipline on the children; and that on at least one occasion the mother’s behaviour at changeover was “appalling and did severely distress the children”. The family report included the opinion that the children “have positive attachments to both parents, but experience some trauma associated with the continuing conflict in their parents’ relationship”. Despite the conflict between them, the parties agreed to an order for equal shared parental responsibility. As such, the Federal Magistrate was obliged to consider equal time, or significant and substantial time with each parent. Orders were made that the children live with the mother 9 nights a fortnight and with the father for 5. The father appealed these orders.
Issues: Did the Federal Magistrate give appropriate consideration to the evidence and findings of family violence when making the parenting orders that he did?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court referred to the 2009 publication “Best Practice Principles for use in Parenting Disputes when Family Violence or Abuse is Alleged”, specifically Section F of the 2009 principles which sets out considerations where children are ordered to spend time with a parent where positive findings of family violence have been made against that parent.
The Full Court found that while they agreed with the argument of the mother’s counsel, that the discussion of weight in relation to family violence had been “clipped” they found that there was no appealable error established. The Federal Magistrate had evidence of both parties and their associates hitting the children, and that both parties were verbally and physically abusive of one another in the presence of the children. Despite acknowledging that the mother’s behaviour was, at times, worse than the father's, when taken in the context of the best interests of the children, the conclusion was that it was in their best interests to remain predominantly in the care of their mother.
M & L (2007) FLC 93-320; (2007) 37 Fam LR 317; [2007] FamCA 396 (4 May 2007) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of cultural evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: Both parents were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, and lived in the NT, one close to Darwin, one quite remote. There was family violence where the father would physically and verbally abuse the mother. On one occasion the paternal grandfather punched the father for hitting the mother. The mother had been the primary care giver of the children. At trial evidence was led about the communities in which each parent lived. The trial judge found that the children would have a greater connection to their father’s culture by living with him.
Issues: Whether the trial judge had adequately considered the evidence of family violence and its potential effects on the children.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court held that there was inadequate consideration of the risk to the children given the father’s history of violence and alcohol consumption. The lack of consideration of the evidence that the children had been primarily cared for by the mother, and that there was no evidence that her care was lacking was overlooked, was also an error. A finding was made by the trial judge that the mother’s parenting was reliant on others in the community, referring to it as “collectivist”. He based his finding on an anthropological report quoted in another judgment. There was no anthropological evidence that the mother’s community engaged in such “collective” parenting, and that the mother was not, herself, the children’s primary care-giver. The trial judge’s finding that the best interests of the children would be met by them living with their father cannot be sustained when evidence of the mother’s adequate care, the fact she was the primary care giver and the father’s violence towards the mother, is balanced against the finding of the cultural benefits to the children of living in the father’s community.
Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303; (2006) 36 Fam LR 395; [2006] FamCA 1316 (5 December 2006) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence and contact orders.
Facts: The proceedings involved competing applications for residence and contact to the child of the parties. The mother made allegations that the father sexually abused the child. While no finding of abuse was made, the Trial Judge did make a finding of unacceptable risk. On appeal, the father challenged the orders made for contact, in particular, the requirement that the contact be supervised.
Issue/s: The trial judge provided inadequate reasons supporting his finding of unacceptable risk of abuse.
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, the Court made observations relevant to the assessment of unacceptable risk. Bryant CJ and Kay J held at [84] that:
‘There remained an obligation on the trial judge to not only evaluate the harm that might befall the child if there is a future act of abuse, but to also evaluate the prospect of such an act occurring. This is not a search for a solution that will eliminate any prospect of serious harm. It is a search to balance the harm that will follow if the risk is not minimised and the harm that will follow if a normal healthy relationship between parent and child is not allowed to prosper’.
S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions must be affected by the violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on past contributions’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Reference to exceptional cases should not mean rare’
Appeal type: Appeal against property orders.
Facts: The parties had two adult children and separated in 2000. The trial judge made a Kennon style adjustment in favour of the wife. His Honour held that the evidence clearly revealed that there had been some violent behaviour by the husband towards the wife. Although there was no explicit evidence from the wife as regards to the effect of the violence on her contributions, the trial judge accepted that the wife’s contributions must have been made significantly more arduous than they ought to have been because of the violence inflicted upon her by the husband.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in adjusting the wife’s contributions to account for the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. Here, the evidence could not have properly led to a Kennon adjustment under section 79 (see [48]). In reaching this decision, the Court made a number of statements of principle, elaborating upon the decision in Kennon.
It was held that evidence of violence alone is not enough, but that the “violent conduct by one party towards the other” must be demonstrated to have an effect on contributions.
In addition, the Court also stated that the reference in Kennon to ‘exceptional’ cases should not be understood to mean rare. They adopted the trial judge’s comments that ‘the references to ‘exceptional cases’ and ‘narrow band of cases’ occurs in the context of the principle of misconduct in general rather than the more narrow formulation about domestic violence. … It seems to me that reading these passages carefully, the key words in a case where there are allegations of domestic violence are ‘significant adverse impact’ and ‘discernible impact’. (see [47]).
B & B [2003] FamCA 274 (8 April 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Failure to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Kennon not an award for damages’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Property orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders and division of property.
Facts: The parties had two children together. At trial, the mother made extensive allegations of physical, verbal and emotional abuse against the father, much of which the father conceded (see [38]). The trial judge made an order that the children should predominately be in the care of their father. Additionally, the trial judge rejected the wife’s submission that the division of property ought to be adjusted to 60/40 from 70/30 division on the basis of the decision in Kennon.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were –
•
Did the trial judge err in failing to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour?
•
Did the trial judge err in attributing responsibility for the domestic violence that occurred during the marriage to the wife?
•
Did the trial judge err in his application of the Kennon principle.
Reasoning/Decision:
The Court held that the trial judge was ‘obliged to adjudicate the violence issue as raised by the wife and to make specific findings in respect of the course of conduct conducted by the husband in the course of the marriage so that he could properly assess relevant aspects of the behaviour of each of the parents in determining in whose care he should place the children’. However, from reading His Honour’s reasons for judgment, it was not clear that he considered and evaluated the relevant evidence and took all the relevant factors into account. The issues raised by the wife in the grounds of appeal could not be described as ‘pernickety or overly critical’ (AMS v AIF) when matters of such significant serious and prolonged violence were clearly raised and left virtually undiscussed in the judgment (see [32]-[53]).
Secondly, the Full Court found that, the trial judge did not attribute responsibility for the domestic violence to the wife: while the trial judge found the wife to have engaged in passive/aggressive conduct, His Honour indicated in the clearest terms that he was not condoning the husband’s conduct in response to such behaviour(see [54]-[57]).
Thirdly, the Full Court held that the application of the principles in Kennonis “not the equivalent of an award for damages”, but used to determine whether the husband’s conduct had the effect of making the wife’s contributions more arduous.
T & S (2001) FLC 93-086; [2001] FamCA 1147 (29 October 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Effect of family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Re f: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother against orders made by the trial judge in relation to the residence, contact and other specific issues relating to the child of the parties’ relationship. The effect of the trial judge’s order was that the father was to have residence of the child and be responsible for the child’s day to day care, welfare and development; and that the mother was to have specified contact with the child. The mother was unrepresented for five days of the six day hearing. A claim by the mother of domestic violence at the hands of the father was raised but the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence. The trial judge instead made a number of adverse findings against the mother.
Issue/s: A major ground of appeal advanced on the Mother's behalf was that she did not receive a fair trial and that a new trial should be ordered. The gravamen of the Mother's case was that because she was a victim of domestic violence who was unrepresented at trial, she was unable to effectively meet the case of the Father and present her own case. As a consequence, and because the Mother suffered from a personality disorder, the trial judge made negative findings against her, and in particular against her credibility.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed on the basis of further evidence tendered on appeal which contained detailed evidence of ongoing domestic violence by the husband, and reports from a psychologist and social worker providing evidence as to the effect of the domestic violence on the mother’s ability to conduct her case at trial. The Court held that if the evidence had been tendered before the trial judge, it would have produced a different result and the best interests of the child required a re-hearing.
B & K [2001] FamCA 880 (14 August 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence orders and property settlement.
Facts: The parties had two children. The trial judge made an order for shared residency of the children. The trial judge accepted evidence that the husband had anally raped the wife.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge give sufficient weight to the family violence the husband had inflicted on the wife and the subsequent effect or impact on her of that violence in making residence orders?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. At [32] the Court noted the authorities referred to by counsel for the wife in support of the argument that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the effect of the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband against the wife: JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515, Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580, Blanch v Blanch & Crawford [1998] FamCA 1908; (1999) FLC 92-837, and Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692.
The Full Court determined that consideration of the family violence and its effect upon the wife was adequate and orders for fortnight-about care of the children was within the trial judge’s discretion.
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact orders’ – ‘Guidelines for matters involving self-represented litigants’ – ‘Parenting orders and effect on children’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and contact orders.
Facts: While not a case specifically dealing with family violence, there is a large proportion of self-represented litigants in family law proceedings and as such the guidelines set out in this case pertain.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge contravene the guidelines in respect of the litigants in person set out by the Court in Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764?
Reasoning/Decision:
The Full Court provided guidelines as follows (taking a number from Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764):
1.
A judge should ensure as far as is possible that procedural fairness is afforded to all parties whether represented or appearing in person in order to ensure a fair trial;
2.
A judge should inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to proceed, the order of calling witnesses and the right which he or she has to cross examine the witnesses;
3.
A judge should explain to the litigant in person any procedures relevant to the litigation;
4.
A judge should generally assist the litigant in person by taking basic information from witnesses called, such as name, address and occupation;
5.
If a change in the normal procedure is requested by the other parties such as the calling of witnesses out of turn the judge may, if he/she considers that there is any serious possibility of such a change causing any injustice to a litigant in person, explain to the unrepresented party the effect and perhaps the undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and his or her right to object to that course;
6.
A judge may provide general advice to a litigant in person that he or she has the right to object to inadmissible evidence, and to inquire whether he or she so objects. A judge is not obliged to provide advice on each occasion that particular questions or documents arise;
7.
If a question is asked, or evidence is sought to be tendered in respect of which the litigant in person has a possible claim of privilege, to inform the litigant of his or her rights;
8.
A judge should attempt to clarify the substance of the submissions of the litigant in person, especially in cases where, because of garrulous or misconceived advocacy, the substantive issues are either ignored, given little attention or obfuscated. (Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150);
9.
Where the interests of justice and the circumstances of the case require it, a judge may:
◦
draw attention to the law applied by the Court in determining issues before it;
◦
question witnesses;
◦
identify applications or submissions which ought to be put to the Court;
◦
suggest procedural steps that may be taken by a party;
◦
clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person or the bases for such orders.
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and there may well be other interventions that a judge may properly make without giving rise to an apprehension of bias.
In the Marriage of Blanch; Blanch v Blanch and Crawford (1999) FLC 92-837; (1998) 24 Fam LR 325; [1998] FamCA 1908 (27 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Erroneous findings of fact’ – ‘Incorrect attribution of fault to the victim’ – ‘Perpetrator responsibility’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The parties were married but separated after seven years. There were two children of the marriage. The wife made allegations of domestic violence against the father; these were denied by the father. The trial judge found at [325] that both parties were responsible for violence in the relationship, and that the relevance of family violence in custody proceedings was to be indicative of a risk ‘to … children in later years that … could cause them harm’. The wife brought an appeal against orders made by the trial judge that the children of the relationship reside with their father.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial judge erred in his findings regarding domestic violence?
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Counsel for the wife submitted that the trial judge addressed the questions of the husband’s domestic violence ‘in almost a passing manner’, despite the presence of overwhelming evidence from the wife that she was the victim of consistent and frequent violence and abuse. It was held that “in cases such as this, where a case of sustained and severe domestic violence by one party is advanced by the other, the court is obliged to give a clear indication whether it accepts or rejects that case and, in any event, to explain why it has reached that conclusion” (see [333]).
In addition it was held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the responsibility for violence between the parties was fairly evenly shared was not available on the evidence.
Other aspects of His Honour’s treatment of domestic violence were also in issue. First, His Honour’s perception of the relevance of violence to the overall welfare of the children was inadequate. The trial judge failed to consider the significant risk of such violence to the children’s emotional development such as “insecurity, fear, unhappiness, anxiety and hyper vigilance”: Patsalou and Patsalou [1994] FamCA 118 and JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 (see [334]). Second, Lindenmayer J also strongly disapproved of the trial judge’s finding that the husband’s violence towards the wife was a product of the marital relationship rather than of the husband’s personality.
Re: Cassandra Kathleen Kennon (Appellant/Wife) and Ian William Kennon (Cross-Appellant/Husband) Appeal (1997) FLC 92-757; [1997] FamCA 27 (10 June 1997) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Relevance of domestic violence’ – ‘Section 79’ – ‘Significantly more arduous’
Proceedings: Property settlement.
Facts: The parties cohabited for approximately five years before separating. The husband was very wealthy and the wife had far more modest means. The property pool was nearly $9 million. There were no children of the marriage. In 1994, the wife filed a property application under s 79 of the Family Law Act. The husband filed a cross application. The wife subsequently filed an amended application which included a claim under the cross-vesting legislation that the husband pay her damages for assault and battery. The husband denied the allegations of assault and restated his position regarding the property claim. The trial judge accepted that a number of assaults had occurred and awarded damages, but found that the husband's conduct had not affected the wife's contributions to allow an adjustment in relation to s 79(4).
Issue/s: The wife did not challenge the trial judge’s finding that the husband's conduct had not affected her contributions. Consequently, the Full Court's comments on the relevance of domestic violence in claims under s79 of the Family Law Act were made in obiter.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed but the Full Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevance of violence in s79 property adjustments. The Full Court said that earlier authorities on s 79 precluding evidence of domestic violence were no longer binding, acknowledging that the ‘pervasiveness and destructiveness of domestic violence’ was now better recognized by the Australian community and courts.
The Full Court cautioned that s 79 of the Act is not a source of ‘social engineering’ or to be used as ‘a means of evening up’ the financial positions of the parties. They held:
‘Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of "negative contributions" which is sometimes referred to in this discussion’.
The Court also referred to this principle as including ‘exceptional cases’ and noted, ‘[i]t is essential to bear in mind the relatively narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party’.
(See also subsequent interpretation in S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003), Baranski & Baranski & Anor [2010] FMCAfam 918 (1 September 2010) and Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012).)
Re Andrew (1996) FLC 92-692; [1996] FamCA 43 (23 May 1996) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Fear of violence’ – ‘Supervised access order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Proceedings: Appeal against supervised access orders.
Facts: The parties separated. Satisfactory access arrangements were in place for 3.5 years. However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and the husband assaulted the wife. The wife held a genuine belief that the husband had tried to kill her and the child on this occasion and subsequently denied the husband access to the child. The husband filed an application for unsupervised access.
The trial judge found that each parent alone could provide adequately for the needs of the child. However, the wife’s fears had become even more entrenched over time and these fears were a major impediment to access, because they were genuine even if they may not be founded in fact. Her capacity to provide care to the child would be impaired and cause detriment to the child if the husband was given unsupervised access. The trial judge made orders for supervised access.
Issue/s: The trial judge gave too much weight to the mother’s attitude and not enough weight to the benefits to the child of unsupervised contact with the father.
Reasoning/decision: The Full Court dismissed the appeal. After citing extensively from past authorities, it was concluded that the finding that the wife’s genuine fear of the husband would significantly affect her ability to provide adequately for the needs of the child as custodial parent despite the benefits to the child from contact with the father was open to the trial judge.
In the Matter Of: N Appellant/Wife and S Respondent/Husband and the Separate Representative [1995] FamCA 139 (20 December 1995); (1996) FLC 92-655; (1995) 19 Fam LR 837. – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Assessment of unacceptable risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Not a family violence case, but it discusses principles in determining unacceptable risk in the context of sexual abuse allegations. In custody proceedings, the mother alleged that the father sexually abused their child and sought to have access by the husband to the child prevented. The trial judge was not satisfied on the civil standard of proof that the sexual abuse had occurred. However, he did not conclude that the abuse certainly did not happen. The mother was steadfast in her belief that the child had been abused by the father. The trial judge did not find the father unfit to have custody or access to the child by reason of sexual abuse or unacceptable risk of abuse, however, mitigated against the concerns and effect on the mother by making interim supervised contact orders.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the father was not an unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Full Court held that the trial judge should not have made interim custody orders and failed to take into consideration the effect this would have not only on the child but also on the mother’s ability and capability to parent effectively. However, as the interim custody order was not challenged the Full Court did not set it aside. As regards to no finding of unacceptable risk, on the evidence, this was open to the trial judge.
Patsalou and Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580; [1994] FamCA 118 (27 October 1994) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Custody proceeding’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Independent research by judge’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Social science research’
Appeal type: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Allegations of family violence were made in custody proceedings. The trial judge accepted the wife’s evidence that prior to separation the husband had been hitting her on a regular basis, in front of the children on a number of occasions. Her Honour stated that the denigration of one parent by the other and the perpetuation of violence by that parent against the other is of importance when assessing where the interests of the children lie and what future arrangements might best advance their welfare. Her Honour also noted a number of articles on the effect upon children of inter-spousal violence including that such effects may be profound and long-lasting. The trial judge concluded that the children’s welfare would be best promoted by remaining in the custody of the wife.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
•
Whether the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the violence and denigration by the husband of the wife was inappropriate and contrary to law.
•
Whether the trial judge erred in referring to the body of research as the articles cited did not constitute evidence before her and the parties were not invited to make submissions with respect to them.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court upheld the trial Judge's finding that allegations of domestic violence were relevant to custody proceedings and found that the reference by the trial judge to published social science literature about the impact of family violence on children was permissible as the published research was referred to as background information rather than evidence.
Evidence of family violence was held to be relevant in custody matters, to the extent that it assisted the court to determine what is in the best interests of the children, as its impact could be ‘profound and long-lasting’. The Full Court approved the comments by the trial judge that denigration and assault cause ‘considerable unnecessary strain’ to the victim and ‘may erode the confidence, dignity and self-esteem of the children’s other parent’. Baker, Kay and Tolcon JJ agreed with the trial judge that such conduct modelled inappropriate behaviour for children and could ‘impinge upon the quality of parenting able to be offered to the children’ and ‘reflects poorly upon the assailant’s capacity to provide children with a positive role model for their own behaviour and methods of resolving disputes and dealing with tensions and stress’.
Between: R Appellant/Husband and C Respondent/Wife [1993] FamCA 62 (25 June 1993); Russell & Close (Unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Fogarty, Baker & Lindenmayer JJ, 25 June 1993) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Meaningful relationship’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separate representative/independent children’s representative’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Appeal type: Appeal against access orders.
Facts: Post separation, an access arrangement for the two children of the relationship was established. The relationship between the parties deteriorated and the mother refused to allow the husband access to the children. One child was found to have been sexually abused, but it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. The mother believed that the father was the perpetrator, however the trial judge was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial judge made orders giving the father unsupervised daytime access to the children to reduce the risk of the mother from making unfounded allegations in the future. The father appealed against these orders. The mother did not challenge the orders, but cross-appealed in relation to findings of fact made by the trial judge.
Issue/s:
•
Whether it was open to the trial judge to make orders giving the husband unsupervised daytime access, where the court was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part. Amendments were made to the trial judge’s orders, clarifying the father’s access period and altering the proposed changeover location. The mother’s appeal against factual findings made by the trial judge and the father’s appeal against daytime access were dismissed.
The Full Court found that the relevant considerations when making access orders in cases involving sexual abuse of children were whether sexual abuse had occurred, whether the perpetrator could be identified, the potential risk of harm to the child from sexual abuse, the potential benefit to the child from parental access and the impact of the custodial parent’s beliefs on the welfare of the children. The Full Court said that the custodial parent’s beliefs regarding the child’s exposure to harm are relevant to the extent that they are likely to adversely affect that parent’s parenting ability and that a subjective test is used to assess the custodial parent’s beliefs.
The Full Court was satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to draw inferences regarding the likely future conduct of the mother. As the trial judge had found the mother genuinely believed the child had been sexually abused, that it was highly likely the mother would make further allegations of sexual abuse against the father if unsupervised overnight access was granted and that this risk did not apply to unsupervised daytime access, it was at the trial judge’s discretion to give the husband unsupervised daytime access.
Walpole & Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] FamCAFC 65 (25 March 2020) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Fatal strangulation’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of family and domestic violence’ – ‘Intolerable situation’ – ‘Non’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Issue: Application for leave to appeal, application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence.
Grounds:
•
The primary judge erred in the application of the grave risk of physical or psychological harm defence (Ground 1);
•
The primary judge erred in the finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship (Ground 2);
•
The judge erred by assuming that the current protection orders in New Zealand would remain in place (Ground 3);
•
The intolerable situation defence applies (raised by the Court).
Facts: The appellant fled New Zealand with the assistance of New Zealand Police with her two children, in mid-2019 she believed the children’s father posed a real risk to her and the children. The father had an extensive criminal history which demonstrated "a pattern of increasingly serious charges against the father (not all of which resulted in convictions), domestic violence offences and breaches of bail and parole" [29]. The mother gave evidence of her intention to remain separated from the father but argued that the extensive history of repeated reconciliations between them meant the court should not have accepted that her intention to remain separated would ensure the children’s safety if they were returned to New Zealand. The father invoked the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the ‘Abduction Convention’) to secure the children’s return [1]. The application for recovery was made by the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the "Central Authority" under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) ("the Regulations"), an Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) was appointed and argued at first instance against the Hague Convention Application being granted, but the judge accepted the mother’s evidence she would not resume cohabitation with the father and the application was granted. The mother sought leave to appeal and applied to lead more evidence of the father’s criminal history and family violence history. The ICL did not participate in the application for leave to appeal despite the order for their participation remaining on foot.
Judgment: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed on basis of the intolerable situation defence (not raised as a ground of appeal but by the Court).
Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 contended that the primary judge erred in finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship. This error was based on the judge’s acceptance "of the mother’s evidence that she had permanently separated from the father and had taken necessary steps to keep him away from her and the children" [51]. In support of these contentions, the mother submitted that the primary judge should have considered her history of separation and reconciliation with the father and instead concluded that it was thus unsafe to assume she would cooperate with attempts to keep her and the children safe. The Court noted that this position was inconsistent with the evidence submitted by the appellant at trial and concluded that "given the manner the case was run at trial" the grounds could not succeed [534].
Ground 3 contended that the primary judge erred in assuming that the protection orders against the father in New Zealand would remain in place. As the mother did not submit as part of her case at trial that she would agree to the father’s application to discharge these protections orders being granted, nor was there evidence that the father’s application had any prospect of success, the third ground was "not made good" [55].
Ryan, Aldridge and Watt JJ all, in separate judgements, granted leave and allowed the appeal after considering the intolerable situation defence under reg 16(3) of the Family Law (Child Abduction) Regulations 1986 (Cth). It was noted that the father’s previous convictions and violence, the pattern of parental separation and reconciliation, and the totality of the circumstances in which the children would find themselves if they were to return to New Zealand were unsafe and intolerable [63].
Ryan and Aldridge JJ criticised the role of the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the Central Authority in pursuing the matter: [78] ‘We have been troubled by what occurred in this case and it is timely to mention the importance of adherence to Model Litigant guidelines. The NSW Guidelines, which apply to the Central Authority, requires more than merely acting honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules. Essentially, the guidelines require that the Central Authority acts with complete propriety and in accordance with the highest professional standards. Relevantly, this includes not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the state or an agency knows to be true.’
[79] ‘In this case, the application disclosed the father’s final term of imprisonment in NSW. Even though the Requesting Authority knew that the father was permanently banned from Australia, had effectively been deported and had lived in New Zealand for many years, it would seem that no attempt was made to establish his criminal antecedents or the involvement (if any) of child protection agencies in New Zealand in relation to his other children. The same applies in NSW. To be fair, the Requesting Authority and the Central Authority disclosed the mother’s application for a protection order and thereby flagged that, on the mother’s case, serious risk issues arose.’
[80] ‘It is our understanding that systems are in place in NSW which enable the Central Authority to access/request information from the NSW Police. We assume New Zealand operates in the same fashion. Thus, the Requesting Authority and Central Authority were able to examine and present the father’s complete criminal history and an entire set of COPS records. Instead, it was left to the mother and the ICL to gather records from New Zealand and domestically. It is no small thing to obtain records from abroad, particularly when time constraints are tight. Fortunately, the mother was granted legal aid, but, what we ask, if she was not? How would this young mother on social security benefits have managed to place this vitally important evidence before the court? The prospect that she would not have been able to do so is obvious.’
Stringer & Nissen (No. 2) [2019] FamCAFC 185 (23 October 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Failure to consider evidence relevant to the child's best interests’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relocation’
Case type: Appeal against interim parenting orders as to with whom the child, X, should live.
Facts: The parties separated in 2015 when X was around 6 months old. In 2015, the parties entered into a parenting plan. In early 2019, the mother and X moved from Town A to live in Sydney. The mother did not tell the father she was leaving Town A because she was afraid of what he might do to her or X, and said that, during the relationship, the father was aggressive and abusive towards her. After leaving Town A, the parties made arrangements for X to spend time with the father until March 2019. At the end of that time, the father refused to return the child to the mother. The primary judge ordered that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility of X and that if the mother returns to live in Town A, then X will live with her, but that if the mother does not return to Town A, then X will live with the father. At the heart of the Court’s decision was the denunciation of the mother’s unilateral decision to move away from Town A.
Issue: Whether it was in the best interests of X to live with his mother in Sydney or with his father in Town A?
Held: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia allowed the appeal against the orders of the primary judge. Their Honours found that the primary judge did not engage in a careful consideration of the evidence, as he failed to take into account the mother’s evidence that she did not tell the father she was moving because she feared him. The Full Court was also perplexed as to why the father’s unilateral decision not to return X to his mother was not denounced in the same way as the mother’s unilateral decision to relocate without telling the father. The Full Court also found that the primary judge misapprehended the nature and extent of the family violence and misapplied legal principles.
At [45], the Court found:
“The allegations of family violence, together with the mother’s concern as to the father’s alcohol abuse were matters on which she relied to demonstrate that it would not be in the child’s best interests to live with the father and his Honour ignored a fundamental integer of the mother’s case which was that there was a risk to the child from being exposed to family violence. The orders she sought for time would however, provide for the maintenance of the child’s relationship with the father while he remained living with his mother. His Honour’s approach was erroneous in principle and to the facts.”
Keating & Keating [2019] FamCAFC 46 (21 March 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Property settlement’
Case type: Appeal.
Facts: The husband was a tradesman and operated a business, called the Keating Group, through a complex trust and corporate structure. The Group traded throughout the marriage, and since the parties separated in 2010, the husband managed and operated it. Its value and dramatic increase in the husband’s director loan account to the Group were key issues in the proceedings. The primary judge separated the parties’ property into 2 pools: non-superannuation assets and property and liability, and superannuation. The non-superannuation property was worth $1,784,854; however as a result of the husband’s indebtedness to the Group and expenses associated with a failed taxation minimisation scheme, liabilities exceeded assets by $804,805. The husband’s and wife’s contributions were assessed at 70% and 30% respectively. Their superannuation contributions were assessed as equal. No adjustment was made under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The wife was ordered to retain her personal possessions, her bank account, car and $12,000 previously received by way of partial property settlement. She also received a superannuation split of $119,000 and 50% of any payment received as a result of a pending class action relating to the tax scheme. The husband retained the Group, which had an annual turnover of $4 million and which provided him with a superior standard of living. He remained personally liable for his loan account and debts due in relation to the tax minimisation scheme.
The wife alleged that she was subject to family violence at the hands of the husband during and after their relationship. Her evidence included that the husband broke her nose, beat her on an overseas trip until she passed out, and that she suffered serious bruising and broken ribs. The primary judge dismissed all incidents of violence towards the wife except that which resulted in her broken wrist, apparently because her evidence was uncorroborated ([41]).
Issue: The wife appealed the property settlement orders on 7 grounds. Relevant grounds of appeal include that:
•
The primary judge failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions and to sufficiently engage with the wife’s case (Grounds 1 and 5).
•
The wife claimed an adjustment, which the primary judge refused to make, arising from family violence under the ‘Kennon’ principles (Ground 4).
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the property order.
Grounds 1 and 5.
At [23]-[24], Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ held –
‘[H]is Honour went no further than to say that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme was unsuccessful…The issue was whether she knew of and supported the husband’s investment in the scheme to the extent that she should shoulder half of the resulting debt. In the result, his Honour’s decision to fix both parties with responsibility for the debt was made ‘…because [the debt] actually exists…’
‘His Honour’s finding that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme failed falls considerably short of engagement with the reasons why the wife said she ought not to be fixed with joint responsibility for the debt. The same applies to the finding that the debt ‘actually exists’. Although parties would ordinarily be expected to take the good with the bad, there was no active engagement by the primary judge with the wife’s case that the husband should bear sole responsibility for the debt and why.’
Given the primary judge’s failure to engage with the wife’s case on these matters, the Court held that Grounds 1 and 5 had been established.
Ground 4.
The wife argued that she was exposed to significant family violence by her husband during and after the relationship. She sought an adjustment under the principle in Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 where it was held that family violence, which is demonstrated to have a significant adverse impact upon one party’s contributions to a marriage, is a relevant consideration to the assessment of contributions within section 79. According to the Court in Kennon, it is necessary to adduce evidence to prove the incidence and effect of domestic violence, and to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the parties’ capacity to ‘contribute’ under section 79(4) ([37]). The Court in Kennon also stated that family violence will be relevant if the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party ([36]).
However, at [33] the Full Court held –
‘The fact that the wife gave evidence of family violence during periods when the parties were separated and after they separated for the last time ought not to have minimised the significance of her evidence of that which occurred during the relationship.’
The Court went on to state that Kennon should not be interpreted as laying down a precise rule that ‘post-separation family violence to a spouse who seeks to continue to contribute to the welfare of the family as a parent is irrelevant’. The reference to ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi & Spagnardi [2003] FamCA 905 appeared ‘to elevate the need for an evidentiary nexus or ‘discernible impact’ between the conduct complained of and its effect on the party’s ability to make relevant contributions, requiring expert or actuarial evidence of the effect of the violence.’ Their Honours stated that perhaps the use of the word ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi was ‘infelicitous’ when in truth, the Court ‘was merely reinforcing the need for there to be an evidentiary nexus between the conduct complained of and the capacity (and or effort expended) to make relevant contributions’ ([39]). Their Honours also affirmed the well-settled view that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted ([42]).
The Court could not conclusively determine whether the primary judge’s decision not to make a ‘Kennon’ type adjustment was wrong due to the absence of a transcript ([43]). While Kennon appears to remain sound law, its considerations apply to ‘a relatively narrow band of cases’ ([67]).
Atkinson v Atkinson [2017] FamCAFC 266 (13 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Alleged false allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Recovery order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Father’s appeal against interim parenting orders, including a recovery order.
Facts: The mother applied for, and was granted, a recovery order for the return of the child after the father failed to return the child to the mother following fortnightly weekend contact. The father argued that the mother physically abused the child and the mother alleged that the father engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse such as to constitute family violence by persistent allegations that the mother physically abused the child.
Issue: Whether the primary judge erred in failing to appoint a single expert before making a recovery order.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed. Interim orders that the child reside with the mother.
In finding that the primary judge did not err in failing to appoint a single expert before making interim orders including a recovery order after the father retained the child Ryan J noted (Johnston and Thackray JJ agreeing):
[49] …the mother’s application was for a recovery order after the father retained the child. The application demanded a prompt response and in my view an adjournment for in all probability many months would not have been in the best interests of the child.
Ralton and Ralton [2017] FamCAFC 182; (7 September 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Application of domestic and international human rights law under the family law act 1975 (cth)’ – ‘Bias’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘No merit’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Unsuccessful application for stay of proceedings’ – ‘Weight of evidence’
Matter: Mother’s appeal against parenting orders that the children B and C reside with the father, he have sole parental responsibility and the mother have limited supervised contact, to progress to alternate weekends and half the school holidays.
Facts: Earlier orders made in 2010 had provided for the children to reside with the mother and have contact with the father. In 2014 and 2015 the children only spent time with the father intermittently. B, in particular, became reluctant to spend time with the father, and in 2016 twice avoided contact by running away from school. The trial judge found that the children were “at risk of longer-term psychological harm in the mother’s household” and would not have any real relationship with their father if they remained in the mother's care [4]. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (‘ICL’) supported the father’s position.
Grounds: The mother’s grounds of appeal were “difficult to follow and understand” and her submissions “did not seek to explain why the primary judge erred but were rather a lengthy and detailed assertion of wrongdoing by his Honour.
Decision: ICL granted leave to appear. No error established and appeal and applications in an appeal dismissed. Mother to pay the father’s costs of the appeal.
Parental alienation was considered in circumstances where the mother appealed against parenting orders on the basis that orders had been made with insufficient consideration of the alleged family violence of the father and the expert witnesses were biased (the Full Court - Bryant CJ, Strickland & Aldridge JJ).
[187] The primary judge was at pains to avoid the use of labels such as “parental alienation” or “enmeshment”. Speaking of the Associate Professor’s evidence, which included a discussion of these concepts, his Honour said:
The issues that he raises with respect to the concept of alienation as a syndrome are well set out in the literature. However, to become focused upon the academic discussion of alienation and whether or not it is a syndrome – and it seems clear that it is not – becomes more of a distraction than anything in this individual case. What is necessary in this case is a careful analysis of the evidence of the parties, the circumstances confronting these two children in each of the households and the behaviours exhibited in order to ascertain what is going to be in their best interests. (quoting from the primary judgment at [70])
[192] … There is therefore no need for us to consider whether or not the evidence justified a finding of parental alienation or enmeshment or whether or not they are valid concepts.
Saska & Radavich [2016] FamCAFC 179 (1 September 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Definition of family violence in section 4ab’ – ‘Key statutory provisions in the family law act’ – ‘Meaning of ‘family violence’’ – ‘Mother a family member by operation of section 4(1ab)’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Section 61da’ – ‘Whether mother a member of the family of the father within the meaning of section 4ab’
Proceedings: Appeal - parenting orders.
Facts: The trial judge made final parenting orders which included an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child of the mother and the father. In making these orders, the trial judge found that the father’s behaviour towards the mother amounted to ‘family violence’ within the meaning of s 4AB of the Family Law Act. As a result of this family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility for the child in s 61DA of the Act did not apply: s 61DA(1). Further, even if the presumption had applied, the trial judge held that it would still not have been in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility: s 61DA(4). The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in finding that the father’s behaviour towards the mother constituted family violence within the meaning of s 4AB(1) because the mother was not ‘a member of the [father’s] family’ as defined in s 4(1AB). Accordingly, the trial judge erred in finding that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted because the father had not engaged in family violence: s 61DA(2)(b).
•
The trial judge erred in finding in the alternative that the presumption was rebutted because equal shared parental responsibility was not in the best interests of the child: s 61DA(4).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court held that the father’s appeal was always doomed to fail because it rested on a misconceived interpretation of s 4(1AB) of the Act. Relevant to the proceedings, the combined effect of s 4(1AB)(e) and s 4(1AC) was that the child was a member of the father’s and a member of the mother’s family. It was never in issue in the proceedings that the mother resided with the child at the material times, the child being a member of the father’s family. Thus, by operation of subparagraph (h) of s 4(1AB), the mother was a member of the father’s family. Further, within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of s 4(1AB) each of the mother and the father, respectively and alternatively, ‘is or has been a member of the family of a child of [the other]’. Accordingly, the father had engaged in family violence against ‘a member of his family’ (see [17]-[24]).
The father’s contention that the trial judge erred in rebutting the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility because the father had committed family violence was therefore dismissed. As demonstrated above, the contention that there was no family violence in this case because the mother was not a member of the father’s family was based on an erroneous reading of the Act.
Additionally, while the trial judge was correct to apply s 61DA(2) and conclude that the presumption did not apply, it was also well within her discretion to conclude that even if the presumption had applied, it would have been rebutted in the child’s best interests: s 61DA(4).
The father also argued that the mother wasn’t fearful, and so the finding of family violence was erroneous. For this argument to be effective, the words of s 4AB(1) would need to be read conjunctively, not disjunctively, as the section is worded. The family member being ‘fearful’ is one possible manifestation of family violence, but is not necessary to make a finding of family violence.
Salah & Salah [2016] FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100 (17 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Ignoring allegations of family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Treatment of issues of family violence’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: At the contested interim hearing, the mother made allegations of significant family violence perpetrated by the father in the presence of the children. In light of this and one of the children’s epilepsy and developmental delay, she sought an order directing the father’s care of the children to be supervised by another adult. The father disputed the allegations of family violence. In making interim parenting orders, the trial judge said (see [23]-[27]):
‘The evidence lead [sic] as to alleged family violence made by each parent is not capable of sustaining a finding at this interim stage of proceedings. In circumstances of conjecture given no other evidence. The presumption for equal shared [parental] responsibility is still applicable.
[…]
Findings with respect to whether either party perpetrated family violence cannot be made at this interim stage given the conflicted evidence. The civil standard of proof is met by neither.
As such and for the same reasons the need for the father’s time with the children to be either in the “presence of” or “supervised by” another adult is not made out’.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made several errors of principle in considering the issues of family violence namely, His Honour erred in his consideration of the family violence issues, failed to have regard to s 61DA(3) of the Act and failed to follow the legislative pathway in his determination of the interim issues.
2.
The trial judge failed to take into account relevant facts.
3.
The trial judge failed to give adequate reasons for his determination.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. The Court noted at [36] that, ‘[i]t is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial’.They continued at [39]-[40]:
‘In SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, the majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) said:
…Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
The trial judge here faced just that challenge. His Honour, when confronted with significant allegations of violence was required to do more than merely note the contention (or “conjecture”) and not to “simply ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue” (see SS v AH)’.
The Court held that while the trial judge was correct in stating that, at that point, he could not make findings on the disputed allegations, he erred by ignoring the allegations of family violence and finding that the presumption of equal shared responsibility applied. His Honour further erred in his treatment of the allegations of family violence by suggesting with that comment ‘given no other evidence’ that the mother’s allegations required corroboration or objective support and erred in incorrectly referring to the civil standard of proof (see [41]-[45]). Grounds two and three were also successful for similar reasons (see [60],[65]).
Holsworth & Holsworth [2016] FamCAFC 98 (9 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the trial judge could not make findings on allegations of family violence until the evidence was properly tested at trial’
Proceedings: Appeal of interim procedural orders in relation to parenting proceedings
Facts: The parties reached agreement in November 2010 that the children live with the mother and spend time with the father. Almost a year later the mother was “psychiatrically unwell” and the children began to live with the father and spend time with the mother. After many years of litigation, including the appointment of an ICL, one child had returned to live with the mother and was to spend time with the father. The matter was listed for trial and an updated family report was ordered.
One ground of appeal was that “[t]he trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mother’s evidence of family violence and did not accept the mother’s evidence of it because she had not produced “third party evidence”.
Issues: In the context of apprehended bias, was the trial judge correct in not determining issues of family violence at an interim hearing?
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court found that the mother’s assertions regarding the trial judge’s consideration of the evidence of family violence were “unsupported by the transcript”. In addition, her Honour was correct in not making findings “until such time as the evidence had been tested” – something which would happen at the final hearing of the matter. Despite the grounds purportedly being a challenge to the trial judge’s “failure to recuse herself”, it was apparent to the Full Court that they were really a complaint that the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence, including that of family violence, at the interim stage of proceedings.
The appeal was dismissed.
Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71 (5 May 2015) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Family reports’ – ‘Findings of fact in relation to allegations of family violence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weight on the expert evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and property orders
Facts: There is one child of the marriage. The parties married in 2002 and separated in late 2008/ early 2009, continuing to live under the same roof until November 2009. The mother claimed that up until November 2004 she was the primary carer for the child and the father worked. In November 2004 the mother went back to work and the father became the primary care-giver for the child. The child had health issues which would require visits to the hospital. The father consulted medical practitioners about the child’s weight and would weigh the child after time in the mother’s care. Around “September 2009 the husband arranged for ongoing surveillance of the wife”. In October the mother became aware of the surveillance and asserted stress and digestive issues as a result. This also affected the child. A consultant psychiatrist provided a Family Report to the Court on 9 January 2011. This report included discussion of risk associated with physical violence during the marriage in addition to the conflict and hostility between the parties in association with the child’s medical issues. It also included risk to the child in regards to the father’s obsession with “health and welfare”.
Issues: Whether the judge erred in attributing significant weight to the family report.
Whether the judge should have made a finding in relation to family violence.
Reasoning/Decision: Despite the father having opportunity to cross-examine the report writer at trial, and opportunity to raise his concerns about the report with the writer, and opportunity for the father to submit to the judge that the report be given little weight, no such cross-examination was forthcoming at trial, and no like submission was made to the trial judge. It was determined that not only was the judge entitled to rely on the expert report as he did, the father was not entitled to make his complaint about its handling to the appeal court.
In the “background facts” of the judgment the trial judge discussed allegations of family violence made by the mother but made no finding that the violence, as alleged, had occurred. The trial judge was not in error by not making findings – “A court need only determine those facts that are necessary for the determination of the issues between the parties”.
Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, Magistrate Coates made interim parenting orders. The father unsuccessfully appealed against those interim orders (see Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011)).
Subsequently, final orders were made providing that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time for two hours per fortnight with the father. The order for supervised time was for an indefinite duration (see Slater & Light [2011] FMCAfam 1021 (22 September 2011 ) ([1]).
Magistrate Coates’ orders turned on a finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of emotional harm to the children ([2]). The emotional harm was said to take the form of imposing on the children negative views of their mother, alienating the children from their mother and a chaotic regime for the children ([22]).
Issues: Whether Magistrate Coates erred in:
•
finding that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children; and
•
ordering supervised time of an indefinite duration ([2], [29]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially allowed. The Court held that the Magistrate did not err in finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children ([69]). This conclusion was open on the psychiatric reports
However, the Court found that the Magistrate erred in ordering an indefinite supervision order, when this was not requested by either the mother or the Independent Children’s Lawyer ([69]-[70]).
The issue of the time and the circumstances in which the father should spend time with the children be remitted for rehearing by a Federal Magistrate other than Federal Magistrate Coates (see Order 3).
McGregor v McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507; [2012] FamCAFC 69 (28 May 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Failure to properly admit academic opinions as evidence’ – ‘Information sharing’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Parties unaware of use of material’ – ‘Reliance upon academic literature as basis for orders’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders and property orders.
Facts: Prior to the trial, the three children of the relationship lived with the father. In parenting and property proceedings, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the father had been physically and verbally aggressive to the mother and that the father had alienated the children from the mother. The Federal Magistrate accordingly made orders for the children to live with their mother. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Magistrate referred extensively to external literature. The father appealed against this decision.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to accord the husband natural justice/procedural fairness because the husband was not given the opportunity to cross-examine, respond to or introduce contrary evidence in relation to a number of academic opinions relied upon by the magistrate in reaching his decision.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was upheld and the matter remitted for hearing. The Full Court held that the Federal Magistrate placed considerable reliance on the academic literature on the topic of alienation of children. None of it was introduced into evidence as opinion evidence, and accordingly no consideration was made by the Federal Magistrate as to whether to exclude the evidence and, if not, to consider what weight to give it. Accordingly, none of this evidence was able to be tested by the father nor was it the subject of submissions or contrary evidence. There was therefore a failure to afford the father natural justice and procedural fairness (see [118]-[121]).
Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18 (10 February 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Where the court was not persuaded that the learned federal magistrate erred in his approach to the wife's claim for a 'kennon type adjustment'’ – ‘Where undisturbed findings of fact made by the learned federal magistrate amply supported the conclusion he reached in relation to this issue’ – ‘Whether the learned federal magistrate impermissibly relied upon extrinsic material and failed to accord the parties procedural fairness’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and property orders.
Facts: The parties had twins. Serious incidents of family violence occurred during their relationship and after separation. At the hearing of the trial, the father was in prison having been convicted of aggravated assault on the mother. Mother granted sole parental responsibility and the children to live with her. The father was to have supervised time (these orders were interim). Property – 25% adjustment re Kennon.
Issues: In making findings regarding family violence and its effect on the mother and children, did his Honour impermissibly take account of extraneous material? Did his Honour err in making a “Kennon type adjustment”?
Decision/Reasoning: The Court held that despite including reference to the mother’s conduct in the courtroom when faced with the father and the discussion about a report, the passages of which were included and relied upon in Re: L (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334, a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division). They were on the public record and so “materially different from matters appearing in reports” which have not yet undergone judicial consideration. While this alone does not guarantee that procedural fairness is achieved in circumstances where the parties were not on notice about the report and did not have opportunity to cross-examine accordingly, the Full Court held that “anything said in Re: L was not necessary to establish the relevance of the findings” made by the Federal Magistrate.
Regarding the property settlement and the “Kennon type adjustment”, the Full Court found that while it represented the “top of the range” it did not “exceed the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion”. Regarding the violence that was perpetrated post-separation, the Full Court held it was correctly included by the Federal Magistrate and was a relevant consideration in determining whether the mother’s contributions as a whole were more arduous.
Wolfe & Director-General, Department of Human Services [2011] FamCAFC 42 (4 March 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’
Matter: Hague Convention return order appeal.
Facts: The mother unsuccessfully opposed the father’s application for return of the children to New Zealand. There were ongoing parenting proceedings between the mother and father in New Zealand, where the mother conceded the children had been habitually resident for their whole lives. The current New Zealand orders (made following a hearing in which the mother alleged the father had abused the children and been violent towards her) provided that the children reside with the mother and have one and a half hours contact with the father each weekend. The mother’s new partner was violent towards her and the children were exposed to that violence. The mother fled New Zealand and returned to her native Australia after leaving her new partner. She gave evidence that the children were fearful to return to New Zealand due to concerns about her new partner.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Bryant CJ, Finn and May JJ noted the first instance judge’s comments with approval:
“[i]n part, she relied on her own refusal to establish that a return of the children would place them in an intolerable situation”. Her Honour disposed of this aspect of the mother’s case by saying, correctly, in our view, that “[i]t is well established that, ordinarily, the objects of the Convention should not be frustrated by a parent’s refusal to return with children to their country of habitual residence”. [32]
Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Psychiatric report’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, the Federal Magistrates Court made interim parenting orders. The effect of these orders was to allocate parental responsibility for the children solely to the mother, require the children to live with the mother and require the children to spend weekly supervised time with the father at a contact centre. The orders were made pending the preparation of a psychiatric report on the risk the father presented to the children. These orders radically altered previous arrangements, as the Federal Magistrate was concerned about the need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm that would arise from them being exposed or subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children (a) for the father’s time to be supervised and (b) to significantly reduce the time they spent with the father.
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate had erred by allocating parental responsibility solely to the respondent.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the first ground of appeal, the Court held, amongst other findings, that if evidence of abuse or family violence is adduced at trial, the Court is obliged to deal with it. The Court must always critically assess the evidence placed before it in determining the issue (see [46]). It was also noted that a finding of family violence may be made in the absence of a Form 4 Notice.
The Court held that it was clearly open on the evidence for the Federal Magistrate to find that family violence had been perpetrated by the appellant.
In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellant contended that the Federal Magistrate relied upon erroneous finding of family violence to then improperly find that the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. The Court dismissed this argument by again noting that the finding of family violence was open to the Federal Magistrate (see [64]-[69]).
Note: final orders were subsequently made, but the finding of family violence was not affected (see Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013)).
Vasser & Taylor-Black [2010] FamCAFC 36 (11 March 2010) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Re F: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother from parenting orders that challenged part of the process followed and some of the rulings made during the conduct of the trial. On the final day of the hearing, the self-represented mother sought to tender a 52 page document in response to the report of an expert witness.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that trial judge failed to provide the mother with procedural fairness in not ascertaining the reason behind the preparation of this document and in not advising her that she may wish to seek legal advice before tendering the particular document, contrary to the litigants in person guidelines: Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed as the mother here was not the victim of unfairness. Although this appeal did not relate to family violence, the Court relevantly observed that the Litigant in Person Guidelines were no more than guidelines.
See Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Amador & Amador (2009) 43 Fam LR 268; [2009] 43 FamCAFC 196 (3 November 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Determining allegations in relation to family violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Requirement of corroboration’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties met online and were married in Belgrade. Their child, who had autism, was born in Belgrade. The mother and the son came to live in Australia with the father when the child was 20 months old. The parties subsequently separated, with the mother alleging that the father had perpetrated domestic violence and sexual assault against her. The father denied these allegations. In 2008, a Federal Magistrate made orders granting the mother sole parental responsibility for the child. The mother was also permitted to relocate to Serbia with the child and the father’s contact time with the child was reduced from weekly to possible annual contact. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Federal Magistrate erred in accepting the mother’s uncorroborated evidence that domestic violence and sexual assault was perpetrated by the father on the mother.
Reasoning/Decision: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. In dismissing this ground of appeal, the Court held that a positive finding may be made on the evidence of the victim without corroborating evidence. See [79].
The Court expressed concern at the manner in which the Federal Magistrate had expressed a finding of insufficient evidence re family violence. They were concerned that the Federal Magistrate had felt in some way constrained by law in being able to make a positive determination in relation to allegations of violence even if the evidence had satisfied her on the requisite standard that the violence occurred as alleged. See [95]-[96].
Oakley & Cooper [2009] FamCAFC 133 (30 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Full court referred to, and discussed, the best practice principles for use in parenting disputes when family violence or abuse is alleged’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Whether the federal magistrate erred by giving insufficient weight to issues of family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders
Facts: The parties were together for approximately 7 years, separating in March 2006 – there were 2 children of the relationship. The mother had 6 children from previous relationships. The Federal Magistrate described their relationship as “extremely volatile”, ending in an incident of domestic violence. The Federal Magistrate made findings inter alia: that the parties were unable to effectively communicate with each other due to them being “aggressive, provocative … show[ing] a lack of maturity and complete absence of child focus”; that the mother used physical discipline on the children; and that on at least one occasion the mother’s behaviour at changeover was “appalling and did severely distress the children”. The family report included the opinion that the children “have positive attachments to both parents, but experience some trauma associated with the continuing conflict in their parents’ relationship”. Despite the conflict between them, the parties agreed to an order for equal shared parental responsibility. As such, the Federal Magistrate was obliged to consider equal time, or significant and substantial time with each parent. Orders were made that the children live with the mother 9 nights a fortnight and with the father for 5. The father appealed these orders.
Issues: Did the Federal Magistrate give appropriate consideration to the evidence and findings of family violence when making the parenting orders that he did?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court referred to the 2009 publication “Best Practice Principles for use in Parenting Disputes when Family Violence or Abuse is Alleged”, specifically Section F of the 2009 principles which sets out considerations where children are ordered to spend time with a parent where positive findings of family violence have been made against that parent.
The Full Court found that while they agreed with the argument of the mother’s counsel, that the discussion of weight in relation to family violence had been “clipped” they found that there was no appealable error established. The Federal Magistrate had evidence of both parties and their associates hitting the children, and that both parties were verbally and physically abusive of one another in the presence of the children. Despite acknowledging that the mother’s behaviour was, at times, worse than the father's, when taken in the context of the best interests of the children, the conclusion was that it was in their best interests to remain predominantly in the care of their mother.
M & L (2007) FLC 93-320; (2007) 37 Fam LR 317; [2007] FamCA 396 (4 May 2007) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of cultural evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: Both parents were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, and lived in the NT, one close to Darwin, one quite remote. There was family violence where the father would physically and verbally abuse the mother. On one occasion the paternal grandfather punched the father for hitting the mother. The mother had been the primary care giver of the children. At trial evidence was led about the communities in which each parent lived. The trial judge found that the children would have a greater connection to their father’s culture by living with him.
Issues: Whether the trial judge had adequately considered the evidence of family violence and its potential effects on the children.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court held that there was inadequate consideration of the risk to the children given the father’s history of violence and alcohol consumption. The lack of consideration of the evidence that the children had been primarily cared for by the mother, and that there was no evidence that her care was lacking was overlooked, was also an error. A finding was made by the trial judge that the mother’s parenting was reliant on others in the community, referring to it as “collectivist”. He based his finding on an anthropological report quoted in another judgment. There was no anthropological evidence that the mother’s community engaged in such “collective” parenting, and that the mother was not, herself, the children’s primary care-giver. The trial judge’s finding that the best interests of the children would be met by them living with their father cannot be sustained when evidence of the mother’s adequate care, the fact she was the primary care giver and the father’s violence towards the mother, is balanced against the finding of the cultural benefits to the children of living in the father’s community.
Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303; (2006) 36 Fam LR 395; [2006] FamCA 1316 (5 December 2006) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence and contact orders.
Facts: The proceedings involved competing applications for residence and contact to the child of the parties. The mother made allegations that the father sexually abused the child. While no finding of abuse was made, the Trial Judge did make a finding of unacceptable risk. On appeal, the father challenged the orders made for contact, in particular, the requirement that the contact be supervised.
Issue/s: The trial judge provided inadequate reasons supporting his finding of unacceptable risk of abuse.
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, the Court made observations relevant to the assessment of unacceptable risk. Bryant CJ and Kay J held at [84] that:
‘There remained an obligation on the trial judge to not only evaluate the harm that might befall the child if there is a future act of abuse, but to also evaluate the prospect of such an act occurring. This is not a search for a solution that will eliminate any prospect of serious harm. It is a search to balance the harm that will follow if the risk is not minimised and the harm that will follow if a normal healthy relationship between parent and child is not allowed to prosper’.
S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions must be affected by the violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on past contributions’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Reference to exceptional cases should not mean rare’
Appeal type: Appeal against property orders.
Facts: The parties had two adult children and separated in 2000. The trial judge made a Kennon style adjustment in favour of the wife. His Honour held that the evidence clearly revealed that there had been some violent behaviour by the husband towards the wife. Although there was no explicit evidence from the wife as regards to the effect of the violence on her contributions, the trial judge accepted that the wife’s contributions must have been made significantly more arduous than they ought to have been because of the violence inflicted upon her by the husband.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in adjusting the wife’s contributions to account for the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. Here, the evidence could not have properly led to a Kennon adjustment under section 79 (see [48]). In reaching this decision, the Court made a number of statements of principle, elaborating upon the decision in Kennon.
It was held that evidence of violence alone is not enough, but that the “violent conduct by one party towards the other” must be demonstrated to have an effect on contributions.
In addition, the Court also stated that the reference in Kennon to ‘exceptional’ cases should not be understood to mean rare. They adopted the trial judge’s comments that ‘the references to ‘exceptional cases’ and ‘narrow band of cases’ occurs in the context of the principle of misconduct in general rather than the more narrow formulation about domestic violence. … It seems to me that reading these passages carefully, the key words in a case where there are allegations of domestic violence are ‘significant adverse impact’ and ‘discernible impact’. (see [47]).
B & B [2003] FamCA 274 (8 April 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Failure to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Kennon not an award for damages’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Property orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders and division of property.
Facts: The parties had two children together. At trial, the mother made extensive allegations of physical, verbal and emotional abuse against the father, much of which the father conceded (see [38]). The trial judge made an order that the children should predominately be in the care of their father. Additionally, the trial judge rejected the wife’s submission that the division of property ought to be adjusted to 60/40 from 70/30 division on the basis of the decision in Kennon.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were –
•
Did the trial judge err in failing to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour?
•
Did the trial judge err in attributing responsibility for the domestic violence that occurred during the marriage to the wife?
•
Did the trial judge err in his application of the Kennon principle.
Reasoning/Decision:
The Court held that the trial judge was ‘obliged to adjudicate the violence issue as raised by the wife and to make specific findings in respect of the course of conduct conducted by the husband in the course of the marriage so that he could properly assess relevant aspects of the behaviour of each of the parents in determining in whose care he should place the children’. However, from reading His Honour’s reasons for judgment, it was not clear that he considered and evaluated the relevant evidence and took all the relevant factors into account. The issues raised by the wife in the grounds of appeal could not be described as ‘pernickety or overly critical’ (AMS v AIF) when matters of such significant serious and prolonged violence were clearly raised and left virtually undiscussed in the judgment (see [32]-[53]).
Secondly, the Full Court found that, the trial judge did not attribute responsibility for the domestic violence to the wife: while the trial judge found the wife to have engaged in passive/aggressive conduct, His Honour indicated in the clearest terms that he was not condoning the husband’s conduct in response to such behaviour(see [54]-[57]).
Thirdly, the Full Court held that the application of the principles in Kennonis “not the equivalent of an award for damages”, but used to determine whether the husband’s conduct had the effect of making the wife’s contributions more arduous.
T & S (2001) FLC 93-086; [2001] FamCA 1147 (29 October 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Effect of family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Re f: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother against orders made by the trial judge in relation to the residence, contact and other specific issues relating to the child of the parties’ relationship. The effect of the trial judge’s order was that the father was to have residence of the child and be responsible for the child’s day to day care, welfare and development; and that the mother was to have specified contact with the child. The mother was unrepresented for five days of the six day hearing. A claim by the mother of domestic violence at the hands of the father was raised but the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence. The trial judge instead made a number of adverse findings against the mother.
Issue/s: A major ground of appeal advanced on the Mother's behalf was that she did not receive a fair trial and that a new trial should be ordered. The gravamen of the Mother's case was that because she was a victim of domestic violence who was unrepresented at trial, she was unable to effectively meet the case of the Father and present her own case. As a consequence, and because the Mother suffered from a personality disorder, the trial judge made negative findings against her, and in particular against her credibility.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed on the basis of further evidence tendered on appeal which contained detailed evidence of ongoing domestic violence by the husband, and reports from a psychologist and social worker providing evidence as to the effect of the domestic violence on the mother’s ability to conduct her case at trial. The Court held that if the evidence had been tendered before the trial judge, it would have produced a different result and the best interests of the child required a re-hearing.
B & K [2001] FamCA 880 (14 August 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence orders and property settlement.
Facts: The parties had two children. The trial judge made an order for shared residency of the children. The trial judge accepted evidence that the husband had anally raped the wife.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge give sufficient weight to the family violence the husband had inflicted on the wife and the subsequent effect or impact on her of that violence in making residence orders?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. At [32] the Court noted the authorities referred to by counsel for the wife in support of the argument that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the effect of the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband against the wife: JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515, Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580, Blanch v Blanch & Crawford [1998] FamCA 1908; (1999) FLC 92-837, and Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692.
The Full Court determined that consideration of the family violence and its effect upon the wife was adequate and orders for fortnight-about care of the children was within the trial judge’s discretion.
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact orders’ – ‘Guidelines for matters involving self-represented litigants’ – ‘Parenting orders and effect on children’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and contact orders.
Facts: While not a case specifically dealing with family violence, there is a large proportion of self-represented litigants in family law proceedings and as such the guidelines set out in this case pertain.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge contravene the guidelines in respect of the litigants in person set out by the Court in Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764?
Reasoning/Decision:
The Full Court provided guidelines as follows (taking a number from Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764):
1.
A judge should ensure as far as is possible that procedural fairness is afforded to all parties whether represented or appearing in person in order to ensure a fair trial;
2.
A judge should inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to proceed, the order of calling witnesses and the right which he or she has to cross examine the witnesses;
3.
A judge should explain to the litigant in person any procedures relevant to the litigation;
4.
A judge should generally assist the litigant in person by taking basic information from witnesses called, such as name, address and occupation;
5.
If a change in the normal procedure is requested by the other parties such as the calling of witnesses out of turn the judge may, if he/she considers that there is any serious possibility of such a change causing any injustice to a litigant in person, explain to the unrepresented party the effect and perhaps the undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and his or her right to object to that course;
6.
A judge may provide general advice to a litigant in person that he or she has the right to object to inadmissible evidence, and to inquire whether he or she so objects. A judge is not obliged to provide advice on each occasion that particular questions or documents arise;
7.
If a question is asked, or evidence is sought to be tendered in respect of which the litigant in person has a possible claim of privilege, to inform the litigant of his or her rights;
8.
A judge should attempt to clarify the substance of the submissions of the litigant in person, especially in cases where, because of garrulous or misconceived advocacy, the substantive issues are either ignored, given little attention or obfuscated. (Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150);
9.
Where the interests of justice and the circumstances of the case require it, a judge may:
◦
draw attention to the law applied by the Court in determining issues before it;
◦
question witnesses;
◦
identify applications or submissions which ought to be put to the Court;
◦
suggest procedural steps that may be taken by a party;
◦
clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person or the bases for such orders.
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and there may well be other interventions that a judge may properly make without giving rise to an apprehension of bias.
In the Marriage of Blanch; Blanch v Blanch and Crawford (1999) FLC 92-837; (1998) 24 Fam LR 325; [1998] FamCA 1908 (27 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Erroneous findings of fact’ – ‘Incorrect attribution of fault to the victim’ – ‘Perpetrator responsibility’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The parties were married but separated after seven years. There were two children of the marriage. The wife made allegations of domestic violence against the father; these were denied by the father. The trial judge found at [325] that both parties were responsible for violence in the relationship, and that the relevance of family violence in custody proceedings was to be indicative of a risk ‘to … children in later years that … could cause them harm’. The wife brought an appeal against orders made by the trial judge that the children of the relationship reside with their father.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial judge erred in his findings regarding domestic violence?
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Counsel for the wife submitted that the trial judge addressed the questions of the husband’s domestic violence ‘in almost a passing manner’, despite the presence of overwhelming evidence from the wife that she was the victim of consistent and frequent violence and abuse. It was held that “in cases such as this, where a case of sustained and severe domestic violence by one party is advanced by the other, the court is obliged to give a clear indication whether it accepts or rejects that case and, in any event, to explain why it has reached that conclusion” (see [333]).
In addition it was held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the responsibility for violence between the parties was fairly evenly shared was not available on the evidence.
Other aspects of His Honour’s treatment of domestic violence were also in issue. First, His Honour’s perception of the relevance of violence to the overall welfare of the children was inadequate. The trial judge failed to consider the significant risk of such violence to the children’s emotional development such as “insecurity, fear, unhappiness, anxiety and hyper vigilance”: Patsalou and Patsalou [1994] FamCA 118 and JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 (see [334]). Second, Lindenmayer J also strongly disapproved of the trial judge’s finding that the husband’s violence towards the wife was a product of the marital relationship rather than of the husband’s personality.
Re: Cassandra Kathleen Kennon (Appellant/Wife) and Ian William Kennon (Cross-Appellant/Husband) Appeal (1997) FLC 92-757; [1997] FamCA 27 (10 June 1997) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Relevance of domestic violence’ – ‘Section 79’ – ‘Significantly more arduous’
Proceedings: Property settlement.
Facts: The parties cohabited for approximately five years before separating. The husband was very wealthy and the wife had far more modest means. The property pool was nearly $9 million. There were no children of the marriage. In 1994, the wife filed a property application under s 79 of the Family Law Act. The husband filed a cross application. The wife subsequently filed an amended application which included a claim under the cross-vesting legislation that the husband pay her damages for assault and battery. The husband denied the allegations of assault and restated his position regarding the property claim. The trial judge accepted that a number of assaults had occurred and awarded damages, but found that the husband's conduct had not affected the wife's contributions to allow an adjustment in relation to s 79(4).
Issue/s: The wife did not challenge the trial judge’s finding that the husband's conduct had not affected her contributions. Consequently, the Full Court's comments on the relevance of domestic violence in claims under s79 of the Family Law Act were made in obiter.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed but the Full Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevance of violence in s79 property adjustments. The Full Court said that earlier authorities on s 79 precluding evidence of domestic violence were no longer binding, acknowledging that the ‘pervasiveness and destructiveness of domestic violence’ was now better recognized by the Australian community and courts.
The Full Court cautioned that s 79 of the Act is not a source of ‘social engineering’ or to be used as ‘a means of evening up’ the financial positions of the parties. They held:
‘Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of "negative contributions" which is sometimes referred to in this discussion’.
The Court also referred to this principle as including ‘exceptional cases’ and noted, ‘[i]t is essential to bear in mind the relatively narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party’.
(See also subsequent interpretation in S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003), Baranski & Baranski & Anor [2010] FMCAfam 918 (1 September 2010) and Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012).)
Re Andrew (1996) FLC 92-692; [1996] FamCA 43 (23 May 1996) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Fear of violence’ – ‘Supervised access order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Proceedings: Appeal against supervised access orders.
Facts: The parties separated. Satisfactory access arrangements were in place for 3.5 years. However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and the husband assaulted the wife. The wife held a genuine belief that the husband had tried to kill her and the child on this occasion and subsequently denied the husband access to the child. The husband filed an application for unsupervised access.
The trial judge found that each parent alone could provide adequately for the needs of the child. However, the wife’s fears had become even more entrenched over time and these fears were a major impediment to access, because they were genuine even if they may not be founded in fact. Her capacity to provide care to the child would be impaired and cause detriment to the child if the husband was given unsupervised access. The trial judge made orders for supervised access.
Issue/s: The trial judge gave too much weight to the mother’s attitude and not enough weight to the benefits to the child of unsupervised contact with the father.
Reasoning/decision: The Full Court dismissed the appeal. After citing extensively from past authorities, it was concluded that the finding that the wife’s genuine fear of the husband would significantly affect her ability to provide adequately for the needs of the child as custodial parent despite the benefits to the child from contact with the father was open to the trial judge.
In the Matter Of: N Appellant/Wife and S Respondent/Husband and the Separate Representative [1995] FamCA 139 (20 December 1995); (1996) FLC 92-655; (1995) 19 Fam LR 837. – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Assessment of unacceptable risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Not a family violence case, but it discusses principles in determining unacceptable risk in the context of sexual abuse allegations. In custody proceedings, the mother alleged that the father sexually abused their child and sought to have access by the husband to the child prevented. The trial judge was not satisfied on the civil standard of proof that the sexual abuse had occurred. However, he did not conclude that the abuse certainly did not happen. The mother was steadfast in her belief that the child had been abused by the father. The trial judge did not find the father unfit to have custody or access to the child by reason of sexual abuse or unacceptable risk of abuse, however, mitigated against the concerns and effect on the mother by making interim supervised contact orders.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the father was not an unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Full Court held that the trial judge should not have made interim custody orders and failed to take into consideration the effect this would have not only on the child but also on the mother’s ability and capability to parent effectively. However, as the interim custody order was not challenged the Full Court did not set it aside. As regards to no finding of unacceptable risk, on the evidence, this was open to the trial judge.
Patsalou and Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580; [1994] FamCA 118 (27 October 1994) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Custody proceeding’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Independent research by judge’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Social science research’
Appeal type: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Allegations of family violence were made in custody proceedings. The trial judge accepted the wife’s evidence that prior to separation the husband had been hitting her on a regular basis, in front of the children on a number of occasions. Her Honour stated that the denigration of one parent by the other and the perpetuation of violence by that parent against the other is of importance when assessing where the interests of the children lie and what future arrangements might best advance their welfare. Her Honour also noted a number of articles on the effect upon children of inter-spousal violence including that such effects may be profound and long-lasting. The trial judge concluded that the children’s welfare would be best promoted by remaining in the custody of the wife.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
•
Whether the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the violence and denigration by the husband of the wife was inappropriate and contrary to law.
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Whether the trial judge erred in referring to the body of research as the articles cited did not constitute evidence before her and the parties were not invited to make submissions with respect to them.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court upheld the trial Judge's finding that allegations of domestic violence were relevant to custody proceedings and found that the reference by the trial judge to published social science literature about the impact of family violence on children was permissible as the published research was referred to as background information rather than evidence.
Evidence of family violence was held to be relevant in custody matters, to the extent that it assisted the court to determine what is in the best interests of the children, as its impact could be ‘profound and long-lasting’. The Full Court approved the comments by the trial judge that denigration and assault cause ‘considerable unnecessary strain’ to the victim and ‘may erode the confidence, dignity and self-esteem of the children’s other parent’. Baker, Kay and Tolcon JJ agreed with the trial judge that such conduct modelled inappropriate behaviour for children and could ‘impinge upon the quality of parenting able to be offered to the children’ and ‘reflects poorly upon the assailant’s capacity to provide children with a positive role model for their own behaviour and methods of resolving disputes and dealing with tensions and stress’.
Between: R Appellant/Husband and C Respondent/Wife [1993] FamCA 62 (25 June 1993); Russell & Close (Unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Fogarty, Baker & Lindenmayer JJ, 25 June 1993) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Meaningful relationship’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separate representative/independent children’s representative’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Appeal type: Appeal against access orders.
Facts: Post separation, an access arrangement for the two children of the relationship was established. The relationship between the parties deteriorated and the mother refused to allow the husband access to the children. One child was found to have been sexually abused, but it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. The mother believed that the father was the perpetrator, however the trial judge was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial judge made orders giving the father unsupervised daytime access to the children to reduce the risk of the mother from making unfounded allegations in the future. The father appealed against these orders. The mother did not challenge the orders, but cross-appealed in relation to findings of fact made by the trial judge.
Issue/s:
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Whether it was open to the trial judge to make orders giving the husband unsupervised daytime access, where the court was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part. Amendments were made to the trial judge’s orders, clarifying the father’s access period and altering the proposed changeover location. The mother’s appeal against factual findings made by the trial judge and the father’s appeal against daytime access were dismissed.
The Full Court found that the relevant considerations when making access orders in cases involving sexual abuse of children were whether sexual abuse had occurred, whether the perpetrator could be identified, the potential risk of harm to the child from sexual abuse, the potential benefit to the child from parental access and the impact of the custodial parent’s beliefs on the welfare of the children. The Full Court said that the custodial parent’s beliefs regarding the child’s exposure to harm are relevant to the extent that they are likely to adversely affect that parent’s parenting ability and that a subjective test is used to assess the custodial parent’s beliefs.
The Full Court was satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to draw inferences regarding the likely future conduct of the mother. As the trial judge had found the mother genuinely believed the child had been sexually abused, that it was highly likely the mother would make further allegations of sexual abuse against the father if unsupervised overnight access was granted and that this risk did not apply to unsupervised daytime access, it was at the trial judge’s discretion to give the husband unsupervised daytime access.