Commonwealth
High Court of Australia
Director of Public Prosecutions v Benjamin Roder (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15 (17 April 2024) – High Court of Australia
‘ Jury directions ’ – ‘ tendency evidence ’ – ‘ standard of proof ’ – ‘ whether tendency evidence needed to be proved beyond reasonable doubt ’ – ‘ risk of applying a less rigorous standard of proof ’ – ‘ Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ’ – ‘ sequential approach ’ – ‘ sexual abuse ’
Proceedings: Application for special leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s judgment regarding a direction proposed to be given by the trial judge.
Charges: The respondent was charged with 27 sexual offences committed against two children of his former domestic partner.
Facts: Prior to the accused’s trial, the applicant served a notice on the respondent stating an intention to adduce evidence that the respondent had a tendency to have a particular state of mind and to act in a particular way, both of which were said to be relevant to the alleged offences [4]. The alleged tendencies were all related to the respondent’s sexual interest in the children and his engagement in sexual activity with them [4].
The tendency notice included a table specifying 33 pieces of evidence that were said to support the alleged tendency. Six of the entries concerned alleged incidents that were not the subject of any charges (uncharged acts). The other 27 entries corresponded with an incident that was the subject of the charges on the indictment (charged acts) [5].
In response to the tendency notice, the respondent applied to the trial judge for a ruling about the form of the direction to be given to the jury about the standard of proof to be applied when addressing the evidence of the charged acts for the purpose of determining whether the alleged tendency was established [6]. The trial judge ruled that the jury would be directed that in order to use the charged acts for tendency purposes, they must find that conduct to be proved beyond reasonable doubt [7]. His Honour also ruled that the jury should approach the evidence of the 27 charges sequentially – e.g., if established beyond reasonable doubt, the first charge could be used as tendency evidence in respect of the second charge and so on [7].
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal [8]. The Court of Appeal found that to direct the jury that they need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of any charged act in order to use it for tendency purposes, whilst also directing that they could not find the respondent guilty of any particular charge unless satisfied that the elements of that charge (including the particular charged act) had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, would be "confusing" and invite the jury to "indulge" in "impermissible circular reasoning" and "apply a less rigorous standard of proof to the charges" than beyond reasonable doubt [9]. The Court added that it was not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury "sequentially", provided it was made clear that the charged conduct could not be used for tendency purposes unless it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt [9]. The applicant sought special leave to appeal this decision to the High Court.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant relied on two proposed grounds of appeal [11]:
•
The direction proposed by the trial judge was precluded by s 61 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (Act) (i.e., the trial judge was precluded from directing the jury that they needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of any charged act in order to use it for tendency purposes).
•
Even if the Act did not preclude such a direction, it would be erroneous for the trial judge to give the proposed direction.
Decision and reasoning: Special leave to appeal was granted and both grounds of appeal were upheld.
Ground 1: The High Court observed that section 61 of the Act provides that, subject to an enactment otherwise providing, “the only matters that the trial judge may direct the jury must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are… (a) the elements of the offence charged or an alternative offence; and (b) the absence of any relevant defence” [14]. Section 62 of the Act abolished any common law rule requiring a trial judge to direct the jury that any matter other than those referred to in section 61 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt [14].
The High Court noted that in concluding that the direction proposed by the trial judge was not precluded by s 61, the Court of Appeal had reasoned that the tendency evidence was evidence of the elements of the offence charged, and therefore it had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt [18]. The High Court stated that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning elided the difference between “the elements of the offence” and the evidence that supports the proof of such elements [19]. Only the former requires proof beyond reasonable doubt [19]. It followed that the first ground of the appeal was upheld [20].
Ground 2: The High Court noted that, per Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, a tendency is an “intermediate fact” that the prosecution seeks to establish and rely on as circumstantial proof of the elements of the offence [24]. Unless the tendency is an “intermediate fact” which is “indispensable” to proof of guilt, it need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt [24]. The High Court acknowledged the Court of Appeal’s concern that the jury would be directed in terms that first invited them to apply a lesser standard in finding whether the charged acts took place for the purposes of determining whether the alleged tendency was established, and then instructed them to determine whether each charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt [25]. In the Court of Appeal’s view, this would risk the jury engaging in “circular reasoning” and “applying a less rigorous standard of proof to the charges on the indictment” [25]. The High Court observed that this concern had been addressed and resolved in recent decisions of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, and cited JS v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 145 in support [26]. The High Court affirmed the statement in JS v The Queen that the differing standards of proof did not involve circular or incoherent reasoning. They simply meant that the jury may consider the same evidence “at different stages of its deliberations with a different onus of proof and for a different purpose” [27].
The High Court concluded that, even leaving aside the Act (subject of ground 1), the trial judge erred in ruling that the jury should be directed that, to use the evidence of the charged acts for tendency purposes, the jury must find those charged acts proved beyond reasonable doubt [31]. The High Court took issue with the sequential approach proposed by the trial judge. It stated that while a trial judge in Victoria may direct a jury on the order in which they must or may consider multiple offences, that power cannot be invoked to limit the jury’s consideration of evidence that is conceded to be relevant to (and substantially probative of) the facts in issue in relation to each charge [31]. The sequential approach had this effect, and therefore was improper. Further, the sequential approach might result in verdicts being dependent on the order in which the jury approached the charges [31]. The second ground of appeal was accordingly upheld.
Finally, the High Court addressed the respondent’s new and alternative argument, that had not been raised before the trial judge or the Court of Appeal [32]. The respondent contended that the jury should be directed that, when considering the respondent’s guilt for each particular charge, they could not use the direct evidence of the corresponding charged act as part of the body of evidence relied upon by the prosecution to support the alleged tendency [32]. The High Court found that to give effect to the respondent’s alternative submission, the trial judge would be required to give the jury a tendency direction at each point in the summing up where a particular charge is being addressed [34]. Directions of this kind would require the jury to repeatedly revisit their own reasoning and conclusions in relation to the existence of the tendency in relation to each successive charge, making their task significantly more complex [34].
Furthermore, the proposed direction misunderstood the nature of tendency evidence, being evidence that on “another occasion or occasions” different to the occasion the subject of a charge, the accused “acted in a particular way”. So described, the direct evidence of a particular charged act would not be admitted as tendency evidence in relation to that same charged act [35]. The proposed direction was accordingly rejected.
The King v Rowan (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 9 (13 March 2024) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Defence of duress’ – ‘ Necessity’ – ‘ Threat’ – ‘ Battered women syndrome’
Charges: Incest x 11; act of indecency x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: Following a trial by jury in June 2021, the female respondent was found guilty of eleven charges of incest and indecency. The victims were the respondent’s daughters. The prosecution case was that the respondent had committed the offences with her partner, the daughter’s father (‘JR’).
The female respondent, who has a mild intellectual disability (IQ of 70), sought to rely on a defence of duress. Evidence of a forensic psychologist opined the respondent’s behaviour to be consistent with battered women syndrome, and evidence of JR’s controlling behaviour and sexually and physically abusive treatment of the respondent. The respondent was financially and socially dependent on JR. The defence of duress was not left to the jury at the respondent’s trial in June 2021. [26]–[27]
The respondent successfully appealed this ruling in the Court of Appeal. The Court (Kyrou, McLeish and Niall JJA) unanimously held duress should have been left to the jury for their consideration.
Grounds of Appeal: The Crown/prosecution sought leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal on the following sole ground:
•
The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the trial judge had erred in ruling that the respondent could not avail herself of the defence of duress.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The Majority (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) held the Victorian Court of Appeal to have adopted and applied ‘the accepted understanding … of the form of threat necessary to establish duress at common law’, as opposed to the doctrine of duress of circumstances. [53]–[57]
The necessity for the accused to be subject to a threat of infliction of the relevant form of harm if the accused fails to commit the acts that constitute the offence charged has been a consistent feature of the consideration of the common law of duress by intermediate courts of appeal in the common law jurisdictions in this country [37]
Accordingly, the Majority dismissed the appellant’s concern that the Victorian Court of Appeal’s judgment reflected the adoption of the doctrine of duress of circumstances — a relatively recent doctrinal development occurring in England and Wales. The doctrine suggests that pressure on the accused’s will ‘can arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or others’ and not merely ‘the wrong threats or violence of another’ (R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652, 653 (Simon Brown J) [47]. The Majority, however, refused to explores this doctrine as neither party contended the common law of Australia should adopt duress of circumstances. [49]
The Majority further held the evidence adduced before the trial judge — namely, the forensic psychologist’s report — could engender reasonable doubt in a reasonable jury that the prosecution negatived the existence of a threat to inflict the threatened harm if the respondent failed to commit the charged offences:
In this case, the evidence of pervasive violence, intimidation, control and sexual abuse perpetrated by JR on the respondent and their children over a sustained period raised a reasonable possibility that any express or implicit demand JR may have placed on the respondent to join in the sexual abuse of [the daughters] carried with it the implication that serious violence and more severe sexual abuse would be inflicted on the respondent or their children if she refused [62]
In a separate judgment, Edelman J dismissed the appeal, finding there to be a foundation in the available evidence sufficient for the defence of duress to be left to the jury. [113]
Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29 (11 October 2023) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Murder’ – ‘ Suicide’ – ‘ Unreasonable verdict’ – ‘ People with mental illness’ – ‘ Evidence’ – ‘ Expert testimony’ – ‘ Appeal dismissed’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: By special leave, Mr Lang appealed an unanimous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Brown J) to uphold his conviction following a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland for the murder of Maureen Boyce.
Mrs Boyce had a sporadic extra-marital relationship with Mr Lang over several years; of which her husband (Mr Boyce) knew. At the time of the incident, Mr Lang and Mrs Boyce were the only two in Mrs Boyce’s apartment. Mrs Boyce suffered from bipolar disorder and longstanding borderline personality disorder [47]. The victim experienced intermittent suicidal ideation, described as a ‘preoccupation with thinking about ending one’s life’ [56].
At trial, Mr Lang accepted only two feasible explanations for Boyce’s death: suicide or murder. A forensic pathologist opined that the injury sustained by Mrs Boyce (a single wound with multiple internal stab wounds) was not self-inflicted.
Grounds of Appeal: Mr Lang appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
Unreasonable jury verdict (ie, the verdict of the jury could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence for there is a reasonable possibility that the deceased committed suicide).
2.
Wrongful admission of expert evidence (ie, the evidence of a forensic pathologist, opining that the injury sustained by the victim was not self-inflicted, was wrongly admitted into evidence).
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed, and order confirmed. The High Court unanimously dismissed the first ground of appeal, finding that the jury’s verdict was not unreasonable. Strong and compelling evidence of Mr Lang’s motive, combined with his conflicting testimony to police ([352]-[356]), was sufficient for the jury to exclude the hypothesis that Mrs Boyce died by suicide ([159]–[160]; [158]; [248])
(Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [2]; Gordon and Edelman JJ at [41], [145]–[185]; Jagot J at [419])
Gordon and Edelman JJ cautioned judicial and prosecutorial/defence care in reasoning Mr Boyce’s death was either a consequence of suicide or murder, in light of the evidence of Mrs Boyce’s mental health, specifically her diagnosis of, and experience with, depression and bipolar disorder (269]-[270]; [284]-[285]):
There is need for great caution in the reasoning that as Mrs Boyce was unlikely to have committed suicide, or more specifically to have committed suicide by the method of stabbing, it is more likely that she was murdered by the appellant. In this case, whoever inflicted the wound, something highly improbable did occur. All of the evidence must be considered, going to the relative likelihood of both hypotheses, in determining whether the prosecution failed to exclude as a reasonable hypothesis that Mrs Boyce committed suicide. In particular, the likelihood of Mrs Boyce deciding to commit suicide cannot be considered in isolation from the likelihood of the appellant deciding to commit murder’ [158]
With respect to Ground Two, the majority (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [3], Jagot J at [470]) held that the evidence was admissible. The majority deemed the evidence sufficient to establish that the forensic pathologist’s opinion was based on his expertise.
Gordon and Edelman JJ dissented ([42], [220]–[242]):
‘The problem for Dr Ong’s opinion on this issue, and the reason that it was both inadmissible and of no weight, is that he failed to expose how his expertise was the substantial basis for connecting the facts to which he referred to this opinion’ [234]
BA v The King [2023] HCA 14 (10 May 2023) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal allowed’ – ‘ Tenancy/Property’ – ‘ Meaning of 'breaking’
Charges: Breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence
Proceedings: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales R v BA [2021] NWCCA 191 (20 August 2021) to acquit.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a domestic relationship. They resided together in an apartment, which they occupied as co-tenants pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The breakdown of the relationship resulted in the appellant ceasing rent payments and moving out. After forcibly entering the complainant’s apartment, the appellant intimidated and assaulted the complainant (see Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ [4]–[5]).
The trial judge directed a verdict of not guilty on the basis that the accused had a right to enter as a lessee. The Crown appealed this direction, submitting that the trial judge erred in holding that the prosecution was required to establish that the appellant did not have a pre-existing right to enter (as a pre-condition to proof of ‘breaking’). The Court of Criminal Appeal (Brereton JA and Fullerton and Adamson JJ) upheld this appeal and ordered a re-trial.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the decision on one ground:
1.
The Court of Criminal Appeal erred in holding that an entry into a dwelling-house pursuant to a pre-existing right to enter will nonetheless involve a “break” if made without the consent of the actual occupant.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed and orders set aside. The majority (Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) concluded that the appellant could not break into the apartment by law as he was still a co-tenant, pursuant to the Residential Tenancy Agreement. [42] That is, he possessed a right of exclusive possession over the apartment and therefore had lawful authority to enter it without the complainant’s consent.
This difficult case illustrates the complexities of the concept of “break and entry”, the meaning of which was established in historical circumstances quite different from contemporary society, including when domestic and family violence was generally not treated a criminal [36]
The Crown observed that the complainant was entitled to protect herself from apprehended violence to her person in the security of her own home by refusing to unlock the front door. In a practical sense, this is true. However, the complainant’s power to keep the appellant, as a co-tenant, out of the apartment was not unlimited. The source of the appellant’s liberty to enter the … apartment was the residential tenancy agreement. It was not the complainant’s consent. It was not within the complainant’s power unilaterally to alter the appellant’s liberty to enter. For example, neither the landlord nor the complainant could lawfully change the locks for the premises to exclude the appellant without the appellant’s consent, or without a reasonable excuse [80]
The minority of Kiefel CJ and Gageler and Jagot JJ dissented:
The appellant’s status as a co-tenant under a residential tenancy agreement did not give him a right to forcibly enter the apartment and assault his former partner who resided in the dwelling-house and who had refused him entry [3]
Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25 (10 August 2022) – High Court of Australia
‘Adverse inferences’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Circumstantial case’ – ‘Drowning’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent assessment of evidence’ – ‘Inference of guilt’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence’ – ‘Unreasonable verdict’ – ‘Unreasonableness ground’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: By special leave the defendant appealed the majority decision of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal (Parker and Livesey JJ, Nicholson J dissenting) to uphold his conviction following trial by judge alone (Lovell J) in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the murder of his wife. He argued that the trial judge’s verdict could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
Following a stroke in 2005 the female victim was confined to a wheelchair and she could no longer speak. For two years before her death she had been living in a nursing home. The Crown alleged that while on an outing her husband pushed her wheelchair into a pond, resulting in her drowning. Lovell J drew inferences adverse to the appellant’s credit from the appellant's behaviour during interviews with police ‘that his relationship with his wife had changed since she had been living permanently in the nursing home, such that he had come to see her as "taking up his time" and no longer had a caring relationship with her.’ In assessing the appellant’s account of his wife’s death as implausible, Lovell J found support for the prosecution case in circumstantial evidence that he had left his watch, wallet and a spare change of clothes in the car and had done internet searches on funerals in the month before. Lovell J found 2 distinct interconnected motives, financial and relationship, concluding the only rational inference available on the whole of the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with intent to kill his wife and therefore his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ground: The majority in the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in how it approached the ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. In particular, the majority misinterpreted and misapplied the approach required to be taken to that ground in accordance with M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487 as applied in Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and the matter remitted for rehearing. Livesey J’s judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal, with which Parker J agreed, erred. ‘What was missing from this analysis, because it had been eschewed as raising “jury” questions, was any independent consideration of whether the evidence left open reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence’ [35].
Peniamina v The Queen [2020] HCA 47 (9 December 2020) – High Court of Australia
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Exclusion of provocation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Partial defence of provocation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appeal concerned the partial defence of provocation, which operates to reduce what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter, under s 304(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld). Section 304 was amended in 2011 to exclude the defence (save in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character) in the case of the unlawful killing of the accused's domestic partner where the sudden provocation is “based on anything” done by the deceased, or anything the accused believes the deceased has done, to end or to change the nature of the relationship or to indicate in any way that the relationship may, should or will end or change. The 2011 amendments placed the burden of proof of the defence on the accused. The issue raised by the appeal is whether in discharging this burden the appellant was required to prove that the provocation was not "based on" anything done (or believed to have been done) by the deceased to change the relationship, notwithstanding that such conduct (or believed conduct) was not the conduct that he claimed had induced his loss of self-control. The appellant killed his wife in circumstances that left it open to find he was angered by a belief that the deceased had been unfaithful and planned to leave him. But the appellant’s case was that, for the purpose of s 304(1), his loss of self-control was ’based on’ the deceased “grabbing [a] knife, threatening [him] with it and cutting his right palm.” The jury found the appellant guilty of murder. On appeal, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to direct the jury to consider whether the exception set out in s 304(3) excluded the availability of the partial defence under s 304(1).
Grounds of appeal: The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the exclusion of the defence of partial provocation pursuant to the exception in s304(3) was not confined to the provocative conduct of the deceased which the defence relied upon as causative of the appellant's loss of self-control.
Held: Appeal was allowed. The majority (Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ) found that, correctly understood, s 304(3) excludes the defence of provocation where the accused was in a domestic relationship with the deceased and his/her loss of self-control was induced by anything done (or believed to have been done) by the deceased to change the relationship. Whether the defence does not apply is a question of law.
Here, it was the appellant’s defence that it was the deceased’s conduct with the knife that induced his loss of self-control. There was no evidentiary foundation to suggest that the conduct with the knife was itself a thing done to change the relationship. It was therefore not open to find that the defence was excluded under s 304(3). The trial judge was wrong to direct the jury that, in addition to proving the elements of the defence, the appellant was required to prove that his loss of self-control was not based on anything done by the deceased to change the relationship.
Note: The appellant was subsequently retried and convicted of manslaughter (the sentencing judge found that the jury accepted the partial defence of provocation, and that the appellant’s belief that the victim had been unfaithful was reasonable) and resentenced: R v Peniamina (No 2) [2021] QSC 282 (25 October 2021).
Roy v O’Neill [2020] HCA 45 (9 December 2020) – High Court of Australia
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Implied licence to enter’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘Police powers’ – ‘Pro-active policing’ – ‘Whether police had any basis to request to submit to a breath test’ – ‘Whether police have powers to attend the threshold of private property to ensure compliance with a domestic violence order’
Proceedings: Appeal from the decision of the Northern Territory Court of Appeal O'Neill v Roy [2019] NTCA 8 (4 September 2019).
Issue: Scope and limits of implied licence.
Facts: The respondent woman was the subject of a DVO that protected her male domestic partner (Mr Johnson, the victim). The DVO contained various conditions including that she was restrained from consuming and/or being under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicating substances when in the company of the victim [2]. In April 2018, the Northern Territory Police Force conducted Operation Haven which was designed to address issues concerning domestic violence and alcohol related crime and as part of that operation three officers from the Northern Territory Police Force visited the respondent and victim’s unit. One of the attending officers gave evidence that he had observed ‘antisocial behaviour coming from the property over the weeks prior to the operation’ [3]. One of the officers had previously observed the respondent in an intoxicated state ‘and she was in an intoxicated state every time he had dealt with her’.
Officers approached the shared unit and observed that the respondent "appeared to be just sort of laying on the ground" through the window and called her to come to the door "for the purposes of a domestic violence order check". Officers noted that the respondent’s eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred and had "a very strong odour of liquor on her breath", which lead them to conduct a breath test. The respondent was taken to Katherine Watch House after testing positive to alcohol for further breath analysis.
The apartment was accessible to the public and there were no signs suggesting the police were not welcome to approach the unit and knock on the front door. They were not asked to leave by the occupants.
The Northern Territory Court of Appeal held that the case involved an implied licence from the occupier of the premises for visitors to be on the footpath and approach the door of the unit rather than an implied licence for a specific purpose. The respondent sought special leave to appeal. The application regards the scope of the licence. It was agreed that the content of the implied licence is determined objectively while the infringement of the implied licence is determined by reference to some subjective characterisation of purpose.
Judgment: The Court per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ dismissed the appeal, having earlier granted special leave to appeal subject to noting that the proposed grounds of appeal might be reframed with greater precision HCATrans 43 (20 March 2020). Keane and Edelman JJ observed that the making of a coercive direction is beyond the scope of the licence generally implied by the law to enter the curtilage of a property but that there was no need for a coercive direction here as Ms Roy complied with the request for a breath test. No question of coercion would arise unless and until Ms Roy refused to consent to provide a breath test, and Constable Elliott decided to invoke the power conferred by reg 6(1)(a). [93]
Kiefel CJ held that either of two lawful purposes (to check compliance with a domestic violence order where Ms Roy was known to be invariably intoxicated or to ascertain the state of Ms Roy and Mr Johnson by way of a proactive domestic violence check) was sufficient for the law to imply a licence for Constable Elliott to enter the dwelling unit in question. He was not a trespasser. The evidence of the results of the breath test was admissible.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41 (11 October 2017) – High Court of Australia
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Current sentencing practice’ – ‘Instinctive synthesis’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of case’
Charges: Incest x 2; Sexual penetration of a child under 16 x 1; Indecent assault x 1.
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The charge subject of the appeal was one count of incest. The appellant pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The total head sentence was 5 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years ([12], [23]).
Section 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provided that the court must have regard to current sentencing practices when sentencing an offender. The Court of Appeal stated that ‘but for the constraints of current sentencing practice’, it would have imposed a longer sentence ([33]).
Issues: Whether the sentence for the charge of incest was manifestly inadequate. In resolving this question, the High Court clarified the relevance of ‘current sentencing practices’ to sentencing.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Victorian Court of Appeal for determination of the appeal against sentence ([77]). The High Court (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, Gageler and Gordon JJ agreeing) held that the Court of Appeal erred by treating the range established by current sentencing practices as decisive of the appeal before it ([2]).
Kiefel CJ, Bell and Hayne JJ stated: ‘the terms of s 5(2) are clear such that, while s 5(2)(b) states a factor that must be taken into account in sentencing an offender, that factor is only one factor, and it is not said to be the controlling factor’ ([9]).
Further, their Honours stated at [50]:
section 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act informs the process of instinctive synthesis as a statutory expression of the concern that a reasonable consistency in sentencing should be maintained as an aspect of the rule of law. Reasonable consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles does not, however, require adherence to a range of sentences that is demonstrably contrary to principle.
Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017) – High Court of Australia
‘Meaning of “significant probative value”’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Sexual offences against underage girls x 11.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant was Robert Hughes, the star of the TV show Hey Dad! The 11 complainants were friends of his daughters or workers on the set. The prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of each of the 11 complainants to support each of the other counts. The prosecution sought to prove tendencies of ‘having a sexual interest in female children under 16 years of age’ and ‘using his social and familial relationships … to obtain access to female children under 16 years of age so that he could engage in sexual activities with them’ ([3]). The tendency evidence was admitted, and the appellant was convicted ([8]).
Issues: Whether tendency evidence is required to display features of similarity with the facts in issue before it can be assessed as having “significant probative value”. This issue had been the subject of diverging lines of authority between the Victorian and New South Wales Court of Appeal.
Decision and Reasoning: The High Court (4:3) dismissed the appeal.
The majority (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ) held that the evidence was admissible. The majority identified that there is likely to be a high degree of probative value when (i) the evidence, by itself or together with other evidence, strongly supports proof of a tendency, and (ii) the tendency strongly supports the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged ([41]).
The majority endorsed the test for “significant probative value” posed in Ford, that ‘the disputed evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the offence charged ([40]). The majority at [40] added the following qualification:
it is not necessary that the disputed evidence has this effect by itself. It is sufficient if the disputed evidence together with other evidence makes significantly more likely any facts making up the elements of the offence charged. Of course, where there are multiple counts on an indictment, it is necessary to consider each count separately to assess whether the tendency evidence which is sought to be adduced in relation to that count is admissible.
Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ dissented.
Gageler J advocated for a more conservative approach: his Honour argued that admitting all the evidence risks the jury placing too much emphasis on the series of allegations, and not assessing each charge individually ([109]).
Nettle J emphasised that the fact that an accused has committed one sexual offence against a child is not, without more, sufficiently probative of the accused committing another sexual offence against a child ([158]). Something more is required, for example a similarity in the relationship between the alleged victims, a connection between the details and circumstances of each offence, or a system of offending ([158]). Nettle J also reiterated the dangers in admitting tendency evidence ([174]).
Gordon J agreed with Gageler and Nettle JJ and set out her Honour’s own set of principles at [216].
The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48 (7 December 2016) – High Court of Australia
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Appeal allowed’ – ‘Dousing with petrol and setting alight’ – ‘Drug misuse’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Methylamphetamine’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of offence’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; Using a prohibited weapon x 1; Dealing with suspected proceeds of crime x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and victim were in a relationship; the victim was 12 weeks’ pregnant with the defendant’s child ([5]). The defendant pleaded guilty to dousing the victim with petrol and setting her alight ([10]). The victim’s injuries were ‘horrendous’ ([11]), and she terminated her pregnancy ([13]). The sentencing judge said that he found it hard to recall a more serious example of the charge in his 38 years of working in criminal law ([14]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 15 years with a non-parole period of 11 years ([1]). The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal against sentence on the basis that there was ‘such a disparity between the sentence imposed and current sentencing practice’ ([1]).
Issues: Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The High Court (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated the original sentence. The High Court discussed two aspects of the Court of Appeal’s decision: first, the Court of Appeal employing the term ‘worst category’ of offending; and second, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of ‘current sentencing practice’.
First, the High Court held that it is an error to describe offences as being within ‘the worst category of cases’ if the offence does not warrant the maximum penalty ([19]), as the term is likely to cause confusion ([17]-[20]).
Second, the High Court remarked that ‘current sentencing practice’ is likely to change over time, ‘current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence [may] depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’ [21]. The High Court found that the cases were too few to establish a pattern, one case was 12 years old, and most did not occur in a domestic violence context ([25]-[31]). The High Court said that ‘violence perpetrated in the course of a domestic relationship against the offender's female partner … involve the abuse of a relationship of trust’, and such violence ‘must steadfastly be deterred’ ([28]). This was a distinguishing factor from cases with comparable serious injuries ([28]).
Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 (2 October 2013) – High Court of Australia
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Antecedents and personal circumstances’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social disadvantage’ – ‘Traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment’
Charge/s: Manslaughter
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his de facto spouse. He was sentenced to five years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and three months’. The DPP appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and resentenced the appellant to seven years and nine months’ imprisonment with the same parole eligibility conditions. The appellant and the deceased had been in a relationship for approximately 16 years. On the day the deceased was killed, the appellant and the deceased spent the afternoon at a local tavern and both became intoxicated. After returning home, an argument ensued and the appellant assaulted the deceased in a prolonged and brutal way. He threw the deceased about the room, rammed her head into walls and repeatedly punched her on the face and head. There was a history of significant domestic violence in the relationship, including a conviction for grievous bodily harm for which the appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended) as well as a conviction for common assault. The appellant was subject to a lifetime violence restraining order in favour of the deceased which prohibited him from having any contact with her. However, this order had been ignored by both parties and the relationship had continued.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
a.
Whether the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied the principles which govern manifest inadequacy of a sentence.
b.
Whether the Court of Appeal erred by failing to pay sufficient regard to the appellant’s antecedents and personal circumstances, in particular the systemic deprivation and disadvantage (including endemic alcohol abuse which is prevalent in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities) that the appellant faced.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Bell J dissenting).
a.
The joint majority (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) found no error in the Court’s approach to the issue of manifest inadequacy. In the Court of Appeal, McLure P made express reference to the gross over-representation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system (particularly in relation to manslaughter) which is directly related to alcohol and drug abuse. Her Honour also made reference to various ‘weighting errors’ in the sentencing at first instance. The Court held that there was no error in this approach. See in particular at [37], where the joint majority noted ‘her Honour was proceeding to make the point that, even in the context of the circumstances of social disadvantage in which domestic violence commonly occurs, the seriousness of the offence is such as to make a compelling claim on the sentencing discretion. And that is so notwithstanding that the number of Aboriginal offenders (and victims) is "grossly disproportionate".
See also McLure P’s statement quoted at [41] – "In this case, the offence is one of the most serious known to the law. The maintenance of adequate standards of punishment for a crime involving the taking of human life is an important consideration. While the role of the criminal law in deterring the commission of violent acts is problematic, and particularly so in relation to Aboriginal communities, it is important to indicate very clearly that drunken violence against Aboriginal women is viewed very seriously". The joint majority approved these remarks at [42] – ‘The passage of time has not lessened the force of that statement. While the appellant's offence may not have been in the very worst category of offences of manslaughter, it is not easy to think of worse examples. Given that the maximum available sentence was 20 years imprisonment, and given the prolonged and brutal beating administered by the appellant upon his de facto spouse, a conclusion that the sentence imposed at first instance was manifestly inadequate cannot be said to have been wrong.’
b.
The appellant did not submit that ‘Aboriginality per se warrants leniency’ (see at [47]). Rather, the appellant contended that social and economic issues commonly associated with Aboriginal communities affected the appellant and that these should have been treated as mitigating factors. He also contended that he was likely to receive traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment when released from prison and that he was ‘willing, and indeed anxious’ (see at [49]) to subject himself to this payback. He submitted that this should have received greater significance as a mitigating factor.
In dismissing these arguments, the Court noted that while mitigating factors such as social disadvantage need to be afforded appropriate weight in sentencing, this cannot result in the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offending. In particular, the Court noted at [53] – ‘To accept that Aboriginal offenders are in general less responsible for their actions than other persons would be to deny Aboriginal people their full measure of human dignity’ and ‘Further, it would be wrong to accept that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender is somehow less in need, or deserving, of such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide.’
The Court also addressed the argument that general deterrence has less significance in relation to crimes which are not premeditated in the context of social disadvantage. In dismissing this assertion, the Court noted that the criminal law is not limited to the ‘utilitarian value of general deterrence’ and stated that the obligation of the State is ‘to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’ (see at [54]). Furthermore, the gravity of the offending in this case was extremely high - see at [55] –
‘A consideration with a very powerful claim on the sentencing discretion in this case is the need to recognise that the appellant, by his violent conduct, took a human life, and, indeed, the life of his de facto spouse. A just sentence must accord due recognition to the human dignity of the victim of domestic violence and the legitimate interest of the general community in the denunciation and punishment of a brutal, alcohol-fuelled destruction of a woman by her partner. A failure on the part of the state to mete out a just punishment of violent offending may be seen as a failure by the state to vindicate the human dignity of the victim; and to impose a lesser punishment by reason of the identity of the victim is to create a group of second-class citizens, a state of affairs entirely at odds with the fundamental idea of equality before the law.’
In relation to the appellant’s alcohol addiction, McLure P held that this factor would increase the weight to be given to personal deterrence and community protection. The joint majority of the High Court agreed and noted that the fact the appellant was affected by an environment of alcohol abuse should be taken into account in assessing personal moral culpability, but this has to be balanced with the seriousness of the offending. See further at [57] where the majority of the High Court said– ‘It is also important to say that it should not be thought that indulging in drunken bouts of domestic violence is not an example of moral culpability to a very serious degree.’
In relation to the relevance of traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment, the High Court’s disposition was that the appellant’s willingness to submit to this punishment was not a relevant consideration in sentencing. However, the first instance judge did take it into account, which was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. While the joint majority of the High Court did not offer a conclusive opinion, they noted that the courts cannot condone the commission of an offence or ‘the pursuit of vendettas’ and held that the appellant did not suffer injustice because the prospect of traditional punishment was given only limited weight (see at [61]-[63]).
Bell J dissented. Her Honour held that it was open to the primary judge to reach the sentence that he did, based on comparable authorities. Bell J was also critical of the practice of giving too much weight to the maximum penalty, given the wide variety of circumstances in which manslaughter convictions can arise. Her Honour stated that a sentence well short of half the maximum penalty does not of itself give rise to legal error.
Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 (4 May 2011) – High Court of Australia (appeal from Queensland Court of Appeal)
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Mr Roach was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm of his female partner. At trial, Howell DCJ admitted evidence of previous (uncharged) assaults that Mr Roach committed on the complainant during their relationship. The relevant Queensland provision—s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977—applies to proceedings for assault occasioning bodily harm and provides that ‘[r]elevant evidence of the history of the domestic relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence was committed is admissible in evidence in the proceeding’. However, s 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 gives the judge power to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it is deemed unfair to the accused to admit.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge should have applied the test in Pfennig v The Queen [1995] HCA 7; (1995) 182 CLR 461 and whether ‘viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of [the relationship evidence] which is consistent with innocence’. Only if there is no reasonable view, can the evidence be admissible because its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused.
The appellant argued that in considering whether to admit evidence under s 132B, the trial judge ought not to admit that evidence if there was a reasonable view of that evidence consistent with innocence (‘the rule in Pfennig’). The appellant argued that the rule in Pfennig recognises the prejudicial effect of evidence used to prove a propensity of the accused ("propensity evidence"), and applies at common law to propensity evidence as a measure of the probative force of that evidence. (see Roach v The Queen [2010] HCATrans288 (5 November 2010)).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ of the High Court held firstly that s 132B has a ‘potentially wide operation’. Section 132B contemplates evidence of other acts of domestic violence throughout the relationship being admitted. The section could also be used to admit similar fact evidence to prove the accused’s propensity to commit similar crimes. The Court found it could also be used to admit other types of evidence including evidence of a person’s state of mind, evidence of the circumstances of the crime or to provide context to the history the relationship. It could also be used as evidence in a provocation or self-defence case, or where the offender is a victim of domestic violence. (See at [30]-[31]). The Court then held that the Pfennig test has no application to the common law residual discretion enshrined in s 130. As such, the test of admissibility under s 132B is whether the evidence is relevant, which is subject to the exercise of the discretion preserved in s 130.
The purpose of admitting the evidence here was not to show a propensity of the accused (re the rule in Pfennig); rather, the evidence:
‘was tendered to explain the circumstance of the offence charged. It was tendered so that she could give a full account and so that her statement of the appellant's conduct on the day of the offence would not appear "out of the blue" to the jury and inexplicable on that account, which may readily occur where there is only one charge. It allowed the prosecution, and the complainant, to meet a question which would naturally arise in the minds of the jury’ at [42].
The High Court noted the permissible ambit of ‘relationship evidence’, and the need for clear directions for juries about the use of such evidence and the purpose for which it is tendered:
[45] In the present case the evidence, if accepted, was capable of showing that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was a violent one, punctuated as it was with acts of violence on the part of the appellant when affected by alcohol. Without this inference being drawn, the jury would most likely have misunderstood the complainant's account of the alleged offence and what was said by the appellant and the complainant in the course of it. To an extent Holmes JA acknowledged this in the conclusions to her reasons. Whilst her Honour identified the relevance of the evidence as showing the particular propensity of the appellant, she also concluded that it made the appellant's conduct in relation to the alleged offence intelligible and not out of the blue.
[47] The importance of directions in cases where evidence may show propensity should not be underestimated. It is necessary in such a case that a trial judge give a clear and comprehensible warning about the misuse of the evidence for that purpose and explain the purpose for which it is tendered. A trial judge should identify the inferences which may be open from it or the questions which may have occurred to the jury without the evidence. Those inferences and those questions should be identified by the prosecution at an early point in the trial. And it should be explained to the jury that the evidence is to allow the complainant to tell her, or his, story but that they will need to consider whether it is true.
[48] The directions in this case were sufficient. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge directed the jury of the need to exercise care and that it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone unless they were convinced of its accuracy. His Honour told the jury that the history of the relationship between the complainant and the appellant had been led "for a very specific purpose" and that they must be "very, very careful in relation to the limited use that [they] may make of such evidence." He explained how evidence could be used as evidence of propensity and directed them that they were not to use the evidence in that way. His Honour informed the jury that the evidence was led so that the incident charged was not considered in isolation or in a vacuum but "to give [them] a true and proper context to properly understand what the complainant said happened on the 13th of April 2006."
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 (5 August 2009) – High Court of Australia
‘Adjournments’ – ‘Amendment’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Case management’ – ‘Pleadings’ – ‘Practice and procedure’
Hearing: Appeal against decision to allow amendments to statement of claim.
Facts: ANU applied for an adjournment at trial to make substantial amendments to its statement of claim against Aon. The adjournment was granted and the primary judge allowed the application to amend the statement of claim. Aon appealed against the decision.
Decision and Reasoning: This case did not concern family violence but contained a number of relevant statements regarding adjournments. French CJ referred to the decision in Sali v SPC Ltd, which concerned the refusal by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria to grant an application for an adjournment of an appeal. By majority, the High Court held there ‘that in the exercise of a discretion to refuse or grant an adjournment, the judge of a busy court was entitled to consider ‘the effect of an adjournment on court resources and the competing claims by litigants in other cases awaiting hearing in the court as well as the interests of the parties’’ (see [26]). Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ went on to say:
‘What might be perceived as an injustice to a party when considered only in the context of an action between parties may not be so when considered in a context which includes the claims of other litigants and the public interest in achieving the most efficient use of court resources’.
Toohey and Gaudron JJ dissented in the result but acknowledged that:
‘The contemporary approach to court administration has introduced another element into the equation or, more accurately, has put another consideration onto the scales. The view that the conduct of litigation is not merely a matter for the parties but is also one for the court and the need to avoid disruptions in the court's lists with consequent inconvenience to the court and prejudice to the interests of other litigants waiting to be heard are pressing concerns to which a court may have regard’.
In the present case, French CJ stated at [27]:
‘The observations made in the two joint judgments in Sali were linked to the particular knowledge that a judge or court, called upon to exercise a discretion to adjourn, would have of the state of that court's lists. However, the mischief engendered by unwarranted adjournments and consequent delays in the resolution of civil proceedings goes beyond their particular effects on the court in which those delays occur. In that connection, there have been a number of cases after Sali in which it has been accepted, in the context of Judicature Act Rules, that the public interest in the efficient use of court resources is a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretions to amend or adjourn’.
Osland v R [1998] HCA 75; 197 CLR 316 (10 December 1998) – High Court of Australia
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony - psychologist’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and her son were jointly tried in the Supreme Court of Victoria for the murder of her husband Mr Osland (the appellant’s son’s step-father). The jury convicted the appellant but was unable to reach a verdict with respect to her son. Her son was later retried and acquitted. The prosecution case was that the appellant and her son planned to murder her husband. The appellant mixed sedatives with her husband’s dinner in sufficient quantity to induce sleep within an hour. The appellant’s son later completed the plan by hitting Mr Osland on the head with an iron pipe while he was asleep. He and the appellant then buried Mr Osland in a grave they had earlier prepared. At trial, the appellant and her son relied on self-defence and provocation raised against ‘an evidentiary background of tyrannical and violent behaviour by Mr Osland over many years’ which had allegedly been ‘escalating in the days prior to his death’ (at [4]). The prosecution accepted that Mr Osland had been violent in the past but maintained that this behaviour had ceased well before he was murdered. The appellant raised expert evidence of the ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS) in support of her case. A psychologist’s evidence indicated that the appellant’s relationship with her husband was ‘consistent with it being a battering relationship’ (at [50]).
The psychologist outlined the general characteristics of battered women as follows (at [51]):
1.
they are ashamed, fear telling others of their predicament and keep it secret.
2.
they tend to relive their experiences and, if frightened or intimidated, their thinking may be cloudy and unfocussed.
3.
they have an increased arousal and become acutely aware of any signal of danger from their partner.
4.
they may stay in an abusive relationship because they believe that, if they leave, the other person will find them or take revenge on other members of the family.
5.
in severe cases, they may live with the belief that one day they will be killed by the other person.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Provocation - Whether the trial judge erred in ‘failing to make clear the connection between the evidence of "battered woman syndrome", admitted at the trial, and the law of provocation’ (see at [155]).
2.
Self-defence – Whether the trial judge erred in ‘failing to make clear the connection between the evidence of "battered woman syndrome", admitted at the trial, and the law of self-defence’ (see at [155]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Gaudron and Gummow JJ dissenting). However, all members of the Court were unanimous in holding that the trial judge’s directions with respect to ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS) were appropriate.
Gaudron and Gummow JJ:
“Expert evidence is admissible with respect to a relevant matter about which ordinary persons are "[not] able to form a sound judgment … without the assistance of [those] possessing special knowledge or experience in the area" and which is the subject "of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience"” (at [53])
“…there may be cases in which a matter of apparently slight significance is properly to be regarded as evidence of provocation when considered in light of expert evidence as to the battered woman's heightened arousal or awareness of danger. And evidence of that may also be relevant to the gravity of the provocation, as may the history of the abusive relationship.” (at [55])
“So, too, expert evidence of heightened arousal or awareness of danger may be directly relevant to self-defence, particularly to the question whether the battered woman believed that she was at risk of death or serious bodily harm and that her actions were necessary to avoid that risk. And, of course, the history of the particular relationship may bear on the reasonableness of that belief.” (at [56])
“…there is an obligation on counsel to make clear to the jury and the trial judge the precise manner in which they seek to rely on expert evidence of battered wife syndrome and to relate it to the other evidence and the issues in the case. In circumstances where evidence of battered wife syndrome is given in general terms, is not directly linked to the other evidence in the case or the issues and no application is made for any specific direction with respect to that evidence, it cannot be concluded that the trial judge erred in not giving precise directions as to the use to which that evidence might be put.” (at [60])
Callinan J (while agreeing that the directions with respect to BWS were appropriate) held that to adopt a new and separate defence of BWS ‘goes too far for the laws of this country’ (see at [239]). His Honour also noted that these issues could be matters for expert evidence as well as matters of common sense for a jury to decide with the assistance from the trial judge.
McHugh J did not make any comments on BWS.
Kirby J:
His Honour discussed the relevance of the BWS defence in abusive relationships. His Honour was of the opinion that the term should not be restricted to women because there may be situations where men are the victims such as similarly abusive same-sex relationships, and ‘unlike conception and childbirth, there is no inherent reason why a battering relationship should be confined to women as victims’ (at [159]).
His Honour was broadly supportive of BWS evidence but did note some controversies around it and was somewhat critical of it: “…it appears to be an “advocacy driven construct” designed to “medicalise” the evidence in a particular case in order to avoid the difficulties which might arise in the context of a criminal trial from a conclusion that the accused's motivations are complex and individual: arising from personal pathology and social conditions rather than a universal or typical pattern of conduct sustained by scientific data’ (at [161]).
Further, he was critical of the term itself and stated it should not be used. He was also aware that the syndrome was ‘based largely on the experiences of Caucasian women of a particular social background’ (whose) ‘”passive” responses may be different from those of women with different economic or ethnic backgrounds’ (at [161]).
Ultimately however, his Honour was supportive – ‘Although BWS does not enjoy universal support, there is considerable agreement that expert testimony about the general dynamics of abusive relationships is admissible if relevant to the issues in the trial and proved by a qualified expert. The greatest relevance of such evidence will usually concern the process of "traumatic bonding" which may occur in abusive relationships’ (at [167]).
M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68 (8 December 1988) – High Court of Australia
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Custody order’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Test to be applied’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody order.
Facts: The trial judge made an order giving the wife guardianship and custody of the child. The wife alleged that the father had sexually abused the child and that the child’s welfare would be put at risk in allowing the father custody. The trial judge was not satisfied that the father had abused the child. However, His Honour considered that there was a possibility that the child had been sexually abused by the father. Accordingly, in the interests of the child, His Honour held that he should eliminate the risk of such abuse by denying access to the father. The father appealed this decision.
Issue/s: What is the correct approach in dealing with sexual abuse allegations and unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The approach to be taken in these matters is not one of competing rights of the parents or ever purely a finding for or against either based on the evidence in support of the allegations. The approach is to determine on all of the evidence what is in the best interests of the child.
The Court concluded and held at [25]:
‘Efforts to define with greater precision the magnitude of the risk which will justify a court in denying a parent access to a child have resulted in a variety of formulations. The degree of risk has been described as a “risk of serious harm”, “an element of risk” or “an appreciable risk”, “a real possibility”, a “real risk”, and an “unacceptable risk”. This imposing array indicates that the courts are striving for a greater degree of definition than the subject is capable of yielding. In devising these tests the courts have endeavoured, in their efforts to protect the child's paramount interests, to achieve a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access. To achieve a proper balance, the test is best expressed by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse’.
With regards to the consideration of risk, it is in “achiev[ing] a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access”. A finding of sexual abuse need not be made to make a finding of unacceptable risk.
Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334 (17 June 1970) – High Court of Australia
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Statements made by deceased's wife charging accused with desire to kill her’
Charges: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for special leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The facts of this case were summarised concisely by Martin CJ (with whom Pullin JA and Hall J agreed) in O’Driscoll v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 175 (10 August 2011) [DT1] at [26] as follows -
‘[T]he appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife by shooting her in the back of the head. A critical issue at trial was whether she was deliberately shot or whether the gun had discharged by accident. The Crown led evidence that the deceased said to the accused, in the presence of other witnesses, 'I know you want to kill me for my money' and 'I know you want to kill me, why don't you get it over with'. These statements were admitted by the trial judge, subject to a direction that the jury should not treat them as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.
Issue/s:
a.
Whether the statements made by the appellant’s wife were admissible.
b.
If they were admissible, whether they should have been excluded by the trial judge because their probative value was outweighed by the potential prejudice to the accused.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court unanimously dismissed both grounds of appeal and held that the evidence was admissible.
a.
Barwick CJ noted at [3] that, ‘The fundamental rule governing the admissibility of evidence is that it be relevant. In every instance the proffered evidence must ultimately be brought to that touchstone.’ Evidence of the ‘nature of the current relationship between the applicant and his wife’ was relevant to the appellant’s guilt. Evidence of a ‘close affectionate relationship’ could be used by the jury to conclude that the appellant was not guilty. Evidence of hostility in the relationship could be used by the jury to conclude that the appellant’s argument that the shooting was accidental lacked credibility. His Honour did concede that if the deceased’s statements ‘had not been part of the evidence of a quarrel of a significant kind’ ([8]), they would have been inadmissible. However, in this case the statements were part of a ‘quarrel’ between the parties and were indicative, ‘of the nature of the quarrel and of the levels which the mutual relationship of the parties had reached’ (see at [8]). More generally, his Honour concluded that ‘evidence of the relations of the accused with others’ is admissible not only in cases where it establishes motive, though this may be the most common way in which it is used. This type of evidence could also be admissible if it explains an ‘occurrence’ or assists in the choice between two explanations of an ‘occurrence’ because such evidence satisfies the test of relevance (see at [7]).
Menzies J (with whom McTiernan J and Walsh J agreed) reached the same conclusion –‘To shut the jury off from any event throwing light upon the relationship between this husband and wife would be to require them to decide the issue as if it happened in a vacuum rather than in the setting of a tense and bitter relationship between a man and a woman who were husband and wife’(see at [4]).
b.
Barwick CJ held that while the deceased’s statements were damaging to the appellant, they were not prejudicial, and showed, ‘the depths to which the relationship of the parties, as husband and wife, had sunk’ (see at [9]).
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; HCA 34 (30 June 1938) – High Court of Australia
‘Civil cases’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Standard of proof’
Proceedings: Petition for divorce on the ground of adultery.
Facts: The applicant sought a dissolution of his marriage to his wife on the ground of her adultery.
Issue/s: What is the standard of proof required in civil matters?
Decision and Reasoning: In explaining the civil standard of proof, Dixon J stated that ‘when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence…It cannot be found as a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities’. His Honour went on to explain that the standard is one of ‘reasonable satisfaction’:
‘But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done involving grave moral delinquency’.
Walpole & Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] FamCAFC 65 (25 March 2020) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Fatal strangulation’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of family and domestic violence’ – ‘Intolerable situation’ – ‘Non’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Issue: Application for leave to appeal, application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence.
Grounds:
•
The primary judge erred in the application of the grave risk of physical or psychological harm defence (Ground 1);
•
The primary judge erred in the finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship (Ground 2);
•
The judge erred by assuming that the current protection orders in New Zealand would remain in place (Ground 3);
•
The intolerable situation defence applies (raised by the Court).
Facts: The appellant fled New Zealand with the assistance of New Zealand Police with her two children, in mid-2019 she believed the children’s father posed a real risk to her and the children. The father had an extensive criminal history which demonstrated "a pattern of increasingly serious charges against the father (not all of which resulted in convictions), domestic violence offences and breaches of bail and parole" [29]. The mother gave evidence of her intention to remain separated from the father but argued that the extensive history of repeated reconciliations between them meant the court should not have accepted that her intention to remain separated would ensure the children’s safety if they were returned to New Zealand. The father invoked the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the ‘Abduction Convention’) to secure the children’s return [1]. The application for recovery was made by the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the "Central Authority" under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) ("the Regulations"), an Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) was appointed and argued at first instance against the Hague Convention Application being granted, but the judge accepted the mother’s evidence she would not resume cohabitation with the father and the application was granted. The mother sought leave to appeal and applied to lead more evidence of the father’s criminal history and family violence history. The ICL did not participate in the application for leave to appeal despite the order for their participation remaining on foot.
Judgment: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed on basis of the intolerable situation defence (not raised as a ground of appeal but by the Court).
Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 contended that the primary judge erred in finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship. This error was based on the judge’s acceptance "of the mother’s evidence that she had permanently separated from the father and had taken necessary steps to keep him away from her and the children" [51]. In support of these contentions, the mother submitted that the primary judge should have considered her history of separation and reconciliation with the father and instead concluded that it was thus unsafe to assume she would cooperate with attempts to keep her and the children safe. The Court noted that this position was inconsistent with the evidence submitted by the appellant at trial and concluded that "given the manner the case was run at trial" the grounds could not succeed [534].
Ground 3 contended that the primary judge erred in assuming that the protection orders against the father in New Zealand would remain in place. As the mother did not submit as part of her case at trial that she would agree to the father’s application to discharge these protections orders being granted, nor was there evidence that the father’s application had any prospect of success, the third ground was "not made good" [55].
Ryan, Aldridge and Watt JJ all, in separate judgements, granted leave and allowed the appeal after considering the intolerable situation defence under reg 16(3) of the Family Law (Child Abduction) Regulations 1986 (Cth). It was noted that the father’s previous convictions and violence, the pattern of parental separation and reconciliation, and the totality of the circumstances in which the children would find themselves if they were to return to New Zealand were unsafe and intolerable [63].
Ryan and Aldridge JJ criticised the role of the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the Central Authority in pursuing the matter: [78] ‘We have been troubled by what occurred in this case and it is timely to mention the importance of adherence to Model Litigant guidelines. The NSW Guidelines, which apply to the Central Authority, requires more than merely acting honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules. Essentially, the guidelines require that the Central Authority acts with complete propriety and in accordance with the highest professional standards. Relevantly, this includes not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the state or an agency knows to be true.’
[79] ‘In this case, the application disclosed the father’s final term of imprisonment in NSW. Even though the Requesting Authority knew that the father was permanently banned from Australia, had effectively been deported and had lived in New Zealand for many years, it would seem that no attempt was made to establish his criminal antecedents or the involvement (if any) of child protection agencies in New Zealand in relation to his other children. The same applies in NSW. To be fair, the Requesting Authority and the Central Authority disclosed the mother’s application for a protection order and thereby flagged that, on the mother’s case, serious risk issues arose.’
[80] ‘It is our understanding that systems are in place in NSW which enable the Central Authority to access/request information from the NSW Police. We assume New Zealand operates in the same fashion. Thus, the Requesting Authority and Central Authority were able to examine and present the father’s complete criminal history and an entire set of COPS records. Instead, it was left to the mother and the ICL to gather records from New Zealand and domestically. It is no small thing to obtain records from abroad, particularly when time constraints are tight. Fortunately, the mother was granted legal aid, but, what we ask, if she was not? How would this young mother on social security benefits have managed to place this vitally important evidence before the court? The prospect that she would not have been able to do so is obvious.’
Stringer & Nissen (No. 2) [2019] FamCAFC 185 (23 October 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Failure to consider evidence relevant to the child's best interests’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relocation’
Case type: Appeal against interim parenting orders as to with whom the child, X, should live.
Facts: The parties separated in 2015 when X was around 6 months old. In 2015, the parties entered into a parenting plan. In early 2019, the mother and X moved from Town A to live in Sydney. The mother did not tell the father she was leaving Town A because she was afraid of what he might do to her or X, and said that, during the relationship, the father was aggressive and abusive towards her. After leaving Town A, the parties made arrangements for X to spend time with the father until March 2019. At the end of that time, the father refused to return the child to the mother. The primary judge ordered that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility of X and that if the mother returns to live in Town A, then X will live with her, but that if the mother does not return to Town A, then X will live with the father. At the heart of the Court’s decision was the denunciation of the mother’s unilateral decision to move away from Town A.
Issue: Whether it was in the best interests of X to live with his mother in Sydney or with his father in Town A?
Held: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia allowed the appeal against the orders of the primary judge. Their Honours found that the primary judge did not engage in a careful consideration of the evidence, as he failed to take into account the mother’s evidence that she did not tell the father she was moving because she feared him. The Full Court was also perplexed as to why the father’s unilateral decision not to return X to his mother was not denounced in the same way as the mother’s unilateral decision to relocate without telling the father. The Full Court also found that the primary judge misapprehended the nature and extent of the family violence and misapplied legal principles.
At [45], the Court found:
“The allegations of family violence, together with the mother’s concern as to the father’s alcohol abuse were matters on which she relied to demonstrate that it would not be in the child’s best interests to live with the father and his Honour ignored a fundamental integer of the mother’s case which was that there was a risk to the child from being exposed to family violence. The orders she sought for time would however, provide for the maintenance of the child’s relationship with the father while he remained living with his mother. His Honour’s approach was erroneous in principle and to the facts.”
Keating & Keating [2019] FamCAFC 46 (21 March 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Property settlement’
Case type: Appeal.
Facts: The husband was a tradesman and operated a business, called the Keating Group, through a complex trust and corporate structure. The Group traded throughout the marriage, and since the parties separated in 2010, the husband managed and operated it. Its value and dramatic increase in the husband’s director loan account to the Group were key issues in the proceedings. The primary judge separated the parties’ property into 2 pools: non-superannuation assets and property and liability, and superannuation. The non-superannuation property was worth $1,784,854; however as a result of the husband’s indebtedness to the Group and expenses associated with a failed taxation minimisation scheme, liabilities exceeded assets by $804,805. The husband’s and wife’s contributions were assessed at 70% and 30% respectively. Their superannuation contributions were assessed as equal. No adjustment was made under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The wife was ordered to retain her personal possessions, her bank account, car and $12,000 previously received by way of partial property settlement. She also received a superannuation split of $119,000 and 50% of any payment received as a result of a pending class action relating to the tax scheme. The husband retained the Group, which had an annual turnover of $4 million and which provided him with a superior standard of living. He remained personally liable for his loan account and debts due in relation to the tax minimisation scheme.
The wife alleged that she was subject to family violence at the hands of the husband during and after their relationship. Her evidence included that the husband broke her nose, beat her on an overseas trip until she passed out, and that she suffered serious bruising and broken ribs. The primary judge dismissed all incidents of violence towards the wife except that which resulted in her broken wrist, apparently because her evidence was uncorroborated ([41]).
Issue: The wife appealed the property settlement orders on 7 grounds. Relevant grounds of appeal include that:
•
The primary judge failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions and to sufficiently engage with the wife’s case (Grounds 1 and 5).
•
The wife claimed an adjustment, which the primary judge refused to make, arising from family violence under the ‘Kennon’ principles (Ground 4).
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the property order.
Grounds 1 and 5.
At [23]-[24], Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ held –
‘[H]is Honour went no further than to say that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme was unsuccessful…The issue was whether she knew of and supported the husband’s investment in the scheme to the extent that she should shoulder half of the resulting debt. In the result, his Honour’s decision to fix both parties with responsibility for the debt was made ‘…because [the debt] actually exists…’
‘His Honour’s finding that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme failed falls considerably short of engagement with the reasons why the wife said she ought not to be fixed with joint responsibility for the debt. The same applies to the finding that the debt ‘actually exists’. Although parties would ordinarily be expected to take the good with the bad, there was no active engagement by the primary judge with the wife’s case that the husband should bear sole responsibility for the debt and why.’
Given the primary judge’s failure to engage with the wife’s case on these matters, the Court held that Grounds 1 and 5 had been established.
Ground 4.
The wife argued that she was exposed to significant family violence by her husband during and after the relationship. She sought an adjustment under the principle in Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 where it was held that family violence, which is demonstrated to have a significant adverse impact upon one party’s contributions to a marriage, is a relevant consideration to the assessment of contributions within section 79. According to the Court in Kennon, it is necessary to adduce evidence to prove the incidence and effect of domestic violence, and to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the parties’ capacity to ‘contribute’ under section 79(4) ([37]). The Court in Kennon also stated that family violence will be relevant if the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party ([36]).
However, at [33] the Full Court held –
‘The fact that the wife gave evidence of family violence during periods when the parties were separated and after they separated for the last time ought not to have minimised the significance of her evidence of that which occurred during the relationship.’
The Court went on to state that Kennon should not be interpreted as laying down a precise rule that ‘post-separation family violence to a spouse who seeks to continue to contribute to the welfare of the family as a parent is irrelevant’. The reference to ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi & Spagnardi [2003] FamCA 905 appeared ‘to elevate the need for an evidentiary nexus or ‘discernible impact’ between the conduct complained of and its effect on the party’s ability to make relevant contributions, requiring expert or actuarial evidence of the effect of the violence.’ Their Honours stated that perhaps the use of the word ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi was ‘infelicitous’ when in truth, the Court ‘was merely reinforcing the need for there to be an evidentiary nexus between the conduct complained of and the capacity (and or effort expended) to make relevant contributions’ ([39]). Their Honours also affirmed the well-settled view that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted ([42]).
The Court could not conclusively determine whether the primary judge’s decision not to make a ‘Kennon’ type adjustment was wrong due to the absence of a transcript ([43]). While Kennon appears to remain sound law, its considerations apply to ‘a relatively narrow band of cases’ ([67]).
Atkinson v Atkinson [2017] FamCAFC 266 (13 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Alleged false allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Recovery order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Father’s appeal against interim parenting orders, including a recovery order.
Facts: The mother applied for, and was granted, a recovery order for the return of the child after the father failed to return the child to the mother following fortnightly weekend contact. The father argued that the mother physically abused the child and the mother alleged that the father engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse such as to constitute family violence by persistent allegations that the mother physically abused the child.
Issue: Whether the primary judge erred in failing to appoint a single expert before making a recovery order.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed. Interim orders that the child reside with the mother.
In finding that the primary judge did not err in failing to appoint a single expert before making interim orders including a recovery order after the father retained the child Ryan J noted (Johnston and Thackray JJ agreeing):
[49] …the mother’s application was for a recovery order after the father retained the child. The application demanded a prompt response and in my view an adjournment for in all probability many months would not have been in the best interests of the child.
Ralton and Ralton [2017] FamCAFC 182; (7 September 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Application of domestic and international human rights law under the family law act 1975 (cth)’ – ‘Bias’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘No merit’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Unsuccessful application for stay of proceedings’ – ‘Weight of evidence’
Matter: Mother’s appeal against parenting orders that the children B and C reside with the father, he have sole parental responsibility and the mother have limited supervised contact, to progress to alternate weekends and half the school holidays.
Facts: Earlier orders made in 2010 had provided for the children to reside with the mother and have contact with the father. In 2014 and 2015 the children only spent time with the father intermittently. B, in particular, became reluctant to spend time with the father, and in 2016 twice avoided contact by running away from school. The trial judge found that the children were “at risk of longer-term psychological harm in the mother’s household” and would not have any real relationship with their father if they remained in the mother's care [4]. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (‘ICL’) supported the father’s position.
Grounds: The mother’s grounds of appeal were “difficult to follow and understand” and her submissions “did not seek to explain why the primary judge erred but were rather a lengthy and detailed assertion of wrongdoing by his Honour.
Decision: ICL granted leave to appear. No error established and appeal and applications in an appeal dismissed. Mother to pay the father’s costs of the appeal.
Parental alienation was considered in circumstances where the mother appealed against parenting orders on the basis that orders had been made with insufficient consideration of the alleged family violence of the father and the expert witnesses were biased (the Full Court - Bryant CJ, Strickland & Aldridge JJ).
[187] The primary judge was at pains to avoid the use of labels such as “parental alienation” or “enmeshment”. Speaking of the Associate Professor’s evidence, which included a discussion of these concepts, his Honour said:
The issues that he raises with respect to the concept of alienation as a syndrome are well set out in the literature. However, to become focused upon the academic discussion of alienation and whether or not it is a syndrome – and it seems clear that it is not – becomes more of a distraction than anything in this individual case. What is necessary in this case is a careful analysis of the evidence of the parties, the circumstances confronting these two children in each of the households and the behaviours exhibited in order to ascertain what is going to be in their best interests. (quoting from the primary judgment at [70])
[192] … There is therefore no need for us to consider whether or not the evidence justified a finding of parental alienation or enmeshment or whether or not they are valid concepts.
Saska & Radavich [2016] FamCAFC 179 (1 September 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Definition of family violence in section 4ab’ – ‘Key statutory provisions in the family law act’ – ‘Meaning of ‘family violence’’ – ‘Mother a family member by operation of section 4(1ab)’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Section 61da’ – ‘Whether mother a member of the family of the father within the meaning of section 4ab’
Proceedings: Appeal - parenting orders.
Facts: The trial judge made final parenting orders which included an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child of the mother and the father. In making these orders, the trial judge found that the father’s behaviour towards the mother amounted to ‘family violence’ within the meaning of s 4AB of the Family Law Act. As a result of this family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility for the child in s 61DA of the Act did not apply: s 61DA(1). Further, even if the presumption had applied, the trial judge held that it would still not have been in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility: s 61DA(4). The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in finding that the father’s behaviour towards the mother constituted family violence within the meaning of s 4AB(1) because the mother was not ‘a member of the [father’s] family’ as defined in s 4(1AB). Accordingly, the trial judge erred in finding that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted because the father had not engaged in family violence: s 61DA(2)(b).
•
The trial judge erred in finding in the alternative that the presumption was rebutted because equal shared parental responsibility was not in the best interests of the child: s 61DA(4).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court held that the father’s appeal was always doomed to fail because it rested on a misconceived interpretation of s 4(1AB) of the Act. Relevant to the proceedings, the combined effect of s 4(1AB)(e) and s 4(1AC) was that the child was a member of the father’s and a member of the mother’s family. It was never in issue in the proceedings that the mother resided with the child at the material times, the child being a member of the father’s family. Thus, by operation of subparagraph (h) of s 4(1AB), the mother was a member of the father’s family. Further, within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of s 4(1AB) each of the mother and the father, respectively and alternatively, ‘is or has been a member of the family of a child of [the other]’. Accordingly, the father had engaged in family violence against ‘a member of his family’ (see [17]-[24]).
The father’s contention that the trial judge erred in rebutting the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility because the father had committed family violence was therefore dismissed. As demonstrated above, the contention that there was no family violence in this case because the mother was not a member of the father’s family was based on an erroneous reading of the Act.
Additionally, while the trial judge was correct to apply s 61DA(2) and conclude that the presumption did not apply, it was also well within her discretion to conclude that even if the presumption had applied, it would have been rebutted in the child’s best interests: s 61DA(4).
The father also argued that the mother wasn’t fearful, and so the finding of family violence was erroneous. For this argument to be effective, the words of s 4AB(1) would need to be read conjunctively, not disjunctively, as the section is worded. The family member being ‘fearful’ is one possible manifestation of family violence, but is not necessary to make a finding of family violence.
Salah & Salah [2016] FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100 (17 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Ignoring allegations of family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Treatment of issues of family violence’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: At the contested interim hearing, the mother made allegations of significant family violence perpetrated by the father in the presence of the children. In light of this and one of the children’s epilepsy and developmental delay, she sought an order directing the father’s care of the children to be supervised by another adult. The father disputed the allegations of family violence. In making interim parenting orders, the trial judge said (see [23]-[27]):
‘The evidence lead [sic] as to alleged family violence made by each parent is not capable of sustaining a finding at this interim stage of proceedings. In circumstances of conjecture given no other evidence. The presumption for equal shared [parental] responsibility is still applicable.
[…]
Findings with respect to whether either party perpetrated family violence cannot be made at this interim stage given the conflicted evidence. The civil standard of proof is met by neither.
As such and for the same reasons the need for the father’s time with the children to be either in the “presence of” or “supervised by” another adult is not made out’.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made several errors of principle in considering the issues of family violence namely, His Honour erred in his consideration of the family violence issues, failed to have regard to s 61DA(3) of the Act and failed to follow the legislative pathway in his determination of the interim issues.
2.
The trial judge failed to take into account relevant facts.
3.
The trial judge failed to give adequate reasons for his determination.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. The Court noted at [36] that, ‘[i]t is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial’.They continued at [39]-[40]:
‘In SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, the majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) said:
…Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
The trial judge here faced just that challenge. His Honour, when confronted with significant allegations of violence was required to do more than merely note the contention (or “conjecture”) and not to “simply ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue” (see SS v AH)’.
The Court held that while the trial judge was correct in stating that, at that point, he could not make findings on the disputed allegations, he erred by ignoring the allegations of family violence and finding that the presumption of equal shared responsibility applied. His Honour further erred in his treatment of the allegations of family violence by suggesting with that comment ‘given no other evidence’ that the mother’s allegations required corroboration or objective support and erred in incorrectly referring to the civil standard of proof (see [41]-[45]). Grounds two and three were also successful for similar reasons (see [60],[65]).
Holsworth & Holsworth [2016] FamCAFC 98 (9 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the trial judge could not make findings on allegations of family violence until the evidence was properly tested at trial’
Proceedings: Appeal of interim procedural orders in relation to parenting proceedings
Facts: The parties reached agreement in November 2010 that the children live with the mother and spend time with the father. Almost a year later the mother was “psychiatrically unwell” and the children began to live with the father and spend time with the mother. After many years of litigation, including the appointment of an ICL, one child had returned to live with the mother and was to spend time with the father. The matter was listed for trial and an updated family report was ordered.
One ground of appeal was that “[t]he trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mother’s evidence of family violence and did not accept the mother’s evidence of it because she had not produced “third party evidence”.
Issues: In the context of apprehended bias, was the trial judge correct in not determining issues of family violence at an interim hearing?
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court found that the mother’s assertions regarding the trial judge’s consideration of the evidence of family violence were “unsupported by the transcript”. In addition, her Honour was correct in not making findings “until such time as the evidence had been tested” – something which would happen at the final hearing of the matter. Despite the grounds purportedly being a challenge to the trial judge’s “failure to recuse herself”, it was apparent to the Full Court that they were really a complaint that the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence, including that of family violence, at the interim stage of proceedings.
The appeal was dismissed.
Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71 (5 May 2015) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Family reports’ – ‘Findings of fact in relation to allegations of family violence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weight on the expert evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and property orders
Facts: There is one child of the marriage. The parties married in 2002 and separated in late 2008/ early 2009, continuing to live under the same roof until November 2009. The mother claimed that up until November 2004 she was the primary carer for the child and the father worked. In November 2004 the mother went back to work and the father became the primary care-giver for the child. The child had health issues which would require visits to the hospital. The father consulted medical practitioners about the child’s weight and would weigh the child after time in the mother’s care. Around “September 2009 the husband arranged for ongoing surveillance of the wife”. In October the mother became aware of the surveillance and asserted stress and digestive issues as a result. This also affected the child. A consultant psychiatrist provided a Family Report to the Court on 9 January 2011. This report included discussion of risk associated with physical violence during the marriage in addition to the conflict and hostility between the parties in association with the child’s medical issues. It also included risk to the child in regards to the father’s obsession with “health and welfare”.
Issues: Whether the judge erred in attributing significant weight to the family report.
Whether the judge should have made a finding in relation to family violence.
Reasoning/Decision: Despite the father having opportunity to cross-examine the report writer at trial, and opportunity to raise his concerns about the report with the writer, and opportunity for the father to submit to the judge that the report be given little weight, no such cross-examination was forthcoming at trial, and no like submission was made to the trial judge. It was determined that not only was the judge entitled to rely on the expert report as he did, the father was not entitled to make his complaint about its handling to the appeal court.
In the “background facts” of the judgment the trial judge discussed allegations of family violence made by the mother but made no finding that the violence, as alleged, had occurred. The trial judge was not in error by not making findings – “A court need only determine those facts that are necessary for the determination of the issues between the parties”.
Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, Magistrate Coates made interim parenting orders. The father unsuccessfully appealed against those interim orders (see Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011)).
Subsequently, final orders were made providing that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time for two hours per fortnight with the father. The order for supervised time was for an indefinite duration (see Slater & Light [2011] FMCAfam 1021 (22 September 2011 ) ([1]).
Magistrate Coates’ orders turned on a finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of emotional harm to the children ([2]). The emotional harm was said to take the form of imposing on the children negative views of their mother, alienating the children from their mother and a chaotic regime for the children ([22]).
Issues: Whether Magistrate Coates erred in:
•
finding that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children; and
•
ordering supervised time of an indefinite duration ([2], [29]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially allowed. The Court held that the Magistrate did not err in finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children ([69]). This conclusion was open on the psychiatric reports
However, the Court found that the Magistrate erred in ordering an indefinite supervision order, when this was not requested by either the mother or the Independent Children’s Lawyer ([69]-[70]).
The issue of the time and the circumstances in which the father should spend time with the children be remitted for rehearing by a Federal Magistrate other than Federal Magistrate Coates (see Order 3).
McGregor v McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507; [2012] FamCAFC 69 (28 May 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Failure to properly admit academic opinions as evidence’ – ‘Information sharing’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Parties unaware of use of material’ – ‘Reliance upon academic literature as basis for orders’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders and property orders.
Facts: Prior to the trial, the three children of the relationship lived with the father. In parenting and property proceedings, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the father had been physically and verbally aggressive to the mother and that the father had alienated the children from the mother. The Federal Magistrate accordingly made orders for the children to live with their mother. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Magistrate referred extensively to external literature. The father appealed against this decision.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to accord the husband natural justice/procedural fairness because the husband was not given the opportunity to cross-examine, respond to or introduce contrary evidence in relation to a number of academic opinions relied upon by the magistrate in reaching his decision.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was upheld and the matter remitted for hearing. The Full Court held that the Federal Magistrate placed considerable reliance on the academic literature on the topic of alienation of children. None of it was introduced into evidence as opinion evidence, and accordingly no consideration was made by the Federal Magistrate as to whether to exclude the evidence and, if not, to consider what weight to give it. Accordingly, none of this evidence was able to be tested by the father nor was it the subject of submissions or contrary evidence. There was therefore a failure to afford the father natural justice and procedural fairness (see [118]-[121]).
Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18 (10 February 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Where the court was not persuaded that the learned federal magistrate erred in his approach to the wife's claim for a 'kennon type adjustment'’ – ‘Where undisturbed findings of fact made by the learned federal magistrate amply supported the conclusion he reached in relation to this issue’ – ‘Whether the learned federal magistrate impermissibly relied upon extrinsic material and failed to accord the parties procedural fairness’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and property orders.
Facts: The parties had twins. Serious incidents of family violence occurred during their relationship and after separation. At the hearing of the trial, the father was in prison having been convicted of aggravated assault on the mother. Mother granted sole parental responsibility and the children to live with her. The father was to have supervised time (these orders were interim). Property – 25% adjustment re Kennon.
Issues: In making findings regarding family violence and its effect on the mother and children, did his Honour impermissibly take account of extraneous material? Did his Honour err in making a “Kennon type adjustment”?
Decision/Reasoning: The Court held that despite including reference to the mother’s conduct in the courtroom when faced with the father and the discussion about a report, the passages of which were included and relied upon in Re: L (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334, a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division). They were on the public record and so “materially different from matters appearing in reports” which have not yet undergone judicial consideration. While this alone does not guarantee that procedural fairness is achieved in circumstances where the parties were not on notice about the report and did not have opportunity to cross-examine accordingly, the Full Court held that “anything said in Re: L was not necessary to establish the relevance of the findings” made by the Federal Magistrate.
Regarding the property settlement and the “Kennon type adjustment”, the Full Court found that while it represented the “top of the range” it did not “exceed the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion”. Regarding the violence that was perpetrated post-separation, the Full Court held it was correctly included by the Federal Magistrate and was a relevant consideration in determining whether the mother’s contributions as a whole were more arduous.
Wolfe & Director-General, Department of Human Services [2011] FamCAFC 42 (4 March 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’
Matter: Hague Convention return order appeal.
Facts: The mother unsuccessfully opposed the father’s application for return of the children to New Zealand. There were ongoing parenting proceedings between the mother and father in New Zealand, where the mother conceded the children had been habitually resident for their whole lives. The current New Zealand orders (made following a hearing in which the mother alleged the father had abused the children and been violent towards her) provided that the children reside with the mother and have one and a half hours contact with the father each weekend. The mother’s new partner was violent towards her and the children were exposed to that violence. The mother fled New Zealand and returned to her native Australia after leaving her new partner. She gave evidence that the children were fearful to return to New Zealand due to concerns about her new partner.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Bryant CJ, Finn and May JJ noted the first instance judge’s comments with approval:
“[i]n part, she relied on her own refusal to establish that a return of the children would place them in an intolerable situation”. Her Honour disposed of this aspect of the mother’s case by saying, correctly, in our view, that “[i]t is well established that, ordinarily, the objects of the Convention should not be frustrated by a parent’s refusal to return with children to their country of habitual residence”. [32]
Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Psychiatric report’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, the Federal Magistrates Court made interim parenting orders. The effect of these orders was to allocate parental responsibility for the children solely to the mother, require the children to live with the mother and require the children to spend weekly supervised time with the father at a contact centre. The orders were made pending the preparation of a psychiatric report on the risk the father presented to the children. These orders radically altered previous arrangements, as the Federal Magistrate was concerned about the need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm that would arise from them being exposed or subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children (a) for the father’s time to be supervised and (b) to significantly reduce the time they spent with the father.
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate had erred by allocating parental responsibility solely to the respondent.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the first ground of appeal, the Court held, amongst other findings, that if evidence of abuse or family violence is adduced at trial, the Court is obliged to deal with it. The Court must always critically assess the evidence placed before it in determining the issue (see [46]). It was also noted that a finding of family violence may be made in the absence of a Form 4 Notice.
The Court held that it was clearly open on the evidence for the Federal Magistrate to find that family violence had been perpetrated by the appellant.
In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellant contended that the Federal Magistrate relied upon erroneous finding of family violence to then improperly find that the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. The Court dismissed this argument by again noting that the finding of family violence was open to the Federal Magistrate (see [64]-[69]).
Note: final orders were subsequently made, but the finding of family violence was not affected (see Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013)).
Vasser & Taylor-Black [2010] FamCAFC 36 (11 March 2010) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Re F: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother from parenting orders that challenged part of the process followed and some of the rulings made during the conduct of the trial. On the final day of the hearing, the self-represented mother sought to tender a 52 page document in response to the report of an expert witness.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that trial judge failed to provide the mother with procedural fairness in not ascertaining the reason behind the preparation of this document and in not advising her that she may wish to seek legal advice before tendering the particular document, contrary to the litigants in person guidelines: Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed as the mother here was not the victim of unfairness. Although this appeal did not relate to family violence, the Court relevantly observed that the Litigant in Person Guidelines were no more than guidelines.
See Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Amador & Amador (2009) 43 Fam LR 268; [2009] 43 FamCAFC 196 (3 November 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Determining allegations in relation to family violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Requirement of corroboration’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties met online and were married in Belgrade. Their child, who had autism, was born in Belgrade. The mother and the son came to live in Australia with the father when the child was 20 months old. The parties subsequently separated, with the mother alleging that the father had perpetrated domestic violence and sexual assault against her. The father denied these allegations. In 2008, a Federal Magistrate made orders granting the mother sole parental responsibility for the child. The mother was also permitted to relocate to Serbia with the child and the father’s contact time with the child was reduced from weekly to possible annual contact. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Federal Magistrate erred in accepting the mother’s uncorroborated evidence that domestic violence and sexual assault was perpetrated by the father on the mother.
Reasoning/Decision: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. In dismissing this ground of appeal, the Court held that a positive finding may be made on the evidence of the victim without corroborating evidence. See [79].
The Court expressed concern at the manner in which the Federal Magistrate had expressed a finding of insufficient evidence re family violence. They were concerned that the Federal Magistrate had felt in some way constrained by law in being able to make a positive determination in relation to allegations of violence even if the evidence had satisfied her on the requisite standard that the violence occurred as alleged. See [95]-[96].
Oakley & Cooper [2009] FamCAFC 133 (30 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Full court referred to, and discussed, the best practice principles for use in parenting disputes when family violence or abuse is alleged’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Whether the federal magistrate erred by giving insufficient weight to issues of family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders
Facts: The parties were together for approximately 7 years, separating in March 2006 – there were 2 children of the relationship. The mother had 6 children from previous relationships. The Federal Magistrate described their relationship as “extremely volatile”, ending in an incident of domestic violence. The Federal Magistrate made findings inter alia: that the parties were unable to effectively communicate with each other due to them being “aggressive, provocative … show[ing] a lack of maturity and complete absence of child focus”; that the mother used physical discipline on the children; and that on at least one occasion the mother’s behaviour at changeover was “appalling and did severely distress the children”. The family report included the opinion that the children “have positive attachments to both parents, but experience some trauma associated with the continuing conflict in their parents’ relationship”. Despite the conflict between them, the parties agreed to an order for equal shared parental responsibility. As such, the Federal Magistrate was obliged to consider equal time, or significant and substantial time with each parent. Orders were made that the children live with the mother 9 nights a fortnight and with the father for 5. The father appealed these orders.
Issues: Did the Federal Magistrate give appropriate consideration to the evidence and findings of family violence when making the parenting orders that he did?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court referred to the 2009 publication “Best Practice Principles for use in Parenting Disputes when Family Violence or Abuse is Alleged”, specifically Section F of the 2009 principles which sets out considerations where children are ordered to spend time with a parent where positive findings of family violence have been made against that parent.
The Full Court found that while they agreed with the argument of the mother’s counsel, that the discussion of weight in relation to family violence had been “clipped” they found that there was no appealable error established. The Federal Magistrate had evidence of both parties and their associates hitting the children, and that both parties were verbally and physically abusive of one another in the presence of the children. Despite acknowledging that the mother’s behaviour was, at times, worse than the father's, when taken in the context of the best interests of the children, the conclusion was that it was in their best interests to remain predominantly in the care of their mother.
M & L (2007) FLC 93-320; (2007) 37 Fam LR 317; [2007] FamCA 396 (4 May 2007) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of cultural evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: Both parents were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, and lived in the NT, one close to Darwin, one quite remote. There was family violence where the father would physically and verbally abuse the mother. On one occasion the paternal grandfather punched the father for hitting the mother. The mother had been the primary care giver of the children. At trial evidence was led about the communities in which each parent lived. The trial judge found that the children would have a greater connection to their father’s culture by living with him.
Issues: Whether the trial judge had adequately considered the evidence of family violence and its potential effects on the children.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court held that there was inadequate consideration of the risk to the children given the father’s history of violence and alcohol consumption. The lack of consideration of the evidence that the children had been primarily cared for by the mother, and that there was no evidence that her care was lacking was overlooked, was also an error. A finding was made by the trial judge that the mother’s parenting was reliant on others in the community, referring to it as “collectivist”. He based his finding on an anthropological report quoted in another judgment. There was no anthropological evidence that the mother’s community engaged in such “collective” parenting, and that the mother was not, herself, the children’s primary care-giver. The trial judge’s finding that the best interests of the children would be met by them living with their father cannot be sustained when evidence of the mother’s adequate care, the fact she was the primary care giver and the father’s violence towards the mother, is balanced against the finding of the cultural benefits to the children of living in the father’s community.
Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303; (2006) 36 Fam LR 395; [2006] FamCA 1316 (5 December 2006) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence and contact orders.
Facts: The proceedings involved competing applications for residence and contact to the child of the parties. The mother made allegations that the father sexually abused the child. While no finding of abuse was made, the Trial Judge did make a finding of unacceptable risk. On appeal, the father challenged the orders made for contact, in particular, the requirement that the contact be supervised.
Issue/s: The trial judge provided inadequate reasons supporting his finding of unacceptable risk of abuse.
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, the Court made observations relevant to the assessment of unacceptable risk. Bryant CJ and Kay J held at [84] that:
‘There remained an obligation on the trial judge to not only evaluate the harm that might befall the child if there is a future act of abuse, but to also evaluate the prospect of such an act occurring. This is not a search for a solution that will eliminate any prospect of serious harm. It is a search to balance the harm that will follow if the risk is not minimised and the harm that will follow if a normal healthy relationship between parent and child is not allowed to prosper’.
S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions must be affected by the violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on past contributions’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Reference to exceptional cases should not mean rare’
Appeal type: Appeal against property orders.
Facts: The parties had two adult children and separated in 2000. The trial judge made a Kennon style adjustment in favour of the wife. His Honour held that the evidence clearly revealed that there had been some violent behaviour by the husband towards the wife. Although there was no explicit evidence from the wife as regards to the effect of the violence on her contributions, the trial judge accepted that the wife’s contributions must have been made significantly more arduous than they ought to have been because of the violence inflicted upon her by the husband.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in adjusting the wife’s contributions to account for the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. Here, the evidence could not have properly led to a Kennon adjustment under section 79 (see [48]). In reaching this decision, the Court made a number of statements of principle, elaborating upon the decision in Kennon.
It was held that evidence of violence alone is not enough, but that the “violent conduct by one party towards the other” must be demonstrated to have an effect on contributions.
In addition, the Court also stated that the reference in Kennon to ‘exceptional’ cases should not be understood to mean rare. They adopted the trial judge’s comments that ‘the references to ‘exceptional cases’ and ‘narrow band of cases’ occurs in the context of the principle of misconduct in general rather than the more narrow formulation about domestic violence. … It seems to me that reading these passages carefully, the key words in a case where there are allegations of domestic violence are ‘significant adverse impact’ and ‘discernible impact’. (see [47]).
B & B [2003] FamCA 274 (8 April 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Failure to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Kennon not an award for damages’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Property orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders and division of property.
Facts: The parties had two children together. At trial, the mother made extensive allegations of physical, verbal and emotional abuse against the father, much of which the father conceded (see [38]). The trial judge made an order that the children should predominately be in the care of their father. Additionally, the trial judge rejected the wife’s submission that the division of property ought to be adjusted to 60/40 from 70/30 division on the basis of the decision in Kennon.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were –
•
Did the trial judge err in failing to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour?
•
Did the trial judge err in attributing responsibility for the domestic violence that occurred during the marriage to the wife?
•
Did the trial judge err in his application of the Kennon principle.
Reasoning/Decision:
The Court held that the trial judge was ‘obliged to adjudicate the violence issue as raised by the wife and to make specific findings in respect of the course of conduct conducted by the husband in the course of the marriage so that he could properly assess relevant aspects of the behaviour of each of the parents in determining in whose care he should place the children’. However, from reading His Honour’s reasons for judgment, it was not clear that he considered and evaluated the relevant evidence and took all the relevant factors into account. The issues raised by the wife in the grounds of appeal could not be described as ‘pernickety or overly critical’ (AMS v AIF) when matters of such significant serious and prolonged violence were clearly raised and left virtually undiscussed in the judgment (see [32]-[53]).
Secondly, the Full Court found that, the trial judge did not attribute responsibility for the domestic violence to the wife: while the trial judge found the wife to have engaged in passive/aggressive conduct, His Honour indicated in the clearest terms that he was not condoning the husband’s conduct in response to such behaviour(see [54]-[57]).
Thirdly, the Full Court held that the application of the principles in Kennonis “not the equivalent of an award for damages”, but used to determine whether the husband’s conduct had the effect of making the wife’s contributions more arduous.
T & S (2001) FLC 93-086; [2001] FamCA 1147 (29 October 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Effect of family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Re f: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother against orders made by the trial judge in relation to the residence, contact and other specific issues relating to the child of the parties’ relationship. The effect of the trial judge’s order was that the father was to have residence of the child and be responsible for the child’s day to day care, welfare and development; and that the mother was to have specified contact with the child. The mother was unrepresented for five days of the six day hearing. A claim by the mother of domestic violence at the hands of the father was raised but the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence. The trial judge instead made a number of adverse findings against the mother.
Issue/s: A major ground of appeal advanced on the Mother's behalf was that she did not receive a fair trial and that a new trial should be ordered. The gravamen of the Mother's case was that because she was a victim of domestic violence who was unrepresented at trial, she was unable to effectively meet the case of the Father and present her own case. As a consequence, and because the Mother suffered from a personality disorder, the trial judge made negative findings against her, and in particular against her credibility.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed on the basis of further evidence tendered on appeal which contained detailed evidence of ongoing domestic violence by the husband, and reports from a psychologist and social worker providing evidence as to the effect of the domestic violence on the mother’s ability to conduct her case at trial. The Court held that if the evidence had been tendered before the trial judge, it would have produced a different result and the best interests of the child required a re-hearing.
B & K [2001] FamCA 880 (14 August 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence orders and property settlement.
Facts: The parties had two children. The trial judge made an order for shared residency of the children. The trial judge accepted evidence that the husband had anally raped the wife.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge give sufficient weight to the family violence the husband had inflicted on the wife and the subsequent effect or impact on her of that violence in making residence orders?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. At [32] the Court noted the authorities referred to by counsel for the wife in support of the argument that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the effect of the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband against the wife: JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515, Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580, Blanch v Blanch & Crawford [1998] FamCA 1908; (1999) FLC 92-837, and Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692.
The Full Court determined that consideration of the family violence and its effect upon the wife was adequate and orders for fortnight-about care of the children was within the trial judge’s discretion.
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact orders’ – ‘Guidelines for matters involving self-represented litigants’ – ‘Parenting orders and effect on children’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and contact orders.
Facts: While not a case specifically dealing with family violence, there is a large proportion of self-represented litigants in family law proceedings and as such the guidelines set out in this case pertain.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge contravene the guidelines in respect of the litigants in person set out by the Court in Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764?
Reasoning/Decision:
The Full Court provided guidelines as follows (taking a number from Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764):
1.
A judge should ensure as far as is possible that procedural fairness is afforded to all parties whether represented or appearing in person in order to ensure a fair trial;
2.
A judge should inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to proceed, the order of calling witnesses and the right which he or she has to cross examine the witnesses;
3.
A judge should explain to the litigant in person any procedures relevant to the litigation;
4.
A judge should generally assist the litigant in person by taking basic information from witnesses called, such as name, address and occupation;
5.
If a change in the normal procedure is requested by the other parties such as the calling of witnesses out of turn the judge may, if he/she considers that there is any serious possibility of such a change causing any injustice to a litigant in person, explain to the unrepresented party the effect and perhaps the undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and his or her right to object to that course;
6.
A judge may provide general advice to a litigant in person that he or she has the right to object to inadmissible evidence, and to inquire whether he or she so objects. A judge is not obliged to provide advice on each occasion that particular questions or documents arise;
7.
If a question is asked, or evidence is sought to be tendered in respect of which the litigant in person has a possible claim of privilege, to inform the litigant of his or her rights;
8.
A judge should attempt to clarify the substance of the submissions of the litigant in person, especially in cases where, because of garrulous or misconceived advocacy, the substantive issues are either ignored, given little attention or obfuscated. (Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150);
9.
Where the interests of justice and the circumstances of the case require it, a judge may:
◦
draw attention to the law applied by the Court in determining issues before it;
◦
question witnesses;
◦
identify applications or submissions which ought to be put to the Court;
◦
suggest procedural steps that may be taken by a party;
◦
clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person or the bases for such orders.
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and there may well be other interventions that a judge may properly make without giving rise to an apprehension of bias.
In the Marriage of Blanch; Blanch v Blanch and Crawford (1999) FLC 92-837; (1998) 24 Fam LR 325; [1998] FamCA 1908 (27 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Erroneous findings of fact’ – ‘Incorrect attribution of fault to the victim’ – ‘Perpetrator responsibility’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The parties were married but separated after seven years. There were two children of the marriage. The wife made allegations of domestic violence against the father; these were denied by the father. The trial judge found at [325] that both parties were responsible for violence in the relationship, and that the relevance of family violence in custody proceedings was to be indicative of a risk ‘to … children in later years that … could cause them harm’. The wife brought an appeal against orders made by the trial judge that the children of the relationship reside with their father.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial judge erred in his findings regarding domestic violence?
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Counsel for the wife submitted that the trial judge addressed the questions of the husband’s domestic violence ‘in almost a passing manner’, despite the presence of overwhelming evidence from the wife that she was the victim of consistent and frequent violence and abuse. It was held that “in cases such as this, where a case of sustained and severe domestic violence by one party is advanced by the other, the court is obliged to give a clear indication whether it accepts or rejects that case and, in any event, to explain why it has reached that conclusion” (see [333]).
In addition it was held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the responsibility for violence between the parties was fairly evenly shared was not available on the evidence.
Other aspects of His Honour’s treatment of domestic violence were also in issue. First, His Honour’s perception of the relevance of violence to the overall welfare of the children was inadequate. The trial judge failed to consider the significant risk of such violence to the children’s emotional development such as “insecurity, fear, unhappiness, anxiety and hyper vigilance”: Patsalou and Patsalou [1994] FamCA 118 and JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 (see [334]). Second, Lindenmayer J also strongly disapproved of the trial judge’s finding that the husband’s violence towards the wife was a product of the marital relationship rather than of the husband’s personality.
Re: Cassandra Kathleen Kennon (Appellant/Wife) and Ian William Kennon (Cross-Appellant/Husband) Appeal (1997) FLC 92-757; [1997] FamCA 27 (10 June 1997) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Relevance of domestic violence’ – ‘Section 79’ – ‘Significantly more arduous’
Proceedings: Property settlement.
Facts: The parties cohabited for approximately five years before separating. The husband was very wealthy and the wife had far more modest means. The property pool was nearly $9 million. There were no children of the marriage. In 1994, the wife filed a property application under s 79 of the Family Law Act. The husband filed a cross application. The wife subsequently filed an amended application which included a claim under the cross-vesting legislation that the husband pay her damages for assault and battery. The husband denied the allegations of assault and restated his position regarding the property claim. The trial judge accepted that a number of assaults had occurred and awarded damages, but found that the husband's conduct had not affected the wife's contributions to allow an adjustment in relation to s 79(4).
Issue/s: The wife did not challenge the trial judge’s finding that the husband's conduct had not affected her contributions. Consequently, the Full Court's comments on the relevance of domestic violence in claims under s79 of the Family Law Act were made in obiter.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed but the Full Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevance of violence in s79 property adjustments. The Full Court said that earlier authorities on s 79 precluding evidence of domestic violence were no longer binding, acknowledging that the ‘pervasiveness and destructiveness of domestic violence’ was now better recognized by the Australian community and courts.
The Full Court cautioned that s 79 of the Act is not a source of ‘social engineering’ or to be used as ‘a means of evening up’ the financial positions of the parties. They held:
‘Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of "negative contributions" which is sometimes referred to in this discussion’.
The Court also referred to this principle as including ‘exceptional cases’ and noted, ‘[i]t is essential to bear in mind the relatively narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party’.
(See also subsequent interpretation in S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003), Baranski & Baranski & Anor [2010] FMCAfam 918 (1 September 2010) and Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012).)
Re Andrew (1996) FLC 92-692; [1996] FamCA 43 (23 May 1996) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Fear of violence’ – ‘Supervised access order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Proceedings: Appeal against supervised access orders.
Facts: The parties separated. Satisfactory access arrangements were in place for 3.5 years. However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and the husband assaulted the wife. The wife held a genuine belief that the husband had tried to kill her and the child on this occasion and subsequently denied the husband access to the child. The husband filed an application for unsupervised access.
The trial judge found that each parent alone could provide adequately for the needs of the child. However, the wife’s fears had become even more entrenched over time and these fears were a major impediment to access, because they were genuine even if they may not be founded in fact. Her capacity to provide care to the child would be impaired and cause detriment to the child if the husband was given unsupervised access. The trial judge made orders for supervised access.
Issue/s: The trial judge gave too much weight to the mother’s attitude and not enough weight to the benefits to the child of unsupervised contact with the father.
Reasoning/decision: The Full Court dismissed the appeal. After citing extensively from past authorities, it was concluded that the finding that the wife’s genuine fear of the husband would significantly affect her ability to provide adequately for the needs of the child as custodial parent despite the benefits to the child from contact with the father was open to the trial judge.
In the Matter Of: N Appellant/Wife and S Respondent/Husband and the Separate Representative [1995] FamCA 139 (20 December 1995); (1996) FLC 92-655; (1995) 19 Fam LR 837. – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Assessment of unacceptable risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Not a family violence case, but it discusses principles in determining unacceptable risk in the context of sexual abuse allegations. In custody proceedings, the mother alleged that the father sexually abused their child and sought to have access by the husband to the child prevented. The trial judge was not satisfied on the civil standard of proof that the sexual abuse had occurred. However, he did not conclude that the abuse certainly did not happen. The mother was steadfast in her belief that the child had been abused by the father. The trial judge did not find the father unfit to have custody or access to the child by reason of sexual abuse or unacceptable risk of abuse, however, mitigated against the concerns and effect on the mother by making interim supervised contact orders.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the father was not an unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Full Court held that the trial judge should not have made interim custody orders and failed to take into consideration the effect this would have not only on the child but also on the mother’s ability and capability to parent effectively. However, as the interim custody order was not challenged the Full Court did not set it aside. As regards to no finding of unacceptable risk, on the evidence, this was open to the trial judge.
Patsalou and Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580; [1994] FamCA 118 (27 October 1994) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Custody proceeding’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Independent research by judge’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Social science research’
Appeal type: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Allegations of family violence were made in custody proceedings. The trial judge accepted the wife’s evidence that prior to separation the husband had been hitting her on a regular basis, in front of the children on a number of occasions. Her Honour stated that the denigration of one parent by the other and the perpetuation of violence by that parent against the other is of importance when assessing where the interests of the children lie and what future arrangements might best advance their welfare. Her Honour also noted a number of articles on the effect upon children of inter-spousal violence including that such effects may be profound and long-lasting. The trial judge concluded that the children’s welfare would be best promoted by remaining in the custody of the wife.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
•
Whether the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the violence and denigration by the husband of the wife was inappropriate and contrary to law.
•
Whether the trial judge erred in referring to the body of research as the articles cited did not constitute evidence before her and the parties were not invited to make submissions with respect to them.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court upheld the trial Judge's finding that allegations of domestic violence were relevant to custody proceedings and found that the reference by the trial judge to published social science literature about the impact of family violence on children was permissible as the published research was referred to as background information rather than evidence.
Evidence of family violence was held to be relevant in custody matters, to the extent that it assisted the court to determine what is in the best interests of the children, as its impact could be ‘profound and long-lasting’. The Full Court approved the comments by the trial judge that denigration and assault cause ‘considerable unnecessary strain’ to the victim and ‘may erode the confidence, dignity and self-esteem of the children’s other parent’. Baker, Kay and Tolcon JJ agreed with the trial judge that such conduct modelled inappropriate behaviour for children and could ‘impinge upon the quality of parenting able to be offered to the children’ and ‘reflects poorly upon the assailant’s capacity to provide children with a positive role model for their own behaviour and methods of resolving disputes and dealing with tensions and stress’.
Between: R Appellant/Husband and C Respondent/Wife [1993] FamCA 62 (25 June 1993); Russell & Close (Unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Fogarty, Baker & Lindenmayer JJ, 25 June 1993) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Meaningful relationship’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separate representative/independent children’s representative’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Appeal type: Appeal against access orders.
Facts: Post separation, an access arrangement for the two children of the relationship was established. The relationship between the parties deteriorated and the mother refused to allow the husband access to the children. One child was found to have been sexually abused, but it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. The mother believed that the father was the perpetrator, however the trial judge was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial judge made orders giving the father unsupervised daytime access to the children to reduce the risk of the mother from making unfounded allegations in the future. The father appealed against these orders. The mother did not challenge the orders, but cross-appealed in relation to findings of fact made by the trial judge.
Issue/s:
•
Whether it was open to the trial judge to make orders giving the husband unsupervised daytime access, where the court was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part. Amendments were made to the trial judge’s orders, clarifying the father’s access period and altering the proposed changeover location. The mother’s appeal against factual findings made by the trial judge and the father’s appeal against daytime access were dismissed.
The Full Court found that the relevant considerations when making access orders in cases involving sexual abuse of children were whether sexual abuse had occurred, whether the perpetrator could be identified, the potential risk of harm to the child from sexual abuse, the potential benefit to the child from parental access and the impact of the custodial parent’s beliefs on the welfare of the children. The Full Court said that the custodial parent’s beliefs regarding the child’s exposure to harm are relevant to the extent that they are likely to adversely affect that parent’s parenting ability and that a subjective test is used to assess the custodial parent’s beliefs.
The Full Court was satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to draw inferences regarding the likely future conduct of the mother. As the trial judge had found the mother genuinely believed the child had been sexually abused, that it was highly likely the mother would make further allegations of sexual abuse against the father if unsupervised overnight access was granted and that this risk did not apply to unsupervised daytime access, it was at the trial judge’s discretion to give the husband unsupervised daytime access.
Family Court of Australia
Bennett & Bennett [2021] FamCA 182 (21 April 2021) – Family Court of Australia
‘Abuse of children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Family violence evidence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Sexual abuse’
Proceedings: Parenting and property proceedings.
Facts: The mother and father separated in 2016. The father was found guilty of assault and aggravated indecent assault in relation to their children. He was also found guilty of multiple assault and intimidation charges against the wife and children.
Issues:
1.
Application to change the children’s surnames, issue of passports and overseas travel, and the father’s access to school information.
2.
Division of net available asset pool.
Decision and reasoning: Parenting and property orders made.
Parenting orders: It was in the children’s best interests that they eradicate their father’s name from their names, given the damage and violence he inflicted on them, noting that “[t]he children need to close this chapter in their lives and this is one practical way of assisting them to do so” (at [124]).
Property orders: The decision of Kennon v Kennon was highly relevant to the facts: “where there is a course of violent conduct during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant impact upon that party’s contribution to the marriage, this is a factor which the trial Judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions under section 79 of the Act.” As per Baker J in Kennon at [84]:
“The incidence of domestic violence in a marriage would generally be a relevant factor when a court comes to assess contributions…for the reason that the contributions made by a party who has suffered domestic violence at the hands of the other party may be all the more onerous because of that violence and therefore attract additional weight.”
The wife’s entitlement was to 95% of the property comprising of the following:
•
The husband’s violence and conduct towards the children and wife made her role as a parent and homemaker far more arduous than it needed to be. Her entitlement for past contributions was assessed at 70% being direct financial contributions, contributions as parent and homemaker, and solely since separation in the most difficult of circumstances (given the husband’s behaviour and offending).
•
In relation to her future needs, her contribution to the children post-separation would continue to be overwhelming. Moreover, “the husband’s conduct towards the children…made her parenting role more arduous as the children have suffered psychologically from their father’s violence.” She would be solely financially, emotionally and psychologically supporting the children for the next 6 years. An adjustment of 25%.
The husband was entitled to 20% of the pool, reducing the wife’s entitlement to 80%.
Pollard and Nordberg [2019] FamCA 365 (7 June 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged child victims’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’
Proceedings: Appeal against grant of recovery order.
Facts: The father had sought, and been granted, a recovery order for the return of the children following the mother’s unilateral removal of the children from the family home in Victoria. She took the children with her to her mother’s home in New South Wales. The mother alleged that the father has been violent to the children, independently of the allegations of his violent behaviour towards the mother.
Issue: Whether the recovery order ought to be revoked pending a final order hearing.
Judgment: Wilson J upheld the mother’s appeal against the father’s recovery order on the basis of family violence allegations against him, despite no expert report being admitted:
[155]If I dismiss the mother’s appeal, the recovery order will operate in such a way that the children are physically, and if necessary, forcibly, returned by police to the father in Victoria. If the allegations of family violence are proved at trial, that means I will order the children to be returned to a violent environment. It must not be overlooked that the mother has alleged that the father has been violent to the children, independently of the allegations of his violent behaviour towards the mother. I refuse to make an interim order returning the children to the father in circumstances where the father may at trial be found to have engaged in family violence. In my judgment this court must act protectively towards the children and remove them from any risk associated with family violence. To do so is consistent with the imperative recorded in s 60CC(2A).
Behn & Ziomek [2019] FamCA 298 (10 May 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Assault child’ – ‘Best interests of child’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relocation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Supervised contact’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Matter: Application for children’s orders for relocation, mother to have sole parental responsibility, supervised contact
Facts: The German national mother wished to return the Germany with the child. The court considered whether the child faced an unacceptable risk in spending time with the father.
Issue: Application for leave to appeal.
Decision and reasoning: Relocation allowed; mother to have sole parental responsibility.
McClelland DCJ accepted that the child faced an unacceptable risk spending time with the father because (1) he had an extensive history of coercive and controlling behaviour towards the mother, and (2) his controlling nature manifest itself in physical violence towards the child.
[200] His Honour accepted evidence that the father had a history of engaging in controlling and coercive conduct in respect to the mother and that that controlling nature had manifested in physical violence to the child. Matters found to constitute controlling and coercive conduct during the relationship included setting up a camera in their home, telling the mother an investigator was following her while she was overseas, questioning her presence at her brother’s wedding, frequent accusations of infidelity, inspecting her used underwear and telling her it tested positive for sperm; attending her medical appointments and attempting to sexually belittle mother by asking questions of and making comments alleging her infidelity to multiple doctors, sending her a divorce kit in response to an argument about money and financially controlling her by draining her bank account and using her credit card.
His Honour accepted that the father’s post-separation manner of conduct of the proceedings and behaviour questioning medical treatment of the child amounted to coercive and controlling behaviour, as did calling the police for seven times for unnecessary police welfare checks. His Honour also accepted that the father’s assault of the child was child abuse.
Frangoulis and Xennon [2019] FamCA 103 (28 February 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Anger management’ – ‘Application in a case’ – ‘Disputed compliance with therapy order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Substantially supervised contact’ – ‘Therapist's expertise disputed’
Matter: Father’s application in a case for reinstatement of contact with the three children X, Y and Z, additional make up contact and that the child X engage in re-unification therapy with the father with a therapist to be agreed or as nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
Facts: The mother alleged serious family violence against the father. A previous interim order required the father to engage with either Mr B or another therapist nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”). The parties were in dispute as to whether the father had complied, the mother disputing the professional expertise of the father’s chosen therapist, who was neither Mr B nor nominated by the ICL. The father contended the ICL approved the father’s proposal to undertake the therapy with Mr F.
Earlier orders provided for the father to have contact with the children supervised by Mr and Ms C in the first week on Saturday from 2:00pm until 5:00pm and in the second week on Sunday from 2:00pm until 5:00pm save and except that the father’s time with X is subject to her wishes. The mother stopped contact pursuant to that order alleging he had spent time with the children without supervision. Berman J had previously held that the father had contravened the supervision order.
The mother referred to a report of Mr B dated 28 August 2017 which observed:
“[the father] was not open to consideration of any difficulties with reactivity or emotional regulation. He was not open to consider any role that he might play in the conflict with [the mother] or any contribution to [X]’s difficulties or possible dilemmas that might arise for the other children. I have decided to terminate contact with [the father] after 2 visits, rather that continue for 6 consultations as had been initially ordered. I did not feel that further contact would enable any helpful resolution to this matter and was concerned that continued discussion might only serve to further entrench a fixed and limited position.” [17]
The mother unequivocally stated she would reinstate the father’s contact once he had complied with the therapy requirement. Berman J expressed surprise that the parties had been unable to negotiate a resolution to the issues in the application.
Decision: Inter alia, Berman J ordered:
1.
That the father will attend upon Mr F for a further two (2) sessions and at the conclusion of which Mr F will prepare a report directed to the following matters:
(a)
A summary of his expertise, experience or skillset in respect of family violence and anger management;
(b)
A report directed to the father’s engagement with therapy and focussing on anger management and family violence;
2.
That to assist with the therapeutic intervention by Mr F, the father will provide to him the following:
(a)
The report of Mr B;
(b)
The report of Ms D;
(c)
The judgments of 27 July 2018 and 19 November 2018.
3.
That upon the expiration of twenty one (21) days from the provision of the report by Mr F, indicating that the father has successfully engaged with counselling and therapy directed to family violence and anger management, the father’s time with the children will be reinstated pursuant to paragraph 1 of orders made 4 August 2017, with further amendment that his time with the children will only require the substantial presence of either Mr or Ms C.
Berman J considered the father’s application for reunification therapy with his child:
[49] … For reunification therapy to be appropriate I consider that there needs to be an assessment undertaken that would satisfy the Court that the potential risk to the child of engaging in what can be an intensive program is outweighed by the reasonable prospect of a successful reinstatement of X’s relationship with her father.
[50] The concept of reunification therapy is not a matter of abstract consideration but rather, should be the subject of evidence that it is a proper therapeutic process and will be undertaken by a practitioner with demonstrated expertise.
[51] A report should be obtained from the nominated practitioner that brings to account the issues raised in the proceedings and provides an assessment as to the prospects of success, limited or otherwise.
Farina & Lofts and Ors [2019] FamCA 27 (23 January 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Family violence evidence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Case type: Interim ruling.
Facts: The applicant and first respondent were in a de facto relationship for 14 years and have two children. They agreed that their respective contributions during the relationship (apart from the Kennon argument) should be regarded as equal ([8]-[10]). The first respondent alleged that the applicant’s conduct amounted to family violence, occurring during and subsequent to their relationship. Her evidence of such violence included a history of protection orders made against the applicant; allegations of physical, verbal, psychological, financial, emotional and mental abuse; allegations of property damage and animal cruelty; and allegations of exposing the children to family violence ([13]).
Issue: The applicant sought a ruling on whether or not family violence evidence relied upon by the first respondent sufficiently met the requirements of the Kennon principles and resulted in an ‘additional adjustment’ to the first respondent.
Held: Carew J ruled that the first respondent’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Court should make an adjustment on the basis of the Kennon principles. Her Honour stated that ‘[w]hile it is settled at law that family violence can be a relevant factor in determining contributions in property proceedings, the difficulty often faced by a trial judge is the inadequacy of evidence to support any relevant finding and adjustment’. Even if there is no direct evidence as to how the conduct affected the victim’s ability to make his or her contributions, the impact may be inferred provided that the evidence clearly supports it. A person’s conduct will be relevant if it has had a ‘significant adverse’ or ‘discernible’ impact on the contributions of another ([6]).
The applicant submitted that the evidence failed to demonstrate a discernible or significant adverse impact on the first respondent’s contributions ([15]). In relation to direct and indirect financial contributions, the first respondent deposed to finding it difficult to contribute financially because of the domestic violence inflicted upon her by the applicant. In relation to non-financial contributions for the welfare of the family, she gave evidence that the applicant also made it difficult for her to contribute as a ‘mother’ ([17]). The applicant further submitted that the first respondent’s evidence to occasionally feeling nervous or humiliated represented a personal impact on the first respondent, but fell short of establishing that those feelings had any discernible or significant impact on her ability to contribute ([18]).
Carew J noted that the need to establish ‘fault’ has been replaced by a ‘no-fault’ system in order to obtain a divorce or other relief, such as a property settlement or spouse maintenance. The repeal of the ‘fault’ based system avoids the humiliation and expense associated with presenting the necessary evidence ([22]). Nevertheless, according to the Kennon principles, there are circumstances where conduct will be relevant to the determination of a property settlement application ([23]).
Her Honour accepted the applicant’s submission that the evidence relied upon by the first respondent was insufficient to establish the impact of the conduct on her ability to make contributions or the quantification of that impact on her contributions, either expressly or impliedly ([24]).
Garrod & Davenort [2018] FamCA 825 (12 October 2018) – Family Court of Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Issue: Parental responsibility.
Facts: The mother alleged that the child was repeatedly struck by the father causing bruising and that the father engaged in intimidating conduct towards her and the child, often following drug use by the father. The father was subject to several intervention orders, none of which successfully prevented his violent and intimidatory conduct. One incident of violence followed the mother’s discovery the father had spent money set aside for payment of bills. The father was persistently in arrears of his child support obligations and viewed child support as a benefit to the mother.
The mother led evidence that the father’s conduct towards her and the child made her highly anxious. The child allegedly made disclosures to the mother in July 2014 after spending time with the father that ‘daddy hit me’ and ‘he was just angry and he hit me’. The following day, the mother alleged a bruise appeared on the child’s hip. [344]
Decision and Reasoning: The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, the father have no contact with the child and there be a moratorium on the father seeking further parenting orders for a period of two years. The father’s conduct towards the mother and the child had made the mother highly anxious.
It was held that that ‘the father’s behaviour ha[d] been manipulative and the violence, which has been physical violence as well as coercive controlling violence, insidious. It was often perpetrated in the presence of the child.’ [5]
Despite the father’s recent admissions regarding his conduct, the Court was unconvinced that he does not pose an unacceptable risk to the child’s safety and wellbeing.[5]
The Court considered the definition of ‘coercive controlling violence’. It was held that: ‘Coercive controlling violence is an ongoing pattern of use of threat, force, emotional abuse and other coercive means to unilaterally dominate a person and induce fear, submission and compliance in them. Its focus is on control, and does not always involve physical harm.’ [223]
Xuarez & Vitela (No 3) [2017] FamCA 1108 (22 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Child-related proceedings’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious proceedings’
Case type: Application by both parties for a vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Mr Xuarez and Ms Vitela (both pseudonyms) had been involved in court proceedings in relation to parenting orders for over 10 years ([7]-[21]). The father had filed 19 separate Applications in a Case between 11 April 2012 and 16 November 2017 ([16]), which were all dismissed, and Notices of Appeal in relation to the dismissals ([17]). Both the mother and the father filed applications for a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Issues: Whether the Court should make the vexatious proceedings order against the mother or the father or both.
Decision and Reasoning: The application made by the mother was granted, while the application by the father was dismissed. An order was made prohibiting Mr Xuarez from instituting proceedings against Ms Vitela or any of her legal representatives and dismissing all extant applications ([45]).
Justice Carew at [29] cites Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy & Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 to set out 11 principles to consider when making an order in relation to vexatious litigants. Applying the principles to the father’s conduct, Carew J highlighted the facts that most of the applications were instituted without reasonable grounds, the father sought orders that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make, and the repetitive nature of the applications amounted to an abuse of process ([34]). It was noteworthy that in 2010, the father was declared a vexatious litigant in another court, in relation to proceedings where the father stalked the mother’s former legal representative ([37]). These facts justified the order being made against the father.
Janssen & Janssen [2016] FamCA 345 (1 February 2016) – Family Court of Australia
‘Discretion to admit the audio recordings and transcripts into evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Recordings made without consent’ – ‘Serious allegations of family violence’ – ‘Whether recordings were reasonably necessary to protect lawful interests’
Proceedings: Application relating to the admissibility of evidence and application as to whether the rules of evidence ought to apply in a Family Court hearing.
Facts: On the first day of a four day hearing, counsel for the applicant (the mother) sought leave to tender voice recordings and transcripts that had been made without the knowledge of the father. Under s 7 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), it is unlawful to record private conversations without the consent of the parties to that conversation unless the recording of the conversation falls within one of the exceptions in s 7(2) and (3).
Issue/s:
•
Whether both the voice recordings and transcripts were admissible.
•
Whether there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ as per s 69ZT(3) requiring the proceedings to be determined according to the rules of evidence set out in the Evidence Act and not according to the procedures set out in s 69ZT(1) and (2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the FLA’).
Reasoning/Decision: First, McClelland J held that both the voice recordings and the transcripts were admitted in evidence under s 7(3) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (the recordings were reasonably necessary to protect the applicant’s lawful interests) and, in the alternative, under s 138 of the Evidence Act (the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence that had been obtained improperly).
McClelland J noted the ‘floodgates’ caution from senior counsel for the father i.e. that there was a danger of parties to a marital relationship experiencing difficulties surreptitiously recording their partner. However, in this regard, His Honour stated that his decision was very much one based on the facts of the case, including the allegations that the father had maintained a charming public face but had engaged in conduct within the family home that was alleged to have constituted family violence in terms of the provisions of s 4AB of the FLA. His Honour also had regard to the potential difficulty of obtaining evidence of family violence when it occurs behind closed doors without any witnesses present other than the perpetrator and victim. Further, His Honour noted that the recordings and transcript would be directly relevant to the issue of credibility as to whether family violence occurred in the proceedings (see [6]-[14]).
Notwithstanding the findings above, senior counsel for the father submitted that the Court ought to exclude the voice recordings (permitting the inclusion of the typed transcript) because the danger of the evidence being unfairly prejudicial to the father outweighed its probative value (s 135 Evidence Act). This was because the mother had knowledge and control of the recording and the circumstances in which the conversation occurred and was recorded. McClellan J dismissed this argument and held the voice recordings were admissible. This could be a matter for cross-examination by the father: Huffman & Gorman (No. 2). Further, His Honour noted submissions from counsel for the applicant and counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer that an important aspect of the evidence contained in the tapes was not simply what was said but how it was said. This was relevant to whether the father’s behaviour could be modelled or mimicked by the children and whether the parenting abilities of the primary carer had been compromised as a result of the content and tone of the communication (s 69ZN of the FLA) (see [15]-[23]).
Second, McClelland J held that the rules of evidence were to be applied in respect to the issues of the events on 10 September 2013 (these events were the subject of criminal proceedings) and to the issue as to whether the father made threats to the children or to the mother in respect to the children (s 69ZT(3)). For the remainder of the issues, the rules of evidence would not apply (s 69ZT(1) and (2)) and His Honour would therefore have the discretion to consider the probative value of such evidence. His Honour stated, ‘evidence in relation to the question of family violence will have to be established clearly, and matters of opinion put in appropriate context and given appropriate weight, depending upon who was expressing the opinion and on what basis, and the establishment of the necessary background facts’ (see [24]-[34]).
Sawyer & Sawyer [2015] FamCA 982 (10 November 2015) – Family Court of Australia
‘Application to discharge the icl’ – ‘Independent children's lawyer’ – ‘Legal practitioners’ – ‘Negligence or bias’
Proceedings: Numerous applications including an application to discharge the ICL.
Facts: The mother and the father separated in 2009.There were three children of their relationship. In 2012, a final parenting order was made with the consent of the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL). There was continued conflict between the parents. Numerous applications were considered by the court in this case in particular, an application brought by the father to discharge the ICL.
Issues: Whether the ICL had been negligent and demonstrated bias towards the mother?
Reasoning/Decision: The application was dismissed. Forest J referred to his previous discussion (in Dean & Susskind [2012] FamCA 897 at [19]-[28]) of the principles applicable to such an application:
‘…
The role is to be discharged independently and professionally, but it is not inconsistent with that duty for an ICL to make submissions to the Court that particular findings of fact, supported by the evidence, be made or that particular evidence be preferred over other evidence, or that a particular course of action be taken by the Court. It is also beyond doubt that an ICL’s duty to advance what he or she independently considers is in the best interests of the children in the case, does not require the ICL to slavishly follow what the children might want or what either one or both of the parents consider is in the best interests of the children.[20]
I consider it to be accepted principle that a court should be slow to remove or discharge an ICL simply where one party complains, in an unsubstantiated way, about the ICL because they do not like or accept the position being taken by the ICL overall or in respect of any particular aspect of the conduct of the case by the ICL. [21]
…
It will, in my opinion, be a matter of considering the evidence presented on each application for the removal of an ICL to determine if it demonstrates sufficient lack of objectivity and professionalism on the part of the ICL such as to justify his or her discharge. The mere appearance of partiality to a particular party’s position will not necessarily suffice to warrant the ICL’s removal. [26]
Parents, particularly in high conflict parenting litigation, must understand that as part of his or her role, the ICL may legitimately and responsibly say things that are challenging and confronting to the parent in respect of his or her views about parenting and the best interests of his or her children in the particular circumstances of the case, but that does not necessarily mean that the ICL is not acting in accordance with his or her duty in the case’. [27]
The father submitted a number of facts as evidence of bias. First, the ICL sought the appointment of a new, female report writer (Ms C). The father argued that the ICL failed to give him an opportunity to argue against Ms C’s appointment and, by retaining Ms C, evidenced ‘significant gender bias’ by removing ‘the only male person within our entire court process’. The fact that the ICL disagreed with the father on the issue of appointing a new family report writer, as she was entitled to do, did not prove that the ICL failed to adequately consider the father’s argument. Further, the selection of a report writer alone, who happened to be female, did not demonstrate or prove gender bias (see [58]-[63]).
Second, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated negligence or bias against him because she would not give him a copy of her instructions to the report writer. Forrest J noted that there is nothing in the Federal Circuit Court Rules or the Family Court Rules that obliges an ICL to provide copies of her instructions to an expert retained by her to each of the parents. Further, the father did not actually request the ICL to provide him with a copy of her instructions; he instead asked whether he would receive a copy of the instructions to which the ICL replied ‘you don’t see the letter of instruction’. In these circumstances, the ICL had not demonstrated negligence or bias that warranted her disqualification (see [65]-[70]).
Third, on the day of the interviews for the report, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated bias in directing the waiting arrangements in her office for the parents and children. Forrest J held that, at the interim stage, where the evidence invited a number of possible findings that could not be made without cross-examination of deponents, he was not in a position to say that the ICL had acted in a way that warranted her immediate discharge (see [71]-[78]).
Finally, the father asserted that the ICL was incompetent as well as negligent and biased against him. Forrest J was not persuaded by the father’s evidence and held that (see [79]-[81]):
‘It is most certainly not the case that where a parent might be able to point to a mistake made by an ICL that the Court will necessarily accede to an application by that parent to discharge that ICL. The authorities I have discussed clearly disclose that significantly more than that is required’.
Theophane & Hunt [2014] FamCA 1038 (24 November 2014) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family reports’ – ‘Impact of loss of relationship with parent’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection of the parent’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Statutory framework’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious proceedings’
Proceedings: Application for final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had one child together. During the relationship, the mother alleged that the father often forced her to have non-consensual sex with him. The parties separated and the mother obtained a DVO against the father. The mother initiated proceedings seeking parenting orders and over the next four years a number of parenting orders were made and amended. However, after an incident at handover, the wife formed the belief the husband would abduct or remove the child from her care, and she attacked the father whilst in a dissociative state. She was convicted of unlawful wounding and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, and immediately released on probation.
The applicant father sought orders for sole parent responsibility for the child, who would live with him and spend supervised weekend and school holiday time with the mother. He argued that the mother presented an unacceptable risk of sexual, physical and emotional harm to the child (the mother suffered sexual abuse as a child). At the time of these proceedings, the father was committed to stand trial on six charges of rape of the mother and one charge of grievous bodily harm against the mother.
The mother sought orders, supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, that she have sole parental responsibility for the child, who would live with her and spend no time, nor have any contact or communication with the father. She later amended her orders and sought to include provision for a card or letter for her birthday and for Christmas. The mother sought no contact as she believed any continued interaction between her and the father in relation to the child, was likely to adversely affect her capacity to parent the child.
Issue/s: What parenting order was in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made providing for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child and sole custody of the child, and for the father’s access and communication with the child to be limited to postal correspondence twice a year until the child turned eighteen. His Honour also made a vexatious litigant order against the father, restraining him from bringing further proceedings without leave of the court.
In relation to making a no contact order, his Honour stated that it is a serious matter that a child neither spend time with nor communicate with a parent. Accordingly, such orders ought to be restricted to cases where the outcome is plainly mandated in the best interests of the child, and no other regime of orders is appropriate or workable. Three scenarios were considered in which ‘no contact’ orders had been made in the past. First, these orders are commonly employed where the Court is satisfied that a parent poses an unacceptable risk of harm to a child. Second, ‘no contact’ orders have been made where the other parent entertained a genuine, but not necessarily reasonable, belief that such a risk of harm existed (on the basis of protecting the child from the consequences of that parent’s belief): Re Andrew. Finally, this approach was taken one step further in Sedgley & Sedgley where the Court held that while the welfare of the child may require some continuity of contact with the non-custodial parent, the need for peace and tranquillity in the custodial parent’s household may be a more compelling need for the child. However, a Court would only cut the relationship between the child and parent on such a ground with considerable hesitation (see [55]-[58]).
The best interest considerations in s 60CC let the court to determine the child live with her mother. His Honour accepted that by time the child turned 12 she would likely come into conflict with the father and was at real risk of harm from his coercive, controlling, dominating and self-serving personality traits (see [177]-[178]). Further, the father was to have no contact with the child except for a card/letter at Christmas and on the child’s birthday. It was found that the father deliberately calculated his interaction with the mother with a view to destabilising her mental health conditions, and even the smallest opportunity for debate or conflict with the mother would be seized upon by the father. If the mother was required to continue to interact with the father in any form of co-parenting, there was a substantial risk that she will either attempt to kill herself, attempt to kill the father, or both.
It was ultimately decided that the prospect and magnitude of the risk of harm to the child if her mother was required to maintain contact with the father far outweighed any benefit the child would obtain by a continuation of any time or communication with her father. It was held that the best interests of the child lay with making a no contact order.
In relation to family violence, his Honour was satisfied that on occasion the father had engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with the mother. However, it was both unnecessary and undesirable to make a finding regarding the father’s conduct in relation to the criminal offence of rape (see [168]-[169]). However, the father’s controlling and domineering behaviour was considered and had bearing on the court’s decision for no contact (see [170]-[171]).
His Honour considered each of the many proceedings instituted by and conducted by the father and was “satisfied that on numerous occasions, either the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously or they have been conducted vexatiously.” He was “therefore satisfied that the father has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings.”[243]
At [246] his Honour stated:
I am satisfied that many of the applications that the father has brought or prosecuted in relation to the mother have been vexatious, although I accept that some, on occasion, have had merit. Some have been vexatious in the sense that they were intended to harass and intimidate the mother into either a further destabilisation and perhaps dissociation, or to attempt to otherwise coerce her to his will. Some were vexatious as being without reasonable foundation. Some may have been both.
And at [248]:
I accept that it is a grave matter to deny a parent the opportunity to litigate in relation to their child. However upon analysis, my order does not prevent the father doing so per se: if there is a legitimate basis for further litigation, sufficient to warrant a grant of leave, then he may do so. However he cannot be trusted with the unfettered right to issue proceedings against the mother in relation to the child, because he will abuse it. For that reason, any application for leave should be, in the first instance made ex parte: s 102QE(4).
Note: this case was confirmed on appeal, see Theophane & Hunt and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 87.
Cannon & Acres [2014] FamCA 104 (6 March 2014) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious litigant’ – ‘Views of the child’
Proceedings: Parenting orders and vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Over many years, the mother and the 12 year old child experienced harassment, physical violence and stalking behaviour by the father. The father had little or no insight into the impact of his behaviour on the child. This was the third final parenting hearing. The current proceedings were brought about by the father in circumstances where the application was doomed to fail. Seeing the profound impact of these fresh proceedings on her mother, the child resolved that she no longer wanted to see or communicate with her father. Benjamin J was satisfied that the views were her own.
Issue/s:
•
What parenting orders were in the best interests of the child?
•
Whether in the circumstances of this proceeding a vexatious proceedings order should be made and if so the nature and extent of that order.
Reasoning/Decision: In making parenting orders, Benjamin J noted that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s 61DA of the Act did not apply because there were reasonable grounds to believe here that the father had perpetrated family violence. This family violence included the father’s entrenched pattern of behaviour (referred to by a psychologist), the father’s stalking behaviour, the verbal abuse, harassment and the assaults by him on the child. Further, shared parental responsibility could not effectively operate given the views of the child, the approach adopted by the father and the impact upon the mother. Accordingly, Benjamin J made an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child (see [379]-[384]). Benjamin J also made an order that the child spend no time with the father and have no communication with the father (see [387]-[404]).
Benjamin J made a vexatious proceedings order prohibiting the father from instituting further proceedings without leave. This order was made under s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). At [420], His Honour noted that the fundamental differences between the old section (s118) and s 102QB were: (1) the test was no longer a court having frivolous or vexatious proceedings before it but rather whether or not there was a history of a person having frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings; and (2) Vexatious proceedings were now defined by statute in s 102Q(1).
To make an order under s 102QB(2), Benjamin J noted at [438] that a two part threshold test needs to be met, namely:
•
That there have been vexatious proceedings instituted or conducted in Australian courts or tribunals; and
•
That the person, in this case the father, has frequently instituted or conducted such proceedings.
Applying this test, Benjamin J proceeded in three parts. First, His Honour determined a number of proceedings initiated by the father constituted vexatious proceedings on the facts (see [441]-[481]). Second, His Honour held that the proceedings amounted to the father ‘frequently’ instituting and conducting vexatious proceedings. In making this determination, Benjamin J noted that the test of ‘frequently’ was used as opposed ‘habitually and persistently’. The term ‘frequently’ is a relative term and is to be considered in the context of the facts of an individual case and, in this case, in the context of the litigation between these parties. This test was said to be satisfied on the facts (see [482]-[494]).
Finally, with the threshold being met, Benjamin J considered whether to exercise the discretion set out in s 102QB(2) of the Act and make a vexatious proceedings order. His Honour noted that a vexatious proceedings order must be considered in the context where there is a need to balance the serious step of restricting a person from commencing proceedings against the need to protect the mother and the child from the constant impact of litigation. In the circumstances, a vexatious proceeding was made (see [495]-[540]).
Modlin & Anstead and Anor [2013] FamCA 955 (6 December 2013) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family reports’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parental capacity’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection of the parent’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Single expert report’
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and the father, who both had compromised mental health: the mother diagnosed as Bipolar and the father also being previously diagnosed as Bipolar, had two children together. Both children had intellectual and developmental disabilities. The parties separated and reconciled several times before final separation, with the mother obtaining Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders (ADVO) on a number of occasions. The father breached one of these orders in February 2010 by breaking into the mother’s home and assaulting the mother. He was charged and spent time in a psychiatric facility. The mother formed a relationship with another man (‘the stepfather’). In 2011, one of the children went temporarily missing in a National Park under the care of the father, the father deliberately sent photographs of his penis to the mother, and one of the children told the mother that the father swore at her. Contact ceased between the father and the children and the mother received victim’s compensation in relation to domestic violence by the father. Proceedings were commenced in relation to the parenting of the children.
Issue/s: It was agreed that the mother and the stepfather would have parental responsibility for the children. However, some of the remaining issues were –
•
Whether the father should have shared parental responsibility or no responsibility for the children;
•
Whether or to what extent the father should spend time or communicate with the children.
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made giving the mother and stepfather equal shared parental responsibility for the children, giving the father no parental responsibility, making provision for the children to live with the mother and stepfather and to have no contact with the father, restraining the father from approaching the children, their school and residence and the parents from discussing proceedings with or near the children.
The Court found that the s 61DA presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply as the father engaged in family violence. Further, in relation to the children’s best interests, including consideration of the evidence about family violence, the Court determined that in any case the presumption would be rebutted on the evidence. It was held that any further contact between the father and the mother would destabilise the mother and prevent her from being able to adequately care for the children (see [197]-[205]). Additionally, on this basis, it was ordered that the father spend no time with either child (see [206]-[210]).
Loughnan J also made a number of orders restraining the father from communicating with the children or the mother or stepfather. These orders were necessary for the physical and mental protection of the mother, especially in light of the evidence of family violence. However, Loughnan J ordered that, if required, the father communicate with the step-father through a post office box and be notified if the family relocated from the region (see [217]-[232]).
Schieffer & Schieffer [2013] FamCA 168 (20 March 2013) – Family Court of Australia
‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Inconsistency of parenting orders with existing family violence order made by state court’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Intersection of legal systems’ – ‘Living arrangements’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Protection orders’
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The parties separated and made consensual arrangements for the care of their child. In June 2012, the father detained the child citing a belief that the child had been sexually abused by the mother’s partner. Subsequently the mother, having happened upon the child and the father’s partner, attempted to detain the child herself. This resulted in an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) being made against the mother in favour of the father’s partner. It applied to the child and the father as well as they lived with Ms E.
The mother refuted the allegation of sexual abuse but her relationship with her partner had ended and the mother acceded to an order precluding any future contact between the child and her former partner. The father then contended that the mother’s deteriorated emotional state constituted a further risk of harm to the child and militated against the child’s return to live with the mother.
Issue/s: What orders regarding the residence of the child and shared parental responsibility were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court was persuaded to make an order for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, consistent with their mutual wish, the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s suggestion and the Family Consultant’s recommendation (see [95]-[100]). His Honour ordered that it was in the child’s best interests to live predominately with the mother. Although both parents were equally capable of meeting the child’s intellectual needs, he considered that the mother was better able to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs (see [106]). The child was to spend substantial and significant time with the father (see [105], [109]-[116]).
The parenting orders were inconsistent with the existing family violence order, as the AVO prohibited the mother from approaching and contacting the child or the father. Although the order made an exception for contact that occurred pursuant to the Act, it was only for the restricted purpose of ‘counselling, conciliation, or mediation’. It was noted that where the terms of the parenting and family violence order were inconsistent, the parenting order should take precedence to facilitate communication between the parents regarding the child and to ensure the child was exchanged for periods of contact (see [91]-[94]).
Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012) – Family Court of Australia
‘Court to consider family violence (60cc)’ – ‘Family violence in property proceedings’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Property proceedings’
Proceedings: Application for property orders.
Facts: The parties married and lived together for 19 months. They had one child. The husband contributed the bulk of the capital to the marriage and was on a far superior income. The wife had cared for the child since separation, nearly eight years prior. During the marriage, the husband perpetrated family violence against the wife on five occasions, over a period of 15 months. This caused the wife to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The wife claimed the family violence made her contributions in the role of homemaker and parent significantly more arduous. The husband had financially supported the wife and the child during the period since separation.
Issue/s: Whether the court should make a Kennon style adjustment in the property settlement proceeding?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court referred to the Full Court in Kennon where the principles regarding family violence making contributions more arduous lie. The Full Court’s further refinement of the Kennon principles in Spagnardi & Spagnardi was also noted (see [138]-[144].
The Court discussed the approach regarding family violence in property proceedings as broken down into three steps: (1) Make findings of fact about one party’s conduct; (2) (If applicable) make findings about the physical or psychological effect of the conduct on the other party; and (3) Make findings of fact about the effect of the conduct of one party upon contributions made by the other party. It was also noted that it could not be assumed in a particular case that an effect on a party’s condition automatically means there is an effect upon the party’s contributions. At trial, the wife had to establish to the judge’s satisfaction a connection between any proven family violence in the case and the contributions she made (see [145]).
On the facts, Watts J first concluded that the wife’s contributions in the role of homemaker and parent during the period over which the violence took place were made significantly more arduous by the violence of the husband. Second, while His Honour also held that the wife’s role as parent post-separation was made significantly more arduous by the family violence during co-habitation, His Honour observed that it was more difficult to make such an assessment. The wife did experience apprehension and heightened emotion around dealing with the husband’s time with the child after the separation. However, the effect of violence on contributions was not constant over the previous eight years, with the wife’s post-traumatic stress disorder having significantly dissipated (see [174]-[179]). Accordingly, it was appropriate to increase the wife’s assessed contributions by 25 per cent for the duration of the relationship and by 5 per cent post separation to take account of the effect of the husband’s conduct on the mother (see [179].
Russell & Russell [2012] FamCA 99 (7 March 2012) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged breach of indian dowry law’ – ‘Dowry’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Final parenting and child orders’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Overseas relocation to india’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Rebuttal of presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Relocation’ – ‘Sole parental responsibility order’
Matter: Application for final parenting and child orders.
Proceedings: Final parenting and child orders hearing, including application for overseas relocation.
Facts: The mother had limited English skills, poor work prospects and no family support in Australia and there was a high level of conflict between the parties exacerbated by cultural issues. Both parties’ extended families remained in India. The mother alleged a history of family violence perpetrated by the father against the mother. The father stated that it was his intention to remain in Australia regardless of the final outcome. There were allegations that India’s dowry laws had been breached by the demand for and payment of dowry by the wife’s family to the husband’s family.
Issue: Was the presumption of shared parenting responsibility rebutted? Ought the mother be allowed to relocate to India with the child?
Judgment: Presumption of shared parenting responsibility rebutted, relocation allowed.
Young J found the presumption of shared parental responsibility was rebutted due to the conflict between the parties, their lack of communication and cultural issues.
The mother was permitted to relocate to India where she had family support available.
Kreet v Sampir [2011] FamCA 22 (18 January 2011); (2011) 252 FLR 234; (2011) 44 Fam LR 405 – Family Court of Australia
‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Marriage occurring in a country other than australia’ – ‘Nullity application’
Proceedings: Nullity application.
Facts: Ms Kreet (the wife), an Australian born woman, married Mr Sampir (the husband) on June 2009 in India. She travelled to India with her parents believing she was going to marry her Australian boyfriend, Mr U. Upon arrival, her parents confiscated her passport and was introduced to Mr Sampir. Her father told her that he would have Mr U’s sisters and mother kidnapped and raped if she refused to marry Mr Sampir. Under duress, the wife married Mr Sampir and submitted his Australian visa application to the authorities. She returned to Australia, resumed her relationship with Mr U and withdraw her sponsorship of the respondent’s visa application. She obtained an indefinite Intervention Order against her father.
Issue/s: Whether the marriage was void?
Reasoning/Decision: Section 23B(1)(d) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) states that a marriage is void if ‘the consent of either parties is not real consent because: (i) it was obtained by duress or fraud; (ii) that party is mistaken as to the identity of the other party or as to the nature of the ceremony performed; or (iii) that party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
While the legislation does not define duress in the context of a marriage, Cronin J found that ‘there was no reason to give it any other meaning than that which is normally known to the law. It must be oppression or coercion to such a degree that consent vanishes: In the Marriage of S (1980) FLC 90-820’ (see [39]).
Cronin J was satisfied that ‘the wife’s physical state at the time of the ceremony was such that she was physically and mentally overborne. Her consent was not real because it was obtained by duress’ (see [43]).
Harridge & Harridge [2010] FamCA 445 (4 June 2010) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father of the two children subject to the parenting proceedings was convicted of three offences involving child pornography.
Issue/s: What parenting orders were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, it contains observations relevant to risk assessment. The Court held that an allegation of potential risk of harm ought not to divert the court from the central task of assessing the best interests of the children. At [53] Murphy J quoted from an article by psychiatrist and barrister, Mahendra, who stated that risk assessment in any situation involves, in essence, asking the following questions:
•
What harmful outcome is potentially present in this situation?
•
What is the probability of this outcome coming about?
•
What risks are probable in this situation in the short, medium and long term?
•
What are the factors that could increase or decrease the risk that is probable?
•
What measures are available whose deployment could mitigate the risks that are probable?
Maluka & Maluka [2009] FamCA 647 (24 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Matter: Application that mother have sole parental responsibility, the children live with the mother, the mother be permitted to change the children’s names and relocate without notice to the father, that the father be restrained from bringing applications in relation to the children for a period of time.
Facts: The mother alleged serious history of domestic and family violence throughout the history of the relationship, including “serious assaults of the mother, stalking, vandalism to property of the mother and her present partner, intimidation, threats of violence (including a history of death threats), verbal abuse, controlling behaviour, isolation and dominance”[4] such that the mother and children live in terror of the father and have done for years.
Held: Mother have sole parental responsibility for the children and they reside with the mother, the mother be permitted to everything necessary to change the children’s surnames, the mother be permitted to relocate the residence of the children to any place in Australia without notice to or permission of the father, the father be subject to a restraining order.
[396] “In many ways the facts as between the parties that I have determined in this case fit most, if not all, of the indicators of coercive controlling violence. The father has used coercion, control, violence, intimidation and threats throughout the relationship, including after separation. He seeks to intimidate and control the mother with the attendant violence, abuse, isolation and aggression. From time to time he focuses this on the children. He dominates and controls the children, particularly X, but his behaviour with regard to Y and her reaction to his verbal abuse of her in June 2008 is indicative of his continuing coercive controlling violence.
[397] The father exercised economic power to control and manipulate the mother and effectively the children. He endeavoured to isolate mother and in effect continues to do so. In that process he denies or minimises his involvement and culpability.
[399] The effect of that long term violence, control and manipulation imposed by the father on the mother has from time to time undermined the mother’s parental authority and undermined her parenting role…”
Note this case was subject to further litigation, although the judge’s comments about the type of family violence experienced were not challenged. See for example Maluka & Maluka [2011] FamCAFC 72; (31 March 2011).
HZ & State Central Authority [2006] FamCA 466 (7 June 2006) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: The mother’s appeal against orders made by Bennett J on 11 April 2006 requiring the return to Greece of three children, C, D and E pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.
Facts: The mother was an Australian-born woman of Greek parentage and the father was Greek. They met and married in Greece and throughout the marriage the mother and three children resided with the father’s parents in Greece. With the father’s consent the mother brought the children to Australia for what she said was a holiday and conceded that the habitual residence of the children was Greece. There was evidence of threatening text messages from the husband to the wife and the eldest child’s evidence of the father’s violence and threatening behaviour towards the mother and his own mother in the presence of the children supported the mother’s allegations.
Grounds: The trial judge erred in failing to find that Article 13(b) (grave risk of physical or psychological harm or place them in an intolerable situation) and Article 13(c) (the eldest child’s views should be taken into account) should prevent the return of the children.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The court was unable to identify error in the trial judge’s decision.
The court acknowledged the limitations of the Hague Convention in cases where domestic and family violence is alleged:
[48] The operation of the Convention which has the effect of potentially sending a mother back into a situation of risk to her own physical wellbeing has been a matter of significant academic criticism …
[75]…As we have already indicted, the return of these children to Greece was anticipated to be in their mother’s company. She had found accommodation for herself remote from that of the father. She led no evidence to suggest that the Greek authorities would be unable to provide her and the children with appropriate protection pending her utilising lawful means to relocate the children from Greece. The finding by the trial Judge that the mother had not persuaded her that the return of the children to Greece would raise a grave risk of harm to the children or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation was a finding clearly open to the trial Judge.
[78]…Given that these were children who were born in Greece and had spent effectively the entirety of their life in Greece until the mother unilaterally determined to retain them in Australia, Greece was clearly the appropriate forum for issues relating to the welfare of these children to be determined. In those circumstances it was appropriate for her Honour to place significant weight on the first of the objects referred to in Article 1 of the Convention namely the prompt return of the children who had been wrongfully retained in Australia.
T and N (2003) FLC 93-172; [2003] FamCA 1129 (4 November 2003) – Family Court of Australia
‘Anger management course’ – ‘Applications’ – ‘Applications and orders for child residence, contact and parenting orders (in fam law proc)’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Consent orders’ – ‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Inadequate undertakings’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Judge refusal to accept consent orders for unsupervised contact’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘Parenting proceeding’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’ – ‘Women’
Proceedings: Orders sought by consent for supervised and unsupervised time with the father
Facts: The parties had two children. There was a history of violent and abusive conduct by the father against the mother and one of the children (including that he bit the child as a baby). This resulted in a number of periods of separation and reconciliation, with a number of Apprehended Violence Orders being brought against and breached by the father (see [17]-[24], [27]-[28]). The father also regularly smoked cannabis (see [25]-[26]). In April 2001, the mother left the family residence without notice, taking the children with her. At the hearing, the parties attempted settlement. The parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer proposed consent orders for children to progress from supervised to unsupervised to block periods of time with the father, who would give undertakings regarding his conduct, discipline of the children, substance use and participation in an anger management course.
Issue/s: What orders were appropriate in the best interests of the children?
Decision and Reasoning: Moore J declined to make the consent orders as proposed as the untested evidence raised concerns for the judge that the orders may not be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the judge made orders by consent for supervised contact only. The allegations against the father indicated him to be a violent and abusive person who represented a high risk of harm to the well-being of the mother and a high risk of harm to his children.
While Her Honour acknowledged that the parents’ consent to arrangements about their children is a powerful, and in most cases a deciding, factor, consent does not displace the obligation of the Court to make orders that are in the best interests of children (see [39]). Moore J also expressed her concern that the Independent Children’s Lawyer would provide support for the proposed consent orders in the face of behaviour that had the potential to place the children in serious jeopardy and in light of orders that would give no protection whatsoever to the children (see [40]).
M & M [1998] FamCA 1742 (12 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Contact’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on children’ – ‘Inability to acknowledge inappropriateness of behaviour’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Supervised by court’
Proceedings: Contact orders.
Facts: The parents had two children together (B and E) and the mother had another son from a previous relationship (D). The children had witnessed violence by the father against their mother, siblings and extended family. The father had several convictions for assault against the mother and one against D, and had been subject to AVOs. After separation, B and E lived with the father, with interim orders made for the mother to have contact with the children. At trial, the parties agreed that B and E should live with the mother but a number of issues were left to be determined. At hearing, a counsellor gave evidence that both children displayed concerning behaviours consistent with early onset and repetitive physical violence.
Issue/s: One of the issues was what contact should the children have with the father?
Reasoning/Decision: On the evidence, the Court held that it was in the children’s best interest that all but in the very short term they should have no contact with the father. Orders were made to reduce contact over the space of 12 months to minimise the distress that could be caused to the children by immediate complete separation (see [96]-[100]). The Court held that the father’s abusive behaviour presented a ‘multi-faceted danger for the children’ including danger of injury as well as “fear, insecurity & vigilance”. It was held there was a risk of the children learning behaviour from the father which would affect their future interactions e.g. the daughter accepting abuse as part of life and the son believing violence is acceptable. See [94]-[95].
In the Marriage of JG and BG (1994) 122 FLR 209; (1994) FLC 92-515; (1994) 18 Fam LR 255 (30 September 1994) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Impact of domestic violence on children’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Parenting’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Parties represented by counsel’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Facts: The case concerned the custody of two children aged four and two. The wife alleged that the husband had been physically and verbally violent towards her on a number of occasions.
Issue/s: What is the relevance of family violence in custody, guardianship and access matters?
Decision and Reasoning: The court accepted that the relevance of family violence will vary according to the nature of the proceedings.
Chisholm J went on to consider the relevance of family violence in proceedings relating to children. His Honour considered at [257] that although it is ‘not the objective of the law in custody and similar proceedings to punish wrongdoers or to provide compensation or redress for victims’, family violence is by no means irrelevant. His Honour held that ‘[family violence] is to be taken into account if it is relevant to the determination of the child’s welfare, which is the paramount consideration’. The standard of proof is the civil standard on the balance of probabilities. However, the conduct of a parent is relevant in custody matters only to the extent that it relates to the welfare of the children.
Where violence is directed at the children themselves, or occurs in the presence of the children, it is obviously and directly relevant to their welfare (see [260]). However, other forms of violence could also be relevant to the welfare of the children such as violence affecting the custodial parent, threats, etc. The Court must assess the nature and extent of the harm in light of the evidence and findings before them. See [261].
The Court also stated that it may be possible for the court to decline to make findings in relation to family violence, where it could determine the case without reference to them.
In the Matter Of: Re K Appeal [1994] FamCA 21; (1994) FLC 92-461 (10 March 1994) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged murder of mother by father’ – ‘Custody’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Over-emphasis of conduct of father’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Prejudice’ – ‘Separate representation’ – ‘Welfare of child’
Matter: Father, grandparents and paternal aunt’s appeal against orders granting sole guardianship and custody of the child to the maternal aunt and permission for her to remove the child from Australia to the United States where she resided.
Facts: The mother died and the father was charged with her murder and was awaiting trial at the time of the hearing before the trial Judge. Those proceedings concerned applications by the maternal aunt and the paternal grandparents and aunt for custody of the only child of the marriage. The applicant father indicated that he supported the application of the grandparents and paternal aunt that they be granted custody of the child. The trial Judge made a finding that on the balance of probabilities the husband shot the wife.
Grounds:
Husband:
•
As he was unrepresented and awaiting trial for murder the trial judge should have made interim rather than final orders, exercised his discretion to stay or adjourn the proceedings, or at least adjouned final determination until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
•
The trial judge failed to give reasons or adequate reasons for his decision to make final orders.
•
It was neither necessary or desirable for his Honour to have made the finding that the husband shot the wife.
Grandparents and paternal aunt:
•
The trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of Mrs Holmes in support of the appellants’ case, particularly in relation to methods of dealing with grief in eastern European families.
•
The trial judge over-emphasized the conduct or involvement of the husband in the wife’s death and this influenced him against the proposals of the appellants.
Intervention by Commonwealth Attorney-General:
The case warranted the appointment of a separate representative pursuant to s 65 of the Family Law Act because (a) permanent removal of the child from the jurisdiction was contemplated which would likely lead to cessation of any contact with the father; and (b) the relationships between and circumstances involving the parties and interveners.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
In considering the Attorney-General’s intervention, the Full Court (Nicholson CJ, Fogarty and Baker JJ) suggested guidelines for appointment of separate representatives for children involved in proceedings, one of which was that separate representatives should normally be appointed where there is an apparently intractable conflict between the parents:
[95] In this regard we lay stress upon the words "intractable conflict". There is a dispute of course in all contested custody cases and there is usually a degree of conflict, but we have in mind that category of cases where there is a high level of long standing conflict between the parents. In such cases the child is very much a pawn in the dispute and is often used as such by either or both parents. In these circumstances we think it important that the child have the support and assistance of an independent person and that the Court similarly have the assistance of such a person to present the child's point of view.
[96] If the child is alienated from both parents, the need for such representation is obvious. Where the child is alienated from one of them, this may or may not be for good cause and may have been largely brought about or contributed to by the conduct of the parent from whom the child is not alienated. In most cases it seems to us to be highly desirable for the child to have access to a person independent of the conflict who will have his or her interests at heart and who will be capable of assisting the child and putting both the child's view and submissions as to the child's best interests to the Court: see Law Council of Australia (1989) "Law Council Submission on Role of Separate Representatives" Vol. 4 No. 4 Australian Family Lawyer, 15. In this regard we also see the separate representative as having an investigative role which may be of great assistance to the Court. Further, the separate representative may well, in this and the previous category of cases, perform the role of an "honest broker" as between the child and or the parents.
Murray & Director of Family Services ACT [1993] FamCA 103 (6 October 1993) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Motorcycle gang’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons’
Matter: Appeal against Hague Convention return order.
Facts: The husband was a member of the New Zealand motorcycle gang known as “the Mongrel Mob”. The mother brought her children aged five, four and two to Australia from New Zealand. Her evidence was that she was the victim of several violent attacks which included head butting, punching, kneeing her at the base of the spine. She had received death threats. The acts of violence either took place in the presence of or in close proximity to the children.
She said the husband had an arsenal of weapons which included firearms, knives, chains and meat cleavers and was likely to use the weapons against her. The husband whilst admitting to a ‘turbulent’ relationship with the wife and some incidents of violence said her claims were exaggerated. The trial Judge had rejected regulation 16(3)(b) defence commenting that it was not possible to determine the veracity of the allegations and that the evidence relating to them would be available only in New Zealand.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
The Full Court in rejecting the mother's appeal characterised the evidence as:
“almost entirely directed at the prospective threat to the wife of a return to New Zealand and more particularly to a return by her to Dunedin.” [170]
They said:
[171] Whilst there is nothing that requires the wife to return to New Zealand, it is obviously desirable and from the point of view of the children that she does so. However, there is no requirement imposed by this court that she or they must return to Dunedin. It is open for her to return to another part of New Zealand where the danger to her may be less and it is of course open to her to seek orders from the New Zealand courts both for personal protection and interim and final custody immediately upon her arrival in New Zealand. She can also, if she wishes, seek leave from the New Zealand court to take the children to Australia.
[172] As his Honour pointed out, New Zealand has a system of family law and provides legal protection to persons in fear of violence which is similar to the system in Australia.
[173] It would be presumptuous and offensive in the extreme for a court in this country to conclude that the wife and the children are not capable of being protected by the New Zealand courts or that relevant New Zealand authorities would not enforce protection orders which are made by the courts.
[174] In our view and in accordance with the views expressed by this Court in Gsponer's case, the circumstances in which Regulation 16(3) comes into operation should be largely confined to situations where such protections are not available…
[175] For us to do otherwise would be to act on untested evidence to thwart the principal purposes of the Hague Convention which are to discourage child abduction and where such abduction has occurred to return such children to the country of habitual residence so the courts of that country can determine where or with whom their best interests lie. These children are New Zealand citizens who have lived all their lives in New Zealand and it is for a New Zealand court to determine their future.
In the marriage of Merriman and Merriman [1993] FamCA 115; (1994) FLC 92-497; (1993) 116 FLR 87 – Family Court of Australia
‘Allegations of violence and abuse’ – ‘Interim custody application’ – ‘Issues of welfare of children and stability’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Proceedings: Interim custody application
Facts: Parties married in 1978 and separated under one roof in March 1993. There are 2 children of the marriage aged 13 and 9 at the hearing. There was corroborated evidence of violence perpetrated by the father on the mother. The husband was convicted of assault upon the wife earlier in the same year of the hearing. He was “ordered not to assault, molest or interfere with” the mother. Regardless of these orders he continued to contact the mother and make threats to her and her family. The husband also verbally abused and belittled the mother in front of the children during the marriage. There were also multiple occasions of physical abuse throughout the marriage. Since separation the husband had given the 13 year old daughter Rohypnol and shared a bed with her. He was advised by the Department of Community Services not to do this. Also post separation, the father took out a life insurance policy for the mother. The mother moved from the matrimonial home to her mother’s house in June 1993. The children remained with the father.
Issues: In light of the father’s history of domestic violence and threats, what interim arrangements should be made for the care of the children?
Reasoning/Decision: Due to the violence of the father, the Court held that he was a risk to the children both physically and developmentally (he is an “inappropriate role model”). It was held that the children were to remain in the former matrimonial home to “preserve stability for the children and for their safety” and their mother was to have interim care of the children. The father was restrained from coming within 2 miles of the home due to “serious concerns as to the safety of the wife and the children”.
Federal Circuit Court of Australia
Khoury and Ganem [2021] FCCA 869 (1 April 2021) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Allegations of serious family violence’ – ‘Application for no contact with father’ – ‘Application for sole parental responsibility’ – ‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Child present’ – ‘Child's fear and anxiety’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control ** financial abuse’ – ‘Criminal charges’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Independent children's lawyer’ – ‘Parenting applications’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Social isolation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to family’ – ‘Threats to kill family’
Matter: Parenting applications: father’s application for interim orders that he and the child X attend ongoing reunification therapy at his expense and subject to the recommendations of the therapist, he spend supervised time with X; mother’s application that she have sole parental responsibility for X, X reside with her and X only spend time with the father in accordance with X’s wishes. The Independent Children’s Lawyer sought orders in the terms proposed by the mother, and a restraint on the father attending X’s school. Earlier final parenting orders made by consent had provided for X to have graduated contact from supervised contact to each Thursday to Sunday. Between 2013 and 2015 the father had sporadic contact with X and each alleged the other was to blame for the lack of contact. Proceedings were recommenced in 2018 and orders made for the parties and child attend therapy with a view to reunification. The reunification therapy was unsuccessful with the therapist reporting the session was terminated early due to the father’s inability to focus on the child’s feelings or regulated his behaviour in response to the child, pressuring the child who was crying and distressed, despite the therapists attempts to encourage the father to engage in behaviour which was not experienced by the child as threatening.
Among other orders the father sought orders for reunification therapy in circumstances where the mother argued it was not in the child’s best interests to see the father because of controlling behaviours, disrespect of women and extreme religious beliefs [98]. The father denies the mother’s allegations.[99]
Decision: Inter alia X reside with the mother, the mother have sole parental responsibility and the father have contact in accordance with X’s wishes, the father be restrained by injunction from attending or being within 500 metres of any school X attends, the mother obtain therapeutic counselling for X to better address her fears and anxieties.
Per Bender J:
[100] As has been set out in this judgment, therapeutic reunification counselling to assist in rebuilding the relationship between X and the Father was not successful and was a distressing and unhappy experience for X.
[101] [expert witnesses] both expressed the view that a further attempt at such therapy could be too distressing for X, especially given her current levels of anxiety and fear and her resistance to spending any time with the Father.
[102] Therefore, the real question for this Court is whether the risk to X of a meaningful relationship with the Father is outweighed by the emotional and psychological risk to X in forcing her to undertake further counselling in the hope that a relationship with the Father might be achieved.
Boden & Boden [2018] FCCA 82 (25 January 2018) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility rebutted’ – ‘Unacceptable risk of harm’
Proceedings: Contested parenting application.
Facts: The father was physically violent and verbally abusive to the mother and children ([79]). There were two Domestic Violence Orders in favour of the mother ([217]). The two eldest daughters suffered from depression and anxiety, cut themselves, and had self-esteem issues ([2]). The youngest son was diagnosed with autism, but the father refused to accept the diagnosis, and refused to make arrangements to reduce the son’s emotional distress ([162]).
Issues: Parenting orders to be made.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Willis identified ‘grave concerns’ about the father’s ability to regulate his emotions and about his parenting skills to independently parent ([248]). The children had ‘suffered catastrophically’ from their parents’ separation and their exposure to the family violence ([2]). Due to the father’s admissions to family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted ([238]).
Judge Willis remarked at [247]:
I have the impression that the mother has significant insight into her own behaviour and that of all of the children. She is acutely aware and has the skills to deal with Z and Y cutting themselves, of them suffering depression and anxiety and having self-esteem issues. Some of these issues will, no doubt, be directly related to their exposure to family violence. Day in day out, experts in this Court talk about the effect of family violence in children and their inability to sustain relationships, become depressed and blame themselves for breakdowns. All of these things have happened for Y and Z.
Judge Willis ordered that the father undertake an anger management course, and that the mother undertake a Domestic Violence course in relation to the cycle of violence ([232]-[233]). The judge ordered that the son have limited contact with the father (see Orders).
Atkinson & Atkinson (No 3) [2016] FCCA 2284 (2 September 2016) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parental responsibility’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Matter: Mother’s application for residence, sole parental responsibility and contact for child X; Father’s application for residence, sole parental responsibility and contact for child X.
Issues: Best interests of child, whether the Father has been violent towards the Mother; and whether the Mother suffered from any mental illness or disorder which “significantly negatively affects her parenting”.
Facts: Each party’s evidence was that the other was not an appropriate parent. The mother alleged the Father perpetrated family violence against her and the Father alleged the mother had a mental illness or disorder which caused her to manufacture malicious allegations against the Father. The father had engaged in a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour by repeated texts and telephone calls and at least one late night attendance at her home. The Court expressed concerns that the Mother’s reports of the Father’s domestic violence towards her to hospital staff following hospital attendance whilst injured and pregnant were not investigated by the Department of Family and Children’s Services of New South Wales (“the Department”) as the parties had resumed their relationship when the mother refused service.
It emerged in cross-examination of the Father that he had failed to disclose his involvement in other litigation, in the Family Court with his ex-wife and various local courts in relation to other family violence matters. The Father had made repeated groundless, repeated, repeated allegations against the Mother to Police, the Department and various medical practitioners. He also failed to comply with procedural and counselling requirements expeditiously.
Decision and reasoning: Ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and reside with the mother, the father to have contact. The father denied all allegations against him and had a complete lack of insight into the impact of his behaviour.
The allegations raised by Mr Atkinson at various points in the proceedings have, on their face, appeared highly concerning. The Court has, accordingly, proceeded with some caution and consumed vast resources in the determination of serial Interim Applications. When each of those allegations, serious on their face, have been examined they have been found wanting substantial, if any, support. Indeed, the actions taken by Mr Atkinson in seeking to obtain evidence, photographing the child, presenting the child to a Doctor on a weekly basis and presenting the child to the Police, is, upon the evidence as it has unfolded, far more injurious to the child than that complained of. The repetition of those behaviours is a far greater concern as to future risk than anything complained of as regards the mother.[440]
In light of the findings that have been made by the Court regarding the perpetration of family violence by Mr Atkinson upon Ms Atkinson, it would be entirely unreasonable and onerous to impose upon Ms Atkinson a burden to consult and endeavour to make joint and consensual decisions with Mr Atkinson. To that end and whilst it is submitted on behalf of Mr Atkinson that the Court should find that these parents have “differing parenting styles rather than family violence”, I make clear that this submission is rejected. What has occurred in the relationship between Mr and Ms Atkinson is, I am satisfied, family violence.[473]
Corby & Corby [2015] FCCA 1099 (16 April 2015) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Recorded conversations’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Whether recordings were reasonably necessary to protect lawful interests’
Proceedings: Application for the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: On the first day of the final parenting hearing in relation to the parties’ only child X, counsel for the mother sought the Court’s leave to tender four short audio recordings of conversations between the mother and father that took place prior to separation. The mother accepted that these recordings were made without the knowledge of the father, that they are ‘private conversations’ and were therefore prima facie made in contravention of s 7 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). However, counsel for the mother submitted that the recordings were admissible because the recordings were ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect her lawful interests (s 7(3)) or, alternatively, the evidence ought to be admitted under s 138(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) because the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of doing so.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the recordings were reasonably necessary to protect the mother’s lawful interests and consequently, admissible?
•
Whether the recordings ought to be admitted on the basis that the desirability of the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting the evidence?
Reasoning/decision: Sexton J held that the mother’s conduct was lawful under s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) and therefore the recordings were admitted on this basis. In making this finding, Sexton J held that first, s 7(3)(b)(i) was satisfied in relation to the term ‘lawful interests’ as the mother had the right to protect her interest not to be intimidated or harassed, and not to be forced to respond to the father’s demands for sexual activity: DW v R (see [19]-[23]).
Second, Sexton J was satisfied that the recordings were ‘reasonably necessary’ (‘reasonably appropriate’ as opposed to ‘essential’ and judged objectively at the time of the recordings) to protect those lawful interests: DW v R. Here, the mother made the recordings for the purpose of having evidence which she could use to convince others to believe her, or to corroborate her word, or to protect herself and the child from further behaviour. Sexton J stated that, ‘[w]hile the complainant in the present case is an adult, she was, if her evidence is accepted, caught up in an abusive relationship with a man who damaged her self-worth and left her miserable and exhausted. If this was so, as the Court found in R v Coutts, it may not have been a realistic option for her to report her predicament to police and obtain a warrant for conversations with her husband to be recorded’ (see [29]). The evidence also disclosed that the father may have had a very different public face to his private face. The mother was not trying to obtain a confession but to establish her credibility if there was ever a dispute about what actually happened (see [24]-[31]).
Although the matter did not turn on the issue, Sexton J also considered whether the evidence should be admitted on the basis that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting the evidence. Sexton J concluded that had it been necessary, she would have exercised the discretion to admit the evidence for a number of reasons including that the evidence was highly probative to making parenting orders in the best interests of the child, the allegations were extremely serious and it was necessary for the court to determine if the child was at risk in the father’s care, the impropriety of the mother in making the recordings was not of the “worst kind”, and it was “unlikely” the mother could have gained consent to make the recordings (see [32]-[36]).
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) Appellate Division
Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 (20 December 2024) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) Appellate Jurisdiction
Appeal from Pickford & Pickford (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 500
‘Parenting’ – ‘coercive control’ – ‘coercive and controlling behaviour’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders
Grounds: The grounds for appeal put forward by the father included:
•
The primary judge erred in concluding that an intention on the part of the perpetrator is not a necessary component of coercive or controlling behaviour (Ground 1 - rejected)
•
The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in coercive and controlling conduct, and in particular in relation to the findings made at paragraphs 2.1 to 2.6. The grounds of appeal centred on the primary judge’s apparent finding that the existence of coercive and controlling conduct could be centred solely upon the mother’s “experience and perception” of the conduct (Ground 2, 3, 4 & 5 - successful)
•
The primary judge erred when making findings about the father’s influence of the children’s expressed views (as were relevant to s 60CC(3)(a)) on account of there being no evidence to support the finding (Ground 6 – successful)
•
There was a denial of procedural fairness arising out of the dismissal of the father’s application to re-open the evidence whilst judgment was still reserved (Ground 7 – successful)
•
Two orders (Orders 10(i) and 10(j)) were not sought by either party or the Independent Children’s and were made without warning to them, thereby depriving them of the chance to be heard in respect of the orders (denial of procedural fairness). Without reciting them, the orders reciprocally provide for the children to spend time with each party on the parties’ respective birthdays (Ground 8 - rejected)
Facts:
The parties were married in 2014, and their two children were born in 2015 and 2017. The parties separated in late 2018, and the mother and children remained in occupation of the former family home (at [246]). Proceedings were commenced by the mother in 2019. Numerous sets of interim parenting orders were made in July 2019, May 2020, August 2020, December 2020, and June 2021. The last of those orders in June 2021 were made with the parties’ consent and required the children to spend substantial time with the father, comprising four nights per fortnight in school terms and parts of the school holidays. No further interim parenting orders were made before the trial started in February 2023.
The trial concluded in February 2024, though written submissions were then filed in July 2024. Judgment was delivered in late July 2024. The parenting orders (Orders 1–33) conferred sole parental responsibility for the children upon the mother, declared the children will live with her, and made provision for the children to spend substantial time with the father, comprising four consecutive nights per fortnight in school terms, one-half of all school holidays and other special occasions. The level of ‘parental conflict’ militated against the father’s proposal for the children to live with the parties for equal time (at [194]–[196]) or, for that matter, even any increase in the amount of time they spend with him (at [197]). However, the children’s meaningful relationships with the father (at [114] and [116]) meant they must still spend a substantial amount of time with him.
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the final parenting orders and remitted the matter for retrial
•
Majority judgment: Aldridge, Carew JJ and Mccelland DCJ
•
Dissenting judgment: Austin and Williams JJ
Reasons:
Ground 1: The Majority found that intention, whilst potentially a decisive factor, is not an essential element of a finding that behaviour was “coercive or controlling” [2]. The majority held that the definition of “family violence” in s 4AB is both remedial and protective and should not be artificially read down by artificial limitations ([43]; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority). According to Aldridge and Carew JJ at [50]-[51] “The definition of family violence is necessarily broad and any interpretation that may be perceived to, or actually, create unnecessary hurdles to an alleged victim proving an allegation of family violence should be avoided… the statutory focus is simply on behaviour that coerces or controls and not the intention of the perpetrator.”
Grounds 2, 3, 4 & 5: These grounds focus on the appellant’s contention that “the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in coercive and controlling conduct” and, in particular, the primary judge erred in finding that the following conduct amounted to coercive and controlling conduct:
2.1. The appellant opposing the respondent’s request for partial property settlement
2.2. adhering to Orders in relation to the payment of school fees, and in acting in a manner agreed to by the respondent
2.3. the appellant’s application for an injunction in relation to [the respondent’s friend]
2.4. the appellant had unreasonably maintained an application for equal time and maintained proceedings simpliciter
2.5 the position adopted by the appellant in relation to certain proposed medical treatment for [the elder child]; and
2.6 the position adopted by the appellant in relation to mental health concerns related to the respondent
There was no challenge that the appellant engaged in coercive or controlling behaviour in respect to surveilling the respondent and the family home from late 2019, using a company called U Company (at [78]). However, the appeal highlighted problems with other findings. These concerned the broader allegations of coercive or controlling conduct, where the primary judge seemed to rely heavily on the mother’s "experience and perception" of the appellant's actions. The appeal court agreed that while the mother's perspective is relevant, a more detailed and contextual analysis of whether the appellant's behaviour could be regarded as coercive or controlling was necessary. It emphasised that coercive and controlling behaviour requires a thorough evaluation of the conduct, its form, intensity, context, and its impact on the person, rather than relying solely on one party’s perception.
Ground 6 This ground argues that the primary judge wrongly found the father had influenced the children’s views about spending more time with him, as there was no evidence to support this. The expert only met the children once when they were aged two and four and too young to express meaningful views (at [133]). The trial had no updated evidence on their views as the mother resiled on the agreement for an updated report. The judge critically noted ‘…that the father has subtly but persistently sought to create opportunities from which [the elder child’s] views could be inferred’ [135]. The appeal court found that the judge’s impression was not based on any evidentiary foundation and could be considered speculative. The ground of appeal was successful.
Ground 7 “Ground 7 is a complaint of the father’s denial of procedural fairness arising out of the dismissal of his application to re-open the evidence whilst judgment was still reserved. The complaint is well founded” [72].
Ground 8 Ground was unsuccessful and considered “trifling and unworthy of appellate attention” [71]. According to Aldridge and Carew JJ at [71], “Judges are obliged to make orders under Pt VII of the Act which promote children’s best interests, not to simply choose between the alternate suites of orders proposed by the parties (U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 at 263 and 284–285).” Whilst procedural fairness must be observed by giving parties a chance to respond to unheralded orders that could not be reasonably anticipated, these orders do not fall within this category.
Carter and Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9 (10 February 2023) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)
‘Appeal from order for equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Context of coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Controlling conduct’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Father perpetrator’ – ‘Findings of family violence’ – ‘Genuine concerns for child's welfare’ – ‘Limitation of contact’
Matter: Mother’s appeal from order for equal shared parental responsibility.
Facts: A final parenting order made 8 April 2022 provided that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for their child, X, born in 2016. The order was made subsequent to a consent order which provided for a graduated increase in the father’s contact with the child to the point he spends alternate weekends and one night in the alternate week with the father. The father had been physically violent towards the mother on one occasion and the father accepted that he had held his hand over his older daughter, Y’s mouth to prevent her screaming. No criminal charges were laid re Y’s allegations but she was named as the protected person in a protection order issued against the father and had not had contact with him since September 2017. The primary judge held that the father’s admission of violence against the mother was relevant to the determination that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply to the matter. The primary judge held that the mother’s conduct in limiting the time the child spent with the father and her insistence upon supervision amounted to controlling conduct for the purpose of the definition of family violence in s4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Held: Appeal dismissed, costs certificates issue in favour of the mother, the father and the independent children’s lawyer.
The primary judge’s error in finding that the mother’s behaviour amounted to controlling conduct did not impact the result of the case, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
McClelland DCJ and Campton JJ) observed that ‘controversially… the primary judge also found that the mother’s conduct in limiting the amount of time the child spent with the father and her insistence upon such time being supervised amounted to controlling conduct for the purpose of the definition of family violence as set out in s 4AB of the Act’ [6], noting:
[16] In the context of the facts and circumstances of this case, we respectfully agree with Bennett J that the conduct of the mother in limiting the amount of time that the child spent with the father could not reasonably be determined to be coercive or controlling conduct for the purposes of s 4AB(1). In that respect, there was no finding that the mother’s concerns for the welfare of the child were other than genuine in the context where she had herself been the subject of one violent assault by the father and had witnessed the father’s admittedly unacceptable conduct towards Y. There was no finding that the mother acted capriciously or maliciously. Indeed, as noted by Bennett J, the mother was acting in accordance with orders of the Court after 30 January 2019.
[17] The mere fact that the mother’s conduct in limiting the child’s time with the father could fall within the example provided in s 4AB(2)(i) does not, in and of itself with nothing more, condemn the conduct as being family violence as defined in s 4AB(1). Context is all important. There was no finding that the mother was acting other than protectively towards the child. Such conduct, in the context of the Act, which has a strong focus on the promotion of the welfare of children and protecting them from being exposed to violence, cannot, in our respectful opinion, in the circumstances of this appeal, reasonably ground a finding of family violence as defined in s 4AB of the Act.
Bennett J observed:
[71] Section 4AB of the Act is drafted in very wide terms in order to catch behaviour which is thought to be undesirable. In so doing, the section also catches behaviour which is both acceptable and necessary (for example, exerting control over a child in the exercise of the parenting powers). Therefore, in practical terms and save for blatant acts of family violence, an evaluation of evidence to ascertain the context in which alleged behaviour took place may be a precondition to the Court characterising behaviour as family violence within the meaning of s 4AB. Contextualising the behaviour calls for findings of fact.
[85] In placing the mother’s behaviour in context, I assume that the relevant period during which the primary judge found that the mother’s behaviour constituted family violence was from the child’s birth until the first parenting order, that is, from 2016 to 30 January 2019. However, there is no analysis of evidence or reasoning by the primary judge as to why the mother’s behaviour around the child spending time with the father “initially” (or otherwise) is evaluated as behaviour that controlled the child in the sense contemplated by s 4AB(1) as family violence.
[87] Whilst it is uncontroversial that the mother did not allow unsupervised time between the father and the child when she and the father were living separately and apart prior to orders being made, the primary judge does not identify the extent to which the father’s limited participation in the first three years of the child’s life is attributable to the mother’s behaviour, or why the control exercised by the mother was not consistent with steps taken by a parent who is acting protectively.
[88] The primary judge refers to the mother’s behaviour as controlling of the child, the father and of the child’s relationship with the father. However, his Honour’s reasons do not include an analysis of the evidence or findings about the respects in which he was satisfied that the mother’s behaviour exceeded legitimate parental control and should be characterised as family violence.
Isles v Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 (1 July 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Child exploitation material’ – ‘Child protection’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Family law parenting’ – ‘Risk of sexual abuse of child by father’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Sexual interest in children and adolescents’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Use of tendency evidence’
Matter: Appeal against family law parenting decision.
Facts:
The appellant father and first respondent mother had four children. When he was nearly 7, their eldest son alleged that his father had sexually assaulted him. As a result, the mother sought to prevent the father from having access to all four children. The father argued that the mother had encouraged the son to make false allegations against him. The mother agreed to consent orders allowing the father to have unsupervised access to the children knowing that the second respondent, the Department of Communities, would intervene to prevent this [66]. The independent children’s lawyer was also party to the proceedings.
At trial, the central issue was whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children [69]. The primary judge found that, although it was not possible to find on the balance of probabilities that the father had perpetrated the abuse, he posed an unacceptable risk to the children and contact should be supervised [75].
Grounds:
(1) In relation to the standard of proof, the primary judge misapplied s140 of the Evidence Act (balance of probabilities in civil cases) and should have made a finding about unacceptable risk on this basis.
(2) In relation to tendency evidence, the primary judge considered tendency evidence that should not have been admitted under Part 3.6 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), regardless of the father’s failure to object [98].
Held: Appeal dismissed.
The court noted the comprehensive and prescriptive requirement to consider “unacceptable risk” when making parenting orders:
[58] …s 60CG of the [Family Law] Act [1975] exhorts courts to avoid making orders which expose any person to an “unacceptable risk of family violence” and, when determining how children’s best interest will be advanced, s 60CC(2)(b) of the Act obliges courts to heed any need to protect children from physical or psychological harm through their subjection or exposure to “abuse”, “neglect” or “family violence”, for which purpose the terms “abuse” and “family violence” are very widely defined in ss4(1) and 4 AB of the Act respectively.
(1) On the standard of proof, the primary judge was correct in separating the need to make a finding on the balance of probabilities in relation to fact (ie did the father sexually assault his son?) and the question of future risk (ie is the father an unacceptable risk to the children?) [83]. While the question of future risk is ‘evidence-based’ and ‘not discretionary’ [85], the court held that even if the risk were only possible, not probable, it would be unacceptable [86].
(2) On tendency evidence, under Part VII of Family Law Act (children), large tranches of the Evidence Act do not normally apply [88]. However, given that the mother and Department sought a finding that the father had committed the criminal offence of sexual assault, the primary judge decided under s69ZT(3) before proceedings had commenced that the Evidence Act would apply [91]-[93]. The relevant tendency evidence was the father’s apparent sexual interest in other adolescents and his alleged interest in child exploitation material [103]. Although the father could have objected to the admission of this evidence at trial, he did not and so could not object on appeal [95, 97]. Despite the admission of this evidence, the primary judge was unable to find that the father had committed the sexual assault, so the appeal court held that the father had suffered no prejudice [103].
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) Family Law
Campi and Ferrin [2022] FedCFamC2F 1621 (24 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Application in a proceeding’ – ‘Best interests of the children’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Family report’ – ‘Interim hearing’ – ‘Parental alienation’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Reportable intensive family therapy’ – ‘Significant risk of psychological harm’
Matter: Mother’s application in a proceeding, seeking orders for reportable intensive family therapy to be conducted by Dr B. to address alleged parental alienation of the mother by the father.
Facts: The children resided with the father and there was evidence the children’s relationship with the mother was fractured and the children had been resistant to contact with the mother since March 2022 when they last had supervised contact with the mother at a contact centre. It appeared the children had refused to participate in contact pursuant to a consent order made September 2022 that the younger child have unsupervised contact with the mother from after school until 7 pm each Friday afternoon which the older child could join if he desired. The court was unable to consider the mother’s allegation that the father had alienated the children from her in the interim hearing.
Newbrun J considered proposals for children to attend intensive family therapy in the context of mother’s allegations of parental alienation by father:
[9] The Court has a real concern that the children may be exposed to a significant risk of psychological harm if they participate in the intensive therapy Reportable Intensive Family Therapy (“RIFT”) model proposed by the Mother to be afforded by the psychologist Dr B. And further, the Court has a real concern that should the children be required to participate in the proposed intensive therapy RIFT model that they may well become even more resistant to spending time with the Mother; if this risk comes to pass, then the prospect of restoring the children’s relationship with the Mother may become even more difficult.
[38] As to the Mother’s proposed order that Dr B be permitted to conduct intensive four day family therapy RIFT model [Reportable Intensive Family Therapy], and provide an expert report in relation to the issue of parental alienation, the Court is of the view that such an order would not be in the best interests of the children, and nor would such an order be in the interests of justice, and in reaching these views, and in summary, takes into account the following matters having regard to rule 7.04 and section 13C(1)(c) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):
(a)
The Court’s concern that the children may be exposed to psychological harm if subjected to the proposed intensive four-day family therapy RIFT model;
(b)
The lack of material before the Court relating to risk screening of the children prior to participating in the proposed intensive family therapy;
(c)
The lack of material before the Court relating to the nature of the proposed intensive family therapy;
(d)
The lack of any independent evaluation of the proposed intensive family therapy;
(e)
The content of the Family Report does not suggest that expert evidence from a clinical psychologist such as Dr B and/or further family therapy is required to elucidate the issue of parental alienation;
(f)
The Family Report writer, appointed under section 62G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to provide a Family Report, is well able to provide appropriate evidence and opinions in relation to the issue of parental alienation (the Family Report writer, refers to and/or discusses the issue of parental alienation in paragraphs 76, 100, 102, 104, 108, 111, 112, 113 albeit she does indicate that the Court needs to conduct a further assessment of this issue). The Court is of the view that it is not necessary in this case for it to have a range of opinion on the issue of parental alienation;
(g)
The content of the Family Report does not refer to and/or support Dr B’s proposed intensive four day family therapy RIFT model.
Wylder v Wylder [2022] FedCFamC2F 1366 (9 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Best interests of child’ – ‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Covert recording’ – ‘Manipulation’ – ‘No contact order’ – ‘Parenting’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Selective misrepresentation’ – ‘Social media’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Weapons’
Case type: Appeal against parenting order.
Facts: The father was an Australian resident who met and married the mother in Country B. They moved to Australia where their daughter was born in 2017. The father made repeated notifications to the Department of Child Safety alleging that the mother used corporal punishment to discipline the child contrary to Australian standards [44], [68]. From videos posted on social media by the father, it was evident that the father did not listen to the child and coached her to make allegations of violence against the mother [56], [111]. The mother did not speak English well and she yielded to the father’s demands to agree to his unsupervised contact with the child in consent orders [26]-[30].
In previous proceedings the Court ordered the father be assessed for drug and alcohol use but he refused to participate [19]. In a search of the premises executing a recovery order for return of the child, police found weapons at the father’s house and charged him with offences under the Weapons Act [36]. In 2015, the father was self-medicating with anti-anxiety drugs when he admitted himself as an inpatient in a mental health unit. He said he had daily intrusive thoughts about killing the mother [124]. He discussed with other inpatients a plan to stalk his treating psychiatrist with intent to harm him and his family [129]. The father’s mother (ie the child’s paternal grandmother) applied for a domestic violence order against the father in 2019 [143]. The Court considered that there was ‘ample evidence’ that the father had engaged in family violence towards the mother [149].
Issue: The best interests of the child.
Held: The Court ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, that the child live with the mother and that the mother be permitted to relocate with the child. The Court ordered that the father should have no time and no communication with the child.
The mother did not pose a risk to the child [116]. After an intervention by police and a social worker, the mother changed her approach and reduced her reliance on physical discipline [67]. The child was happy living with the mother [290].
The father was assessed by a forensic psychiatrist as being a high risk of suicide and murder-suicide, including kidnapping and absconding with the child, and an even higher risk to others generally [234]. He was also assessed as having a narcissistic personality and an anti-social personality disorder [219]. His postings on social media and abusive threats against his wife were in breach of a court order and he demonstrated contempt towards the Family Court and legal processes [305].
Although the father claimed to be the victim of physical violence from the mother, what concerned Judge Vasta was the father’s coercive control of the mother:
1.
However, it is not the spectre of physical violence that concerns this Court; rather, it is the spectre of coercive control. Whilst it had been documented that the parents had separated on occasions, the mother said that the father spoke to her in such a way that she felt compelled to return to the relationship. The father denies any such conduct.
2.
What has been of concern is the documented history of the litigation. It is incongruous that the mother would make the complaints that she made during the previous filing in this Court (BRC 11666/2019); have a Court make an order that mandated supervised visits between the father and the child; and, then choose to ignore that and, instead, come to a compromise solution with the father that gave him unsupervised equal time with the child.
3.
There seems to be no other rational explanation for this other than the father implementing coercive control over the mother to the extent that she felt that she had no other choice but to comply with the father’s demands. The judicious use of covertly recorded conversations with one parent by the other parent and then referring to selective excerpts is a feature that is often found in cases of coercive control.
4.
In this case, the father did give to the Court such selective recordings. The father pointed to one particular recording where the mother made an “admission” that the father was the favoured parent by the child. In another recording, the mother “admitted” that the father treated her like a queen. In another recording, the mother is said to convey that she arranged custody arrangements for her financial benefit. In a further recording, the mother has “conceded” that she was “not going back to court again”. And in a final recording, the mother “admitted” that the father would never hurt his daughter.
5.
These recordings were used by the father to intimidate the mother into not pursuing any parenting matter because these recordings would be used against her, as if they were repudiations of her stance. Of course, they have little evidentiary value as they are excerpts from a larger conversation upon which the Court has no information, and therefore, no context.
6.
The behaviour in making constant notifications to the Department of Child Safety can also be seen as a manifestation of the coercive control. Further, posting the videos to social media can also be seen as a manifestation of coercive control. One such video records a “Tik Tok” dance that the mother had uploaded to social media. The father recorded himself watching the video where the father made derogatory comments suggesting that the manner of solo dancing in the video was not befitting that of a woman who had a boyfriend, let alone a woman who was a mother.
7.
….
8.
The father will attempt to draw the child into his world; a world where the mother is evil and cannot be trusted and a world where institutions such as the police and the Courts are malevolent and must be resisted. This was perfectly illustrated by the manner in which the father dealt with the child when making the videos. He ignored what the child was saying and imposed his own version of the facts and would not brook any variation to that. The child will never be truly free under the care of the father and she will not have the opportunity to grow and experience life because she will be made to conform to his world view.
9.
And this is just part of the danger that the father represents. The evidence that the father planned to do harm to his treating psychiatrist because that psychiatrist would not support his application for a pension is concerning enough. But when this is added to the father’s manipulation of the mother to avoid having to endure supervised visits with the child, the reaction of the father to police attempting to serve him with the police protection order, the obsessive determination with which he wished to expose a “rapist” at the school, his Facebook comments to a Member of Parliament as to his capacity for violence and the nonchalance with which he violated a Court order and injunction about posting on social media, the jeopardy at which he places X cannot be overstated.
10.
There are absolutely no safeguards that the Court could put in place that would allow the father to have any form of contact with X and yet keep the child safe.
11.
It is never an easy task for a Court to make orders that prohibit contact between a parent and child, however there are those rare cases where such an order is the only order that can be made in the best interests of the child. This is one of those cases.
Ramzi & Moussa [2022] FedCFamC2F 1473 (4 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Application that child spend no time with a parent’ – ‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Cultural and spiritual abuse’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Economic and financial abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic violence’ – ‘Fear’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Impact on mother's parenting capacity’ – ‘Injunctive orders’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Mitigation of risk’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘No time ordered’ – ‘Parenting arrangements’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Poor literacy skills’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Sole parental responsibility’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: The proceedings were for the determination of parenting arrangements for a five-year old child (X) of the two parties.
Issue: The parties agreed that the child should live with the mother. However, at issue was:
1.
Whether the mother should be ordered to return to Melbourne with the child;
2.
How parental responsibility for the child should be exercised;
3.
Whether the father poses a risk of harm to the child;
4.
If the child is to spend time with the father in Melbourne, how much time should be allowed and should it be supervised
The alleged risks posed by the father were that:
1.
X had been exposed to and would be exposed to family violence;
2.
He had engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;
3.
Orders allowing contact may pose a risk to the mother’s caring capacity.
Facts: The mother left her home country at a young age for another foreign country for an arranged marriage with the father and the couple later moved to Australia. The mother had only a basic level of education and spoke very limited English.
The parties separated after living together in Melbourne for two years. The mother applied for a protection order and the child (X) lived with her. Pursuant to an interim parenting order, X spent a few hours of supervised contact with his father each week. Subsequently, unsupervised contact was ordered with changeover at a supervised contact centre. The mother was late to changeover on several occasions and eventually stopped bringing X altogether before moving with the child to Sydney.
The mother made extensive allegations of family violence against the father which occurred over the course of their marriage and afterwards. These included coercive and controlling behaviour, physical abuse such as choking and beatings, sexual assault, threats and humiliation (both from the father and family/community members), monitoring her movements, denying her economic autonomy and depriving her of liberty.
The alleged risks posed by the father were that:
1.
X had been exposed to and would be exposed to family violence;
2.
He had engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;
3.
Orders allowing contact may pose a risk to the mother’s caring capacity.
Reasoning: Beckhouse J accepted the mother’s account, finding that:
•
family violence was established (Family Law Act 1974 (Cth) s4AB(1)); and
•
the risk of X being subject or exposed to violence outweighed the benefit of having a meaningful relationship with his father (s60CC).
Beckhouse J stated that it was not necessary to make factual findings about the occurrence of each alleged individual incident ([202], s4AB(1)). The lack of eye-witnesses, inconsistencies and delayed reporting were not an impediment, particularly given the cultural barriers to disclosure. The mother’s evidence was detailed and specific, corroborated by external agencies and was understood in the context of the cyclical nature of family violence and her cultural and personal background. The father’s ‘blanket denials’ offered no plausible explanation or alternatives.
Beckhouse J found that this risk could not be ameliorated. The father had displayed a lack of responsibility for his conduct and demonstrated no desire to change. His extensive familial and community support network was viewed as a ‘double-edged sword,’ as the paternal family potentially helped conceal his conduct and he failed to understand how ongoing communication with the maternal family impacted the mother.
It was determined that contact orders would cause the mother stress and anxiety, to the detriment of her parenting ability. Given this and the risk that X would be leveraged as a weapon, both supervised time and video communication were deemed unviable.
Orders: The child reside with the mother and she have sole parental responsibility. The child have no contact or communication with the father, the child be removed from the international travel watchlist and the mother be permitted to obtain a passport for the child and travel overseas without the father’s consent.
Additionally, the father was permitted to send X a birthday message every year.
Backhouse J noted at [243] that in establishing whether a person is ‘fearful’ under s4AB(1): “fear can arise from a culmination of events and patterns of behaviour”.
Backhouse J observed at [202]:
…There are some specific individual characteristics in this matter that lead me to place less weight on inconsistent versions of events given by the mother. English was not the mother’s first language. She was poorly educated. She spoke through an interpreter. I cannot be satisfied she would have understood how domestic and family violence is defined in Australia.
Federal Magistrates' Court of Australia
Heilig & Cabiness [2011] FMCAfam 97 (2 March 2011) – Federal Magistrates’ Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parental responsibility’ – ‘People affected by drug misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Separation’
Issue: Contact.
Facts: Orders for the children to reside with the mother and have alternate weekend contact with the father had been made following trial in 2003. The father has multiple criminal convictions for violent family violence offending against numerous former partners which predated the first trial for which he was convicted after the 2003 trial. The father commenced the current proceedings by filing a contravention application, which related to his lack of contact in accordance with the 2003 orders for a seven-year period (a portion of which time he was in custody serving a term of imprisonment for violent offending against the mother and two other former partners). Interim orders suspended all previous contact orders. The father sought orders for contact and to receive updates on the children’s educational progress.
The father had a long history of illicit drug consumption, controlling abusive behaviours to domestic partners, had mental health issues and conceded that, at the time of the hearing, had no meaningful relationship with the children. It was also conceded that the children were present in the same building in which quite serious family violence occurred up until 2004, though it was not conceded that the family violence was necessarily perpetrated against the mother.
Decision and Reasoning: It was ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, the children reside with the mother and have no contact with the father.
At [30], the Court favourably refers to research quoted in the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal on the Crown manifest inadequacy appeal in relation to the father’s sentencing, cited as R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) at [77]:
An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control: J Stubbs, “Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence and Family Violence”, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House, Issues Paper 9, 2004, pages 6-7.
It was concluded, on the basis of the father’s criminal history, the children’s fear of and lack of relationship with their father that no order for contact or communication should be made. The children were found to be at risk of psychological or physical harm if their relationship with the father was to resume.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
1807390 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 4216 (5 October 2022) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Ability to leave abusive relationship’ – ‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Cultural and spiritual abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of decision to refuse protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Facts: The female applicant and her husband were in an arranged marriage in Sri Lanka. Over the course of the marriage her husband was physically violent – including striking and choking her,– he humiliated her, verbally abused her with sexual language, tormented her about her religion and forced her to do sexual acts. He prevented her from contacting her family over a17 year period. The husband was emotionally and psychologically abusive towards their daughter and on one occasion threw their 8-year-old son against the wall when the applicant disobeyed him. Given her husband’s respected status as a doctor and the lack of responsiveness of the Sri Lankan police to domestic violence reports, the applicant never reported the conduct.
She fled to Australia in 2012 on the pretence of visiting her son and daughter who had moved here to study, ceased contact with her husband and subsequently applied for a Protection Visa.
Issue: Did the applicant have a well-founded fear of persecution from her husband upon returning to Sri Lanka such that she was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations as a refugee pursuant to s36(2)(a) Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Decision and reasoning: The tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that she was subjected to domestic and family violence from her husband in Sri Lanka and she had a well-founded fear of persecution. The tribunal acknowledged that some confusion and possible exaggeration from the applicant in giving evidence “may be attributable to the impact of past trauma and her psychological disorder, as referenced by her treating psychiatrists”, citing the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book on trauma-informed judicial practice[28]. The tribunal accepted that the experience of domestic violence victimisation may negatively impact memory and recount in court. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant and her daughter’s evidence described constant controlling and threatening behaviour by the applicant’s husband, referring to the description of coercive control in the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book.
The Tribunal found that while the applicant had not had contact with her husband for ten years, his past behaviour, her defiance of him and his proximity to the applicant’s family home in Sri Lanka posed a real risk that he would try to harm her [36]. The intentional and selective nature of the harm involved systematic and discriminatory conduct [37], s5J(4)(c) and was characterised as gender-based violence, meaning that her fear of persecution related to membership of the social group of women in Sri Lanka [38], s5J(1)(a). DFAT country information evidenced the unchecked occurrence of such violence in Sri Lanka and lack of effective protection available [40]-[42]. Cultural factors also substantiated the applicant’s claim that internal relocation would not mitigate the risk of harm, as the presence of a single woman would attract attention and likely enable her to be found [43].
X (a pseudonym) (Migration) [2022] AATA 1149 (21 March 2022) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Cancellation of visa’ – ‘Deportation’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Immigration’ – ‘People affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Risk to domestic partners’ – ‘Risk to health, safety and good order of community’ – ‘S.116 of the migration act 1958 (the act)’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: Application for review of the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to cancel Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Facts: The applicant, Mr X, came to Australia at the age of 7 and was 47 years old at the date of decision. He had an extensive criminal history commencing in 1996 including multiple series of domestic violence offending, the first commencing December 2001, the second commencing November 2007 and the third in 2009. There was also a series of domestic violence offences in 2016 and 2018. Mr X’s explanations did not fully correlate to the convictions and tended to minimize his offending. His former partner’s children were removed from her care following the offending and returned to her care after Mr X’s visa was revoked and he was taken into immigration detention. He has a history of breaches of community corrections orders, bipolar disorder and drug and alcohol misuse (addressed while in prison). He is the father of 4 children, 3 of whom are adults, the youngest 17 years old, and has contact with and good relationships with 3 of his children. He has no family or support in New Zealand. The delegate relied on his ongoing risk of offending to women with whom he may be in a domestic relationship pursuant to s116(1)(e) of the Act.
Issues:
1.
Whether the ground for cancellation in s116(1)(e) of the Act - Mr X is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to:
◦
the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or
◦
the health or safety of an individual or individuals;
is made out, and if so,
1.
whether the visa should be cancelled.
Decision and Reasoning: Decision to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa affirmed.
The Tribunal held that Mr X may be a risk to individuals in the community and in particular previous and future domestic partners and a risk to children in the household (shown by the removal of his former partner’s children). The factors which favour Mr X remaining in Australia do not outweigh the risk he poses to a segment of the community.
The Tribunal considered the distress and hardship Mr X would experience if returned to New Zealand, the likely impact on his children and mental health, his strong ties to the Australian community, his continued minimization of his offending, longstanding issues of aggression towards domestic partners and repeated non-compliance with court orders. The Tribunal also considered the fact that if the decision to cancel his visa is affirmed, he will be removed from Australia and be unlikely to be able to return. Consideration was also given to the fact that since his visa was cancelled he was sentenced to a further period of imprisonment, meaning he has a substantial criminal record as defined in s 501(7) of the Act; thus, if the visa cancellation is revoked his visa is likely be cancelled again.
A (a pseudonym) and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2021] AATA 5499 (7 September 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Child support’ – ‘Child support agency’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Counselling records’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Non-compliance with parenting orders’ – ‘Percentage of care’ – ‘Risk to children’ – ‘Section 51, child support (assessment) act 1989’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: The mother’s application for review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal) of a decision to dismiss her objection to the determination of Services Australia – Child Support (the Agency) that the care percentages of 80% to the mother and 20% to the father of the two younger children should be reflected in the child support assessment for an interim period.
Facts: The mother and father are parents of three children in respect of whom there has been a child support assessment in place since 8 January 2020, which reflected that the mother had 100% care of all three children In March 2021 the father advised the Agency that since September 2020 there had been court orders in place granting him 14 per cent care of the children and that the mother had withheld care since November 2020. On 7 December 2020 the father filed an application for interim orders seeking 100% care of the children and to enforce the existing orders and commenced contravention proceedings on 11 February 2021. The Agency made an interim care decision that from the November 2020 to September 2021 the care record must reflect that the father had a care percentage of 20% care on the basis the mother withheld care and the father was taking reasonable action to have the court-ordered care arrangement complied with. The mother’s evidence was that the children ran away from the father when he attended their school to collect them, that they are fearful of him due to his history of violence towards the mother during the relationship, and that they have not had contact with the father for three years. The mother consented to disclosure of confidential notes from counselling sessions with her psychotherapist (including some sessions with the children in which they expressed their fear of the father) spanning a 10 year period from the time of separation.
Issues:
1.
Whether the father (for the purpose of section 51, Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) was taking reasonable action to ensure the court orders were complied with; and
2.
whether there were special circumstances such that an interim care determination should not be made.
Decision and Reasoning: The decision under review was set aside, and in substitution the tribunal decided that from 7 November 2020 the mother has had 100 per cent care of the children for the purpose of s51 of the Act.
The tribunal was satisfied that the father took reasonable action to ensure the court-ordered care arrangements were complied with for the purposes of section 51 of the Act. In respect of the father, as required by subsections 51(2), (3) and (4) of the Act, the first care percentage is 14% while the second percentage is 0%.
In the special circumstances of this case as they relate to the children of the assessment, the father should not have the benefit of an interim period. On balance, the tribunal was satisfied that the father’s own behaviour had significantly contributed to the care arrangements not being complied with. The tribunal placed significant weight on contemporaneous counselling records which reflected that the children had disclosed that they were exposed to family violence perpetrated by the father and were subsequently fearful of the father.
B and C (pseudonyms) (Child support) [2021] AATA 5500 (3 September 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Child support’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘Non-compliance with parenting orders’ – ‘Percentage of care’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk to child’ – ‘Section 51, child support (assessment) act 1989’ – ‘Suicide threat by child’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: The father’s application for review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal) of the decision to dismiss his objection to the determination of Services Australia – Child Support (the Agency) pursuant to s51 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that the mother’s actual 100 per cent care of the child should be reflected in the child support assessment and no interim care determination should be made.
Facts: The mother and father are parents of one child (aged 12) in respect of whom there has been a child support assessment in place since 30 September 2009. Parenting orders dated June 2020 provide that the child will spend 5 nights per fortnight and half of each school holidays in the care of the father. The pre-existing care determination was 33% care to the father and 67% care to the mother, which accorded with the care provided for in the parenting orders. On 18 December 2020 the mother advised the Agency that the child was in her 100% care due to a medical crisis, namely that the child had threatened suicide if returned to the father’s care. The child’s psychiatrist directed the child should reside with the mother and not be required to reside with the father. Medical records confirming this advice were adduced at the hearing. The father disagreed with the care change due to the court orders. The father did not respond to a disputed care contact letter issued by the Agency and on 16 February 2021 a delegate of the Agency decided that care of the child was 100% to the mother and 0% to the father from 2 November 2020. The father provided the court orders and reason for decision which make mention of the child’s mental health and the mother provided a provisional protection order made on 8 March 2021 for the protection of the child (which was later withdrawn). On 24 March 2021 an objections officer disallowed the father’s objection and the father sought review by the tribunal.
Issues:
1.
What were the care arrangements in relation to the care of the child in the relevant care period and should a new determination of a percentage of care for the child be made? If so, what is the percentage of care and from when should it apply?
2.
Should an interim care determination be made in relation to the care of the child, or were there were special circumstances such that an interim determination should not be made?
Decision and Reasoning: Decision affirmed.
From 20 November 2020 the child’s actual care was 100% to the mother and 0% to the father. The tribunal acknowledged that there was a court-ordered care arrangement in place that was not being adhered to, and that the father contended that he was taking reasonable action to have his court-ordered care restored. However, the tribunal found that special circumstances existed on the basis of the psychiatrist’s advice that the child remain wholly in the mother’s care due to his medical crisis, and that it was therefore appropriate to determine the respective care percentages based on actual care, rather than making an interim care determination by reference to the parenting orders.
Simpson v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2021] AATA 78 (1 February 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Another reason to revoke mandatory cancellation decision’ – ‘Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of visa’ – ‘Character test’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Proceedings: Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of visa.
Facts: A delegate of the Minister (the respondent) mandatorily cancelled the applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on the basis that he did not pass the character test and was serving a full-time custodial sentence. The applicant made written representations to the respondent requesting revocation of the cancellation of the visa. The respondent declined to revoke the cancellation.
Issues: Under s 501CA(4) of the Act, the original decision may be revoked if –
1.
The applicant passed the character test (subsection (b)(i)).
2.
There is another reason why the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be revoked (subsection (b)(ii)).
Decision and reasoning: Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of the applicant’s visa was dismissed.
Issues 1: The applicant had a “substantial criminal record”. He did not pass the character test defined in s 501(6) of the Act and could not rely on s 501CA(4)(b)(i) as a reason for the mandatory cancellation of the visa to be revoked.
Issue 2: The Tribunal was required to consider “Primary Considerations” under Direction 79 (as well as “Other Considerations”).
On Primary Consideration A “Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct”, the Tribunal member noted that under the Direction she was “not limited to considering proven offences” but “required to consider the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s ‘conduct to date’.” This included an incident where the applicant damaged his ex-partner’s new partner’s car, grabbed his ex-partner, and threatened her and her new partner with violence. This was “very serious conduct” (at [52]). The applicant had also committed 34 criminal offences and had a lengthy traffic history. There was a moderate risk he would commit further offences. Primary Consideration A weighed heavily against revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa ([49]-[84]).
D (a pseudonym) (Migration) [2020] AATA 3488 (30 June 2020) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘Evidence of de facto relationship’ – ‘Evidence of family violence’ – ‘Immigration’ – ‘No family violence’ – ‘Partner visa’ – ‘S.65 of the migration act 1958’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
Proceedings: Application for review of the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Facts: The applicant, Ms. D claimed that her relationship with Mr P, the visa sponsor, had ceased and she had been the victim of family violence. She applied for Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). A delegate of the Minister refused to grant a visa to the applicant on the basis that she did not meet cl.820.211(2)(a) of the Migration Regulations (1994) because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the applicant was the de facto partner of the sponsor, as defined under section 5CB of the Act.
Issues: To grant a Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa, the Tribunal must be satisfied:
1.
The evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the applicant and the sponsor had been in a de facto relationship and that the relationship has ceased to exist.
2.
The evidence is sufficient to demonstrate family violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that there was a de facto relationship and it had ceased but found there was no family violence, so affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
After considering the financial and social aspects of the relationship, the nature of the household and the persons’ commitment to each other, the Tribunal member was satisfied that the applicant and sponsor had been in a de facto relationship, and the relationship had ceased [14].
Relying on statutory declarations provided by a social worker and a psychologist and a mental health plan written by a medical practitioner, the applicant made a non-judicially determined (see r1.24 and 1.25 Migration Regulations (1994)) claim of family violence.
After considering the evidence, the Tribunal member was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered relevant family violence. The Tribunal member found no evidence of physical violence and was not convinced that the psychological trauma experienced by the applicant met the test required by the legislation to sustain a claim of family violence [28]. The Tribunal sought the opinion of an independent expert.
The Independent expert report (the report) found that “the sponsor’s conduct did not cause [Ms. D] to reasonably fear for, or to be reasonably apprehensive about, her well-being or safety. … [Ms. D] said that she has maintained a friendship with the sponsor despite him reportedly continuing to verbally abuse her.”[33] The report found the applicant had not experienced family violence outlined in r1.21 Migration Regulations (1994).
The applicant challenged the report. The Tribunal member was concerned as to whether the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness [42] and a second hearing took place.
The Tribunal member considered the written responses of the applicant and her agent to the report, the responses of the independent expert to the matters raised by the applicant and her agent and discussed these issues with the applicant and her agent at the second hearing [62]. The Tribunal member found that the applicant had not suffered family violence committed by the sponsor.
Hamilton and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2020] AATA 1918 (26 June 2020) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘New start allowance’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Workers compensation’
Case type: Review
Facts: The female applicant sought review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Social Services and Child Support Division, which affirmed the decision of the Department of Human Services rejecting her new start allowance claim because she had a compensation lump sum preclusion period from 2 March 2010 to 21 April 2025. The applicant had received a workers compensation lump sum payment for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident. Her evidence was that she suffered severe financial hardship as her abusive male ex-partner had accessed and gambled her savings. She terminated the relationship and had to sell her home due to her financial difficulties, retaining about $400,000. The relationship resumed and he used her ATM card to take money from her bank account threatening to beat her if she did not provide access to her funds. The applicant finally terminated the relationship and said he had taken all the money which she had following the sale of her house which represented all that remained of the settlement sum she had received ([67]). The applicant was unable to obtain continuous employment and was experiencing severe financial hardship ([79]).
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist.
Held: The Tribunal set aside the decision and held that the applicant’s circumstances were "special" pursuant to s 1184K, such that much of her compensation payment should be treated as not having been made so as to reduce the preclusion period applicable to her compensation payment so that it ended on 21 May 2020 ([82]). The special circumstances in accordance with s 1184K(1) related to the totality of the applicant’s circumstances, including her financial hardship, her injuries, her financial deprivation following domestic violence and financial abuse ([79]).
The hearing was conducted via telephone in accordance with the provisions of the Tribunal’s COVID-19 Special Measures Practice Direction - Freedom of Information, General and Veterans’ Appeals Divisions ([29]).
Australian Information Commissioner
‘WZ’ and CEO of Services Australia (Privacy) [2021] AICmr 12 (13 April 2021) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Audit of policies, procedures and systems’ – ‘Complainant had notified of separation from partner’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Privacy’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Residential address disclosed to the complainant's former partner’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The female complainant was receiving Centrelink payments administered by Services Australia (the respondent) while living with her former male partner. She obtained an Apprehended Violence Order (which her partner was imprisoned for breaching). The complainant notified the respondent of her separation from the partner, but the respondent considered the separation unverified. Their online records continued to be linked meaning that if the complainant updated her address online, her partner’s address would also be updated. Her former partner posted a screenshot of the complainant’s new address to social media and made threats against her and her current partner.
Issues: Whether Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy as defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
Decision and reasoning: The Commissioner found that the respondent interfered with the complainant’s privacy by:
1.
Disclosing the complainant’s personal information, namely, her new address to her former partner, for a purpose other than that for which it was collected, in breach of Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 6.
2.
Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that it used accurate and up-to-date personal information of the complainant in the form of her relationship status having regard to the purposes of its use, being to update her former partner’s address, in breach of APP 10.2.
3.
Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that it used accurate and up-to-date personal information of the complainant in the form of her address at which she could be contacted in breach of APP 10.2.
4.
Failing to take reasonable steps to protect the complainant’s personal information, being her updated address, from unauthorised disclosure to her former partner in breach of APP 11.1.
In addition to ordering compensation for non-economic loss (including re-activation of psychological symptoms and distress) and expenditure incurred in association with the privacy complaint, and ordering an apology, the Agency was required to undertake an audit of policies, procedures, and systems to ensure the privacy breach was not repeated or continued. The Commissioner noted at [156]-[160]:
The effect of this privacy breach on the complainant has been significant. This is in large part due to the fact that she feared harm from the former partner… While the changes the respondent has made are encouraging, I remain concerned that individuals are at risk of their personal information being disclosed to former partners.
[…]
It is appropriate for the respondent to put in place more robust measures where the consequences for individuals are more significant. It is therefore appropriate to have special measures in place to protect individuals identified as being at risk of domestic violence. However, I remain concerned about the risks to individuals seeking to update their own address and not that of their former partner, where the respondent is not satisfied that the individual has in fact separated from their partner, regardless of whether they have a history of family or domestic violence. The ‘reasonable steps test’ is one that takes into account all relevant circumstances, including what is practical and what is required where the adverse consequences to particular individuals are significant.
I therefore see no reason to limit the audit to a particular cohort of individuals, including those at risk of family domestic violence. It is appropriate in order to address the grievance to target the situation where an individual makes unverified claims to have separated from, or to be no longer living with, their partner, and seeks to update their address, whether online or in person.”
‘ST’ and Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia (Privacy) [2020] AICmr 30 (30 June 2020) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Damages for non-economic loss’ – ‘Disclosure for tribunal proceedings’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Information privacy principles’ – ‘Privacy’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The female complainant’s complaint concerned the disclosure of her personal information, collected by the former Child Support Agency for a Tribunal hearing, to the complainant’s ex-partner. She claimed that the personal information revealed the places she visited which she had attempted to keep hidden from the ex-partner as she feared harm.
Issues: Whether Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy as defined in the Privacy Act.
Decision and reasoning: Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy, breaching the Information Privacy Principles (IPP), by disclosing the complainant’s personal information in breach of IPP 11. The locational information disclosed was not relevant to the decision under review by the Tribunal and the complainant was therefore not likely aware that information of its kind would be disclosed.
In terms of damages, the Commission accepted that the complainant had already disclosed some of the places she had frequented through other processes. The Commissioner noted at [75]-[76]:
“I do not consider that the previously disclosed information negates the complainant’s claim to have feared the ex-partner locating her. The complainant clearly went to some lengths to redact certain information from the documents she provided in the primary decision process and I accept her claim that she thought carefully about what information to disclose.”
“However, I am of the view that in all the circumstances, the degree by which the disclosure contributed to the complainant’s fear of being located by the ex-partner was not significant. I place weight on the fact that the complainant had disclosed some locations to the ex-partner during the COA process and that she continued to maintain a PO Box at the same post office as the ex-partner. I also note the absence of any evidence showing that the complainant sought the assistance of police. While I accept the complainant’s claims to have feared being located by the ex-partner, these claims are not so specific and detailed (nor are they supported by specific and detailed corroborating evidence) as to cause me to form the view that the disclosure exacerbated her fear of being located to a significant extent.”
The Commissioner was satisfied that the privacy breach had caused the complainant distress, but no other claimed damage. She was awarded $3,000 for non-economic loss.
‘PJ’ and Australian Federal Police (Freedom of Information) [2018] AICmr 64 (10 September 2018) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Confidentiality’ – ‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Public interest’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Whether disclosure of personal information unreasonable’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant applied to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for access to “any notes made on myself by the Australian Federal Police. Not criminal records, but any and all police files/notes made on me.” The AFP exempted access to 13 folios in part under s 47F (the personal privacy exemption) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Some exempt material included names, dates of birth and contact details of third party individuals, and information pertaining to an alleged domestic violence incident.
Issues: Whether the material the AFP found to be exempt under s 47F was conditionally exempt. If so, whether giving the applicant access to conditionally exempt documents would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest (s 11A(5)).
Decision and reasoning: Access to personal information of third party individuals and about an alleged domestic violence incident involving the applicant was refused.
Taking into account the nature of the information, that the information was provided for a limited purpose and was not well-known or available from other public sources, the Commissioner accepted the AFP’s submission that disclosure could undermine a range of processes intended to protect individuals and could discourage those who may be affected by domestic violence from coming forward to police. The Commissioner was satisfied disclosure would be unreasonable and the relevant material was conditionally exempt under s 47F. It was also contrary to the public interest to give the applicant access to the conditionally exempt documents at this time.
‘DK’ and Telstra Corporation Limited [2014] AICmr 118 (30 October 2014) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Family law judge’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Non-economic loss’ – ‘Privacy’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The complainant worked as a judge in the family law jurisdiction. He requested that Telstra connect a phone line to his home for the sole purpose of an alarm system installed by the Court. Telstra set up the phone line and published the complainant’s name, address and the phone number in both the White Pages online and in the hard copy directory.
Issues: Whether Telstra had breached the complainant’s privacy.
Decision and reasoning: Telstra interfered with the complainant's privacy by failing to take reasonable steps to provide notice to the complainant that it would use and disclose his personal information for the purpose of publishing it in the White Pages, in breach of National Privacy Principle (NPP) 1.3. Telstra was ordered to apologise, review its processes and review its Privacy Statement.
Telstra was also ordered to pay the complainant $18,000 for non-economic loss. In reaching this amount, the Commissioner noted the following evidence from the complainant:
“Since the publication of my details a litigant from a matter decided by me has begun to loiter at and about our home. As my details and those of my partner are suppressed on every public register I infer his knowledge of our address is the White Pages site…
“We have just moved to our home and our enjoyment of it has been rudely interrupted…We both jump whenever the street bell rings. I have applied to be transferred interstate. On moving we will incur moving costs, expenses re sale of our home and costs of resettling… We will both have expenses travelling to visit family and friends as our lives, to date, have been in [omitted]…
“The invasion of and prejudice to my privacy and personal safety can be readily envisioned as arising for others such as victims of crime, women fleeing domestic violence and the like.”
In awarding compensation, the commissioner was guided by severity of the impact of the privacy breach on the complainant (with concerns for his/his partner’s safely leading him to move interstate); the added security threat he/his partner were exposed to; the responsibility of Telstra as an organisation to have appropriate measures in place; and the extent of the publication to a very wide audience in both online and hard copy form.
‘AG’ and Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AICmr 55 (26 April 2013) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Material obtained in confidence’ – ‘Personal privacy exemption’ – ‘Request for access to documents’ – ‘Visa application’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant applied to the Department to access specific documents related to his ex-wife. The Department refused access to 11 documents saying disclosure would reveal information provided in confidence and personal information about third parties, of which disclosure would be unreasonable and contrary to public interest.
Issues: Whether the documents were exempt under ss 45 (material obtained in confidence) and 47F (personal privacy exemption) of the FOI Act.
Decision and reasoning: Access refused.
Documents exempt under s 45 included statutory declarations made by the applicant’s ex-wife and other third parties in relation to her application for permanent residency in Australia, as well as a record of interview with the ex-wife and letter sent by a third party. The commissioner was satisfied that disclosure of the documents sought would cause detriment to the applicant’s ex-wife. The Commissioner was satisfied that disclosure of the documents sought would be a breach of confidence and the documents were exempt under s 45.
Documents exempt under s 47F were general correspondence in relation to the applicant’s ex-wife visa applications. The documents contained personal information of the applicant’s ex-wife, the applicant and or third parties, which was of a sensitive and personal nature (including names/other information). Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the protection of an individual’s right to privacy, and an agency’s ability to obtain confidential information and to obtain similar information in the future. Giving the applicant access to the documents was contrary to the public interest.
In reaching the decision, Acting Information Commissioner Pirani stated:
“[20] The Department has created Form 1040 for the purposes of a visa applicant providing documentation in relation to family violence matters. This was the form used by the applicant’s ex-wife in support of the visa application. Form 1040 states that the information provided in the form ‘is given and received on the understanding that it will be treated in confidence’.”
‘AF’ and Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AICmr 54 (26 April 2013) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Material obtained in confidence’ – ‘Request for access to documents’ – ‘Visa application’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant’s relationship with his former partner ended and she applied for a Subclass 100 visa on domestic violence grounds. The applicant applied to the Department for access to all material in any form relating to his former partner. The Department applied the material obtained in confidence exemption (s 45) and the personal privacy exemption (s 47F) to statutory declarations made by the applicant’s former partner and a competent person in relation to a visa application made by the applicant’s partner under the family violence provisions of the Migration Regulations.
Issues: Whether the documents were, inter-alia, exempt under s 45 (material obtained in confidence).
Decision and reasoning: Access refused. In particular, the Commission was satisfied that the statutory declarations were communicated and received on the basis of a mutual understanding of confidence between the applicant’s former partner and the Department and the competent person. Disclosure “would result in detriment to the authors of the statutory declarations as it would reveal private matters relating to the allegations of family violence. The disclosure of this information may cause a level of embarrassment and discomfort to the authors of the statutory declarations”. The Commissioner was satisfied that unauthorised disclosure of the information contained in the documents would cause detriment to the applicant’s former partner and the competent person.
Australian Capital Territory
Court of Appeal
Murphy v R [2025] ACTCA 10 (4 March 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘multiple victims’ – ‘whether manifestly excessive’ – ‘assessment of objective seriousness’ – ‘prior family violence as aggravating factor’ – ‘adjustment of start date due to miscounting error’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The appellant appealed against his convictions of negligently causing grievous bodily harm (x1- count 3), recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm (x1- count 6), sexual intercourse without consent (x3- counts 9,15,17), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x3-counts 10,12,17), common assault (x6 – counts 18, 19 and others), damage property (x1), choke, strangle or suffocate (x1- count 1).
Facts: The appellant offended against four female complainants.
Ms A: Ms A was 16 years old; the appellant was 20 years old [9]. The relationship was controlling and aggressive [10]. The appellant negligently caused Ms A grievous bodily harm by instructing her to take a knife and cut herself [12]. The appellant recklessly inflicted bodily harm on Ms A by cutting her with a house key [14]. The appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms A without her consent [17].
Ms B: The appellant was in a relationship with Ms B from July 2012 to November 2018. The appellant assaulted her on four occasions by punching her to various parts of her body. The appellant damaged Ms B’s property – he used a screwdriver to break her phone. He assaulted Ms B occasioning actual bodily harm by lifting her and slamming her on a slate floor. He assaulted Ms B by waterboarding her and by pressing his forearms into her neck with force until she was unable to breathe and became incontinent. The appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms B without her consent on two occasions.
Ms C: The appellant and Ms C were in a relationship from February 2019 to July 2020 [43]. The appellant choked Ms C by putting both arms over her shoulders and around her neck and pressing hard against the front of her neck and throat [50]. The appellant damaged the door and walls of Ms C’s home [53]-[55]. The appellant assaulted Ms C by shoving her four times, grabbing her breast and spitting phlegm into Ms C’s eyes [57]-[58].
Ms D: The appellant and Ms D were in a relationship from July 2021 to January 2022 [60]. The appellant was verbally abusing Ms D [67]. The appellant then assaulted Ms D by pushing her over twice [67]-[68]. The appellant grabbed Ms D’s shoulders and threw her onto a dirt verge – she fell on her hip and hit her head on something hard [68].
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on several grounds of appeal:
(a) the sentences imposed on count 3 and count 6 were manifestly excessive;
(b) the primary judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of count 3 and count 6;
(c) the primary judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of count 18 and count 19 by finding these offences as being in “the worst case”;
(d) the primary judge erred in treating prior family violence by the appellant against the victim (Ms B) as an aggravating factor for count 18 and count 19;
(e) the primary judge erred in having regard to an irrelevant consideration for count 19, namely the possibility that the victim had suffered an unproven injury; and
(f) the primary judge erred in failing to have regard to an additional 19 days served by the appellant in pre-sentence custody.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground (a): The appellant submitted that the individual sentences imposed in respect of counts 3 and 6 were manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge found that the first offence (count 3) was at the low end of objective seriousness and that the second offence (count 6) was in the low to mid-range of objective seriousness. The offending involved controlling, manipulative and violent behaviour in circumstances where there was a significant power differential [84].
On appeal, the Court concluded that a consideration of the objective seriousness of the offences in light of the maximum penalty, together with the appellant’s lack of remorse, the need to recognise the harm to the victim and to protect the community, as well as the limited prospects for rehabilitation and absence of remorse, did not reveal the sentences to be outside of the available range as to be “plainly unjust” [99].
Ground (b) and ground (d): These grounds were dealt with together. Ground (b) stated that the sentencing judge had erred by treating the appellant’s behaviour prior to the commission of the offences as an aggravating factor for counts 3 and 6. Ground (d) stated that the sentencing judge erred by characterising count 18 as occurring “within a long-standing context of manipulation, violence and control by the appellant”, and that the primary judge was in error to treat s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act as operating to increase the objective seriousness of counts 18 and 19.
On appeal, the Court agreed that the appellant’s “controlling and aggressive” conduct aggravated the objective seriousness of counts 3 and 6 [107], and so disposed of ground (b). On ground (d), the Court found that the primary judge had been correct to treat s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act as operating to increase the objective seriousness of counts 18 and 19 [142]. The primary judge had also been correct to find that count 18 occurred “within a long-standing context of manipulation, violence and control” [141].
Ground (c): The Court found that, whether by reference to “worst category” or “at the very high end” or “at the very upper end of seriousness”, the finding made by the primary judge as to the objective seriousness of the offending was entirely justified [162].
Ground (e): The appellant submitted that the primary judge erred by having regard to an irrelevant consideration in assessing the objective seriousness of Count 19, namely that the victim, Ms B, suffered an unproven injury [164]. The Court found in this instance the victim defecating was relevant not because it was an injury but because it was part of the response she had to the application of force to her neck by the appellant. Just as it was relevant that the victim’s response to the force included that she could not breathe or talk while the force was being applied; so too was her involuntary defecation. It was a factor that informed the nature and extent of the common assault perpetrated against her and thus was a matter that properly informed the objective seriousness of the offence [173].
Ground (f): It was accepted on appeal that the sentencing judge had been provided with the incorrect number of days that the appellant had served by way of pre-sentence custody referable to the offending. As at the date of sentence, the appellant had in fact been held in custody for 207 days (an additional 19 days) [176]. The Court found that the start date of the sentence may be adjusted to fix the error without re-exercising the discretion (as the appellant had been arguing for) [186].
TS v DT [2025] ACTCA 6 (21 February 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against extension of final protection order’ – ‘Family Violence Act 2016, s 86’ – ‘relevant criterion for applications to extend protection orders’ – ‘hardship’
Proceedings: Appeal against extension of final protection order.
Charges: N/A
Facts: The appellant appealed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal from an order of the Magistrates Court extending a final protection order made against him. The respondent is a protected person under the order.
The appellant and the respondent were married. They separated following a domestic violence incident where the appellant assaulted the respondent and their teenage son while brandishing a knife [2]. Some time later, the appellant and the respondent moved back in together into a house they had jointly purchased. They resumed living together until, following another domestic violence incident, the respondent applied for a protection order against the applicant prohibiting the applicant from being at the family home [3]-[4].
Grounds of appeal: The central complaint made by the applicant in the Court of Appeal was that the appeal judge in the Supreme Court failed to address the grounds before him [65]. The applicant had submitted the order should be varied on the basis of hardship caused to the applicant (he was “practically homeless” [14]).
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the Supreme Court judge had been correct in their interpretation of s 86 of the Family Violence Act 2016 [68]. The criteria that apply to decisions about the making of a family violence order might be relevant to applications to amend an order other than an application for extension [68(e)]. Decisions on applications for extensions are governed by a single criterion – whether the court is “satisfied that a protection order is no longer necessary to protect the protected person from family violence by the respondent”. An application to extend an order is not an invitation to reconsider or redraft provisions of that order.
The Supreme Court judge was therefore not required to consider the appellant’s hardship grounds [71], and the appeal was dismissed [72].
Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30 (15 November 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘aggravated threat to kill’ – ‘aggravated stalking’ – ‘breach of family violence order’ – ‘texts and calls’ – ‘attending complainant’s residence’ – ‘manifest excessiveness’ – ‘degree of sentence accumulation’- ‘threats’ - ‘following harassing and monitoring’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The appellant had been convicted of making an aggravated threat to kill another person (x1), aggravated stalking (x1), and contravening a family violence order (x1).
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had been in a relationship which commenced in 2021 and concluded in early 2023 [6].
The threat to kill involved the appellant going to the complainant’s house armed with a large knife. He banged on the door and threatened to kick the front door in. The complainant let him in, whereupon the appellant grabbed her, pointed the knife at her and said he was going to kill her. After a while, the appellant handed the complainant the knife and asked her to kill him. He eventually left the house [14].
The aggravated stalking offence included the appellant sending hundreds of text messages and making dozens of phone calls to the complainant in a roughly two-week period. It also involved the appellant texting threats while standing outside the complainant’s house [10].
The breach of the family violence order involved the appellant being served with the Family Violence Order, then calling the victim every day (making a total of 34 calls and sending 9 text messages) [17]. The appellant also attended the complainant’s house on 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 27 March. On some of those occasions he was there more than once. On 29 March 2023, the appellant sent the victim threatening texts. The complainant rang the police, and the police located the appellant lying in bushland [19].
Grounds of appeal: In the notice of appeal, the appellant contended that both the individual sentences imposed, and the overall total sentence, were manifestly excessive [36]. In submissions, the appellant sought leave to expand the grounds to include that the primary judge erred in not applying the full 25% discount for the appellant’s guilty plea; and that the primary judge erred in failing to properly apply the Bugmy and Verdins principles [37].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused for the two grounds of appeal raised in submissions (based on these grounds having no merit):
(1) Guilty plea: Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant should have obtained a 25% guilty plea discount on each offence. In respect of the aggravated stalking and breach of FVO offences, the sentencing judge had found that the prosecution case was overwhelmingly strong and therefore arrived at discounts below 25% [72-73]. The Court found that s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act was correctly interpreted and applied (the subsection states that in deciding any lesser penalties, the court must not make any significant reduction for the fact that the offender pleaded guilty if, based on established facts, the court considers that the prosecution’s case was overwhelming strong) [84].
(2) Bugmy and Verdins principles: There was no dispute that the Bugmy principles were relevant [39]. On appeal, the Court found that the sentencing judge was correct to assess the result of the appellant’s adverse childhood experiences as relevant to the risk he presented of future reoffending and the need for the community to be protected. Therefore, while moral culpability was reduced due to childhood disadvantage, the re-offending risk and need for community protection justifiably pulled in the other direction [52-53].
In relation to the Verdins principles, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s mental health “could be treated through therapy” and thus her Honour’s view that the appellant’s mental health created a risk to the community was an error. The Court did not agree [60]. The sentencing judge was correct to find that potential for treatment and rehabilitation was not a complete answer to the risk posed to the community due to mental impairment [64]. The appellant may not have been the best vehicle for general deterrence, but specific deterrence was justifiably given special weight [64].
As for the original ground of appeal based on manifest excessiveness, the Court found that this ground was not made out [107]. The Court accepted the respondent’s submission that while the offences were committed in the period of a month and bore factual similarities, the criminality in each was different [103]. In the Court’s view, the different criminalities of the charged offences required separate consideration and sentence [106]. The sentence structure which admitted of a degree of concurrency acknowledged the course of conduct while still paying proper regard to the relationship between the facts of the offences [106].
Robertson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] ACTCA 26 (30 August 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Premeditation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ – Attempted murder – ‘Attempted breach of family violence order’ – ‘Guilty plea discount’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Attempted murder x1; attempted breach of a family violence order x1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The matter was an appeal against a sentence imposed by McCallum J (primary judge) for the defendant’s convictions of attempted murder and attempted breach of a family violence order.
The appellant eavesdropped on the victim’s phone calls outside her home before breaking in while she was in her bedroom. The appellant took the victim’s phone, grabbed a large knife from the kitchen and attacked her, slicing her ear and stabbing her 11 times. As the appellant returned to the kitchen, the victim then fled to the backyard, screaming for help. A neighbour woke up and called emergency services. Meanwhile, the appellant ignited a newspaper on the stove and used a cylindrical spray can to burn the victim’s face, chest, arms and torso. The Police arrived to find the property locked, hearing the victim’s screams and seeing bursts of flames. Upon gaining entry, they restrained and handcuffed him.
Grounds of appeal:
1. In respect of the offence of attempted murder, the primary judge erred in awarding a discount of 10% for the appellant’s plea of guilty; and
2. Each of the individual sentences, the total effective sentence (27 years and 3 months’ imprisonment) and the non-parole period (20 years) were manifestly excessive.
Held:: The Court (Mossop ACJ, Baker and McWilliam JJ) dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: The Court found no error in the approach the primary judge had taken, or the 10% discount applied.
The discount was calculated consistently with legal principles and legislative requirements. Given the family violence context, the previous assaults on the victim, and the appellant’s lack of remorse, the offence was classified as within the “worst category” for offending of that kind [30]. While recognising the utility of providing consistent discounts for guilty pleas, the primary judge determined that applying a discount greater than 10% would result in a penalty unreasonably disproportionate to the offence, this justified a departure from ordinary sentencing ranges [31]. Fixing the indeterminate life imprisonment sentence at 30 years before applying the 10% discount to reduce it by 3 years was appropriate [32].
Accordingly, no error was established.
Ground 2: The Court found no basis to conclude that the individual sentences, aggregate sentence, or the non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
For the attempted murder offence, the extreme physical, emotional and psychological harm the offending had on the victim, the appellant’s recent recidivism, and the appellant’s lack of remorse all justified imposing a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment prior to the discount [36-38]. The attempted breach of the family violence order, in the context of the recent attempted murder, demonstrated an extraordinary disregard for the victim’s suffering. The Court treats breaches of these orders seriously, therefore the three-month sentence was well-within the appropriate range [42-49].
The court observed: ‘The appellant is reported to have “felt bad” upon seeing the victim’s injuries, and then stated that a way of preventing his unlawful behaviour from occurring again in the future was to find a more reliable partner, as her actions were the cause of his offending behaviour. The lack of insight is disturbing.’ [38]
The Court accepted there was no basis for sentences to be served concurrently [55], and that consecutive sentencing properly reflected the overall criminality [56]. The non-parole period, a substantial portion of the sentence, was necessary to meet the deterrent and punitive aims of sentencing, hence it was not manifestly excessive [59].
Deng v Australian Capital Territory [2024] ACTCA 10 (15 March 2024) - Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against jurisdiction’ – ‘Arbitrary detention’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Family Violence Act’
Proceedings: Appeal against jurisdiction and finding that remand was not arbitrary.
Charges: 1x Breach of prevention order
Facts: The applicant was arrested in 2019 and charged with destroying or damaging property. The Magistrate initiated a prevention order pursuant to s 112 of the Family Violence Act (ACT), prohibiting the applicant from engaging in certain conduct “until all related charges are finalised’. Four months later, another Magistrate finalised the relate charge by convicting the appellant and fining him $2000. This had the effect of ending the restrictions imposed by the prevention order. Two months later, the appellant visited the house of his ex-partner and was subsequently arrested and charged for breaching the prevention order. The applicant was remanded in custody and released 58 days later as the restrictions on the prevention order had terminated months earlier:
As a result of the wording of the family violence order, there was, in fact, no prohibition upon his being at his former partner’s house … as the only “related charge” had been finalised before that date [14]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant contested the legality of the Magistrate’s order, arguing:
1.
The Magistrate(s) acted without jurisdiction by making remand orders for a breach of a restriction which had terminated;
2.
The primary judge failed to consider the effect s 40C of the Human Rights Act (which concerns legal proceedings in relation to public authority actions).
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The Court (McCallum CJ, Mossop and McWilliam JJ) agreed with reasoning of the primary judge: the fact that certain restrictions of a prevention order might end does not mean the prevention order also ends. The prevention order is only ended by operation of the Family Violence Act:
The inclusion of a statement as to the circumstances in which the prohibitions would cease (“until all related charges are finalised”) was unnecessary because s 30 of the FV Act itself determined when the order ended. Section 30 describes four specific circumstances in which an SIFVO [Special Interim Family Violence Order] comes to an end. That these describe the only circumstances in which the order may be ended is made clear by the language of the section: “A special interim order ends only when the first of the following happens …” [33]
Giving full effect to the terms of the statute and the terms of the order meant that the prohibitions upon being at a particular address or within a specified distance of a particular person within the order came to an end when “all related charges [were] finalised”. But the order itself, without any operative prohibitions, would continue in effect until, by operation of s 30, it came to an end [35]
Further, it was within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to hear any arguments related to the charge and deal with the applicant, including by making remand orders where appropriate:
If the elements of an offence under s 43(2) were not established in the Magistrates Court beyond reasonable doubt, then there would be no jurisdiction to convict the appellant or impose a penalty. However, that there may not ultimately be jurisdiction to convict the appellant or impose a penalty does not deny the Magistrates Court jurisdiction to commence to hear the proceedings, including making any decisions about bail in the meantime, and determine whether or not the appellant is guilty or not guilty [44]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 (16 February 2024) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’– ‘Damaging property’– ‘Threat to kill’– ‘Strangulation/choking’– ‘History of domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x reckless threat to kill, 1x forcible confinement, 2x act endangering health (choke/suffocate/strangle), 3x common assault, 3x damage property less than $5000 in value, 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 1x damage property, 1x make a demand with a threat to endanger health, safety, or physical well-being.
Facts: The male respondent was convicted and sentenced to 5 years and 7 months’ imprisonment for 14 offences committed against his female intimate partner over an eight-month period (February–October 2020). [128]
Grounds of appeal: The prosecution appealed the original sentence on four grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in allowing a 25% discount for the respondent’s plea of guilty with respect to the offence of making a demand with a threat to endanger health, safety or physical wellbeing;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in allowing a discount in excess of 10% for the respondent’s pleas of guilty with respect to the offences of making a reckless threat to kill, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and two instances of common assault and
3.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, by failing to take into account and/or misstating the material facts relevant to that assessment; and
4.
The sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. [58]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. Respondent sentenced to 8 years and 9 months’ imprisonment. [171]
With respect to the first two grounds of appeal, the Majority (McWilliam and Abraham JJ) held that there was no ‘evident justification’ for the plea discounts. [90] The respondent’s plea of guilty were arrived at late [92]; [97].
With respect to ground three, the Majority held that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the conduct constituting the charge of occasioning actual bodily harm was premised on a factual error. The sentencing judge mistook the extent of the harm caused by the impugned conduct as requiring surgical procedures when it did not. [104]–[105]
With respect to ground four, the Majority held the sentences to be manifestly inadequate. In comparison to relevant cases, the sentence imposed for the offence of choking, threat to kill, making a demand with a threat to endanger life were ‘substantially lower’. [127]; [132]; [133]; [138]; [140]
With respect to choking, the Majority summarised the following relevant factors in assessing objective seriousness:
For this offence, without being exhaustive, the following have been referred to: (1) the length of time during which the “choking” persisted; (2) the amount of force used; (3) whether the victim’s breathing was restricted; (4) whether verbal threats were made at the time of the choking; (5) whether the victim sustained any injuries; (6) whether any aides like rope or cable were used; (7) the vulnerabilities of the victim; (8) whether the conduct was deliberate and sustained, designed to threaten and inflict harm; and (9) whether the conduct occurred in a family violence context [131]
In dissent, Loukas-Karlsson J regarded ‘leniency in sentencing’ to not ‘equate to manifest inadequacy’. [2] For Loukas-Karlsson, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate ‘that a successful appeal on … grounds one and two would amount to anything more than “tinkering” with the sentence, that is, nothing but a slight adjustment in sentence’. [13] In effect, the sentence was neither ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’ [26]; [43]
Day v R [2023] ACTCA 39 (11 October 2023) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘pro-social conduct’
Charges: 2x choke, suffocate or strangle, 1x threat to kill, 1x contravention of prevention order, 1x transfer offence (damage property)
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for offences committed in a domestic violence context. The applicant and complainant/victim had a short relationship 2015–16 that recommenced in 2019. In September 2021, the applicant, unprovoked, pushed the complainant off their bed, and manually strangled her on the floor. Despite demanding the victim to leave, the applicant obstructed her from doing so and strangled her again. [8]–[12] The complainant managed to escape the house, and three months later sought a prevention order against the applicant. [13] Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on the following grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to take into account the appellant’s subjective circumstances;
2.
The accumulation of the individual sentences was excessive or the sentencing judge failed to take into account totality; and
3.
The individual sentences, the aggregate sentence and the non-parole period imposed were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The applicant did not establish any of the grounds of appeal. With respect to ground 1, the sentencing judge demonstrated no error in their approach to the subjective circumstances of the applicant [48]:
In any event, the matters identified by the appellant as “strikingly pro-social” going to rehabilitation, which he submitted were not identified or taken into account in sentencing, or not having been dealt with appropriately were, save for one limited matter, expressly identified by the sentencing judge. It may be accepted that they were not referred to with the emphasis or in the manner that the appellant might have desired, but the references reflected the material before the sentencing judge. The matter not referred to is that he has had a stable housing record since 2016 and has a positive relationship with his neighbours. It is unclear how, in the context of family violence offences, this matter could be characterised as strikingly pro-social conduct such as to materially impact on the sentencing [33]
With respect to the remaining grounds, the Court upheld the sentence as not manifestly excessive nor in discordance with the principle of totality [66];[69]. In so doing, the Court stressed the limitation of considering current sentencing practice:
Current sentence practice is only one sentencing consideration. The Crown referred the sentencing judge to a number of other cases during the sentencing hearing but observed that they were not really comparable. Simply because a case has different features does not mean it may not provide assistance generally as to the range of sentences being imposed. Factually comparable cases are difficult to find, as the facts of the offence and the offender are both relevant. Given that reality, a sentence imposed in a factually more serious case (or less serious case) may, with other cases, provide some guidance. The assistance depends on the facts of the given cases. This is bearing in mind, the relevant inquiry for manifest excess is not just a comparison between cases. His Honour considered the cases referred to, analysing the circumstances in which the sentences were imposed [63]
Vuolo v Fall [2023] ACTCA 33 (3 August 2023) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Stalking’ ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ - ‘family law’
Charges: 1x stalking
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: Before a Magistrate, the applicant was found guilty of one charge of stalking and placed on a good behaviour order for 12 months. The offence was proven in relation to the applicant stalking his ex-partner, with whom he had been married between 2010 and 2017, on ‘six occasions, in just over a three-month period in the same year’. [1] The stalking occurred following handover of their children per shared-custody arrangements. [7]
The sentence was appealed, and subsequently overturned by a single judge of the Supreme Court (‘primary judge’) in favour of the complainant: the applicant was resentenced by a conviction and a good behaviour order imposed for a period of 12 months backdated to the original date of sentence.
Grounds of appeal: The applicants seeks to quash or set aside the orders of the Supreme Court judgement, and reinstate the orders imposed in the Magistrates Court. The applicant sought to appeal the order on seven grounds, which can be summarised as followed:
•
Grounds 1 and 4: The primary judge erred in finding that the non-conviction order (made by the Magistrate) was ‘an outlier’ [13]
•
Ground 2: The primary judge erred in finding that the use of a vehicle (to stalk) was relevant and aggravating [48]
•
Ground 3: The primary judge erred in adopting the Magistrate’s summary of the facts, which noted that the victim “felt fearful and harassed” by the applicant [52]
•
Ground 5: The primary judge erred in reasoning that if the sentence was treated as a guide for future decision, ‘it would lead to a wide range of offending not attracting punishment’ [28]
•
Ground 6: The primary judge erred in finding that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate [61]
•
Ground 7: The primary judge erred in failing to find that the Court on a review appeal retained a residual discretion to decline to interfere with the sentence even where error has been established [62]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The Court (Backer, McWilliam and Abraham JJ) dismissed grounds 1 and 2. The Court found no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the sentence was an outlier. Previous sentences were considered, each including a term of imprisonment where the offending was objectively serious [21] (Ground 1 and 4). The Court held that ‘using a motor vehicle to follow a person is objectively more serious than other conduct which may also fall within the definition of stalking’ [50] (Ground 2).
The Court upheld the fifth ground of appeal, finding that the primary judge’s reasoning was not ‘directed to explaining why the sentence [of the Magistrate] is manifestly inadequate, but rather at the consequences of failing to correct it’. [45] The impugned statement was that a failure to correct the sentence would ‘erode sentencing standards’. [40] Consequently, the Court considered grounds 3, 6 and 7 in light of reconsidering the sentence.
The Court held the primary issue in dispute to be whether a conviction should have been recorded. [70] Having regard to sentencing objectives and considerations (Sentencing Act ss 7, 33), the Court held the original sentence (i.e. a good behaviour order without conviction) was manifestly inadequate and insufficient to meet the need for general deterrence. [86]–[88] The offending is ‘punishable by two years’ imprisonment’ [72]: it ‘was sustained conduct … sufficiently concerning to prompt evasive action by the victim’ and occurred in the context of family violence [73]–[75].
NS v Hotchkis [2021] ACTCA 13 (2 June 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Charges: Common assault x 1; Contravening a Family Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal from ACT Supreme Court against convictions imposed in the ACT Magistrates Court.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant were married and living together. The appellant kicked the complainant’s leg during an argument. The applicant breached a family violence order by engaging in offensive or harassing behaviour towards the complainant or by harassing, threatening or intimidating her. The complainant made an audio-recording and a central issue in the appeal was whether the magistrate in the initial hearing had erred in ruling that the audio recording was admissible. The appellant’s appeal to the Supreme Court against his conviction was dismissed: NS v Hotchkis [2019] ACTSC 309 (8 November 2019).
Grounds of appeal: The primary appeal judge erred in dismissing the first appeal on grounds that:
1.
The magistrate erred in ruling that the audio recording made by the complainant was admissible (pursuant to ss4 and 5(2)(d)-(e) of the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) (LDA).
2.
The convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that ss 4 and 5 were not breached, as the complainant believed, on reasonable grounds, the recording was necessary for the protection of her lawful interests. Further, there was no error in concluding there was no prohibition in s 10 for the admissibility of the conversation. No question of the application of s 138 of the Evidence Act arose.
Ground 2: The primary judge reviewed the evidence, set out findings of fact and reasons given by the magistrate, and referred to the appellant’s submissions that the statements made did not breach the family violence order. There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion:
“I have no hesitation in agreeing with the Magistrate that the evidence established a breach of the family violence order. Having listening to the recording on numerous occasions, I am satisfied that his conduct was, and was intended to be, harassing and intimidating. I agree with the Magistrate that he was yelling at [the complainant], and that his tone was aggressive. His suggestion that he was talking to the dog is improbable, but in any event I am satisfied that his conduct was really directed towards [the complainant], and intimidating her.”
“In finding the appellant guilty of assault, the Magistrate was entitled to take into account the clear aggression demonstrated by the appellant at the time that [the complainant] says she was kicked. She was also entitled to find that the appellant had threatened to “snot” [the complainant], and that this was a threat to hit her. The Magistrate was also entitled to find that the accused had kicked the rubbish bin just before he kicked the complainant, although his intention may have been to scare the dog. These were all circumstances supportive of the evidence of [the complainant]. Finally, the Magistrate had the benefit of seeing and hearing [the complainant] cross examined and the appellant giving his evidence. Her finding that [the complainant] was a credible witness, and the appellant was not, should not lightly be interfered with. I am satisfied that there was ample evidence upon which the Magistrate was entitled to convict the appellant.”
TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Accommodation’ – ‘Appeal of family violence order’ – ‘Exclusion from home’ – ‘Ongoing risk’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Proceedings: Appeal of Family Violence Order.
Facts: The matter was an appeal to the Court of Appeal following a final Family Violence Order (FVO) made against the appellant by the Chief Magistrate, and upheld on appeal by the Primary Judge: TS v DT [2019] ACTSC 295 (25 October 2019). The appellant sought that the FVO made by the Chief Magistrate be quashed, and no further orders made excluding the appellant from the premises of the family home (where the respondent was living).
Issues: The male appellant applied to adduce additional evidence in the appeal. The appellant also raised 12 grounds of appeal: the decisions of the Chief Magistrate (Ground 1) and Primary Judge (Ground 2) were unreasonable and not supported by evidence; the Chief Magistrate erred in running a final hearing on the FVO application (Grounds 3 and 10), making an FVO that was too long (2 years from final hearing) (Ground 4) and applying the Browne v Dunn principle (Ground 5); the Primary Judge attempted to cover up the Chief Magistrate’s alleged misconduct (Ground 6); the Chief Magistrate erred in law by relying on 2018 convictions (Ground 7) and the 2007/8 incident to support the making of the FVO (Ground 8); there was judicial misconduct by the Chief Justice in the conduct of the final hearing (Ground 9); and there was failure to have regard to evidence including relating to “property law issues” and the accommodation difficulties of the appellant (Grounds 11 and 12).
Decision and reasoning: The application to adduce additional evidence was refused ([52]-[64]), and the grounds of appeal were dismissed ([65]-[162]).
On Grounds 1 and 2, the decisions of the Chief Magistrate and Primary Judge were not unreasonable and were supported by evidence (including specific instances of violence against the respondent and her son, further supported by criminal convictions of the appellant) ([66]-[87]).
On Grounds 3 and 10, there was no error in making a final order excluding the appellant from access to the family home as the proceedings were run as a final hearing ([88]-[100], [142]-[143]). On Ground 4, the FVO’s duration was grounded in statute. Further, the Chief Magistrate weighed the competing interests of the appellant and the respondent (including the appellant’s accommodation difficulties) but found these could only be remedied by excluding the appellant from the family home ([101]-[112]). On Ground 5, there was no error in application of the Browne v Dunn principle ([113-[122]) and on Ground 6, there was no evidence of judicial bias ([123]-[125]).
On Ground 7, there was no miscarriage of justice relating to the 2018 convictions (which confirmed findings of instances of violence and substantiated the respondent’s fear) ([126]-[131]) and on Ground 8, appropriate regard was had to an incident in 2007/8 ([132]-[137]). On Ground 9, the Chief Magistrate’s conduct during the hearing was unremarkable ([138]-[141]).
On Grounds 11 and 12, the Chief Magistrate and Primary Judge had due regard to the evidence presented by the appellant, including evidence relating to “property law issues” and the accommodation circumstances of the appellant ([142]-[161]). On the property law issues, at [153]-[154], the Court noted:
“The appellant contends that the respondent had an additional purpose in seeking as a condition of the final FVO that the appellant be excluded from the family house – namely, an objective on the respondent’s part to obtain sole ownership of the family home. As I noted earlier, irrespective whether this was the case, there was clear evidence before the Chief Magistrate that the respondent would have difficulty relocating her place of residence and, further, that there was a history of violent conduct on the part of the appellant towards the respondent which supported the final FVO being made.
Further, and notwithstanding the submissions of the appellant to the contrary, the ultimate proper disposition of assets is a matter for the family law proceedings. That the respondent may seek sole ownership of the matrimonial home in those proceedings does not mean that her claims under the FV Act had no basis.”
Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 (7 July 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Inconsistent verdicts’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory verdicts’
Charges: Burglary x 1 (guilty); Unlawful confinement x 1 (guilty); Choking x 1 (guilty); Indecent assault x 1 (not guilty); Choking x 1 (not guilty); Intentionally causing property damage x 3 (not guilty); Stealing CCTV hard drive x 1 (not guilty).
Proceedings: Application for leave to amend notice of appeal and for leave to appeal (grounds 3, 4, 6 and 7) and appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The trial court found that the appellant man broke into his former partner’s (the complainant’s) house before dragging her from bed and strangling her. The complainant’s evidence was that the appellant ‘made her stay’ in the room by threatening to strangle her if she tried to leave, strangling her multiple times and threatening to kill her. The appellant allegedly committed property damage. There was some delay before the complainant alleged that the appellant had indecently assaulted her. The appellant allegedly ripped out the CCTV hard drive before leaving. The appellant also allegedly slashed the tyres of the complainant’s car.
Grounds of appeal: (1) Verdicts were inconsistent; (2) Verdicts were unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory; … (6) Trial judge erred in making factual findings; (7) Sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
Grounds (1)-(2) Dismissed. There were rational explanations why the jury may have acquitted the appellant of some charges while finding the appellant guilty on others. One factor identified was that the complainant was upset and frightened; she ‘may have misremembered matters or failed to appreciate details’, although the complainant did make some errors in her evidence and did not directly witness some of the alleged charges/events. Where there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, the jury may have accepted that this was because she had just ‘survived a gruelling series of events’ [101].
Ground (6) Allowed. Two of the trial judge’s factual errors did not reduce the objective seriousness of the offence to something less than ‘midrange’:
[155] The offence was committed in the complainant’s home, during the night. It was motivated by a desire to vent anger and assert physical control over the complainant in response to her termination of the relationship. The offence was of not insignificant duration. It was associated with violence and a threat to kill; whether the violence was properly described as “extreme violence” poses a semantic question that is unnecessary to answer.
A third factual error of substance required the Court of Appeal to resentence on Counts 1, 2 and 3.
Ground (7) Allowed. Total sentence reduced from 5 years and 5 months to 3 years and 6 months.
R v UG [2020] ACTCA 8 (27 February 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People with mental health issues’ – ‘Physical violence - threat to kill child - suicide threat- weapon’
Offences: Common assault x2; possessing offensive weapon with intent x1; d amaging property x 2; make demand with threat to kill x1; aggravated dangerous driving x1
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issues: The Crown submitted that the sentences were manifestly inadequate:
•
The length of sentence for the offence of making a demand with threat to kill failed to reflect the objective seriousness of the offence;
•
The very limited degree to which the offences were cumulative meant that the total sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
•
The actual imprisonment period of four months was manifestly inadequate having regard to relevant sentencing purposes.
Facts: R (the appellant man) and C (the complainant woman) were in a relationship at the time of offending. An argument had broken out after R told C he wanted to commit suicide. R grabbed C as she tried to leave their shared bedroom and pushed her onto the bed (first common assault). He then retrieved a large axe from their wardrobe. R pushed C to the ground while they struggled over the axe (second common assault) and swung the axe at her head, narrowly missing. R used the axe to damage items within the house before forcing the couple’s four children into his car. He left and returned several times to demand C get in the car. He eventually threatened to kill their eldest daughter with the axe if C did not get in but drove away once more as police approached his vehicle. This led to a large-scale search. The R was located and arrested later that evening. While all four children were physically unharmed, the eldest daughter was later assessed by a paediatrician who thought it was likely that the offences significantly impacted her emotional and behavioural wellbeing.
On the day of offending, the respondent had failed to take his prescribed antidepressant medication and had consumed a significant quantity of alcohol.
Initially R pleaded not guilty to all charges. Following discussions between the parties the respondent pleaded guilty to six charges and was committed to the Supreme Court for sentence.
The sentencing judge imposed a total sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment.
Judgment: In addressing the first aspect, the Court noted that while the offender’s mental health condition somewhat reduced his moral culpability, it was still necessary to consider the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation. By failing to reflect these purposes, along with the high objective seriousness of the offence, the sentence starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment for the offence of making a demand with threat to kill was "plainly unreasonable" [69-71]. For the second aspect, the Court believed the degree of cumulation failed to achieve a total sentence that was just and appropriate to reflect the overall criminality [73]. The Court did not make a decision as to the third aspect as they had found they had already found the sentences to be manifestly inadequate for other reasons. Despite finding the sentences manifestly inadequate, the Court refused to resentence the offender on the basis that the appeal raised no point of principle, had limited precedent value and would disrupt the offender’s rehabilitation [97].
The Court also discussed the preliminary issue of the correct approach to sentencing for family violence offences and the correct manner of dealing with the effect of a sentence of imprisonment on the offender’s family [44]. The Court rejected the Crown’s contention that family violence offences constitute a special category of offence in relation to which different sentencing principles apply, and instead provided that absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the same sentencing standards should apply to all offenders (Bugmy v The Queen) [48]-[51].
R v Wyper [2017] ACTCA 59 (11 December 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Complainant's credibility’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Intensive correction order’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Engaging in sexual intercourse without consent and being reckless as to whether the person was consenting x 1.
Appeal type: Defendant’s appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant and defendant were in a relationship ([11]). The defendant asked the complainant to leave the house; she did not want to leave. The complainant alleged that the defendant held her down and digitally penetrated her ([13]). The defendant denied that he digitally penetrated the complainant, and alleged that she damaged a number of his belongings ([14]). The defendant called the police about the property damage, and the complainant called the police about the sexual assault 2 hours later ([20]-[21]). A medical examination of the complainant revealed abrasions consistent with assault ([23]).
The defendant was convicted at trial. He was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, served by way of intensive correction order (‘ICO’), and 100 hours’ community service ([2]).
Issues: The defendant appealed against conviction on 3 grounds: (a) the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory; (b) the trial judge caused a miscarriage of justice by failing to fairly put the defence case to the jury; and (c) the trial judge caused a miscarriage of justice by failing to direct the jury that the complainant had a motive to lie.
The Crown appealed on the ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Both the defendant’s appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentenced were dismissed ([8]).
Appeal against conviction
On ground (a), the defendant argued that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory having regard to the unreliability of the complainant’s evidence. The Court (Murrell CJ, Bromwich J and Robinson AJ) held that while it was ‘somewhat implausible’ that the complainant did not cause the property damage, it was open to the jury to convict the defendant ([53]).
On grounds (b) and (c), the defendant argued that the judge should have directed the jury on the complainant’s possible motive to lie to avoid the consequences of her causing the property damage. However, the Court stated that the summing up was fair, given that the motive to lie was not a large issue in the trial ([66]-[68]).
Crown appeal against sentence
The Crown argued that by ordering an ICO, the trial judge failed to give adequate weight ‘to the principle that, for family violence offences, the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation are particularly important’ ([96]). The Court reiterated the importance of general and specific deterrence in sentencing family violence offenders ([97]), however, the Court emphasised the exceptional nature of the offending at [99]:
This was not a typical offence of family violence. There was no evidence of a history of domestic violence, controlling behaviour or psychological abuse. There were none of the typical indicia of power imbalance. Rather, the offence occurred in the context of a relationship ending, without those features apparently being present.
Imposing an ICO, while lenient, was justified by the defendant’s subjective circumstances, such as his lack of criminal history, and the fact that there was no history of domestic violence in the relationship ([129]-[130]).
O’Brien v R [2015] ACTCA 47 (15 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Double jeopardy- sentencing’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Perverting the course of justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentence cumulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Trafficking in cocaine’
Charge/s: Trafficking in cocaine, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts), forcible confinement, perverting the course of justice. Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The sentence imposed at first instance related to three distinct instances of criminality: the drug offence, the domestic violence offences and the perverting the course of justice offence. The domestic violence offences involved the appellant severely beating his then domestic partner which caused horrific injuries. He also choked her in the presence of his young son, restrained her from leaving their premises and forced her to take prescription sedatives so as to prevent her from seeking medical treatment which would reveal the assaults. He detained her for 24 hours. The perverting the course of justice offence involved the appellant encouraging his (by then former) partner not to attend court in relation to the domestic violence charges and encouraging her to produce false evidence about her psychological frame of mind. The aggregate sentence imposed was 12 years and 11 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 4 months.
Issue/s: Whether the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant submitted that the domestic violence sentences should not have been made cumulative on the sentences for the drug offences. He also submitted that the sentencing judge did not apply the totality principle. The Court held that while the aggregate sentence could be considered by some to be somewhat harsh, it was not unreasonable and was appropriate having regard to all the circumstances. There was no overlap in the three instances of criminality, nor could it be said that the three incidents arose from a single episode or course of conduct, ‘such that the criminality involved in one of the incidents was subsumed or comprehended in the others’ (see at [29]). The sentencing judge did take accumulation, concurrency and totality into account and did impose a degree of concurrency.
Kien v R [2012] ACTCA 25 (24 May 2012) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Choking so as to render unconscious’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Intentionally inflicting actual bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally inflicting actual bodily harm, choking so as to render unconscious.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage with his wife ended and she obtained a domestic violence protection order against him (though this was not in place at the time of the offence). The appellant went to the family home and an argument ensued, which developed into a physical fight. The appellant then took a chair from his wife (which she was threatening to throw at him) and struck her with it so forcefully that it broke into pieces. He then choked her until she became unconscious. He then wrapped a towel around her neck and used both hands to pull the material down toward the floor. A domestic violence protection order was previously in place in favour of the victim. He was subject to a good behaviour order at the time of the offences imposed for a prior breach of the protection order. He was sentenced to a total of four years and seven months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and one month.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the offences were unprovoked.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the fact the offences were not unprovoked should have mitigated the severity of the sentence. This argument was rejected — the actions of the victim were all in response to the appellant coming to the matrimonial home where he was not welcome. He was asked to leave but did not do so. His response to his wife’s actions were so disproportionate that they could not have been seen as provocative.
2.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that two comparable cases showed the sentence was manifestly excessive. This argument was rejected, with the Court holding that the offences were serious and resulted in severe facial injuries committed in a context where the appellant was not welcome in the house. While they were heavy sentences, they were proportionate to the criminality involved.
Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 (30 June 2006) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Hostile witness’ – ‘Incompetence of counsel’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unco-operative witness’
Charge/s: Assault, contravention of a protection order.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was charged with assaulting his female partner (‘the complainant’) and contravening a protection order in her favour. He pleaded guilty to assault but not guilty to contravening a protection order. The offending came to light after a police officer (‘the informant’) attended the complainant’s premises. The informant observed that the complainant was very distressed and had bruises on her body. A conversation between the complainant and the informant was recorded. In this conversation, the complainant made some allegations that the appellant had hit her but she was largely unresponsive to questions and was affected to a considerable degree by alcohol (See [41]-[43]). At trial, the prosecution sought to prove the tape and transcript of this conversation only for its possible use in refreshing the complainant’s memory. However, counsel for the appellant, Mr Elmaraazey, tendered this document as evidence (‘exhibit 3’).
The complainant was called to give evidence after the informant. When asked about whether there was an incident between her and the appellant, she stated ‘I can’t remember the exact details’ and proceeded to give an account of the evening that made no reference to any physical violence. She agreed that she had a conversation with the informant but could not recall its contents. The prosecution then proceeded to cross-examine the complainant about the various bruises that had been observed on her that evening. The complainant said she could not remember how the bruises happened. The prosecution applied to the magistrate for leave to cross-examine the complainant on the basis that the witness had made a prior inconsistent statement with reference to exhibit 3. Mr Elmaraazey did not object. The complainant’s response was to accept that exhibit 3 accurately reflected what she had told the informant but she could neither confirm nor deny that it represented what actually happened (See [26]-[40]). Accordingly, absent the tender of exhibit 3 as evidence, there would have been insufficient evidence to convict the appellant (See [47]).
The magistrate found the appellant had assaulted the complainant and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment for the assault and 3 months imprisonment for the breach of protection order. He was sentenced to an additional 6 months imprisonment for breach of an earlier imposed recognisance.
Issue/s:
1.
The incompetence of counsel for the appellant, Mr Elmaraazey, led to a miscarriage of justice.
2.
The sentencing magistrate erred in assuming that the injuries sustained by the complainant were the result of a ‘violent and prolonged’ assault.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, in the absence of the tender of exhibit 3 by Mr Elmaraazey, it was, at the very least, unlikely that the statement would have been admitted as evidence that the appellant assaulted the complainant. It was open to the prosecutor to seek leave to give the statement to the complainant to refresh her memory, if s 32 of the Evidence Act were satisfied. However, the failure of this process to refresh the complainant’s memory meant the prosecutor could not tender the prior statement as evidence of the truth of its contents (See [145]-[180]). There was a resulting miscarriage of justice (See [181]-[191]).
Second, the sentencing judge erred in assuming that all the injuries resulted from the charged assault. Even if the terms of exhibit 3 had been properly proved, they included an allegation of assault that had occurred the previous evening. The only unequivocal allegation of recent violence was that the appellant hit her in the face on their return from the shops. It was an error not to attempt to distinguish between the violence inflicted the previous night and those in the hours preceding the interview with the informant (See [196]-[207]).
Supreme Court
DPP v Vaana [2024] ACTSC 46 (27 February 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaged property’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Bugmy principles’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Aggravated damage x 1; possession of offensive weapon with intent x 1; aggravated threat to kill x 1.
Facts: The male offender engaged in a pattern of ‘overbearing, controlling behaviour’ towards his female partner (the complainant). [8] Attending a football match, the offender demanded the complainant hand over her mobile phone and passcode. When the complainant refused to do so, the offender left to the supermarket, purchased a knife and returned to puncture the complainant’s car tyres. [8]–[11] While wielding the knife, the offender threatened the complainant’s family, all of whom were present at the football match and witnessed the incident. [19]
The Registrar of the Magistrates Court refused to list the matter that day and the temporary application was listed a week later. The applicant was informed that the application in the proceeding must be served on the respondent. The applicant then appealed from the decision not to list the matter on an urgent basis and the requirement to serve documents on the respondent. The appeal was listed on an expedited basis.
Decision and Reasoning: Total effective sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment. [44] In sentencing the offender, Berman AJ spotlighted the delayed recognition of domestic violence offences as a serious offence:
For many years, domestic violence offences were not treated with the seriousness they truly deserved. This has now changed, and proper recognition is now given to the harm that such offences cause to the victims of it, and society generally [1]
Acting Judge Berman emphasised the seriousness of the offending, particularly that it occurred in a public space in front of the offender’s children. [24] His Honour took into account the offender’s dysfunctional and violent upbringing, and criminal history which included offences of stalking/intimidation and damaging property. [27]–[30]
DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30 (19 February 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Tendency Evidence’ – ‘Relationship and context evidence’ – ‘Admissibility’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘breach of protection orders’ – ‘incidents of violence’
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Charge: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 6; aggravated common assault x 1; aggravated minor property damage x 1; contravention of protection order x 3.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in an ‘on-and-off relationship’ from April 2017 to December 2022. [9] The relationship was riddled with family violence perpetrated by the accused against the complainant. [9] The violence was physical, sexual and in disregard of several protection orders made by the complainant. [13]–[20]
On 23 November 2023, the prosecution filed an application to adduce tendency evidence (and subsequently, an Amended Notice). The evidence concerned prior incidents demonstrative of three tendencies: (i) the accused’s tendency to be violent towards and controlling of the complainant; (ii) the accused’s tendency to disregard court orders regulating his contact with the complainant; and (iii) the accused’s tendency to ignore the complainant’s protests when she declined sexual intercourse. [3] In the alternative, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence as relationship or context evidence. [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence of certain listed incidents is relevant and admissible as relationship or context evidence in support of counts 1–3 and 6–8 on the indictment. [5] Evidence of those incidents must not be used in support of the first two tendencies. Whether such evidence may be used in support of the third tendency is a matter for the trial judge. [6]
In arriving at these conclusions, Baker J made clear the distinction between context or relationship evidence and tendency evidence:
The reasoning process for context or relationship evidence is different to tendency reasoning. For example, evidence may be relevant as context or relationship evidence because it explains why the complainant did not respond to the alleged offending in a way that the jury might have expected if they were unaware of the broader context of the relationship. The use of evidence in this way does not engage tendency reasoning. It is concerned with the believability of the complainant’s response, rather than with the tendency of the accused [50]
Similarly, context or relationship evidence may also be relevant to a consideration of the accused’s state of mind without engaging tendency reasoning. For example, it may be necessary for the tribunal of fact to hear broader evidence of the relationship between an accused and the complainant in order for the tribunal of fact to draw accurate inferences about an accused’s state of mind, or their reason for acting in a particular way towards the complainant. Again, the use of evidence in this matter does not engage tendency reasoning. It is not reasoning which involves the tendency of an accused to have a particular state of mind or to act in a particular way [51]
Justice Baker held the uncharged incidents to be particularly relevant as context or relationship evidence, bearing a strong potential to provide assistance to the jury in understanding ‘why the complainant acted as she did’; specifically, ‘why the complainant permitted the accused to return to her in breach’ of the protection order. [62] This included those uncharged incidents which, when considered in isolation, seemed relatively minor:
In the present case, some of the incidents sought to be adduced by the prosecution may, when considered in isolation, seem minor. For example, as the prosecutor acknowledged, incident 13, where the accused is alleged to have thrown a cheeseburger at the complainant, may appear insignificant when considered alone. However, the relentlessness of the accused’s behaviour towards the complainant may be an important aspect of the complainant’s experience of the relationship, which in turn may be essential to an understanding of the complainant’s state of mind, and why the complainant responded as she did [68]
Accordingly, her Honour rejected the accused’s argument that the incidents should be rejected because they involved less serious conduct. [77]
With respect to tendency evidence, Baker J accepted that evidence of accused’s tendency to inflict violence on an intimate partner ‘may have significant probative value in assessing similar allegations of domestic violence’. [86] However, this is not determinative of the probative value of tendency evidence:
[T]he Court must consider two questions when considering the probative value of a tendency of this nature:
(1) Does the evidence that is sought to be adduced, either by itself, or considered with other evidence, strongly support proof of the tendency?
(2) Does the tendency strongly support proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged? [88]
In raising this test, Baker J had difficulty in determining how the tendency alleged is probative of the facts alleged in the relevant offences. [96]–[99]
DPP v Gale [2024] ACTSC 297 (17 October 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Bugmy prinnciples’ – ‘Threat’ – ‘Emotional and Psychological abuse’ – ‘Aboriginal’ – ‘Bail’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Threatening a witness x 1; intentionally and unlawfully choking x 2; aggravated stalking x 1; aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Facts: In July 2023, the male offender pleaded guilty to a series of offences committed against his former female partner (‘complainant’), with whom he had been in an intimate two year relationship. [3]
The offending occurred throughout their relationship, as early as May 2022 when the offender strangled the complainant. While detained in custody for this incident, the offender persistently communicated with the complainant via email in a ‘threatening manner’; specifically, the offender told the complainant ‘to retract her statement to police’ as she had lied due to ‘mental health’. [9]–[10] The complainant complied with these threats and the offender was released on bail. The offender continued to be violent towards the complainant, stalking, choking and verbally abusing her. [13]–[28]
Decision and Reasoning: Two years’ imprisonment. Judge Mossop took note of the offender’s guilty plea [60] and criminal history, with convictions for drink-driving, weapons and cannabis possession and previous conviction of choking the complainant. [58]–[59]
Further, Mossop J considered the offending to involve ‘serious family violence offending and other offending designed to control or manipulate the victim’. [63] Such violence was present throughout the offender’s childhood: ‘his father provided a role model involving violence against women and unlawful conduct’. [64]
DPP v Linsley [2023] ACTSC 255 (12 September 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Intentionally and unlawfully choking x 1.
Facts: The 20 year old male offender choked and rendered unconscious his female intimate partner. [5] The incident occurred at the complainant’s home, during an argument concerning who owned a gaming console. [7] The complainant regained consciousness, finding herself on the ground with the offender’s hands still pushing down on her neck. [7] The offender let go, and the complainant fled her home and informed a youth support worker of what occurred. [8]
Decision and Reasoning: Sixteen months’ imprisonment, Good Behaviour Order (16 months) and psychological treatment [36]. In sentencing the offender, Berman AJ regarded the protection of the community ‘best achieved’ by the imposition of a sentence focused on the offender’s rehabilitation:
If the sentence aids in bringing about a situation where the offender commits no further crimes, then the community benefits. This is one of those matters where it is appropriate to focus on rehabilitation, despite the serious nature of the offender’s misconduct[ 2]–[3]
Acting Justice Berman noted the offender’s young age (20 years old), anxiety, depression, history of suicidal ideation and ADHD-diagnosis, [15] balancing these considerations with the seriousness of the offence:
The objective gravity of the offender’s conduct is such that nothing less than a sentence of imprisonment would properly reflect what the offender did. At the risk of repetition, the complainant was in her own home, he choked her more than once and with enough force to cause her to lose consciousness and be unable to breathe. She had obvious injuries and, even in the absence of a victim impact statement, I am satisfied that she would have suffered psychologically as well. All this, simply because they were arguing over who owned the Xbox [31]
Groves (a pseudonym) v Everette (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 27 (22 February 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal from decision of registrar not to list a matter on an urgent basis for the hearing of an application to temporarily extend a protection order’ – ‘Matter remains listed in magistrates court’ – ‘No decision to refuse to amend protection order’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Supreme court jurisdiction not enlivened’ – ‘Whether court has jurisdiction to hear appeal’
Proceedings: Appeal from Registrar of Magistrate Courts’ refusal to list application for a temporary extension of a final protection order for urgent hearing.
Facts: The female applicant sought an extension of a final family violence order (and temporary extension pending the hearing) due to expire the same day. She sought an urgent hearing of the application and that it be heard in the absence of the respondent.
The Registrar of the Magistrates Court refused to list the matter that day and the temporary application was listed a week later. The applicant was informed that the application in the proceeding must be served on the respondent. The applicant then appealed from the decision not to list the matter on an urgent basis and the requirement to serve documents on the respondent. The appeal was listed on an expedited basis.
Reasoning and decision: The matter was adjourned without making a decision on the application or appeal, as the judge found that the court did not have jurisdiction over the Registrar’s decision.
Loukas-Karlsson J considered the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to deal with the matter under s 92 of the Family Violence Act, determining that the court would have power over a registrar’s refusal to make an amendment to the final order. However, Her Honour found the registrar’s decision in this case did not constitute a refusal and was effectively related to internal listing matters. The fact that the Registrar had listed the application for a week’s time was clear evidence that they had not refused the application.
The applicant had raised r 3803(c ) (Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT)), excluding family violence proceedings from appeals (r 6256), to argue that there was no avenue for an appeal in the Magistrates Court. However, Her Honour determined that the order could be varied at the Magistrate’s discretion as finding otherwise would leave the appellant with no avenue to challenge an order.
Her Honour considered that the appellant had taken reasonable steps to attempt to serve the application and affirmed that the Magistrate had the power to vary or amend the Registrar’s order requiring personal service.
In the addendum, Her Honour noted that the decision not to hear the application for a temporary extension on the day it was made was ‘remarkable’ and left the applicant with no protection.
DPP v McGary [2023] ACTSC 14 (2 February 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Ground rules hearing’ – ‘Pre-trial application’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Special witness provisions’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Young people’
Proceedings: DPP pre-trial application for:
1.
An intermediary to be appointed for the complainant witness and a ground rules hearing be held
2.
The witness (complainant’s father) give evidence by audio-visual link
3.
The complainant’s father give evidence with a support person present
Facts: The respondent had been charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and plead not guilty to each.
The respondent and complainant had been in a relationship for a few months. The charges related to an incident during the relationship where the respondent digitally penetrated the complainant’s anus and had anal intercourse with her despite her objections and resistance. She claimed that she continued in the relationship for a short time following the assaults as a matter of self-preservation, feeling it would be dangerous for her to end the relationship. She sought medical assistance and subsequently disclosed the sexual assault before ultimately making a police complaint.
The complainant’s father, whose evidence included the changes he noted in the complainant’s demeanour after the alleged incident, suffered from a significant cardiac condition.
Reasoning and decision:
•
The Director’s application under s 4AJ of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) for the appointment of a witness intermediary for [the complainant] is dismissed.
•
The witness, [redacted], give their evidence at the trial by audio-visual link from a place in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) that is outside the courtroom, namely the Court’s remote witness room, pursuant to s 32(1)(a) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991(ACT)
•
The witness, [redacted], give their evidence at the trial with a support present, pursuant to s 49(1) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991(ACT)
a.
Baker J was satisfied that the complainant suffered anxiety, stress, PTSD and elements of depression. While there was no evidence of these conditions continuing, her Honour emphasised that the stress of giving evidence in court could lead to an exacerbation of the issues.
While the conditions were recognised as potentially affecting someone’s ability to communicate, HH found that there was no evidence from the police interview or medical records indicating that the complainant’s conditions had affected her ability to communicate. Her Honour highlighted that the purpose of a witness intermediary is not to reduce stress or be a support person but to facilitate communication and refused the application.
b.
Baker J found that it was in the interests of the administration of justice that the complainant’s father testify via audio-visual link on account of his cardiac condition, as giving evidence would exacerbate stress and impact his health. No unfair prejudice was found as the evidence was not likely to be contentious and the jury could be given appropriate directions.
c.
Her Honour was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice that a support person be provided as the father’s cardiac condition met the threshold of ‘disability’ and the impact of stress on his health would affect his ability to give evidence.
Alvin (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] ACTSC 358 (20 December 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Bail review’ – ‘Change in circumstances’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Drug rehabilitation’ – ‘Offending whilst on bail or facing charges for other offences’ – ‘People who are affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Review of decision of magistrates court’
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant had been refused bail by a Magistrate. He subsequently pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including domestic violence offences against his former partner. The applicant gave evidence that he had remained drug free while in custody, despite drugs being readily available. He was unable to enter a rehabilitation program unless he was released and had the powerful motivating factor that he has been advised by Child Youth and Protection Services he would not have care of his two children until he completed a course of residential rehabilitation.
Reasoning and decision: Bail granted.
The applicant’s recent plea of guilty to a number offences constituted a change in circumstances, removing the risk to the applicant’s partner that she would be prevailed upon by him to withdraw complaints.
Special and exceptional circumstances were also found in the new incentives for the applicant to undertake residential rehabilitation. McCallum CJ reasoned that the fixing of the sentencing date would motivate rehabilitation and, more significantly, Child Youth and Protection Services has notified him that he had to undergo rehabilitation before they would restore care of his two children. This included the infant child he had with his current partner who was victim to some of the domestic violence offences.
While there was evidence of a history of conflict with his current partner, this occurred while he was addicted to ice and the Court accepted that he appears to have remained drug free since being in custody. While some risk of him returning to drugs was identified, McCallum CJ found that it was warranted to allow the applicant the opportunity to rehabilitate.
DPP v Dunn [2022] ACTSC 355 (16 December 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Proceedings: Sentencing following a plea of guilty to:
1.
Common assault (s26 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT))
2.
Choking, strangling or suffocating (s28(2)(a))
3.
Sexual intercourse without consent (s54)
4.
Contravening a family violence order (s43(2))
Facts: The offender and victim were in a relationship. A protection order had been granted on application of the victim but was ‘consensually not complied with’ and the relationship between the offender and victim continued [4].
Common assault: After an argument, the defendant took the victim’s phone from her and she went into the bathroom to take a bath. Further argument ensued in the bathroom, during which the offender put his hands around the victim’s throat without squeezing, before pushing her back against the vanity unit.
Choke, suffocate or strangle: After a verbal argument, the victim tried to make the offender leave. He forced his way into the house and carried the victim over his shoulder into the bedroom while she screamed for help. The defendant shoved her and pushed her down onto the bed, telling her to be quiet and placing his hand over her mouth. The victim had difficulty breathing and sustained a minor lip injury.
Sexual intercourse without consent: The offender visited the victim’s residence after she had been drinking all day and was substantially intoxicated. The victim fell asleep and woke to find the defendant rubbing her vagina. She initially responded consensually to avoid a fight but then feigned being asleep in the hope that by letting it continue, the seriousness of the offence would allow her to leave the relationship. While she pretended to sleep, the defendant had sexual intercourse with her.
Contravene family violence order: Following the sexual assault, the victim blocked the offender’s contact and social media but he continued to contact her. One evening he visited her residence and the victim activated security sirens, making him leave. She later told him to return to take away food he had left outside the house. He attended the premises several times that evening and during one visit the victim’s sister told him to leave. He also spoke briefly with the victim.
Reasoning and decision: An aggregate sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months was imposed.
Mossop J considered the objective seriousness of the four offences and the offender’s subjective circumstances.
The common assault was found to be in the mid-range of seriousness, attributable to the act’s demonstration of dominance and control within an intimate relationship. The strangulation was determined to be in the low-mid range, given the apparently short duration and fact that the victim did not appear to have approached passing out or sustained significant injury. The unusual circumstances of the sexual intercourse without consent charge – being the victim’s deliberate behaviour to first indicate consent and then pretend to be asleep in the hope that the offender would commit an offence – in the context of a relationship which included sexual intercourse led to a finding of low range objective seriousness.
The offender was found to have some relevant difficulties in his background, having been brought up with an alcoholic and abusive father. This moderated the significance of general deterrence slightly subject to the countervailing necessity for specific deterrence given his significant history of past domestic and family violence. This included assaults of the victim and a past partner and her child, and multiple contraventions of protection orders. Mossop J highlighted that while the present offending was not objectively high on a spectrum of seriousness, his criminal history revealed a disturbing pattern of offending directed towards intimate partners, making denunciation, deterrence and recognition of harm significant sentencing purposes.
While the offender had expressed some empathy about the victim and indicated a willingness to engage in family violence intervention programs, the evidence of his ‘patchy’ prior engagement in similar programs weakened his prospects of rehabilitation [41].
TS v DT [2022] ACTSC 137 (10 June 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application to extend protection order’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of extended litigation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Whether protection order no longer necessary’
Matter: Appeal of decision of a Magistrate to extend the term of a protection order granted to the respondent woman DT, which among other terms prevented the appellant man, TS from residing in the matrimonial home (which protection order was the subject of TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) and an earlier appeal) for a period of 12 months (it having been extended a number of times previously on an interim basis).
Facts: The protection order, among other terms, prevented TS from residing in the former family home (that protection order was the subject of TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) and an earlier appeal) for a period of 12 months (it had been extended a number of times previously on an interim basis). TS argued DT had the means to obtain alternative accommodation and TS could not afford alternative accommodation, hence should be allowed to reside in the former family home, envisioning either the parties living separately under one roof (as they had between 2008 and 2017) or DT vacating the former family home so that TS could reside there. TS claimed the protection order application was a tactic to force TS to accept an outcome in property proceedings contrary to his best interests. DT gave (largely unchallenged) evidence that TS continued to subject her to daily abuse, and that she remained fearful of TS, particularly if they were to reside under one roof. TS had not filed a response to DT’s then Federal Circuit Court application for property orders in relation to the former matrimonial home and orders had been made in that court that if he did not respond orders would be made unopposed in terms of DT’s application (granting DT sole ownership of the former matrimonial home or proceeds of sale thereof). DT submitted evidence of his psychiatric disorder.
Grounds: (Taken from TS’s application)
1.
The decision is unreasonable and not supported by evidence.
2.
cross jurisdictional issues. The magistrate was totally focused on issues with property settlement under the jurisdiction of the federal circuit court, than what was before him in his own magistrate court, kicking the can into another jurisdiction. It clearly shows that this is a property matter and not a safety issue. corruption of the Family Violence Act in order to get property.
3.
Evidence presented that was beneficial to me was totally ignored.
4.
my lack of accommodation and resulting hardships was not considered.
5.
my human rights and ownership rights have been abused by keeping me out of my house for the last 4 years and now with the order given becomes 5.
6.
sex discrimination by allowing my wife to stay in the house without moving out while i because i am male have to be out for 5 years because of my gender. If men and women are treated equally then she should have been in the house for 2.5 years and then move out because she is permanent APS employee earning higher income than me.
7.
disability discrimination as ample evidence was given about my depression while my wife does not have any disability.
8.
There was much more time spent in the court for property matters than on other matters.as such the court was corrupted by matters not in its jurisdiction and as such its decision is heavily flawed.
Issues:
Whether the only consideration in an application to extend a protection order is whether the protection order is no longer necessary to protect the applicant from family violence (s86 Family Violence Act 2016) or whether the requirement to consider “hardship” to a respondent in s14 of that Act is a relevant consideration on an extension application.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed, decision appealed from affirmed.
While the Magistrate erred in considering s 14 of the Family Violence Act 2016, TS failed to demonstrate that there was any change in the circumstances (including his attitude or the circumstances of the parties reducing or eliminating the risk posed by TS to DT) justifying the grant of the protection order which had been twice affirmed on appeal. Kennett J held that in fact TS’s conduct of the proceedings and focus on his “right” to reside in the home demonstrated a continued need for the protection order, as did his continued minimisation of the 2017 events which resulted in his conviction for common assault and the original grant of the protection order. The parties’ continued conflict in relation to property matters in Australia and in Sri Lanka also indicated a continued need for the protection order.
TS v DT [2025] ACTCA 6 (21 February 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against extension of final protection order’ – ‘Family Violence Act 2016, s 86’ – ‘relevant criterion for applications to extend protection orders’ – ‘hardship’
Proceedings: Appeal against extension of final protection order.
Charges: N/A
Facts: The appellant appealed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal from an order of the Magistrates Court extending a final protection order made against him. The respondent is a protected person under the order.
The appellant and the respondent were married. They separated following a domestic violence incident where the appellant assaulted the respondent and their teenage son while brandishing a knife [2]. Some time later, the appellant and the respondent moved back in together into a house they had jointly purchased. They resumed living together until, following another domestic violence incident, the respondent applied for a protection order against the applicant prohibiting the applicant from being at the family home [3]-[4].
Grounds of appeal: The central complaint made by the applicant in the Court of Appeal was that the appeal judge in the Supreme Court failed to address the grounds before him [65]. The applicant had submitted the order should be varied on the basis of hardship caused to the applicant (he was “practically homeless” [14]).
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the Supreme Court judge had been correct in their interpretation of s 86 of the Family Violence Act 2016 [68]. The criteria that apply to decisions about the making of a family violence order might be relevant to applications to amend an order other than an application for extension [68(e)]. Decisions on applications for extensions are governed by a single criterion – whether the court is “satisfied that a protection order is no longer necessary to protect the protected person from family violence by the respondent”. An application to extend an order is not an invitation to reconsider or redraft provisions of that order.
The Supreme Court judge was therefore not required to consider the appellant’s hardship grounds [71], and the appeal was dismissed [72].
Morrison v Maher (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 63 (1 April 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Character evidence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing monitoring’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Re-sentence following appeal’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5; Property damage; Possess offensive weapon with intent; choking (common assault x 2; Non-consensual sharing of explicit images; Trespass x 2; Property damage; Contravention of a Family Violence Order x 7; Aggravated stalking; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2; Stalking x 3; Attempt to contravene a Family Violence Order; Use of a carriage service to harass.
Proceedings: Re-sentence following appeal.
Facts: The male offender was 43 years old with no prior criminal history. The offending against his wife spanned nearly 10 years and included multiple offences on numerous occasions. The complaints came to light when the victim separated from the offender and sought a Family Violence Protection Order. The offender subsequently repeatedly breached the Family Violence Order, including whilst in custody.
The offender had a traumatic childhood and was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Attachment Disorder and Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He and his former wife married in 2000 and had two children. He successfully appealed his original sentence of a total period of imprisonment of nine years and eight months, with a non-parole period of five years and eight months in Morrison v Maher [2021] ACTSC 312 (8 December 2021) on the basis of conceded errors of reasoning in the original sentencing decision (Maher v Morrison [2020] ACTMC 26 (17 December 2020)).
Decision and reasoning:
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Charge CC2019/6240 is amended by deleting “between 24 March 2019 and 26 April 2019” and inserting “on or about 20 May 2019”.
3.
An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is nine years, four months and 26 days imposed, with a non-parole period to equivalent of 60 per cent of the total effective sentence. As the appellant did not wish the matter to be remitted to the Magistrates’ Court for resentence Mossop J was unable to consider new evidence the appellant sought to adduce, noting that the appellant’s statement and evidence before the first instance court sought to shift a degree of responsibility for his offending to the victim and the controlling nature of the offending meant such behaviours indicated likely entrenched attitudes, making it difficult to assess his prospects of rehabilitation [117].
Mossop J observed at [105]:
The offending involves serious domestic violence offending. It is offending directed to the maintenance of control over the victim. It occurred in the context of a relationship where physical and emotional tools were used to maintain that control. It occurred in the victim’s home. Some of the offences directly involved the children. Others indirectly involved the children through the creation of a climate of fear. The assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending must be made with due regard to that context.
R v Teel (a pseudonym) [2021] ACTSC 183 (17 August 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Intimate images’ – ‘Intimate video footage’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stepchild’ – ‘Technology facilitate abuse’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 4; committing an act of indecency without consent x 8; committing an act of indecency in presence of a young person x 3; non-consensual distribution of intimate images x 7.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: Between1 January 2011 and 22 April 2012 the male accused committed the first series of offences against his then partner, KD. Between 12 December 2017 and 28 September 2018 the accused committed the second series of offences against his then wife, NM. Following her separation from the accused NM discovered evidence the accused had taken photographs of her naked while she was asleep, which she later reported to police. Coincidentally KD’s mother discovered an SD card containing images and videos of the accused committing sexual offences against KD while she was unconscious. The execution of a search warrant on the accused’s premises revealed further images and videos of sexual offences committed against NM, including some committed in the presence of NM and the accused’s son. A number of the images and videos were uploaded to pornographic websites without the consent of either victim, and a number were distributed to another person via email.
The accused was a victim of childhood sexual abuse and multiple psychological report suggested he had symptoms consistent with PTSD, major depressive disorder, ADHD and alcohol misuse disorder, although it was apparent he did not disclose the full extent of his offending to all of the report-writers. He entered pleas of guilty at an early stage.
Decision and Reasoning: Aggregate sentence of 9 years and 10 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Only sentences of full-time imprisonment were appropriate and Burns J noted at [115]:
It is also important that the sentences I impose mark the community’s abhorrence of sexual offending, particularly against intimate partners. All women have the right to feel safe in their domestic relationships. Like all members of the community, they have the right to have their physical integrity respected.
R v Smith [2021] ACTSC 114 (3 June 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Plea of guilty during trial’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threat’
Charge: Sexual intercourse without consent; contravention of family violence order (FVO); the pleas in full satisfaction of the indictment on the basis that the facts relating to a charge of choking, suffocating or strangling, and three transfer charges of common assault, would be taken into account in relation to the contravention of the FVO.
Facts: The offences were committed by the male offender against his female partner over 2 days in March 2020. Their relationship involved domestic violence, including controlling and abusive behaviour by the offender towards the victim. An incident of assault by the offender against the victim in February 2019 led to criminal charges and an FVO was made by the ACT Magistrates Court on 7 May 2019 for 12 months. On the offender’s release from custody after serving a sentence of imprisonment for the assault the parties resumed cohabitation. The victim sought to leave on 24 March, booking herself into a hotel. In a series of text messages the offender threatened suicide and urged the victim to return, which she did. The offender repeatedly applied force to the victim’s throat over a period of 10 minutes causing her to become short of breath, then removed her underpants and digitally penetrated her vagina without her consent and wiped his hands on her face. The offender forced the victim to drive him to McDonalds, and when they returned questioned her, and not accepting her answers, slapped her face. The victim was too frightened to leave. When the offender woke in the morning he elbowed her as he got out of bed, then they went to the hotel to retrieve the victim’s belongings. On the way out the victim was able to seek help from the receptionist who hid her from the offender, and police were called. The victim’s victim impact statement described a range of trauma-related impacts of the offending.
Sentence: 40 months and 12 days (three years, four months and 12 days), with a non-parole period of 28 months, approximately 70 per cent of the head sentence.
Mossop J observed:
[44] The circumstances of this case involve a disturbing example of domestic violence. The offender has a criminal history, including previous offences directed to the current victim, that means he is not entitled to leniency. I do not place any significant weight upon the remorse communicated to the author of the pre-sentence report. I accept that statements unsupported by evidence that is able to be tested should be treated with great caution: see Barbaro v R [2012] VSCA 288; 226 A Crim R 354 at [38] and Imbornone v R [2017] NSWCCA 144 at [57].
R v Heijm [2021] ACTSC 17 (5 February 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Misuse of drugs and alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender applied force to the face of his pregnant female partner during an argument. The following day the victim’s face was observed to be swollen and red, she had a cut lip and blood coming from her mouth and nose. She attended the hospital and underwent a CT scan which revealed a fractured right eye socket and a blood clot around her right eye. The Forensic Medical Officer opined that her injuries were the result of blunt force trauma. The victim was reluctant to report the incident to police.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: An aggregate sentence of 21 months, suspended after 13 months, and a good behaviour order were imposed. This reflected the guilty plea and earlier breaches of good behaviour orders/suspended sentence.
The offending was at the low end of the mid-range of objective seriousness for grievous bodily harm. It was an example of domestic violence, occurred at the victim’s home and while she was heavily pregnant. The offender was on conditional liberty at the time ([11]). Other relevant circumstances included that the offender had a disrupted childhood and an early introduction to illicit drugs. However, notwithstanding the likely lifelong effects of this, the offender was not a young man and there was little evidence of strong motivation to address his drug and alcohol problems. He had a long criminal history, including previous domestic violence offending directed against the same victim. There was a high risk of re-offending ([30]-[34]).
The victim faced difficulty in reporting the offending:
“She disclosed to the hospital staff that she had been injured at home. She also spoke to police but did not want to disclose who had injured her or how it had happened. That evening the offender attended the hospital to see her but was refused entry. The victim told police that she was scared and wanted to speak to the offender in the presence of the police. She did so, before the offender left and she returned inside the hospital.
“DVCS members later contacted police on the victim’s behalf to report that she had been assaulted by the offender. The victim decided that she was prepared to make a statement to police and she participated in a family violence evidence-in-chief interview on 8 February 2020.
R v DQ [2020] ACTSC 352 (18 December 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Initial charge of damaging property by fire with intent to endanger life’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The case concerned the sentencing for the offender’s attempted murder-suicide of herself and her 2 children by setting the house on fire.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A total head sentence of 9 years and 5 months was imposed, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 4 months. This reflected the guilty plea and a degree of cumulation for 2 separate victims with a single set of acts.
The offending was above the mid-range of objective seriousness for attempted murder. It involved the offender’s children in “the most extreme breach of her parental obligations,” and exploitation of her parental authority to achieve the children’s compliance. There was a degree of premeditation. It was a persistent and serious attempt that, but for a neighbour and the fire brigade’s actions, would have been successful ([23]-[28]).
Further, the offending occurred in the context of a long and acrimonious breakdown of the offender’s relationship with her ex-husband and associated Family Court proceedings relating to division of property and custody of the children, which affected her mental health. The offender was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder which was given some weight as it was long-standing and had the potential to distort her thinking to an extent. It was not accepted that the evidence established a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder or chronic adjustment disorder. She had no criminal history, and was at low risk of re-offending. However, the sentence also needed to reflect accountability, denunciation, and just punishment ([29]-[56]).
R v Tonna (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 360 (2 October 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Driving whilst disqualified, repeat offender’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated burglary; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm; Possessing a drug of dependence; Driving whilst disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence as a repeat offender; Contravening a Family Violence Order committed on three occasions x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: Mr Tonna was in an intimate relationship with the female victim of the assault for about four years, before it ended in mid-2019. Mr Tonna breached Family Violence Order (FVO) made for the protection of the victim by attending her residence twice while she was sleeping, accusing her of having a man in the room and damaging property. Mr Tonna subsequently hit the victim with his car, causing injuries. Separately, Mr Tonna also broke into a block of units and was in possession of methylamphetamine. He pleaded guilty.
Decision and reasoning: A total sentence of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment was imposed.
The breaches of the Family Violence Order were serious. Refshauge J said at [26]-[27]:
“The reported comment made by Mr Tonna when attacking the victim’s window on 23 July 2019, namely accusing her of having a man in her room, apart from being none of his business, does show he had not accepted the end of the relationship. Difficult though that may be, it is something that he has to confront and acknowledge.
“It should be noted that the actions on that morning also constituted at least three separate approaches to the victim though relatively close together in time, at 6 am, 7:10 am and 7:30 am. Each could have constituted a separate offence. While not formally described in these proceedings as a rolled-up plea, it is appropriate to treat them in this way. I have described that approach in R v John[2017] ACTSC 144 at [106]- [107] and will follow what I there said.”
The assault, a violence offence, was also serious. Refshauge J said at [28]-[29]:
“It was, in the circumstances, in the nature of a family violence offence. It is the duty of courts to denounce such offences. It also shows an exercise by Mr Tonna of power which is, in reality, an abuse of power, an abuse that is often exacerbated by the vulnerability of women. The assault is an example of escalation and the use of the car, which can properly be described in this situation as a weapon, a potentially lethal weapon. Thus, such offending can escalate and lead, as family violence offences often do, to the death of the victim.
“Further, a victim who, as in this case, is on the ground is in a vulnerable situation (R v Hodge[2015] ACTSC 214 at [15]). The victim must have been terrified as her Victim Impact Statement shows. These are serious offences as explained in decisions such as:
Roberts v Smorhun at [120]-[127] and Goundar v Goddard [2010] ACTSC 56 at [32]- [36]. In relation to the assaults in the context of family violence, see R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322 at [65]-[66].”
Kibblewhite v Buik [2020] ACTSC 132 (11 June 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Autism spectrum disorder’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Specific error’ – ‘Step-children’
Charges: Contravening a family violence order x 1
Case type: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of contravening a family violence order protecting his female former partner (the victim) and her two children. A conviction was recorded and he was ordered to enter into a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
The family violence order prevented the appellant from being at the premises where the protected persons lived, being within 100 metres of them or engaging in behaviour that constituted family violence. He had attended her home at her invitation after mediation, they had rekindled the relationship and the police were called when the victim sent a text message to a friend asking her to call police. The victim said she sent the text message because the appellant "had begun playing psychological mind games on her and abusing her in relation to a number of morning after pills he had located" ([12]). The appellant claimed that because the victim initiated the contact, he thought that he did not breach the family violence order. The appellant was self-represented at the sentencing hearing. Further evidence of a forensic psychiatrist’s report was also admitted on appeal.
Grounds:
1.
The (self-represented) appellant was denied procedural fairness in being denied an adjournment by the learned Magistrate;
2.
Her Honour failed to consider whether a non-conviction order was appropriate;
3.
Her Honour placed undue weight on the need for general and specific deterrence and denunciation; and
4.
the sentence was manifestly excessive ([2]).
Held: The appeal was allowed, the Magistrate’s orders set aside and the appellant was ordered to enter into a good behaviour order for 9 months without conviction ([75]).
The appellant had faced prior charges of assaulting and resisting an officer and contravening a domestic violence order which were dismissed under the "Mental Health Act" ([18]). He suffered from autistic spectrum disorder which affected his thinking, increased his anxiety and interfered with his ability to maintain relationships. The offending was at the low end of the spectrum for this kind of offence. Extenuating circumstances included (1) the victim’s invitation to recommence contact; (2) the re-establishment of a physical relationship between the parties over a period of weeks before the conduct in question; (3) the victim’s consent to the appellant being at her home; and (4) the absence of any request for him to leave the house or cease contact prior to the police being called ([68]). Mossop J noted that the power in s17 Crimes (Sentencing) Act to not record a conviction will not often be deployed in family violence cases due to the need for general and specific deterrence, but the extenuating circumstances of the present case and the appellant’s personal matters meant a conviction should not have been recorded ([70]). The Magistrate made a specific error in failing to give consideration to the application of s 17 ([51]).
R v Palmer [2020] ACTSC 13 (3 February 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Choking’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim history of trauma and abuse’
Charges: Burglary x1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x1; Choking a person and rendering them insensible x1;
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male offender was convicted on his pleas of guilty. The female victim was his former partner. He entered her house while she was asleep and remained in the property despite the victim asking him to leave. The offender assaulted the victim after a verbal argument and choked her so as to render the victim unconscious. The offender had a significant criminal history and had been dealt with in the Magistrate’s Court for other offending against the same victim. He attributed his violent and abusive behaviour towards the victim to his struggles to cope with the victim’s psychosocial difficulties due to her long history of trauma and abuse [13].
Held: Justice Elkaim sentenced the accused to 10 months imprisonment for the burglary, 5 months’ imprisonment for the assault, and 20 months imprisonment for the choking offence. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Elkaim J found the offence of burglary to have "just below medium objective seriousness" [6]. His Honour noted that "Although s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) says full-time imprisonment should be a last resort, I can see no alternative here. Domestic violence is abhorrent. Choking a person is a serious crime. The offender should not have been anywhere near his victim. He was already on bail for family violence offences against the same victim. When she told him to leave he should have done so. He should not have assaulted her and he certainly should not have choked her." [15]. The seriousness of the offence and the domestic violence were aggravating factors and a 15% discount for the guilty plea was allowed.
R v Laipato [2019] ACTSC 386 (20 December 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Burglary’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persons with mental illness’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Burglary x 1; Unlawful confinement x 1; Unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling a person x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The male offender was found guilty by a jury of burglary, unlawful confinement and unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling a person. He was acquitted of 6 other charges. The offender and female victim (his former partner) were engaged in SMS text conversation about their relationship in the hours leading to the offending conduct. The victim made it clear that the relationship was over, and the offender was angry as a result of this conversation ([4]). The offender attended the victim’s home after midnight, dragged her from her bed into the neighbouring room and choked her ([5]). The offence was accompanied by a death threat, calculated to increase the victim’s fear. The offender and victim had been in an intermittent relationship since 2012, and have a 4-year old son. In her Victim Impact Statement, the victim explained the impact of the domestic violence. She suffers severe anxiety, PTSD and depression, and sometimes "feels very angry that her former partner hurt her so much, both physically and emotionally". At the time of the offending conduct, she felt helpless, fearful and thought that she might die ([6]-[7]).
Held: The offender was sentenced to 5 years’ and 5 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. The offender has a very lengthy criminal history, including multiple convictions for burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, aggravated burglary, recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, assault and drug and traffic offences ([8]). A significant aggravating feature of the offences was that they occurred in a family violence context ([9]). The unlawful confinement lasted for a minimum of 1.5 hours, and this was "impulsive and without any significant planning". The purpose of the confinement was to manifest his anger towards the victim for ending the relationship and to exercise control over her. During the course of the confinement, the offender inflicted extreme violence on, and instilled fear in, the victim, who now suffers continuing psychological consequences ([10]). The choking conduct was deliberate and sustained, and the victim’s ability to breathe was sometimes completely impaired ([11]).
Although the offender’s childhood was marred by instability, he now enjoys a supportive family relationship ([13]). In a pre-sentence report, the offender indicated that he had no intention to reunite with the victim and claimed to have been subjected to violence in the relationship ([14]). He also has a long history of alcohol and drug use, as well as Major Depressive Disorder, which was described as in full remission in 2017. He was also assaulted while in custody that same year. He plans to reunite with his son, with whom he is believed to have a "healthy, loving relationship" ([17]-[20]).
The offender has also shown no remorse for his current and previous offending. This gave rise to a concern regarding his ability and commitment to avoid criminal offending and to achieve a stable, co-parenting relationship with the victim. During his present period in custody, he did not take any steps to address his drug and alcohol abuse issues or his attitude to domestic violence. Therefore, his prospects of rehabilitation could not be described as good ([21]-[23]).
R v MZ [2019] ACTSC 341 (6 December 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sexual violence’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x1; Administration of certain declared substances x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The complainant woman and male offender were married and lived together. The offender engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant while she was asleep. An audio recording taken during the time reveals that the complainant did not consent to the offender’s conduct and that when she woke up she immediately asked the offender to stop. The offender then left the bedroom, only to return ten minutes later and force a bitter substance into the complainant’s mouth. The substances administered were temazepam and zopiclone.
Judgment: In determining the objective seriousness of the offence, Mossop J noted that "while the offending did occur in a domestic context, the evidence did not establish that it was part of any pattern of oppression of the victim through violence or sexual violence. Nor does it establish that there was any marked inequality of power between husband and wife." [9]. The judge found the offending to also lack other aggravating factors as the offender did not use a weapon or violence, threaten the victim, or have a significant degree of premeditation and the victim was not injured, humiliated or degraded in a way more explicit than the conduct itself [7]. Justice Mossop also did not consider the presence of the sleeping child to be an aggravating factor as the child had no awareness of what was going on. The Court accepted that the offender’s depression and general anxiety disorder meant that "he is likely to find a sentence of full-time imprisonment more onerous than a person without those conditions" [40]. The sexual intercourse offending was held to be in the lower range of objective seriousness for this offence [10]. It was not possible to find on the evidence that the administration of a declared substance offence "was an intention to cause harm to the victim other than through interference with her recollection of events".
The offender was sentenced to 22 months’ imprisonment for the first charge, with the sentence to be suspended after four months upon the offender entering into an undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations for 19 months. For the charge of administering a declared substance, the offender was convicted and sentenced to a suspended sentence of two months’ imprisonment.
R v Teer [2019] ACTSC 334 (29 November 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Act of indecency x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender attempted to strangle the victim when she refused to engage in sexual activity, pushing the victim face-down against a pillow. After releasing the victim and letting her partially roll-over, the offender grabbed the victim’s throat and restricted her breathing for 5 to 10 seconds while threatening if she continued making noise. There was medical evidence of petechial bruising.
Issue: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: Loukas-Karlsson J discounted the penalty for each charge by 5% as the offender entered guilty pleas one week before a re-trial for the offences. His Honour only reduced the sentences by 5% rather than the usual 10% because the offender demonstrated a lack of remorse and tried to justify his actions. It was also noted at [60] that ‘it must be recognised by the Court that the offences committed against the victim had a serious and significant impact upon her. Both the short and the long-term consequences of being the victim of these offences must be acknowledged’.
‘In respect to the offence of an act of indecency…the offender [was] sentenced to a good behaviour order with the core conditions requiring him to sign an undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations’ for a period of 20 months reduced to 19 months on account of the guilty plea. ‘In respect of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm…the offender [was] sentenced to a good behaviour bond’ with the same core conditions for a period of 32 months reduced to 30 months on account of the 5% reduction for entering guilty pleas. [64]
NS v Hotchkis [2019] ACTSC 309 (8 November 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Audio recording’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: 1 x common assault; 1 x contravention of a Family Violence Order
Case type: Appeal against convictions
Facts: The appellant allegedly kicked the complainant’s leg during an argument (assault charge). At that time, the appellant and complainant were married and living together. The complainant had obtained a Family Violence Order against the appellant, which the appellant allegedly breached during the argument by causing or threatening to cause injury to the complainant or by harassing, threatening or intimidating her ([3]). A central issue was whether an audio recording made by the complainant was admissible.
Issue: The appellant appealed the findings of guilt on the basis that 1) the learned Magistrate erred in ruling that the audio recording made by the complainant was admissible pursuant to s 5(2)(d)-(e) of the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) (LDA), and 2) the convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported by the available evidence.
Held: The prosecution sought to adduce a recording of the alleged events said to have been made by the complainant on her mobile. The appellant objected on the ground that the recording was made in contravention of the provisions of the LDA ([10]). Burns J did not challenge the Magistrate’s finding that a ‘private conversation’, for the purposes of the LDA, existed ([13]), and turned his mind to whether any of the exception provisions applied such that the complainant’s use of the listening device was not proscribed by the LDA ([15]). In his Honour’s opinion, the Magistrate was correct in finding that the exception in s 4(3)(b)(i) was satisfied. The complainant feared that the appellant might seriously injure or kill her, and gave evidence that she had regularly been abused by him. Therefore, there were reasonable grounds for her to consider that the recording was necessary to protect her lawful interests ([21]). His Honour also found that the exceptions in s 5(2)(d) and (e) were established ([22]).
His Honour concluded that even if the recording had been obtained in contravention of the LDA, the proper exercise of the discretion found in s 138 of the Evidence Act would have resulted in its admission ([31]). The evidence was important, both in its own right and as support for the complainant’s evidence, and its probative value was significant. The gravity of the contravention was low, and there was no suggestion to the complainant that she knew that she was violating the LDA. Further, the offences charged against the appellant were serious domestic violence offences ([26]-[27]). At [30], Burns J noted that ‘[a] criminal has no right to keep their offending private, or to claim that the gathering of evidence of their crime is a breach of their privacy’.
As to the second ground of appeal, his Honour agreed with the Magistrate that the evidence established a breach of the Family Violence Order, as the conduct was harassing and intimidating. The Magistrate was entitled to consider the aggression by the appellant towards the complainant at the time she said she was kicked. As there was sufficient evidence on which the Magistrate was entitled to convict the appellant, the appeal was dismissed ([40]-[41]).
Davis v Stephens [2019] ACTSC 271 (1 October 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Victims who are (alleged) perpetrators’
Offences: Common assault x 2; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The female appellant and male victim had been in a relationship for about two years (which was ‘volatile’ and ’they tended to be jealous’ of each other and had numerous ‘fights’) but they had broken up the day before the offending and the appellant had moved out. Early in the morning of the offending, the appellant entered the front door and started punching the victim in the head. The appellant saw another woman on the couch and started moving towards her, so the victim grabbed the appellant’s arm. The appellant bit the victim’s arm hard and grabbed his testicles. She then chased after the other woman before taking the victim’s phone, leaving the house and knocking over the victim’s motorcycle. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to a 12-month Good Behaviour Order. She appealed her conviction on the following grounds:
1.
The Magistrate erred by not properly directing herself to the law of self-defence in terms of both personal self-defence and self-defence of property, and/or
2.
The Magistrate erred by returning inconsistent verdicts by dismissing charges of Damage to property but returning verdicts of guilty on the other charges in circumstances where the evidence was substantially the same between the counts. That error was compounded because the verdict of not guilty should have caused reasonable doubt in relation to the other counts.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal. His Honour found that the Magistrate accepted the evidence of the victim (the victim grabbed the appellant’s arm to stop the appellant coming further into the house, not to prevent her from retreating out of the house) and, as such, the basis for self-defence fell away [76]. Regarding Ground 2, his Honour held that "the bare fact of there being a guilty verdict in relation to some charges arising from a course of events and an acquittal in relation to one or more charges arising from the same course of events is not enough to establish that the guilty verdicts must be unreasonable. It is necessary for the appellant to demonstrate that the different outcomes cannot stand together as a matter of logic and common sense" [79]. His Honour found that the Magistrate was correct in distinguishing the verdicts in relation to events that occurred inside the house from those which occurred outside the house [82].
His Honour further held that the sentence imposed fell within the range of appropriate outcomes and was not excessive, let alone "manifestly excessive" [84].
Kumar v Love [2019] ACTSC 238 (30 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Common assault
Case type: Appeal against convicions
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of two charges of common assault arising out of an altercation with the victim (his wife). The acts of assault included slapping the victim across the face, pushing her forehead backwards striking the wall behind, grabbing her hair, twisting her head and hitting her face on the wall, and striking his daughter’s shoulder. The charges fell into the category of family violence. The appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge and did not testify. The defence argued that the victim fabricated the assaults with the intention of terminating the marriage ([17]).
Issue: The appellant appealed on the ground that the Magistrate’s findings of guilt were unsafe and unsatisfactory on the basis that:
•
It was not open to the Magistrate to wholly reject the appellant’s evidence; and
•
There were a number of significant parts of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution which should have given rise to a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt.
Held: Crowe AJ dismissed the appeal. His Honour rejected the first ground of appeal and saw no basis upon which to doubt the Magistrate’s rejection of the appellant’s version of events. His version of events changed as the interview progressed. For example, after he said that he had not touched the victim at all, he then said that he had tickled her ([35]). In relation to the second ground, the Magistrate was entitled to accept the complainant as a witness of truth, and reject the proposition that the victim fabricated the entire story in order to terminate her unhappy marriage with the appellant. The discrepancy between the victim’s evidence and that of her female friend did not provide a sufficient basis to reasonably doubt the victim’s evidence as to the appellant’s violence towards her. The discrepancy was explained by reference to the extent of the victim’s distress, and the physical and language communication difficulties at that time ([40]-[47]).Crowe AJ dismissed the appeal. His Honour rejected the first ground of appeal and saw no basis upon which to doubt the Magistrate’s rejection of the appellant’s version of events. His version of events changed as the interview progressed. For example, after he said that he had not touched the victim at all, he then said that he had tickled her ([35]). In relation to the second ground, the Magistrate was entitled to accept the complainant as a witness of truth, and reject the proposition that the victim fabricated the entire story in order to terminate her unhappy marriage with the appellant. The discrepancy between the victim’s evidence and that of her female friend did not provide a sufficient basis to reasonably doubt the victim’s evidence as to the appellant’s violence towards her. The discrepancy was explained by reference to the extent of the victim’s distress, and the physical and language communication difficulties at that time ([40]-[47]).
R v EP (No 3) [2019] ACTSC 242 (28 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 1 x threaten to capture or distribute intimate images; 1 x use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence; 2 x indecency; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x common assault; 1 x stalking
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim were in a de facto relationship for approximately 6 years and have a daughter. Despite the breakdown of their relationship, they remained on amicable terms ([7]). The offender was charged with a combination of Federal and Territory offences. The offender pleaded guilty to threatening to distribute an intimate image (Count 5) and using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (Count 6). He was found guilty of 2 charges of committing an act of indecency (Counts 2 and 4) and a charge of sexual assault in the third degree (Count 3). A charge of common assault and stalking were transferred to the Court, which required consideration of the provisions on back-up and related offences in the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ([13]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offences.
Held: The Court sentenced the offender to 3 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months for the Territory offences, and declined to make a recognizance release order with respect to the Federal offence as the offender would still be serving a period of imprisonment for the Territory offences after the expiration of that offence. The charge of common assault was dismissed.
The offender’s subjective circumstances were observed at [32]-[40]. He had 2 daughters from a previous marriage and worked as a self-employed technician prior to custody. However, he had not been working for the past 6 months due to mental health issues, and suffered financial distress as a result ([35]). The offender reported infrequent social use of cannabis and his self-reported alcohol use was deemed ‘risky’ ([36]). The offender showed some insight into the impact of his offending, but attempted to minimise and justify some of his actions ([39]). The offender was also being treated for symptoms of depression ([40]).
The Court did not attribute significant weight to the offender’s expression of remorse ([41]-[44]). He had no relevant criminal history and was of prior good character ([45]-[46]). He pleaded guilty to 2 charges before the trial commenced, and the 2 further transfer charges in the course of the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the Court allowed a discount of approximately 10% in each case ([47]-[54]). The Court also considered the time spent in custody ([55]-[56]), and analysed relevant cases and statistics ([57]-[69]). At [89], the Court found that all the offences committed against the victim significantly impacted her. The Court also took into account the principles of totality, concurrency and accumulation ([70]-[78]), and relevant statutory considerations ([79]-[88]). Significantly, it was noted at [88] that the ‘Courts have made it clear that women must not be treated by men as property’.
Barron v Laverty [2019] ACTSC 198 (31 July 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 5 x contravention of a Family Violence Order; 1 x use carriage service to harass/menace
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In early 2019, the appellant was sentenced to a total of 2 years’ and 8 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months, following guilty pleas to 6 charges, namely, contravening family violence orders obtained by his parents and his ex-partner against him and using carriage service to harass/menace.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on various grounds, including that the total sentence was manifestly excessive and that her Honour erred in her approach to s 110(2)(a) Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) by ordering that the suspended sentences imposed for the breach offences be served cumulatively.
Held: Murrell CJ noted that the appellant had a very significant domestic violence history ([52]). Her Honour considered the appellant’s prior convictions of matters of dishonesty, and contravening protection orders ([25]), for which he had been sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months. Offences 1 and 2 were committed while he was subject to these suspended sentences, and Offence 3 was committed 3 days after his release from prison (for contravening a protection order) ([26]). Further, the appellant’s illicit substance abuse rendered him unsuitable for an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO) ([29]).
Murrell CJ held that the appellant’s continued contraventions of court orders required a significant total sentence to be imposed. Her Honour was not satisfied that, when considering the appropriateness of the total sentencing, the sentencing judge erred in exercising her sentencing discretion ([41]).
The appellant argued that, as the original suspended sentences were concurrent, the sentencing judge fell into specific error when she made them cumulative ([56]). After analysing the interpretation of s 110(2) in some detail, her Honour concluded that the sentencing judge fell into error ([95]). The appeal was therefore allowed and the appellant was re-sentenced to a total sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 months ([100]).
R v NX (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 131 (24 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic violence offences’ – ‘Offender on conditional liberty at the time of offending’ – ‘Presence of child’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social abuse and isolation’
Charges: Sexual assault in the third degree x 1, sexual intercourse without consent x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 3; common assault x 2; capturing visual data in circumstances where the capture is an invasion of privacy and indecent x 1; damage to property x 3.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship since 2017. The offences took place over three days.
While the victim was driving her car with the offender in the passenger seat the offender took the victim’s mobile phone, snapped it in half and threw the pieces out of the car window. That afternoon he headbutted her in the middle of the forehead causing her pain and told her to “get the fuck out” of the house. The victim left the residence on foot with her son as the offender had taken her car keys. [5]
While she was gone the offender slashed two of the car’s tyres with a knife.[6] When the victim returned the offender told her that he had lost her keys and that somebody had popped the tyres of her car. He told her to go inside the house otherwise he would “start shit” with the victim’s flatmate. [7]
Later that night the offender held a Stanley knife with the blade out to the victim’s throat and near her face and directed her to “suck [his] dick”. The victim felt forced to do so and the offender filmed the incident. [8]
Two days later the offender attempted to cuddle the victim but she did not wish to cuddle and did not reciprocate. The offender became angry and began yelling. He punched the victim in the back of the head a number of times. The victim tried to put on a dress and the offender ripped it off her then grabbed her left breast and twisted and squeezed it causing pain and bruising. The victim’s son was present. [10]
Decision and Reasoning: Four years and eight months imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years.
In considering the objective seriousness of the offence, Mossop J observed:
The offending had some of the typical features of domestic violence in that it involved attempts to control the victim’s behaviour and sought to place responsibility for the offender’s unlawful conduct upon the victim. It occurred in circumstances where the victim was particularly vulnerable by reason of the need to care for and protect her small child. [14]
R v Cowling [2019] ACTSC 138 (23 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Intensive corrections order’ – ‘Options’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Unlawful confinement x 1; choking, suffocating or strangling x 1; common assault x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender engaged in controlling and violent behaviour towards the victim during their relationship and had threatened to kill her and her family if she ended the relationship. On 1 November 2016, the offender drove himself and the victim home. He did not allow her to exit the vehicle, pulled her hair and punched her in the face several times. On 21 March 2017, the victim visited the offender’s residence and an argument ensued. The offender grabbed the victim, pushed her down and squeezed her neck. Later that night, the offender choked the victim for ‘about 20 minutes’ and threatened to kill her, he intermittently released his hands [7]. On 22 March 2017, the victim fled and called her brother to get her. The offender later attended the brother’s residence, and made threats and attempted to drive his vehicle towards the brother. The brother was the victim of the common assault charge.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held: The Court considered the objective circumstances of the offending. The unlawful confinement charge was serious as it involved gratuitous violence against the victim, including punching her in the face. The choking charge was also serious as the victim felt that she could pass out and the conduct was accompanied by threats ([27]-[28]). The offender reported that he attended psychological counselling sessions in the past ([34]). His personal circumstances were also taken into account. His parents separated when he was young, he reported a supportive family environment, he has a four year son with an ex-partner with whom he maintains contact, and he is currently employed. He denied any past or current drug use. Although there was an almost decade-old matter for possession of prohibited drugs, no conviction was recorded ([33]). Further, his criminal history was limited. The Court refused to take into account a current family violence charge against him, as he had not yet been convicted and was entitled to a presumption of innocence ([44]-[45]). The offender’s remorse, references provided to the court, time already spent in custody, and sentencing principles, particularly rehabilitation, were also taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence ([38]-[43], [51], [80-[88]). The Court noted that the offender entered pleas of guilty 11 days prior to when the trial was listed to commence for a second time, and allowed a discount of approximately 15% ([46]-[50]). The offences were found to significantly impact the victim. ‘This sort of violence against women must be deterred and must be punished’ ([100]).
The Court recorded the convictions for the 3 offences. The sentence imposed was ordered to be served by way of an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO), which highlights the importance of rehabilitation. The ICO was made on the condition that the offender perform 400 hours of community service, continue to engage with psychological services to manage his mental health, and be assessed for and complete offence specific intervention ([114]).
R v Hudson [2019] ACTSC 110 (2 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Blackmail’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Using carriage service to harass x 2; Demand accompanied by threat to endanger x 1; Threaten to inflict grievous bodily harm x 1; Blackmail x 1; Arson x 1; Recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm x 1; Possession of a prohibited item (as a detainee) x 2; Obstructing a public official x 1; Possessing an offensive weapon with intent x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing and application for reparation order.
Facts: The accused had been in a relationship with the female victim for three years, with their relationship ending three months before the offence was committed. After the relationship ended, the accused became a member of a motorcycle gang and the female victim commenced a relationship with her current partner. Upon learning of the victims’ relationship, the offender harassed and threatened his ex-partner (via text message and Facebook). He also threatened and blackmailed her new partner, demanding $5000 for ‘whoring out [his] missus’ [26].
The appellant was arrested for these offences. While in custody, the offender started a fire in his cell and possessed dangerous items out of fear he was at risk from members of rival motorcycle gangs. The offender then injured an officer while being restrained.
Issues: What are the appropriate sentences given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Murrell CJ provided that ‘sentences must deliver appropriate punishment, and speak to the purposes of accountability, denunciation, and recognition of harm’ [81]. In reaching his decision, Murrell CJ consequently considered the high objective seriousness of the accused’s harassment of his ex-partner; the accused’s extensive criminal history; good behaviour during previous periods of imprisonment; his dysfunctional upbringing; and the fact that the accused had allegedly not been receiving proper treatment for his post-traumatic stress disorder.
The accused was sentenced to four years and two months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 33 months.
In sentencing the offender, Murrell J noted:
43. The family violence offences and associated offences bear the hallmarks of many serious family violence matters. At the time of the offences, the offender remained angry and distraught over the breakup of his relationship with Ms Lees. He was jealous, felt a sense of entitlement in relation to Ms Lees, and wanted to control her new relationship. He behaved in a volatile and irrational manner, elevating the danger and threat of danger perceived by the victims. In addition, the offender called his Nomads associates in aid, which would have considerably enhanced the fear felt by the victims.
R v Green (no. 3) [2019] ACTSC 96 (11 April 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Directed acquittal application’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Choking, suffocating or strangling a person x 2.
Proceeding type: No-case submission/Directed acquittal application.
Facts: The accused was charged with two counts of choking, suffocating or strangling his mother while in an argument. While the mother claimed that the accused strangled her in her initial accounts of the incident, she eventually recanted her allegations claiming she had fictionalised them while angry with the accused.
Issues: The proceedings focused on the questions of whether the words ‘chokes’ ‘suffocates’ and ‘strangles’ in s 28(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 should be interpreted with respect to their effects on the victim’s breathing and consequently whether the correct interpretations of these words warrant upholding the accused’s no-case submission.
Decision and reasoning: Although choking, suffocating or strangling is an offence under s 28(2), the terms are not defined within the legislation and prior to these proceedings were yet to receive judicial consideration in the ACT. Loukas-Karlsson J provided, in comparing s 28(2) of the Crimes Act to the corresponding offences in other jurisdictions, that the intention behind the provision may have been to build on the ACT’s existing offences which contain the elements of ‘choke, strangle or suffocate’ in an attempt to ‘lower the threshold of conduct to capture a broader range of conduct, particularly in the domestic violence setting’ [34]. Upon considering this intention along with the elements’ statutory context, ‘authoritative’ definitions from the Macquarie Dictionary and extrinsic material (such as the Explanatory Statement) Loukas-Karlsson J concluded that ‘the relevant element is constituted by the stopping of the breath’ [46].
In considering the accused’s directed acquittal application, Loukas-Karlsson J provided that “a verdict of not guilty may be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty” (Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51) [84]. Since the accused did not stop the victim’s breath on either attempt, his conduct failed to satisfy the necessary element. His Honour therefore concluded that there was a defect in the evidence such that a verdict of not guilty must be directed.
Lewis v Storey [2019] ACTSC 74 (22 March 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Five offences including two counts of common assault, one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one count of choking to render insensible, and one count of possession of an offensive weapon with intent.
Case type: Appeal of sentence.
Facts: The victim and the appellant had been in a relationship for approximately two months. The two counts of common assault were constituted by the appellant putting his hands around the victim’s neck and pushing her into a wall, as well as saying intimidating and threatening words. The appellant also armed himself with two knives (count of possession of an offensive weapon with intent), and had wrapped his arm around the victim’s neck cutting off her circulation and causing her to lose consciousness (count of choking to render insensible). The count of assault occasioning bodily harm was established by the appellant kicking the victim numerous times, grabbing her hair and repeatedly hitting her head on the ground, and slapping the victim’s face. The victim suffered significant injuries ([18]). Notably, a total head sentence of three years and six months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issues: The appellant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that that the sentence with the respect to the charge of choke render insensible and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive. He sought leave to add two grounds of appeal: 1) that the Magistrate offended the R v De Simoni principle by punishing him for attempted murder; and 2) that the Magistrate erred by not applying the full discount of 20% to the sentence imposed for the offence to choke to render insensible. He sought orders setting aside the Magistrate’s order, and that he be re-sentenced in respect of that charge.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal and re-sentenced the appellant, in relation to the offence of choking to render insensible, to three years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 17 months. At [43], the Court held that a head sentence of three years and two months was not manifestly excessive. With respect to the non-parole period of 18 months, the Court found that ‘as expressed as a percentage of a head sentence of 3 years and 2 months of imprisonment, the relevant percentage is approximately 47%’. This is outside the usual range of non-parole periods in the ACT. The proper approach to fixing a non-parole period is to have regard to all the sentencing purposes, the objective seriousness of the offence, and the appellant’s subjective circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation. The proportion of the sentence served by way of non-parole period is a matter of judicial discretion, and ordinarily, the non-parole period is a significant part of the total sentence ([52]). The appellant’s youth was important to his prospect of rehabilitation. It was necessary to fix a non-parole period that is relatively low, but also reflected the total sentence and was consistent with sentencing purposes ([53]).
R v KD [2019] ACTSC 62 (15 March 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Attempted sexual intercourse without consent x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to an offence of attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The accused and the victim lived together for two years prior to the accused entering custody, and had a child together ([21]-[22]). The victim was lying on her back when the accused pinned her down and repeatedly placed a pillow over her face. He then attempted to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with her ([4]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Loukas-Karlsson J found that the offence approached mid-range seriousness. The objective seriousness of the offence was informed by the fact that the accused pinned down the victim and repeatedly placed a pillow over her face ([15]-[17]). His Honour considered the accused’s personal circumstances at [18]-[28]. He was young (24 years old), had been diagnosed with PTSD at the age of five as a result of witnessing domestic violence between his parents, reported to have been sexually abused by a family member, left high school early, worked in hospitality and as a removalist, and used drugs from an early age. The accused accepted responsibility for the offence and acknowledged the negative impacts of his actions. He indicated that he was willing to participate in programs and interventions. In considering the objective seriousness of the offence and subjective matters, his Honour held that the appropriate sentence for the offence of attempted sexual intercourse without consent is two years and nine months imprisonment. However, his Honour reduced the sentence to two years and four months due to the guilty plea.
R v Kennewell [2019] ACTSC 125 (25 January 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Bystander intervention’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the offence of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm after the matter was committed for trial, but before the trial date was set.
The offender attended a friend’s party in the ACT, but started arguing with his girlfriend and left the party. Later that night, the victim heard the argument and, specifically, a female screaming. Concerned for her safety, the victim approached them. The offender stabbed the victim 3 times, and then ran away, followed by his girlfriend. The offender was arrested and granted bail the following day. He was subsequently imprisoned for offences (involving stabbing another person with a knife) committed in NSW while on bail.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Burns J held that the recent offending demonstrated that the offence in question was not an isolated incident. He was also found in possession of an instrument capable of being used to stab after he was extradited from NSW. These matters strongly suggest the need for specific deterrence. His Honour found the offending was unprovoked. The offender’s personal circumstances were also considered. He is a 20 year old Indigenous man, his parents separated when he was young, and he has anger management, drug and alcohol issues. However, he maintains a good relationship with his family, with whom he had remained in contact since he was incarcerated. It was noted that the offender is in good health, has a positive attitude, has employment available to him, and had completed an anger management course. His Honour was satisfied that the offender had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, provided that he ceases carrying weapons, and addresses his anger management, drug and alcohol issues and employment. Even though the offender said that he carries a knife for self-protection, Burns J held that ‘no law-abiding citizen in this country, not associating with criminals or engaging in criminal conduct, needs to carry a knife for self-protection’ ([30]).
Notwithstanding his young age and rehabilitation prospects, Burns J held that the sentence needed to reinforce the fact that using knives to seriously harm others will be met with harsh punishment. Nothing less than full-time imprisonment would sufficiently address the sentencing requirements ([31]). The offender was convicted and sentenced to 3 years and 1 month imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months.
KIC v Tennant [2019] ACTSC 145 (23 January 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Child contact’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant had previously been served with an Interim Family Violence Order (the Order). Among other things, the Order prohibited the appellant from being within 100 metres of the protected person, his wife, except when handing over their child. The wife alleged that shortly after being served, the appellant breached the Order by walking in front of her house at a time she was home. She claimed that when the appellant was walking past her property, he stopped and looked into the residence. She also claimed that the appellant returned twice after leaving and began to follow her when he saw her outside.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the breach in the Magistrate Court. This plea was later withdrawn, but then reinstated during these proceedings.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: During the proceedings in the Magistrate Court, the appellant attempted to tender a document detailing the events of the day the offence allegedly occurred. The magistrate rejected this document on the grounds that it sought to ‘traverse’ the plea of guilty [9]. While Burns J disagrees with the grounds on which the magistrate refused the document, His Honour believed it should have been rejected because it was self-serving. The contents and rejection of the appellant’s document formed the main focus of Burns J’s judgment.
Burns J had great difficulty accepting most of the appellant’s evidence both in the document and that which the appellant gave before Burns J. The appellant claimed that he visited the area near to his wife’s residence to find a spot for his daughter to wait for him to pick her up the next day. The appellant also claimed that he had recently undergone a procedure to his eyes which resulted in him being unable to see more than one metre in front of him. Burns J provided that given the condition of the appellant’s eyes and the fact that he visited the residence at 10 pm, ‘it does not make any sense whatsoever that in his circumstances’ he visited the residence for the reason he claimed [13].
Burns J also found it difficult to accept the appellant’s submissions as he had made no challenge to the Statement of Facts that were read before the magistrate. The Statement of Facts did not include any of the above claims and instead provided that the appellant walked passed the protected person’s house while he was out walking to take care of his health (as the appellant claimed to be diabetic). His Honour concluded that he was “not now prepared to find that the events occurred in the way in which the appellant now suggests that they did. On that basis, [Burns J] propose[d] to proceed on the basis that the circumstances of the offence went as put before the magistrate’ [17].
Burns J dismissed the appeal, commenting ‘it has not been demonstrated that the sentence [was] manifestly excessive, nor [was Burns J] satisfied that there was any relevant error which would have affected the outcome of the proceedings before the magistrate’ [21].
R v Vincent [2018] ACTSC 347 (12 December 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Vulnerable people’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Minor property damage x 2
Facts: The offender was in a relationship with the complainant for 12 years. They had a child, aged seven at trial. The relationship ended late 2017. The offender visited the complainant’s home to visit children. He entered the house, damaged property, and assaulted the complainant with a baton by hitting her on the arms and on the back of the head.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one month’s imprisonment for the first count of damaging property, and one month’s imprisonment for the second count of damaging property. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The term of imprisonment for the offence of assault was suspended on the condition that the offender enter a Good Behaviour Order for 18 months.
The offender had a significant criminal record, which included a contravention of a protection order against the complainant for which he already served a period of time in custody. He grew up in difficult circumstances – his mother had a drug addiction and did not adequately support him. The offender also had a long-standing history with drugs and alcohol which was exacerbated by his separation with the complainant. Whilst in custody, he completed a drug and alcohol awareness program and commenced an anger management course. His Honour noted that domestic violence is an ‘appalling crime’ and ‘offends the most basic norms of society’ ([11]). There were positive signs of rehabilitation, such as the fact that the offender was in a stable relationship, had ongoing accommodation and employment, and was a valuable member at his workplace. The complainant had sent an email to the offender saying she had ‘moved on’ and wanted the offender to attend their child’s graduation. His Honour stated: ‘Expressions of reconciliation by victims of domestic violence are often a regrettable reflection of the dominance of the abuser. However, in this case, primarily because the offender is in a new relationship, I am prepared to accept the sincerity of the victim’s request.’
Fallon v Baker [2018] ACTSC 319 (9 November 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant had a history of heavy drinking. Despite having been prescribed medication to assist with his alcohol dependence, the appellant was heavily intoxicated on the night the offence occurred. His intoxicated state led him to punch his wife in the back on at least four occasions while she was pretending to sleep and to later threaten to strangle their youngest child to stop him crying. This threat prompted the mother to call the police.
In the magistrate’s judgment, he noted that the wife declined to participate in the Family Violence Evidence-in-Chief interview as she did not want the appellant to know she was the one who had contacted the police. The wife declined out of fear of losing the children due to the husband’s past behaviour and conduct in the relationship. The magistrate attributed the appellant’s behaviour to his dependence on alcohol.
Along with appealing the magistrate’s sentence, the appellant also sought to admit further evidence and to have the sentencing proceedings reopened.
Issues: (1) Was the sentence imposed manifestly excessive; and (2) did the magistrate fail to consider or give proper weight to the subjective circumstances of the appellant; (3) should further evidence be admitted and the sentencing proceedings reopened.
Decision and reasoning: Mossop J dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence imposed by the magistrate. His Honour was satisfied that the magistrate considered all possible consequences of a conviction for the appellant’s employment and other subjective circumstances and that the appellant’s submissions failed to demonstrate otherwise. As such, the appellant’s first ground for appeal was unsuccessful.
When considering the second ground, Mossop J used the wife’s fear of making a complaint and of losing her children, and the history of similar events during the relationship as evidence ‘that the offending conduct in the present case occurred in a context of typical domestic violence cases …[This] history of conduct within the relationship indicates that the offending conduct had a more objectively serious character than it would have had if that history was not present’ [21]. Mossop J used these facts to reject the appellant’s claim that the magistrate’s sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to the third issue, the appellant sought to admit evidence detailing the consequences of the conviction on his employment and job prospects given that the conviction caused his employer to consider terminating the appellant’s employment and the appellant to consequently resign. Mossop J, however, did not consider the admission of further evidence to be in the interests of justice as the evidence was of limited scope and addressed a matter already considered by the magistrate.
R v Williams [2018] ACTSC 354 (18 October 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Intensive correction order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Unlawful confinement x 1; Threat to kill x 1; Inflicting actual bodily harm x 1; Common assault x 2; Aggravated dangerous driving x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing and application for an intensive corrections order.
Facts: At the time the offences were committed, the accused was on bail in relation to family violence charges against his partner. The accused’s bail conditions prohibited him from assaulting or intimidating his partner, being near her, having contact with her and from attending her home. While on bail, the accused assaulted his partner, unlawfully confined her and threatened to kill her. When attempting to flee the home, the accused also struck his partner’s current boyfriend with a car, recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm.
Issues: (1) What are the appropriate sentences given the accused’s offences; and (2) is an intensive correction order appropriate for the accused?
Decision and reasoning: Burns J rejected the submission for an intensive corrections order on the grounds that the accused’s imminent deportation from Australia (due to his visa being revoked) made it unlikely that the accused would comply with the order. The accused was instead sentenced to two years and four months’ imprisonment. Burns J reached this decision by considering the relatively low seriousness of the harm inflicted upon the victim; the victim’s vulnerability; and the fact that the accused was on conditional liberty at the time of committing the offences.
Burns J notes at [5] [The offence of unlawful confinement] ‘involved an attempt by you to control the victim by means of intimidation. Some factors which are relevant to determining the objective seriousness of this offence, but also relevant to all of the offences, were that the offences occurred in the victim's own home and, in fact, in her bedroom. With respect to the particular offence, there was force and intimidation used to stop the victim leaving the room. It occurred in the context of threats being made to the victim. The victim was five and a half months pregnant at the time with your child. There was also another child in the house at the time of the commission of these offences. The offences which occurred with regard to KS, in the first tranche of offending, involved a breach of trust because you were only able to gain access to the premises because you had been in a relationship with the victim.’
R v Simonds [2018] ACTSC 265 (21 September 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Choke, suffocate or strangle x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Unlawful confinement x 1; Threat to kill another person x 1.
Proceeding type: Trial by judge alone.
Facts: The accused and the complainant went out to dinner. At about midnight the accused, apparently intoxicated, went out alone. Some hours later, he returned and although not obviously intoxicated, soon became violent. He dragged the complainant, hit her in the face, held a knife to her throat, and detained her in the flat for about four hours. During this time, he threatened to kill her, and demanded information from her about her mobile phone.
Issues: Whether or not the events as described by the complainant occurred; Whether or not the Court could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: A verdict of not guilty was entered as to each of the six counts in the indictment. The Court was satisfied that the complainant ‘was probably telling the truth’, but noted that the required standard was beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, his Honour could not accept the complainant’s evidence. The emails, particularly, appeared to seriously contradict her version of events, such that they had a significant effect on her evidence being accepted beyond reasonable doubt.
R v Rose [2018] ACTSC 237 (23 May 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aiding and abetting the commission of an offence - caused damage to two vehicles by fire and intended to cause, or was reckless about causing damage to the vehicles.
Proceeding type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender aided and abetted the co-offender to set fire to his former partner’s car using accelerant, which caused the destruction of the vehicle. As a result, an adjacent vehicle also caught fire and suffered damage.
Issues: Burns J determined the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Decision and reasoning: In determining the sentence, the Court took into account the age of the offender (19 years old), the fact that he had no previous convictions, his attempt to contact the owners of the vehicle to apologise for his actions, the contents of the Pre-Sentence Report (which revealed that he had continued family support and a positive peer network), the fact that he was in stable employment and that he was considered to be at low risk of re-offending. His Honour also took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, albeit that it was not entered at the earliest opportunity. These matters were relevant to a finding that he had good prospects for rehabilitation ([10]). A sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort, and accordingly, the Court ordered a Good Behaviour Order for a period of 12 months and recorded a conviction. He was also required to complete 150 hours of community service and accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services for that period.
SA v Badenhorst [2018] ACTSC 216 (21 May 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Intermediate sanctions’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing options’
Charges: Assault x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against decision to refuse adjournment; appeal against sentence.
Facts: In the course of sentencing submissions, the Magistrate was not willing to accept a submission relating to the likely impact of a conviction upon the appellant’s employment. The appellant sought an adjournment to obtain evidence to put before the Magistrate. The Magistrate refused the request.
Issues: Whether the Magistrate fell into error in refusing the application for an adjournment.
Decision and Reasoning: Burns J upheld the appeal.
The Magistrate’s refusal of an adjournment was unreasonable so as to bespeak error ([5]). Having received fresh evidence (a letter from the principal of the school where the appellant was employed), Burns J held that, if a conviction was recorded, she would lose her ‘working with children’ approval and, consequently, her job as a teacher. Such an outcome would be disproportionate compared to the nature of the offence ([11]).
His Honour took into account the appellant’s character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition, as well as the seriousness of the offence and extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed.
His Honour noted that there is no rule of law that a domestic violence offence cannot be the subject of non-conviction order ([15]). Consequently, the conviction was set aside and a non-conviction order made. The Court also imposed a good behaviour order.
Purcell v O’Reilly [2018] ACTSC 60 (9 March 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Separation’
Proceeding: Appeal from Magistrate’s sentence order following conviction for damage property causing damage of no more than $5000.
Grounds:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
2.
The Magistrate misapplied s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act (2005) (ACT) in failing to make a non-conviction order.
3.
The Magistrate erred in refusing to consider a non-conviction order on the basis that as a family violence offence the matter was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a non-conviction order. He also submitted the sentence was manifestly excessive as the appellant was entitled to a sentencing discount as without the appellant’s confessions the offence would have been difficult to prove.
Facts: The offence occurred when the appellant man was a guest in his former wife’s home so that he could take his son to football training in the morning. The appellant demanded to see his former wife’s phone and refusing, she retreated to her bedroom and locked the door. The appellant threatened to break the door down if she did not unlock it. The appellant’s daughter blocked his access to her mother’s bedroom door. The appellant went to the lounge room, picked up a flat screen TV and threw it to the ground, picked up the glass table it had been sitting on then threw the table onto the TV screen, causing it to shatter. His former wife declined to make a statement to police and police proceeded with the matter based upon the appellant’s admissions at the scene.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Magistrate was simply identifying this particular offence as involving family violence, and taking place in the complainant’s home where a child was present. On that basis, she concluded that the particular offence is too serious to be dealt with under s 17. This is not a case in which, but for Mr Purcell’s admissions, either the offence would never have come to light or it would have been difficult to prove in a defended hearing. The judge noted that in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302, Johnson J (with whom Hunt AJA and Latham J agreed) said at [77]:
An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control.
Penfold J observed:
[48] … the incident giving rise to Mr Purcell’s conviction, and its source in Mr Purcell’s determination to examine the victim’s mobile phone, seem to reflect both an attempt to exercise power or control over his former wife and a belief that this was justified. For this reason, the incident as a whole may legitimately be treated as more serious than it would have been if the TV had been destroyed in anger or frustration generated by some event unrelated to conflict between Mr Purcell and his former wife.
R v KN [2018] ACTSC 111 (26 February 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Intentionally and unlawfully choking a person so as to render that person insensible or unconscious x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant headbutted his wife, causing her to become unconscious. He tightly wrapped a piece of rope around her neck, causing her to again become unconscious. She had lost control of her bodily functions and urinated ([1]). The incident occurred in 2013. The complainant was unwilling to provide a statement previously, because she wanted to continue in her relationship with the defendant ([4]).
The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges ([5]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 2 years and 9 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended ([17]). Mitigating factors included the defendant’s: pleas of guilty; limited criminal history; childhood trauma; mental health issues; and engagement in psychological services ([11]). Burns J considered that the defendant had very good prospects for rehabilitation ([16]).
R v Kulczycki [2018] ACTSC 9 (30 January 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Blackmail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘History of breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Revenge porn’
Charges: Blackmail x 1; Stalking x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and complainant were in a relationship for 2 years. They sometimes filmed consensual sex ([6]-[7]). After the relationship broke down, the defendant sent the complainant emails and text messages threatening to release the video unless the complainant paid him $20,000 ([8]-[9]). The complainant obtained a protection order, and the defendant breached the order three times ([11]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Elkaim J remarked on the seriousness of the blackmail in the context of a domestic relationship at [16]: ‘blackmail of the type involved in this case must be regarded as serious. This is not so much because of the amount of money demanded but because it involved a threat to breach the privacy of a relationship and to cause severe embarrassment to the complainant’. While the defendant had promising prospects of rehabilitation and had taken steps to reduce his consumption of illicit drugs, Elkiam J considered that a period of imprisonment was necessary ([21-[22]). The defendant was sentenced to a head sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently with 6 months’ imprisonment for stalking [22].
Justice Elkaim remarked on the seriousness of the blackmail in the context of a domestic relationship at [16]: ‘blackmail of the type involved in this case must be regarded as serious. This is not so much because of the amount of money demanded but because it involved a threat to breach the privacy of a relationship and to cause severe embarrassment to the complainant’.
Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201 (4 August 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Administration offence’ – ‘False accusation’ – ‘Interpretation of evidence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Making a false accusation x 3; Public mischief x 6.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant and ‘EK’ had been in a relationship. After the relationship had ended, the defendant made allegations to the police that EK had sexually assaulted her, had followed her in his car, and had broken into her house ([5]-[12]). The police made investigations, but eventually determined that the accusations were false ([14]).
At trial, the prosecution relied upon the following evidence to show the defendant’s tendency to make false complaints: the fact that there were many allegations supported the inference that each one was false; a complaint of sexual assault made by the defendant against a neighbour when she was 17; and three other allegations made by the defendant against EK’s family ([26], [29]). The defendant was convicted of two counts of making a false accusation and three counts of public mischief (for wasting police officers’ time). She had not yet been sentenced.
Issues: One issues was whether the Magistrate correctly applied tendency evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially upheld. Justice Refshauge found that the Magistrate applied the tendency evidence incorrectly for two reasons.
•
First, the sequence in which the Magistrate addressed the incidents was not logical. The Magistrate first found that the defendant made two false allegations in 2014. The Magistrate then used the evidence of the 2014 allegations to support reasoning that earlier accusations, in 2013, were also false ([52]).
•
Second, the Magistrate reformulated the tendency evidence to conclude that it showed a ‘vendetta against the family’ ([32], [45]). This was not how the prosecution framed the evidence in the notice of tendency evidence, and the defendant was not given an opportunity to respond to this argument ([45]). Therefore, the evidence was inadmissible ([68]).
Note: this case was subsequently remitted to the Magistrates Court for retrial before a different Magistrate, see Parkinson v Alexander (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 290 (9 October 2017).
R v Rappel [2017] ACTSC 38 (24 February 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women as a vulnerable group’
Charges: Murder x 1; Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Contravene protection order.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and the deceased had formerly been in a domestic relationship and had a child together ([9]). The deceased had taken out a domestic violence order (DVO) against the defendant the day before the defendant killed her ([17]-[19]). When the defendant received the order, he bought an axe, drove to the deceased house and cut her neck with the axe, severing her spine. She was holding his newborn child at the time, and her two sons were in the same room ([33]-[36]). The axe severed her sister’s finger, which formed the basis of the grievous bodily harm charge. He then assaulted her brother, which formed the basis of the assault occasioning bodily harm charge ([37]-[39]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed. The defendant raised the mitigating factor of diminished responsibility.
Decision and Reasoning: Burns J described the objective circumstances of the murder ‘within the worst category of cases of murder, and would warrant a term of life imprisonment’ [133].
Burns J said at [131] ‘For many years now, the courts of this country have spoken of the need to protect members of the community, and particularly women, from domestic violence, and the need for courts to take seriously offences of domestic violence. If these statements are to have meaning, if the protection offered by the [Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT)] is to have significance, it is incumbent on courts to recognise the heinousness of offences of violence committed in retribution for a member of the community invoking the protection provided by the Act.’
His Honour took into account as mitigating factors the defendant’s plea of guilty, his experience of abuse as a child, and his long history of mental health issues ([103]). Other contributing factors included his use of anabolic steroids, methylamphetamines and a personality disorder, but his Honour did not place significant weight on these circumstances ([120]). His Honour also had regard to victim impact statements tendered by the deceased’s family ([124]-[128]). His Honour concluded (at [151]):
‘The present offence of murder was vicious and cowardly. Those who witnessed your violence will have to live with their memories for the rest of their lives. Your actions deprived three children of their mother, including your own infant daughter Ayla. You have effectively deprived Ayla of both of her parents. The effects of your actions will be felt for decades to come. There is a very substantial community interest in retribution, deterrence and punishment. This can only be achieved by a very substantial period of imprisonment.’
His Honour imposed a sentence of 32 years and 2 months’ imprisonment.
Note: the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT) referenced in this decision has been repealed and replaced by the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT).
R v Ennis [2016] ACTSC 72 (4 April 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Good behaviour order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Hearing: Breach of good behaviour order.
Facts: In 2012, Mr Ennis was involved in an altercation with his female partner of 27 years. He was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was subject to a good behaviour order for 2 years with a condition to perform 100 hours of unpaid community service work. In 2014, Mr Ennis breached this order by failing to perform the community service work (‘the first breach’). The good behaviour order was extended by 12 months and Mr Ennis ordered to perform 108 hours of community service work (See R v Ennis [2014] ACTSC 369 (4 November 2014)).
However, before the end of the good behaviour order in 2015, Mr Ennis breached the order again (‘the second breach’). Mr Ennis and his partner, who had been drinking alcohol, argued outside their house. Mr Ennis pulled her by her hair and dragged her inside. He let her go and slammed the door in her face (common assault). In March 2016, a magistrate sentenced Mr Ennis to 5 months imprisonment, suspended immediately, and made a good behaviour order for 18 months with various conditions. His Honour then referred the matter to Refshauge J for breach of the good behaviour order that had been extended upon Mr Ennis’ first instance of breach.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Ennis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: While Mr Ennis complied with nearly 2 years of the original good behaviour order without breach constituted by further offence and nearly 9 months of the additional period ordered by Refshauge J, Mr Ennis had failed at his attempts at rehabilitation. This offending was also facilitated by the consumption of alcohol. Further, the nature of offending was serious. Per Refshauge J, ‘It is, as his Honour Magistrate Morrison said, a family violence offence, and it is serious in that it was the commission of the offence against the same victim, although many years apart. It is a similar offence also, in that it is an assault and another family violence assault. Nevertheless, it is a much less serious version of the offence, although in this case, because of the earlier history, it attracted a sentence of imprisonment, although suspended’. It was relevant that Mr Ennis’ partner had moved away and it was unlikely that the relationship would resume in the near future (See [15]-[22]). Accordingly, the duration of the good behaviour order was extended to 2 years to run from the date of this decision.
R v BNS [2016] ACTSC 51 (24 March 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Accused has conviction for intimidating witness’ – ‘Evidence via audio visual link from remote location’ – ‘History of family violence by accused against witness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’
Hearing: Application for evidence to be given by audio visual link from a location outside the courtroom.
Facts: The accused, BNS, pleaded not guilty to 2 counts of incest and 5 counts of committing an act of indecency on TN. At the time of offence, BNS was in a relationship with SN, the mother of TN, and was the step father to TN. SN was called to give evidence at trial. She was expected to give evidence of complaint made by TN and relationship evidence (of her and the child’s relationship with BNS).
Here, an application was made for SN to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location. BNS was physically abusive to SN during the relationship. SN said she had ongoing anxiety and depression which would inhibit her ability to give her best evidence if she was required to give evidence in the courtroom. In light of the history of family violence, she felt intimidated in front of BNS. Finally, BNS also had a conviction for intimidating a witness.
SN did not have the right to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location under Part 4 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act because she was not a child, complainant, or a similar fact witness. In the absence of statutory provision, it was noted that there is no power at common law for a court to allow evidence to be heard by video link: R v Hampson [2009] EWCA Crim 1569. However, s 32 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act empowered the court to direct a person to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location.
Issue/s: Whether the application to give evidence outside the courtroom via audio visual link should be allowed under s 32 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed as the pre-conditions set out in s 32 were met. First, the necessary facilities were available (See [10]). Second, the evidence could be more conveniently given from a remote location by video link. SN’s aversion to the accused would make it more convenient for her to give evidence remotely. It was also more convenient for the court to have the evidence given free of the inhibitions troubling SN (See [12]-[13]). Finally, BNS did not object to SN giving evidence remotely and, accordingly, it could not be said that it would be unfair to the accused for SN to give evidence remotely. Although the general rule is that prosecution witnesses should give evidence in the presence of the accused, it was noted that there have been numerous past occasions where the giving of evidence by video link has not been unfair (See [14]-[22]). Further, there were no discretionary matters requiring the application to be refused (See [23]-[30]).
R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (26 February 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of a good behaviour order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Young people’
Hearing: Breach of a good behaviour order.
Facts: Mr Curtis assaulted his female partner by punching her a number of times, causing her bruising. He was charged with assault occasioning bodily harm. In October 2013, Refshauge J sentenced Mr Curtis to 12 months imprisonment, wholly suspended, and imposed a good behaviour order with a probation condition for 2 years (See R v Curtis [2013] ACTSC 291 (16 December 2013)). In April 2015, within the period of the good behaviour order, Mr Curtis was found in possession of a number of electronic and other items reasonably suspected of being stolen. In December 2015, he pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court and was sentenced to a further good behaviour order for 18 months with a community service condition. The magistrate referred the breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour obligations to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Curtis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: The offence subject of the breach was of a different character and less serious to the offence that Mr Curtis was originally sentenced for. This offending was not part of a life of serious criminal offending but a stupid criminal offence prompted by his perceived necessity. Mr Curtis had otherwise complied with the good behaviour order. His Honour was satisfied that this justified re-sentencing Mr Curtis rather than imposing the suspended sentence (See [45]-[49]).
In re-sentencing Mr Curtis, Refshauge J noted the need for general deterrence because the original offence was of family violence. He further noted that ‘Vindication of the victim is always important in family violence offences and, again, the expression of the court's displeasure with the offending by the imposition of imprisonment will meet that objective’ (See [52]). His Honour further noted Mr Curtis’ youth, his employment, and the birth of his child into a stable relationship (absent any family violence) (See [50]-[55]). Mr Curtis was re-sentenced to 12 months imprisonment to commence from 15 August 2015 (to take into account pre-sentence custody), wholly suspended. His Honour further imposed a good behaviour order for 18 months with probation conditions and a community service condition.
Note: the defendant subsequently breached his good behaviour order (although the breach was not related to further domestic and family violence) and was re-sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended (see R v Curtis (No 3) [2017] ACTSC 101 (27 April 2017).
R v Williams [2015] ACTSC 406 (18 December 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Brother’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After arguing with his brother, Mr Williams chased his brother down the street. He caught up with his brother and hit him with a guitar, rendering him unconscious. Mr Williams’ brother was found to have a depressed skull fracture and a haematoma on his brain. He underwent surgery and spent three weeks in hospital before being moved to a rehabilitation facility.
Decision and Reasoning: This was a serious offence, especially because it involved family violence. The offence was not premeditated but was aggravated because it took place at a time when Mr Williams was already subject to a NSW good behaviour order made in connection with an earlier family violence offence (against Mr Williams’ former partner). Further, Mr Williams tried to minimise his actions. The injuries sustained by his brother were quite serious (See [11]-[22]). Penfold J also had regard to Mr Williams’ subjective circumstances including his extensive criminal history (See [23]-[26]). He noted that Mr Williams had attended some anger management and drug and alcohol programs but these had not had an effective rehabilitative impact (See [27]-[31]).
In terms of general deterrence, His Honour noted, ‘This is an offence of a kind that requires general deterrence, and in some cases at least, general deterrence may be effective. I note defence counsel's comment that general deterrence in relation to the grievous bodily harm offence is particularly relevant in relation to “glassing” offences, but I consider that deterring violence within the family is at least as important as deterring alcohol-fuelled violence between strangers or acquaintances’ (See [33]). Personal deterrence was also relevant on the facts (See [34]). Penfold J sentenced Mr Williams to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
R v Pikula [2015] ACTSC 380 (12 November 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Brother’ – ‘Causing grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, causing grievous bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After consuming a significant quantity of alcohol, Mr Pikula, a man with Aboriginal and Tongan ancestry, began arguing with his step-brother (Mr Mapa). Another step-brother, Mr King, tried to intervene but was stabbed with a knife in the back of his thigh by Mr Pikula (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). The following evening, Mr Pikula again became highly intoxicated and argued with Mr Mapa. He stabbed Mr Mapa twice in the back. The knife wounds punctured his lung (grievous bodily harm).
Decision and Reasoning: Refshauge J sentenced Mr Pikula to 22 months imprisonment for assault occasioning actual bodily harm and 27 months imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm (cumulative). His Honour also recommended that a condition of Mr Pikula’s parole would include a requirement that he undergo treatment and counselling for alcohol abuse. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J noted the importance of both general deterrence and specific deterrence (in light of his violent criminal record). The offending was serious here and warranted denunciation. While it had some association with alcohol, which may provide some opportunity for rehabilitation, this could not be said to overwhelm the other purposes of sentencing. His Honour also had regard to Mr Pikula’s troubled childhood and his long history of alcohol abuse.
At [1], ‘There can be no doubt that one of the marks of a civilised society is that its members can be protected from violence in their lives. While there can, of course, be no guarantee of such protection, nevertheless, the community expects that appropriate steps will be taken to maximise such protection. This is especially true of the need for safety within the family’.
R v NQ [2015] ACTSC 308 (14 October 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Act of indecency without consent’ – ‘Assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Act of indecency without consent, assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The male offender and the female complainant were married. They had been in a relationship for 17 years and had 3 children. The offender and the complainant had been drinking alcohol together when the offender requested oral sex. The complainant declined and went to bed. Five minutes later the offender walked into the bedroom and demanded the complainant perform oral sex on him. She refused repeatedly and started crying. The offender said, ‘Do you think your crying is going to get you what you want? It’s your job to do it’. He then took all his clothes off and positioned himself on top of the complainant. She pushed the offender off but he continued to talk angrily. The offender then dragged the complainant across the bed and pushed her head close to his penis. He tried to slap her twice but was blocked by the complainant. She fell off the bed, hurting her head. The offender continued to demand oral sex. He pinned her down on the bed and yelled, ‘You need to suck me off, it’s not about love or intimacy’. The complainant, crying, pleaded for him to let her go and the offender replied ‘What can you do about it?’ The offender then became upset and the complainant called the police.
Decision and Reasoning: These offences were objectively serious. The assault lasted almost an hour and included physical and mental abuse. Robinson AJ noted, ‘I take into account the fact that prior sexual relationship is relevant in assessing the seriousness of sexual assault. Here it is not a sexual assault by an unknown stranger which would give rise to extreme terror in the mind of the complainant’ (See [8]). His Honour also took into account a number of subjective circumstances. There had been some measure of reconciliation between the offender and the complainant. While these events were not an isolated incident of abuse and this mitigated the leniency that could otherwise have been shown in this case, the offender had taken opportunities to assist himself and took responsibility for his offending (See [9]-[14]).
In sum, His Honour noted: ‘I have come to the view that only a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate to the level of offending in this case. There is a need to punish this offending and to send a clear message by way of general deterrence to others that participation in sexual behaviour is a matter of choice not subjugation. I have also determined to deal with the offending as if it were only one transaction and impose concurrent sentences’ at [15]. The offender was sentenced to one year and nine months on the charge of unlawful assault and seven months imprisonment for an act of indecency. These sentences were wholly suspended upon the offender entering a good behaviour order for three years.
R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322 (12 October 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts), damaging property, engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (two counts)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and the victim were in a relationship. After drinking three bottles of wine one night, the offender smashed a bottle and jar because ‘he was angry’. The victim decided to stay at her mother’s house and that it was best to take the offender’s car keys. When she went to get them, the offender grabbed her by her hair, threw her to the ground, stood over her, stomped on her face and chest and punched her a number of times. During the attack, the offender told the victim ‘This is what you get for lying to me’ and threatened to kill her. He then put his hands around her neck and tried to strangle her (count 1). When the victim tried to phone someone for help, the offender snapped her mobile in half (count 2). About 15 minutes after the initial attack had ended, the offender grabbed the victim by the back of her neck, smashed a mug over her head and hit her multiple times with the smashed mug. After the mug broke, he went to get another mug and again hit her, causing a large laceration to the victim’s head (count 3). After the victim had a shower, the offender told her ‘Now that I have done that to you, we are going to do everything my way from now on. It is not your way, it is going to be my way, okay.’ He then put his penis into the victim’s mouth despite her resisting and turning her head away (count 4) and forced her legs apart and had sexual intercourse with her (count 5).
The next morning the offender asked the victim what had happened. When she told him and asked to be taken to the hospital, he refused until later that day. The offender later apologised to the victim and told her, ‘If you tell the police then we will not see each other again’.
In relation to this conduct the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (counts 1 and 3), one count of damaging property (count 2) and two counts of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (counts 4 and 5).
Issue: What sentence the offender should receive.
Decision and reasoning: Refshauge ACJ began his judgement by emphasising the seriousness of domestic violence and the considerations relevant to sentencing offenders: ‘Domestic violence is a scourge in the Australian community. It has become so problematic that significant efforts are being made at the Federal, State and Territory levels to address it. Clearly, the courts have a part to play in denouncing such conduct and making it clear that in a civilised society it is completely unacceptable. In sentencing offenders who commit domestic violence against their partners, the courts must use the objectives to be achieved in sentencing: general deterrence, specific deterrence, accountability of the offender and vindication of the victim, as well as denouncing the conduct. Nevertheless, at all times a sentence for any criminal offence must be appropriate to the circumstances of the offence and proportionate to the criminality of the offence and the culpability of the offender’ ([1]-[4]).
The offender had a long history of alcohol abuse and alcohol related violence. He had previously been convicted of a violent assault on his previous partner, two offences of drink driving and driving while disqualified. While in custody, the offender completed the SMART Recovery Program and First Steps to Anger Management Program to address his alcohol abuse and violence. He also accepted that he had an alcohol problem and expressed remorse about the offending and its impact on the victim.
References about the offender were provided by his employer (he was employed as a wards person in a hospital), his brother-in-law and his pastor. All three references described him as a respectful and caring person of good character. His brother-in-law and pastor also commented on the positive changes the offender made while in custody. He developed his faith in God, was obedient and respectful of authority, enjoyed the education and rehabilitation programs available and was very remorseful about his conduct in harming the victim. The victim also prepared a victim impact statement in which she expressed her continued serious emotional trauma and its impact on all areas of her life including friends, family, work and finances.
The offending was very serious with the whole of the events constituting a ‘brutal, extended attack on a victim which not only left her with physical scars but with social and mental scars that will last for some considerable time’ ([70]). The facts the assaults occurred in the context of a domestic relationship and the victim suffered injuries were aggravating factors. The circumstances in which the property was damaged also made the offence more serious: ‘To deny a victim of a brutal assault the opportunity to gain assistance would have increased the terror she must have experienced and has aggravated the offence’ ([67]). The sexual assaults violated the victim’s integrity and were a serious intrusion into her personal life despite occurring in the context of a domestic relationship.
In sentencing, Refshauge ACJ emphasised the need for special and general deterrence to denounce the offences committed by the offender. While the offender had taken positive steps in rehabilitation, this could not overbear the other purposes of sentencing. Rather, it was taken into account in setting the non-parole period. The seriousness of the offending meant that imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence. After considering the principle of totality and ensuring the offender was not punished twice, Refshauge ACJ sentenced him to a total sentence of six years’ imprisonment, backdated for the time already spent in custody. A non-parole period of three years and three months was also ordered. The total sentence comprised of:
•
Count 1: one year and eight months’ imprisonment;
•
Count 2: one year imprisonment, cumulative as to four months on the sentence for count 1;
•
Count 3: two years imprisonment, cumulative as to one year on the sentence for count 2;
•
Count 4: three years imprisonment, cumulative as to one year and three months on the sentence for count 3;
•
Count 5: three years and six months imprisonment, cumulative as to one year and nine months on the sentence for count 4.
Alchin v McInerney [2015] ACTSC 300 (25 September 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case referenced now superseded legislation, however the statements of principle are unaffected by the legislation change.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in an ‘off and on relationship’ with the female victim for 10 years. A Domestic Violence Order was made in favour of the victim against the appellant. Subsequently, one evening between 9.13pm and 10.04pm, the appellant made 10 telephone calls to the victim. He left one message saying: ‘You wait cunt. Your house is smashed and that fucking cunt you’re rooting. I am going to kill that cunt’. The appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity to the breach and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 22 months with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The offence was very serious but the objective circumstances did not warrant a term of imprisonment of 22 months. As per Robinson AJ: ‘Significantly, there was no face to face confrontation, no infringement of the prohibition to be on the property of or within 100 metres of Ms BC and no weapon was involved. Ms BC did not answer the telephone calls’. His Honour referred to R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172 as being a factually similar case. His Honour acknowledged that compliance with any type of protection order is essential to protect members of the community from violence and anti-social behaviour. It is therefore open to the Court to impose a stern penalty to achieve this end. However, the punishment must still be proportionate to the offending and here this could not be said to be the case (See [25]-[26], [32]-[35]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 14 months imprisonment. Robinson AJ stated: ‘In my view substantial weight should be accorded, in the circumstances of this case, to deterring the offender and others from committing the same offence. His conduct was a defiance of the orders of the Court. This was by no means the first such defiance. There is value in our society upholding all orders of Courts. There could be said to be even more value in upholding protection orders in the context of the role that protection orders now play in our society in all jurisdictions’ at [54].
McClung v Vince [2015] ACTSC 255 (27 August 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Common assault, damage to property.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his former female partner had four children together. They separated two months prior to the offending but the appellant had been staying at the family home for a week prior to the offences. On 6 November 2014 at about 11pm, the appellant banged on his former partner’s window demanding she wake up. She let him in and went back to bed (where her 5 year old daughter was sleeping). The appellant went to the bedroom and punched a hole in the door. He started yelling and abusing his former partner. Despite the cries of the 5 year old daughter to stop, the appellant restrained his former partner and started hitting her. He woke up the couple’s 3 year old son. The appellant then hit the bedroom door several more times and started yelling again. The couple’s 13 year old daughter called the police. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for common assault and 6 months imprisonment for damage to property, suspended after 8 months. The appellant had previously been convicted for offences of assault against his former partner in 2006 and 2012. These offences were also committed under the influence of alcohol.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing magistrate did not fail to consider the possibility of part of the sentence being served by way of periodic detention. Second, although counsel submitted that the appellant had been compliant with bail conditions imposed in 2014 (namely, sobriety), the magistrate was entitled not to place any great weight on this consideration. This was particularly so given that the appellant had assaulted his former partner before under the influence of alcohol. Finally, counsel for the appellant submitted that previous assaults had been dealt with by a non-custodial sentence and to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment for at least 8 months was an oversized incremental step. Robinson AJ stated: ‘The argument regarding the oversized incremental step is answered by the proposition that the courts dealing with the earlier assaults allowed leniency (perhaps too much) in a desire to rehabilitate the appellant. Further there is no sentencing principle that requires courts to impose sentences incrementally according to some upward scale’ (See [18]).
R v Guy [2015] ACTSC 237 (5 August 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of good behaviour order’ – ‘Childhood disadvantage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Damaging property, assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Proceeding: Resentencing
Facts: The offender was charged and pleaded guilty to damaging property for breaking a window in his partner’s house. He was convicted and sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. This conviction breached a good behaviour order that was made after he was convicted for assaulting his partner. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended upon complying with a good behaviour order for two years. The good behaviour order was cancelled as a result of the breach and the six months’ suspended sentence was imposed, but was ordered to be served concurrently with another term of imprisonment. The offender successfully appealed this sentence. A sentence of six months’ imprisonment wholly suspended on the condition of a 12-month good behaviour order was imposed on appeal. A good behaviour order for the offence of damaging property was also made.
The offender was subsequently convicted of traffic offences, constituting a breach of both good behaviour orders. As a result, the good behaviour bond imposed for the offence of damaging property was extended for a further 12 months. He was also resentenced to six months’ imprisonment on the assault charge, suspended for a period of 12 months on the conditions of a further good behaviour order for 12 months and 80 hours of community service. This effectively increased the length of the good behaviour orders as well as requiring the offender to perform community service work.
The offender again breached these good behaviour bonds when he was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm. This conviction arose when the offender choked his partner and threw a chest of drawers that hit her in the head. In relation to this offence, he was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended after nine months with a good behaviour order for two years thereafter.
Issue: How should the offender be resentenced for the final breach of the two good behaviour orders?
Decision and reasoning:
The offender suffered a difficult childhood in which he was sexually abused and had great difficulties in school as a result of having ADHD and dyslexia. After leaving school at 14, he was homeless for many years. He also had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. The offender also suffered from various mental illnesses, including major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality traits, for which he was receiving treatment. He had a long criminal history with 122 offences on his criminal record. This reduced towards the time of offending in question and suggested his criminality was abating.
The final breach of the good behaviour orders was serious when considering ‘the offence was a family violence offence committed on a complainant who had been the victim of earlier offences of a similar type committed by [the offender], for which the current Good Behaviour Orders owe their genesis’ ([37]). However, there was a need to take into account the offender’s mental health. Refshauge J considered that ‘the option for rehabilitation can be given greater prominence without minimising the need for some level of special and general deterrence’ ([38]).
Refshauge J cancelled the good behaviour orders in accordance with s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT). The conviction of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was confirmed. The offender was convicted to six months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for a period of two years. A good behaviour order was made for two years with the conditions that the offender would be supervised, must complete 180 hours of community service, and must participate in the Detention Exit Community Mental Health Outreach Program for three months. The conviction for damaging property was also confirmed and the offender was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment, taking into account the time already spent in custody.
Refshauge J concluded by telling the offender, ‘If you are genuine in your efforts, the Court will support you in this, as I hope I have shown you, but if you are not, then you can expect further custodial sentences and a revolving door’ ([57]).
For Refshauge J’s previous decision on appeal, see Guy v Anderson (No 2) [2013] ACTSC 245.
R v McLaughlin [2015] ACTSC 201 (16 July 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Contravening a protection order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contravening a protection order, resisting a public official
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: When the offender returned home he tripped after his dogs walked in front of him. In front of his wife (the victim) and children, the offender became angry and started kicking the dogs. After the victim asked him to calm and stop hurting the animals, the offender punched her in the stomach (count 1). Approximately 10 minutes later when they were discussing the punch, the victim said ‘You grew up watching your dad hit your mum and now you think it’s okay to hit me too’. In response, the offender punched her again to the back of her head, causing her to fall to the ground. He then punched her twice more, kicked her in the head five times and stomped on her head. As a result, the victim suffered a large cut to her forehead requiring seven stitches and a bloody nose (count 2). Both children were present during this assault. When the offender was arrested by police he became aggressive, spat at one of the officers (count 3) and resisted the arrest (count 4). Approximately 3 months later a domestic violence order was made against the offender restraining him from engaging in conduct that constitutes domestic violence to the victim, including offensive, harassing or threatening conduct. The offender subsequently had an argument with the victim where he was abusive and threatening towards her (count 5). When someone attempted to intervene, the offender threatened to kick him. At the time this offence took place the offender was on bail for the previous 4 offences.
In relation to this conduct, the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to two counts of common assault (counts 1 and 3), one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (count 2), one count of resisting a public official (count 4) and one count of contravening a protection order (count 5).
Issue: What sentence should be imposed.
Decision and reasoning:
In assessing the objective seriousness of the offences, Burns J took into account that the offender was significantly larger than the victim, that the offences occurred in the context of a domestic relationship and that the children were present during the attack. Burns J considered the offender’s conduct to be ‘cowardly, shameful and rightly characterised as criminal’ ([7]). A victim impact statement was also prepared by the victim, explaining the trauma and anxiety the offences caused her and the children. Burns J noted that ‘As is so often the case in domestic violence offences, the long term burden of your violence will not only be felt by your wife, but also by your children’.
The offender’s childhood was marred by exposure to domestic violence and he ‘was disappointed in [his] actions and how [he] exposed [his] children to that type of domestic violence, which [he] despised as a child’ ([22]). He had secure employment to return to after being released from custody. The offender had a history of drug and alcohol abuse and mental health issues including suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. Due to these concerns, he was assessed as being at moderate risk of reoffending. However, Burns J noted that the offender had been attending numerous rehabilitation programs for his alcohol and drug abuse and was receiving treatment for his mental health issues. Expert psychologist reports noted that the offender’s behaviour was ‘strongly influenced by [his] background of mental health issues arising out of [his] traumatic childhood, particularly [his] ongoing complex post traumatic stress disorder’ and that he was unable to make calm or rational choices at the time of offending ([32]).
The offender demonstrated a degree of remorse in his statements to psychologists and his guilty pleas. Therefore, the sentence was reduced by 25 per cent as a result of these early pleas. The offender’s mental illness was causally connected to his offending and to his abuse of alcohol. It also impaired his mental functioning at the time of the offences and reduced his moral culpability by impairing his ability to exercise appropriate judgement and make calm and rational choices. Full time imprisonment would have a deleterious effect on his mental health and prospects of rehabilitation. Burns J concluded that the need for general and specific deterrence should be moderate in light of the offender’s reduced culpability as a result of his mental illness.
Burns J convicted and sentenced the offender to:
•
Count 2: Nine months’ imprisonment to be served by way of periodic detention;
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Count 5: Three months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence for count 2, suspended after 13 days on the condition of complying with a good behaviour order for 18 months;
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Count 1: Good behaviour order for a period of nine months;
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Count 3: Fine of $600.00; and
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Count 4: Good behaviour order for three months.
R v Ross [2015] ACTSC 22 (1 July 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, burglary and choking a person so as to render them insensible or unconscious
Proceeding: Bail
Facts: While on bail for previous offending, the accused allegedly entered his ex-partner’s (the victim) home and attacked her, placing his hand around her neck and squeezing until she felt light headed. At the time these offences were committed, the accused was subject to a protection order in favour of the victim. The breach of this order was a serious offence for the purposes of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) (the Act) and therefore the presumption against bail did not apply to the accused. In order for bail to be granted, the court must have been satisfied that there were special and exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail under s 9D(2) of the Act.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was not granted. The charge of contravening a protection order was ultimately withdrawn because of procedural issues relating to service. However, s 9D of the Act still applies where a person is on bail for a serious offence of which offence that person is acquitted. Therefore, the fact that the charge was withdrawn did not amount to special and exceptional circumstances in favour of granting bail. The accused allegedly committed very serious offences of family violence. He had a history of offending, having previously been convicted of two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, four offences of assault, two offences of contravention of a protection order, numerous traffic offences including drink-driving offences and fives offences of failing to appear in accordance with a bail undertaking. He had also shown an unwillingness to obey and disrespect of court orders. Given the accused’s history and the real risk that he would not attend trial and reoffend, bail should not have been granted even if there were special and exceptional circumstances in favour of granting bail.
R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172 (23 June 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a protection order’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Threat to kill, breach of a protection order x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was charged with and pleaded guilty to 2 counts of breaching a protection order (where the protected person was his former female partner) and making threats to kill. On 18 January 2015, the offender contacted the protected person, asking to see his son. She refused because he had been using ice and was acting aggressive and demanding. The offender then sent her a number of text messages that were indecent, offensive and aggressive. The protected person ignored these messages as he had sent similar messages in the past. However, the next day, the offender called again and left a voice mail and text messages threatening to kill her.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment, including 12 months imprisonment for the breaches of the protection order and 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for the threat to kill. This sentence was appropriate in light of a number of factors. The offences required punishment and denunciation, and considerations of general and specific deterrence were also significant. Refshauge J accepted that the offender genuinely sought rehabilitation but noted that agencies the offender had been referred to in the past had had no significant impact on his behaviour. His Honour took into account the plea of guilty, the offender’s mental health and accepted that the offender felt remorseful (See [44]-[48]).
His Honour further took into account the seriousness of the offences, which were particularly concerning as they were committed in the context of family violence. First, the threat to kill was serious. The use of ice, earlier harassment and changed tone from the earlier conversation all showed the serious intent of the offender and the fear that this threat was likely to have had engendered in the victim. The fact that this offence was brought on by the use of ice was not a mitigating factor but Refshauge J took into the offender’s desire for rehabilitation and the, so far unsuccessful, attempts he had made at rehabilitation. The denial of access to his son also provided explanation for the offence but was not a mitigating factor in any way (See [37]-[40]). Second, the breaches of the protection order were also serious, albeit less serious than the threat to kill. The breaches were deliberate and intentional. While they were not the most serious versions of the offence, they were not made by personal approach, they were still serious as the contact was made over two days and was abusive and indecent (See [41]-[42]).
Refshauge J stated:
There is no doubt that the addiction to drugs creates significant problems for the community, as well as for the user and his or her family. When the drug is methylamphetamine, or ice, the violence that it also generates can create further problems, particularly if there are stressed family situations leading to family violence. When mental health issues are added to the situation, it creates great complexity in trying to deal with the multiple issues that arise (See [1]).
R v Peadon [2015] ACTSC 132 (14 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community views’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Charge/s: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, burglary x 2, common assault x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: On two occasions on one evening, the offender attended the residence of his former partner. On the first occasion, the offender entered through a window and engaged in a physical confrontation with his former partner’s boyfriend. The offender then left the premises. He returned later in the evening and picked up a knife from the kitchen. The offender started a physical confrontation with his former partner’s boyfriend. To protect himself, the victim placed his hand on the blade of the knife and sustained a serious injury to his hand.
Decision and Reasoning: On the burglary charges, the offender was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and 16 months imprisonment, with the balance suspended and a good behaviour order imposed. On the charge of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, the offender was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, wholly suspended upon entering into a good behaviour order. In imposing this sentence, Burns J took into a number of considerations that warranted greater punishment. His Honour noted that, ‘these offences [were] family violence offences and as such must be treated very seriously by [the] Court. [The] community views with great abhorrence the infliction of violence by people in family relationships’. It was also significant that the offences occurred in the victim’s own home. In mitigation, Burns J took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, the steps taken by the offender to address his alcohol abuse (which was a significant factor in all his offending), his remorse and general prospects for rehabilitation.
LE v SX [2015] ACTSC 79 (11 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application for a domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic and family abuse in the context of family law proceedings’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Order sought: Application for a domestic violence order (DVO).
Appeal type: Application for extension of time in which to bring an appeal from the decision of the Magistrates Court dismissing an application for a domestic violence order.
Facts: On 25 February 2014, the applicant applied for a DVO against her former male partner. Both parties were represented. The transcript of the proceedings extended over some 86 pages. The applicant gave evidence in chief of a number of incidents involving the applicant and her daughter being followed and stared at by the respondent, being grabbed and punched by the respondent, and the respondent sending threatening messages. Of particular relevance to the appeal, the applicant gave evidence of an incident that occurred on 1 December 2010 at the time of the couple’s separation. The applicant thought the respondent was overseas but he appeared in her house and dragged her into the hallway, sat on top of her, and smashed her head onto the floor (‘the December 2010 incident’). The next day the applicant made an application for housing assistance to the Commissioner for Social Housing stating that she was homeless and escaping violence from her partner.
On 27 May 2014, the magistrate found that the principal incidents of which the applicant gave evidence did not occur or did not constitute domestic violence. In particular, the magistrate was satisfied that the respondent was not in Australia on or about 1 December 2010 and he did not return until after the applicant had gone to the Commissioner for Social Housing. Although the applicant had been injured by someone at the time she went to the Commissioner for Social Housing, Her Honour was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent caused that injury.
The application for leave to appeal was not filed until 2 January 2015 (a period of 7 months delay). The applicant was prompted to lodge this appeal because of an adverse decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court on 18 December 2014. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court related to parental responsibility and living arrangements for the child of the applicant and the respondent. One of the reasons the applicant sought to overturn the decision of the Magistrates Court was that this decision had an impact on the findings and outcome in the Federal Circuit Court decision.
Issue/s: Whether the grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success and whether the extension of time within which to appeal should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Mossop Ass J dismissed the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. His Honour accepted that, at least in relation to the December 2010 incident, there was a reasonably arguable ground of appeal based on documentary evidence presented to the Supreme Court on appeal. Essentially, this paperwork demonstrated that there was at least a possibility that the dates originally provided were incorrect and the respondent could have been in the country at the time of the incident (see [82]-[92]).
However, there were other factors telling against the grant of an extension of time: the length of time since the decision; the limited prospects of ultimately obtaining an order even if domestic violence was ultimately established; the interests of SX in not having a long finalised decision reopened; and the availability of protection under the Act if circumstances warrant it. The way in which the Federal Circuit Court relied on the findings and decision reached in the Magistrates Court was a matter of significant concern to the applicant but the correctness of the Federal Circuit Court’s approach and conclusions was a matter to be resolved in that appellate hierarchy (See [112]-[113]).
Note: this case was affirmed on appeal (see LE v SX [2017] ACTCA 34)
McElholum v Hughes [2015] ACTSC 78 (24 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his former partner had commenced family law proceedings relating to parenting orders for their son. The appellant, a solicitor, was self-represented while his former partner (the complainant) was represented by a firm of solicitors and a barrister. While at the Federal Magistrates Court, the appellant knocked on the interview door where his former partner and her counsel (the solicitor, barrister and a law clerk) were conferring. He asked if they had considered his proposal. When he was told they would be another 10-15 minutes, the appellant replied ‘that’s not good enough’. The barrister attempted to close the door with her left wrist but the appellant forced it open and said, ‘who are you?’ in a raised voice. The barrister called security. 30 minutes later she complained of pain in her wrist. The appellant was charged with assault and pleaded not guilty. The magistrate found the charge proved and fined the appellant $100 and ordered the appellant to pay costs of $69, a criminal levy of $50 and a victim’s service levy of $10.
Issue/s: The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence. The notice of appeal was nearly 70 pages long and contained many convoluted and repetitive grounds of appeal. Two relevant grounds were:
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The evidence of the witnesses called by the prosecution was tainted by interest or was perjured (appeal against conviction).
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The magistrate erred in placing significance on the location of the assault namely, the court building (appeal against sentence).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence were dismissed. First, one of the grounds in relation to the appeal against conviction was that the evidence given by the barrister, the solicitor, the law clerk and his former partner was tainted because they all had an ulterior motive i.e. to gain advantage in the family law proceedings. Refshauge J held that there was no evidence to support this allegation and stated, ‘the incident was reported to a security officer of the Commonwealth Law Courts promptly, the evidence of the various parties was not identical, usually a matter indicative of truth, because identical recollections of different witnesses, especially as to inessential facts, is often an indication of concoction and it is not explained what benefit [his former partner] would obtain from such a device’. Further, the allegation that the witnesses perjured themselves was unsustainable. The evidence given was corroborated by the CCTV footage and by the evidence of the other parties(See [301]-[323]).
Second, in relation to the appeal against sentence, the magistrate did not err in placing significance on the fact that the assault took place in a court building. Refshauge J stated, ‘while [the appellant] certainly possessed the right to be within the bounds of the court precinct, this is not an unlimited right and does not give him the right to assault other people. A court precinct is a place where people should be able to expect the law to be observed at all times’. Further, His Honour quoted from Grimshaw and Mann [2013] ACTSC 189, ‘intermediate Courts of Appeal have regularly referred to the fact that violent offences committed in public are more serious’. However, this was not to state that assaults occurring in a private home are not serious (See [372]-[377]).
Note: this case was affirmed on appeal (see McElholum v Hughes [2016] ACTCA 37 (29 September 2016)).
R v Seears [2015] ACTSC 109 (23 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Intentionally cause damage to property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary (armed and intent to cause harm).
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: S left her male partner, the offender, to be in a relationship with another man (the victim). Thereafter, the offender sent many abusive and threatening text messages to S. On the morning of 26 May 2013, the intoxicated appellant drove to the victim’s house, where S was now living. He was carrying a 1.2 metre spirit level and a bag with an angle grinder, cable ties, electrical tape, a kitchen knife and a timber-handled holding knife. The offender used the spirit level to smash the window of the victim’s bedroom, where the victim and S were asleep. The victim asked the offender what he was there for to which the offender replied, ‘You know what I’m here for; I’m going to kill you’ and ‘You’re sleeping with my wife’. He continued to scream at the victim as the victim walked away. The offender then struck the victim with the spirit level on the left arm and left side of his head, causing significant lacerations. S tried to intervene as the offender punched the victim in the face, threatening to kill him. The police were called and the offender removed.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 3 years and 1 month imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. In imposing this sentence, Murrell CJ took into account a number of considerations. First, the offender had a history of taking the law into his own hands. He was on bail for common assault at the time of the offences and had previously committed offences of common assault. Second, Her Honour took into the offender’s subjective circumstances namely, the offender’s intention to ‘settle down’ by continuing his employment in the building industry and removing himself from his involvement in the Rebels Motorcycle Gang. However, she noted that it was surprising that someone at age 63 had not ‘learnt his lesson from a series of prior similar incidents’. Third, the objective circumstances were of at least moderate seriousness (See [26]-[33]). Finally, Her Honour took into account general sentencing considerations (See [35]-[40]).
R v Saedam [2015] ACTSC 85 (1 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Views of victims’
Charges: Engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (3 counts), assault, assault with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse, theft
Proceeding: Bail
Facts: The applicant and his wife (the victim) lived together for some time after migrating to Perth from Syria. While living in Perth, the victim left the applicant and moved into a refuge as a result of domestic violence in the relationship. After the applicant and victim reconciled, they moved to Canberra where their relationship remained volatile. One day the applicant went into the bedroom and had sexual intercourse with the victim, despite her asking him not to, attempting to push him away and crying throughout. Later in the day, the applicant verbally abused the victim and threatened to withdraw his immigration sponsorship of the victim’s family to come to Australia. He then again had intercourse with the victim, who continued to cry but otherwise did not move. The next day, the applicant slapped the victim and dragged her by her hair, rolled her on her back and again had intercourse with her. The victim continued to struggle, hitting the applicant’s chest and pushing him away. The applicant was charged with three counts of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent, one count of assault, one count of assault with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse and one count of theft. He pleaded not guilty to each charge.
While in custody, the victim visited the applicant every two or three days. She subsequently made a statutory declaration that she was ‘a little tired and confused’ at the time of making her complaint to the police. She sought to change her statement that all sexual intercourse was consented to and that she had been drinking before the assault. The victim wrote a letter to the Court in respect of the bail application, in which she said she did not object to the applicant being granted bail. She also stated that she was not pressured into writing the letter, that the applicant was not harmful to the community, and that as a pregnant woman she did not want her child to grow up knowing their father was in gaol.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was granted on conditions including that his family pay a surety of $5000, he surrender travel documents, he not contact the victim, and that he reside in Perth.
The offences that the applicant was charged with were serious. However, Refshauge J determined he could not assess the strength of the Crown case given the absence of much evidence and the victim’s damaged reputation as evidence because of her apparent retraction of the complaint. The applicant also had a substantial cash surety available to him and proposed to live with his parents. He had no criminal record. His departure from Canberra to Perth immediately after the offences were alleged was an indication of his intention to flee. However, this risk could be mitigated by imposing conditions on bail such as the surrender of travel documents, that he report to police and be prohibited from being at a place of international departure. Refshauge J accepted that the applicant was likely to commit further violent offences against the victim if he had contact with her. However, this could also be mitigated by the applicant living in Perth and on the condition that he not contact the victim. The Crown’s submission that the applicant could intimidate and interfere with witnesses if bail was granted was rejected. The fact the applicant could withdraw his sponsorship of the victim’s family was unlikely to be affected by his bail status. Further, the victim had already retracted her initial complaint, with no evidence from the prosecution that this was a result of intimidation from the application.
R v Elphick (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 23 (1 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of personal protection orders’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threatening to commit arson’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Threatening to commit arson, stalking, breach of a personal protection order x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offences arose out of the breakdown of a relationship between the offender and his former female partner. The relationship ended acrimoniously, particularly in relation to the care and access arrangements relating to the care of the couple’s child. The offender’s former partner obtained Domestic Violence Order against the offender and her parents obtained Personal Violence Protection Orders. Subsequently, the offender and his former partner had an argument over the telephone over the care and access arrangements for their daughter. The offender went over to the house of his former partner’s parents and began shouting and swearing at his former partner. He produced a cigarette lighter and threatened to burn her parent’s car. Further, the offender pleaded guilty to a count of stalking on the basis of 25 phone calls made to his former partner. Most were for relatively short periods and were made at varying hours of the day. Finally, the offender breached the Personal Protection Orders by calling his former partner’s parents on multiple occasions.
Decision and Reasoning: Refshauge J imposed a total sentence of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J took into account the purposes of sentencing and in particular, specific deterrence and vindication of the victims (in light of the Victim Impact Statements delivered in court — See [67]-[70]). He also took into account the offender’s plea of guilty and his subjective circumstances (including the offender’s drug problem).
These offences were serious and warranted a term of imprisonment. The offence of arson was serious because the offender produced a cigarette lighter, there was a threat with intent to achieve an objective to which he may otherwise not have been entitled, and it was committed at the home of the victim. The stalking offence was also a serious offence particularly because it was committed with a circumstance of aggravation, namely in the presence of a Domestic Violence Order. Finally, the breaches of Personal Protection Orders were serious because they involved a disregard of a court order designed to protect the subjects of the orders.
R v Thompson [2015] ACTSC 69 (20 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Young people’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, unlawful confinement, common assault, carry/use a firearm with disregard for own safety or safety of other persons.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The 26 year old male offender and the 21 year old female complainant commenced a relationship after meeting on an online dating website. Five weeks after their first meeting, the complainant told the offender that she wanted to end the relationship but wished to remain friends. The complainant then went overseas for 2 months. Upon her return, the offender tried to re-commence their relationship but the complainant did not want to. At a meeting between the pair, the offender said the complainant was ‘cruel’, ‘yelled at him’ and ‘humiliated him’. A month later, the complainant was home alone in her apartment. The offender sprung out from behind a door, covered her mouth with a gloved hand and told her not to scream. In his other hand, he was holding a gun. There was a struggle in which the offender tackled the complainant onto the bed and held a gun against her chest. The complainant was confined to the apartment for 3 hours.
Decision and Reasoning: Imprisonment was the only penalty appropriate in the circumstances. These were very serious offences — the complainant was in her own apartment which the offender broke into, he carried a gun, he wore medical gloves, held the gun against the complainant’s chest, and confined the complainant in terrifying circumstances for 3 hours. However, on the balance of probabilities, Robinson AJ found that the offender was suffering from a depressive mental illness on the day of the offence. The moral culpability of the offender was reduced, although not eliminated, by this depressive illness. There was a moderate risk of reoffending but His Honour concluded the offender had very good prospects for rehabilitation in light of the treatment of his mental illness and his new relationship. In the circumstances, it was desirable to give weight to the promotion of the rehabilitation of the offender. Accordingly, the offender, was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 2 years imprisonment, suspended from 9 December 2015.
Note: the convictions in relation to this case were set aside and a retrial was ordered because the trial judge failed to provide a warning about having a support person (see Thompson v The Queen; The Queen v Thompson [2016] ACTCA 12 (6 May 2016).
Hutcheon v West [2015] ACTSC 55 (13 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Choking a person so as to render them unconscious, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and victim were in a domestic relationship for three and a half years and lived together with the complaint’s son. One afternoon the respondent and victim got into a fight that resulted in the respondent striking the victim across her face and placing her in a chokehold. The respondent then placed his knee on the victim’s shoulder. After the victim asked him to stop, he asked ‘You want to die?’. The respondent then placed his hand around the victim’s throat and started squeezing before placing his other hand over her mouth and nose. As a result the victim briefly lost consciousness. Later the same day the respondent grabbed the victim by her hair and began shaking her. Attempting to free herself from the respondent’s grip, she ended up on the ground when the respondent kicked her face, and jumped and stomped on her arm and head. When the respondent realised the victim’s son witnessed the attack he told him ‘I didn’t do anything wrong. Mum’s flipping out’.
In relation to this conduct the respondent was charged and made late guilty pleas to choking a person so as to render that person unconscious, for which he was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment; assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which he was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment, with three months to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed for the offence of choking; and common assault, for which he was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence imposed on the charge of choking. A non-parole period of 12 months was ordered. While the offending occurred, the respondent was on parole for burglary, theft and unauthorised possession of a firearm. The respondent’s parole was subsequently revoked and he was liable to serve the remainder of his sentence. The sentence imposed for the offence of choking was ordered to commence at the expiration of the sentence the respondent was serving as a result of the cancellation of the parole order.
The respondent had an extensive criminal history, having been convicted for approximately 80 criminal offences in the past 20 years. He also had a long history of substance abuse and mental health issues including being previously diagnosed with antisocial and paranoid personality traits. A pre-sentence report noted that the respondent made derogatory comments about the victim and demonstrated minimal victim empathy. The report also considered the respondent was at high risk of reoffending.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on the sentences imposed for the offences of choking and assault occasioning bodily harm. These sentences were set aside and the respondent was resentenced to a term of three years and one month’s imprisonment for the offence of choking and 20 months’ imprisonment for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
The starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment adopted by the magistrate before a reduction for the guilty pleas was manifestly inadequate in relation to the choking offence when considering the maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, the objective circumstances of the offence and the subjective circumstances of the offender. Burns J held that an appropriate starting point was three years and nine months’ imprisonment with a reduction of eight months for the plea of guilty. Likewise, the starting point of 14 months’ imprisonment for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was also manifestly inadequate. An appropriate starting point when considering the seriousness of the offending was two years’ imprisonment, reduced to 20 months’ imprisonment to reflect the plea of guilty.
In coming to this conclusion, Burns J considered that the seriousness of offences of violence within intimate relationships requires sentences that strongly denounce and deter such offending. Citing Wood CJ in R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, ‘such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence’.
R v Eimerl [2015] ACTSC 72 (12 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Parent/s’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: Forcible confinement, damaging property, theft.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender, who was on parole at the time, confined his mother in her home for 2 hours. During the course of confinement, the offender verbally abused his mother, threatened violence and damage to property, and damaged a heater and a wooden cedar door. The offender’s anger was based on his belief that his parents were communicating with Corrective Services, putting in jeopardy his parole order. His parents were in fact communicating with Corrective Services because they were concerned he had resumed his methamphetamine use. The offender completed a substance misuse program before being paroled in 2013. His initial response to parole supervision was satisfactory — his urinalysis results were negative and he obtained employment. However, at the time of the confinement, he had resumed his methamphetamine use.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 2 years and 1 month imprisonment was imposed. Burns J took into account the circumstances of the offence (it was committed out of anger and a sense of betrayal, it caused a significant degree of fear but no injuries were inflicted). His Honour also noted the guilty plea, the youth of the offender and that rehabilitation was an important consideration (however, this had to be ‘considered guarded’ (see[16])). There was a need for both general and specific deterrence.
His Honour further took into account that this was a family violence matter and stated, ‘that is relevant because the only reason that you were able to commit this offence was because of the relationship of trust that existed between you and the victim. If you had not been a family member who was loved and trusted by your victim you would not have had the opportunity to commit this offence. I also note that the offence occurred in the victim's own home, where she should have been entitled to feel safe’ (See [17]).
R v Brown [2015] ACTSC 65 (5 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perjury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victims as alleged perpetrators’
Charge/s: Perjury.
Proceeding: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant gave false evidence in a bail application involving an allegation of assault that had been made against her ex-partner. It was alleged that her ex-partner assaulted his mother. The defendant’s ex-partner also assaulted her prior to the alleged assault on his mother. A psychologist’s report indicated that the defendant was suffering from ‘a major depressive disorder of moderate severity’ (see at [4]) when she was in a relationship with her partner. The report described the relationship as physically and emotionally abusive which resulted in a gradual deterioration of the defendant’s mental health and reported low self-worth and feeling overwhelmed. Notwithstanding this, she felt that her partner was the only person who she could rely on. The defendant had no prior convictions. She was 18 years old when the offence occurred.
Issue/s: The appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was ordered to enter into a good behaviour order for 15 months with conditions that she accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Service and not to associate with her former partner. No conviction was recorded. Burns J noted that this offence, while serious, was at the lower end of the spectrum for offences of this nature. His Honour accepted that her mental illness affected her judgment and also noted the fact she was in a controlling relationship with her ex-partner. The defendant had good prospects of rehabilitation. The offence of perjury is serious and normally results in the recording of a conviction and imprisonment. However, in this case, the mitigating factors including her youth and mental illness meant that rehabilitation, rather than general deterrence were the primary sentencing considerations. His Honour warned the defendant that relationships like those with her ex-partner are characterised by a significant degree of manipulation and that the defendant ought to be aware of the likelihood of her ex-partner to attempt to recommence the relationship using protestations that he has changed and is going to behave in a different way. He urged the defendant to be mature enough to understand that such change is not going to happen.
R v East [2015] ACTSC 54 (16 February 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Offender’s traumatic childhood’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Forcible confinement, common assault.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was the complainant’s carer and partner. They had been in an ‘on again off again’ sexual relationship for 3 years and the offender had recently moved back into the complainant’s flat. On 14 October 2013, during an argument, the complainant told the offender to get his belongings and leave the flat. She then attempted to leave herself but the offender grabbed her arms and forced her back into the flat. The complainant made a number of unsuccessful attempts to escape and the offender took her mobile phone. The offender refused to leave. At one stage, he agreed to pack his belongings and asked the complainant for some money. When she refused, he forced her onto the couch. She tried to yell but the offender grabbed her throat, restricting her ability to breathe. After 5 hours, the offender gave the complainant her mobile and left the flat. These offences put the offender in breach of a good behaviour order imposed in respect of an earlier offence of a reckless threat to kill made against the same complainant. That offence involved the heavily intoxicated and distressed offender threatening his partner with a knife, a hammer and a piece of concrete.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 months. Penfold J took into account a number of factors in imposing this sentence. In determining the charged offences to be of mid-range seriousness, His Honour noted that in some cases being confined in one’s own home by a partner might be less frightening than being confined in a strange place by a stranger (depending on past experiences with the partner); during confinement, the offender was physically violent to the complainant; the offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offence; the domestic relationship put the parties into a position of trust and, to an extent, the offender abused this trust (however, the offender’s role as a carer did not mean that the offence involved any extra abuse of a position of trust because the complainant was 14 years older and the offender had a very disturbed upbringing); the offences had a distressing and more than short-term effect on the complainant; and the offender accepted responsibility for his actions (See [13]-[14]).
Penfold J also took into account the subjective circumstances of the offender. He did not seem to have any tendency towards criminal behaviour except in the context of this relationship. However, His Honour noted that ‘much of violent crime committed within domestic relationships is committed by men who otherwise live entirely within the law’. Further, the offender had a very disturbed upbringing. His mother suffered with severe mental illness and schizophrenia and would alternate between being a loving mother to being emotionally and physically abusive towards her children. He witnessed his mother kill herself when he was 8 when she set herself alight. The offender was then raised by his adoptive father, who would drink heavily to cope and belt the children (See [15]-[17]). The relationship between the offender and the complainant was ‘toxic’ and characterised by substance abuse and conflict (See [18]-[22]). Penfold J also took into account general and specific deterrence, the offender’s guilty plea and the offender’s acceptance of counselling.
R v BJ [2015] ACTSC 47 (4 February 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a good behaviour order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Young people’
Hearing: Breach of 12 month good behaviour order.
Facts: In February 2014, BJ was sentenced for burglary, minor theft and common assault. These charges arose out of the breakdown of a relationship between BJ, then aged 17, and the female complainant. He was sentenced to a 12 month good behaviour order, including a condition that he undertake the Cognitive Self-Change Program. Nearly 5 months after BJ was sentenced, he began another serious of offences against another ex-partner. These offences involved: taking his ex-partner’s car keys, damaging her car and stealing the car; using a false Facebook identity to taunt her with pictures of the car hidden in a forest; attempting to get her (alone) to meet him in the forest; further damaging the car; and making a series of harassing phone calls to his ex-partner. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for these offences, 3 months served in full time custody and 6 months suspended subject to a 24 month good behaviour order. The matter was referred to Penfold J here to deal with the breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour order.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of BJ’s breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: Penfold J noted that he was incorrect in his 2014 sentencing remarks and BJ did in fact have a tendency to behave inappropriately in the context of failed intimate relationships. He noted that this behaviour needed to be addressed as early as possible. Penfold J imposed a new good behaviour order for 2 years subject to the following conditions: accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions, under take counselling courses, programs or treatments, and undertake either one or both of a Men’s Cognitive Self-Change Program and a Family Violence Cognitive Self-Change Program.
R v Mazaydeh [2014] ACTSC 325 (13 November 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threatening to cause damage to the complainant’s property’ – ‘Victim impact’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault x 3, threatening to cause damage to the complainant’s property.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was a friend and former partner of the female complainant. The offender became jealous when the complainant received a phone call because he suspected it was from another man. The complainant asked the offender to leave her apartment. He refused. He pushed and attempted to choke the complainant and held a knife to the throat of her cat. The assaults were accompanied by verbal abuse and abusive text messaging. The offender also rifled through the victim’s belongings and demanded her phone. The incident lasted about 15 minutes.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a good behaviour order for 3 years and fined $1750. In terms of the objective seriousness of the offending, Murrell CJ noted that the conduct constituting the assault occasioning bodily harm was extremely serious. It was a very forceful and frightening assault that involved the offender taking hold of the victim’s throat. The actual bodily harm that resulted was at the lower end of the spectrum but the incident had a considerable psychological impact. The other offences were less serious. The incident, while not fleeting, was relatively short. It was not only frightening but designed to humiliate. It occurred within the victim’s home, in circumstances where she had asked him to leave.
Further, this was an incident of domestic violence. Her Honour noted:
‘These offences occurred in the context of a previous relationship between the offender and the victim and involved violence within the victim's home, an apparent sense of entitlement on the part of the offender, and humiliation through verbal and text abuse of the victim.
The sentencing purposes of punishment, general deterrence and denunciation are very important, as well as the recognition of harm to the victim personally and the community generally through offences of this nature. The victim provided a victim impact statement in which she referred to impacts upon her of the type that frequently result from offences of domestic violence, including feelings of anxiety, difficulty sleeping, difficulty concentrating at work and elsewhere, and an adverse effect on her ability to form relationships. Since the incident, the victim has moved house because she felt unsafe in the apartment where the offence occurred’ (See [15]-[16]).
Her Honour also took into account the subjective circumstances of the offender including that the offender had been assessed as being at low risk of re-offending, he was employed, is a member of a close and supportive family and has no problems with drug dependence or mental health. However, Murrell CJ further noted that the offender lacked insight into the seriousness of his conduct and the impact on the victim. Although this was probably a one-off incident, Her Honour considered that it would be of assistance to the offender to undertake courses that may guide him towards greater insight and maturity in relation to interpersonal relationships.
R v Ennis [2014] ACTSC 369 (4 November 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Good behaviour order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Hearing: Breach of community service condition to a good behaviour order.
Facts: In 2012, Mr Ennis was convicted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Mr Ennis and his female partner, who had been together for 27 years, were both drunk and fought ‘over money’. During this argument, Mr Ennis caused his partner to suffer a fracture to the left forearm and a laceration to the outside of her lower leg. Mr Ennis had a long history of cannabis and alcohol abuse. He claimed that this alcohol abuse led to his criminality. The sentencing judge made a good behaviour order for 2 years, with a condition that Mr Ennis perform 100 hours of community service within 12 months. Mr Ennis breached this order by failing to complete the community service work conditions. He submitted that the breach was the result of his alcohol abuse.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Ennis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: The order was amended by extending the good behaviour period to a further 12 months, extending the number of hours of community service work to 108 hours to be completed in 12 months, and requiring Mr Ennis to be subject supervision by the Director-General. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J noted that while Mr Ennis’ breach was unsurprising in light of his alcohol abuse, this did not provide an excuse for his behaviour (See [16]). In favour of Mr Ennis, it was significant that he had not committed any offences in the two years since the order was made. His Honour noted, ‘This is a very important matter, for that is the fundamental objective of the criminal law, namely, as Brennan J described it in Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 437, the protection of society which is achieved by the prevention of crime and the eradication of recidivism’ (See [21]).
Further, Mr Ennis had taken steps towards rehabilitation namely, enrolling in a number of programs including drug and alcohol counselling, a Men and Anger Program and an Employment Pathway Plan (See [23]-[27]). Mr Ennis’ partner was also addressing her alcohol abuse and they were both accessing counselling at relationships Australia (See [28]). However, Refshauge J remained sceptical in his assessment of this reform and nevertheless extended the good behaviour order (See [30]-[33]).
His Honour noted: Despite the considerable contribution that illicit drug use makes to criminality in the community, alcohol remains a problem for those addicted to it. Alcohol abuse remains a very significant source of crime and leads the addict to unhealthy and anti-social behaviour and situations (See [1]).
See also R v Ennis [2016] ACTSC 72 (4 April 2016).
Pasa v Bell [2014] ACTSC 303 (30 October 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘At the complainant’s home’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General and personal deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to an offence that he assaulted his former fiance and de facto partner of 2 years (the complainant). The offence occurred about 1 month after the appellant and the complainant had separated in the presence of the complainant, a friend, and the appellant’s young son. The appellant and the complainant argued and the complainant asked him to leave. The garage door hit the appellant on the head as he left and he turned around the pushed the complainant. She fell backwards into the car. The appellant spoke in a threatening manner to the complainant. He pushed her again, kicked her car twice, and left.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the primary judge erred in his assessment of what constituted an aggravating feature of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence was dismissed. In relation to the appeal against conviction, the appellant submitted that the mere fact the offence was committed at the home of the victim is not enough to aggravate the offence; there must be some level of intrusion. Murrell CJ noted that a sentencing court must consider all relevant objective and subjective matters. She stated,
‘When considering the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, including general and personal deterrence, a sentencing court is entitled to consider the fact that an offence involved domestic violence, and that the violence has occurred at the victim’s home. An offence involving domestic violence is one that involves abuse of a partner, former partner or other family member (using the term “family” in the broadest sense). Frequently, such offences occur in the home, where the inhibitions of an offender may be lowered, the impact on the victim may be heightened (as she or he is made to feel that a formerly safe place has been violated) and the occurrence of the offence is more readily concealed. Further, where a domestic violence offence occurs in the victim’s home, it is often associated with secondary abuse to other family members’ (See [16]; See also R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 [30]-[31]).
Here, the primary judge did not approach the matter on the basis that the ‘mere fact’ that the incident took place at the complainant’s home was an aggravating feature. He considered the location of the offence in the context of other relevant circumstances namely that it occurred at a place where the complainant was entitled to feel safe, it occurred in the presence of the appellant’s son, and the appellant refused to leave.
Reid v Smith [2014] ACTSC 349 (21 October 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Damaging property, breach of domestic violence order, assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, and the victim were in a relationship and had a son together. The appellant and victim also both had a daughter each from previous relationships. He was charged and convicted of damaging property, assault and breaching a domestic violence order made to protect the victim. No further information about the offending or factual matrix was provided. Since his arrest and while on bail, the appellant attended Oolong House several times where he received rehabilitative treatment. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to 12 months’ imprisonment each for the assault and damaging property offences, to be served concurrently, and two years’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order. In sentencing, the magistrate stated ‘The current offences continue a pattern of behaviour that appears entrenched in the context of the relationship with the victim. Despite legal sanctions and protection orders, [the appellant] has yet to demonstrate the responsibility to abide by conditions to uphold the safety of vulnerable people in his life. Under the influence of substances his behaviour poses unacceptable risks for such people’ ([5]).
The appellant had a somewhat difficult childhood with his parents divorcing after his father suffered a stroke and his mother abusing alcohol. He finished school at year 10 and had very limited and sporadic employment since then. He had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse and engaged in residential rehabilitation several times. The appellant also suffered depression, stress and anxiety and was housed in the AMC Crisis Support Unit since his remand due to his risk of suicide and/or self-harm. He had an extensive history of criminal offending, including convictions for common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and contravening protection orders against the victim.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether the magistrate failed to take into account the time spent at a rehabilitation centre.
2.
Whether the magistrate failed to give adequate weight to the decision in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 (‘Bugmy’).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
There is no requirement in sentencing to give credit and discount the sentence for time spent in residential rehabilitation between the commission of an offence and the sentencing for that offence. The magistrate therefore did not err in failing to explicitly take into account the appellant’s successful completion of the Oolong House rehabilitation program.
2.
In Bugmy, the High Court of Australia considered, ‘An Aboriginal offender’s deprived background may mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate for the offence in the same way that the deprived background of a non-Aboriginal offence may mitigate that offender’s sentence… Aboriginal Australians as a group are subject to social and economic disadvantage measured across a range of indices but to recognise this is to say nothing about a particular Aboriginal offender… An offender’s childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender’s recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender’s moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender ’. While Penfold ACJ acknowledged that the appellant had a ‘somewhat troubled background’, she did not consider that a failure to give adequate weight to a particular consideration was a sufficient ground to evoke the court’s appellant jurisdiction, relying on R v Ang [2014] ACTCA 17, [22]-[24].
Hossen v Hughes [2014] ACTSC 101 (21 May 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravating and mitigating factors’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, his wife (the complainant) and their children moved to Canberra in order for him to complete a PhD. After their daughter complained that she did not like the lunch the complainant was preparing, the complainant struck the daughter’s hip with a plastic doll to ‘chastise her for her behaviour’. The appellant became angry at the complainant’s actions and slapped her. When questioned by police, the appellant said ‘I do not think I did anything wrong. In my culture, I did not do anything wrong’. He pleaded guilty to assault at the earliest opportunity and expressed remorse in a letter to the court.
At trial, the appellant was unrepresented but had a Bangladeshi interpreter. A conviction was recorded and the appellant was ordered to sign a good behaviour undertaking for two years. The magistrate noted that ‘cultural differences may be in play here, but I don’t accept them on the basis that you’ve been here for two years, you’ve acknowledged in your own statement to me today that you understand what you did was wrong’.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
The magistrate erred in treating the presence of their daughter as an aggravating factor when the assault of the complainant would not have occurred but for her hitting their daughter;
2.
The magistrate erred in not giving sufficient reasons for refusing a non-conviction order pursuant to s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (the Act).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed and the sentence imposed by the magistrate was confirmed.
1.
In sentencing, the magistrate referred to Refshauge J’s comments in Elson v Ayton [2010] ACTSC 70 to conclude that the presence of their daughter was an aggravating factor and that ‘the courts have no tolerance, or very little tolerance, for people who engage in domestic violence, and certainly in the presence of children’. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the presence of their daughter should not have been an aggravating factor because the complainant’s action in hitting her provoked the appellant’s assault and that this provocation was a mitigating factor. However, Penfold J held that there was nothing in the nature of the assault that meant their daughter’s presence was an inherent part of the objective circumstances of the offence. Further, while the complainant’s conduct in hitting her daughter with a doll may reduce the culpability of the appellant’s assault, it is not properly described as a mitigating factor. Therefore, there was no error in the magistrate’s approach to the presence of their daughter.
2.
The magistrate was obliged to provide an explanation to the appellant for declining to make a non-conviction order. He was unrepresented, inexperienced in the procedures of Australian courts and English was not his first language. The magistrate performed this obligation in explaining that a non-conviction order could not be made due to the nature and circumstances of the offence. However, the magistrate did not allow the appellant to put forward evidence or a proper explanation when he attempted to explain the detriment to his future should a conviction be recorded. Therefore, the magistrate erred in dealing with the appellant’s application for a non-conviction order by failing to give proper consideration to the application, having regard to the particular difficulties faced by the appellant.
Despite this error, the appeal was dismissed because re-sentencing was not appropriate. Having regard to the factors in s 17 of the Act, Penfold J held there were no grounds sufficient to make a non-conviction order. In particular, the appellant’s character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition; the seriousness of the offence; his extenuating circumstances; and the absence of any properly explained or substantiated claim that a conviction would have negative impacts on his future prospects, would not have excluded the making of a non-conviction order.
R v Rogers [2014] ACTSC 124 (1 April 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Late plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor-strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Unlawful confinement, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim were in a domestic relationship. The victim had a son from a previous relationship. Six months after moving in together, the offender sat on the victim’s stomach, held both arms above her head and tied her wrists to the bed. The offender told the victim, “you’ve hurt my feelings. Now you have to pay. I’m going to take you for a drive to the forest and I’m going to kill you”. He then slapped her across the face several times and stuck a piece of clothing in her mouth. The victim was gagging and choking and believed that she would suffocate. The offender then hit the victim’s thigh with a car aerial and held a lit match to her face, threatening “have you ever played ‘light the match’ game?”. The next day the offender brought the victim flowers and apologised. Several days later the victim woke up to the offender slapping her face. Her son then walked into the room but returned to his bedroom after the offender screamed at him. The victim packed herself and her son into the car to escape after the offender had left. However, the offender returned and parked his car behind the victim’s car. He grabbed the victim’s shoulders, pushed her backwards causing her to hit to head and dragged her into the house. When inside, he grabbed her throat, kicked her, forced her face under a running tap, slapped her and threatened her.
The offender was charged with unlawful confinement and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He maintained a plea of not guilty for nearly two years until changing his plea to guilty on the date the trial was to begin.
The offender had a long history of offending including convictions of nine common assaults, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, stalking and two breaches of domestic violence orders. He also had a history of dysfunctional relationships, with many of these convictions resulting from domestic violence. He abused prescription drugs and suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder, depression and bipolar. During one period of excessive drug use, the offender was diagnosed with amphetamine-induced paranoid psychosis. The offender engaged in the methadone program and drug and alcohol counselling to address his substance abuse. He reported that since the offending, he had ceased using drugs or drinking heavily and that he was no longer short-tempered and jumpy.
Issue: What sentence should the offender receive?
Decision and reasoning: Penfold J emphasised the need for general deterrence and denunciation for domestic violence offences. Having regard to the offender’s criminal history and his repeated failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities, rehabilitation was not the highest priority in sentencing. His Honour accepted some concession was needed for the offender’s improved behaviour in the two years since the offending and his continued engagement with mental health services. However, no sentence other than imprisonment was appropriate when considering the gravity of the offending and the effect on the victim and her son.
The offences were all serious examples of the relevant offences. The presence of the victim’s son during the second assault occasioning actual bodily harm aggravated the offence. All the offences were further aggravated by the breach of trust that is ‘inherent is most if not all domestic violence offences, especially those that occur in the privacy of a home shared by the victim and the perpetrator, a circumstance which of itself — that is the sharing of the home — seems to me to establish a mutual relationship of trust’ ([7]).
Penfold J sentenced the offender to a total sentence of 38 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 24 months. This total sentence comprised of 25 months’ imprisonment for the offence of unlawful confinement, 18 months’ imprisonment for the first offence of assault occasioning bodily harm, and 20 months’ imprisonment for the second offence of assault occasioning bodily harm. The first assault occasioning bodily harm sentence was ordered to be accumulated so as to add three months to the unlawful confinement offence and the second assault occasioning bodily harm sentence was ordered to be accumulated so as to add 10 months to the total sentence.
Beniamini v Storman [2014] ACTSC 2 (22 January 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing damage to property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing damage to property x 2, trespassing without reasonable excuse, assault, minor theft.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with a young woman, the complainant, and they had two children together. The relationship was characterised by ongoing conflict, caused largely by the appellant’s ongoing abuse of alcohol, and subsequently the relationship broke down. Later, the appellant went to the complainant’s house to see the children but she refused to let him in. The appellant damaged the front security door and shouted threats. He was arrested and granted bail for this offence. However, before the proceedings could be resolved, the appellant again went to the complainant’s property, and broke open the front door. The appellant began to strangle the complainant (assault). The complainant’s daughter rang the complainant’s mother who arrived and manage to calm the appellant down. The police arrived and the appellant ran off. On another subsequent occasion, the appellant was charged with minor theft for leaving a petrol station without paying.
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to: intentionally causing damage to property — fine of $1,500; intentionally causing damage to property — 3 months imprisonment to commence on 1 August 2013; trespassing without reasonable excuse — fine of $500; assault — 17 months imprisonment to commence on 1 September 2013; minor theft — fine of $250. A non-parole period of 12 months was set on the total period of 18 months imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the terms of imprisonment imposed, including the non-parole period, were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence for the assault was manifestly excessive, the appeal allowed and the appellant re-sentenced (see R v Beniamini; Beniamini v Storman [2014] ACTSC 40 (22 January 2014)). The offence of assault was serious: it was committed late at night in the complainant’s home; it was an offence in the context of family violence; and the offence was protracted. It was more serious by the fact that the appellant was on conditional liberty at the time, the offence was committed in the presence of children, and the appellant had prior convictions for personal violence (but not family violence).
However, despite the seriousness of the assault, the sentence was manifestly excessive because the magistrate started her calculation of sentence on the basis that this was almost the worst category of the offence (See [119]). Since the time of offences, the appellant had made no further inappropriate contact with the complainant, had managed to resolve issues of access to the children, and had stopped drinking. This was also his first offence of violence in the family context. It was also relevant that the denial of access to his children at the time was arbitrary and not under any court order. He was remorseful and showed insight into his actions (See [94]-[104]).
R v Curtis [2013] ACTSC 291 (16 December 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Young people’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: Mr Curtis, an 18 year old Aboriginal man, and the female victim were in a relationship. On 1 June 2013, Mr Curtis became agitated and aggressive towards the victim. He started punching her legs, arms, torso and stomach, causing bruising. When interviewed by police, he said that the victim had wanted him to teach her how to ‘stick up’ for herself and that they were just ‘mucking around’ but he stopped when he thought that what was happening did not ‘feel right’.
Decision and Reasoning: Mr Curtis was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, and ordered to comply with good behaviour obligations (a probation condition making Mr Curtis subject to the supervision of the Director-General and required to obey all reasonable directions as to counselling or treatment for his mental health and his abuse of alcohol and other drugs). In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J took into account Mr Curtis’ plea of guilty. He also took into account the subjective circumstances of Mr Curtis including his troubled childhood, his relationship with his 20 month old child, his current committed relationship, his use of alcohol and illicit substances, and his history of mental health issues (See [6]-[19]).
Refshauge J also took into account that the offence was serious especially because it was committed in the context of a relationship. His Honour quoted Higgins CJ in R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 at [30]: ‘I appreciate that personality disorders may often underlie the criminal behaviour of men who beat women. Alcohol or other substance abuse may sometimes be a triggering factor. Nevertheless, they must take responsibility for their actions and be seen to have done so. The offence is often hidden, so general deterrence is a factor that is quite prominent. So also is specific deterrence. No offender engaging in this kind of behaviour, nor their victims, should feel that it is to be treated lightly. Rather, it must be made the subject of condign punishment. That is not to say, of course, that any mitigatory factors or prospects for rehabilitation will be disregarded’ (See [28]-[32]).
Refshauge J further accepted that the youth of Mr Curtis and his prospects for rehabilitation were very relevant to the sentencing exercise. Per His Honour, ‘for youthful offenders rehabilitation is usually more important than general deterrence, especially when retributive punishment may in fact lead to further offending. A youthful offender should not be sent to an adult prison if it can be avoided’ (See [20]). A lengthy good behaviour order was warranted in light of the need for rehabilitation. In this context, His Honour noted the influence of excessive alcohol on the offending which, although not mitigating the offending, was very relevant to rehabilitation (See 36].
See also R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (26 February 2016).
Roberts v Smorhun [2013] ACTSC 218 (1 November 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case referenced now superseded legislation, however the statements of principle are unaffected by the legislation change.
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and the male appellant had been in a relationship for 6-12 months and had lived together until mid-December 2012. After the complainant was granted an interim domestic violence order against the appellant, the appellant telephoned the complainant to meet him at a friend’s place so he could give her the keys back to her place. At this meeting, an argument developed and the appellant started chasing the complainant, yelling abuse. When he caught up to the complainant, he raised his arm as if to punch her, but instead he grabbed the complainant’s sunglasses, snapped them in half and threw them in her face. This caused the complainant injury. The appellant was sentenced to 32 months imprisonment for the charge of contravening a protection order, with no further penalty for the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm..
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant re-sentenced to 23 months imprisonment. Refshauge J noted that there was no doubt that the offending was serious. The fact that the appellant had been convicted of 9 prior offences of the same character against another woman meant that he could be afforded little leniency. However, the sentence was nonetheless disproportionate to the offending conduct.
The prosecution submissions on sentence at first instance referred to the fact this was a family violence offence, referring to dicta of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) that:
When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterized as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape.[81]
The court noted that this statement had been cited with approval by the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Parker v R [1994] TASSC 94 (21 July 1994) and in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302. [82]
Three features listed by the sentencing judge as aggravating the offence, were not in fact aggravating features. First, while domestic violence orders play a special place in the criminal law’s efforts to prevent domestic violence, His Honour erred in finding that a domestic violence was a feature of aggravation for the offence of contravening a domestic violence order. Second, His Honour also incorrectly found that the fact the offence occurred in public was a circumstance of aggravation in this particular case as there were no people present at the time of offence. His Honour also previously referred to this issue in the case of Grimshaw v Mann [2013] ACTSC 189 at [49]-[51], where he expressed some difficulty with characterising the public nature of an assault as an aggravating feature, as it implies that a private assault is less serious. Finally, the sentencing judge inferred that the broken part of the complainant’s glasses was sharp and this aggravated the offending. However, this conclusion was not supported by the evidence (See [132]-[138]). Further, the sentencing judge did not take into adequately discount the sentence to account for the appellant’s plea of guilty (See [143]).
In dicta, His Honour considered the principles in Pearce v The Queen. The sentencing judge pointed out that the appellant’s assault covered most, if not all, of the conduct prohibited by the protection order, and decided to impose no penalty, other than the conviction, for the assault offence. His justification was that there was no element in the assault offence that had not been encompassed in the offence of contravening the protection order. Refshauge J stated that ‘[i]f that were strictly correct, then the conviction for the offence of contravening the protection order would have resulted in a requirement that there be a verdict of autrefois convict in respect of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. That would have been the appropriate response if the elements [were] such that the whole of the criminality of offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was contained in the offence of contravening the protection order.’ However, as the parties did not argue on this issue, it was unnecessary for His Honour to resolve it on the appeal. The appellant brought the appeal against the sentence on the charge of contravening the protection order. There was no cross-appeal that the sentence for the assault offence was manifestly inadequate, ‘which would be likely if it was thought that there was criminality in that offence separate from the other such that, for example, the plea of autrefois convict would not apply’ ([150]).In any event, Refshauge J concluded that the offence of contravening the protection order did not include any of the fault element of the offence of assault ([151]).
Refshauge J quoted from R v BG (an unreported judgment from December 2010):
Compliance with any sort of protection order is essential for the court in protecting members of the community from violence and other unwanted behaviour. Breaches of protection orders risk the success of the regime from achieving that purpose, especially if they encourage people to think that they can breach with impunity. A severe approach is necessary, consistent with fairness to the accused. Thus, the Court cannot punish beyond what is appropriate to the offence (See [4]).
Khan v Evans [2013] ACTSC 211 (4 October 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breaches of an interim protection order x 4, breach of a personal protection order, failure to comply with a bail undertaking to appear in court, common assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, had been in a relationship with the female complainant and they had 3 children together. The complainant was granted a personal protection order against the appellant. The appellant breached these orders on 5 occasions by being at the premises of the complainant. The common assault offences occurred when the appellant assaulted his father. The appellant pleaded guilty to 4 breaches of an interim protection order made on 23 July 2012 and breach then of the personal protection order subsequently made on 23 August 2012, a failure to comply with a bail undertaking to appear in court, and 2 offences of common assault. In the Magistrates Court, a total period of imprisonment of 16 months was imposed from 21 March 2013, with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Issue/s: The grounds of appeal were –
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
The magistrate erred in failing to take into account a period of pre-sentence custody.
•
The good behaviour order for which the appellant was sentenced had been cancelled and could not have been breached by the offences.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on grounds 2 and 3 but not ground 1. The magistrate failed to take into account a period by pre-sentence custody by starting the sentences on 21 March 2013 rather than 23 February 2013. Further, the good behaviour order for which the appellant had been sentenced had previously been cancelled (See [42]-[49]). However, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Refshauge J stated,
‘While the offence against Mr Khan’s father could also be described as domestic violence, the fact is that the interim personal protection order and the personal protection orders are there to protect the complainant from what might be described as domestic violence in its widest sense. Therefore, such orders are an important component of the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence. Breaches of personal protection orders are serious matters which the courts must treat seriously to ensure the integrity of the system which the protection orders are intended to put in to effect’ (See [52]).
Grimshaw v Mann [2013] ACTSC 189 (29 August 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Applications and orders for child residence, contact and parenting orders’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Public/private space’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The Aboriginal male appellant was involved in an altercation with his former female partner (the complainant) of 7 years. The relationship ended in 2010 due to the appellant’s use of drug and alcohol, and he had not seen the children since. In May 2012, the appellant moved to Canberra to be closer to his children and commenced proceedings in the Family Court for access rights. On 2 June 2012, outside a late night convenience store, the appellant started arguing with the complainant and struck her three times with a closed fist. She fell to the ground and hit her head. She was helped up by her two friends and threw a glass soft drink bottle at the appellant. She missed but smashed another glass bottle over his head. The appellant needed four stiches. The appellant voluntarily handed himself into the police two days later. The complainant had previously obtained two protection orders against the appellant. Both had expired at the time of offence.
At the sentencing hearing, a lengthy Victim Impact Statement was tendered. However, it contained a good deal of irrelevant and inadmissible material. Refshauge J on appeal stated:
‘Allegations of further serious offending cannot come within the definition of “harm suffered by the victim [as a result of, or in the course of, the commission] of the offence”: s 47 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). While defence counsel may be wary of exercising their rights to cross-examine a victim on a Victim Impact Statement, discussions with prosecutors should result in an appropriate response from responsible prosecutors about inadmissible material and such statements. Without that proper approach, it is likely that such statements will lose their value and that the courts will have to intervene to ensure that the legislation is respected to ensure inadmissible, and often inflammatory, material is not included in such statements’ (See [41]).
The appellant pleaded guilty to common assault and was sentenced to 10 months imprisonment, three months to be served by full-time custody, three months by periodic detention and the balance suspended and a two year good behaviour order made. The appellant sought assistance for his alcohol and drug issues, made contact with the Aboriginal Justice Centre, and enrolled in a men’s anger program.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant re-sentenced to 10 months imprisonment to commence on 28 May 2013, suspended for two years from 27 August 2013. The sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. First, the sentencing magistrate did not take into account the appellant’s injuries caused by the complainant which occurred when the appellant was no longer a threat to the complainant. Second, the injuries sustained by the complainant, as apparent from photographic evidence, were not as serious as what was described in the Victim Impact Statement. Finally, the appellant’s criminal history, although containing prior convictions for violent offences, did not demonstrate a propensity to violence. He had not been charged with any domestic violence offences and he had not breached two personal protection orders (See [77]-[82]).
His Honour further stated:
‘The prosecution referred to the aggravating factor that the assault “took place in a public place.” I have some difficulty with that factor as an aggravating one. It implies that an assault in private is less serious. I am not sure that this follows.
Most family violence occurs in private yet is regarded as very serious. Indeed, privacy can emphasise the vulnerability and helplessness of the victim.
However that may be, intermediate Courts of Appeal have regularly referred to the fact that violent offences committed in public are more serious. See, for example, R v Freestone [2009] QCA 290at [30], Ludeman v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 298 at 321; [132], Smith v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 3at [32], R v Edwards [2012] QCA 117at [23], Shoard v Van Der Zanden [2013] WASC 163at [41]. This is the not the place to consider the rationale for such an approach; that will have to wait for another day. It is enough that the reliance by the learned Magistrate on the fact that the assault occurred in public as an aggravating factor was not an error’ (See [49]-[51]).
Cranfield v Watson [2013] ACTSC 160 (1 August 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts)
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship and resided together with their son. While arguing one day, the appellant grabbed the complainant’s arm and punched her in the face a number of times. In response, the complainant struck the appellant in the torso. The pair continued to exchange blows throughout the day with the appellant striking the complainant to the face and punching her thigh, and the complainant hitting the appellant in the torso and face and bitting his arm. A week later, the appellant became angry after having computer difficulties and started swearing at the complainant. When she told him to stop being pathetic and throwing tantrums, the appellant slapped the complainant and caused her eardrum to rupture.
In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was sentenced to 11 months’ imprisonment for the first offence and five months’ imprisonment, of which two months’ was to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the first offence, for the second offence. The total sentence was therefore 14 months’ imprisonment. Five months of that sentence was to be served in full custody, with the following five months to be served by way of periodic detention, and the remaining four months suspended upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour order for two years.
The magistrate considered that it was an aggravating feature of the first offence that the assault was comprised of several violent, physical contacts that extended over a period of time. He also considered it was an aggravating feature of both offences that they included blows to the head and face of a female. Finally, his Honour considered the ruptured eardrum of the complainant was an aggravating factor of the second offence.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant was re-sentenced.
The magistrate erred in considering that the nature and duration of the violence in relation to the first offence was an aggravating feature. Rather, it was a circumstance that was relevant to the sentencing of the appellant. Further, the fact the complainant suffered a ruptured eardrum was not an aggravating feature of the second offence. It was merely an element of that offence — namely, that the assault resulted in actual bodily harm. The magistrate also failed to properly consider a psychiatrist report put before him. That report noted that the appellant’s domestic violence was likely related to his on-going mental health difficulties including suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Burns J considered the term of imprisonment with respect to the offences was excessive where there was evidence that the appellant’s conduct was either caused by or contributed to by mental health conditions. These conditions were capable of being treated. Further, the appellant did not have a significant history of violent offending, having only been convicted of two offences of common assault 11 years prior to the offending.
In resentencing the appellant, Burns J accepted that the offences warranted terms of imprisonment. The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the first offence and two months’ imprisonment for the second offence. The total sentence of seven months’ imprisonment was backdated to recognise the two months the appellant had already spent in custody, and suspended thereafter. Burns J imposed a good behaviour order for two years with the conditions the appellant accept supervision and obey reasonable directions; undertake programs or counselling as directed, including the Family Violence Cognitive Self Change Program if appropriate; and undertake counselling or treatment with respect to mental health issues.
Guy v Anderson [2013] ACTSC 5 (14 January 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Forgiveness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reconciliation’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Damaging property, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant was in an intermittent relationship with the female complainant. During the course of an argument, the intoxicated appellant shouted in the complainant’s face and hit her. The appellant then sat on top of the complainant and attempted to choke her. He stood up and kicked her in the ribs when she screamed for help. The appellant sat on top of her again and choked her until her vision went blurry. She started retching and the appellant dragged her to the toilet by her hair. When she finished retching, he poured half a bottle of wine over her head and again placed his hands around her throat. The appellant then pulled the complainant into the lounge room and the complainant tried to calm him down. She went to the police the next day. He was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment for common assault and 6 months imprisonment, wholly suspended and conditional on a good behaviour order, for assault occasioning bodily harm.
On a subsequent occasion, the complainant and the appellant again started arguing. The appellant went outside the house to have a cigarette and the complainant locked him out. She packed his bag and left it at the rear door. The appellant, who had not seen the bag, began knocking on the rear door and the window. As the complainant was on the phone to police, she heard the sound of the appellant breaking the window. The complainant told the appellant his belongings were at the front door and he left. He pleaded guilty to damaging property and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment. The conviction constituted a breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour order and the magistrate imposed the full 6 months of this sentence.
Issue/s: The sentence for damaging property and the action taken in respect of the breach of the good behaviour order was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, the sentence for the offence of damaging property was manifestly excessive in the circumstances. Although this was a domestic violence offence, this did not mandate a particular response and the circumstances as a whole needed to be considered. Refshauge J accepted the fact that complainant and the appellant had reconciled needed to be treated cautiously. He stated that, ‘Forgiveness by victims of domestic violence offences is highly problematic and must be treated with considerable caution for the reasons outlined by Simpson J in R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994)at 8. As her Honour said, “the victim’s attitude to sentencing … was not a matter which should have influenced the sentencing decision”.’ However, reconciliation of the complainant and the offender (as opposed to her forgiveness) can be relevant as to prospects of rehabilitation.
Second, the magistrate’s decision to impose the full 6 months suspended sentence was manifestly excessive. While the breaching offence was not trivial, it was at the low end of seriousness for the offence and was also of a different character from the original offence. Significantly, the appellant had also complied with the probation condition, sought mental health assistance of his own volition and participated in the Family Violence Cognitive Self-Change Program. See re-sentencing [1]-[5].
Saddler v Pavicic [2011] ACTSC 199 (9 December 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Parent/s’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault.
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of an argument, the 31 year old respondent and his 60 year old mother (the first complainant) began pushing and shoving each other. This culminated in the respondent grabbing the complainant by the neck and pushing her, causing her to fall and fracture her wrist (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). Later that afternoon, the first complainant was visited by the male second complainant and his 4 children. The second complainant heard a revving noise and saw the respondent holding a chainsaw outside the window. The respondent said, ‘You fucking Australian cunt, come out here, I am going to cut you, like this’, and then tried to enter the backdoor. When he failed, the respondent picked up a fish gaff and swung it above his head (assault). The magistrate recorded a conviction and fined the respondent $1,000 for assault occasioning bodily harm and $1,500 for assault.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was not entitled to leniency in sentencing on the basis of his prior criminal history or on the basis of his plea. The sentence imposed gave little, if any, weight to the requirements of specific and general deterrence, nor did it reflect the objective seriousness of the offence, even taking into account the provocation from the complainant. The appellant was re-sentenced to a suspended sentence of 7 months imprisonment.
In reaching this conclusion, Burns J noted that this was clearly a domestic violence offence. He noted that, ‘It is now well settled that offences of domestic violence must be treated seriously, and frequently display aggravating features not present in offences occurring outside a domestic relationship. The only reason the respondent was in a position to commit the offence on his mother was because of that relationship. As such, the offence involved a serious breach of the trust reposed in the respondent as a son by his mother. Additionally, the age of the complainant was an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the offence’at [12].
The sentence imposed by the magistrate in relation to the assault was also manifestly inadequate.
Donoso v Koster [2011] ACTSC 192 (24 November 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘Non-conviction order’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant forcibly pulled sheets from on top of the complainant when she was in bed. The sheets caught on the complainant’s necklace and this caused pain and a red welt on her lower neck. The magistrate recorded a conviction.
Issue/s: A conviction should not have been recorded.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The prosecution submitted that, as this was a family violence offence, it had a certain degree of seriousness and a conviction ought to be recorded. Burns J accepted that ‘there are circumstances and principles relating to family violence offences which that they must be taken particularly seriously’. However, the objective seriousness of the offence and the subjective circumstances of the offender are always relevant. Objectively, this offence came very close to the bottom of the range of seriousness of offences of this nature. Further, the appellant was otherwise a man of good character. He had no prior convictions and was spoken of highly in provided testimonials. Further, he was employed in an area in which the recording of a conviction would result in particular hardship (i.e. termination of employment). The conviction was set aside and a good behaviour order for a period of 12 months was imposed.
Connelly v Allan [2011] ACTSC 170 (13 October 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Voice recognition evidence’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order (two counts)
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The appellant was subject to a domestic violence order that prohibited him from contacting his former partner (the applicant), behaving in a harassing manner towards her or threatening her. The appellant breached this order by making a number of phone calls to the applicant. He was charged with two counts of breaching the domestic violence order and was convicted of both charges. Those convictions amounted to a breach of two good behaviour orders previously made when the appellant was convicted of stalking and two additional counts of contravening a protection order in December 2007 and common assault in June 2007. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on each of the counts of breaching the domestic violence order, to be served concurrently. On the breach of the first good behaviour order he was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, one month of which was to be cumulative on the other sentences. All the imprisonment to be served by periodic detention.
In convicting the appellant, the magistrate accepted evidence from the applicant and a friend that they recognised the appellant’s voice. The phone calls were allegedly made using a public phone, so this voice recognition was the only evidence to support that the appellant was guilty of the offences.
The appellant had a long history of criminal offending comprising of 52 charges. A pre-sentence report stated that the appellant had suffered a dysfunctional, violent and unstable family background. His father was an alcoholic and was violence towards his mother. The appellant also abused alcohol, drinking about six stubbies every night. Since the offending, the appellant reported that he was still drinking but not at a problematic level. However, there was no evidence to support these assertions. The appellant suffered from depression and anxiety that ‘result in markedly diminished capacity in judgement’, according to a psychologist’s report. Another psychologist concluded that the appellant’s offending history was alcohol induced and based.
Issues:
1.
The ground of appeal against the conviction was that the magistrate failed to direct and warn herself adequately in relation to the voice identification evidence.
2.
The grounds of appeal against the sentence were:
(a)
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
(b)
The magistrate failed to have proper regard to the significance of the appellant’s alcoholism in structuring an appropriate sentence; and
(c)
The magistrate erred in not finding that community service was appropriate in all the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal against the conviction was dismissed. In considering whether the appellant was guilty, the magistrate scrutinised the applicant’s evidence as to voice recognition carefully. Both witnesses knew the appellant well and recognised his voice on the phone. While the magistrate should have given a warning, it would have been confined to the fact that the conversations were limited and that people can be mistaken about the voices of those they know well. Despite the lack of warning, Refshauge ACJ held there was no miscarriage of justice, as even if a warning was given, it would not have affected the magistrate’s conclusion.
However, the appeal against the sentence was allowed and the appellant was ordered to be re-sentenced. The appellant’s offending was at the lower end of the spectrum of contravening a domestic violence order. However, the magistrate did not err in concluding that imprisonment was the appropriate punishment when considering his offending history and breaches of good behaviour orders. Rather, the magistrate erred in dismissing the option of suspending a term of imprisonment with a good behaviour order to include a community service condition. The offences were not so serious that a suspended sentence was too lenient.
In the matter of an application for bail by Hutchings [2011] ACTSC 83 (20 April 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of conditions’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Uncharged allegations’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: Mr Hutchings breached an interim Domestic Violence Order by sending the female complainant a letter summarising his feelings towards her and the end of their relationship. This was also in breach of bail conditions imposed for a dangerous driving offence. He was granted bail with a condition included that he not contact the complainant in any way. The complainant later received a telephone call and message, alleged to be from Mr Hutchings. He was arrested and charged with breaches of the Domestic Violence Order. This activated s 9D of the Bail Act which provided that bail could not be granted unless there were special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail. The magistrate refused bail in those circumstances.
Issue/s: Whether there were special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was rejected. The Police were concerned that Mr Hutchings would commit further breaches of the Domestic Violence Order if allowed on bail. They noted that the complainant had made further complaints against Mr Hutchings but there was insufficient evidence to justify the commencement of proceedings. Burns J noted that the courts must be very cautious about relying on uncharged allegations but concluded that it was a concern to be taken into account [10]. While Mr Hutchings’ daughter was pregnant and needed Mr Hutchings to drive her around, Burns J noted that she could make other arrangements [12]. Accordingly, there were no special and exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail.
Ross v Mothersole [2010] ACTSC 125 (19 October 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Glassing’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's views’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault, threatening to harm a public official, obstructing a public official.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim of the two assaults were in a relationship. The first offence occurred when the intoxicated appellant swore at the victim and smashed a beer glass in her face. She required five stiches (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). At the watch house, the appellant threatened violence against police officers and resisted search attempts. On a subsequent occasion, the appellant and the victim were out drinking together and, during the course of argument, the appellant yelled, ‘I could kill you right now and no-one would ever know’. He then put the victim into a headlock, and head-butted and punched the complainant in the face (assault). A total head sentence of 36 months imprisonment was imposed with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: The sentence for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentencing magistrate failed to take proper account of the appellant’s plea of guilty in sentencing (See [78]). Refshauge J noted that it is very desirable that a sentencing magistrate or judge makes express reference to the issue of a plea of guilty to show that it has been taken into account. Further, the sentencing magistrate did not address the relevant mental state of the appellant (intention or recklessness). Refshauge J stated, ‘there is no doubt that “glassing” is a serious offence, whether intentionally (significantly more serious) or recklessly. It is a cruel and vicious offence, especially where the damage done is to the victim’s face, the scars from which will be long obvious and distressingly disfiguring. It is a serious offence which ordinarily will need to be visited by a sentence of imprisonment, mostly served by full-time custody’ (See [88]). However, notwithstanding this, on the facts, it was more likely than not that the appellant did not intend to use the glass as a weapon (See [90]).
In re-sentencing the appellant, Refshauge J had regard to a letter from the victim. It showed that she was still devoted to the appellant and wanted to maintain their relationship. She stated, ‘ I know he is truly sorry for hurting me and the time he has spent in jail he has not wasted one day doing everything possible to completely turn his life around, every course available in the prison Egan has not only completed but done so with proud achievement’. This showed that the insight and rehabilitative opportunities noted in the original sentencing hearing had been fulfilled and the appellant had addressed his offending behaviour (See [92]-[94]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm. The other sentences were confirmed leaving a head sentence of 30 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Tuckey v Ede [2010] ACTSC 95 (8 September 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Non-conviction order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Summary offence of assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The intoxicated male appellant started arguing with his partner (the female complainant) in their house. The appellant kicked a chair at the complainant and broke it. She threw the broken chair at him and he slapped her in the face. The complainant called the police. After discussion, the appellant agreed to plead guilty to a summary charge of assault and the prosecution agreed to make submissions not opposing the making of a non-conviction order. Her Honour refused to make a non-conviction order, convicted the appellant and imposed a 12 month good behaviour order.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing process was flawed.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld because the sentencing process in the Magistrates Court was flawed in light of further evidence provided about the agreement between the prosecution and the defence before the hearing. Although the appellant was not entitled to assume that the magistrate would make the orders that had been agreed upon, he was entitled to expect that the prosecution’s attitude to a non-conviction order would have been articulated during the hearing (See [26]-[42]).
Another sentence was appropriate in this case. The appellant had no criminal record nor any identified problem with alcohol or anger management. The offence was an isolated incident in which the complainant also took part. The couple had reconciled and were again living with their child. The appellant had a sound employment record, had already been punished by spending the night in police custody and was unable to return home for 3 weeks because of his bail conditions. Finally, the conviction would make it difficult for him to see his partner’s family in Vietnam (See [43]-[45]).
The appellant’s conviction was set aside and a good behaviour order imposed for 12 months. In re-sentencing the appellant, Penfold J stated:
‘However, the appellant should not interpret this conclusion as in any sense condoning of his use of physical violence on his partner (or anyone else for that matter). Rather, it is a recognition that while it is vital for domestic violence to be taken seriously by the police and the prosecuting authorities and the courts, it is also important for a victim of domestic violence to be able to call for help when she needs it in the belief that after her immediate needs have been addressed, the longer-term consequences of the call for help will be decided in a calmer environment in which her longer-term interests and wishes will also receive recognition. The appellant should be aware however, that if there were any repetition of this kind of behaviour by him, I expect that a sentencing court would take it very seriously’ (See [47]).
Elson v Ayton [2010] ACTSC 70 (15 July 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence accumulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault x 3, damaging property x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. The appellant became very angry with the complainant and she got in her car with her daughter to leave. The appellant punched the driver’s side window of the car causing the window to shatter. He then punched the complainant in the nose and eye, causing her nose to bleed. On a subsequent occasion, in breach of his bail conditions, the intoxicated appellant went to the complainant’s house. He abused her saying, ‘he would kill her and hurt her,’ and put his right arm around her throat. He threw a jar and punched his fist through the microwave door. On a third occasion, again in breach of bail conditions, the appellant went to the complainant’s home with his teenage son. He grabbed her by the throat, punched her in the face, and kicked her. The appellant only stopped when the complainant’s 10 year old son called the police.
While the sentencing magistrate stated that she intended to impose a total sentence of 48 months, with a 24 months non-parole period, the accumulation of sentences the magistrate articulated in court was only a total of 30 months. However, amendments were subsequently made to the bench sheets to reflect what Her Honour intended.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing magistrate erred in amending the sentences.
2.
The sentencing magistrate erred in imposing the maximum penalty for the damaging property offences.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive and the sentencing magistrate misapplied the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. First, the parties should have been given an opportunity to be heard before the sentences were amended. This failure amounted to an error requiring the sentence to be set aside (See [81]-[93]). Second, the offences of damaging property were not in the worst category of offences — the damage was not considerable and there were no matters of aggravation of either offence such as planning or premeditation. The magistrate erred in imposing the imposition of the maximum penalty on these offences (See [94]-[103]).
Third, the sentence of 15 months imprisonment imposed for the second assault was excessive in light of the sentence of 18 months imprisonment for the first assault. The first assault was more serious. It involved the smashing of a window, the appellant caused the complainant’s nose to bleed, it was committed in the presence of a child, and the appellant pleaded not guilty to this offence (See [105]-[109]). Further, by merely accumulating the sentences for the three episodes, the sentencing magistrate could not be said to have applied the principle of totality (See [109]-[116]).
The appellant was re-sentenced by Refshauge J to a total sentence of 34 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months based on evidence that the appellant had taken steps to address his drug and alcohol use (See [121]-[130]). His Honour noted, ‘these offences are serious, particularly because they are offences of family violence, some committed in the presence of children, some committed whilst on bail and in breach of conditions of that bail. The repetition of assaults on the victim also makes the offences serious’ [122].
Goundar v Goddard [2010] ACTSC 56 (29 June 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Purpose of sentencing’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and his wife, the complainant, were involved in a lengthy argument regarding the conduct of the complainant’s daughter. The appellant swore at the complainant and said, ‘I’m going to kill you’. He then pushed the complainant on her forehead, causing her to fall backwards into her chair. The complainant went to her daughter’s bedroom and was followed by the appellant. The argument continued and at one point the appellant came so close he caused the complainant to stumble backwards onto the bed. The appellant pleaded guilty to assault. Counsel for the appellant sought a non-conviction sentence and the prosecution made no opposing submissions. The magistrate imposed a good behaviour order which required the appellant to subject to probation for 18 months and required the appellant to attend counselling on anger management and inter-personal relationships.
Issue/s: The condition of the good behaviour order requiring the appellant to be subject to probation for 18 months was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the period of supervision set aside. This was an offence at the lower end of the scale of seriousness for such offences, notwithstanding that this was a family violence offence. It was committed by a person with no criminal history. Further, a substantial number of very positive references were submitted attesting to the appellant’s good character (See [44]-[47]).
The respondent submitted that weight had to be given to general and specific deterrence because this was a family violence offence. Refshauge J accepted this but noted that ‘supervision on probation is not ordinarily seen as part of the deterrent component of sentencing’. It is generally a rehabilitative part of sentencing. Here, unless actual supervision was required for a rehabilitative purpose, i.e. to ensure the appellant attended counselling, it was not appropriate to make a probation condition. There was no suggestion on the facts that the appellant would benefit from such guidance (See [48]-[59]).
Twerd v Holmes [2010] ACTSC 55 (25 June 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charge/s: Unlawful confinement.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant unlawfully confined his former partner by forcing her into a taxi and compelling her to travel with him, against her will. He then took her to another person’s house where she was prevented from answering her phone. She was held captive for approximately 2 hours. The magistrate imposed a sentence of 20 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. This was a very serious offence. Its seriousness was not diminished by the fact that it occurred within the context of a relationship breakdown, that it was not carried out for financial gain, and that it was committed in the presence of third parties. Further, the appellant had a long criminal history (See [3]-[4]).
In the matter of an application for Bail by Breen [2009] ACTSC 172 (31 December 2009) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Presumption against the grant of bail’ – ‘Threatening to kill’
Charge/s: Threatening to kill, failing to surrender firearms x 3, possessing a quantity of cannabis.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: Mr Breen, an Aboriginal man, was in a relationship with a woman and they had three children. Mr Breen rang the mother of his partner, asking if she knew where his partner was. He was extremely agitated and said, ‘If we were married, we would now be divorced’ and ‘I’ve got big problems with my head’. Mr Breen then said, ‘and if [his partner] gets boyfriends out of this, I will get my gun and blow all their heads off. I will kill us all. Better that than have them molested as I was’. Mr Breen stayed on the phone to his partner’s mother for an hour and on two occasions he threatened to kill the whole family. When police later arrived, Mr Breen said he was depressed and ‘wanted to end it all’. A search of the property uncovered three unregistered rifles and cannabis. He was arrested and was refused bail by a magistrate for ‘mental health issues’ and his access to ‘illicit’ firearms.
Issue/s: Whether Mr Breen should be granted bail.
Decision and reasoning: Section 9B of the Bail Act meant that the presumption in favour of bail did not apply. Refshauge J noted that, in determining whether to grant or refuse bail, the court had to engage in an assessment of ‘future risk’. Given that refusal of bail is tantamount to preventative detention, the court should not make a decision on the basis of suspicion or speculation (See [57]-[61]). His Honour stated, ‘the appropriate initial view was that this was a serious offence which was engendered in emotional circumstances where very serious violence, at least to Mr Breen himself if not to his partner and children, was threatened and where there were apparent means to carry out such a threat. This was exacerbated by the fact that Mr Breen clearly [had] some mental health issues which [made] the likelihood of unpredictable outcomes greater’ at [61].
However, on the basis of tendered evidence, Refshauge J was satisfied that the imposition of strict bail conditions could manage these concerns (See [91]). Mr Breen’s behaviour was caused by a mental impairment that was treatable (and treatment were already occurring). While Mr Breen had a worrying fascination with guns and weapons, he was not in a realistic position or had the immediate capacity to carry out his threat. There was no evidence to satisfy Refshauge J that Mr Breen’s partner would be in danger with the provision of suitable bail conditions. Mr Breen had work available and his parents were prepared to offer a cash surety.
Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 (16 April 2009) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had been married for eight years and had two children. An argument arose between the appellant and the complainant. Their 12 year old son stepped between them but was pushed away by the appellant. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the hair, pulled her into the bedroom and threw her on the bed. The complainant called the appellant’s mother a prostitute and he twisted her arm behind her back and slapped her face several times. The police were called. The appellant made full admissions. In sentencing submissions, counsel for the appellant informed the magistrate that a conviction would prevent the family from migrating to Canada and asked for a short adjournment to procure such evidence from his office. The magistrate refused. The appellant was convicted and made subject to a good behaviour order for 12 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to provide procedural fairness by not permitting an adjournment.
Decision and reasoning: The magistrate erred in refusing to allow an adjournment for the material relating to the potential barriers of a conviction to migrating to Canada to be procured. The adjournment would only have been brief and the issue of migration status was of major concern to the family. It was not appropriate to deny the appellant the opportunity of putting his case before the court just because his legal representation had failed to have the requisite documents on hand. The appeal was allowed and it fell to Refshauge J to re-sentence the appellant (See [34]-[51]).
In re-sentencing the appellant, His Honour had particular regard to the issues of the migration process to Canada and the views expressed by the complainant in a letter to the court. First, Refshauge J accepted that there was a real likelihood that in a case of domestic violence the appellant would be refused admission to Canada. This would adversely affect the family (See [73]-[78]). Second, in relation to the letter from the complainant, His Honour stated that:
‘In my view, there is a great danger in putting a victim of domestic violence in the position where they are seen to have some power to influence a sentence. This is often likely to be an intolerable choice between the bonds of affection which often persist despite the violence and their need for protection against recurrence and for the offender to be held accountable’ at [82].
His Honour accepted the letter for the following: the appellant had previously good character, the incident was a one-off occurrence, he voluntarily participated in an anger management course, and it confirmed the effect on the family if they were unable to migrate to Canada. But, in light of the issues mentioned above, accepting the letter as evidence of reconciliation needed to be treated with caution (See [79]-[84]).
The appellant had no prior convictions and previous good character. The offence was serious but at the lower end of the criminal calendar and, as a matter of marginal extenuation, the victim was equally as abusive. A non-conviction order was warranted because of the appellant’s immediate engagement in a rehabilitation program, his plea of guilty and early confession, and the risk to the family if their immigration plans were thwarted (See [92]-[97]).
R v Taylor (No 2) [2008] ACTSC 97 (12 September 2008) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Good behaviour orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Purpose of sentencing’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order.
Hearing type: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: On 16 January 2007, the offender was found guilty for breaching a Domestic Violence Protection Order, protecting Ms Perrin (with whom he had two children). He drove past Ms Perrin’s residence, yelled at her, and summonsed another man at the premises to fight him. The offence was committed in breach of two earlier imposed and unrelated good behaviour orders for aggravated robbery and assault occasioning bodily harm (‘the 2004 offences’). Accordingly, it fell to Rares J to sentence the offender for the breach of the protection order and re-sentence the offender for the 2004 offences. At the time of sentencing, the offender and Ms Perrin had reconciled.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, wholly suspended with conditions [2]. In sentencing the offender, Rares J was satisfied that the offender had made a serious and concerted effort to turn his life around — the offender had stopped taking cannabis and alcohol, had obtained employment, paid for his own attendance with Ms Perrin at a Relationships Australia course, and had the support of his family and Ms Perrin’s family to make a good life for their children. His Honour also took into account the fact that he had pleaded not guilty to the offence of breaching the domestic violence order and that he had a prior criminal history.
Rares J noted that while he did not want to undermine the offender’s ‘terrific’ improvement, a penalty had to be crafted that appropriately reflected the offender’s criminality, the seriousness of the conduct and general deterrence. His Honour noted:
‘In many, many cases before the courts, the subjective impact of a punishment on an offender once brought to justice can be seen to be great. But to do justice according to law, must be to uphold the laws themselves and their purpose to ensure that we all obey the law. The community must know that offenders, whatever their personal circumstances are, receive a punishment that is appropriate and recognises the seriousness of the offending and the breaches of the community’s standards embodied in its criminal laws’ at [17].
Redden v Slavin-Molloy [2008] ACTSC 37 (29 April 2008) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated breaches’ – ‘Specific deterrence’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant obtained a protection order against the male appellant, her former partner. In breach of this order, the appellant attended her home. When she refused to let him inside, he began yelling and attempted to break down the door. She called for help and the appellant fled. The next day, the appellant again tried to obtain entry to the complainant’s home. He struck and damaged the front door when he was refused entry and again ran off when he was told the police had been called. In December 2007, the offender was sentenced to 10 and 15 months imprisonment respectively for these breaches. Earlier, in May 2007, the offender had been sentenced for a number of other offences, including four charges of contravening a protection order. For the most serious of these breaches, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment to be served as periodic detention.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence of 10 months imprisonment and 15 months imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Penfold J noted that:
‘To the extent that punishing an offender ever more severely because of repeat offending, rather than because the individual offences have become more serious, is justifiable, such an approach must relate to the need for specific deterrence of an offender who appears unwilling to learn from previous penalties. Even in that case, the penalty must still remain referable in some way to the actual offence committed’ at [38].
Here, the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [42]). In particular, the two sentences imposed were at least twice as severe as the most severe penalty previously imposed for breach of a protection order in May 2007. However, if the May 2007 breaches were so much less severe than the conduct here, it was hard to see how they would have justified imprisonment at all (See [37]). Further, at the time of the August breaches, the offender had not served any full-time custody or even any periodic detention. It could not be assumed that his actions in August were informed by any understanding of the reality of a custodial sentence (See [39]). Other relevant mitigating factors were taken into account (See [30]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for each breach.
Miller v MacDonald [2006] ACTSC 76 (30 June 2006) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Conflict between orders’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Explaining the orders’ – ‘Family court orders’ – ‘Mistake of law’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Recklessness’ – ‘Repeated breaches’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s former wife, with whom he had a daughter, obtained a domestic violence protection order against him, prohibiting contact. Shortly before the appellant left for an extended visit to the United States, the Family Court made an order which vacated this contact order. It stated that while the appellant was out of the country, he could send gifts and correspondence or postcards to his daughter provided that the contact was directed to the child and that he could send a photograph from time to time. When he was back in Australia, the appellant sent his daughter a package containing photographs, gifts and a letter. Additionally, the appellant mistakenly sent his former wife an email when he sent a group message to his siblings. He had previously been interviewed by police for a similar mistake. The appellant had spent 42 days in custody on remand. The magistrate imposed a six month term of imprisonment from the date he was taken into custody and directed he be released after serving 42 days, effectively that he be released the day following the hearing. He also imposed an 18 month good behaviour bond, subject to some conditions (see[22]).
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant made an honest and reasonable mistake of law by sending his daughter a package.
2.
The email to his wife was sent in error.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, His Honour held that: ‘[I]t is certainly fair to say that if a person seeks to rely on a Family Court order that varies what is otherwise a clear domestic violence order, it is incumbent upon that person to take steps to understand what the Family Court order says. And it seems to me that the Magistrate was perfectly entitled to find that Mr Miller was at least reckless in assuming that that order, which on its face only covers the time that he was out of the country, continued to apply after he had returned to Australia’ at [5].
Second, on its own, the email sent in error to his former wife would have been unlikely to meet the requisite standard of intent or recklessness. However, given that the appellant had made the same mistake before and had been interviewed by police for this, there was at least recklessness in relation to the sending of that message.
Third, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. His Honour noted that these were low level breaches of a domestic violence order, they involved recklessness rather than intent, and the nature of the correspondence in both the letter and the email was non-violent and non-threatening. However, the appellant had three prior appearances relating to seven convictions for breaches of a protection order. Connolly J stated:
‘It seems to me that even though these were lower level, indeed very low level breaches in the sense that there was no actual or apprehended or threatened violence, repeated breaches however low level, do inevitably meet with an increase in sentence on the basic premise that when low level sentences do not stop the offending behaviour a court has little option but to continue a pattern of steadily ramping up the sentence’ at [20].
R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 (1 December 2005) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Impact of domestic violence on women and children’ – ‘Persons affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim had previously been in a relationship and had two children together. The offender and victim’s version of events differed. The victim alleged that after consuming alcohol with the offender one night, the offender dragged her out of bed, hit her three time in the face and put his hands around her neck and pushed his thumbs into her throat. While doing so, the offender said something to the effect of “Slut, I’ll kill you, I’ll kill you”. When she woke up the next morning the offender continued to follow and abuse her. The offender said that the offending occurred after he blacked out after drinking substantial amounts of alcohol. He said that the assault occurred after the victim, who was drunk, was following him between pubs and abused him verbally and physically by kicking him. After she got in an altercation with a patron, she was removed from the pub and was spoken to by police officers. The offender agreed to take the victim home, where they sat outside smoking marijuana and drinking bourbon. They then got in an argument over their children and the victim struck the offender. According to the offender, this is when he grabbed her throat and beat the victim.
Higgins CJ, after hearing corroborating witnesses, accepted that the assault occurred in the way described by the offender. However, he did not suggest that the victim was fabricating her account: ‘She was savagely beaten, she had a lot to drink and it is unsurprising that some of the details became confused in her mind’ ([26]).
In relation to this conduct the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
For three months prior to the assault, the offender had undergone rehabilitation at Oolong House. He had a long history of offending, including 28 prior assaults. Most of the previous offending occurred after the offender had consumed alcohol. While he acknowledged his alcohol abuse, the offender did not consider he needed drug and alcohol intervention. He also admitted to feeling ‘horrified by what he had done’ and said ‘violence towards women is not in his makeup and he has no excuses for what he has done’.
Issue: What sentence should the offender receive?
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. While the preceding conduct on the night of the offending and the alcohol abuse engaged in by both the parties may explain the offending, it did not excuse it. There were some prospects of rehabilitation for the offender. However, having regard to the severity of the attack and the offender’s criminal history and alcohol abuse, a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate: ‘No other sentence will say to men who abuse women that such conduct is abhorrent and will result in severe punishment whatever the status or record of the offender’ ([32]).
In considering the purposes of sentencing domestic violence offending, Higgins CJ noted that while alcohol may have been a triggering factor, offenders must take responsibility for their actions and be seen to do so. As domestic violence offences are often hidden, general deterrence is also an important consideration in sentencing. So too is specific deterrence. Higgins CJ emphasised that domestic violence ‘is a pernicious and evil phenomenon not only because of the immediate trauma to the victim. Its evil influence spreads to children as well. It is no coincidence that, in my experience, young offenders, more often than not, present with a family history of domestic violence. It used to be regarded as a family matter, to be kept private. Victims would be made to feel humiliated, and ashamed to complain; in truth it is entirely the criminal conduct of the perpetrator which is at fault. It is entirely in the public interest that such conduct be exposed and deterred’ ([30]).
Gray v Burt [2005] ACTSC 93 (23 September 2005) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application to revoke domestic violence order’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal of a magistrate to revoke a Domestic Violence Order.
Facts: On 22 October 2003, a Domestic Violence Order was made by the Deputy Registrar of the Magistrates Court for the protection of the female respondent against the appellant, with whom she was in a sexual relationship. Both parties had disabilities. During their ‘physical relationship’, the respondent suffered three separate fractures of her legs. She had no history of such injuries prior to the physical relationship and no history of such injuries subsequent to the physical relationship. On 24 May 2004, the Order was varied by consent and in particular the Order restrained and prohibited the male appellant from taking certain actions in relation to the respondent. The appellant applied to have the order revoked but a magistrate declined to revoke the Order. His Honour concluded that the physical nature of the relationship represented a genuine risk to the well-being of the respondent.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in failing to revoke the order. His Honour made three errors in reaching his decision to not revoke the order –
1.
The magistrate failed to take into account the fact that the injuries occurred while the respondent was living in an apartment with the appellant and was not receiving the same degree of care as she did now.
2.
The magistrate failed to take into account evidence about counselling that the parties had commenced and intended to continue.
3.
The magistrate failed to take into account the likelihood of future sexual contact between the parties in circumstances where the appellant was now under full-time supervision at Hartley Court (a disability support facility).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the location of where the injuries occurred was not relevant because it was the physical relationship that caused the injuries. Second, there was no evidence that the counselling had been concluded nor that it would reduce the likelihood of injury if the physical relationship was to continue. Accordingly, this was not a relevant consideration. Finally, the magistrate did consider the fact that such a relationship was likely to continue on the basis of evidence before him.
Further, the magistrate did not fail to take into account the fact that persons with disabilities had the same basic rights as other members of Australian society. The magistrate specifically referred to the wishes of the respondent to continue the relationship with the appellant. However, His Honour concluded that the risk to the respondent resulting from such a relationship as such that he was unable to be satisfied that the order preventing such a relationship was no longer necessary for her protection.
R v In [2001] ACTSC 102 (2 November 2001) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor-suicide threats’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charge/s: Unlawful confinement, assault occasioning bodily harm.
Hearing type: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offences occurred after the male offender and his wife, the complainant, had separated and the offender had moved out of the family home. He occasionally stayed overnight to see the children. After seeing his wife kiss another man, the offender arrived at the family home late at night, when the children were present in the house. The complainant let him in and went back to bed. The offender followed her and sat on top of her. He placed a sharp object against her throat and said, ‘This is a knife. If you move I will fucking kill you’. He then placed pre-cut strips of duct tape over the complainant’s mouth and eyes. He bound her wrists and ankles and tied her hands and feet together. He said, ‘You’ll have your wish — you’ll see me die tonight, you’ll see me die’.
The complainant had difficulty breathing and the offender removed the duct tape. He interrogated her about her relationship with the other man, hitting her several times around the head and shoulders. He left the room saying, ‘If you fucking move I’ll kill you’ and returned with a telephone book. The offender asked for the other man’s phone number before leaving the room again. The complainant heard him enter the nearby bedroom, occupied by two of their daughters and heard him say, ‘Now take this darling. I know it tastes awful, doesn’t it’.
He returned to the complainant and resumed interrogating her, striking her. He said multiple times that he was going to kill himself and take the children with him. The offender eventually became tearful and untied the complainant. She rang the emergency number and asked for an ambulance, thinking her children had been poisoned. The police and ambulance arrived. The children were unharmed. The offender left the premises and went to the police station the next morning.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for unlawful confinement and 3 years imprisonment for assault, concurrent and a non-parole period of 18 months. Crispin J took into account a number of subjective factors in imposing this sentence. The offender pleaded guilty. At the time the offender entered the house, while there was some measure of pre-meditation in the appellant’s actions (the decision to confine and interrogate the complainant), the offender did not intend to threaten the complainant with a knife or to kill his children. The offender stopped the violence and threats of his own volition.
At the time of offending, the offender was suffering from serious psychological illnesses including acute depression and adjustment order. It was submitted on the offender’s behalf that, because of this illness, this made the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. Crispin J disagreed and stated,
‘The extent of his psychological condition is relevant to the issue of general deterrence but, in my view, the need to protect former spouses or partners from conduct of this nature cannot be so easily dismissed. Many people no doubt experience great stress upon the breakup of their marriages or other close relationships and in some cases they may suffer from symptoms of an underlying psychological illness or even become psychologically ill for the first time. One may and should respond with sympathy. However, when a person commits serious criminal acts against a former spouse or partner the court must take into account the need to deter other people from similar conduct. The risk of serious injury and, as in this case, grave emotional trauma may be at least as serious when the offender is psychologically ill. Accordingly, the need for deterrence should be given due recognition, though the weight which should be given to that factor will vary according to the circumstances of the case, and the actual sentences must be determined by reference to all relevant factors’ (See [19]).
Other relevant factors included that the offender was remorseful, he had no prior convictions and was previously a committed father and a person of impeccable character. He had taken steps to obtain counselling and achieved a significant measure of rehabilitation. He had already been imprisoned for 8 months and this caused significant distress in light of his inability to see his children and his potential to be a suicide risk.
However, Crispin J was unable to accept counsel submissions that the offender should be released on parole immediately. The offences were too serious to be dealt with in that manner — the complainant was confined for an extended period and intended to cause significant fear in the complainant.
R v Lorenz [1998] ACTSC 275 (14 August 1998) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Robbery with an offensive weapon.
Trial: Judge only trial.
Facts: On 20 November 1996, Ms Lorenz (‘the accused’) entered a supermarket and attempted to purchase some cigarettes with her EFTPOS card from the complainant. The transaction could not be completed because there were insufficient funds in the account. The accused maintained she was sure there were funds in the account and re-tried the card but it was again declined. She then left the store. Ten minutes later, the accused returned to the store with a pen knife. She approached the complainant, held the knife out in front of her and said, ‘give me all your fucking money or I’ll slit your throat’. The complainant gave the accused $360 in cash and the accused left the store. While initially denying any involvement, the accused made admissions to the police.
Counsel for the accused argued that the accused was acting out of duress on the basis of a threat made by Ms Lorenz’s partner on the night before the robbery and repeated the following morning to the effect that if she did not obtain enough money to enable him to re-register his car he would kill her. This threat followed a pattern of violent and threatening behaviour towards the accused over a number of years (See [11]). On the morning of the robbery, the accused, who was pregnant with the couple’s third child, found out that she was unable to get the immediate payment of an advance payment from the Department of Social Security to pay the re-registration.
Decision and Reasoning: There was some discussion in this case of ‘battered woman syndrome’ (See [26]-[31]). Crispin J accepted that upon failing to receive advance payment from the Department of Social Security, the accused became frightened and confused and the robbery was an impulsive act due to her fear that her partner would kill her. His Honour stated: ‘In my view her failure to attempt to extricate herself from the situation whether by leaving him or otherwise is largely explicable by her fear and confusion. Furthermore, she may have thought that any escape would have been only temporary and that sooner or later [her partner] would have been bound to have caught up with her and carried out his threat’ at [30].
However, ‘a diagnosis of battered woman syndrome does not of itself give rise to any defence. The law does not recognise any general principle that people should be absolved from criminal conduct because they had been beaten or abused or because a psychological condition caused by such treatment may have led them to commit the offences with which they are charged. Nonetheless, evidence that such a person may have had a psychological condition of this kind may be relevant to several defences known to the law’ at [31].
Here, counsel for the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to rely on the defence of duress. In the accused’s favour, His Honour found that the threat was effective at the time of the offence, the accused did not fail to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to render the threat ineffective, and, in light of the extremity of the actual and threatened violence displayed by the accused’s partner, a person of ordinary firmness of mind may have acted in the way the accused did (See [35]-[37]). However, the accused’s partner did not direct the accused to commit the offence and accordingly the defence of duress failed (See [38]-[41]). In the alternative, counsel for the accused attempted to rely on the defence of necessity. However, His Honour held that the imminence of danger fell well short of the required standard for the successful proof of the defence (See [42]-[45]). She was accordingly found guilty.
The accused left her partner shortly after the robbery and had formed a relationship with another man. She had just turned 23, had three children and was pregnant to her new partner. The new relationship was apparently a happy one. In these circumstances, and to give her the opportunity to start a new life for herself and her children, Crispin J found it appropriate to defer passing sentence on the condition that she enter into recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of three years.
Magistrates' Court
Police v Blackwell (A pseudonnym) [2024] ACTMC 5 (19 March 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harrassing and monitoring’ – ‘Threats to distribute intimate images’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘text messages’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Stalking with intention to harass in contravention of protection order x 2; threat to distribute intimate image of another x 1; contravention of protection order x 2; attempt to contravene a protection order x 1.
Facts: The male defendant and female complainant were married in 2008 and separated in 2022. In June 2022, the complainant obtained a protection order against the complainant, prohibiting any communication. [3]–[5]
The defendant breached this protection order, sending the complainant a total of 250 messages between June and August of 2022, and a total of 341 messages between August and November 2022. 290 of these messages were sent on 11 October 2022 and were of a threatening nature. [11] Included among these messages was a threat to distribute ‘intimate video footage’ of himself and the complainant engaged in sexual activity. [14]
In May 2023, the defendant was served a special interim protection order, as a result of the defendant’s persistent breach of the original order. [18]
Decision and reasoning: Partially suspended sentence of 81 days’ imprisonment and undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations for 24 months. [157] Magistrate Temby had regard to the complainant’s impact statement, satisfied that the defendant’s ‘voluminous messaging, and … threats’ heavily impacted the complainant’s sense of safety and isolation. [29]
The defendant’s offending was regarded as ‘a serious example’ of stalking, occurring over an extended period (2.5 months) and involving a large volume of unlawful communication. [30] Similarly, the defendant’s threat to distribute a particular intimate image of the complainant was ‘an insidious kind of threat’, falling above the middle of the range in terms of objective seriousness [40] Magistrate Temby observed this offending occurred while the defendant was on ‘conditional liberty’. This is an aggravating factor on sentence. [50]–[51]
Magistrate Temby further noted the defendant’s mental health conditions (inc. anxiety, depression and Autism Spectrum Disorder) and alcohol use disorder. [98] However, the Magistrate queried the extent to which these conditions contributed to the defendant’s offending. [100] The Magistrate lastly observed the defendant’s lack of appreciation with respect to the harm of his actions and consequent lack of responsibility. [122]
TS v PU [2019] ACTMC 22 (12 July 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Employment’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Final protection order application’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Police domestic and family violence’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for final family violence order (FVO).
Facts: The male respondent and the female applicant both worked for the Australian Federal Police. An interim FVO prevented the respondent from working as an active officer as he was not allowed use of firearms. The circumstances of the offending included exposing the couple’s child to domestic and family violence, and text messages from the respondent threatening suicide including images of the respondent with a firearm in his mouth.
Decision and reasoning: A 24-month FVO was granted. In particular, the Magistrate considered the hardship to the respondent in making a FVO but noted at [34]-[35]:
“Those who have the professional privilege of using and carrying firearms in the workplace know full well that this grant of privilege for firearms can be revoked if their behaviour is inconsistent with a continued grant. The consequential effect of any order made in favour of the applicant relating to depriving the respondent’s ability to access firearms has weighed heavily in this decision. Ultimately, the respondent must take responsibility for his conduct in terms of the professional repercussions he has brought upon himself and the personal (and legal) repercussions caused by involving the applicant in his behaviour. Encouragement of him to so do is expressed in s 6 as an object of the FV Act.
Bearing all of the issues in mind, I find that in the circumstances of this matter, the level of hardship to the respondent caused by granting a final order does not outweigh the need to grant an order. That is, any s 14 hardship upon the respondent has not outweighed the s 6 and other competing s 14 considerations. I have decided to impose a final order and I turn my mind to the conditions of that order.”
Love v Kumar [2018] ACTMC 23 (31 October 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse background’ – ‘Visa threats’
Charges: Common assault x 5.
Matter: Judgement.
Facts: The events relating to the charges took place between 2014 and 2017. The defendant male and complainant female were married and had one child. The 5 assault charges relate to the following alleged incidents:
1.
slapped complainant wife across face
2.
slapped complainant wife across face
3.
struck his child on the her back of shoulder because she was crying;
4.
pushed complainant wife’s forehead backwards striking the wall behind
5.
grabbed complainant wife’s hair and twisted her head and hit her face on wall
Decision and Reasoning: In relation to charges 1-3, the Magistrate was not satisfied that the case had been sufficiently made out to justify a finding of the accused’s guilt.
In relation to charges 4 and 5, the Magistrate found the accused guilty.
Special Magistrate Hunter OAM observed:
Taken together the evidence if accepted of giving information to officials at Immigration, the refusal to recant that information, the bruise to the head which is consistent with the allegation on 18th and the general information such as not allowing Ms Devi to have a phone, not allow her to contact her brother and the like which could lead to a conclusion that the defendant was controlling her life, (which is not unknown in domestic violence situations). It also leads to a conclusion that Ms Devi is speaking the truth and should be believed. [207]
And:
I am also satisfied that she had been controlled at least to some extent. That is supported by uncontroverted evidence that she had to secret a SIM card so that she could contact her family and brother by phone. This is consistent with the evidence from her brother that she had no access to contact him except by public phone until he gave her the SIM card. I am also satisfied she had limited access to friends and family. That evidence was corroborated by her brother and by the fact she used the SIM card he gave her to make the various phone calls she made to family and friends. I also note the Defendant had alluded to that control in some of his answers in the ROI such as those referred to by Prosecution counsel in her submissions. [209]
[Note: This decision was unsuccessfully appealed: Kumar v Love [2019] ACTSC 238 (30 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court]
New South Wales
Court of Appeal
Rock v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 47 (28 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO)’ – ‘Trespass’ – ‘Delay in giving reasons for judgment’ – ‘Alleged battery’ – ‘Relationship breakdown’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘PTSD’-‘systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal of dismissed claims; application for leave to appeal dismissed claims.
Charges: Malicious prosecution x1, trespass x 1, battery x6
Facts: The applicant, Mr Rock, and the respondent, Ms Henderson were married and had two children [7]. Ms Henderson had provided material to Constable Pitt who applied for a provisional ADVO against Mr Rock. The material included an incident at Sydney Airport when Mr Rock had confronted Ms Henderson and the man she was travelling with [8]. Mr Rock consented to an interim ADVO pending a final hearing [12], at which the judge found that the test had not been met for a final ADVO to be issued [16].
Later, Mr Rock and the two children were returning from a holiday when they found Ms Henderson at their home [17]. According to Mr Rock, she was tampering with a fuse box. She left promptly, but was charged with contravening the ADVO that was in place against her. Mr Rock made claims for malicious prosecution in respect of the ADVO taken out against him by Ms Henderson, and for trespass in respect of Ms Henderson’s presence at the home [18]. Ms Rock, one of the children, brought a proceeding for six alleged counts of battery against Ms Henderson relating to separate events [21]. The two claims were heard together. Orders were made, with the reasons for the orders given 3 months later [23], [29].
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant raised several grounds on appeal. It is helpful to have reference to the court’s framing of these into three issues [34]:
1.
What consequences, if any, follow from the fact that the primary judge did not give her reasons for decision until 3 months and 4 days after delivering judgment?
2.
Is the tort of malicious prosecution available in respect of the procuring of an ADVO?
3.
Should the appeal succeed on its merits?
Ms Rock’s appeal relied on the same ground as the applicant regarding the delay in giving reasons after making orders. Her remaining grounds concerned liability and damages [35].
Decision and Reasoning: The Court reviewed the case law in respect of delays in delivering reasons for judgment. The Court found that, in general, a court should not make final orders without giving reasons (where reasons are required) unless there is sufficient cause to take that course, e.g. because of urgency [60]. The reasons are due “as soon as reasonably practicable after judgment is delivered” [60]. The Court found that the reasons in this case were not delivered “as soon as reasonably practicable”, but concluded that nothing came of this other than some delay in hearing of the appeal – this did not merit a retrial [65].
Regarding the tort of malicious prosecution and whether this tort would encompass taking out an ADVO, the Court again began by canvassing the case law and the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 [66]. The Court held that the tort did not encompass taking out an ADVO [166]. The Court went on to explain why the applicant would not have been successful on the tort in any event [189]. The Court found that the trespass claim had been made out, but that since there had been no loss, the applicant was entitled to nominal damages only [215]. The grounds comprising Ms Rock’s appeal were either dismissed, or leave was refused in request of them [218].
Rahman v Rahman [2024] NSWCA 198 (8 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
'Following, harassing and monitoring' – 'Stalking' – 'People with children' – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Jurisdictional error’ –‘telephone evidence’
Case type: Application for judicial review in the NSW Court of Appeal.
The applicant, Fahmid Rahman, challenged a decision of the District Court to dismiss his appeal against an extension of a final apprehended domestic violence order (‘ADVO’) made under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The application was treated as seeking judicial review on grounds of jurisdictional error.
Charges: Stalking (x1); intimidation (x1) [NB: These were the previous convictions, please note the court did not consider these charges, the Court treated the matter as an application to review for jurisdictional error only.]
Facts:
1.
The applicant and the first respondent were formerly married. They have two children. The children are in the sole care of the applicant, Mr Rahman.
2.
On 17 February 2022, a final ADVO was made against Mr Rahman for the protection of Ms Rahman, prohibiting him from approaching her residence or workplace, including the former matrimonial home. Although Mr Rahman had previously been acquitted of assault, he was convicted of stalking and intimidation.
3.
Before the ADVO expired, Ms Rahman sought an extension under s 73(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), alleging ongoing fear of Mr Rahman and citing his controlling behaviour and continued litigation against her. Magistrate Swain extended the ADVO by two years. Mr Rahman appealed to the District Court, which dismissed the appeal after a rehearing, finding that the complainant continued to fear personal violence.
4.
The primary judge referred to the applicant’s litigation conduct as ‘systems abuse’ and upheld the extension.
5.
Mr Rahman then sought judicial review of the upholding of the extension in the Court of Appeal.
Grounds of Appeal: Mr Rahman relied on four grounds of alleged jurisdictional error.
1.
Denial of natural justice. This ground asserts jurisdictional error on the part of both the magistrate and the primary judge, that error being identified as denying the applicant natural justice.
2.
Failure to consider material considerations. This ground asserts a failure by the primary judge to consider a material consideration “being the reasons for the appellant’s failure to cross examine with proper identification/failure to attend court”.
3.
Procedural unfairness. This ground complains of procedural unfairness, describing this as “being not transparent in actions/decisions” and goes on to make a serious allegation that the decision was in bad faith.
4.
Consideration failures. This ground alleges that irrelevant considerations were taken into account and/or relevant considerations were not taken into account.
Decision: The NSW Court of Appeal (Ward P, Adamson and Stern JJA) dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the District Court proceedings. The Court ordered Mr Rahman to pay the respondent’s costs.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The applicant alleged that both the magistrate and the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by denying natural justice [32]. The Court first held that judicial review of the magistrate’s decision was not competent, as those orders had merged into and been superseded by the District Court’s orders on appeal [33].
As for the primary judge, the applicant argued that natural justice was denied because the judge allowed evidence from three telephone witnesses without proper identification or affidavit and failed to refer to section 73(3) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) [34]–[35]. These actions were said to breach procedural fairness and amount to a jurisdictional error under Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 177 and Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 [36]–[37]. The Court rejected this. It confirmed that permitting telephone evidence, particularly where the applicant had introduced late evidence himself, did not breach procedural fairness. Further, there was no jurisdictional error, as the applicant’s own counsel had accepted the procedure at trial without objection [41].
The core argument advanced in oral submissions was that the primary judge failed to identify a “change in circumstances” as required by s 73(3) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The Court held this was misconceived; s 73(3) does not impose a jurisdictional condition, but merely allows a court to decline to hear an application where there has been no change, and it appears to be an appeal in disguise [45]–[47].
In any event, the judge did address the relevant facts, noting a proliferation of litigation and continued contact attempts through emails as evidence of changing circumstances, satisfying the test under s 73(1) that it was "proper in all the circumstances" to extend the order [48].
Ground 2: The applicant argued that the primary judge failed to consider a material issue, namely, his inability to cross-examine witnesses who gave evidence via telephone without “proper identification” [50]. The Court rejected this argument. The telephone evidence arose only because the applicant sought leave to rely on a late-served affidavit from Mr Syed. In response, the judge allowed the respondent to call three reply witnesses by phone to avoid prejudice from the late filing [52]–[54].
Before the affidavit was read, the judge confirmed with the applicant’s counsel that this course was understood and accepted. The applicant’s counsel raised no objection at the time and each witness was properly sworn, identified, and cross-examined [55]–[57].
The applicant’s later claim that he could not verify the identity of phone witnesses or cross-examine them effectively was inaccurate, his counsel conducted cross-examination and made no complaint during the hearing. The Court confirmed that admitting telephone evidence was within the judge’s procedural discretion and did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness or jurisdictional error [58]–[59].
Ground 3: The applicant claimed that the District Court proceedings were procedurally unfair due to a lack of transparency, that the decision was made in bad faith, and that the wrong legal test was applied when assessing whether to extend the ADVO. The Court firmly rejected all aspects of this ground [70].
First, the Court found no lack of transparency or procedural unfairness. While the primary judge’s reasons were brief and delivered ex tempore, they were adequate in context. The Court reiterated that when evaluating the sufficiency of reasons, it is essential to consider the nature of the proceedings and the constraints on the decision-maker, particularly where reasons are given orally at the conclusion of a full-day hearing with another matter the Court needed to hear (Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [56]; NSW Land and Housing Corp v Orr (2019) 100 NSWLR 578 at [70]) [62].
Second, the Court found no evidentiary basis for the serious allegation of bad faith. It warned that such assertions should not be made lightly and must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence, especially where submission are made by or under the name of a solicitor, as an officer of the Court [64]–[65].
Third, the applicant contended that the judge erred by applying the balance of probabilities standard rather than a higher threshold. This was found to be legally incorrect. Under s 16(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), the correct standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. The Court explained that Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 does not alter the standard but recognises that more serious allegations require stronger evidence to reach that standard (at 362–363). The judge had properly applied this principle, as well as s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) [66]–[68].
Finally, the Court held that the primary judge clearly indicated his independent state of satisfaction that the complainant feared the applicant, the core requirement under s 16(1) of the Act. No error, and certainly no jurisdictional error, was established [69].
Ground 4: The applicant argued that the judge erred by referring to outstanding costs orders and to the National Domestic Violence Bench Book. The Court held these were both permissible references. The costs orders were part of the procedural history and directly relevant to the respondent’s evidence about the stress and anxiety as a result of the proliferation of litigation [73]. The Bench Book was cited in relation to "systems abuse", in the context of the submission by the first respondent’s solicitor as to the persistence in the applicant’s pursuit of litigation against the first respondent. The Court affirmed that neither point gave rise to jurisdictional error [74].
Rock v Henderson [2021] NSWCA 155 (29 July 2021) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Family court proceedings’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Improper purpose’ – ‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Trespass’
Proceeding: Application for leave to appeal against striking out Statement of Claim in full.
Facts: The male applicant and female respondent were formerly husband and wife with financial and child proceedings pending in the Family Court. In 2018 there was an incident at Sydney Airport between them where it was alleged the applicant approached the respondent and her current partner and caused her humiliation and embarrassment [58]. The respondent made a written statement which led to the police obtaining a provisional protection order against the applicant [54]. It was dismissed in June 2019 [4].
The applicant sued the respondent for damages for malicious prosecution and for trespass to land. The malicious prosecution submission related to the protection order application [4]. The trespass to land submission related to the respondent entering the applicant’s property in July 2019 where the children, whom she was prohibited from approaching by a separate protection order, resided with him [4]. The respondent filed a Notice of Motion to the District Court seeking the claim be struck out, in full or in part pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedural Rules 2005 (NSW), rule 14.28 [5]. The primary judge ordered the applicants’ claim be struck out in full as the applicant commenced the proceedings for an improper purpose, namely to circumvent or derive some advantage in the family law proceedings. The applicant applied for leave to appeal.
Grounds of Appeal:
The Primary judge erred in finding the appellant’s actions for malicious prosecution and trespass were an abuse of process in that they were commenced for an improper or collateral purpose in that:
1.
there was an absence of evidence capable of supporting that finding; and
2.
as a matter of law, the purpose ascribed to the applicant was not an improper or collateral purpose as a matter of law.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave granted, appeal upheld.
Wright J considered the evidence that the claimed amount was the same as the proceeds from the sale of the Lilydale house provided no basis for a claim of circumventing the family law proceeding or obtaining an advantage [87],[91]. Naming the children in the claim for damages for trespass was not an improper purpose [92]. The evidence was insufficient to cross the high threshold to prove the proceedings were instituted for an improper or collateral purpose and therefore the primary judge erred in his judgement.
Wright J found that the elements of malicious prosecution were sufficiently clear and the minor defects in the applicant’s statement did not justify the claim being struck out [117]. Further, the distress caused to the applicant by the children’s distress was relevant to his claims for damages and therefore was not liable to be struck out as tending to cause prejudice, delay or embarrassment [117].
Brereton JA and Belle P agreed with the orders proposed by Wright J [50].
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305 (14 September 2001) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘General principles’ – ‘Negligence’ – ‘Opinion’
Appeal Type: General civil appeal.
Facts: This decision was not concerned with domestic and family violence but is relevant in relation to the admission of expert evidence in cases involving domestic and family violence. The plaintiff was injured after falling down the stairs at work and sued her employer for negligence. At trial, her employer was found to have breached their duty of care because the stairs were slippery and this was the reason the plaintiff fell. This finding of fact made at trial was largely based on expert evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The expert attested to the slipperiness of the stairs. The plaintiff was awarded damages. But for the expert’s report, ‘a conclusion that the stairs were not slippery would have been inevitable’ (see at [56]). The defendant appealed on the basis that, inter alia, the trial judge erred in accepting the expert evidence.
Issues: Whether the trial judge erred in accepting the opinion of the expert regarding the slipperiness of the stairs.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. All members of the Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge ought not to have accepted the evidence. Importantly, this appeal was concerned with whether the evidence ought to have been accepted by the trial judge, not with its admissibility. Heydon JA firstly considered whether the expert’s testimony ‘(complied) with a prime duty of experts in giving opinion evidence: to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the validity of the expert's conclusions’ ([59]). It was in this context that his Honour engaged in general discussion about the admissibility of expert evidence. Expert evidence cannot usurp the role of the trial judge (or jury if present) in making findings of fact. The task of the tribunal of fact is to make an independent assessment of expert evidence in forming its own conclusion. It cannot do this, ‘if the expert does not fully expose the reasoning relied on’ (see at [67]). The Court is not obliged to accept the opinion of an expert, even if no other evidence is called to contradict it (see at [87]). This is important especially where the evidence goes to the ultimate issue in the case. Evidence which goes to the ultimate issue is not inadmissible for that reason (see s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). Essentially, an expert gives opinion based on facts, and as such must prove ‘by admissible means the facts on which the opinion is based, or state explicitly the assumptions as to fact on which the opinion is based’ (see at [64]).
See at [85] where his Honour summarises the general principles of the admissibility of expert evidence –
‘In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of "specialised knowledge"; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be "wholly or substantially based on the witness's expert knowledge"; so far as the opinion is based on facts "observed" by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on "assumed" or "accepted" facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert's evidence must explain how the field of "specialised knowledge" in which the witness is expert by reason of "training, study or experience", and on which the opinion is "wholly or substantially based", applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert's specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ's characterisation of the evidence in HG v R [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414, on "a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise" (at [41]).’
Court of Criminal Appeal
Sampson v The King [2025] NSWCCA 25 (21 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm’ – ‘application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘erred by rounding down discount’ – ‘erred by failing to consider offence was unplanned’ – ‘erred by failing to properly evaluate the applicant’s mental illness’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Intentionally cause grievous bodily harm (x1).
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 8 years. One evening, the applicant and complainant were at home. The applicant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The applicant began to argue with the complainant, culminating in him striking the complainant with a garden stake. The stake made contact with the complainant’s right eye area. The complainant suffered injuries to her right eye for which she underwent corrective surgery. Her vision in her right eye is very poor due to the scarring, and it is unlikely that there will be substantial improvement.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the following grounds:
(1) The sentencing judge erred in applying the sentence discount of 10 per cent by rounding down the discount to even months.
(2) The sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the principal offence by failing to analyse the intent component of the offence and consider the submission that the offence was unplanned.
(3) The sentencing judge erred in failing to properly evaluate the applicant’s mental illness in accordance with the principles stated in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The Court considered each ground of appeal as follows:
(1) The Court identified the basis of the 10% discount as s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) [36]. The Court agreed that by rounding the discount (such that the head sentence was 5 years’ imprisonment rather than 4 years, 11 months and 12 days), the sentencing judge had effectively reduced the discount [44]. The Court found that this was not the type of error where there can be an arithmetical correction [52], and accordingly, found it was necessary to resentence the applicant [58].
(2) The Court found that although a written submission was made to the effect that the lack of planning was a mitigating factor, nothing further was said about the matter in oral submissions [66]. The Court observed that the fact that there was little planning does not necessarily mean the offending was mitigated; the onus was on the applicant to establish that this mitigation was in order [69]. The Court rejected the ground on the basis that the lack of planning was of little or no significance [72]-[73].
(3) The Court upheld the third ground of appeal [107]. It found that the effect of the applicant’s mental health issues on general deterrence had been expressly put forward as a submission on behalf of the applicant [106]. The sentencing judge ought to have dealt with the fact that the offender was an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [105].
Sentence quashed. Appellant resentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years 8 months commencing on 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 May 2025 with a balance of term of 1 year 10 months expiring 8 February 2027.
Wardell v R [2025] NSWCCA 26 (3 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘aggravated indecent assault’ – ‘aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘two complainants’ - 'standard of proof' - 'no misstatement of law in tendency direction' - 'sentencing older offender' - 'appropriateness of outlining indicative prison sentences'
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Charges: The applicant was convicted of 10 counts of aggravated indecent assault and 13 counts of aggravated sexual assault against two complainants. The aggregate sentence imposed in respect of those offences was imprisonment for 14 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.
Facts: At trial, the prosecution relied on tendency evidence in support of each of the counts. The tendency evidence was identified paragraphs of the statements of each of the two complainants and of a third woman, Ms Hetherington [11]. The asserted tendencies all related to the applicant’s tendency to have a sexual interest in young females working for him aged between 16 to 19, and more specifically, an interest in the two complainants. [7].
Grounds of appeal:
The ground of appeal relied upon for the appeal against conviction was that the trial judge had erred in his directions on tendency reasoning, resulting in a miscarriage of justice [24].
The two grounds of appeal relied upon for the appeal against sentence were [24]:
(1) that the sentencing judge had erred in nominating indicative sentences in respect of offences for which his Honour did not think it appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment; and
(2) that the trial judge erred in how he determined the aggregate sentence by failing to properly consider the applicant’s life expectancy.
Decision and reasoning: Leave was granted in respect of both the appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence; both appeals were dismissed.
Appeal against convictions
While the ground of appeal against conviction did not allege a “wrong decision on any question of law” in the trial judge’s directions on tendency reasoning, it did make four complaints about aspects of the tendency directions [25]. The Court began its consideration of this ground by observing the general principle that there will be a miscarriage of justice as a result of a trial judge’s directions to the jury if the directions deflected the jury’s attention from the need to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt before returning a verdict of guilty [27].
The Court observed that three of the four complaints relied on by the applicant raised the same general issue of whether the directions led to a miscarriage of justice in light of the High Court’s reasoning in DPP v Roder [2024] HCA 15 and the Court’s statement that a single tendency evidence direction should be given and should not direct or invite the jury to make findings in respect of charged conduct as a basis for then considering whether the alleged tendency or tendencies had been established [32]. The fourth complaint related to the form of the third and fourth tendencies [33].
In regard to the first three complaints about the tendency directions, the Court noted that the trial took place prior to the High Court’s judgment in Roder and the Court’s own judgment in JS v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 145 [64]. In future, the Court expected that tendency directions would comply with the approach set out in Roder [64].
The applicant submitted that the directions had not complied with the instruction in Roder not to direct or invite the jury to make findings in respect of charged conduct for the purposes of considering whether any of the alleged tendencies was established [65]. The result of this was that the jury would “carry forward” satisfaction about charged conduct for tendency purposes to proof of the charged conduct at a lower standard of proof [65]. The Court accepted that the directions on tendency evidence were not an example of the simpler approach referred to in Roder which emphasises the tendency as the intermediate fact to be found rather than focusing on the conduct said to support the tendency [68]. The Court therefore found there was the potential for the directions to have given rise to a miscarriage of justice [68]. A miscarriage would be avoided, however, if the summing up taken as a whole ensured that there was not a risk of the jury failing to apply the required standard of proof to the determination of whether the accused was guilty of any count [68].
In the Court’s view, the tendency directions did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case [74]. The summing up as a whole effectively instructed the jury so that, notwithstanding the length and problematic aspects of the tendency directions, the jury would not have been deflected from their fundamental task of determining guilt beyond reasonable doubt [74]. The Court reached this conclusion for several reasons:
•
First, it was not contended by the applicant that there was any specific misstatement of the law in the summing up, including in relation to tendency evidence [75].
•
Second, the trial judge’s directions in relation to the tendency evidence were consistent with the principle in Bauer [2018] HCA 40 and the conclusion in Roder that tendencies ordinarily need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, none of the evidence of charged or uncharged acts, when relied upon as tendency evidence, was indispensable to reaching a verdict of guilty in respect of any charged act. There was direct evidence of each charged act as well as, in some cases, supporting evidence [76].
•
Third, the trial judge made clear that it is not enough to convict the respondent on any of the charges that the jury was satisfied (on the balance of probabilities) of the tendency evidence [79]. The tendencies were intermediate facts, and the jury had to be satisfied of the respondent’s guilt on each charge beyond reasonable doubt [80].
•
Fourth, as part of the tendency directions, the trial judge gave an example of how the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applied, saying that “in practical terms what this means is that if you were satisfied as to the tendency evidence establishing the tendency, when you then come to consider that same material as a charge, you would then need to apply the high standard of beyond reasonable doubt. ...” [80].
•
Fifth, the summing up included careful directions as to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the onus on the Crown to prove the elements of each charge beyond reasonable doubt; the need for separate consideration of each count; the need to accept the evidence of the relevant complainant as to the occurrence of each count; and, the direction that a tendency, if proved, “may assist the Crown to prove the accused committed the offences, but it is not enough by itself” [82].
•
Sixth, the fact that the jury did not convict on all counts, and in particular did not convict on all counts involving the second complainant, is consistent with the jury not treating the tendency evidence in an unthinkingly uniform way or as allowing them to apply a lesser standard of proof than beyond reasonable doubt in respect of each charge [85].
•
Finally, counsel for the applicant at the trial did not seek any additional directions or redirections [86]. As explained in Astill v R [2024] NSWCCA 118 at [62], this could be an indication that, in the context of the trial, the tendency evidence directions and the summing up were not perceived to have involved a miscarriage of justice.
The fourth complaint about the tendency directions related to the third and fourth tendencies alleged by the Crown. These were that the applicant had a tendency to have sexual interest in each of the complainants respectively [88]. The applicant submitted that the trial judge should have directed that only the evidence of the first complainant could be relied on to establish the third tendency and only the evidence of the second complainant could be relied on to establish the fourth tendency. By failing to give such directions, it was submitted that the trial judge must have left the jury thinking that the whole of the evidence in the case was admissible to establish those tendencies [88]. The Court dismissed this complaint by stating that evidence of a sexual interest in one of the complainants was indeed relevant to whether he had a sexual interest in the other. Both complainants were females within the same age range (16-19) who were in the same relationship to the respondent – his interest in one was logically probative of interest in the other [90].
Appeal against sentence
The applicant also sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him, on two grounds: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in nominating indicative prison sentences for offences for which he did not think imprisonment was appropriate; and (2) that his Honour erred in the manner in which he determined to fix the ultimate aggregate sentence [106].
Regarding the first ground, the Court found there was no error in his Honour specifying indicative periods of imprisonment for these offences, confirming the significant notional concurrency between offences in this matter, although he may not have found the threshold in s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) crossed if he had been dealing with the four relevant offences in isolation [130]. His Honour was obliged to consider these offences in light of the broader pattern of offending, and the sentencing options available. The applicant was not entitled to the benefit, in mitigation of penalty, of any of these four offences being isolated [130]. Leave to appeal was granted on this ground, but this ground was dismissed [132].
Regarding the second ground, the Court observed that although there are many ways in which advanced age can ameliorate the sentence to be imposed, to give determinative weight to age would be inconsistent with principle [138]. The Court opined that his Honour did not use the applicant’s life expectancy as a short-cut in sentencing him [139]. Returning to the impact of age on numerous occasions, in appropriate contexts, his Honour ameliorated this sentence very significantly – but not mechanically – because of the applicant’s age [139]. It was not erroneous for His Honour to have rejected the approach proposed by the parties if this would have resulted in a non-parole period that would not be sufficient [140]. Leave to appeal was granted, but this ground was dismissed [141].
Shen v R [2024] NSWCCA 252 (20 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘manifestly excessive’ – ‘assault occasioning actual bodily harm – ‘alcohol-fuelled’ – ‘advanced age’ – ‘mental health’ – ‘general deterrence’ – ‘no previous criminal record’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Aggravated detention, intending to commit a serious indictable offence (assault occasioning actual bodily harm), causing actual bodily harm x1.
Facts: The complainant was the ex-wife of the applicant. After consuming a bottle of Chinese wine during the day, the applicant knocked on the complainant’s door with mooncakes and armed with a wooden stick [7]. The complainant allowed the applicant to enter the apartment, and the applicant proceeded to strike her face and body with the stick and his fists [7]. The applicant disconnected the complainant’s landline, took her mobile phone, tied her feet together, covered her with a blanket and left. The victim escaped 3-4 hours later after she had freed herself sufficiently to plug her landline back in and call an ambulance [8].
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive [3]-[4].
Decision and reasoning: The sentence was found to be unjust; it was quashed and the applicant was resentenced.
The principles relevant to an intervention by the Court in a sentence imposed are well-known: there has to be disclosed identifiable error in the sentencing judge acting upon a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide/affect the sentence imposed, mistaking facts, or not taking into account some material consideration [21]. If identifiable error is not disclosed, the Court may still intervene where the result of the exercise of the sentencing discretion is unreasonable or plainly unjust [22].
Rothman J ( Kirk JA & Yehia J agreeing) ‘Domestic violence is a particularly pernicious and serious class of offending. It invariably involves a vulnerable victim and repeat offending. Further, given the incidence of domestic violence, it requires, ordinarily, significant attention to general deterrence.’ [26]
Not all subjective circumstances pertinent to the applicant were ameliorating [24]. He did not display the level of insight one would hope to be present in a person of advanced age. He had no criminal record and was not otherwise known to police or law enforcement authorities. The sentencing judge, based on a psychologist’s report, was not satisfied that depression, anxiety or the applicant’s traumatic brain injury (TBI) was causative of the offending [28]. Instead, her Honour considered the TBI “as part of the general mix of matters affecting the applicant’s health” [29].
On appeal, the Court acknowledged that the advanced age of the applicant, together with his TBI and psychological conditions, made him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [32]. The Court also noted that the custodial sentence will weigh more heavily on him, and that the lack of previous convictions/complaints about domestic violence mean that community protection is less of a consideration [33]. Finally, the Court noted that as a first-time offender, the applicant was entitled to leniency [34]. On those bases, the Court was satisfied manifest error had been disclosed and the sentence imposed was “plainly unjust” and “unreasonable”. The sentence was quashed, and the applicant resentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months with a remainder term of 2 years and 3 months.
R v Karim [2024] NSWCCA 234 (13 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘manifestly inadequate’ – ‘indicative sentences” – “different forms of offending” – “COVID-19 related hardship’ – ‘double counting’ – ‘double jeopardy’– ‘notional accumulation’ – ‘aim of killing unborn fetus’ – ‘sexual and reproductive abuse’- ‘adult-like offending by young person’ – ‘strangulation’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: The “domestic violence offences” were cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x1, intentionally choke with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1, and sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation x 1.
The “drug offences” were supply prohibited drug on an ongoing basis x 1, participate in a criminal group x1, and deal with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime x1 (NB: these offences are beyond the scope of this summary).
Facts: The facts of the “domestic violence offences” were as follows. The respondent and the complainant had been in an intimate relationship. In April or May 2021, the complainant discovered she was pregnant. The respondent pressured the complainant to terminate the pregnancy. The complainant was planning a gender reveal party on the day the offending occurred, 17 September 2021. The complainant attended the respondent’s home at his request, and they argued.
The complainant attempted to leave. The respondent prevented the complainant from leaving, pushed her to the ground and stomped on her stomach with force. The respondent then placed his hand around the complainant’s neck and choked her. The complainant lost consciousness. The respondent revived her with cold water and recommenced kicking her stomach (ultimately causing demise of the fetus). The respondent inserted his finger into the complainant’s vagina three times to check whether she was bleeding. The respondent left to wash his hands, during which time the complainant tried to escape the house, but the respondent caught her and dragged her back to the loungeroom to resume kicking and stomping on her stomach.
The respondent eventually stopped and left the house, breaking the complainant’s phone. The complainant ran out of the house, collapsing outside her car.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown argued that the sentencing judge had handed down a manifestly inadequate sentence. The inadequacy was due to the sentencing judge:
- arriving at manifestly inadequate indicative sentences;
- double-counting of the onerous conditions of the respondent’s custody because of the COVID-19 pandemic; and
- allowing for an inadequate degree of notional accumulation.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed, sentence quashed, and respondent resentenced.
The Court agreed with the Crown’s submission that the sentencing judge’s findings regarding the objective seriousness of the domestic violence offences were not reflected in the indicative sentences [76]. In so finding, the Court noted that a judge’s assessment as to the degree of objective seriousness is not expected to bear a “mathematical equivalence to the legislative guideposts” [76].
The Court also found that the respondent’s subjective case (youth, mental health issues, remorse and onerous nature of custody during pandemic) did not significantly counteract the seriousness of the domestic violence offences [77]. As for the respondent’s youth, the Court observed that the weight accorded to rehabilitation over general deterrence and retribution may be lesser when the young person has conducted themselves like an adult and committed a crime of violence [79]. It was accepted by all that the respondent’s remorse and insight into his offending was limited [81].
As for custodial hardship, the Court noted that the sentencing judge had stated that but for this factor, the indicative penalties for both sets of offending would have been “more significant” [66]. While respondent’s custody involved spending time in pandemic-related lockdowns with restricted family visits, the Court held that the severity of the offending meant the indicative sentences imposed in light of this hardship were unduly lenient [84]. The Court did not decide whether the finding of special circumstances based on the pandemic restrictions was “double counting”, but affirmed that the indicative sentences adopted did not reflect the severity of the offending [90]. The Court held that these indicative sentences, together with the way in which the sentences were accumulated, had resulted in a manifestly inadequate sentence [95].
The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was quashed. The respondent was re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment with a 10-year non-parole period [105].
Barker v R [2024] NSWCCA 227 (6 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Resentence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘threats’
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant pleaded guilty to three domestic violence-related offences, using an offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence of intimidation (x1), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (‘AOBH’) and damaging property.
Facts: The victim and the offender had been in an intimate relationship. After a period of instability, during which the couple separated and reunited following the victim’s pregnancy in late 2022, the relationship ended definitively in January 2023. The applicant had a history of violence during the relationship and was regularly using drugs and alcohol.
On the night of 4 February 2023, the victim encountered the applicant at a pub in Albury. At the pub the applicant smirked at her and called her pathetic. At the end of the evening the victim asked her friend to drop her off at the offenders’ units to collect belongings. She had stopped living there after their relationship ended. The offender was not home at the time the victim arrived, and she let herself in. The applicant returned unexpectedly and became confrontational.
•
Count 1: The applicant retrieved a kitchen knife and confronted the victim, holding the knife close to her face. The victim said, “I just want to grab my stuff and leave”, to which the offender replied, “If you leave, I will kill you.”
•
Count 2: The offender dropped the knife and grabbed the victim by the hair and pulled her downwards. The offender punched the victim twice, once to the back of the head and once to the left side of the face and threw her to the ground.
•
Count 3: The complainant took her mobile phone, an iPhone 13 and fled to the toilet to lock the door. The offender kicked the door in, damaging the lock. He grabbed the mobile phone from the victim and walked into the lounge room, where he smashed the mobile telephone on the floor, causing it to be inoperable
The victim was unable to leave until the next morning, when the applicant contacted her mother for a pickup and apologised for his actions.
Procedural history: The District Court sentenced Mr Barker to an aggregate term of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 3 months.
Grounds of appeal: Mr Barker relied on four grounds of appeal:
1.
The learned sentencing Judge erroneously took into account unproved matters in a way that was adverse to the interest of the applicant.
2.
The learned sentencing Judge erred in his consideration of matters dealt with in the Children’s Court.
3.
The sentencing proceeding miscarried as a consequence of admitting into evidence the applicant’s Children’s Court criminal record.
4.
The learned sentencing Judge failed to properly apply the principles enunciated by the High Court in Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571.
Decision: The Court (Sweeney, Hamill and N Adams JJ) granted leave, allowed the appeal, and quashed the original sentence.
The applicant was resentenced to an aggregate term of 14 months imprisonment, to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order commencing 6 December 2024, with conditions including supervision and participation in rehabilitation programs.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The Court accepted that Judge Grant erred by taking into account unproven allegations adverse to the applicant’s interests, contrary to the principles in R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 [8];[13]. Specifically, the judge remarked that the applicant had “bashed his girlfriend twice”, despite the fact that the applicant had been acquitted of the second alleged assault [10]. These remarks suggested that the judge had acted on disputed material not proven beyond reasonable doubt, in breach of Olbrich and s 4(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which requires factual findings adverse to the offender to be proved to the requisite standard [12].
Ground 2 and 3: The Court also accepted that the sentencing judge had erred by relying on the applicant’s juvenile record, in breach of s 15(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) [15]. That provision prohibits admission of juvenile matters where no conviction was recorded and the offender has not been subject to punishment within the preceding two years [17]. Despite this, the judge referred to the applicant being “dealt with as a juvenile for common assault and domestic violence”, and used this to infer a history of relationship violence inconsistent with the applicant’s self-report [18]. This was impermissible and infected the judge’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility and prospects of rehabilitation [19].
Ground 4: The Court did not need to determine Ground 4 independently due to the established errors on Grounds 1–3. The Court noted that the applicant is a young offender with no prior record, which entitles him to some leniency. His upbringing clearly involved abuse, neglect and trauma and it appears he lacked guidance to develop appropriate attitudes. The circumstances of his upbringing reduce to some extent his moral culpability for his offending, in accordance with the principles in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 [51].
Per Sweeney J (Hammil and Adamas JJ agreeing) ‘Domestic violence must be denounced, especially as the applicant maintains troubling attitudes towards his partner and his conduct towards her, still justifying his behaviour and blaming her for his offending.’ [50]
R v Rose [2024] NSWCCA 193 (28 October 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breaking and entering dwellinghouse’ – ‘Detaining with intent to obtain a psychological advantage’ – ‘Armed with a knife’ – ‘Threats of self-harm’ – ‘Smashing backdoor’ – ‘Concern for victim’s welfare’ – ‘Manifest inadequacy’ – ‘Double counting’ – ‘Objective seriousness’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: Breaking and entering dwellinghouse and committing a serious indictable offence therein, namely, detaining with intent to obtain a psychological advantage while armed with a knife (x1).
Facts: The respondent and the victim had been in a casual sexual relationship, which had ended. The victim asked the respondent not to contact her [9]. A week later at about 1am, the respondent arrived at the victim’s residence knowing she was alone in the house. The respondent gained entry to the house by smashing the glass backdoor with a crowbar he had brought for the purpose. He was equipped with tools and a “miner’s lamp” [10]. The victim woke to the respondent leaning over her armed with a 9cm knife which he had pointed very close to her face. The respondent threw his and the victim’s phones to the ground and continued to hold the victim down on the bed for several minutes, eventually releasing her [11]. He detained the victim for 2 hours and 43 minutes and made threats of self-harm, saying his actions were the victim’s “just deserts” [12]. The victim dissuaded the respondent from carrying out his threats [14]. At 4am, the respondent left. He told the victim to call the police and himself called the police, asking them to hurry so he did not harm the victim. The police arrived at 4:17am and arrested him [16].
Grounds of appeal: The Director relied on two grounds of appeal [7]:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence:
(a)
by failing to find that the offence was aggravated by reason of the actual or threatened use of violence pursuant to s 21A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999; and
(b)
by failing to have regard to the actual and threatened use of violence (including by the use of a knife) in assessing objective seriousness.
2.
The sentence pronounced is manifestly inadequate
Decision and Reasoning: As to the first ground of appeal, the Crown prosecutor had at sentencing conceded that an evaluation of the objective seriousness of the offending as falling in the mid-range was open. The Court held that this made the case for non-interference “irresistible” [49], but went on to opine that it would have been double counting for the sentencing judge to have found that the offence was more serious due to the actual or threatened use of violence (as was suggested by sub-grounds a. and b. of ground 1) [50]-[51].
As to the second ground of appeal (manifest inadequacy), the Court held that the starting point sentence of 2 years and 8 months was not plainly unjust or wholly unreasonable [53]. Further, the respondent was entitled to the statutory reduction of 25 percent for his early guilty plea [60]. This reduced the term of imprisonment to 1 of 2 years, bringing into question whether an ICO should be imposed as an appropriate means of serving the sentence. There was no suggestion that the sentencing judge did not properly consider the question of whether an ICO should be imposed, having regard to the mandatory considerations stipulated by the provisions of s 66 SPA [61]. In the Court’s assessment, the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons for deciding, in the exercise of her discretion, that an ICO was the appropriate means of serving the sentence to be imposed [63].
R v Stephens [2024] NSWCCA 170 (11 September 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘sustained period of regular offending’ – ‘sexual jealousy and possessiveness’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Double counting’ – ‘Special circumstances involving psychiatric intervention’ -‘strangulation’ –‘damaging property’- ‘children present’- ‘uncharged acts’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 7, armed with intent to commit an indictable offence x2, intentionally choking without consent x5 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 4, intentionally choking without consent x1, destruction or damage to property x2)
Facts: The respondent and the complainant were in a domestic relationship for three years. The offending, and the uncharged/Form 1 acts, occurred between 3 November 2018 and 17 October 2020. The full facts of each count are too extensive to set out here. In summary, the defendant would assault (both verbally and physically) the complainant on a regular basis when he lost his temper, causing her actual bodily harm. There was often an element of jealousy and paranoia that the complainant was seeing other men.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown advanced several bases for an inference that the sentencing discretion miscarried, producing a manifestly inadequate sentence [158]:
1.
First, the aggregate sentence and the non-parole period both manifestly failed to reflect the respondent’s objective criminality and the totality of the offending.
2.
Second, the sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to specific and general deterrence as well as community protection.
3.
Third, the sentencing judge allowed subjective considerations to, in effect, overwhelm the sentencing exercise.
4.
Fourth, the sentencing judge gave undue prominence to the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation and impermissibly engaged in a form of “double counting”, and thereby erroneously reduced the aggregate sentence imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence was quashed and the respondent was resentenced.
The Court held that:
1.
A conclusion that a sentence is manifestly inadequate does not depend upon the attribution of an identified specific error in the reasoning of the sentencing judge [28].
2.
The indicative sentences for two of the counts were lenient given the objective seriousness of the offending, and the fact that nothing in the respondent’s subjective case demanded such leniency [170].
3.
The findings of the sentencing judge paid insufficient regard to the importance that specific deterrence and community protection play in sentencing for domestic violence offending [182]. Where there is a lack of remorse or significant insight into the offending by the offender, specific deterrence should be a significant consideration [188].
4.
The respondent’s lack of remorse was not appropriately factored into the sentencing judge’s assessment of rehabilitative potential [188].
5.
The finding of special circumstances based on the need for supervision (upon release to obtain psychiatric and psychological treatment) was excessively generous [192]. Also, there was a degree of double counting in the consideration of rehabilitation both when fixing the aggregate sentence, and as a basis for a finding of special circumstances [195].
6.
The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was “unreasonable or plainly unjust” [199].
The respondent’s sentence was quashed, and he was re-sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 6 years, with a non-parole period of 4 years [237].
Nathan Ayoub v R [2024] NSWCCA 168 (6 September 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘principles of totality’ – ‘offending on parole’ – ‘backdating sentence to achieve concurrency with balance of parole’ – ‘concurrence between indicative sentences’ – ‘Bugmy features’ – ‘depression and anxiety’ – ‘following, harassing and monitoring’- ‘sexual jealousy and possessiveness’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x3), stalk and intimidate (x1).
Facts: The stalk and intimidate offence comprised the applicant calling the complainant 113 times in the span of two days [11]; the applicant distributing pornographic photos which he claimed to be of the complainant [12]; and the applicant denigrating the complainant to the complainant’s children before running off with, and downloading the data from, the complainant’s phone [13].
The facts of the three assault offences were as follows (all separate occasions):
1.
While the complainant was sitting on a toilet, the applicant took hold of her mouth and hit her nose, causing it to bleed [14].
2.
The applicant dragged the victim by the hair to a bedroom. He threw her on the bed, punched her to the head (causing a split in her skin) [15], forcibly removed her pants and pulled at her underwear with great force, causing pain and bleeding. The applicant then kicked the victim, insulted her, and pushed her head down [16].
3.
The applicant took hold of the complainant’s hair and shook her around before punching her in the head and headbutting her. The applicant punched the complainant again before striking her on the chin. He dragged her to a bedroom by the hair and put her on the bed, pushing her head into the bed. He told her to go to sleep [17].
The Court noted that the applicant had been sentenced in May 2016 for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x1), sexual intercourse without consent (x2), and detaining for advantage (x1).
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentencing judged had erred in applying the principles of totality.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was dismissed [44].
The Court began by observing that the principle of totality is well-established [29]. The degree of concurrency in the structure of two or more sentences depends on what would be just and appropriate with reference to the totality of the offending. The offences in question do not need to be connected [31].
At the time he was arrested for the current offending, the applicant had been on parole in relation to earlier offending. His parole was revoked with the result that between 29 November 2022 and December 2023 the applicant was simultaneously serving the balance of his parole and being held in custody with respect to the current offending [32].
The earlier sentence of 9 years with a non-parole period of 6 years commenced on 20 November 2014. The applicant had been released on parole on 24 December 2022 and was arrested for the current offences on 29 November 2022 – meaning he was on parole for 23 months and 6 days [33]. In sentencing the applicant, the sentencing judge had backdated the sentence to begin on 1 October 2023, meaning there was an overlap of about 2 months between the end of the earlier sentence (he was serving the balance of the parole period in custody given that parole had been revoked) and the start of the new sentence [35].
The Court noted that the sentencing judge had provided for a degree of notional concurrence between the indicative sentences for the current offences, and had backdated the aggregate sentence to achieve a degree of concurrency with the applicant’s balance of parole [39]. The sentencing judge had therefore applied the principles of totality both as between the individual offences the applicant was currently being sentenced for, and with respect to the earlier sentence.
The applicant had argued that, taken together, the sentences imposed totalled imprisonment for a total period of 13 years, 7 months and 11 days before parole was available. He was therefore subject to an effective non-parole period that comprised 86% of the total effective sentence. The Court pointed out that this assumed the applicant was imprisoned for the entirety of the earlier sentence, when in fact the applicant had been released on parole for approximately 23 months. Therefore, the effective non-parole period was actually only 71% of the total effective sentence [41].
Wilson J stated (Ward P concurring) ‘Victims of domestic violence and other serious violent crimes are as entitled to the protection of the courts as violent offenders are to proper consideration by the courts of their subjective cases. The latter does not obviate the former…’ [62]
Ridgeway v R [2024] NSWCCA 152 (21 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Bugmy features’ – ‘Application for extension of time’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Disadvantaged background as mitigating factor’ – ‘Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Psychologist report’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Planning or premeditation’
Proceedings: Application for (1) extension of time in which to bring an application for leave to appeal, and (2) leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x1, robbery x1, contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) x2.
Facts: The applicant had previously been in a relationship with the complainant. The complainant had ended the relationship, and obtained apprehended domestic violence orders against the applicant. On the day of the offending, the complainant had driven to the beach with a friend; both had arrived separately in their own cars. After they had parked, the applicant drove into the carpark and stopped his car behind the complainant and her friend’s cars, blocking them from leaving. The applicant and the complainant got out of their cars. The complainant told him he was breaching the apprehended domestic violence order, and asked him to leave. The complainant asked her friend to call the police. The applicant went to his car and got a hunting knife, which he used to stab the complainant in the head and twice in the upper back. The applicant then demanded the friend give him her phone and, when she refused, he wrestled it from her and drove off at speed.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant’s ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his application of the principles enunciated in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 [3].
Decision and reasoning: The application to extend the time to bring an application for leave to appeal was granted, and leave to appeal was granted. The appeal was dismissed.
On appeal, evidence was adduced to support the applicant’s application. This included correspondence from a law firm acting for the applicant in an institutional child sexual abuse claim [27], letters from the applicant expressing remorse for his offending [28], and a letter from the applicant’s general practitioner, who observed that the applicant suffered from poor mental health and had a difficult childhood [29]. In addition, the applicant relied on a psychological report prepared for the sentencing hearing, which affirmed that the applicant had had a difficult life involving childhood sexual abuse, intellectual difficulties, antisocial role modelling and polysubstance abuse [30].
The sentencing judge had, in line with the principles from Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37, considered the applicant’s deprived upbringing. The sentencing judge observed that the sentence imposed reflected this upbringing but, at the same time, upbringing “can never overcome and should never outweigh the significance of the objective seriousness of this offence” [45].
On appeal, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred by reducing the extent to which the applicant’s disadvantaged background (the “Bugmy features”) ameliorated the sentence imposed on him [48]. The Court found that the sentencing judge had not treated the Bugmy features as having lesser relevance on account of the seriousness of the offence. Instead, the sentencing judge had given appropriate weight to these features, however, the seriousness of the offence was such that the sentence imposed was still significant [62].
As a side point, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred by characterising the offence as “planned” [50]. The Court did not agree that the sentencing judge had characterised the offending as “planned”. The sentencing judge had observed that the use of a tracking device to determine the complainant’s location indicated a level of premeditation [52]. The Court found this observation to have been correct [53].
The sentence imposed has to be viewed in the light that, leaving aside the firearms offence, the other offences showed significant disregard for the victim, her physical and mental health, her integrity and the safety of her home, and then, finally, the attempt to persuade her to break the law for the benefit of the applicant. In my view, the aggregate sentence was within the range of sentences which were available, and the applicant has not established that the sentence is manifestly excessive or plainly unjust. [59]
Astill v R [2024] NSWCCA 118 (8 July 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘multiple complainants’ – ‘use of tendency evidence in respect of same complainant’ – ‘standard of proof for tendency evidence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against convictions and sentence.
Charges: The applicant was a senior correctional officer. He was charged with 51 offences involving interactions with some 13 female inmates at the correctional centre where he worked, including:
(1) 13 counts of aggravated sexual assault;
(2) 22 counts of aggravated indecent assault;
(3) three counts of aggravated act of indecency; and
(4) 13 counts of misconduct in a public office, contrary to the common law.
The applicant pleaded guilty to seven of the 13 counts of misconduct in public office and not guilty to all other counts. At trial the applicant was found guilty of 27 counts relating to nine complainants.
Facts: At trial, the Crown relied on a detailed tendency notice which identified the tendency sought to be proved by the tendency evidence as the applicant’s “tendency to act in a particular way towards female inmates at Dillwynia Correctional Centre while he was on duty as a Senior Correctional Officer ” [7].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal: that a miscarriage of justice had resulted from the absence of directions to the jury regarding the relationship evidence adduced by the Crown. The applicant argued that the jury may have impermissibly used the relationship evidence as tendency evidence. The applicant put particular emphasis on Ms Baker’s email that referred to the applicant “caving her head in” [32].
(1) A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the directions given to the jury concerning the Crown case on tendency.
(2) A miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to direct the jury that the complaint evidence could not be used or its “truth” purpose.
The third ground of appeal related to the application for leave to appeal against sentence:
(3) The aggregate sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal against convictions was refused, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed in relation to sentence.
Appeal against convictions
In relation to the first ground of appeal relied on, the Court began its consideration of this ground by observing that the criticism made by the applicant was not of the tendency directions per se but as to their completeness [23]. The applicant made three distinct complaints about the directions, namely [24]:
(1) The directions did not make plain that, insofar as the tendency evidence was (i) for the very same count or (ii) for any of the complainant’s own counts in the indictment, it could not be used as tendency evidence (i) for the very same count or (ii) for any of the complainant’s own counts in the indictment.
(2) The jury were not told that, insofar as the tendency evidence included the very same allegations in the indictment, lack of satisfaction at the tendency stage would mean a verdict of not guilty would need to be returned in relation to those count(s).
(3) The circumstances of this case warranted a direction pursuant to s 161A(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (Act) that, insofar as the Crown case on tendency relied upon the allegations in the indictment, the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of those acts before engaging in tendency reasoning.
In relation to the first complaint, the Court found that it was not necessary for the trial judge to have given a supplementary direction of the kind sought. In fact, it would have probably been wrong of the trial judge to have done so [47]. The Court opined that to have given such a direction would have unduly increased the complexity of the jury’s task, encouraged a revisiting of the underlying body of evidence supporting the alleged tendency on the occasion of the jury’s consideration of each charge, amongst other vices [47].
The Court held that the same observation could be made in relation to the second complaint under ground 1. The giving of a further direction would detract from the simple elegance of the approach mandated by Director of Public Prosecutions v Roder [2023] VSCA 262 at [17]-[18] and encourage the conflation of standards of proof [48].
In relation to the third complaint, the Court found that s161A(3) of the Act has been interpreted by the High Court in Roder as relaxing the prohibition in s 161A(1). Section 161A recognises that tendency evidence will not usually form an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning to guilt but is a form of circumstantial evidence which, generally speaking, only needs to be proved on the balance of probabilities [55]. In this case, the terms of s 161A(3) (which creates an exception to the rule that tendency evidence need only be proved on the balance of probabilities) were not engaged as there was direct evidence of the offending from each of the relevant complainants as well as documentary evidence, evidence of other correctional officers. and admissions by the applicant [56]. The tendency evidence was not “indispensable” within the meaning of Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 in the sense that failure to prove the existence of the tendency would mean there was no case to go to the jury [56].
Ground 2
Ground 2 was that a miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to direct the jury that the complaint evidence could not be used for its ‘truth’ purpose given the jury were directed that the complaint evidence could only be used in relation to the ‘credit’ purpose [65]. The Court observed that the complaint evidence was admitted as evidence that was relevant and within the exception to the hearsay rule. It was made clear at the time of its admission that it was not being tendered for the purposes of re-establishing witness credibility within s 108 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and no limitation was placed on its use [66]. As no limitation on the evidence’s use was made out, the ground of appeal failed [68].
Appeal against sentence
The sole ground of appeal relating to the applicant’s sentence was to the effect that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was “ manifestly excessive both with respect to the maximum and minimum terms ” [76]. For reference, the trial judge had imposed an aggregate sentence of 23 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years and 4 months.
The Court began its assessment by observing that the principles in relation to challenges to an aggregate sentence on the basis of manifest excessiveness are well-established. Appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result arrived at in the court below is markedly different from sentences in other cases; intervention is only warranted where the difference is such that it may be concluded that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the reasons of the sentencing judge [77]. There is no single correct sentence and judges at first instance should be afforded as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and application of principle [77]. The Court further observed that even if indicative sentences are assessed as being excessive, that does not necessarily mean that the aggregate sentence is excessive [78].
In assessing the indicative sentences, the Court observed that the multiplicity of charges spanned a wide range of victims, all of whom were extremely vulnerable given the extreme power disparity between the applicant and them [81]-[82]. The Court ultimately concluded that although the sentence was a ‘stern’ one, it was appropriately so and it was certainly not so far outside the range of sentences available that there must have been an error, nor was it unreasonable or plainly unjust [99].
Mitchell Brown v R [2024] NSWCCA 143 (5 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Crushing effect on respondent’ – ‘use of a weapon’ – ‘sustained offending’ – ‘contravention of Apprehended Domestic Violence Order’ – ‘attempt to influence witness’ – ‘lack of remorse’ – ‘high likelihood of reoffending’- ‘following, harassing, monitoring’ –‘strangulation’ -‘threats’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x2, use of offensive weapon to commit indictable offence x1, acquire pistol subject to firearms prohibition order x1, contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) x1, attempt to influence witness with intent to procure acquittal of serious indictable offence x1 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: stalk or intimidate with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm x2, possess unauthorised pistol x1).
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were in a relationship. One day, the complainant returned home from hospital [15]. When she arrived home, the applicant became agitated. The applicant locked the door of the house, and told the complainant he was going to kill her [16]. The applicant choked her; the complainant managed to push the applicant away. The applicant walked away and returned with a hunting knife. He pinned the complainant down, waved the knife, and said he was going to stab her with it [16]. The complainant freed herself and ran for the door, but the applicant caught her before she reached the door. He began hitting her head, causing her to fall and hit the lounge as she fell. He then kicked her torso [17].
Some time later, the complainant was sitting in a car with their child. The applicant told the complainant that he was going to kill her. The applicant went inside the house and returned with a knife. He walked up to the car the complainant was in and told her to come inside the house. The victim contacted the Police, and they attended the premises. These facts comprised sequence 3, which was the form 1 offence [19].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant submitted that the aggregate sentence was of such length that it would have a crushing effect upon the applicant, especially given that at the time of sentence he had already spent over 8 ½ years in custody and was only 30 years old [2]. The applicant further submitted the offending had largely occurred in short episodes, only two of which were violent. It was therefore submitted that error was to be inferred in the application of the totality principle, and that such error had resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted, appeal was dismissed [69].
The Court began by observing that sentencing judges are afforded flexibility in sentencing and appellate intervention in sentencing is only warranted where it must be concluded there was some misapplication of principle [59]. The Court went on to say that the sentence imposed had to reflect that the offences showed significant disregard for the victim, her physical and mental health, her integrity, the presence of her young child, and the safety of her home [65]-[67]. Taken together, the Court considered they showed a serious course of domestic violence in which each episode was quite sustained [65].
The findings of the sentencing judge, which were not challenged, about the high likelihood of reoffending and the lack of remorse, meant that sentencing considerations such as denunciation and community protection were entitled to significant weight [66].
Moore v R [2024] NSWCCA 115 (8 July 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Extension of time’ – ‘appeal against sentence’ – ‘unconscious complainant’ – ‘degrading sexual violence’ – ‘detention’ – ‘strangling’ –‘consent’ - ‘Bugmy features’ – ‘specific and general deterrence’ – ‘comparator cases’ – ‘previous agreement to sadomasochistic acts’
Proceedings: Application for extension of time to bring application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Two sets of charges. Charge set 1 included assault occasioning actual bodily harm x2, sexual intercourse without consent x2 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: intentionally record an intimate image without consent x 2). Charge set 2 included act with intent to influence a witness x3, aggravated detention for advantage x1, intentional choking x1 (further offence considered on a “Form 1” basis: intimidation x1).
Facts: The offending took place over a 6-month period when the applicant and the complainant were in a sexual relationship. On multiple occasions, the complainant was taken to hospital with injuries inflicted upon her by the applicant (these were included within charge set 1 – for example, the applicant slammed the complainant’s head against the wall, punched her to the head, bit her and grabbed her around the throat. In August 2021, the applicant filmed himself having sexual intercourse with the complainant whilst she was unconscious on two occasions. On both occasions, the offences were accompanied by a number of degrading acts, including slapping and spitting [10], [13].
The second charge set involved the applicant interrogating the complainant about her going to the police; physically abusing her (punching, hair pulling, slapping across the head); accusing her of lying; injecting her with methylamphetamine; and refusing to let the complainant out of the car for approximately 90 minutes. At one point, the applicant choked the complainant to the point where she could not breathe [24].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on three grounds [31]:
1.
the sentencing judge erred in failing to have regard to relevant principles applicable to offenders with mental health issues and to whom “Bugmy features” apply (see Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37), including that less weight be placed on general and specific deterrence;
2.
the sentencing judge erred in the finding of objective seriousness in relation to the sexual assault offences; and
3.
the overall term of imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Elaborating on ground 2 above, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred in assessing the applicant as having commenced sexual intercourse with the complainant without consent (the proper point in time for assessment beginning when the complainant became unconscious) [79]. The applicant further argued that the degrading nature of the acts should not increase their objective seriousness given such acts were previously consented to [81].
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
The Court expressed its findings as follows.
1.
As to ground 1 of appeal:
(a)
Where no submission was made about a causal connection between the applicant’s background, mental health and the offending, the sentencing judge was not obliged to refer to every part of the psychological report and to make separate links that had not been put to his Honour [73].
(b)
The sentencing judge had accepted that the presence of the Bugmy features reduced the applicant’s moral culpability. Notwithstanding that, having regard to the applicant’s criminal record and the violence in the current offending, the sentencing judge was entitled to give weight to general and specific deterrence [74].
2.
As to ground 2 of appeal:
(a)
The objective seriousness of sexual offences is not reduced by reason of what the parties had previously agreed to participate in [85]. In circumstances where the offending was degrading, violent and took advantage of the complainant whilst she was unconscious, the sentencing judge’s findings of objective seriousness were entirely open to his Honour [87].
3.
As to ground 3 of appeal:
(a)
Consideration of the “comparable” cases put forward by the applicant revealed that the indicative sentences for the sexual intercourse offences and the aggregate sentence were not excessive or plainly unjust. Comparisons were of limited utility given the number of offences and seriousness of the offending which revealed a serious course of domestic violence over a six-month period [95], [97], [99], [102].
R v VR [2024] NSWCCA 91 (7 June 2024) — New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ - ‘Extensive history of domestic violence’ - ‘Coercive control’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Economic and financial abuse’ - ‘jealousy’ - ‘intimate images’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: Rape x 12; inciting the commission of an act of indecency x 1.
Facts: In June 2023, the male respondent was found guilty by a jury of offences committed over 17 years against three victims, two of whom were the respondent’s ex-wives and the other an intimate partner. The offending was extremely violent, characterised by a high degree of degradation and humiliation that was partly demonstrative of the respondent’s jealousy and coercive control. [9]–[34]
Grounds of Appeal: The prosecution appeal on the sole ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. Sentence quashed. Respondent re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 14 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
Hamill J (with whom Mitchelmore JA and Wright J agreed) emphasised that prosecution appeals against inadequate sentencing ‘should be rare’ and only upheld where there is an identifiable error. [63]–[64]
For Justice Hamill, the identifiable error was the unreasonable and manifestly inadequate sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. It fell below the level of sentence necessary to or capable of reflecting the objective gravity of the ‘particularly egregious facts of the case’: [72]
The sentence fails to vindicate the dignity of the three separate victims, or to reflect the grave objective seriousness of offences spanning over a period of 17 years, or to capture the overall criminality involved [73]
In determining sentence, Hamill J noted the respondent’s lack of remorse and insight into the harm he has perpetrated. [82]
Habambo v R [2023] NSWCCA 328 (15 December 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Factual error’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Intimidation’ - Strangulation/choking’ - Property Damage’ - ‘Evidence’ - ‘Admissibility’ - ‘Objective seriousness’ - ‘History of domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Charges: 15x common assault, 15x intimidation, 1x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 1x malicious damage, 2x intentionally choke with recklessness
Facts: The male applicant was convicted for 28 counts of domestic violence offences against his former wife (the complainant). The applicant’s conduct including strangling the complainant with a plastic bag [20], slapping her across the face [29], intimidation [40] and pushing the complainant while pregnant [55] on several distinct occasions across multiple years. The applicant was sentenced to a total aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a 2 year conditional release order. [2]–[3]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds. With respect to conviction, the applicant appealed the admissibility of two forms of evidence (ie, a record of text messages and a record of WhatsApp messages). With respect to sentence, the applicant argued that the aggregate sentence was manifestly and that the sentencing judge erred in their determination of certain counts as serious offending.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal conviction refused and leave to appeal sentence granted and dismissed.
With respect to the conviction appeal, the Court (Ward P, Rothman J and Davies J) first regarded the text messages as both ‘admissible and relevant’. The messages were specifically relevant ‘to the circumstance where there was a dispute raised as to the complaint made by the complainant to the applicant’s sister, Ms Harb’. [222] These messages were not relied upon as opinion evidence, but rather to demonstrate Ms Harb’s credibility. [223] Accordingly, the admission of the text messages did not ‘cause manifest or unfair prejudice to the applicant’. [226]
Second, the Court held that the WhatsApp messages to equally be admissible. The Court dismissed the applicant’s argument that these messages were inadmissible: they formed a substantial component of the applicant’s evidence/cross-examination: ‘[I]t cannot be said that there was not a rational forensic decision open to defence counsel not to seek an earlier ruling as to the admissibility of the text messages; and complaint cannot now be made at the fact that defence counsel did not do so’. [296]
With respect to the sentencing appeal, the Court held first that the sentencing judge’s assessment of counts 3 and 11 (intimidation by strangulation/choking) as objectively high in gravity was appropriate. [322]; [324] In each instance, the applicant intimidated the complainant by effectively depriving her of oxygen, either manually (using his hands to cover her mouth and nose) or with a plastic bag. Accordingly, the behaviour ‘could be said to amount to suffocation’. [322]
Similarly, with respect to a count of common assault, the Court upheld the sentencing judge’s treatment of the conduct as falling at the ‘mid-range’ of objective seriousness:
The offence constituting count 34 was not the first time the applicant had assaulted the complainant. It was, in fact, part of the final episode of intimidation and violence inflicted upon the complainant by the applicant, following nine years of domestic violence. The fact that it occurred at the complainant’s home and in front of the children were both aggravating factors. The assault was far more serious than some of the previous assaults including the two others committed in this final episode. The assault involved the applicant jamming the complainant in the door, having just threatened to throw her off the balcony he was preventing her from leaving. The extent of the complainant’s distress from the episode including count 34 can be seen in the police BWV which was Exhibit P [334]
Lastly, the Court held that the aggregate sentence of 10 years, though ‘stern’, was not manifestly excessive:
The offending involved domestic violence over a nine year period. Two of the offences were suffocating or choking offences contrary to s 37 of the Crimes Act, 15 of the offences were intimidation offences contrary to the CDPV Act, two of which involved acts of suffocation, and a number of other offences of common assault. The applicant received a generous adjustment to the statutory ratio from 75% to 60%. The aggregate sentence is not plainly unjust [377]
Elwood v R [2023] NSWCCA 200 (17 August 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘threats to police’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment for domestic and personal violence offences, property offences and offences against police. The applicant and the female complainant (the applicant’s estranged partner) were in a ‘volatile’ relationship over six years. [4] In December 2021, the applicant contravened a prevention order, recklessly wounding the complainant with a jagged edge of a broken bottle while intoxicated. The applicant threatened the complainant’s sister, doing so in the presence of his children. The applicant subsequently threatened police that arrived at the scene. [1]; [5]–[14]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on the sole ground that the aggregate sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. [2]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed.
The Court (Adamson JA, Wright and Fagan JJ) acknowledged the ‘salient features’ of the case; notably, the ‘applicant’s past domestic violence against [the complainant]’, the ‘renewed violence of the applicant’ in the presence of children and towards both the complainant and her sister, the ‘wanton damage’ done to the complainant’s property and the violence towards the police. [19]–[24] In lieu of these features, the Court held the head sentence of 5 years was not manifestly excessive.
DS v R [2023] NSWCCA 151 (23 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘motor vehicle’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 2x use of an offensive weapon with intent to commit an assault, 1x aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, 1x attempted sexual intercourse without consent, 2x sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation (recklessly inflict actual bodily harm), 1x sexual intercourse without consent
Facts: The male applicant was found guilty of domestic violence offences, committed against his female former partner (the complainant), and sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. [4] The male applicant punched the complainant multiple times in the face, dragged her in front of a vehicle and started the engine, before dragging her to a dog kennel and having non-consensual sexual intercourse. Finally, the applicant dragged and assaulted the complainant while in the presence of children. [11]–[32]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on two grounds, both of which turn on whether a miscarriage of justice was occasioned:
1.
Miscarriage of justice — error in refusing the application to severe counts 4 and 5 (aggravated sexual intercourse and attempted sexual intercourse without consent with the family dog’s penis) from the indictment prior to the commencement of a trial;
2.
Miscarriage of justice — error in refusing the application to discharge the jury once the Crown had elected to “no bill” count 5 [5]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal against conviction granted and appeal dismissed.
With respect to ground one, Yehia Y (with whom Beech-Jones CJ and Weinstein J agree) held that the refusal of the trial judge to sever the indictment or discharge the jury was neither an error or irregularity in the trial. The conduct informing counts 4 and 5 was bestiality. The applicant submitted that the evidence relating to these counts was so ‘depravingly different’ rendering their linkage to other counts on the indictment unfair. [70]–[71] Justice Yehia dismissed this ground, holding the ‘whole of the applicant’s alleged conduct’ to be ‘unpleasant and of a violent and humiliating character’ [89]:
I am not persuaded that the applicant has demonstrated error on the part of the trial judge in refusing to sever counts 4 and 5 on the indictment. The trial judge, when considering the application for severance, observed that there is always a consideration of some prejudice in a trial where there are a number of counts in the indictment. In determining whether the applicant would be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason of the evidence constituting counts 4 and 5, her Honour identified, correctly in my view, that the other allegations on the indictment were of an extremely violent nature [88]
With respect to ground two, Yehia J accepted the force of the applicant’s submission that ‘the jury should have been discharged after count 5 was no billed and in circumstances where only some of the evidence relating to the dog was to be relied on by the Crown to prove count 4’. [110] However, the verdicts of the jury demonstrated careful and conscientious consideration of the evidence such that there was clearly no prejudice against the applicant. [121] Accordingly, Yehia J held that the applicant ‘failed to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned either as a result of the refusal to sever counts 4 and 5 and/or as a result of the refusal to discharge the jury after count 5 was no billed’. [121]
Giacometti v R [2023] NSWCCA 150 (23 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Inconsistent evidence’ – ‘Intentional choking without consent’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Paraphilic disorder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Psychiatric evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’ – ‘Wounding’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Attempted sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Intentional choking so as to render unconscious x 2; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; Reckless wounding x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years and 9 months, after entering a late plea of guilty to seven offences against his then female partner.
The sentencing judge found that the applicant’s personal history and mental health diagnoses cited in psychiatric reports were inconsistent. The sentencing judge was not satisfied of the accuracy or reliability of the history provided by the applicant and disregarded most of the applicant’s subjective circumstances [51].
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in declining to consider evidence of his subjective circumstances; and
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Hamil J (Mitchelmore JA and Davies agreeing) found error in ground 1 but dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: The court held that the sentencing judge erred in declining to consider evidence of the applicant’s subjective circumstances. The sentencing judge was correct to find the applicant’s alcohol abuse did not explain his conduct [97] and the judge was entitled to be suspect in accepting the accuracy of his history [102].
However, the sentencing judge was not justified in rejecting almost all of the applicant’s subjective circumstances. The applicant was entitled to have his relative youth, lack of prior convictions, sexual abuse, neglect, and diagnosis of a paraphilic disorder considered. These factors were largely consistent and should not have been rejected [107].
Ground 2: This ground was rejected. The court held the applicant’s course of conduct represented sexual and violent offending of an extreme and depraved kind [111]. The applicant’s childhood experiences, and mental health conditions only had a modest impact on his moral culpability [119]. The Court found that the aggregate sentence and non-parole period would have been of at least the same magnitude as the sentence imposed in the District Court [139].
R v Sharrouf [2023] NSWCCA 137 (16 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Lack of planning and mitigation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Spiritual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Sexual assault without consent x 8; aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 1; indecent assault x 1; attempted choke with intent to commit an indictable offence (intimidation) x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 2; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5; common assault x 6.
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 10 years with a non-parole period of 5 years after a judge alone trial after pleading not guilty to 40 offences and was found guilty of 24 charges. All offences were committed against his then-wife (they were “married” in an Islamic ceremony which was not officially recorded) between 2007-2008 shortly after their marriage. The victim made a statement to police in 2009 but did not proceed to make a formal statement until July 2019. Expert evidence was led of the respondent’s schizophrenia and melancholic depression. The respondent had been exposed to family violence as a child. The offending included multiple counts of penile-vaginal and penile-anal rape. The respondent demanded that the complainant behave in a manner contrary to her religious beliefs, he assaulted the complainant as punishment for “hiding” things from him or seeking advice in relation to his financially controlling behaviour, he punched the complainant to the face breaking her nose and rendering her unconscious and deliberately caused injuries to the complainant’s legs and feet such that she had difficulty walking as punishment for perceived misdeeds on her part.
The respondent conceded grounds 2 and 3 but argued that the court should exercise its residual discretion to decline to intervene.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of counts 9, 16 and 26;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing convictions with no further penalty pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (‘CSP Act’) in relation to counts 2, 10, 36 and 38; and
3.
The aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate.
Decision: Sentence quashed (Price, Wilson and Dhanji JJ), resentenced to an aggregate term of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years (Price and Wilson JJ).
Ground 1: The sentencing judge understated the objective seriousness of 9, 16 and 26 [171]. Re counts 16 and 26 (sexual assault without consent), the sentencing judge emphasised the spontaneity and lack of planning of these offences in assessing their objective seriousness. Price J (Wilson J agreeing) observed:
[167] How in these circumstances could the lack of planning reduce the objective gravity of the offending? As Adamson J (as her Honour then was) observed in Kennedy v R [2022] NSWCCA 215 at [51]:
“... it is typical of offences of domestic violence committed by persons such as the applicant that they are not “premeditated”. Thus, the lack of planning in this context is of negligible, if any significance.”
[168] This Court has observed that the short duration of a sexual assault would not ordinarily be considered as a factor which mitigates the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Daley [2010] NSWCCA 233 at [48]; Cowling v R [2015] NSWCCA 213 at [16]. In the present case, where the respondent’s sexual offending was a repetitive feature in a violent domestic relationship, the short duration of an offence could not amount to a mitigating factor.
[169] In the passage quoted at [151] above, the judge said that the offending in count 16 “was not associated with particular additional violence of the kind that characterised some of the offending.” It is unclear to which offences his Honour was referring, however, the infliction of actual bodily harm at the time of, or immediately before or after the sexual assault would have amounted to an offence of aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Re count 9, neither the spontaneity or its short duration could reduce the objective seriousness of the offence, which involved chasing the victim, punching her to the face with a closed fist, causing her to fall to the ground, unconscious with a broken nose [170].
Ground 2: In finding that the sentencing judge erred in applying s10A CSP Act to impose no conviction for counts 2, 10, 36 and 38 Price J (Wilson and Dhanji JJ agreeing) observed:
[188] I recognise that the recording of a conviction may have serious consequences for an offender. However, general sentencing principles apply to the operation of the section. Where an offence is objectively serious and general deterrence, denunciation, and the protection of the community are of importance, the scope for the use of the section must necessarily be substantially diminished. I acknowledge that current sentencing legislation does not prohibit the application of s 10A to a domestic violence offence. Nevertheless, the appropriate use of s 10A in a domestic violence offence must be rare.
In addition no reasons were given for departing from a sentence of full-time detention or a supervised order as required by s4A(2) CSP Act.
Ground 3: Price J (Wilson and Dhanji JJ agreeing) held the aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment and non-parole period of 5 years is “so manifestly inadequate that it does not reflect the totality of the criminality involved in the respondent’s offending.”
Residual discretion to decline to intervene:
In agreeing with Price J’s refusal to exercise the residual discretion, Wilson J noted:
[269] This is not a matter in which the residual discretion should be exercised. The courts must ensure that those who seek to brutally dominate a domestic partner, and violently impose a claimed gender superiority on another, are held to account. The aggregate sentence proposed by Price J is one that achieves that aim, whilst giving proper ameliorative weight to the respondent’s subjective case.
Waldron v R [2023] NSWCCA 128 (9 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accused case not glaringly improbable’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence directions’ – ‘Directions apt to reverse onus of proof’ – ‘Error in jury direction’ – ‘Female alleged perpetrator’ – ‘Intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Jury direction’ – ‘Male complainant’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Misdirection’ – ‘No rational inference direction’ – ‘No substantial miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Onus of proof’ – ‘Perpetrator misidentification’ – ‘Proper directions’ – ‘Proviso’ – ‘Re-trial’ – ‘Rebutting self-defence’ – ‘Self defence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uniform evidence law’ – ‘Use of tendency evidence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Wounding’
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The female accused was charged with wounding her male former domestic partner. At trial she claimed she acted in self-defence in wounding the complainant when he arrived at her home angry and in the company of a companion and initiated a physical altercation between them. The female accused is physically much smaller than the male complainant. Her case included evidence of the complainant’s past offending against a former female domestic partner:
[29] A tendency notice served pursuant to s 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) identified the tendencies of the complainant the applicant sought to establish:
(a)
To make threats to kill to ex-partners;
(b)
To threaten or to bash them in front of friends/family;
(c)
To call ex-partners ‘slut’ or ‘dog’ ‘cunt’; and
(d)
To threaten to or actually visit ex-partner’s homes with the intention to commit violence.
[30] The notice identified a variety of evidentiary sources that were said to be capable of establishing these tendencies. The Prosecutor objected to the evidence, but Judge English accepted that the evidence had significant probative value and was admissible.
In relation to the adduced tendency evidence, which included a statement of agreed facts (s 191 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) that the complainant had admitted and been convicted of the offences of Use carriage service to menace/harass/offend and stalk/intimidate intend fear physical or mental harm against [the victim] in relation to a former partner. The statement included text messages and telephone calls heard by police containing threats to kill and bash the victim and calling the victim a “slut” and “cunt”, and that the accused was apprehended while actually causing damage to the victim’s home.
In directing the jury, the trial judge identified the nature of the evidence and tendency the applicant sought to establish:
Part of the defence case is that the complainant has a tendency to have a particular state of mind, namely, to become angry to an extreme towards ex-partners. It is also part of the defence case that the complainant has a tendency to act on that state of mind by making threats to kill ex-partners, threatening to bash them in front of family and/or friends, calling ex-partners words such as a ‘slut’, or a ‘dog’, or a ‘cunt’, or threaten to – or actually – visit ex-partner’s homes with the intention to commit violence. [34]
The applicant submitted and the respondent conceded that parts of the following direction were erroneous:
Whether you reason in the way argued by the defence, or the Crown is entirely a matter for you. You will need to be very careful about drawing the inference asked of you by the defence, and I will direct you to consider whether there be any alternative explanations for that evidence, and I direct you that you should not draw any inference from the direct evidence unless it is a rational inference in the circumstances. Very shortly I will give you a general direction about drawing inferences when you are considering this part of the defence case. But if you find the complainant did have the tendency alleged by the defence, then you can use that fact in considering whether it is more likely than not that he acted in the way alleged by the accused on 19 July 2020. That is, that he was the aggressor on this occasion. [Emphasis added.] [36]
Grounds:
1.
Her Honour erred in directing the jury that it should not draw the inference that the complainant had a tendency to act in a particular way unless it was the only rational inference in the circumstances.
2.
Her Honour erred in directing the jury that it could take into account a tendency of the complainant to act in a particular way in considering whether it is more likely than not that he acted in the way alleged by the applicant.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
Leave to appeal granted.
2.
Appeal upheld.
3.
Quash the applicant’s conviction.
4.
Order that there be a new trial.
5.
List the matter for call-over on 8 June 2023 at the District Court sitting at Newcastle.
6.
The Court directs that, pursuant to s 59(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), that the commencement date of the aggregate sentence for H82562810 (court file 2021/00297170) imposed on the applicant at Toronto Local Court on 28 March 2022 be varied from 14 March 2024 to 14 March 2022.
Hamill J (Button and Sweeney JJ agreeing) observed:
[38] The applicant was correct to submit, and the respondent was correct to concede, that parts of that direction were erroneous. There were at least three flaws in the direction.
[39] First, the jury should not have been directed that it should be “very careful about drawing the inference asked of you by the defence”. There was nothing wrong with directing the jury that the process of drawing an inference should be a rational one, but it will rarely be appropriate for a jury to be warned that it needs to be “very careful” about drawing an inference favourable to an accused in a criminal trial. That is because the accused, except in unusual cases, bears no onus.
[40] Secondly, the direction introduced a standard of proof – “whether it is more likely than not” – that the alleged victim acted in accordance with the tendency on the day of the offence. This cast an onus on the applicant to establish that the complainant acted “in the way alleged by the accused on 19 July 2020”. The direction had the capacity to, and perhaps did, reverse the onus of proof. Other directions made it clear that the prosecution bore the onus and emphasised the high standard it was required to meet. Even considered in that context, the direction represented a significant legal error in the summing up.
And:
[43] Her Honour drew no distinction between drawing an inference of guilt against an accused person – where all other reasonable inferences must be excluded – and drawing an inference favourable to the applicant as part of her circumstantial case based on the tendency evidence.
[44] It is, by now, well established that tendency evidence is a species of circumstantial evidence and there is no requirement that it be proved to any particular standard, let alone (as these directions were want to suggest) that it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
In rejecting the respondent’s arguments that the despite the misdirection no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred, and that the applicant’s account was “glaringly improbable”, Hamill J (Button and Sweeney JJ agreeing) was not persuaded that self-defence was eliminated beyond reasonable doubt.
Lawrence v R [2023] NSWCCA 110(24 May 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Driving’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Intimidation x 1; Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 6.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male offender accosted and detained his former de facto wife, contravening a protection order which protected her. For 9 hours, the offender drove the victim at a high speed and in an erratic manner, while abusing, threatening, and assaulting her. The period of detention ended when the victim ran from the car, despite the offender’s threats that he would kill her if she escaped.
The offender was sentenced by the District Court to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years, affording a 10% discount for late pleas.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred by aggravating the offending by reason of the applicant’s criminal history;
2.
the sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending without reference to the applicant’s reduced moral culpability and mental health conditions;
3.
the sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s drug use from an early age did not amount to a mitigating factor;
4.
the sentencing judge erred in double counting the presence of the knife in Count 1, both in determining where on the scale of seriousness the offending sat and also by counting it as an aggravating factor; and
5.
the sentencing judge erred in imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Wilson J (Gleeson JA and Davies J agreeing) dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: It was held there was no error in the conclusion that the offender’s criminal history was an aggravating factor. It was a feature relevant to the overall determination, but not used to elevate the objective gravity of the offences [58].
Ground 2: The sentencing judge was correct to treat the offender’s moral culpability distinct from the objective gravity of the offences. The offender’s deprived background or mental health impairment are features that affect the weight to be given to considerations of moral blameworthiness and general deterrence [79].
Ground 3: The sentencing judge appropriately gave weight to the offender’s drug addiction as a manifestation of his deprived background. There was no need to have further regard to it [85]; Wilson J stated ‘it will be a rare case in which a drug addiction, of itself and standing alone, can be treated as a mitigating factor, no matter what age an offender was when the addiction commenced’ [85].
Ground 4: The sentencing judge did not err by double counting. Double counting is not established by the number of times a feature is mentioned, but the use of the feature [90].
Ground 5: The sentence was not excessive, if anything, it was lenient [101].
Liu v R [2023] NSWCCA 30 (24 February 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder’ – ‘Failure to properly consider the offender's advanced age in sentencing’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Principles in gulyas v western australia’ – ‘S27 crimes act 1900 (nsw)’ – ‘Severity’ – ‘Weapon’
Charge: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder.
Proceeding: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Ground: The sentencing judge had failed to apply the principle regarding advance aged in determining the sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim were married in 2014 and living with the widower of a woman the victim had cared for. The appellant had become jealous of the attention the victim gave to the widower.
The applicant attacked his wife with a meat tenderising mallet and stabbed her before cutting his own wrists and hers, leaving her with very serious injuries. At the time of the attack the appellant was 81 years and 6 months old and was 82 years and 8 months old at the time of sentencing.
The appellant pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder (s 27 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years and 3 months.
Reasoning and decision: Leave to appeal, appeal dismissed.
Campbell J (Adamson JA [1]and McNaughton J [50] agreeing) emphasised that the general principles regarding advanced aged and sentencing expressed by Steytler P in Gulyas v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263 are nuanced and not to be mechanically applied or seen as automatically leading to a lesser sentence than the objective circumstances require [40].
The appellant had no age-related mental impairment. Similarly, imprisonment would not necessarily be more arduous for him as he was found to enjoy generally good health and was not struggling with age-related frailty. The impact of advanced age on sentencing is subject to proportionality: the punishment must fit the crime.
The sentencing judge’s regard to age as a special circumstance had a real and direct effect in reducing the minimum time that the appellant was to serve. No error in the previous judgement was found, as the appellant’s advanced age had not been treated as peripheral.
Latu v R [2023] NSWCCA 19 (17 February 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘appeal against conviction’ – ‘relationship evidence’ – ‘tendency evidence’ – ‘tendency to use violence to the head region’ - 'anti-tendency directions' - 'real chance or significant risk of impermissible reasoning' - 'threats' - 'physical violence and harm'
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Charges: Murder x1 (applicant was convicted at trial).
Facts: The applicant and the deceased, Ms Baker, were living together in an intimate domestic relationship [8]. During the relationship, the applicant threatened and used violence against Ms Baker. There was an escalation in the violence in the months leading up to the offence [10], resulting in an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO). Despite this, the applicant continued to be violent towards Ms Baker [11]. He made threats to hurt her family if she tried to leave the relationship or disclosed the violence, and he severely assaulted her [12]-[13]. One night, the applicant and Ms Baker were at their apartment. A neighbour heard a man and a woman arguing in the early hours of the morning [19]. The Crown case was that sometime during the night, the applicant viciously attacked Ms Baker, inflicting multiple blunt force blows to her head. The autopsy showed the violence consisted of the applicant using his fists against her; him moving her head against a surface like a wall or flooring; and/or by him kicking and stomping on her [20]. The mechanism of death was a subdural haematoma [22].
During the trial, the Crown relied on tendency and relationship evidence.
To establish the alleged tendency, the Crown relied on evidence of the applicant being violent against Ms Baker and against Hayley Bingley, the applicant’s former partner. The tendency was that the applicant acted in a particular way in relation to women with whom he was in an intimate domestic relationship – namely, when angry, he would engage in violence towards such women by the use of physical force to the head region [24].
In terms of the relationship evidence, there was evidence of controlling behaviour by the applicant, evidence of jealousy, and evidence of violent behaviour [26]. Part of the relationship evidence sought to be tendered by the Crown was a series of emails, called the “Dial-a-Dump” emails [29]. These were mostly between the applicant and Ms Baker. One email from Ms Baker referred to her fear that the applicant was going to “cave [her] head in” [32]. The forensic pathologist’s report described Ms Baker’s injuries, including a bone that had been “caved in” [38].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal: that a miscarriage of justice had resulted from the absence of directions to the jury regarding the relationship evidence adduced by the Crown. The applicant argued that the jury may have impermissibly used the relationship evidence as tendency evidence. The applicant put particular emphasis on Ms Baker’s email that referred to the applicant “caving her head in” [32].
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The Court considered each ground of appeal as follows:
The Court began its consideration of the appeal by observing that an anti-tendency direction or warning is not required in every case where relationship evidence is led, only where there is a real chance or significant risk that the jury may reason impermissibly [64]. The fact that experienced defence counsel does not seek such a direction will be a significant factor in determining whether one was necessary [65]. The Court concluded that there was no real chance or significant risk that the jury might use the relationship evidence in an impermissible way to reason that the applicant had a tendency to have a particular state of mind and, therefore, the requisite intention to murder or inflict really serious injury on the deceased [65]. This was so for several reasons:
(1) The Crown prosecutor had clearly distinguished between the matters relied on for tendency purposes and the remainder of the relationship evidence [66].
(2) The trial judge had repeatedly given a tendency direction in relation to the eight incidents relied upon by the Crown to establish tendency [67]-[68].
(3) The Court found it was difficult to see how the relationship evidence could be employed for impermissible tendency purposes [70]. The only tendency the Court found to be evidenced by the relationship evidence was a tendency to threaten Ms Baker [71]. In response to the applicant’s submission that the impugned tendency was a state of mind (a willingness to cause grievous bodily harm), the Court cited Elomar v R; Hasan v R; Cheikho v R; Cheikho v R; Jamal v R [2014] NSWCCA 303, a case that affirmed that “proof of the state of a person’s mind is not tendency evidence” [72].
(4) At the time of the pre-trial determination concerning the relationship evidence, there was no objection to it on the basis of the danger of impermissible reasoning, nor was a direction suggested [73].
(5) When the “Dial-a-Dump” emails were tendered, there was neither an objection on the ground that they contained second-hand hearsay, nor any suggestion that an anti-tendency direction would be needed because of their content [74].
(6) No complaint was made about the terms of the Crown’s closing address [75].
(7) The judge sought directions from counsel, but no anti-tendency direction was sought [76].
The Court further observed that there are reasonable explanations for defence counsel having not sought an anti-tendency direction in this case [79]. There was no miscarriage of justice demonstrated; accordingly, leave to appeal was refused [81].
Thorp v R [2022] NSWCCA 180 (31 August 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Applicant pleaded guilty to aggravated detain and breach of apprehended domestic violence order (advo)’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Whether both charges arose from same incident’ – ‘Whether sentencing judge erred in imposing wholly consecutive sentences’
Matter: application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of:
1.
Aggravated detain for advantage contrary to s 86(2)(b) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); and
2.
Breach of an ADVO contrary to 14(1) Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)
The applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months imprisonment on the first charge; and 2 months on the second charge, to be served wholly concurrently.
The applicant had prior convictions for domestic violence and other offences.
The applicant and the victim had been in an on-off relationship for three years. At the time of the offences, the applicant was subject to an ADVO which included a requirement not to come within 200 m of the victim. The Victim and applicant were in the applicant’s car and both knew there was an electric stock prod in the car. The victim was driving while the applicant read through her phone messages. He became angry that she had texted a friend, yelled at her and threatened to break her legs so she couldn’t run away. The victim drove to the carpark of a restaurant, got out of the car, and started running away from the applicant, screaming for help. The applicant caught up to the victim and started dragging her back to the car, injuring her knees, arms and hands. An employee appeared from the restaurant, saw what was happening, and returned shortly with three other men. They yelled at the applicant who dropped the victim. One of the men helped the victim and the applicant drove out of the carpark, nearly hitting the other two men.
Grounds:
1.
[The sentencing judge] erred by doubly punishing the applicant for his breach of the [ADVO], such double punishment manifesting in:
(a)
the assessment of the objective seriousness of the detain offence including the fact that it constituted a contravention of the ADVO; and
(b)
an entirely consecutive sentence being imposed for the contravene ADVO offence.
2.
The sentence imposed for the detain offence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave granted; appeal against sentence dismissed.
Ierace J, with whom Bell CJ and Bellew J agreed, dismissed the appeal on the first ground, holding at [71]:
the sentencing judge clearly explained that the contravention of the ADVO contributed to the seriousness of the detain offence but also warranted discrete punishment for contravening the court order by an act of violence. The relatively short sentence of 2 months fixed term imprisonment is consistent with it reflecting primarily the criminality of the breach of a court order.
His Honour also dismissed the appeal on the ground of manifestly excessive sentence. While the second case cited by the applicant in support of his manifest excess argument was similar, the difference in sentence imposed (three months more in the case at hand) was ‘not so much as to reflect a misapplication of principle’ [89]. Moreover, the ‘protection of society and the safety of the victim were of particular importance’ so a ‘significant total sentence and a ratio of the overall non-parole period to the balance of term of 56 per cent was the means of achieving that result’ [90].
GS v R; DPP v GS [2022] NSWCCA 65 (1 April 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Choking, suffocation or strangulation’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Intentionally chokes’ – ‘Meaning of 'intentionally chokes'’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Residual discretion not to remit for trial’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: intentional choking x 1; assault occasionally actual bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against directed acquittal; appeal against conviction; appeal against sentence.
Facts: The DPP appealed against a directed acquittal on the charge of intentionally choking contrary to s 37(1A) Crime Act 1900 (NSW).
The defendant GS appealed against a conviction on a charge of occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act.
GS also appealed against his sentence for the above conviction. He was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months. However, he had served 29 months’ imprisonment by the time the sentence was imposed.
GS and the victim JC were in a relationship. The charges arose from GS’ conduct over 24 hours. According to JC, GS returned home at 5am, work up JC and began punching her. The punching continued in different parts of her body throughout the day. JC also threw three objects at her, causing bruising. At around 8 or 9am he armed himself with a knife which he kept with him throughout the day in case she tried to run away and threatened to cut her throat if she didn’t stop lying to him. JC said that GS jumped on her while she was on the bed, kept his hands around her neck for about one minute, after which she managed to slide her head out of his hands. This caused bruising to her neck, which was ‘really sore’ for a couple of days, but she did not specifically mention that her breathing or blood flow was affected. The next day, GS forced JC to accompany him to the fruit shop and then home again. After GS said he was going to have a shower, JC ran to the train station. GS followed her and put her in a headlock. A witness called police. GS said he did not commit any of the offences alleged and was trying to restrain JC from jumping in front of a train. JC had a mental illness. GS was found not guilty of three related charges and two ‘backup’ charges.
Decision and Reasoning:
DPP v GS:
1.
Set aside the order for the acquittal of GS on the charge of intentionally choking contrary to s 37(1A) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);
2.
Declare that “intentionally chokes” within the meaning of s 37(1A) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) means “intentionally apply pressure to the neck so as to be capable of affecting the breath or the flow of blood to or from the head”;
3.
In the exercise of the residual discretion, decline to remit GS to the District Court for a re-trial.
GS v R:
1.
Dismiss the appeal against conviction and sentence.
Payne JA, with whom Rothman and Harrison JJ agreed, declared that ‘intentionally chokes’ means ‘intentionally apply pressure to the neck so as to be capable of affecting the breath or the flow of blood to and from the head.’
His Honour reached this conclusion by undertaking statutory interpretation of s 37(1A) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). He referred to the context and structure of s 37 as a whole [49]. He said at [50]:
Section 37(1A) was designed to facilitate the prosecution of choking, suffocation and strangulation offences in the context of a “zero tolerance” approach to domestic violence. The section was expressly intended to fill a gap in the legislation for the choking, suffocation or strangulation of a victim of domestic violence where the victim was not rendered unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance. The purpose of including s37(1A) was to create an offence which responded to issues raised in the NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team report to Parliament for the period 2015-2017.
DS v R [2022] NSWCCA 55 (21 March 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Agreement to punishment’ – ‘Application to extend time to appeal’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse people’ – ‘Delay in reporting’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 21.
Proceedings: Application to extend time to appeal.
Facts: The appellant and victim were married for 17 years and had two children. The appellant was convicted of 21 charges of sexual intercourse without consent, which the appellant used to ‘punish’ the victim whom he falsely believed was having an affair [4]. The offending included ‘fellatio, fellatio with urination in the complainant’s mouth, digital/vaginal penetration, vaginal penetration with a “sex toy”, and attempted anal penetration with that toy’ [4].
The defendant sought leave to appeal on the following grounds:
1.
Unreasonable, or cannot be supported by the evidence.
2.
His Honour misdirected himself on the elements of the offences (negation of consent).
3.
Relationship evidence had no probative force on the question of consent.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed.
The trial judge found that ‘the complainant’s agreement to sexual intercourse was not freely and voluntarily given in circumstances where she was “subjecting herself to the punishment he had imposed”’. Furthermore, ‘consent was negated under s 61HA(4)(c) where the complainant had been “assaulted multiple times and was scared that this would occur again”’ [58]. In response to these findings and in support of his second ground of appeal, the appellant submitted that ‘the complainant agreed to participate in the various sexual acts to “manipulate” him so that he would stay in the relationship against his wishes’ and ‘that she participated because she was prepared to do whatever was necessary to remain in the relationship with him’ [60]. The Court affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the victim did not give free and voluntary consent and rejected the appellant’s submission on the probative value of the relationship evidence. The Court explained that ‘the complainant did not regard herself as having any choice, because of her situation and her need to protect her children, but to accept and “agree” to’ the appellant’s ‘punishments’. Furthermore, ‘the complainant’s evidence… describes her as being “scared” and the sexual activity variously as “dangerous”, “aggressive”, “unbearable”, “brutal”, “painful”, “rough”, “hurting” and “bruising”. The evidence suggests no sensible explanation for why the complainant would have freely and voluntarily subjected herself to that conduct. Finally, the sequence of events leading to the complainant jumping off the carport roof… is consistent with the sexual activity which preceded it not being consensual’ [88]-[92]. The trial judge’s findings ‘demonstrate the probative value of the evidence in relation to the issues of consent and delay in making any complaint’ and ‘do not involve or include any tendency reasoning’ [67]. Finally, the Court found that evidence of the victim’s fear, both generally and in response to threats made by the appellant, provided a ‘reasonable justification for her’ delay in reporting the offending [90].
Nguyen v R [2021] NSWCCA 118 (18 June 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Kidnapping threat’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated entry with intent to steal; Steal property in dwelling house; Intimidation; Form 1 offences attached to sequence 6 (Damage property, contravene Apprehended Violence Order); Section 166 Certificate (Dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against aggregate sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant had been in a relationship, which had ended prior to the offending. While the complainant was at the hospital giving birth to their child, the applicant entered her home, damaged her car, ransacked her room, and stole her laptop. He sent her many threatening messages via text, WhatsApp and email (threats to kill, violent sexual assault, stalking, removal of child, suicide etc), including breach of a provisional Apprehended Violence Order (AVO). He also used the complainant’s laptop to access her personal MyGov account and make two fraudulent tax returns in the complainant’s name causing payments to be made to the applicant’s own bank account. The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years 11 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper practical effect to the finding of special circumstances.
2.
The sentencing judge erred by taking into account the incorrect offence when dealing with the second offence on Form 1.
3.
The aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: It was evident from the sentencing judge’s remarks that he gave proper effect to his finding of the basis for special circumstances by varying the statutory ratio downwards to 70%.
Ground 2: It was clear that the sentencing judge nominated the incorrect offence at a point in his reasons. However, while the Crown’s submissions focused on whether the error vitiated the sentencing discretion, the true question in the circumstances here was whether the error was an inadvertent misstatement that did not affect the sentence imposed. The slip that occurred could not properly be characterised as a material error capable of vitiating the sentence imposed.
Ground 3: The aggregate sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the fact that the applicant’s criminality encompassed offences of a different nature and varying degrees of seriousness with multiple complainants. Relevant matters in relation to the sequence 6 offence (aggravated entry with intent to steal and the Form 1 offence) included at [107]:
•
The offences were committed in the context of a relationship marred by domestic violence. The applicant twice threatened to kill the applicant and had also threatened her with violent sexual assault and removal of her newborn baby.
•
It was significant that the applicant purposefully chose the complainant’s home and attended at a time he thought she would be asleep and near to her giving birth.
•
The offence was not less serious because the duration of the entry was short.
•
The objective seriousness of the sequence 6 offence was at the middle of the range, noting the persons present were inherently vulnerable and the offence was not impulsive.
•
The offences involved an abuse of trust.
•
The applicant was a young man who had a prior record including offences of domestic violence perpetrated against the same complainant, which disentitled him to leniency, pointed to an increased need for specific deterrence and contributed to a finding that his prospects of rehabilitation were poor or guarded.
•
The need for general deterrence and the protection of the community.
•
The statistics did not point to the indicative sentence for sequence 6 being manifestly excessive.
The aggregate sentence was also appropriate in light of the circumstances of the other offending including at [108]:
•
The stealing offence was assessed as “falling slightly below the middle range of objective seriousness but not by much”, due to the non-monetary value of the laptop which could be expected to contain personal information.
•
The intimidation offence was assessed as at the middle end of the range of objective gravity noting the conduct was premeditated and designed to instil further mental harm on the complainant, when the applicant was aware she had just given birth.
•
The sentencing judge found the dishonesty offences fell slightly below the middle range of offending given the multiple victims (the ATO and the complainant), and the applicant having exploited his possession of the complainant’s laptop (subject of the stealing offence) to perpetrate the fraud.
•
No challenge was made with respect to accumulation.
•
The two offences on the Form 1, particularly contravene AVO, required an increase to the penalty for the principal offence (sequence 6), to ensure personal deterrence and extract retribution.
•
The applicant showed little or no insight into the complainant’s perspective and was not genuinely remorseful.
•
The applicant represented a medium risk of re-offending.
•
The challenge to a limited adjustment to the sentencing ratio for special circumstances was rejected.
•
There was no double counting.
McFarland v R [2021] NSWCCA 79 (23 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Factors relevant to sentencing’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated take and detain a person with intent to obtain advantage (aggravation being actual bodily harm, advantage being psychological gratification) plus a Form 1 for common assault x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Driving with a high range content of alcohol in blood x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in a de facto relationship. The intoxicated applicant assaulted the victim, punching and strangling her. He forced her partially into the car and drove 2.9 km, leaving her legs dragging along the gravel. The victim’s injuries were described by sentencing judge as “horrific” and representing the most serious form of actual bodily harm. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the following factors:
•
Aggravated take and detain offence was assessed at above the mid-range of objective seriousness. The maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment is an important legislative guidepost.
•
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm offence was assessed at the mid-range of objective seriousness. It carried a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.
•
Applicant’s subjective case was not powerful, even taking account of his genuine remorse.
•
No evidence to support a finding that the applicant’s moral culpability was anything but high or that he was not an appropriate vehicle for general or specific deterrence.
•
Self-induced intoxication is not a mitigating factor.
•
Applicant’s prior conviction for domestic violence offending against his previous female domestic partner disentitled him to leniency.
•
Although the offending was unplanned, it was not fleeting. The totality of the offending involved relatively sustained violence.
•
Harm suffered by the victim was described by the sentencing judge as “horrific”.
•
It was necessary the sentence reflected specific deterrence, general deterrence, recognition of the human dignity of the victim and the community’s legitimate interest in the denunciation of alcohol fuelled domestic violence.
Cooper v R [2021] NSWCCA 65 (14 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mercy killing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Substance misuse’
Charges: Murder x 1; Form 1 offences (stalking/intimidating with intent and contravening an apprehended domestic violence order, ADVO).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant injected the deceased, his partner, with a lethal dose of heroin intending to cause her death. The sentencing judge accepted that this was a “mercy killing” at the deceased’s request. After a 25% reduction for his guilty plea, the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 13 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 10 years. There was a history of domestic violence (including an ADVO in place) and substance abuse.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The Court did not take into account the applicant’s deprived background and early introduction to substance abuse in determining his moral culpability for the offending.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no dispute that the applicant’s deprived background and early introduction to alcohol and substance abuse was a highly relevant factor in considering the applicant’s moral culpability: Bugmy v The Queen; R v Millwood. However, the sentencing judge did take these principles into account, setting out in detail the applicant’s troubled background and early association with drugs and alcohol and referring with approval to the forensic psychiatrist’s assessment of the applicant’s mental condition. These conclusions formed part of the context for a finding of the applicant’s low moral culpability ([68]-[72]).
Ground 2: Notwithstanding the tragic circumstances surrounding the killing and the applicant’s low moral culpability, it could not be said the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. It had to be remembered that: (1) This was a deliberate killing of another human being by the injection of an illegal drug; (2) It took place whilst the applicant was on conditional liberty and in direct breach of his bail conditions and the ADVO; (3) Although not a significant issue in sentencing, offences on a Form 1 needed to be taken into account; and (4) Despite the applicant’s mental illness reducing the need for the sentence to reflect denunciation and general deterrence, specific deterrence remained of importance ([82]-[86]).
Rogers v R [2021] NSWCCA 61 (9 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Defence relied upon at trial’ – ‘Extreme provocation’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant suffocated his wife during a physical altercation and attempted to commit suicide. The appellant had discovered his wife had formed a relationship with another man. There was evidence that the deceased kicked the appellant during the struggle. At trials in 2018 and 2019, the appellant relied upon the partial defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind under s 23A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The jury rejected the partial defence and convicted the appellant of murder. No application was made at trial for the partial defence of extreme provocation to be left to the jury.
Grounds of appeal/Issues: Application for leave to rely upon the ground of appeal pursuant to Rule 4 Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW).
Ground: A miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to leave the partial defence of extreme provocation under s 23 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) to the jury.
Held: Leave to rely on the ground of appeal refused; leave to appeal against conviction refused.
Issue 1: As Bathurst CJ observed in ARS v R, the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) does not exist to enable an accused who has been convicted on one set of issues to have a new trial under a new set of issues which could or should have been raised at the first trial. In any event, the appellant had not lost a real chance of a verdict of not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter, because extreme provocation was not left to the jury: ([166]-[167]).
Issue 2: Properly constructed, s 23 provides that the conduct of the deceased to which the accused person responded (s 23(2)(a)), and which caused the accused person to lose self-control (s 23(2)(c)), and which was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control (s 23(2)(d)) must be conduct which constituted a serious indictable offence (s 23(2)(b)). Omitting the words “in the position of the accused” in the 2014 amendment means s 23(2)(d) now significantly departs from the common law. “[T]he ordinary person test now contained in s 23(2)(d) assumes a calm ordinary person and that it is not relevant that the accused person was particularly sensitive to the situation or was experiencing a depressive disorder” (see [92]-[104]).
The critical and determining aspect of the appeal concerned the objective element in s 23(2)(d). It was accepted that the notional ordinary person may act in unreasonable ways but “the reaction must still be within the range of possible reactions of an ordinary person as assessed by the Court when considering the threshold question of law involved.” In the context and factual circumstances of the case, the reaction of the appellant was “not within the range of possible reactions of an ordinary person. The partial defence of extreme provocation ought not to have been left to the jury” ([141]-[163]).
Taylor v R [2020] NSWCCA 355 (20 December 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Significant probative value’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Breaking and entering into dwelling and committing serious indictable offence, namely, intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm, knowing that persons were inside x 1 (Count 4); Intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm x 1 (Count 6); Possession of an implement of housebreaking without lawful excuse x 1 (Count 8); Entering dwelling with intent to commit serious indictable offence, namely, intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm, knowing that persons were inside x 1 (Count 9).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man and the complainant woman were in an on-off relationship for about two years prior to the alleged offences. Following a trial by jury in the District Court of New South Wales, the applicant was found not guilty on Counts 1-3, but guilty on Counts 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12.
In relation to Count 9, the Crown’s case required the applicant to have gained external access to the complainant’s fourth floor apartment of a five storey building, despite there being no means for the applicant to access the balcony externally.
In relation to Counts 1-10, the Crown relied on tendency evidence, namely, a signed statement of agreed facts from 2010 used in sentencing the applicant for a charge of recklessly occasioning grievous bodily harm to his former wife on 25 October 2008. The facts concerned acts of violence and threats towards his former wife of 30 years, and their pet, during the breakdown of the relationship. The signed statement of agreed facts also included a statement that there was a history of domestic violence in the relationship.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The verdict on Count 9 was unreasonable as there was no direct evidence, or no proper inference from direct evidence, that there were persons in the premises at the time of entry, and that element of the offence was not capable of proof; and
2.
Evidence in relation to conduct committed in 2008 ought not to have been admitted as tendency evidence.
Held: Ground 1 upheld, ground 2 dismissed; applicant re-sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 14 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Ground 1: It was not reasonably open to the jury to have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had accessed the balcony externally. There was no evidence how the applicant could have gained external access.
Ground 2: The appeal on ground 2 was dismissed by majority (Beech-Jones J, with Walton J agreeing). First, the tendency evidence relied upon had “significant probative value”. The evidence strongly supported proof that the applicant possessed the alleged tendency (to be violent/threatening towards women with whom he was in/had an intimate relationship) as at the time of the alleged charges (March 2018). There was no relevant difference in this context between the violent breakdown of the 30-year relationship and the 2-year relationship (Beech-Jones J at [140]-[155], Walton J agreeing at [136]).
Further, the probative value of the tendency evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. The submission that the admission of the tendency evidence would lead to the jury having an “adverse emotional response” was rejected. The trial judge’s direction specifically warned the jury in that regard (Beech-Jones J at [156]-[157], Walton J agreeing at [136]).
Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322 (10 December 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family court matters’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Victim as perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant was the partner of Man Haron Monis (who was the perpetrator of, and died during, the Lindt Café siege in December 2014) ([6]). Prior to meeting Monis, the applicant had not been involved in any criminal conduct ([5]). It was accepted that Monis exercised a significant degree of influence/psychological persuasion and a measure of control over the applicant, fortified by a level of physical abuse, and she was prepared to act at his behest ([9], [37], [38], [39]).
Man Haron Monis planned the murder of his former wife (the victim, with whom he had two children). But he was not prepared to carry out the killing himself, planning with the applicant that instead she would carry out the murder. Part of the applicant’s motive included the desire to form a “single family unit” with Man Haron Monis and the children ([29(h)]; [69]).
The applicant stabbed the victim 18 times before dousing her with petrol and setting her alight. The applicant was convicted of the murder of the victim following a judge alone trial. She was sentenced to 44 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 33 years.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the significance of the death of Man Haron Monis to the applicant’s risk of re-offending and prospects of rehabilitation.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his application of s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which deals with the power of the court to reduce penalties for facilitating the administration of justice.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave to appeal granted, ground 1 upheld. The applicant was re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 35 years with a non-parole period of 26 years and 3 months. Grounds 2 and 3 dismissed.
Ground 1: The sentencing judge failed to take into account the death of Monis, and the removal of his ongoing influence on the applicant, as relevant factors in determining future dangerousness, the need for personal deterrence, and the prospects of rehabilitation ([68]-[72]).
Ground 2: The sentencing judge gave proper consideration to the nature of the assistance given ([99]). Section 22A did not require a two-stage approach to sentencing (as opposed to taking the matter into account as part of the “instinctive synthesis approach”), nor impose a legal requirement to quantify the extent to which the sentence was reduced ([100]-[104]). While it would provide further transparency to the sentencing process if the court specifies the penalty that would be imposed but for the assistance provided, a failure to quantify the discount does not by itself establish error ([105]).
Ground 3: The sentencing judge did not err in his conclusion that the psychological persuasion of Monis, and physical abuse, did not give rise to “a form of non-exculpatory duress such as to reduce the applicant’s moral culpability”. The sentencing judge was also correct in his finding of the objective gravity of the offence, and in concluding there was no evidence of contrition or remorse (but there was limited evidence of remorse/ rehabilitation on appeal) ([118]-[119]).
In re-sentencing, despite the relevance of the death of Monis to the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation and re-offending, the Court noted that the offence was serious and retribution/general deterrence were significant ([120]-[129]).
Bussey v R [2020] NSWCCA 280 (16 November 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Rape where parties formerly in intimate relationship’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Indecent assault x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Aggravated sexual assault without consent (deprivation of liberty) x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant man and female victim had remained in contact following the end of their relationship as they were in a music band together. The victim refused the applicant’s request to revive the relationship. The applicant strangled her until she passed out. When he then asked whether she “was going to fight him”, she said “no and reluctantly gave in to intercourse”.
The victim reported the incident to her friends and the police. The victim identified prior sexual practices between the applicant and herself, including regular consensual choking, physical restraint, being thrown onto a bed, role playing and “rough sex”. The defence case was that all sexual contact between the applicant and the victim was consensual. The applicant was found not guilty on Counts 1, 2 and 4, and guilty on one charge of aggravated sexual assault without consent (Count 3).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The verdict was unreasonable, as it was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on the other three counts.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by not having sufficient regard, or giving weight, to the historical extent and nature of the prior sexual experience between the applicant and the victim.
Held: Appeal dismissed (per Harrison J, Hoeben CJ and Bellew J agreeing).
Ground 1: In a case where there are mixed verdicts of guilty and not guilty, and the complainant’s evidence is the only evidence of an accused’s guilt, a court may (but not must) conclude the verdicts are factually inconsistent: citing MFA v The Queen, R v Markuleski, and Mackenzie v The Queen. The court held that the verdicts of not guilty on Counts 1, 2 and 4 were explicable without leading to the conclusion that the jury formed an adverse impression about the victim’s credibility. As such, the guilty verdict on Count 3, dependent on the jury’s acceptance of the victim’s credibility, was not inconsistent and unreasonable ([62]-[70]).
Grounds 2 and 3: The seriousness of the offending was not mitigated by the prior sexual relationship between the applicant and the victim. Harrison J (Hoeben CJ and Bellew J agreeing) held at [87]-[88]:
“Mr Bussey maintained that, but for his Honour’s failure to have sufficient regard to the fact that he and RM had, until only a relatively short time before the commission of the offence, been in a close and enthusiastic personal relationship, he would have concluded that Mr Bussey’s objective criminality was reduced and would have imposed a less severe sentence. In this sense, it is said that his Honour allegedly failed to have regard to a relevant consideration:
In my opinion, that submission falls foul of the principle that just because it may be possible to contemplate more serious examples of the same offence does not mean that the particular offence being considered is for that reason less serious.”
And at [95]-[97], with Hoeben CJ and Bellew J particularly noting their agreement with these remarks:
“The cases reveal a consistent and commendable emphasis upon the need to consider each offence of sexual assault upon a woman by her partner or former partner with special and particular regard to the circumstances of the case. However, there has in my view been a regrettable tendency in some cases to refer to the fact that the assault occurred within, or following the breakdown of, a relationship as something that might “mitigate” the seriousness of the particular offence. This type of language has the unfortunate potential erroneously to dilute the significance of the offence under consideration. Put simply, the objective seriousness of sexual intercourse without consent cannot be reduced because of factors such as a prior sexual history between an offender and his victim without making unjustified and impermissible assumptions about the effect upon the victim. It depreciates the notion that no means no, whatever other factors may be involved. To accept that a prior relationship can ever operate to mitigate the seriousness of the offending completely abandons that uncontroversial wisdom and reverts to the type of attitude that once saw domestic violence treated as less culpable than other assaults. It also proceeds upon the implicit and unsafe adoption of non-consensual sexual intercourse with a stranger as the default position.
I cannot accept that a statement such as “the violation of the person and the defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had previously had a longstanding sexual relationship” is now or could ever have been an acceptable, far less correct, summary of the law or that it should continue to influence this Court in the determination of cases such as the present. Violation and defilement of the victim are quintessential aspects of the offence and the victim’s familiarity with an assailant can have no bearing upon that fundamental circumstance. Indeed, such an assault, committed by a person with whom the victim may have had a formerly close and respectful relationship, is potentially more likely to exacerbate the seriousness of the offence than otherwise. I cannot accept the proposition that there can be varying degrees of violation and defilement. Such a concept appears to derive from the offensive notion that a man should in certain circumstances be entitled to raise his prior relationship with the victim as some kind of limited excuse for disregarding the absence of consent to an act of intercourse with him to which activity the victim had historically consented.”
As I have indicated, Mr Bussey’s submissions implicitly rely upon the proposition that the offence of which he was found guilty could have been more serious. The fact that one can imagine the commission of more serious offences of this type is not controversial. It does not, however, mean that the sentence imposed by his Honour for the offence committed by Mr Bussey should somehow be assessed by reference to that fact. It certainly does not mean that the objective seriousness of Count 3 is diminished or reduced because Mr Bussey and RM had previously been in a consensual sexual relationship. Once it is accepted that no means no, that should be the end of the matter.”
Yaman v R [2020] NSWCCA 239 (25 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Aggravated break and enter, commit assault occasioning actual bodily harm, breach ADVO.
Facts: The male applicant was in a domestic relationship with the female victim which ended due to ongoing domestic violence. The offender breached a protection order by calling the victim 48 times and attending the victim’s residence. As the victim unlocked her front door the applicant ‘collided’ with her, and they fell into her apartment. He put his foot on her head to hold her down screaming ‘how dare you ignore me’ and ‘who are you to tell me it’s over’ [23]. The applicant took a knife from the kitchen, pushed the victim onto a couch. The victim told the applicant ‘If you’re gunna pull a knife on me do it’ which caused him to back off and leave the premises. The victim had several small lacerations to the backs of her hands [27].
Grounds of Appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge was in error in finding that the aggravated break and enter involved ‘some significant planning’;
2.
(2A) The sentencing judge erred in finding the applicant’s criminal history was ‘aggravating on sentence’; (2B) The sentencing judge failed to give reasons as to how the applicant’s history ‘aggravated’ the sentences imposed’
3.
The sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the aggravated break and enter offence as ‘mid-range offence’
4.
The sentence imposed for the aggravated break and enter offence is manifestly excessive
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted on grounds 1,2 and 4 and refused leave to appeal on ground 3. The appeals were dismissed.
Fullerton J held there was ‘more than sufficient factual foundation’ to support a finding that the offence involved significant planning. He found the phone calls indicated the applicant’s determination to confront the victim [5].
Wilson J regarded the phone calls, the offender’s presence in the stairwell and the speed he ran to the victim as evidence that it was open to the court to find the only reasonable conclusion was that there was some planning [96].
Wilson J held that the applicant’s characterisation of the offence “significantly minimised the gravity of his crime” [117]. He found that because of the telephone calls the victim had already received, she was already in a state of fear before the confrontation. His Honour found that just because applicant did not use the knife to inflict injury, did not make the incident less serious. That the applicant waited for the victim to be home before charging at her and propelling them both through the doorway heightened the gravity of the crime [119].
Le v R [2020] NSWCCA 238 (23 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unreasonableness’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: 2x counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, with a third alternative charge that was not pressed.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction on 1 count of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm.
Facts: The female victim and male offender were in an intimate relationship for 15 months. On the relevant night, the offender and the victim had consumed cocaine. The offender hit the victim multiple times after the victim had continued talking after sex. Critically, the offender stomped or kicked the victim’s hip, which fractured her femur and required a hip replacement. The victim did not go to the hospital or report the incident immediately. About two weeks after the injury, she called the police, following an argument where the offender did not hit her but she feared that he would hit her again. Over the next few weeks, she subsequently went to hospital, discovered the seriousness of her injury and gave a recorded statement to police.
Issue: Whether appeal against conviction should be allowed on the ground that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal against conviction was granted. However, the appeal was dismissed by a majority of 2:1.
Hoeben CJ would have allowed the appeal. He considered that there were objective deficiencies in the account of the victim: [30]. She was inconsistent in her account of how she sustained the injury: [53]. This also extended to the circumstances of the injury and the nature of the fight: [45]–[47]. She told a series of lies, admittedly in relation to trivial factors like drug use or the injuries of the accused: [96]–[98]. Further, there was little evidence to support that there had been months of physical abuse prior: [102]. These inconsistencies were so significant that the jury ought to have had a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the offender: [24].
Adamson and Davies JJ, writing separately but agreeing with each other, did not consider that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable. Adamson J, providing primary reasons, accepted that the victim was at times inconsistent but noted that juries can accept parts of what witnesses say, while rejecting other parts: [202]. Recapping the evidence, Adamson J reiterated that the question is whether it was open to a reasonable jury to find that the Crown had established its case beyond reasonable doubt: [205]. In this case, the jury only needed to be satisfied that the offender had stomped or kicked the victim in the left hip and this caused her hip to fracture: [205]. Given the evidence, Adamson J did not have a doubt and, further, any such doubt would be the kind of doubt that was resolved by the jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence: [226].
Davies J, providing additional reasons, added that, even though this was primarily a single-witness case, the fact the victim sustained a fractured femur was significant objective evidence: [112]. The expert evidence suggested that a fall was an unlikely cause of an isolated injury to the hip: [117], [121]. This was so despite aspects of the victim’s evidence being unreliable: [124]. The defence case that the victim may have fabricated charges following the break up was inconsistent with the victim’s reluctance to provide statements to the police: [128]–[130]. It was open to the jury to reject the applicant’s case but it was also open to accept that the hip fracture occurred in the way that the victim said: [132]. Therefore, the appeal ground was not made out.
Ebsworth v R [2020] NSWCCA 229 (11 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘De Simoni issue’ – ‘Intent to kill’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Breaking, entering and committing a serious indictable offence in circumstances of aggravation x 1; Using an offensive weapon with intent to assault x 2; Intimidation x 5; Recklessly damaging property x 1; Contravening a DFV protection order x 5.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man and female victim were in a domestic relationship. After an argument, the applicant was told to leave the victim’s premises and did so. Later, he returned when the victim was absent and cut up most of her clothes. As a consequence of that incident, an protection order was issued. Following this the applicant committed a number of offences including threatening to kill the victim, sending abusive and threatening messages, breaking into the victim’s house and assaulting the victim, including strangling her and threatening to kill her while holding a knife. The victim was able to run from the house, but the applicant chased her with the knife, grabbed her hair and punched her repetitively in the face. In response to the victim’s cousin intervening to protect the victim, the applicant threatened to stab both the victim and her cousin. Afterwards, the applicant continued to send abusive and threatening messages to the victim, including threatening to shoot her and her family. The applicant is of Aboriginal heritage.
Grounds: (2) Whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into consideration a more serious offence contrary to the principles in De Simoni.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge considered that the applicant had a state of mind to kill or inflict serious injury upon the victim at the time of committing charge 1. As such, the applicant submits that the sentencing judge was sentencing the applicant in relation to a more serious, uncharged offence (i.e., strangulation with intent of committing murder under s 29 of the Crimes Act). The difficulty with this submission is that the strangling of the victim would have to have been done for the purpose of killing the victim to fall under s 29 of the Crimes Act.
[58] If a choking occurs, which choking does not kill the victim, the offender does not commit an offence under s 29, unless there was an intention to kill. The sentencing judge referred to threats to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm for which the choking was an act following through on those threats. But the sentencing judge did not conclude that the “following through” by choking was done with an intent to kill. It could have been done to inflict really serious injury. The requirement in s 29 of the Crimes Act to commit an act of strangling “with intent … to commit murder”, requires the offender to have an intention to kill; not one that may be to inflict really serious injury. On the other hand, if a strangulation occurs which does, in fact, cause death, then an intention to cause really serious injury is sufficient to give rise to the crime of murder.
…
[63] The prohibition based upon the principles established by the High Court in De Simoni should not be overstated. The principles disentitle a sentencing court from inflicting punishment or aggravating an offence for which a sentence is to be imposed, because conduct has occurred which otherwise would be a more serious offence.
Nothing in the circumstances of this case give rise to the principles described in De Simoni.
Romeo v R [2020] NSWCCA 221 (31 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Family law dispute’ – ‘Soliciting to murder’
Charges: Soliciting to murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant contravened a protection order protecting his former wife. The applicant arranged a third party to murder the victim before his next appearance in court, paying the third party $30,000. The third party planned to defraud the applicant and informed police of the applicant’s intention to murder his former wife. An undercover police operative posing as the person who would carry out the murder met with the applicant and was instructed to get the victim to write a letter to her son to explain the victim’s disappearance. The original sentence was 9 years and 9 months commencing on 18 November 2016 and expiring on 17 August 2026 with a non-parole period of 6 years expiring on 17 November 2022.
Grounds: (1) The sentencing judge erred in finding that the offending fell within the middle of the range of seriousness; (2) the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
(1) The assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence as falling within the middle range was open to the judge.
[88] In the present case, the offence was motivated at least partially by the applicant’s wish to have his former wife murdered before he was due to attend court on 29 November 2016 for the AVO. As this Court has emphasised, an offence of solicit to murder is seriously aggravated where the motive is to interfere with the administration of justice.
Citing Efthimiadis v R (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 9 (9 February 2016) at [85]-[86] of that decision:
[85] Personal and general deterrence are important considerations in the sentencing exercise for the reasons previously given and as the offence of soliciting a person to murder another is a heinous crime …
[86] In my mind, there is another reason that general deterrence has significance in the present case. All too often partners in a domestic relationship resort to violence. The community cannot tolerate violence in any domestic setting, but the community’s abhorrence of a crime intended to secure the custody of a young child by the murder of the mother needs to be expressed in the sentence to deter persons who might be like-minded to commit such a crime.
(2) The sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Samandi v R [2020] NSWCCA 217 (27 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Application to withdraw guilty plea’ – ‘Guilty pleas after commencement of trial’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 6; Assault x 3; Intentionally damaging property x 1; Making a false accusation knowing that persons are innocent of an alleged offence x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: When the applicant was originally committed for trial the Crown also alleged four counts of sexual intercourse without consent (also domestic violence offences). The Crown accepted a plea arrangement where the applicant pled guilty to all other counts and the Crown would not proceed further on the four counts of having sexual intercourse without consent. The applicant signed instructions agreeing to the plea deal. The trial judge set out the scale of the offending, namely that between December 2015 and February 2017, the male applicant repeatedly assaulted his female partner. The trial judge highlighted that ‘A common feature of the assaults upon the victim was the quite unnecessary use of force in response to minor matters’, as well as the applicant giving ‘false explanation[s] to the police’ to cover up his conduct [71]. The trial judge noted that domestic violence offences are ‘serious matters … worthy of exemplary sentences in the context of giving proper weight to the purposes of sentencing that reflect the need to send a message to the wider community’ [96]. The trial judge took into account mitigating factors such as the guilty plea.
Issues: (1) Whether a miscarriage of justice will occur if the applicant is not permitted to withdraw their guilty plea; … (4) Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal against conviction refused. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal against sentence dismissed.
(1) The applicant has not established that a miscarriage of justice will result from him being held to the pleas of guilty that he entered.
The Applicant’s pleas of guilty were entered freely and voluntarily, and were the subject of written instructions from the Applicant to his lawyers. There was no intimidation, improper inducement or fraud which led to the Applicant’s pleas of guilty. This was an informed decision by the Applicant to plead guilty to the charges for which sentence was passed [123].
(4) The aggregate sentence was not manifestly excessive. The Court endorsed the judgment in Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 that:
[155]: ‘[78] … current sentencing practices of ‘offences involving domestic violence’ [may] depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. It is undoubtedly the case that the criminal law, in the area of domestic violence, requires rigorous and demanding consequences for perpetrators for the purpose of protecting partners, family members and the wider community. [79] In the context of domestic violence offences, the High Court has observed that it is a longstanding obligation of the State to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’.
[156]: The applicant’s offences reflected his exercise of control and domination over the victim with these being common features of domestic violence offences [76]-[77]… Specific and general deterrence were important factors on sentence in this case together with the requirement for powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and recognition of the harm done to the victim as a result of these offences: Cherry v R [76].
[157]: It is important to keep in mind, as well, the serious public justice offence committed by the applicant contrary to s 314Crimes Act 1900 … the applicant’s s 314 offence involved the making of false allegations against police officers designed to protect the applicant himself from prosecution for domestic violence offences against his partner. The applicant caused injuries to himself which he falsely attributed to police. As his Honour [the sentencing judge] observed, the applicant did not carry through with further reports. However, this was a serious public justice offence which warranted the indicative sentence of imprisonment for two years which was itself a significant component of the aggregate sentence imposed upon the applicant.
[158]: There is a continuing and deep-seated lack of insight on the part of the applicant concerning his domestic violence offences.
AK v Regina [2020] NSWCCA 194 (5 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘People affected by mental illness’ – ‘Sexual violence’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threat to kill child’
Charges: Detained wife with the intent to obtain an advantage (psychological gratification) x 1; Detained stepchild with the intent to obtain an advantage (psychological gratification) x 1; Doing an act intending to influence a witness to withhold evidence/procure an acquittal x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 1; Common assault x 2; Intimidation/Stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant entered his wife’s home premises in contravention of a protection order, intending to intimidate her. The wife returned home with her child, PC, and was scared when she saw the appellant. She yelled to PC to open the door and the appellant told PC that if she opened the door of the room, he would kill PC. Over a number of hours, the applicant spoke with his wife about an impending court case and threatened to kill himself if she called the police. The wife told the applicant she would ‘say whatever the offender wanted her to say in court’. The applicant detained his wife locked in a bedroom for approximately two hours during which time the applicant said, ‘I’m sorry I hit you, I love you’ and then had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. The applicant told the victim he had sent his brother $3000, so that if anything happened to the offender, his brother would kill her and he re-iterated his threat that if she called the police he would commit suicide.
Ground: (1) The sentencing judge erred by failing to properly consider the mental health of the applicant.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
No error has been demonstrated. Ground 1 dismissed.
The sentencing judge made specific reference to the context of domestic violence citing the High Court in Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 at [54]-[55]:
‘the longstanding obligation of the of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’.
Reference was also made to The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, recognising the:
‘societal shift in relation to domestic violence and that current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence depart from past sentencing practices for this category offence, because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’ [15].
Aggravating factors included the actual or threatened use of violence, the presence of children, the commission of offences in the home of the victim, ‘a place where they are entitled to expect to be safe and free from this type of conduct’, and the breach of bail and a protection order [16]. The sentencing judge took into account medical reports that indicated that the offender’s mental condition may have ‘contributed to the commission of the offending in a material way’. The sentencing judge weighed up the relevant factors on the evidence before him, including:
[40] …a background of repeated, violent offending, where an AVO and bail conditions in place seem to have made no difference to this offender’s willingness to attack, detain, humiliate, terrorise and rape his partner in the presence of her children.
Samandi v DPP (NSW) [2020] NSWCCA 102 (9 June 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for bail pending appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Reasonable prospects of success’
Charges: Assault x 3; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 6; Intentionally damaging property x 1; Contravening a DFV protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail pending application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The male applicant plead guilty to offences committed against his wife and has now lodged an application for leave to appeal against convictions and sentences, contending his instructions to withdraw his pleas were not followed. The Crown case against the applicant was ‘very strong’. The applicant also contends that his lawyers failed to inform the sentencing judge about issues related to his health.
Issues: Whether special exceptional circumstances justify the grant of bail.
Decision and reasoning: Special or exceptional circumstances established. Application for bail granted subject to conditions.
The applicant has not established that he has reasonable prospects of success on his conviction appeal. However, the applicant’s contention that the consideration of additional medical evidence could result in him being resentenced is ‘reasonably arguable or … at least [has] some reasonable prospects of success’ on appeal [34]. Further, although the applicant’s submission that being in custody prevents him from properly preparing for appeal as an unrepresented litigant does not ‘qualify as special or exceptional circumstances standing alone’ [33], it can be considered as part of a combination of factors.
Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3 (6 February 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for extension of time for leave to appeal’ – ‘Controlling and obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Motor vehicle’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Visa’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder; Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
Case type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against aggregate sentence
Ground of appeal: His honour erred in the notional accumulation of indicative sentences in determining the aggregate sentence
Facts: The applicant man and female first victim met shortly after she moved from Columbia in 2011 and they married in 201. They had separated having had ‘relationship difficulties’ at the time of the offences. After a series of arguments, the first victim moved out of the marital home at his demand. A few days later, the applicant began texting her and her friend, then when asked not to text her emailed the first victim’s sister (copied to the victim) and accused the first victim of fraudulently obtaining a visa and of trying to steal money from him and his family. He also stated that he "hope[d] [the victim] were to die in a car accident and that she has to fly home the body" [20]. The first victim subsequently made several statements to police leading up to the offending "in case something happened to [her]" and that she felt vulnerable and ‘unsafe to go outside’ and she was worried about what the applicant would do "because he is very controlling" [21-2]. The Applicant was also found to have searched for the first victim online, her place of work and the phrase ‘carotid artery neck’ [26]. This search history was relied upon by the Crown to contend that the offences were premediated and that the "Applicant armed himself with a knife intending to cut the victim’s carotid artery in her neck with an intention to kill" [26].
On the day of the offence, the Applicant had waited for the first victim to arrive at work. When she arrived, he approached her, produced a knife from his pocket and "lunged at the victim’s head and neck area, stabbing her in the forehead, the left-chest area and the left arm which she had raised to protect herself" [32]. One of her colleagues approached the Applicant and told him to stop. The Applicant then stabbed the colleague in the skull, causing immediate bleeding and a bone fracture. The Applicant then ran to his vehicle and accelerated quickly towards the first victim, who had collapsed on the ground, and crushed her between the bumper bar of his vehicle and another parked vehicle before driving away.
The first victim suffered abrasions and bruising, multiple fractured ribs, fractures to the left scapula, several vertebrae and pelvis. She had stab wounds to her chest and arm and a laceration to her left forehead. She was hospitalised for two weeks, a number of days in intensive care and required surgery for several injuries. The second victim required sutures for a laceration as a result of the stab wound to the top of her head and the injury caused a mildly displaced fracture of the skull.
The Applicant admitted that he brought the knife with him "intending to cut [his] throat in front of [the victim]" but instead "completely lost it" during a police interview. He had a major depressive illness but no evidence of psychosis or hallucinations and there was expert evidence he was capable of forming and intention to kill, wound and/or do grievous bodily harm.
The applicant had no prior criminal history. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 21 years comprising a non-parole period of 14 years commencing on 19 August 2015 and expiring on 18 August 2029, with a balance of term of seven years commencing on 19 August 2029 and expiring on 18 August 2036 [4]. The sentencing Judge gave the following sentence indications:
(a)
Count 1 - the offence under s.27 Crimes Act 1900 of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder - imprisonment for 17 years and six months with a non-parole period of 12 years;
(b)
Count 3 - the offence under s.33(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm - imprisonment for 11 years and three months with a non-parole period of eight years.
The applicant lodged his Notice of Intention to Seek Leave to appeal in time on 1 May 2019 and it was extended until 1 February 2019. Notice of Application for leave to Appeal was not lodged until 30 August 2019. The Crown submitted that the extension of time should not be granted as there was not merit in the ground of appeal.
Held: The ground of appeal lacked sufficient merit to warrant and extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal against sentence [114]. Johnson J (Macfarlan JA concurring) provided that "the Applicant’s submission in support of [the] ground of appeal are based upon a misconception concerning the operation of the statutory provisions providing for aggregative sentencing in this State" [87]. "The principles of sentencing concerning accumulation and concurrency at general law, as explained in Pearce v The Queen, have no application where an aggregate sentence is used by the sentencing Court."[91] The sentencing judge was found to have correctly complied with the statutory provisions as well as to have taken a "detailed, careful and balanced approach in reaching sentence in this case" [113].
Field v R [2020] NSWCCA 105 (1 May 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence as "just below midrange" was not open to her.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in her approach to general deterrence by failing to have regard to the individual circumstances of the offence and offender.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give effect to his findings of special circumstances in relation to the overall effective sentence.
4.
The sentence is manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male victim was in a relationship with Ms Crowther (‘C’), who was also in a relationship with the appellant, an Aboriginal man. After staying at C’s house overnight, the victim sent C text messages (which were consistent with someone who was in an intimate relationship) but C did not reply so the victim waited for C at her house while consuming alcohol. The victim fell asleep on the front veranda and was awoken by the appellant opening the front door. The victim punched the appellant in the face, causing him to stagger backwards. The victim then went inside and remonstrated with C. He then felt a blow to his stomach and realised he had been stabbed, so he went to the kitchen to escape. He applied paper towel to his stomach and the appellant said, "Come out and I’ll finish ya". C left to collect her daughter from school and the appellant also subsequently left. The victim was left by himself and called 000. He underwent a number of surgical procedures over the following months.
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years. In sentencing the appellant, the judge found that the appellant was raised in an extremely violent and dysfunctional environment [18]. Furthermore, he left school in year eight, was illiterate [19], had been using drugs since he was 16 [20] and suffered from longstanding mental illnesses [21].
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal. Regarding Ground 1, the court held that the assessment of objective seriousness was open to the sentencing judge, taking into account the serious injuries and harm suffered by the victim, that the appellant used a knife capable of inflicting serious injury or worse, and that the offence was committed spontaneously as part of an excessive and disproportionate mode of self-defence [54].
The court also held that Ground 2 had not been made out. The court found that the comments made by the sentencing judge regarding general deterrence had direct application to the facts of the case and did not constitute some generalised "motherhood statement", from their context and content [74]. The sentencing judge did not downplay or ignore the appellant’s mental illness [74] because the mental illness aspect of the appellant’s claims "appear[ed] to be unrelated to his criminality generally and this offence in particular" [70].
In holding that Ground 3 had not been made out, the court stated that the "fact that the applicant was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the offences operates as an aggravating factor by virtue of its existence at the operative time and not because of its capacity to rationally affect the criminality of the offence" [86].
The court held that Ground 4 had not been made out and therefore that the sentence was not manifestly excessive because:
1.
The sentence has to be considered against a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 7 years. These are significant guidelines.
2.
The applicant received the benefit of a finding of special circumstances such that the non-parole period is 67 per cent of the total sentence.
3.
Having been found guilty by a jury after trial, the applicant was not entitled to any utilitarian discount.
4.
The offence properly fell just below the midrange of objective seriousness for the reasons advanced in relation to appeal ground 1. Although the applicant’s offence was found to involve a spontaneous act of excessive self-defence, those actions also involved a significantly disproportionate response to the perceived threat. This response involved the use of a knife which caused severe ongoing physical and emotional harm to the victim.
5.
The applicant’s criminal history disentitled him to the leniency to which a person with no criminal history may have been entitled.
6.
The applicant was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the commission of the offence.
7.
The applicant’s sentence was backdated in a manner favourable to the applicant to 18 April 2018. This backdating subsumed the entirety of his time in custody for six other unrelated offences for which he had received sentences of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 6 months.
Goodbun v R [2020] NSWCCA 77 (23 April 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of advo’ – ‘Guilty plea - history of domestic violence - lack of remorse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Whether aggregate sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust’ – ‘Whether unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances’
Charges: Murder x 1; Contravening an apprehended domestic violence order x 1; Using an unregistered firearm x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife (the victim), and to three related offences, namely, contravening an apprehended domestic violence order, using an unregistered firearm, and assault occasioning actually bodily harm. The victim was shot dead by the applicant. They had been married for 40 years and had 2 adult children. The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 41 years 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 31 years and 1 month. He was born in 1956 and, if alive, would be 91 at the time of eligibility for parole.
The sentencing judge described the murder as a "chilling and deeply shocking crime which, without hyperbole, could be described as an execution" ([46]). Her Honour stated that while the applicant did not have a lengthy criminal history for domestic violence, the incident occurred in the context of a history of significant domestic violence ([63]). It was against this background that the sentencing judge found the applicant to be motivated by hatred to kill the victim as she was instrumental in the issue of an ADVO and the bringing of associated criminal charges. She also highlighted the need for specific and general deterrence, "describing domestic violence as a profoundly serious problem in the community, extending not infrequently to the murder of a spouse or partner" ([64]). Her Honour did not make a finding of special circumstances and emphasised that the "principle consideration is to ensure that the minimum period of incarceration reflects the crime and the subjective case".
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence on two grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in determining that it was unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances because of the length of the sentence that she proposed to impose and the ordinary statutory ratio that applied;
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal Ground 1: It was submitted that the sentencing judge erred in determining that it was unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances, having regard to the applicant’s age, health, lack of experience in prison and risk of institutionalisation ([70]). All judges dismissed the first ground of appeal. Bathurst CJ held that the sentencing judge did not err in reaching her conclusion that the non-parole period was the minimum period of incarceration appropriate, as she took into account the applicant’s age, the nature of the case and the applicant’s subjective circumstances ([77]). Fullerton J added that the sentencing judge was justified in declining to make a finding of special circumstances, as she gave "extensive consideration" to matters relevant to determining the minimum period of incarceration, including, but not limited to, the objective gravity of the totality of the offending, and the lack of evidence of genuine remorse or prospects of rehabilitation ([125]). Similarly, Bellew J found that just because a sentence may have the practical effect of amounting to a sentence of life imprisonment, it does not mean that a sentencing judge has erred. The objective seriousness of an offence is a fundamental principle that should be reflected in a sentence, even where adherence to such a principle may impose a life sentence on an offender of middle to advanced age ([215]).
Appeal Ground 2: Bathurst CJ dissented on the second ground of appeal. His Honour found that the indicative sentence of 40 years and 6 months imposed after a discount for the guilty plea was extremely high. He noted that the sentence appeared to be inconsistent with legal principle in sentencing for this type of offence ([112]). Further, he found that the aggregate sentence was substantially imposed for the murder offence, and as a consequence, it was manifestly excessive and should be set aside ([114]-[115]). As this was a dissenting judgment, it was not necessary for his Honour to re-sentence the applicant ([116]).
Fullerton and Bellew JJ, on the other hand, dismissed the second ground of appeal. After taking into account the sentencing judge’s sentencing remarks and giving due weight to "the applicant’s calculated and brazen determination to kill his wife in an act of callous and unbridled revenge", Fullerton J was not satisfied that the aggregate sentence was "unreasonably or plainly unjust" ([132]-[133]). Before concluding that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable or unjust, Bellew J set out the circumstances of the offending which indicated that it was towards the very top of the range:
•
The commission of the offences in the context of domestic violence, and in the context of a breach of an ADVO, were circumstances which called for the need for specific and general deterrence, and denunciation ([261]);
•
Another important part of the background to the offending was the fact that the applicant made a number of statements prior to the offending in which he expressed an intention to kill the deceased ([262]);
•
The applicant’s planning of the murder was significant - he travelled a considerable distance to the victim’s home, and arrived in the early morning at a time when he knew that she would likely be asleep ([263]-]264]);
•
The offending was in the nature of an execution and involved gratuitous cruelty towards the victim ([265]).
•
The offending was in breach of the ADVO and the applicant’s conditions of bail ([266]).
Amante v R [2020] NSWCCA 34 (11 March 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Photographic evidence’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Destroying or damaging property x 1 (domestic violence offence).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: This is an application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by Colefax DCJ in R v Amante [2019] NSWDC 222. The applicant, whilst under the influence of ice, threatened his estranged partner and subsequently set fire to her Department of Housing unit causing significant damage, potential danger and hardship to other residents ([11]). The applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on two grounds. Firstly, he contended that the sentencing judge erred in taking "judicial notice" of the fact that the fire in the roof cavity "posed a serious structural risk to the integrity of the building". Secondly, he alleged error in the way in which the sentencing judge dealt with the applicant’s mental health issues, specifically in finding that they were "largely untreated and largely unresolved".
Held: The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.
Beech-Jones J acknowledged the sentencing judge’s remarks at [46]-[48]. The applicant had a dysfunctional upbringing, which reduced his moral culpability. Moreover, he was genuinely remorseful and his rehabilitation prospects were found to be reasonable provided that he "receive appropriate treatment". The sentencing judge also found special circumstances and varied the statutory ratio accordingly.
The first ground was a challenge to the factual finding of the sentencing judge. The applicant contended that the sentencing judge erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that the spread of the fire to the roof cavity "posed a serious structural risk to the integrity of the building". The applicant argued that he had found this fact to be an aggravating factor, and as such was required to be satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant warned of the dangers of relying on photographic evidence, and contended that it was "somewhat remarkable" that the sentencing judge purported to take judicial notice of the structural integrity of the building, whilst also noting the lack of expert evidence in relation to the fire ([52]). N Adams J (Payne JA concurring) found that Ground 1 had not been established. She treated Ground 1 as a challenge to the factual conclusion of the sentencing judge and in submissions counsel for the applicant accepted that the relevant test was whether the conclusion was open to His Honour (R v O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397) [55]. Beech-Jones J agreed the matter should be considered by reference to evidence available to support His Honour’s conclusion. Her Honour found that the sentencing judge drew an inference that was open to him based on both the agreed facts that the fire went into the roof void, as well as the photographic evidence which showed that the wooden beams in the roof were burnt ([62]). She was also not satisfied that the sentencing judge found the fact as an aggravating factor, as he had not stated anything to this effect ([64]).
In relation to the second ground, it was submitted that his Honour denied the applicant procedural fairness by finding that considerations of specific deterrence and the need to protect the community were "fully engaged" in the applicant’s case because of his "largely untreated and largely unresolved" mental health issues. The applicant submitted that his mental health issues were being treated with medication and that his major depressive disorder was in remission. Ground 2 was also not established. N Adams J (Payne JA and Beech-Jones J concurring) found that it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the applicant’s mental health issues were unresolved, given his poor history ([82]-[83]). This case is a "classic example" of how sentencing judges may be required to make "individualised discretionary decisions" based on the available material. The sentencing judge "ameliorated the sentence on the basis that no rational person would react to a break-up by setting fire to their ex partner’s house threatening the lives of other people", however, specific deterrence became a relevant consideration as the applicant’s mental health and drug issues was found to have led him to commit the offence ([85]).
Consequently, the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
Elwood v R [2019] NSWCCA 315 (20 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of jealous, obsessive and stalking behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People with intellectual disability’
Offences: Sexual intercourse without consent; Contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (‘ADVO’)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the sexual offence.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his approach to the applicant’s intellectual disability.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give effect to his findings of special circumstances in relation to the overall effective sentence.
4.
The sentence is manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim had been in a relationship for six years and lived with the applicant’s parents (as they were only 18 and 20 years old respectively). At the time of the offending, the applicant was subject to an ADVO not to assault, molest, harass, threaten or otherwise interfere with his partner. The order did not prohibit contact or cohabitation with her. The applicant and victim were having consensual intercourse when the applicant started touching the victim’s bottom without her consent. He then inserted his finger into her anus with force, causing the victim to scream so loudly that the applicant’s mother called out to them. The applicant responded by pushing the victim away from him with both fists. The victim immediately complained to the applicant’s mother and asked her to notify the police.
The applicant plead guilty and was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, after the sentencing judge took into account an offence of common assault on a Form 1.
Judgment: The court granted leave and allowed the appeal, upholding Ground 3, and resentenced the applicant to three years and two months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and eight months. The court found that the sentencing judge was satisfied that a number of circumstances, both personal to the applicant (such as his compromised level of cognitive functioning) and features of the sentencing process itself, supported a finding of special circumstances [50]. Having made such a finding, the sentencing judge was required to determine the extent or the degree to which the statutory ratio should be reduced, both in the appointment of the aggregate sentence and after accumulation in the ultimate sentencing order [54]. Where a finding of special circumstances is not based solely on the fact of accumulation (as occurred in this case), the sentencing judge is required to carry that finding into effect on accumulation or give an explanation for why it was not done [61]. The court accepted the applicant’s contention that the judge’s discretion miscarried because the sentencing judge did not indicate that he intended that the effective non-parole period would not reflect the finding of special circumstances that had been given effect to in the appointment of the aggregate sentence [55].
While the court endorsed the sentencing judge’s finding that there was an attenuation of the applicant’s moral culpability for the sexual offending by reason of his compromised level of intellectual functioning, the court also found that the applicant was, for that reason, an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [67]. Furthermore, the court accepted that the applicant had been convicted of multiple charges of assault and offences of stalk and intimidate in a domestic context, both as a juvenile and as an adult, none of which attracted a sentence of imprisonment [28].
The court rejected Ground 1, finding that the sentencing judge made the correct assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence (in the low and middle range) [40], [41]. The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that no sentencing error was committed because the sentencing judge failed to make mention of the impact of the applicant’s intellectual or cognitive functioning on the question of either general or specific deterrence [48]. Based on its finding in regards to Ground 3, the court found it unnecessary to consider Ground 4.
Ross, Christopher v R [2019] NSWCCA 314 (20 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercion’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Specific considerations’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear or physical or mental harm x 2; aggravated detain for advantage x 1; common assault x 1; influence witness x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man was sentenced with respect to 5 offences involving domestic violence against his female de facto partner (complainant), including one offence of seeking to dissuade her from giving truthful evidence. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 years’ 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years 8 months. The applicant and complainant had known each other since childhood, and their relationship commenced in 2016. At that stage, the complainant had 5 children living with her. The Department of Community Services took the children into care as both parties were using drugs. The relationship soon became dysfunctional with constant arguments and pushing and shoving by each party.
The applicant had intimidated the complainant on several occasions by making threats to kill. One incident involved the use of a syringe to intimidate, and another involved the complainant threatening to take her own life ([5]-[7]). The applicant also detained the complainant without her consent with an intention to obtain an advantage, namely psychological satisfaction, and caused actual bodily harm ([10]]-[11]). On another occasion, the applicant pushed the complainant, causing her to fell particularly frightened ([13]). Whilst the applicant was shopping, the complainant ran to a nearby police station, claiming to have been kept hostage by him and fearful for her life. He was later arrested, charged and refused bail. The police also gave an ADVO for the complainant’s protection, prohibiting the applicant from contacting her. While in custody, the applicant contacted the complainant and pressured her to give false evidence by making a statutory declaration which described her allegations as false and misleading ([17]). She did so, and the applicant was released on bail. He continued to commit further offences against the complainant. He was arrested again and charged with contravening the ADVO, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault, intentionally choking a person with recklessness, and escaping police custody ([18]-[19]).
Grounds: The aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive
Held: The application for leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence was granted; the appeal was dismissed. The Appeal Court was unable to conclude that the sentencing judge failed to apply the relevant principles such that there was an error in the sentence imposed ([42]-[45]). The sentence was not manifestly excessive ([56]).
It was submitted inter alia that the sentence did not reflect the factual findings made by the judge as to his disadvantaged background and the genesis of his drug dependency ([2]).
The sentencing judge emphasised the need for the court to provide full protection to domestic violence victims, because such conduct involves a violation of trust and the use of physical strength to control and subordinate the other party to an intimate relationship ([28]). The sentencing judge found that the offence of influencing a witness involved overtones of domestic violence in that the applicant, although in custody, continued "to exert the power, influence and control that he had established over the complainant, as a result of her dependency upon him" ([34]).
The applicant’s subjective circumstances included that: his father was murdered, he grew up in a household which involved alcohol and drug use, and violence, and he began using drugs and alcohol himself at an early age ([40]). The sentencing judge noted that although his deprived upbringing and early onset of drug and alcohol abuse served to ameliorate his level of moral culpability, he nevertheless had a substantial level of moral culpability ([41]). The Appeal Court considered cases like R v Fernando and Bugmy v The Queen, which discussed the role of alcohol abuse and alcohol-fuelled violence in Aboriginal communities. Wood J in Fernando recognised that both of these problems are endemic in some Aboriginal communities, and considered that where an offender's abuse of alcohol is a reflection of the environment in which he or she was raised, it should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. In Munda, the Court addressed the tension between accepting a reduction in moral culpability due to the offender’s disadvantaged background, and the need to provide the victim of violence with "such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide."
Wood v R [2019] NSWCCA 94 (19 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Absence of planning’ – ‘Apprehended violence order’ – ‘Gratuitous cruelty’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1; Contravention of an Apprehended Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought leave on the following grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in having regard to the applicant’s record of previous convictions as a matter that aggravated the offence;
•
The judge erred in taking into account the fact that the applicant was on conditional liberty as a factor that aggravated the offence;
•
The judge erred in failing to have regard to the lack of planning in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence;
•
The judge erred in failing to take into account the applicant’s disadvantaged background as a factor relevant to his moral culpability;
•
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s intoxication aggravated the applicant’s offending;
•
The judge erred in find that the Crown had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s offending involved gratuitous cruelty; and
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive. [5]
The applicant and the deceased had been in an ‘on again/off again relationship’ characterised by domestic violence for three years [9]. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a non-parole period of 19 years 1 month with a balance of term of 6 years and 5 months. The applicant violently killed the deceased, stabbing her with a knife, when both were intoxicated, the applicant having come home an hour earlier than the deceased. At the time of the murder he was subject to a s 20(1)(b) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) recognisance for 18 months, commencing 17 May 2017 and expiring 16 November 2018 and a s 9 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act bond for 18 months, commencing 17 May 2017 and expiring 16 November 2018.
Decision and reasoning: The application for leave to appeal was granted in respect of grounds 3 and 6, the appeal allowed substituting a sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
Regarding the third ground, the court found that the absence of planning is a ‘consideration which goes to the objective seriousness of the offending and was wrongly taken into account by the sentencing judge when considering the applicant’s subjective case’ [108]. This ground of appeal was made out.
Hoeben CJ held that the sixth ground was made out as on the evidence available to the sentencing judge it was not possible to conclude that the injuries were inflicted at a time other than of the killing.
Moore v R [2019] NSWCCA 264 (4 November 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical harm and violence -threats to kill’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm with intent x 1; Detain with intent to obtain an advantage and immediately beforehand occasion actual bodily harm x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought leave to appeal on grounds that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the counts, failed to accurately assess the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending and the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive (12 years imprisonment, non-parole period 9 years). The accused ‘ambushed his ex-partner outside her house, beating her around the head and body with an improvised metal pole. He then forced the victim into her own car, which he proceeded to drive around to [surrounding suburbs], all the while making threats to kill himself, or to kill them both’. When the victim tried to escape the applicant pulled her back into the car by her hair. The victim was trapped in the car for four hours before the applicant crashed into a telephone pole.
Grounds of appeal:
•
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the counts;
•
The judge failed to accurately assess the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending;
•
The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Held:
Ground 1: The sentencing judge did not err in his assessment of the objective seriousness of Count 1 because the seriousness of the offence was increased by factors including planning, duration, brutality, infliction of pain, lack of provocation, and that it occurred in a context of a domestic relationship. In relation to Count 2, it was found that the magistrate did not err in his assessment as the offence occurred spontaneously.
Ground 2: The court found that it was open on the evidence for the judge to approach the issues relating to the establishment of mitigating factors in the way he did.
Ground 3: ‘Given the gravity of the applicant’s offending and the findings of the judge as to objective seriousness, with full recognition of the mitigating factors that stood in the applicant’s favour’, Hulme J was of the view that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive
Majzoub v Regina [2019] NSWCCA 94 (8 May 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accumulation of sentence’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Obstruct justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: The applicant was arraigned on an indictment containing 17 counts. Counts 1 to 11 charged various offences of violence and of detaining for advantage (including common assault); while counts 12 to 15 alleged that the applicant attempted to influence the complainant not to give evidence against him.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: Norton DCJ sentenced the accused to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years. That sentence was partly accumulated upon an aggregate sentence for other offences imposed on him by Bennett DCJ. The applicant pleaded guilty to offences, such as common assault and attempting to influence the complainant not to give evidence made directly by him and through one of his sisters. He was found guilty of possession of an offensive weapon with intent, reckless wounding, two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and two counts of detaining for advantage.
The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. He sought a lesser non-parole period, and argued that there should be greater measure of concurrency in the indicative sentences ([14]). Although the application was outside the limitation period, there was no objection by the Crown that an extension of time should be granted ([6]).
Issue: Whether, in any event, the aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but would dismiss the appeal.
Personal circumstances:
The applicant was born in Lebanon, his father used to assault his mother under the influence of alcohol, he left school in year 8 and had very little employment since. He began to use drugs at the age of 14. At the time of his arrest, he was using ice on a daily basis ([11]). Notably, the applicant had an extensive criminal history, including drug offences, stalking and intimidating and contravening apprehended violence orders. The present offences were committed while he was on some kind of conditional liberty ([10]).
Non-parole period:
The Court noted that Norton DCJ needed to find special circumstances before departing from the 9 year non-parole period that was the statutory norm in accordance with section 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). It was open her Honour to decline to make a finding of special circumstances ([16]-[18]).
Accumulation/concurrence:
The Crown noted that the total of the indicative sentences for the present offences was 29 years and 10 months, so that the aggregate sentence of 12 years would demonstrate a substantial measure of concurrence. The Court held that Norton DCJ’s determination in that respect, and her decision as to the measure of the accumulation of the aggregate sentence upon the sentence imposed by Bennett DCJ, demonstrated an exercise of discretion consistent with established principle ([23]).
Manifestly excessive:
A sentence will only be manifestly excessive if it is ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’ ([25]). The Court stated that the offences constituted a pattern of domestic violence of considerable gravity, and noted the seriousness of domestic violence and the need for denunciatory and deterrent sentences. Their Honours found that Norton DCJ fairly described the applicant’s subjective case as ‘far from compelling’, and held that the aggregate sentence, including the non-parole period, were well within the legitimate bounds of the exercise of her discretion. Therefore, the sentence was not shown to be unreasonable or plainly unjust ([28]-[29]).
SC v R [2019] NSWCCA 25 (15 February 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of trust’ – ‘Children’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Nine counts, including assault occasioning actual bodily harm, sexual intercourse without consent and armed with intent to intimidate.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were married with three children. The applicant was tried by a jury on nine counts, which included various sex offences and assaults. The complainant alleged that the applicant had punched her in the face and mouth, forcibly held her down and raped her, forced anal intercourse on two instances, pushed her head against a laundry wall, threw her out of a door, and grabbed a knife and threatened physical harm. The jury found the applicant guilty on Counts 6, 7 and 8 and not guilty on Counts 1-5 and 9. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months ([92]).
Issues: The appellant sought leave to appeal against the conviction on the grounds that (1) there was a miscarriage of justice as the trial judge failed to discharge the jury following the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence (ground 1); and (2) the verdict in respect of Count 6 was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on Counts 1-5 and 9, and could not otherwise be supported by the evidence at trial (ground 2). The appellant further sought leave to appeal against the sentence on the grounds that (1) there was an error by the sentencing judge in the assessment of the gravity of Count 6 (ground 3); and (2) the indicative sentences for Counts 6, 7 and 8 were excessive and that the level of accumulation was too great (ground 4).
Decision and reasoning: The Court granted leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence. Ground 1 related to an application to discharge the jury on the basis that the jury may have heard the word ‘pistol’. The trial judge refused to discharge the jury and directed them at [78]. The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to assume that the jury understood and complied with his direction. Their Honours were not satisfied that there was any miscarriage of justice ([85]). As to ground 2, the Court held that there was no inconsistency between the jury’s verdicts of not guilty and guilty ([69]). With respect to ground 3, their Honours held that the sentencing judge did not err in finding the offending in Count 6 to be ‘above the mid-range’, and that the indicative sentence for Count 6 was not excessive ([109]). In order to establish ground 4, the applicant was required to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust ([111]). The Court did not regard any of the indicative sentences as excessive, having regard to the sentencing judge’s findings and assessment of their seriousness. All three counts involved a grave breach of trust and were aggravated by having occurred in the complainant’s home. Count 7 was further aggravated by having been committed in the presence of their eldest child ([112]).
Viavattene v R [2018] NSWCCA 197 (5 September 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Bail’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm x 9; Knowingly contravene an apprehended violence order x 1; Using a carriage service in a manner that was menacing, harassing or offensive x 4.
Appeal type: An application pursuant to s 49 of the Bail Act 2013 NSW for release on bail pending the hearing of an appeal to the District Court against convictions recorded in, and sentences imposed by, the Local Court.
Facts: The applicant applied for release on bail pending the hearing of an appeal to the District Court against convictions recorded in, and sentences imposed by, the Local Court. The applicant was charged with nine offences of stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm, one charge of knowingly contravening an apprehended violence order and four charges of using a carriage service in a manner that was menacing, harassing or offensive.
Issues: Whether bail should be ordered.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was refused as the Court was not satisfied that cause was established by the applicant. At the time of sentencing, the applicant was 49 years old. He also had health difficulties and family responsibilities. However, the Court noted that the evidence led by the prosecution, his prior criminal record and the Presiding Magistrate’s comments suggested that he was a substantial menace to the community. Evidence of the difficulties that the applicant was experiencing in custody was inadequate ([27]). His Honour nevertheless accepted that the applicant’s family was experiencing hardship as a result of his absence, and that he was experiencing some problems in custody. To the extent that the matters relevant to unacceptable risks can inform whether a show cause was established, the Court noted that there was not any proper bail proposal put forward to the Court which would alleviate the risks to the various persons who experienced the applicant’s behaviour in previous years.
Suksa-Ngacharoen v Regina [2018] NSWCCA 142 (10 August 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Concurrent sentences’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm by the explosion of a substance x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim were in a relationship. In 2013, the applicant was charged with common assault and an apprehended domestic violence order (‘ADVO’) was imposed upon him. In 2014, the applicant doused the victim with methylated spirits and set her alight.
District Judge Syme imposed a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years and 3 months. The applicant was also sentenced to: 18 months’ imprisonment for the charge of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order; seven months’ imprisonment for breach of bond in relation to the charge of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order; and three months’ imprisonment for breach of bond in relation to the charge of common assault.
Issues: Appeal against sentence on 7 grounds.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Leeming JA and Bellew J agreed with Wilson J’s reasoning with respect to grounds 1-6. However, their Honours held that ground 7 (the sentence was manifestly excessive) was established. The applicant had participated in courses, had expressed remorse, had not used drugs in custody, had no other criminal records, and experienced language and cultural difficulties in custody owing to his Thai heritage. Whilst these factors did not detract from the objective seriousness of the offending, they suggested that there was an unarticulated error of principle on the part of the sentencing judge. Their Honours quashed the sentence and imposed a total sentence of 17 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years.
Wilson J held that the appeal should be dismissed. Her Honour dismissed ground 4 (failure to properly assess the applicant’s evidence of remorse) on the basis that the applicant had not made reparation and blamed his drug use for the commission of the crime. Accordingly, Wilson J considered that the applicant’s expression of remorse was no more than ‘the often ritual incantation’, easily uttered, whether sincerely or otherwise ([116]).
Her Honour dismissed ground 6 (error by partly accumulating the sentence for the substantive offence on the related offence of contravene ADVO) on the basis that offences committed in breach of an ADVO and the offence of breaching an ADVO, involved separate and distinct criminality which warranted the imposition of distinct sentences for each offence ([131]). Wilson J said at [132]:
‘The criminality of breaching an ADVO rests in the complete disregard for an order of a court, conduct which has the practical effect of undermining the authority of the courts, and preventing the courts from extending effective protection to persons at risk of harm from another. The legislative intent of the scheme for apprehended domestic violence orders is to permit a court to restrain the conduct of an individual who poses a risk to a person with whom he or she is or was in a domestic relationship… Conduct which involves deliberate disobedience of a court order must be treated as serious, and should ordinarily be separately punished from any offence that occurs at the same time, always having regard to the requirements of the totality principle as set out in Pearce v The Queen (1989) 194 CLR 610.’
Her Honour disagreed with the majority with respect to appeal ground 7. The applicant's crime was extremely serious, and the consequences for the victim were devastating and long-term. The gravity of the crime warranted a stern sentence representing condign punishment. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive ([145]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Al-Zuhairi [2018] NSWCCA 151 (27 July 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victims and witnesses’ – ‘Victim experiences of court processes’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1
Appeal type: Appeal on the case stated; Appeal against acquittal
Facts: The respondent was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for assaulting the brother of his ex-partner (the complainant). The complainant’s evidence-in-chief was a recorded statement pursuant to s 289F(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (NSW). The recording was not tendered in evidence. The transcript did not set out the content of the recorded statement.
On appeal, Colefax SC DCJ held that the recorded statement was required to be tendered as an exhibit. He set aside the respondent’s conviction.
Issues: Whether, in a proceeding for a ‘domestic violence offence’, a recorded statement by a complainant must be formally tendered in the Local Court for the contents of the recorded statement to be put into evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court of Appeal (Payne JA, Hulme and Fagan JJ) quashed the orders made by the District Court, and remitted the matter to the District Court for re-hearing. The Court held that the playing of the recording in the Local Court was sufficient to render it evidence for the purpose of an appeal to the District Court.
The significance of the decision is that recorded statements given by complainants in domestic violence offences can be accepted as evidence as if the contents were given by the complainant in person, notwithstanding that the contents were not recorded on the Local Court transcript or admitted formally as an exhibit.
R v Patsan [2018] NSWCCA 129 (29 June 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Dynamics of domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Recklessly causing grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought an extension of time for leave to appeal against a sentence of 2 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 4 months, for recklessly causing grievous bodily harm to which he pleaded guilty. A further charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was taken into account in the sentence.
Issue: The applicant sought to appeal against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court was not persuaded that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust, and consequently, refused leave to appeal against the sentence ([47]-[48]). Importantly, the Court acknowledged the special dynamics of domestic violence. Their Honours rejected the applicant’s submission that the sentencing judge used him as a scapegoat for the prevalence of domestic violence offences. ‘While every sentence imposed must have regard to all the circumstances particular to the specific case, individualised justice does not require sentencing judges to ignore patterns of behaviour which are repeated all too frequently before them’. In most cases, the conduct will involve an attack by a male who is in a position to inflict considerable harm to his victim because of his superior physical strength, and where there is no real prospect of spontaneous physical retaliation because of the disparity between their respective strengths ([39]-[40]).
Glynn Kaderavek v R [2018] NSWCCA 92 (11 May 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault x 1; Recklessly causing grievous bodily harm x 1; Perverting the course of justice x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant lived together and had two children. The assault charge occurred when the applicant choked the victim and chased her around the backyard with a wooden stick. The grievous bodily harm charge occurred when the applicant punched the victim, breaking her jaw. The offender then smashed walls with a tow bar and broke belongings in the house. The offender gave a false statement to police alleging that there was a home invasion ([8]).
The chronology of sentencing was ‘unusual’ ([7]). The present offences were committed in August 2013, but the complainant did not report them to the police until July 2014 because of emotional abuse from the applicant ([8]). In March 2014, the applicant committed further offences against the complainant and was sentenced for those offences. At the time of sentencing for the present offences, the applicant was still in custody for the March 2014 offences ([7]). The judge made a finding of special circumstances to recognise the applicant’s mental health issues. The sentencing judge stated that he would reduce the non-parole period so that the offender could be appropriately supervised when released into the community ([27]).
The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years. The sentence was ordered to commence on 7 July 2015 ([5]), the date of expiry of the total sentence (non-parole period and the balance of the term) for the March 2014 offences ([7]).
Issues: The applicant argued that the sentencing judge erred in wholly accumulating the sentence on earlier sentences because the judge failed to take into account:
•
a period of pre-sentence custody;
•
the effect of the earlier sentences on the total ratio between the non-parole period and total sentence; and
•
the principle of totality ([6]).
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground was upheld because Hamill J (Beazley P and Schmidt J agreeing) found that the sentence should have commenced on 7 April 2015, the expiry date of the non-parole period for the March 2014 offences. Hamill J dismissed the second and third grounds of appeal because there was no error in wholly accumulating the sentences or the judge’s application of the principle of totality ([23]-[24]).
Hamill J held that the total impact of the sentence negated the judge’s finding of special circumstances. This was because the when the entire period of imprisonment was taken into account, there was no decrease in the non-parole period ([28]).
Hamill J considered that he needed to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, in accordance with Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37 ([30]). Hamill J imposed the same head sentence. His Honour commenced the sentence on 7 April 2015 and reduced the non-parole period to 4 years and 6 months to reflect the finding of special circumstances ([31]).
Ussher-Clarke v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 61 (13 April 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Impact on consent and disclosure’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Recklessly cause grievous bodily harm x 1; Intending to procure a witness to give false evidence x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant kicked his partner, the complainant, in the abdomen. The complainant was 12 weeks pregnant, and she miscarried the following morning ([10]). There were conflicting opinions given by experts as to the likelihood that the kick could have caused the miscarriage (see [17]-[44]).
The complainant gave statements to the police immediately after the incident indicating that the appellant had kicked her. In the weeks after the incident, the appellant made a number of phone calls to the complainant to encourage her to lie to the police. In a subsequent statement and in her evidence at trial, the complainant claimed that the appellant had not assaulted her ([8]).
The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge in relation to influencing a witness. The applicant was convicted of the recklessly cause grievous bodily harm charge and was sentenced to a head sentence of 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years.
Issues: Whether the conviction was unreasonable and unable to be supported by the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The Court discussed the principles governing granting leave to appeal against conviction ([59]-[60]). The Court noted that the Crown had to prove that the kick was a significant cause of the miscarriage, not that that it was the sole cause ([60]-[61]). The Court concluded that it was open to the jury to accept the experts’ evidence, while conflicting, as supporting the conclusion that the kick caused the miscarriage ([89]).
Diaz v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 33 (14 March 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated kidnapping’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Destroying or damaging property x 4; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and victim had been in a relationship for approximately 5 months. The assault and destroying property charges were in relation to arguments where the applicant pulled out some of the victim’s hair, and smashed her phone, a vase and a television set ([13]-[15]). The aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent charges occurred when the applicant pinned the victim onto a bed ([17]). He digitally penetrated her, became angry about the contents of her Facebook and text messages ([18]) and punched her approximately 20 to 30 times ([19]-[20]). This continued for about 5 hours ([21]). The applicant had a ‘disturbing’ criminal history including two similar domestic violence offences where the applicant detained the victim in her apartment ([28]-[31]). The applicant was on parole for those sentences at the time of this offence ([33]).
The applicant was sentenced to a head sentence of 7 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months ([10]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Acting Justice Hidden at [47] endorsed the trial judge’s characterisation of the manner in which the applicant detained the victim “by instilling fear and control over her… by his conduct, demeanour, words and assault” (at [39]).
It was significant that the offences were committed while the applicant was on parole. The domestic violence context of these offences was also important, with Hidden AJ quoting from Johnson J’s judgement in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 at [86]:
In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important.
Justice Garling added: ‘[in] R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, Wood CJ at CL (with whom Studdert and Bell JJ agreed) said at [41] of violent attacks in domestic settings this:
Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically or otherwise to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth, such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.
Armstrong v R [2017] NSWCCA 323 (15 December 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Conviction’ – ‘Exposing children to violence’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Assault x 1; Sexual assault x 2; Aggravated sexual assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence in relation to the two counts of aggravated sexual assault.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship. In the presence of the complainant’s son, the appellant punched and bit the complainant, held her down while she was screaming and pushed his fingers into her vagina and anus ([15]).
The prosecution sought to adduce tendency evidence ([8]). CCTV footage showed the appellant dragging the complainant by her hair ([13]). The Crown relied upon the CCTV evidence to argue that the appellant had a tendency to be violent towards the complainant ([8]). The tendency evidence was admitted, and the appellant was found guilty of the two counts of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to a head sentence of 8 years and 9 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the tendency evidence) should have been admitted; and whether the sentencing judge erred in determining the objective seriousness of the offences by not taking into account the fact that they were not committed for sexual gratification.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal against sentence was refused. In relation to the appeal against conviction, the Court (Meagher JA, Rothman and Button JJ) stated that tendency evidence need not directly establish the elements of an offence charged, but should make one or more of the facts in issue significantly more likely ([20]). The Court at [19] quoted the majority of the High Court in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017) at [40]:
The test posed by s 97(1)(b) [of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)] is as stated in Ford [(2009) 201 A Crim R 451 at [125]]: ‘the disputed evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the offence charged’. The only qualification to this is that it is not necessary that the disputed evidence has this effect by itself. It is sufficient if the disputed evidence together with other evidence makes significantly more likely any facts making up the elements of the offence charged. [emphasis in original]
Since the appellant’s case was that he was acting in self-defence, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the CCTV footage. The footage was sufficiently probative of the appellant’s propensity to act violently towards the complainant ([21]).
In relation to the appeal against sentence, the Court held that the trial judge did not err, Meagher JA stated that: ‘there is nothing to commend the proposition that engaging in sexual intercourse without consent to gratify oneself is in any sense more objectionable than doing so to humiliate and physically dominate another’ ([35]). Thus, the trial judge did not err in measuring the objective seriousness of the offence.
R v Evans [2017] NSWCCA 281 (21 November 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating circumstances: breach of bail and protection order’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Fair hearing’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Power and control’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Text messages’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Indecent assault x 1; Common assault x 2; intentionally destroy property x 1; Contravene apprehended domestic violence order x 1; Do act with intent to influence witness x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a relationship and had three children ([10]). The common assault charges occurred when the applicant grabbed the complainant’s throat and forced her against the wall, onto the bed and onto the ground ([11]-[14], [22]-[24]). The indecent assault charge occurred when the applicant forced her onto the bed and placed his fingers in her vagina ([15]-[18]). The ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge occurred when the applicant asked the complainant over text message to drop the charges on at least 16 occasions ([33]). For example, one of the text messages said, ‘you will be left with the kids full time with no break so I couldn’t handily [sic] going away so that’s why I want you to drop the charges’ ([33]).
After a plea of guilty, the applicant received a head sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months ([3]). For the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, the applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 2 months’ imprisonment ([4]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Adamson J, with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Davies J agreed, held that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, Adamson J at [38] quoted the sentencing judge:
[the charge] reveals a course of conduct that I regard as being particularly serious. It was repetitive and was clearly designed to emotionally manipulate and blackmail the complainant to discontinue the charges against him. It was also conduct that was in breach of his bail conditions as well as another court order, namely an interim ADVO. These are aggravating features.
Adamson J similarly commented at [46] on the importance of the charge (s 323(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) in the context of domestic violence offences:
It is within the common experience of courts that many charges of domestic violence cannot be prosecuted because the defendant manages to persuade the complainant, including by threatening violence, not to give evidence against him. Conduct of this nature against complainants is inimical to the interests of justice and the administration of justice. The perpetrators of domestic violence may, by committing offences under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, effectively immunise themselves from prosecution.
However, his Honour considered that the text messages were not as serious compared to other possible offences under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, such as bribing a witness or threatening violence (see [48]-[51]). Therefore, the sentence of 3 years and 2 months was manifestly excessive, and led to the head sentence being manifestly excessive ([51]).
The applicant was re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years ([61]). On the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, the applicant was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment (after applying the 20% reduction for his plea of guilty) ([59]).
DPP v Darcy-Shillingsworth [2017] NSWCCA 224 (13 September 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggregate sentence’ – ‘Community interest’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Suspending an aggregate sentence’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Reckless wounding x 1; kidnapping x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; reckless grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was sentenced to 150 hours of community service for reckless wounding, and an aggregate sentence of 21 months imprisonment, which was suspended upon the offender entering into an 18 month good behaviour bond for assault occasioning actual bodily harm and recklessly causing grievous bodily harm. The assaults were committed against the respondent’s partner, with whom he had 3 children, and her father. The respondent, his partner and their children lived in a small town with a largely Aboriginal population.
The respondent struck his partner, causing her to fall to the ground (Count 1). Later that evening, he drove her around the neighbourhood doing burnouts in his vehicle (Count 2). The respondent also hit her in the face while she was still in the car, pulled her from the car and hit her again, knocking her to the ground (Count 3). He also punched his partner’s father a few times (Count 4).
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether to allow the appeal against the sentences.
Held: The Court held that the sentences imposed did not adequately reflect the community interest in general deterrence ([85]). Their Honours allowed the appeal against the sentences, and resentenced the respondent to an aggregate sentence comprising a non-parole period of 15 months, with a balance of term of 15 months, giving a sentence of 2 years and 6 months.
General deterrence is a matter of some importance in cases of domestic violence ([82]-[85]). Citing The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, the Court noted that ‘…current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. This statement has been understood by the Court as reflecting the current response of the criminal law in relation to domestic violence as requiring ‘rigorous and demanding consequences for perpetrators for the purpose of protecting partners, family members and the wider community’ ([83]-[84], see also Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 at [78]).
Further, it did not appear on the evidence that the respondent expressed any remorse in relation to his attack on his de facto partner. In the absence of any finding of remorse or significant insight into the behaviour which led to the offending, specific deterrence should have been a key sentencing consideration ([82]). The violence to his partner occurred in a remote community which was not close to any police presence. Importantly, Count 3 took place in the presence of his partner’s father, who tried to stop the attack. The Court held that her father did not escalate the violence or take the law into his own hands. He simply warned that he was calling the police. This act ought to have caused the respondent to come to his senses and cease the violent behaviour, but instead he started to attack the victim’s father, causing grievous bodily harm. Therefore, in light of the statutory purposes of sentencing and the role of criminal law in redressing violence of this nature, the Court held that offences of such gravity cannot be dealt with as leniently as was done in this case ([107]-[108]).
Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 (28 June 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Escalation of violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 3; Assault x 4; Breaking and entering x 1; Contravening domestic violence order x 4.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a relationship since 2013 ([12]). The applicant committed a series of assaults, including striking the complainant with his hands ([16]) and car keys ([13]), touching her with a hot pipe used to smoke ice ([27]), and choking her, once until she was nearly unconscious ([14], [20], [25]). The applicant also entered the home of the complainant’s friend, assaulted her and stole her mobile phone ([34]). The applicant pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years ([6]).
Issues: The applicant appealed on three grounds: first, that the judge erred in finding that the offending was in the mid-range of objective seriousness; second, that the sentence accorded insufficient weight to the prospects of rehabilitation; and third, that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([9]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Justice Johnson briefly dismissed the first and second grounds of appeal ([60, [68]). On the third ground, His Honour discussed the importance of general and specific deterrence and denunciation in domestic violence cases (see [74]-[80]).
His Honour observed: “It is correct to characterise the Applicant’s course of conduct towards NR as one involving escalating violence. His act of choking NR in Count 4 had the potential for very grave consequences. Although not applicable to the Applicant in this case, it is noteworthy that in the second reading speech in support of the Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Act 2014, which amended s.37 Crimes Act 1900, the Attorney General, Mr Hazzard, observed that strangulation “is prevalent in domestic violence incidents” (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014)” [75].
He further noted: “In the context of domestic violence offences, the High Court has observed that it is a longstanding obligation of the State to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence: Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at 620 [54].” [79]
The applicant’s regular use of the drug Ice was a relevant factor but not a of itself a mitigating circumstance.[81]
This case concerned repeated offences of escalating violence, in breach of a domestic violence order ([80]). Having regard to these considerations, the sentence was not manifestly excessive ([83]).
Xue v R [2017] NSWCCA 137 (21 June 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Cultural considerations’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Starting point’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to one count of wound with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. The applicant received a discount of 25% for his guilty plea.
The applicant and victim were husband and wife and had been married for 30 years. The witnesses to the incident were the applicant’s son and daughter-in-law. There had been some history of domestic violence. The applicant started accusing the victim of having an affair, and began to violently threaten and assault her with a knife. Their son intervened and drove his mother to the hospital where she was admitted for her injuries. The applicant said that he had argued with his wife and had accused her of having an affair. He also said that it was very shameful for a man if his wife had an affair in Chinese culture.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The applicant submitted that allowing for the 25% discount for an early plea of guilty, the starting point for the sentence must have been 8 years, which in the circumstances was excessive. The applicant also argued that the 4 year non-parole period was above the majority of sentences imposed for this offence.
Held: The appeal against sentence was refused. The applicant’s circumstances at the time of the offending and his genuine belief that the victim may have been having an affair could not justify or ameliorate the seriousness of the offending. The catalyst of domestic violence is often a genuine, albeit irrational, belief of being wronged in some way by the victim. A resort to violence in such circumstances is unjustifiable, even if the offender’s belief is correct. The court regarded the sentencing judge’s remarks about the courts’ and the community’s concern at the level of domestic violence in the community as ‘timely and appropriate’ ([53]).
Further, the Court found that the notional starting point was not manifestly excessive as no evidence was put before the Court to establish that such a starting point was excessive in the circumstances. In considering whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, approaching the case from a hypothetical starting point diverts attention from the question as to whether the sentence actually imposed was unreasonable ([50]). However, where there is no dispute over whether the discount was excessive, justice demands that the focus be on the starting point ([4], see also TYN v R [2009] NSWCCA 146 [33]-[34]).
Hurst v R [2017] NSWCCA 114 (31 May 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Delay’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual violence’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Assault x 2; aggravated detain for advantage x 1; incite another to commit an act of indecency x 1; maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit the indictable offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 1; assault occasioning bodily harm x 1;
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to 9 offences, relating to physical and sexual violence against his then girlfriend (the complainant), with whom he commenced an intimate domestic relationship in 2005. The sentencing judge imposed a total effective sentence of 18 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years. His Honour had regard to the delay in prosecution and noted that the delay was largely due to the complainant’s decision not to proceed against the applicant at the time that the offences occurred.
Issue: The applicant appealed against the sentence on various grounds, including that the sentencing judge erred by failing to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of aggravated detention for advantage (Ground 1), and that he did not take into account the delay in prosecution and the prejudice suffered by the applicant on sentence (Ground 3).
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal against the sentence, but dismissed the appeal.
Objective seriousness:
The Court was not satisfied that Ground 1 was established on the evidence ([105]-[110]). When a sentencing judge has made it clear from his or her findings that they regard the offence as serious, little more is required ([105]). While he did not expressly determine the objective criminality of the offence of aggravated detain for advantage, he gave due consideration to the nature of the conduct and the circumstances in which it occurred ([109]). Further, the evidence of the applicant’s conduct made a conclusion of significant seriousness self-evident ([109]).
Delay:
Hoeben CJ at CL (with Price and Longergan JJ agreeing) noted that a common aspect of domestic violence related offences is that there may be a considerable delay between the occurrence of the offence and the complaint being made. However such delay should not be held against the victim. It is a direct product of the nature of the offending itself, and it would be incongruous if an offender could gain a benefit from such delay ([132]). Where there is unexplained considerable delay during which there has been steps taken towards rehabilitation, and/or a change of circumstances that increases the hardship brought about by a custodial sentence, it may be appropriate to impose a sentence that would otherwise be considered to fall below the range of an appropriate sentence ([133], see also Hughes v R [2013] NSWCCA 129 at [58]).
The Court noted the significant difference between delay that can be attributed to a police failure to charge and what occurred with the complainant. She was a victim of ongoing domestic violence which involved extremely controlling behaviour, and she chose not to proceed with those charges at the time. It appeared that she did not feel ready and able to address these matters for many years ([138]). The applicant did not make any attempt to rehabilitate in the lengthy period between offending and sentencing. It was open to the sentencing judge to take into account the lack of evidence that the applicant suffered any anxiety as a consequence of concern that he would be prosecuted in connection with any of these matters. His Honour’s further finding that there was no evidence that the applicant had contributed to any delay was ‘somewhat generous’ since the applicant could have brought these matters to the attention of the authorities at any time after they occurred ([140]).
Further, there was no evidence that the delay in the proceedings caused the applicant increased hardship. Even if there were, this ground of appeal was founded entirely upon the apportionment of weight to a particular sentencing factor in the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion. In those circumstances, it is well established that matters of weight will only rarely justify the intervention of the Court. Circumstances warranting the Court’s intervention have not been demonstrated in this case ([141]).
Vaiusu v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 71 (5 April 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Ex tempore judgement’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Perpetrator victim of domestic violence’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’
Charges: Wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the appellant’s brother in law. The victim had hit the appellant’s sister, apparently accidentally, in a scuffle outside a nightclub. The appellant’s sister told her that the victim had hit her, but she did not tell her that it was an accident. The appellant followed the victim to a train station and stabbed him in the neck with a broken bottle ([7]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year and 2 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to take sufficient account of her background as a victim of domestic violence by her stepfather growing up ([23]). It was also submitted that the appellant was subject to domestic violence by her husband, whose death she was still mourning at the time of the offending ([24]). Further, the trial judge made no mention of the fact that her daughter would be left without a parent if the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment ([26]).
The Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, R A Hulme and Beech-Jones JJ) emphasised that a trial judge cannot carefully consider their remarks while delivering an ex tempore judgement. If a trial judge does not mention a particular factor, that does not mean that they have not had regard to it ([31]). Even though the trial judge did not specifically mention the factors raised by the appellant, it was evident that the trial judge adopted a sympathetic approach to sentencing while having regard to the maximum sentence and current sentencing practices ([36]-[38]).
McIlwraith v R [2017] NSWCCA 13 (22 February 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Intimidation’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Specific intent’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Numerous charges, including aggravated breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence under section 112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Case type Appeal against conviction.
Facts: On 18 June 2014, the applicant entered 3 properties, and was arrested and charged with a number of offences alleging breaking and entering, and stealing property. The applicant pleaded guilty to one (Count 5) of 8 counts, and elected to be tried by judge alone. The trial judge acquitted the applicant on Counts 1, 2, 3 and 8, and convicted him on Count 7 (an offence of aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence under section 112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)). The serious indictable offence was one of intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm under section 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
The applicant was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months with respect to Count 5. He was also sentenced to 4 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years with respect to Count 7. The first sentence was wholly concurrent with, and consumed within, the longer second sentence.
The applicant appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding that the offence of intimidation under section 13 is not an offence of ‘specific intent’.
Issue: A key question for the Court was whether the offence of intimidation under section 13 is one of ‘specific intent’, and whether the applicant’s intoxication at the time of the offending can be taken into account in determining his guilt.
Held: The Court refused to grant leave to appeal with respect to the challenge to the findings of fact, and otherwise dismissed the appeal against the conviction. It also refused leave to appeal against the sentence imposed in the District Court.
The provisions of Part 11A dealing with intoxication are concerned with circumstances in which a particular state of mind is required and can be viewed as wrongful. A particular state of mind can involve a specific intent to achieve an identified consequence (as in section 13(1) or section 13(3)), matters of which the accused is aware and consequences which he or she knows to be likely ([39]). The question for the Court was whether the offence of intimidation is an offence of specific intent and whether the provisions under Part 11A of Crimes Act regarding intoxication apply to it.
Basten J found that the offence of intimidation under section 13(1) is one of specific intent, and thus subject to the provisions of Part 11A ([39]). Therefore an offender’s intoxication can be taken into account in determining criminal liability. His Honour reached this conclusion by considering the decisions of R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80 and Harkins v R [2015] NSWCCA 263 ([39]-[42]).
Morgan v R [2016] NSWCCA 298 (16 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Specially aggravated break, enter and commit an indictable offence, namely reckless wounding x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant (both women) lived together with the victim’s two children and had been in an intimate relationship ([4]). The victim and applicant argued, which escalated into a physical confrontation. The victim barricaded herself in a bedroom and picked up her infant child. The applicant broke into the room and stabbed the victim in the back. The applicant continued to chase, hit and choke the victim, and the victim sustained stab wounds to her buttock, arms, wrist and neck ([5]-[8]). The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 6 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal (Ward JA, Bellew J and Hidden AJ) had regard to the applicant’s subjective circumstances, such as the fact that she had experienced domestic violence and sexual abuse as a child, and had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression and borderline personality disorder ([10]-[12]). The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had adequate regard to the subjective circumstances proffered by the applicant ([27]). The victim did not sustain any serious injuries ([16]).
The Court of Appeal remarked that the charge of break and enter was unusual in this case, given that the applicant broke an internal door. This fact made it impossible to find comparable cases ([22], [26]).
Drew v R [2016] NSWCCA 310 (16 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Aggravation’ – ‘Culture considerations’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Vulnerability’ – ‘Worst category’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Initially charged with wound with intent to murder. He entered into a plea of guilty to a charge of wound with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, as well as one count of contravening an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO).
Case type Appeal against decision.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, as well as one count of contravening an ADVO. He was sentenced to 12 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years and 4 months. The sentencing judge made a number of observations, including a statement that the victim was a vulnerable person due to the culture of silence and ostracism of those who complain in relation to acts of violence in the Indigenous community. Her Honour also stated that the offence fell within the worst category of offences of its kind.
The appellant was in a domestic relationship with the victim at the time of the offending. There was a history of domestic violence in the relationship to the extent that an ADVO had been taken out against the appellant. He has a long and varied criminal history which included numerous violent offences against 13 separate victims. 3 of those victims were his domestic partners at the time of the offence, and one was his own son. 9 of those instances involved a weapon.
Issue: The appellant relied on the following grounds of appeal:
•
The judge erred by finding the offending was aggravated due to the victim being Aboriginal and thereby a vulnerable person.
•
The judge erred in the characterisation of the offence as falling within the ‘worst category’.
•
The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal. It made remarks on the need to take special care when making findings of fact about vulnerable victims.
Vulnerability:
A question arose as to whether the sentencing judge was entitled to take into account the serious problem of under-reporting of domestic violence in Indigenous communities due to a culture of ‘silence and ostracism’, and aggravate the offence on that basis ([83]). Her Honour was entitled to note both the high rates of domestic violence, and the vulnerability of women and children in Indigenous communities, but she erred in finding the offence to be aggravated on account of the victim being classified ‘vulnerable’ due to this under-reporting problem ([85], [90]). ‘A Court may not aggravate an offence by taking judicial notice of the fact that some Aboriginal women might be less likely to complain of domestic violence because of a culture of silence and ostracism in their communities’ ([84], see also [1], [8]). No evidence was capable of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a member of a particular class bearing those characteristics ([90]).
Further, the aggravating factor of vulnerability under section 21A(2)(l) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is only engaged where the victim belongs to a class that is vulnerable because of a common characteristic ([8], [75]-[78]). An ultimate finding of vulnerability of the victim in the more general sense of being under an impaired ability to avoid physical conflict with the appellant or to defend herself in the event of conflict was open as an inference from primary facts ([5]).
Fagan J noted that it was a circumstance of the offence, relevant to determining an appropriate sentence, that because of the victim’s emotional and intimate attachment to the appellant, she was less likely than any other potential victim to avoid him or to put herself out of harm’s way ([7]). The individual vulnerability of the victim was an ‘inescapable conclusion from the evidence’ and had, in practical terms, the same consequence for assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence ([8]).
‘Worst category’:
The use of the phrase ‘worst category’ should be avoided by judges unless it is in the context of imposing the maximum penalty available for that offence ([105]). However, when taking into account the features of the offence, such as the seriousness of the victim’s injuries, the appellant’s earlier threat to the victim, the fact that the offence occurred without regard to the ADVO, the prolonged nature of the attack, the location of the offence (the victim’s home), and the appellant’s intoxication at the time of the offence, it was open to the sentencing judge to classify the objective seriousness of the offence as her Honour did ([106]-[114]). It is not necessary for the injuries to be of the ‘worst type’ for an offence to fall into the ‘worst case’ category. The nature of the offence can bring a case within that category ([107]).
Manifestly excessive:
The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had a history of violent offending, which included offending during parole periods. The sentencing factors of specific deterrence and community protection meant that no shorter sentence could be warranted in law.
Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284 (7 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reasonableness’ – ‘Relevance of past violent conduct’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The female appellant was in a relationship with the deceased, James Polkinghorne, and they had a child together. Evidence was led at trial that the deceased had physically and verbally abused the appellant throughout their relationship. She was unable to leave the relationship and saw seeking help from the police as impossible.
On the 13 May 2012, the appellant went to her parents’ place, against the deceased’s wishes. During the course of the day, there were 80 calls and SMS messages between the appellant and the deceased. These messages and calls were tendered as evidence at trial (recordings were available because the police had been tapping the deceased’s phone in light of his suspected involvement in a previous murder). These messages, while not phrased in terms of ‘killing’ the appellant, were extremely threatening and abusive. The deceased was affected by methylamphetamine.
That night, the deceased went to the home of the appellant’s parents. He was ‘going crazy, screaming and kicking items’. The appellant’s brother called 000. From here, there were some inconsistencies in the accounts of the appellant’s father, brother and the record of interview from the appellant produced after the killing. There was no contention that the appellant was punched and thrown around by the deceased. Both the appellant in her record of interview and her brother at trial said that the deceased yelled, “I’m going to fucking kill her’ and ‘I’ll get youse cunts’. The appellant’s father and brother started fighting with the deceased. The appellant retrieved a knife from inside and stabbed the deceased. After trial by a jury, she was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment wholly suspended.
Issue/s: Whether it was open for the jury to conclude, to the criminal standard of proof, that the fatal stab wound inflicted by the appellant was not a reasonable response to the circumstances as she saw them?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed (McCallum J and RS Hulme AJ in majority, Leeming JA in dissent). In the majority judgment, RS Hulme AJ first held that there was no rational reason for the jury to reject the substance of the evidence before them. This evidence included the terms and tone of what the deceased had said in the phone calls and messages that day. As per His Honour at [163]:
‘Certainly he had not in terms threatened to “kill” the Appellant. However he was powerful, had been violent in the past, had previously attacked the Appellant and on the day in question he was very angry, irrational, and had threatened to seriously hurt her and to come to where the Appellant was, thus providing some opportunity to carry out his threats’.
Further, notwithstanding the inconsistencies, much of the evidence suggested that the appellant and her brother had been in serious danger. Accordingly, RS Hulme AJ concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the appellant believed her act was necessary to defend herself or some other person (see [170]).
Second, His Honour held that the appellant’s response was reasonable. This was in circumstances where the police would have taken time to arrive, the appellant saw substantial disadvantages in calling the police, and it was not obvious that they would be able to overwhelm the deceased. Therefore, it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant had not acted in defence of herself or her brother and father (see [171]-[173]). The appeal was allowed.
McCallum J largely agreed with RS Hulme AJ but provided some additional comments. Her Honour was also unable to accept that the jury could, acting reasonably, have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s conduct was not reasonable in the circumstances as she perceived them at the time of the stabbing (see [93]). Her Honour noted that Leeming JA in dissent had placed emphasis on the objective medical evidence and the evidence of eye witnesses at the confrontation. Acknowledging that it is important to have regard to the whole of the evidence, McCallum J continued:
‘Ultimately, however, the critical issue in this case is the reasonableness of inflicting mortal injury judging that issue by reference to an assessment of the circumstances in that instant as perceived by Ms Silva. While the evidence directly relating to the time of the stabbing is important, that assessment is also critically informed by a close analysis of the circumstances leading up to the fatal confrontation’ (see [94]).
McCallum J’s own assessment was that the appellant could only have seen the deceased’s attack on her that evening as ‘urgent, life-threatening and inescapable’ and that the events in the street could not be divorced from the ‘irrational, menacing rage exhibited by the deceased in his calls to Ms Silva in the period leading up to the time when he confronted her physically’ (see especially [95]-[109]). Her Honour concluded at [110]:
‘The circumstances described in the evidence in this case are the kind in which, more commonly, it is the woman who is killed. In my assessment of the record of the trial, the evidence was not capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt…that Ms Silva’s conduct in fatally stabbing the deceased was not reasonable in the circumstances as she perceived them at the time of the stabbing’.
In dissent, Leeming J was not persuaded that a deep penetrating stab into the deceased’s chest cavity, while he was struggling with two other men, was a reasonable response to the circumstances as the appellant saw them at 9.09pm and it was therefore open to the jury to reach this conclusion (see discussion at [83]). His Honour also noted that the jury had the advantage of seeing the evidence first hand and therefore declined to interfere with the verdict.
See also R v Silva [2015] NSWSC 148 (6 March 2015).
Ngatamariki v R [2016] NSWCCA 155 (9 August 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 2.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to his partner (the victim), with whom he resided with their 2 children. He was intoxicated at the time of the offending and had a prior conviction for domestic violence towards the victim. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred by having regard to his prior conviction in determining the objective seriousness of the offence, and that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal. The applicant’s offending was extremely serious, and constituted a ‘brutal and violent attack…on an innocent, and largely defenceless, victim’. The Court noted that the sentence imposed required a strong measure of general deterrence ([71]). The trial judge correctly took into account the fact that the offending occurred in the context of a domestic relationship ([72]). Denunciation of, and punishment for, ‘brutal’ and ‘alcohol-fuelled’ conduct in such circumstances is particularly apt ([73]).
Further, the trial judge was found not to have improperly used the applicant’s prior convictions as a factor which aggravated the seriousness of his offending. The domestic relationship between the applicant and victim was relevant to determining the objective seriousness of the offending ([45]). In order to make a complaint of manifest excessiveness, the applicant must demonstrate that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust. The submissions and evidence did not establish that the sentence imposed fell into such a category. In light of the circumstances, the sentence was one that might be regarded as modest ([75]).
Browning v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 147 (17 June 2015) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of an apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditional liberty’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Repeated breaches’ – ‘Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc with intent to burn, maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc with intent to burn, maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm, breach of an apprehended domestic violence order x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been married for 30 years but separated in August 2012. The complainant obtained an Apprehended Domestic Violence order (ADVO) against the applicant for 12 months. Notwithstanding this, the applicant breached the order on two occasions. On a subsequent occasion, the applicant doused the complainant in petrol and made a sustained attempt to light her on fire. He was stopped by three teenage boys. The applicant was sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment for the offence of using an explosive substance or corrosive fluid with intent, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Court’s finding that the offence of using an explosive substance or corrosive fluid with intent was in the mid-range of seriousness failed to adequately account for the Court’s findings that:
1.
the offence was not pre-meditated but spontaneous;
2.
no significant harm was occasioned to the victim;
3.
the applicant’s attempts to carry out his intended actions were less determined than in other examples of this offence; and
4.
other matters bore on the assessment of the seriousness of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: This ground of appeal was dismissed. Garling J held (Gleeson JA and Johnson J agreeing) that the finding of the sentencing judge that this offence was in the mid-range was, if anything, unduly favourable to the applicant. This was a sustained attempt to set the complainant alight after the applicant had doused her in petrol. The only impediment to his success was the repeated intervention of the teenage men (See [96]-[100] and [3]).
Johnson J made some additional observations at [5]-[8]. His Honour cited with approval Spigelman CJ’s observations regarding apprehended domestic violence orders in John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited v Ryde Local Court [2005] NSWCA 101 at [20]:
‘The legislative scheme is directed to the protection of the community in a direct and immediate sense, rather than through mechanisms such as deterrence. Individuals can obtain protection against actual or threatened acts of personal violence, stalking intimidation and harassment. Apprehended Violence Orders constitute the primary means in this State of asserting the fundamental right to freedom from fear. The objects served by such orders are quite distinct from those that are served by civil adversarial proceedings or proceedings in which an arm of the State seeks to enforce the criminal law’.
His Honour further noted that the applicant was a repeat domestic violence offender. Accordingly, in sentencing for these offences, it was appropriate to have in mind the statement of the Court in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) at [86]:
‘In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important’.
Finally, Johnson J stated:
‘Where a court has made an apprehended domestic violence order to protect a person, and then further orders are made by way of conditional liberty for criminal offences arising from breaches of that order, the commission of another offence, in breach of that conditional liberty, will constitute significant aggravating circumstances: s 21A(2)(j) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. This is especially so where the offence against the protected person is of the very grave character of the s 47 offence in this case, with the offence being committed so soon after the applicant had been given the benefit of conditional liberty by order of the District Court’.
Note: Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced on 25 September 2018 imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Ahmu v The Queen; DPP v Ahmu [2014] NSWCCA 312 (15 December 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Offender often believes violence is justified’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Vindication of the victim’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Rape x 15, indecent assault x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship and had a two year old son at the time of the offences. At trial, it was alleged by the prosecution that the appellant was sexually predatory, violent and abusive in his relationship with the complainant and that he was a child molester with a sexual interest in children, including his two year old son. The complainant obtained an apprehended violence order against the applicant in 2009 but the relationship resumed in 2010 because she was concerned about the appellant having unsupervised access with the child. The rape and indecent assault offences occurred throughout one night in 2010, in the presence of their two year old son. The complainant, who was pregnant at the time, pleaded with the appellant to stop, but the appellant threatened to kill her and continued regardless. A number of the sexual acts were accompanied by humiliating and degrading conduct. The appellant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed but the Crown appeal against sentence was allowed. The overall sentence demonstrated that the sentencing judge either misapprehended the significance of the standard non-parole period or underestimated the objective seriousness of the offences. Here, the gross, repeated attacks on the complainant occurred over an extended period and were committed by the appellant who understood what he was doing despite his (limited) mental issues and possible intoxication. This, combined with deliberate additional humiliation and a callous indifference to the presence of their son, meant that the objective seriousness of the offence fell within the middle of the range and brought the standard non-parole period into sharp focus as a yardstick: Muldrock v The Queen (See [78]-[79]).
Even in light of the residual discretion of the Court to decline to interfere with the sentence, re-sentencing the appellant to nine years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months was appropriate in the interests of justice. As per Adams J at [83]:
‘In considering the exercise of the residual discretion, it is appropriate in my view to bear in mind - in terms not usually used but implicit in sentencing for offences such as the present - the need to do justice to the victim, so appallingly dealt with, whose vindication is part of the function of the administration of criminal justice. This applies with particular force in cases of so-called domestic violence, where there seems to often be present in offenders a degree of self-justification as if, in some way, the victim (to use the vernacular) had it coming. I do not say that this was specifically the offender's state of mind in the present case but the facts strongly suggest that he thought he had some kind of right to do what he did. This aspect of domestic violence emphasises the importance, to my mind, of general deterrence, as well as the protection of the community, especially women, who are far too often the victims of this attitude. These considerations also underline the importance of denunciation’.
Pasoski v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 309 (15 December 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Context evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2, sexual assault x 5.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant lived together with their daughters and were in a relationship since 2003. In November 2010, the applicant physically assaulted the complainant in their home on two occasions, by kicking her in the legs, and slapping her face, causing her to fall (see [13]). The sexual assault charges were alleged to have occurred on one night, where the applicant had vaginal penile intercourse five times without her consent (see [13]).
At a voir dire during trial, the applicant’s trial counsel successfully objected to the admission of other evidence of previous penile vaginal penetration without consent (see [27]). That evidence was not admitted because the trial judge found that the ‘evidence is more in the nature of tendency evidence than contextual evidence’ (see [31]). However, evidence of the applicant’s controlling behaviour was admitted, and was relied upon at trial (see [12]).
In summing up, the trial judge gave directions as to the use of the evidence of controlling behaviour, stating that ‘the Crown relies upon this evidence only for one purpose… to put the complainant's allegations concerning the offences in November 2010 into a realistic context’ (see [42]). Her Honour also stated: ‘if that evidence was not there, you would be asking yourselves, well, why would the accused throw his weight around in this horrible manner with the complainant completely out of the blue, when they had been in an apparently normal relationship for the previous six years?’ (see [42]).
Issues: Two of the grounds of appeal concerned ‘context evidence’ (see [6], [44]):
1.
‘A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the admission of the so-called context evidence’ because it was not relevant and was prejudicial, and
2.
The trial judge erred by failing to identify the precise issues to which the evidence was directed.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused on both the ‘context evidence’ grounds.
In relation to the first ground, Meagher JA referred to the use of context evidence as being admissible if it is used to ‘remove implausibility that might attach to a complainant’s account of what otherwise would be seen as isolated incidents’ (see [24]). His Honour referred to HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; 235 CLR 334 [6] to observe that ‘by doing so, it bears upon the assessment of the probability of the existence of facts directly in issue (Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 55) … Similar observations were made in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12; 242 CLR 610 at [42] and BBH v The Queen [2012] HCA 9; 245 CLR 499 at [146]-[150].’
Meagher JA held that the evidence was properly admitted (see [45]). His Honour found that from the conduct of the trial, ‘it was apparent that the Crown was relying upon it only as showing that the relationship was an unhappy one from the complainant's perspective so as to make more plausible her evidence that she did not consent to having sexual intercourse with the applicant on the five occasions in question’ (see [33]). Furthermore, the fact that trial counsel had not objected to the evidence at the voir dire, despite having objected to the evidence of the other sexual assaults on the grounds that it might invite propensity reasoning, indicated that ‘the parties and the Court were conscious that evidence tendered to explain the context in which the alleged offences occurred might, depending on its content, be relied on or used for a tendency purpose’ (see [30]).
In relation to the second ground, regarding the directions given by the trial judge to the jury, Meagher JA held that the directions did not give rise to a real risk that the jury might employ propensity reasoning, and thus did not occasion a miscarriage of justice (see [49]). His Honour found that the direction regarding the applicant ‘throwing his weight around’ did verge on an invitation to the jury to employ propensity reasoning (see [47]). However, his Honour held that, assessed in context, the other directions made clear to the jury that the evidence of controlling behaviour was not being relied upon to suggest a ‘propensity of the applicant physically or sexually to impose his will on the complainant’ (see [48]).
The other issues concerned two failures of the trial judge. First, the trial judge failed to properly comply with s 55F(2)(b) of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW), and therefore two counts of sexual assault were quashed (see [8]-[11]). Second, the trial judge erred in taking into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing that the offences were committed in the complainant's home: EK v R [2010] NSWCCA 199; 79 NSWLR 740 at [79] (see [54]). Accordingly, the aggregate sentence of imprisonment was reduced from five years and six months with a non-parole period of two years and nine months to four years and eleven months with a non-parole period of two years and five and a half months.
Monteiro v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 277 (26 November 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated rape namely, immediately before sexual intercourse the appellant inflicted actual bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant was physically and verbally abusive towards the female complainant throughout their relationship. At the time of the offence, the relationship had ended and the appellant started yelling at the complainant that they should resume this relationship. He slapped the complainant in the face and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her without her consent. The appellant was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months for the principal offence of aggravated rape.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The manifest excess argument was dismissed. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the prior relationship between the appellant and the complainant was a factor that should have mitigated the sentence imposed. Bellew J noted that while the existence of a relationship between offender and victim can be a relevant consideration in determining the objective seriousness of sexual offending, each case must turn on its own facts. Here, the relationship was over and it therefore followed that the existence of a prior relationship was not a factor that warranted mitigation of sentence. In particular, this was not a case where the complainant had invited the appellant to engage in sexual intercourse with her or had indicated that she was prepared to do so (cf NM v R [2012] NSWCCA 215 and Norman v R [2012] NSWCCA 230.) His Honour continued at [131]-[132]:
‘What remains important is that even though the relationship had ended, the offending occurred in what might be loosely described as a domestic setting. In R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, Wood CJ at CL (with whom Studdert and Bell JJ agreed) said at [41]:
"As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell [2000] NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.”
These principles were confirmed, after a review of the relevant authorities, by Johnson J (with whom Hunt AJA and Latham J agreed) in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302at [65] and following. Leaving aside the question of general deterrence, the observations of Wood CJ at CL are directly apposite to the present case’.
R v Eckermann [2013] NSWCCA 188 (15 August 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentences’ – ‘Where the offender is known to the victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: After being in a domestic relationship for nine years and having two children together, the respondent and the complainant separated due to domestic violence perpetrated by the respondent. The complainant was asleep when she was woken by the respondent breaking into the property. He was shouting and looking for the complainant’s new partner. This woke and scared the children. He started throttling the complainant and then punched her in the face. The complainant managed to call the police. In sentencing, the judge characterised the offending as being towards the lower end of the spectrum. This was in light of a number of factors including that the respondent was not a stranger to the complainant (and therefore the offence would have been less frightening than a home invasion by a stranger) and that the respondent’s primary motivation was to protect his children from danger from the complainant’s new partner. The respondent was sentenced to two years imprisonment, suspended conditional upon entering into a good behaviour bond.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the offending as being ‘towards the lower end of the spectrum’.
2.
The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months and a balance term of 10 months. First, Price J held that the sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the offence as at the lower end. Home invasion offences do not become less serious by virtue of a prior domestic relationship between an offender and the victim. Rather, the objective gravity of the crime is to be assessed on the facts of the case and here it was not open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the offence would have been less frightening than a home invasion by a stranger (See [35]-[36]). Further, very little weight could be given to the respondent’s motivation to protect his children. His actions terrified the complainant and the children. The offending was aggravated by the fact that it was committed in the presence of the children (See [37]-[45]). Accordingly, the offending was towards the middle of the range for such offences (See [46]).
Second, notwithstanding the respondent’s subjective circumstances including his love for his children, his employment, and good prospects of rehabilitation, a suspended sentence was manifestly inadequate. As per Price J at [54]-[55]:
‘This was a serious offence of violence by the respondent. When women (and men) enter into a new domestic relationship, they are entitled to do so without the threat of violence from a former partner. This is particularly so when there are children of the prior relationship as acts of violence towards a parent particularly when committed in the children's presence have the potential to impact severely upon their well-being and future development.
This Court has emphasised the seriousness with which violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated: Hiron v R [2007] NSWCCA 336.Specific and general deterrence, denunciation of the offending conduct and the protection of the community are important factors in sentencing a domestic violence offender: R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41; R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436; R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302.In my view, the respondent's subjective circumstances could not justify the suspension of the sentence. A full-time sentence of imprisonment was called for’.
McLaughlin v R [2013] NSWCCA 152 (3 July 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2, common assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and her young son moved from Tasmania to Victoria to live with the male applicant, her then de facto partner. At the time of offence, the complainant was vulnerable and isolated in that she was unemployed, cut off from friends and family, and suffered from a physical disability to her leg. Count 1 occurred when the applicant and complainant were arguing and the applicant dragged her off the bed, causing her to hit her jaw and bite her lip. Count 2 occurred when the applicant and complainant were again arguing and the applicant hit her to the side of her head near her eye. Count 3 occurred when they were arguing about an apprehended violence order (AVO) that had been made for the protection of the complainant and, as the complainant walked into her son’s room, the applicant grabbed her by the hair and throat. The applicant was sentenced to a total head sentence of two years and four months imprisonment with a non-parole period of four months.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred when she found that the offences were aggravated by the fact that they took place in the generalised presence of a child under the age of 18 years.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Error was demonstrated with ground one of the appeal. While there was evidence for Count 3 on which it might have been open to the sentencing judge to find that the child must have realised what was happening (even though he did not see the events), Her Honour did not make such a finding. Accordingly, the sentencing judge erred in taking into account that the offence was committed in the presence of the child (See [31]). Further, for Counts 1 and 2 there was no direct evidence of the presence of a child (See [32]). However, Button J declined to intervene with the sentence on appeal (See [54]-[55]).
The second ground of appeal was dismissed. At [48]-[49] Button J noted that:
‘The approach of this Court to men who assault vulnerable women is well established and need not be elaborated upon by me: see R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41, and R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302’.
‘If an offender sees fit repeatedly to visit violence upon a woman in breach of a bond and an apprehended violence order imposed months before with regard to the same behaviour and the same victim, he should expect to be imprisoned, and not for an insubstantial period’.
R v Cortese [2013] NSWCCA 148 (26 June 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault, rape.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim told the male respondent that she wanted to end their relationship. They argued, during which the respondent tried to make sexual advances towards the victim, including trying to kiss her and rubbing her vagina. Despite protestations from the victim, the respondent stayed over the night. The next morning the respondent forced himself on top of the victim, forced at least two fingers into her vagina, and then forced his penis into her vagina and had penile/vaginal intercourse with the victim without her consent. The respondent was sentenced to a good behaviour bond for twelve months for the indecent assault and two years imprisonment, wholly suspended, for the rape offence. In assessing the seriousness of the offending, the sentencing judge stated that the ‘prior sexual relationship [between the respondent and the victim] is an important mitigating factor’ and held the offending was at the bottom of the range (See [36]-[39]).
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of each offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. The sentencing judge erred in her characterisation of the seriousness of the offending. In reaching this conclusion, Beech-Jones J stated at [55] that:
‘…cases confirm that the mere fact that there was a pre-existing relationship between an offender and a victim does not mitigate the criminality involved. Needless to say, each case will depend upon facts, but one common circumstance in which a pre-existing relationship has been found to diminish the seriousness of the offence is where it suggests some prevarication or at least initial consent on the part of the victim. Thus, if sexual contact is initiated by the victim or initially consented to by the victim, then the ensuing offence may be considered less serious’: See NM v R [2012] NSWCCA 215; Bellchambers v R [2011] NSWCCA 131; R v Hendricks [2011] NSWCCA 203; Stewart v R [2012] NSWCCA 183.
Here, the pre-existing relationship had no relevance as the victim repeatedly expressed her lack of consent (See [55]). Following from this, it was clear that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the culpability of the respondent was clearly erroneous. This was a case involving the rape of a young woman which occurred in the context of threats of violence, as well as aggressive and humiliating language. It came after she was detained overnight. The offending would likely fall below the mid-range of offences of this character but was not ‘bottom of the range’ (See [56]-[58]).
ZZ v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 83 (19 April 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated rape (recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm), rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The sexual offences were committed in the context of a sexual relationship between the male applicant and the female complainant. The applicant and complainant had been drinking, taking drugs and engaging in consensual sexual relations. The applicant then asked the complainant to drink his urine and, after urging the uncertain complainant to try it, the applicant urinated into her mouth. The complainant, gagging and nearly vomiting, tried to pull away but the applicant forced her head back towards his penis (count 1 — rape). After further sexual activity, the complainant became increasingly distressed and uncomfortable. She attempted to leave but was pushed into the bathroom wall by the applicant. He penetrated her anus with his penis so forcefully that she smashed her head against the tiles and suffered a deep four-centimetre laceration to her forehead. He continued penetrating her and smashed her head against the wall again (count 2 — aggravated rape). The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years and six months with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were that –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of count 1.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in the way the applicable standard non-parole periods in respect of the sexual assault offences were taken into account.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, while the sentencing judge accepted the offence as ‘being in the mid range of seriousness’, His Honour later incorrectly referred to count 1 as ‘being at the top of the mid range’ and erroneously sentenced the applicant on this basis. Second, the standard non-parole period played a greater role in the sentencing judge’s decision than as a guidepost, to be taken into account with other factors on sentence, contrary to the principle articulated in Muldrock v The Queen.
In re-sentencing the applicant, Johnson J took into account the objective gravity of the applicant’s offences, his subjective circumstances and other aspects bearing upon the question of sentence, including the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period for counts 1 and 2. Johnson J noted that the objective gravity of the applicant’s offences needed to be assessed in the context of the relationship between the applicant and the victim. It was true that the complainant was not sexually assaulted by a stranger, where, if she had been, a further element of fear and terror would have been expected. However, the fact that the victim knew the offender and trusted him provided her with ‘little comfort’ here (See [103]). In a case such as this, involving significant violence and infliction of injury, the context of this relationship offered no real assistance to the offender on sentence (See [107]).
Norman v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 230 (9 November 2012) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape x 3.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of the complainant’s 13 year marriage to the appellant, the complainant and the appellant had anal intercourse five times but only twice with her consent. At trial, the Crown sought to tender evidence of non-sexual domestic violence (see [22]). They argued that the evidence was not being admitted as evidence indicating a propensity on the part of the appellant which rendered it more likely that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged (therefore ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act and the test in Pfennig v R [1995] HCA 7; 182 CLR 461 did not apply). The trial judge accepted this argument and ruled that evidence of non-sexual domestic violence could be admitted for the purpose of showing the relationship between the appellant and the complainant. The appellant was found guilty.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that 'relationship' evidence should not have been admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. MacFarlane J noted the relevant law, stating that: ‘As pointed out in Roach v R [2011] HCA 12; 242 CLR 610, evidence which incidentally shows propensity but which is otherwise relevant will not be excluded provided that the jury is properly warned against its use as propensity evidence (see also BBH v R [2012] HCA 9at [146]- [149])’.
Relationship evidence may be relevant if it assists in the evaluation of other evidence such as that of a complainant. His Honour continued at [26]: ‘In other words, relationship evidence may be admitted on the basis that, without it, the jury would be faced with a seemingly inexplicable or fanciful isolated incident. To enable complainants to give their account of events comprehensively, they must be permitted to place the incidents of which they complain in a meaningful context’.
However, the Courts have emphasised that it is necessary to consider carefully the basis upon which ‘relationship’ evidence is relevant in a particular case (see Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95; 171 A Crim R 463 at [112]; DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272; 200 A Crim R 206 at [28] - [30] and RG v R [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [36] - [37]) (at [29]).
Here, MacFarlane J held that evidence of two isolated incidents of non-sexual domestic violence was irrelevant and should have been excluded. While the Crown submitted that the evidence was relevant to demonstrate ‘the nature of the relationship,’ MacFarlane J noted:
‘[C]onsistently with the approach taken by this Court in Qualtieriand DJV, it is insufficient to rely solely upon such a proposition. Evidence "is not relevant merely because it discloses aspects of the relationship between an accused and a complainant. There must be an issue which the evidence may explain or resolve by placing the alleged events in their true context": DJVper McClellan CJ at CL at [29]. Particularly because of its potentially prejudicial character, the precise basis upon which the evidence is relevant must be closely analysed’.
The evidence was also not relevant to demonstrate why the alleged sexual assaults were not reported earlier, and nor could it be said that the evidence would have assisted the jury, in any permissible way, in evaluating the complainant’s evidence (see [32]-[34]).
Therefore, His Honour concluded at [35]-[36]:
‘[E]vidence of the two isolated incidents of non-sexual domestic violence was not necessary to place the sexual assaults within a meaningful context… [I]t is difficult to see what, if any, use the jury could have made of the evidence other than to engage in impermissible propensity reasoning that the appellant was the type of man who might have sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. Whilst the trial judge directed the jury not to reason in that way, there was unfairness to the appellant in the evidence being before the jury when it was not relevant on any basis’.
Despite this, on the facts, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. The Crown case against the appellant was so overwhelming there was no significant possibility that a jury would have acquitted the appellant (See [38]).
Stewart v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 183 (29 August 2012) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Dominance’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Psychological consequences’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a somewhat disrupted and non-continuous relationship for some years. On the day of the offence, the complainant informed the applicant that their relationship was over and she was communicating with other men on Facebook. Jealous, the applicant smashed the complainant’s mobile phone. Later that evening, the intoxicated applicant lay on top of the complainant and, while she was struggling, placed his fingers into her vagina for about 30 seconds. The applicant was sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and eight months. In his remarks, the sentencing judge noted that:
‘I just want to make it clear, as I have to do unfortunately in cases of this nature, as far as I am concerned, cases of sexual assault have significant effects on the victim. There are two particular ways, they result in significant distrust as far as the victim is concerned in forming relationships, particularly with males if the assailant was a male. The other very broad area that is affected is the confidence or self-confidence of the victim is significantly damaged, they have concerns about their own self-worth, sometimes that is demonstrated by self-harm but there are other ways in which it is demonstrated. There is no satisfactory material yet available to indicate how long those matters may last, I always proceed on the basis that they will continue to be present for a very long time’ at [58].
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his consideration of the impact of the offence on the victim.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The first ground of appeal was dismissed. It would have been preferable for the sentencing judge not to state that he ‘always’ proceeded on the basis that the psychological effects of sexual assaults would last for a long time. This ground of appeal may have had some force if there had been evidence that the complainant had not suffered psychological injury. However, here, the victim impact statement contained clear evidence of the significant psychological injuries the complainant had suffered (See [62]-[64]).
The second ground of appeal was also dismissed. This was a serious example of an offence against the section. Button J noted at [69] that:
‘The matter can be sharply contrasted with a case where two persons are engaged in intimate contact by consent, and one of them fleetingly goes too far. The digital penetration in this case was not fleeting, and it was preceded by a physical assault upon the victim. Throughout the sexual offence the victim was making her lack of consent abundantly clear and struggling to put an end to the invasion of her body. Most importantly, His Honour found that the offence was an attempt to demonstrate dominance over a young woman who was in truth free to engage in Facebook contact, or any other kind of contact, with whomever she wished. An offence of sexual penetration that is motivated by a desire to dominate the victim, because he or she has failed to comply with the expectations of the offender, will very rarely be anything other than a serious offence’.
Further, while this was a stern sentence in light of the applicant’s subjective circumstances, it was not manifestly excessive (See [71]).
Bellchambers v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 131 (10 June 2011) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape x 4.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and the male applicant were in a relationship. Counts 1 and 2 took place after the complainant refused to have sex with the applicant but he had sexual intercourse with her regardless. The complainant reported these incidents to her general practitioner and the applicant was charged. Despite these charges, a sexual relationship continued between the applicant and the complainant. Counts 3 and 4 took place again after the complainant said she did not want to have sexual intercourse with the applicant. The applicant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred by failing to impose a non-parole period for the first two counts.
•
The sentencing judge failed to determine the objective seriousness of the offences.
•
The sentencing judge did not properly assess the totality of the criminal offending by determining the individual sentences and then assessing the totality but rather did the reverse.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentencing judge’s decision was replete with errors and the appeal was allowed. First, the sentencing judge failed to set a non-parole period for the first two counts (See [30]-[31]). Second, the sentencing judge erred by stating that the objective seriousness of the offences were ‘at least’ in the mid-range of gravity. The sentencing judge must make apparent and define the extent to which the offence is above the mid-range (See [32]-[36]). Third, the sentencing judge did not follow the approach set out in R v Pearce.
Finally, the sentence was manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge failed to fix individual sentences and review these provisional sentences to ensure they were appropriate for the offences at hand. Further, the sentencing judge erred in his characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offences. While the offences were serious, they occurred in the context of a domestic relationship ‘which involved considerable ambivalence on the part of the complainant’ (See [47]). The sentencing judge also failed to review the subjective circumstances of the applicant. The applicant was resentenced to seven years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years.
Sudath v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 207 (9 September 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Evidence via cctv’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant had become violent and abusive towards the female complainant throughout their relationship. On the night of the offences, the complainant was breast feeding their child when the appellant started pulling up her night dress. The complainant said no. She then put her son down and tried to get something from under the bed. While she was kneeling, the appellant forced his penis into her anus. She screamed no but the appellant continued. The next day the appellant yelled at the complainant and physically assaulted her. The appellant was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with an aggregate balance of term of two years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge erred in law by holding that he was ‘satisfied’ within the meaning of s 294B(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that the complainant was “entitled” to give her evidence pursuant to the provisions of s 294B(3) of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The trial judge was correct in ruling that evidence could be given by alternative means. For complaints in sexual offence proceedings, it is generally not a sufficient reason to deny the use of CCTV or other technology merely because the jury might form the impression that the accused is/was violent. As per McClellan CJ at [29]:
‘The submission which the appellant made could of course be made in any case where there is an allegation of sexual intercourse without consent in a relationship of ongoing violence. There are many cases of this character. It was because of the personal trauma likely to be experienced by a complainant when giving evidence that s 294B was enacted. If the submission was accepted a substantial purpose of the legislative provision would be defeated. It may be that in an unusual case a submission in these terms may be accepted by a trial judge. However, the discretion is to be exercised in the individual circumstances of each case’.
Raczkowski v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 152 (4 July 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Attempted rape’ – ‘Breach of apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘Detain with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Using a prohibited pistol without a licence or permit’
Charge/s: Using a prohibited pistol without a licence or permit, detain with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm, attempted rape, indecent assault, breach of apprehended domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the applicant’s wife of over 40 years. Their relationship had deteriorated and an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO) had been issued for the protection of the complainant. The applicant breached this order on a number of occasions and was charged. He was bailed on conditions which included that he not approach or contact the complainant. However, again, the applicant breached these conditions. He wrote to the complainant. Further, one night the applicant, who was intoxicated, entered the property of the complainant without her consent and engaged in serious misconduct throughout the night including physically assaulting the complainant, typing her up, attempting to rape her, pulling out a pistol and threatening the complainant with it, and sexual assaults.
Issue/s:
•
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the fact that the applicant was suffering from severe depression at the time of the offences.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the applicant’s depression and that they occurred in the context of a domestic relationship.
Decision and Reasoning: These grounds of appeal were dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. First, the sentencing judge was not obliged to find that the applicant’s judgment was impaired by his illness. To the extent that the depression may have contributed to the applicant’s poor judgement, its significance was diminished by the applicant’s voluntary consumption of large amounts of alcohol. Additionally, there was evidence of advance planning by the applicant. In these circumstances, specific and general deterrence were particularly important. This approach of the sentencing judge was amply endorsed by authority, particularly when offences have been committed in a domestic context: R v Hamid and when such offences occur in breach of extant restraining orders such as an ADVO: Hiron v The Queen(See [33]-[37]).
Second, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The relevance of depression was considered in the above ground of appeal. Additionally, in terms of the relevance of a (broken down) domestic relationship, as per Grove J at [46]:
‘That a violent and pre planned attack occurred in what might be classified as a domestic setting is not a matter of mitigation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that it is a circumstance of significant seriousness: R v Edigarov; R v Dunn; and R v Burton’.
Here, the applicant detained and abused his wife verbally, physically and sexually. He did so in defiance of the conditions imposed by the ADVO and by bail. The production and use of the pistol, particularly where the applicant was ingesting significance quantities of alcohol, magnified the fear in the complainant (See [47]).
Jeffries v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 144 (26 June 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated kidnapping’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Detain for advantage and cause actual bodily harm, detain for advantage.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim of the aggravated kidnapping was the male applicant’s domestic partner (AW) and the victim of the kidnapping offence was AW’s 15 year old daughter, KW. The relationship between the applicant and AW had been marked by incidents of physical violence. At the time of the offence, AW had obtained an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO) against the applicant. The applicant physically assaulted and verbally abused AW and KW, including partially ripping AW’s tongue. There was a knock on the door during the incident and someone called out, ‘It’s the police’. The applicant told AW and KW not to say anything. AW and KW were unable to leave the house that night. The applicant was sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the objective seriousness of the offences and the absence of any subjective factors operating in the applicant’s favour (at [99]). The offences involved the protracted detention of AW and KW for the advantage of fending off police intervention with respect to the applicant’s violence against both victims. They were committed in the context of the applicant’s controlling and violent relationship with the victim, and he inflicted actual bodily harm of a serious (and bizarre) type on AW. Great fear was instilled in both victims (See [90]).
Significant aggravating factors existed on the facts namely, that the offences were committed whilst the Applicant was on bail for an offence of violence committed against AW and was subject to an apprehended domestic violence order intended to control his conduct towards his domestic partner. These were flagrant violations of both forms of conditional liberty intended to protect AW (See [91]). It was also a significant aggravating factor that the offender’s ‘recidivist conduct demonstrated a propensity to act violently towards his partners’ (See [92]).
R v Burton [2008] NSWCCA 128 (20 June 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Detain for advantage’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Influencing witness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Common assault x 3, assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2, detain for advantage, influencing witness.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was released on parole as part of a sentence of imprisonment for break, enter and steal. He subsequently commenced a relationship with the female complainant, who was eight years older than him, and moved into her home with her two children. The respondent committed a series of offences against the complainant involving violent assaults and threats, including an offence of influencing a witness by convincing the complainant to withdraw the charges against him. The total effective sentence included a non-parole period of one year and nine months with a balance of term of one year. The sentencing judge backdated sentences for Counts 1, 2 and 3 so that they operated concurrently with the balance of parole. Even at sentence, the victim provided a measure of support to the respondent.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentences imposed failed to reflect the objective seriousness of the offences and were so inadequate as to be plainly unjust. Several aspects of the sentence imposed supported this conclusion. First, the approach of making the sentences concurrent meant that no effective sentence was imposed for three separate and serious offences of violence (See [92]-[93]). Second, the sentence for the detain for advantage offence did not reflect its objective seriousness, which was aggravated by the use of a knife. It was committed in the context of a ‘controlling and violent relationship’, extended over some hours, and involved actual threats of violence towards the victim (See [94]-[95]). It was additionally noted at [97] domestic violence offences involve the exercise of ‘power, dominance and control’ over the victim.
Third, the use of a bond for the offence of influencing a witness diluted significantly, and erroneously, the objective criminality in this case and a custodial sentence should have instead been imposed. Johnson J then made some observations regarding the role of victim’s attitude towards the respondent in sentencing, noting that it ought to play ‘no part on sentence’ at [102]. His Honour quoted (at [104]) the remarks of Simpson J in R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) which deal directly with this issue:
‘There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.’
Fourth, the sentencing judge’s remarks made no reference to specific deterrence, general deterrence nor the need for denunciation of the respondent’s conduct (See [106]-[107]). Finally, the final count of assault was a significant and unusual feature, committed after the respondent had been in custody for over two months. It was a further incident of control or dominance by the respondent over the victim, this time in a prison setting (See [108]-[110]).
In resentencing, the Court emphasised the importance of general and personal deterrence, denunciation and community protection, and noted that the offending took different forms and occurred at different times against the same victim and often in the presence of his children. The respondent had a substantial criminal history and showed little prospects for rehabilitation. The total effective sentenced was increased to four years and six months, with a non-parole period of three years (See [115]-[130]).
Shaw v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 58 (14 March 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated break and enter (with actual bodily harm)’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Malicious damage’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Aggravated break and enter with actual bodily harm, malicious damage to property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant had been in a domestic relationship for approximately five years and lived together with their three children. Following a domestic dispute, the complainant went with the three children to stay at a friend’s place. Over the next five days, the applicant made a number of threats to the complainant’s physical safety by telephone before he, intoxicated, broke into the friend’s place. He demanded to see his son before grabbing the complainant by her hair and striking her a number of times. The applicant had a long criminal history of offending in the domestic context and while those incidents did not involve actual violence, they evidenced a propensity to harassment in domestic situations and a failure to manage his anger. The complainant submitted a statutory declaration taking some responsibility for what she considered to be her part in provoking the applicant to act as he did. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Fullerton J found that the fact the offence was a domestic violence offence and that the victim was in a vulnerable position, did not elevate the offending to an ‘objectively high’ level. (See at [36]). The offending was not planned or premeditated, and the applicant did not arm himself with a weapon to inflict injury. As such, the offending was better characterised as in the middle of the range. In relation to the victim’s strong expression of support for the applicant, His Honour acknowledged the caution that must be exercised in attaching weight to such sentiments. In R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) Simpson J said:
‘In my opinion, exceptional caution should be exercised in the receipt, and the use, of evidence of that kind [general evidence of forgiveness and desire that the assailant/ partner not be imprisoned] in cases that fall within the general description of domestic violence offences, of which this case is one. It is a fact known to the courts and to the community that victims of domestic violence frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attackers. It is said, and has been said so often and for so long as to be almost notorious, that it was this pattern of post offence forgiveness, accompanied by apparent remorse or contrition on the part of the offender, that prevented the prosecution of such offenders. In turn, it appeared that the victim of domestic violence was in a class different to the rest of the community insofar as the protection of the law was concerned. Domestic violence was not seen as a crime which attracted the sanction of the law in the same way or to the same extent as other crimes, whether or not of violence. The perpetrator of domestic violence was relatively safe to commit crimes with impunity, at least provided he or she (and, in the cases that have to date come before the courts, it has almost invariably been he) could attain the victim's forgiveness.
There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
For too long the community in general and the agencies of law enforcement in particular, have turned their backs upon the helpless victims of domestic violence. Acceptance of the victim's word that he/she forgives the offender, casts too great a burden of responsibility upon one individual already in a vulnerable position. Neither the community, the law enforcement agencies, nor the courts can be permitted to abdicate their responsibility in this fashion. Protection of the particular victim in the particular case is a step towards protection of other victims in other cases…’
Notwithstanding this, Fullerton J was persuaded to give the victim’s support significant weight in this case. The victim’s view that the offending was ‘totally out of character’ was also supported in evidence from the applicant’s work supervisor. The sentence was reduced accordingly (See at [48]).
Kennedy v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 21 (22 February 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male Aboriginal applicant had been in a de facto relationship with the female Aboriginal victim of the assault. Their relationship had been volatile and the police had taken out an interim apprehended violence order (AVO) on behalf of the victim. Three weeks prior to the offence, the victim had ended the relationship and taken the applicant’s medication for schizophrenia with her in her handbag. The applicant began experiencing auditory hallucinations and attacked the victim. She suffered severe physical injuries including facial fractures, fractures to her nasal bones and fractures of the mandible.
At sentence, the applicant explained that he did not obtain replacement medicine because there was no doctor and he did not want to leave his sick father. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge found that the applicant’s state of mind was induced by his failure to take his medication, such that his psychological status was of his own default. The applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment consisting of a non-parole period of four years, with a balance of term of three years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s psychological status was his own fault.
•
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment that the offence was in the ‘upper level of seriousness’.
•
The sentencing judge failed to appropriately take into account the applicant’s mental disorder when imposing sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, the sentencing judge failed to give reasons for his finding that the applicant’s psychological status was his own fault. In particular, the sentencing judge failed to examine the circumstances which led to the applicant ceasing to take his medication. Such failure means that the sentencing judge could not arrived at such a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt (See [25]-[27]). Second, the sentencing judge erred in determining the objective seriousness of the offence by only having regard to the physical aspects of the assault and failing to consider the applicant’s psychological condition (See [38]-[40]). Third, the sentencing judge failed to take into account the applicant’s mental disorder as being relevant to the applicant’s moral culpability (See [46]-[49]). Relevant to domestic violence, an aggravating factor of this offending was that at the time of the offence, the applicant was subject to an AVO, taken out to protect the victim (at [8]).
Hiron v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 336 (7 December 2007) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 4, false imprisonment, resist arrest x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim of the assaults and false imprisonment was the applicant’s de facto partner, who was pregnant at the time. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of imprisonment comprising of a non-parole period of four years with a balance of term of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred in not having proper regard to the totality principle.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Price J noted at [32] that:
‘Offences for violent attacks in domestic settings, this Court has emphasised, must be treated with real seriousness. Important factors in sentencing a domestic violence offender are specific and general deterrence, denunciation of the offending conduct and protection of the community: see for example R v Edigarov; R v Dunn; and R v Hamid’.
Price J then quoted from Wood CJ in Edigarov at [41] where it was said that:
‘…such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.’
Here, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive or that the sentencing judge erred in his application of the totality principle. Each of the four offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm involved separate episodes of violence towards the victim. After each occasion, the applicant had the opportunity to stop. The false imprisonment was serious and distressing to the victim. Some offences involved the use of a weapon and the offences involved gratuitous cruelty. The offences were committed while the applicant was on conditional liberty. The offender abused a position of trust, as the partner of the victim and the father of their children. The victim was vulnerable in that she was a pregnant female of much smaller build than the applicant (See [34]-[39]).
Vragovic v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 46 (27 February 2007) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Characterisation of seriousness’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim had been married for some years before they divorced in mid-2003. The victim then commenced a relationship with another man and an apprehended domestic violence order was obtained protecting both the victim and her new partner. One evening, the victim was at home alone speaking on the telephone when the line went dead. The applicant then broke into the house and beat her with a piece of exhaust pipe and a shortened firearm. The applicant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years. This sentence was partially accumulated upon an earlier imposed sentence for grievous bodily harm with intent against the victim’s new partner. Accordingly, the effective overall sentence for both offences was 14 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his description that the offence ‘must be near the top of the range of seriousness’.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Adams J stated at [33]:
‘It was once thought in some circles that domestic violence was somehow less serious than criminal violence inflicted in other circumstances. I do not agree. In many cases of domestic violence a distinguishing characteristic is the notion of the offender that he (and it is almost invariably a male) is entitled to act as he did pursuant to some perverted view of the rights of a male over a female with whom he is or was intimately connected. It is this characteristic of self-justification which requires particular emphasis to be given, in cases of this kind, to the elements of general and personal deterrence. In this case, the appellant had already been arrested for another extremely vicious attack on [his ex-wife’s new partner] for motives which were plainly related to those for which he attacked his ex-wife. The notion that this was some kind of temporary aberration is, I think, disproved by this concatenation of events. There was no a sudden loss of control arising out of circumstances beyond his capacity to deal with. It was a cold, calculating and brutal attack upon a helpless woman at night in her own home’.
Here, the characterisation of the offence by the sentencing judge as ‘near the top of the range of seriousness’ related not to the actual physical injuries or to the overall seriousness of the offence but to the circumstances in which the injuries were inflicted. This characterisation was correct (See [34]).
Walker v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 347 (1 November 2006) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Distress at the breakdown of a relationship is no excuse for violence’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offence arose out of the breakdown of the fifteen year marriage between the applicant and the victim. The victim told the applicant that she was seeing another man and that their marriage was over. Some days later, the applicant beat the victim and attacked her with a 32 cm long kitchen knife. The applicant was sentenced to a head sentence of three years with a non-parole period of eighteen months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge correctly characterised the objective criminality of the offending as very serious. The sentencing judge emphasised, as many on the bench had done so previously, that however sad and distressing a matrimonial breakdown might be, violence of any kind is not to be accepted as a more or less natural incident of such a breakdown (See [7]). The sentencing judge further gave appropriate weight to the relevant subjective matters (See [8]-[9]).
R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Multiple victims’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Repeat domestic violence offenders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Vulnerability of the victim’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Assault x 2, assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5, detaining without consent and with intent to obtain an advantage (to avoid detection for assaulting her), malicious wounding.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The total effective sentence included a non-parole period of two years and six months, with the balance of the term lasting two years. The offending involved prolonged and serious violence committed against three women with whom the respondent was either married or in a relationship over an eight year period.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Johnson J at [65] - [88] provided a very useful summary of the relevant principles, particularly of relevant Court of Criminal Appeal authority. This authority has placed great emphasis on general deterrence, due to the prevalence of domestic violence, as well as the vulnerability of victims and breaches of trust involved. Specific deterrence and denunciation is also important.
Johnson J also quoted Wood CJ in R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436 who stated –
‘As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell (2000) NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.’
Her Honour went on at [77] –
‘These judicial statements are complemented by criminological research concerning domestic violence. An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control: J Stubbs, “Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence and Family Violence”, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House, Issues Paper 9, 2004, pp 6-7.
Her Honour then commented specifically on the relevant considerations when sentencing — ‘In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important’ at [86].
‘This is not to say that promotion of rehabilitation of the offender is not an important factor. It remains necessary to provide individualised justice in the circumstances of the particular sentencing decision. Nevertheless, the factors to which reference has been made above assume particular significance in the case of a domestic violence offender who has committed a series of offences over an extended period of time against different victims’ at [88].
While the respondent did have a mental illness, Her Honour found that it was not such as to reduce his moral culpability, or reduce the need for general deterrence, as he was aware of the gravity of the offending. In applying these principles to the facts, Johnson J found that the sentences imposed at trial were manifestly inadequate and did not reflect the ‘objective criminality’ that was involved. The respondent showed minimal remorse, was seeking to ‘justify his crimes’ and had a criminal record of assaults and breaches of apprehended domestic violence orders. The respondent was re-sentenced accordingly (See at [152]).
R v Kershaw [2005] NSWCCA 56 (1 March 2005) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of apprehended violence order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Rape, breach of an apprehended violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been married for 16 years and lived with their eight year old daughter. They had been arguing when the applicant pushed the complainant forcefully. She rang the police and obtained an apprehended violence order (AVO) restraining intimidating conduct and restraining the applicant from being at their premises under the influence of alcohol, liquor or drugs. The applicant arrived back at their premises and complained about the AVO. He then stripped naked. The complainant told the applicant that she was not willing to have sex with him and was not going to change her mind about the AVO. He then raped the complainant. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. A 10 percent reduction in sentence was made to take into account this guilty plea.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the discount for the guilty plea was appropriate, was not ‘meagre’ and was actually quite significant. Further, the applicant contended that the trial judge erred by taking a ‘harsh view’ in finding that the applicant and the complainant continuing their relationship is an issue with regards to the applicant’s rehabilitation. The complainant maintained a ‘favourable’ view of the applicant and the relationship (See at [21]). Bryson JA held that the complainant’s ‘forgiving and optimistic attitude’ should not play a large part in the sentencing decision. The trial judge was correct to conclude that the fact that the offence was committed against his wife was an aggravating factor. As per the trial judge, at [24] ‘The sentencing process is not and of course should not be in the hands of complainants, and the merciful or relenting attitude of a complainant does not reduce the gravity of the offence and does not have much effect on the interest of justice in imposing an appropriate sentence’.
The trial judge’s view that the gravity of the offence was severe was correct. Other aggravating factors included his previous conviction for assaulting his wife, the fact that offence was committed after ongoing supervision and a good behaviour bond was completed, and it was in breach of an AVO. This justified a correspondingly high sentence.
R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41 (23 February 2004) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of an apprehended violence order’ – ‘Break and entering a dwelling armed with an offensive weapon’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Purposes of sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breaking and entering a dwelling armed with an offensive weapon, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, breach of an apprehended domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The de facto relationship between the male respondent and the female complainant had ended in mid-2000. In 2001, the respondent was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and placed on a bond for two years. Six months later, the poorly disguised respondent crashed his car into the complainant’s car, which she was driving with her two children. The respondent then tried to force the complainant out of her car and punched her in the nose, eye and head. In 2002, the respondent broke into the complainant’s house and attacked her with a Stanley knife. The complainant’s new partner intervened. The respondent was sentenced to three years and nine months imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and nine months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Adams J stated at [47]:
‘Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. Unlike the casual robbery, where the victim is often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, the victim of a domestic violence offence is personally targeted. To my mind these considerations emphasise not only the need for general and personal deterrence but also of denunciation in cases of this kind’.
He found that the sentencing judge did not give adequate weight to the need for deterrence and denunciation. Further, the extent of injury committed by the offender is an important factor in assessing the appropriate measure of punishment and the sentence here did not adequately reflect the pain and suffering the respondent caused. Finally, the sentencing judge erred in imposing wholly concurrent sentences because there were two distinct and separate instances of violence against the complainant and her new partner. The respondent was re-sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment.
R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 (6 May 2003) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Defences’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Forensic psychiatrist’s evidence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of the manslaughter of her daughter, who died of malnutrition at the age of 14 months. The appellant refused to take the child to the hospital, against the advice of medical practitioners and friends. In a record of interview, the appellant said that she did not take the deceased to the hospital because her husband believed that children should not be infused with fluids or have any artificial substances injected into their bodies. At trial, the appellant gave evidence that her husband was controlling, verbally abusive and violent, and she was afraid to contravene his wishes. Defence counsel also called evidence from a forensic psychiatrist, Dr Nielssen. Dr Nielssen did not find that the appellant suffered from any kind of psychiatric disorder but that her situation fitted ‘battered wife syndrome’. As a result of this, the appellant accepted the decisions made by her husband, despite having reservations about them (See [31]). The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in summarising Dr Nielssen’s evidence altogether, as it related to the defence of duress. Rather, His Honour ought to have summarised the parts of Dr Nielssen’s evidence that were relevant to the subjective test, and then after describing the objective test, directed the jury’s attention to those parts of Dr Nielssen’s evidence that were relevant to that test and how a hypothetical person in the same circumstances, i.e. a battered wife, would have acted as to withdrawing from the relationship etc.
•
The trial judge’s summing-up on the evidence of battered wives syndrome from Dr Nielssen was inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, as per Durford J at [43], ‘although it is undoubtedly the duty of a trial judge in summing up to relate the different pieces of evidence to the different issues in the trial: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 105, this was a "single issue" trial and that single issue was duress. The evidence of Dr Nielssen about the battered wife syndrome was relevant to both the subjective and objective tests and there was no need to divide it up in a way which had not been suggested by either counsel in their addresses: Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 75at [59]-[60]’.
Second, a trial judge is not required to read or summarise the whole of the relevant evidence to the jury which has already been heard from witnesses, but merely to present a balanced summary of the salient parts which is fair to both sides. The evidence of Dr Nielssen was sufficiently and fairly summarised by the trial judge. Some of the questions and answers not repeated in the summing-up were merely elaboration of general propositions of the doctor which had been summarised, and one answer in particular which it was claimed should not have been omitted had been substantially paraphrased by the appellant's trial counsel in his final address (See [47]-[48]).
R v Palu [2002] NSWCCA 381 (17 September 2002) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Malicious grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Relevance of the attitude of the victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent and the male victim were drinking partners and got into a fight. The victim suffered a skull fracture. The sentencing judge adjourned proceedings and granted bail to the respondent on certain conditions, under s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
Issue/s: In light of the seriousness of the offence and because it was inevitable that a full-time custodial sentence had to be imposed, it was outside the exercise of His Honour’s discretion to make an order adjourning proceedings.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. This was not a case involving domestic violence but Howie J’s comments regarding the relevance of a victim’s attitude to sentence have been cited in subsequent domestic violence cases. Here, the sentencing judge was unduly influenced by the fact that the victim and the respondent were still friends. At [37] His Honour provided:
‘The attitude of the victim cannot be allowed to interfere with a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. This is so whether the attitude expressed is one of vengeance or of forgiveness: R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994). Sentencing proceedings are not a private matter between the victim and the offender, not even to the extent that the determination of the appropriate punishment may involve meting out retribution for the wrong suffered by the victim. A serious crime is a wrong committed against the community at large and the community is itself entitled to retribution. In particular, crimes of violence committed in public are an affront to the peace and good order of the community and require deterrent sentences: Henderson (NSWCCA, unreported, 5 November 1997). Matters of general public importance are at the heart of the policies and principles that direct the proper assessment of punishment, the purpose of which is to protect the public, not to mollify the victim’.
Howie J also noted that a sentencing judge should only give very limited weight to statements made by an offender to a psychiatrist or psychologist reproduced in reports, including expressions of remorse (See [39]-[41]).
Note: Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced on 25 September 2018 imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173 (15 May 2002) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Contrition’ – ‘Forgiveness by the victim’ – ‘Good character’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent to murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent to murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant began to suspect that his wife, the victim, was having an affair (an allegation without basis). One morning, while the children were at school, the victim was lying in bed and was struck several times, mainly on the head, with a bottle wielded by the applicant. The applicant said to the victim that he wanted to kill her because she did not respect him. He then tied the victim up and gagged her whilst continuing to threaten to kill her and then himself. The victim was not released until her children returned home from school and the victim lost a lot of blood. The applicant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years. In imposing this sentence, the sentencing judge made reference to the former good character of the accused and stated:
‘We must all accept the fact that differences in marriages do occur and it is expected that people will try and resolve any differences without violence. However to go to the stage of wanting to end the marriage by killing someone is quite unacceptable of course and quite frightening to the wider community. There can be no mitigating factors in such an act with that intention. We do accept the realities of marriages breaking up and people separating but we can never accept or tolerate any person killing someone as the solution. And so it is difficult with reference to a person being a man of good character up until now. It is difficult to know what relevance that has where a person has considered the final solution’ at [16].
The fact is that at the start of the assault that morning the prisoner did state and evidence an intention to kill. Such an expression and intention must immediately negate any consideration of mitigating factors because of good character, then to extend the trauma and terror of the assault all day until the late afternoon takes the actions of the prisoner into a further level of callousness’ at [17].
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge did not take into account the previous good character of the applicant when fixing the sentence.
•
The sentencing judge failed to consider the contrition of the applicant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, O’Keefe J noted that there is nothing wrong with a judge discussing the weight which should be given to the previous good character of an offender. While the sentencing judge’s remarks at [16] were unexceptional, the sentencing judge erred at [17] when he completely excluded the applicant’s previous good character as a mitigating factor and therefore did not take it into consideration in mitigation of the penalty (see [19]). However, the sentence imposed by the judge and the non-parole period were very lenient given the objective gravity of the offence and taking into account the subjective features of the applicant, and a lesser sentence would not have been appropriate in the circumstances. This ground of appeal was therefore dismissed.
Second, on the facts, it was arguable that the applicant showed contrition and further, the absence of an affirmative finding in relation to contrition by the sentencing judge was not to be regarded as a matter overlooked by His Honour (See [27]). Additionally, O’Keefe J commented on forgiveness of the victim at [28] and stated:
‘The fact that he expressed contrition to his wife and that she said that she forgave him did not detract from the duty of the judge to impose a proper sentence. Her views in relation to the contrition of the Applicant, as opposed to what he said to her, do not seem to have been tested. Furthermore, even the stated acceptance by the victim of her acceptance of her attacker's contrition does not bind the court, nor does it detract from the need to give proper weight to the principle of general deterrence, R v Kanj [2000] NSWCCA 408, a principle that is important in cases of domestic violence (R v Green [2001] NSWCCA 258; R v Glen [1994] [1994] NSWCCA 1). Furthermore, the fact that a victim may forgive her attacker is not determinative. Indeed, its weight in relation to general deterrence will be a variable depending on the offence and the circumstances. It is a matter for judgment by the sentencing judge’.
R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436 (5 October 2001) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Common assault, assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm, kidnapping.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 3 August 1999, the respondent assaulted his wife (the victim) in the presence of their three year old daughter by pushing her against a refrigerator, pursuing her into the bedroom and pushing her to the floor. After throwing and kicking items, he left the unit and the victim went to a friend’s unit for safety. The respondent arrived there an hour later and threatened to kill her if she did not return home. Police were called and the respondent assaulted these officers. The respondent was released on bail and became subject to an apprehended domestic violence order. On 7 October 2000, the respondent kidnapped the victim while she was walking along the street with her daughter. He drove her to his parents’ home and repeatedly punched and kicked her. The victim managed to escape and called the police. The sentencing judge imposed the following sentences:
•
Common assault: six months imprisonment.
•
Assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm: 18 months imprisonment, suspended upon the condition that he enter into a good behaviour bond.
•
Kidnapping: two years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six months and 12 days.
In imposing the sentence for kidnapping, His Honour found that there were special circumstances in that all of the offences of the respondent were ‘by-products of (his) anger and frustration and disappointment at the failure of (his) marriage and at the imposition of the apprehended violence order against (him)’.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the objective seriousness of the combination of the offences involved.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Wood CJ held that the sentence imposed failed to give sufficient weight to the objective seriousness of the offences and too much significance was attached to the emotional reaction of the respondent to being thwarted in the marriage, a circumstance that provided no excuse whatsoever for his behaviour (See [39], [52]). In relation to the assault of his wife, Wood CJ found that the offence involved the sustained use of physical violence causing fear in the presence of an equally terrified child. It could not be characterised as a momentary or uncharacteristic loss of self-control, as the aggression continued into the evening. Further, at [41]:
‘As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell (2000) NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence’.
Additionally, the kidnapping offence involved sustained violence by the respondent who caused substantial injury to his wife and again threatened to kill her. It was again committed in the presence of their young daughter and caused significant fear. Further, the sentencing judge failed to reflect three aggravating factors in the sentence namely, this was not an isolated act of violence, and the offence was committed while the offender was on bail and while the offender was subject to an apprehended violence order in relation to the same victim (See [47]-[51]). In re-sentencing the respondent, the court took into account the principle of double jeopardy (See [55]-[65]).
R v MacAdam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 (9 May 2001) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of an apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim had been married for 21 years before the victim left the family home and obtained an apprehended violence order. On the day of the offence, the victim was arriving at the Family Court accompanied by their four year old son when the applicant approached her and produced a knife, approximately 30 cm in length with a serrated edge blade. The victim fled but was chased by the applicant and almost fatally stabbed in the arm, back and stomach. The applicant was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years. A psychiatric report tendered from Dr Nielssen diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a major depressive illness and a personality disorder.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in failing to accept the findings of Dr Nielssen and in concluding that there was no evidence which established a link between the major depressive illness the applicant was suffering and the commission of the offence (See [51]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. In light of the opinion of Dr Nielssen and fresh evidence adduced, there was a link between the illness suffered by the applicant and the offence (See [58]). James J also noted that the sentencing judge’s conclusions regarding the severity of the attack (particularly in light of the apprehended violence order) were entirely open to him. The attack was very severe and showed a degree of viciousness. The offence was committed in breach of an apprehended domestic violence order and this was a significant aggravating factor (See [37]-[38]).
R v Grech [1999] NSWCCA 268 (6 September 1999) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Person in authority having sexual intercourse with person with intellectual disability’ – ‘Position of trust’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Person in authority having sexual intercourse with a person with intellectual disability x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male complainant, who had an intellectual disability, lived in a group home where the male applicant worked as a team leader. They formed a sexual relationship. The complainant gave evidence at trial that the sexual contact commenced when he turned 18 and that they loved each other. The applicant was found guilty after a trial of two counts of a person in authority having sexual intercourse with a person who has an intellectual disability under Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66F. The applicant was sentenced to a minimum term of three years imprisonment with an additional term of two years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentencing judge failed to adequately take into account the evidence of the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the complainant together with the lack of evidence of psychological or other injury suffered by the complainant and his borderline degree of intellectual disability.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Carruthers AJ held that even if one were to accept that there was a genuine mutual loving relationship on the facts (of which there was some doubt), this did not reduce the criminality of the applicant as assessed by the trial judge. His Honour noted that the legislature did not encumber s 66F(2) with qualifications and it was clearly intended to prohibit absolutely, persons with authority (as defined) having sexual intercourse with intellectually disabled persons over whom they have authority (See [32]). Deterrence looms large for offences under s 66F(2) as ‘it is the mark of a civilised society that those who are incapable fully of protecting their own interests, should be protected from exploitation by those in whom society vests the responsibility of caring for them. Carers who breach this trust must expect condign punishment’ (See [37]). The seriousness of the offence was explained by Carruthers AJ at [33]-[34]:
‘strong emotional relationships are quite capable of developing between carer and intellectually disabled person, whether they are of the same gender or not. It is essential, therefore, that persons in authority exercise the utmost care to avoid such situations developing, and immediately there are indications of such a situation arising, the obligation is on the person in authority to remove himself or herself from the relationship or, at the very least, immediately to seek expert counselling.
‘Neither of these courses was adopted in the subject case and, intolerably, the relationship developed into one of a continuing and prolonged violation of the provisions of s 66F(2). The applicant knew not only that he was in breach of his position of trust, but that he was in breach of the criminal law, and he was also aware that the complainant had previously been the victim of sexual exploitation and as a consequence a prior carer was serving a lengthy custodial sentence. The fact that the relationship may have developed, as the applicant contends, into a mutual loving relationship could fairly be described as an aggravating feature of the case rather than a mitigating factor’.
R v Kotevski [1998] NSWCCA 1 (3 April 1998) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing judge should not enter into a determination of the merits of matrimonial disputes’
Charge/s: Malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s estranged wife. Despite living apart and having commenced Family Court proceedings, they continued to work together in a takeaway food business. One day at work, they were arguing and the applicant ‘snapped’. He repeatedly stabbed the victim with a scraper and a trowel before picking up a long bladed knife and lunging at the victim. Someone heard the victim’s screams and managed to intervene. The applicant was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a minimum term of two years and three months.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in not taking into account, or in not sufficiently taking into account, the belief by the applicant that he had been unfairly treated by his wife and the applicant's consequential feelings of anger and frustration.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in declining to enter into a determination of the merits of the matrimonial disputes between the applicant and his wife.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by James J (Simpson J agreeing). First, the sentencing judge did not proceed on the basis that the applicant’s belief and feelings about his wife were irrelevant in the sentencing of the applicant. On the contrary, the sentencing judge appropriately took into account these feelings expressly when he noted that the attack by the applicant on his wife was not pre-meditated and that the applicant while subject to stress had ‘snapped’ and had ‘on the spur of the moment’ engaged in a ‘heated’ attack. His Honour was not required to take the applicant’s belief and feelings about his wife any further into account (10-11). Second, the sentencing judge was justified in adopting the position that he would not enter into a determination of the merits of the matrimonial disputes (i.e. who was right and who was wrong) and this was irrelevant to sentencing, except insofar as determining the attack was not pre-meditated (11-14).
R v O’Grady [1997] NSWCCA 1 (13 May 1997) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Detention against will with intent to carnally know the victim’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Factors not mitigating at sentence’ – ‘Public confidence in the criminal system’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, detention against will with intent to carnally know the victim.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim and the male respondent had previously been in a consenting sexual relationship but at the time of the offence the relationship had ended and they were merely seeing each other as friends. The respondent asked the victim for another chance at the relationship but the victim refused. He then threatened the victim with a knife and tied her up. The respondent fondled the victim and had penile intercourse with her without her consent. The respondent was sentenced to three years imprisonment, to be served by way of periodic detention for the aggravated sexual intercourse without consent and deferred sentence for the detention offence on the condition that the respondent enter into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of five years. In imposing this sentence, the judge found that these offences were ‘foreign’ to the respondent’s normal character, had their roots in compulsive gambling, and were an ‘aberration committed by a young man who loved a young girl’.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Sully J held that while there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the offences were ‘foreign’ to the respondent’s normal character, the offending did not have its roots in ‘compulsive gambling’ and nor could the objective seriousness of the offences be broken down as being no more than ‘an aberration committed by a young man who loved a young girl’. These were extremely serious offences which resulted from the breakdown of the relationship between respondent and the victim and the victim’s rejection of the respondent’s request to resume the relationship (See 8). As per Sully J at p. 9 that where a relationship breaks down:
‘ the woman who is involved in the relationship is entitled to feel that, whatever other consequences ensue, her personal safety will not be threatened at all, let alone threatened by the commission of criminal offences of the gravity of those with which we are now called upon to deal’.
In sum, the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate. They were wholly inadequate to denounce the violent rape, at knife point, of a defenceless young woman in what ought to have been the safety and security of her own home. They were wholly inadequate to properly denounce the victim’s violent and prolonged detention for that purpose. They were also wholly inadequate to deter both the respondent and other young men from similar behaviour. Further, very importantly, the sentences imposed were hopelessly inadequate to ensure that there is maintained public respect for and confidence in current standards of criminal justice (See 11). The respondent was resentenced to five years imprisonment for the sexual intercourse with consent offence with a minimum term of three years and three years imprisonment on the detention offence.
R v Rowe [1996] NSWCCA 1 (3 October 1996) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Family hardship’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Kidnapping, rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant lived in an ‘off and on’ de facto relationship over a period of five years and had two children together. Immediately prior to the offences, the relationship had broken down again. The applicant became jealous because he believed the complainant was seeing a new man. He then forced the complainant into his car, drove her to his premises, threatened to kill her family and this new man, and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her without consent. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with an effective minimum term of four years. The complainant wrote to the sentencing judge stating that she had resumed a relationship with the applicant, she did not want him to go to prison (particularly because of the trauma that would result to their children), and she had forgiven the applicant.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to his subjective features including his age, background, disrupted and violent upbringing, education and employment.
2.
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the wishes of the complainant
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing judge did not err when he rejected the claim that these subjective circumstances had a relationship to the commission of these offences and therefore ought to have mitigated the sentence (See 472). Second, Hunt CJ dismissed the contention that the sentencing judge ought to have given greater weight to the wishes of the complainant. As at 472-473:
‘This Court has said more than once that the attitude of complainants cannot govern the approach to be taken in sentencing. In Glen, Simpson J pointed out that, whilst forgiveness by the victim may be relevant in some cases, exceptional caution is required in allowing such evidence to be given in relation to domestic violence type offences. The present offences fell within the same category, where the nature of the relationship between the offender and the victim is such that the victim will frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attacker. The importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
‘This Court has also said more than once that the hardship upon the family of an offender will not be relevant in mitigation unless it goes beyond that which inevitably results in any case of incarceration and unless it is sufficiently extreme as to demand that the judge draw back. That has not been established in this case. It may be ironic, as has been suggested, that the victim and her children are going to suffer the punishment imposed upon the offender, but the fact remains that the law requires such a punishment to be imposed’.
R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim’s forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual intercourse with consent’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Sexual intercourse without consent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim had been in an intermittent relationship for two years and had a daughter together. The appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent in the front yard of his premises. At the time of offence, he was upset about his possible denial of access to his daughter.
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant did not appreciate when he pleaded guilty that he was acknowledging the absence of consent of the victim to sexual intercourse.
2.
The admission of guilt involved in the plea should be regarded as tainted and not a free and voluntary confession.
3.
The sentencing judge fell into error by failing to give adequate weight to the lack of any relevant prior record, the emotional background to the incident - including the appellant’s fears concerning future contact with his daughter, the remorse expressed and the attitude of the complainant.
Decision and Reasoning: As per Grove J (Loveday AJ and Simpson J agreeing) the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence was dismissed. First, counsel for the appellant at trial obtained adequate written instructions prior to the arraignment that the appellant wished to plead guilty. These evidenced that the appellant knew the consequences of pleading guilty (See 5-6). Second, the terms of the written instructions, the evidence of the solicitor and the lack of credibility attaching to the appellant’s assertion combine to made this ground of appeal untenable (See 7). Finally, none of the above matters were overlooked by the sentencing judge and no error was accordingly demonstrated. In particular, the sentencing judge made express reference to the attitude of the complainant, which cannot govern the duty of the court when proceeding to sentence (See 8).
After agreeing with the reasons of Grove J, Simpson J made further comments on the relevance of the victim’s attitude of the offences to the sentence which should be imposed. Her Honour provided:
‘In my opinion, exceptional caution should be exercised in the receipt, and the use, of evidence of that kind in cases that fall within the general description of domestic violence offences, of which this case is one. It is a fact known to the courts and to the community that victims of domestic violence frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attackers. It is said, and has been said so often and for so long as to be almost notorious, that it was this pattern of post offence forgiveness, accompanied by apparent remorse or contrition on the part of the offender, that prevented the prosecution of such offenders. In turn, it appeared that the victim of domestic violence was in a class different to the rest of the community insofar as the protection of the law was concerned. Domestic violence was not seen as a crime which attracted the sanction of the law in the same way or to the same extent as other crimes, whether or not of violence. The perpetrator of domestic violence was relatively safe to commit crimes with impunity, at least provided he or she (and, in the cases that have to date come before the courts, it has almost invariably been be) could attain the victim's forgiveness.
There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
For too long the community in general and the agencies of law enforcement in particular, have turned their backs upon the helpless victims of domestic violence. Acceptance of the victim's word that he/she forgives the offender, casts too great a burden of responsibility upon one individual already in a vulnerable position. Neither the community, the law enforcement agencies, nor the courts can be permitted to abdicate their responsibility in this fashion. Protection of the particular victim in the particular case is a step towards protection of other victims in other cases.
The second reason of principle for treating with extreme caution the evidence of the forgiveness of the victim in the circumstances of this case is that the legislature has, since 1982, made clear its intention that special considerations apply to offences of domestic violence’.
Supreme Court
R v He [2024] NSWSC 417 (31 May 2024) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Drug-induced psychosis’ – ‘Suicide attempt’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: In June 2020, the male offender murdered his 19 year-old girlfriend of two years, using a hammer and two knives to stab her at least 75 times with the intention to kill her. [1] The murder took place in the apartment they shared. [3] Shortly after, the offender attempted suicide by jumping off the fourth floor of the apartment building. [3] He sustained extremely severe traumatic brain and spinal cord injuries. [3] In October 2022, the offender entered a plea of guilty to murder. [9]
Issue: Whether the offender was operating under a mental illness, condition or impairment at the time of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was operating under self-inflicted psychosis. The offender was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years. [111]
The offender asserts that, at the time of the offence, he was suffering from a drug-induced psychosis caused by long term nitrous oxide use. [13] Having regard to expert evidence, Lonergan J concluded on the balance of probabilities that the offender was suffering from a self-inflicted transient drug-induced psychosis. [89] It was in that state that the offender ‘directed his rage’ to the deceased, killing her in a ‘frenzied and merciless attack’. [89] The objective seriousness of offending was subsequently ‘marginally reduced’: [90]
His moral culpability is also mildly reduced, noting however that it is appallingly self-indulgent to deliberately use and abuse an intoxicating inhalant to remove oneself from reality and responsibility for one’s own actions. This is what the offender did. I cannot exclude entirely the indicators that the attack was directed at [the deceased] as part of the offender’s own unjustified dissatisfaction with her, and that he was taking out on her his rage at his own failures and inadequacies, like so many men who murder their domestic partners, but I cannot make a finding beyond reasonable doubt that this was the, or a precipitant or motivating factor for this particular attack during which he murdered his domestic partner [91]
Justice Lonergan held the offending to be ‘extremely violent’, ‘above the mid-range of seriousness for offences of this type’. [94]
R v Dowling [2023] NSWSC 1620 (20 December 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Vulnerable group’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘History of domestic violence’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The male offender and male deceased had been in an ‘on and off’ relationship since at least 2004. Throughout, the offender had been physically violent towards the deceased, and was even sentenced to imprisonment for assaulting the deceased and damaging property. [6]
In the two weeks leading to the murder, neighbours reported the offender’s abusive behaviour towards the deceased, encouraging the deceased to separate from the offender. [9]
One night, the offender forced the deceased’s dentures backwards into his throat, causing the deceased to asphyxiate. [21] Four to five days later, police officers attending the house discovered the deceased’s body on the floor next to the bed. [37]
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 22 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years and 10 months. [121] Despite no evidence of premeditation, the offending was not ‘an isolated incident of violence’. Rather, it was part of a ‘history of violence conduct[ed] by the offender towards’ his intimate partner: [58]
There is an inherent degree of trust in a domestic relationship. Such trust is betrayed when one partner perpetrates violence upon the other, particularly in private. [61]
R A Hulme AJ observed the offender’s history of substance abuse, [74] significant criminal history (including violent offences), [90]; [110] and lack of remorse. [79] Further, Hulme AJ took into account the fact the offender was on parole at the time of committing the offence (‘for a very serious offence’). [104]
R v Knight [2023] NSWSC 321 (31 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Bugmy principles’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The Aboriginal male offender and Aboriginal female deceased were in a domestic relationship for 30 years. [1] Throughout, there were instances of domestic violence. Yet, it was observed that they ‘loved each other and were devoted’ to their eight children. [2]
In March 2021, the offender killed the deceased, stabbing her once with a knife in their home in the presence of one of their children. [22]–[23] At the time, the offender was subject to a protection order, preventing him from threatening or assaulting the deceased for a period of 12 hours after consuming alcohol. [12] The offender breached this order, being intoxicated when he stabbed the deceased. [38]–[41]
Decision and Reasoning: Offender sentenced to a non-parole period of 12 years and 5 months, with a balance of term of 5 years. [132]
Justice Yehia took note of the following aggravating features that increased the objective seriousness of the offence: the deceased was killed in her own home, with a knife and in the presence of her children. [46] That the offence was not intentional, deliberate or premeditated, but rather, an ‘impulsive and spontaneous act’ conversely lessened the gravity of the offence. [47] Accordingly, the offence fell below the middle of the range of objective seriousness. [50]
Justice Yehia was satisfied that the offender was ‘deeply remorseful’ of his actions, pleading guilty at the first opportunity and giving evidence in the sentencing proceedings. [75]–[77] Further, the offender’s moral culpability was significantly reduced, having regard to the offender’s background of disadvantage and deprivation. [88]
R v Dempsey [2023] NSWSC 205 (17 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Coercive Control’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The male offender brutally murdered his former de facto partner, and mother of his two young children, in her home. [1]; [15] The offender struck the deceased multiple times with a wooden plank, before placing her body in a filled bath tub.
The relationship was ‘volatile’, with the offender particularly ‘possessive, regularly intoxicated and often verbally abusive’ towards the deceased. [12] Until the murder, the offender had not been physically violent towards the deceased.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 19 years and 9 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 ½ years. [72]
Justice Haim held the offending to constitute ‘criminality of an extremely high order’: [33]
The fact that the murder represented an extreme case of domestic violence gives rise to the need to impose a sentence that will deter others from thinking they have some right to control the conduct of their former domestic partners [34]
Though not part of ‘an ongoing pattern of domestic violence’, the offence was ‘a manifestation of the offender’s controlling and possessive behaviour’. [34] It was spurred by the deceased’s desire to leave the relationship and move her children to another town.
The offence occurred in the deceased’s own home — an aggravating feature of the offence — and was carried out with a weapon. [37] In determining the sentence, Justice Hamil noted the offender’s lack of relevant criminal convictions (most of which concerned drug offences), [61] and delayed expression of remorse and acknowledgment of responsibility. [64]
R v Songcuan (No 3) [2023] NSWSC 183 (3 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Advanced age’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Common law’ – ‘Covid19’ – ‘Extreme provocation’ – ‘Female primary perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Homicide’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Male primary victim’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Otherwise exemplary character’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Proceeding: Sentencing hearing for manslaughter conviction.
Charge(s): Manslaughter.
Facts: The male accused and female deceased were married in the Philippines before immigrating to Australia. Their relationship had deteriorated over the decade prior to the wife’s death. Tension had escalated significantly during COVID lockdowns and the deceased wife was increasingly aggressive, controlling and violent towards the accused, believing him to be unfaithful to her.
The deceased had found a birthday card sent by a co-worker to the accused and an argument had ensued, during which the deceased wife struck the accused with a rolled-up canvas-photograph and threw a remote control. The accused went into the garage and was followed by the deceased, where she threatened the accused with pliers. The accused disarmed her, put his arm around her throat and hand over her mouth and applied pressure until she stopped breathing.
Decision and Reasoning: The accused was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 5 years.
Campbell J accepted the accused’s account of the deterioration of the couple’s relationship and the deceased’s aggressive, controlling and violent behaviour towards him. It was significant that were no allegations of previous domestic violence by the accused and there was evidence he had sought reconcile the relationship by seeking the intervention of their daughter and the local pastor.
Campbell J found that the manslaughter had been an isolated incident in which the accused had uncharacteristically lost self-control. The intensification of the deceased’s ongoing threatening, controlling and violent behaviour towards him was found to constitute intimidation (s13 Crimes Act (NSW)) and HH found that the manslaughter was one of extreme provocation, both cumulative and immediate.
The starting point were the principles of retribution and denunciation, particularly important in the context of an instance of serious domestic violence where the accused had clear moral culpability. However, the accused was found to have lived an ‘exemplary’ and ‘completely blameless’ pro-social life and his conduct was an ‘aberration.’ These factors in conjunction with his old age gave him strong prospects of rehabilitation and made him extremely unlikely to reoffend, reducing the relevance of deterrence. The accused’s early plea of guilty and the additional hardships imposed upon him by COVID-related delays were also taken into account.
R v Ahmed (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 105 (17 February 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Murder.
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and female victim were married and had immigrated from Bangladesh together. The relationship began to deteriorate, and the victim developed a romantic attachment with a mutual friend.
The offender became suspicious of their relationship, confronting the parties and expressing mental health concerns to his GP. He began to act aggressively and controllingly towards the victim, losing his temper, threatening to kill himself, tracking her location, calling her frequently at work and insisting she go to bed at the same time as him.
The victim began to express her desire to separate but agreed to take a break and travel to Bangladesh. During this time, the offender monitored the victim’s Facebook, messaged her requesting details of the minutiae of her life and searched on the internet for how to punish an unfaithful wife in Islam. Upon returning to Australia, the victim made it known that there was no future in their relationship.
On the day of the murder, the offender confronted the victim in her home about the affair and threatened her with a knife, demanding her phone. Upon seeing that the victim remained romantically involved with the friend, the offender stabbed her 14 times. As she died, he uploaded a photo and status on Facebook before calling triple-zero 20 minutes later and admitting to killing his wife.
Sentence: 24 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
While the offender was suffering an adjustment order, N Adams J was not satisfied that he was substantially impaired and found that the murder was one of a jealous and humiliated husband flying into a rage about his wife leaving.
The offence was a grave example of murder. While not premeditated, the evidence established that the victim was in fear of her life within the relationship. Her defencelessness and pleas for forgiveness, the brutality of the attack, the offender’s deliberate delay in calling 000 and failure to render any assistance, and his internet search of punishment prior to the killing all increased the seriousness.
The adjustment disorder slightly reduced the offender’s moral culpability and regard was had to his good prospects of rehabilitation and unlikeliness of reoffending, as he had demonstrated remorse, made admissions and had no criminal history.
R v Gina Kennedy (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWSC 1499 (4 November 2022) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Axe’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Killing of estranged husband’ – ‘Motivation of jealousy and revenge’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Planning’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charge: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to killing her estranged husband with an axe. She then handed herself into police the next day. Their relationship had been marred by domestic violence. Police had been called numerous times and their four children had been removed by Child Protection due to the offender’s assault on her eldest child. The deceased had assaulted the offender three times [101]. The offender had behaved in a jealous and controlling way towards her husband, did not like him talking to his mother, was jealous of him being with other women and conducted multiple online searches into methods of killing someone [102]. The offender killed the deceased in his home while he was asleep and while she was subject to an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order.
Issues: Appropriate sentence: had the offender killed her husband in self-defence or for motives of jealousy and revenge for him leaving the relationship?
Decision and Reasoning: Sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 19 years.
At [111] Adams J found that it was ‘a planned killing committed out of revenge and jealousy’ not due to the history of domestic violence. Her Honour reduced the sentence by 25% due to the offender’s early offer to plead guilty [172].
State of NSW v Monteiro (Final) [2020] NSWSC 881 (8 July 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault in the context of an intimate relationship’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assessment of whether defendant poses an unacceptable risk’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Extended supervision order’ – ‘False report’ – ‘High risk offender’ – ‘High/unacceptable risk of re-offending’ – ‘History of offending in the context of intimate relationships’
Charges: Aggravated sexual assault without consent x 1; Malicious damage x 1; Larceny x 1.
Proceedings: Extended Supervision Order (ESO) application.
Facts: The defendant had previously been found guilty of aggravated sexual assault without consent. The defendant never accepted responsibility for the offence and contested the charges at trial. At the time of the offence, the male defendant was in an intimate relationship with the female victim. The defendant was possessive, erratic, physically and verbally abusive and ‘intimidating and demanding’ towards the victim. The victim asked the defendant to move out of the parties’ shared accommodation and when they met to ‘hand over his keys’, the defendant physically assaulted and raped the victim. Later, when the victim went to report the assault to the police, it transpired that ‘the defendant had earlier made a false report that he had been assaulted by the victim and that she had threatened to invent a charge of rape’ as an attempt to pre-empt the victim’s report. While she was at the police station the defendant had returned to her flat and ‘destroyed the interior’ [14] of it, he overturned the fish tank killing her fish and damaged photographs and other personal items. The trial judge’s assessment of a high risk of re-offending is supported by the statements of two forensic psychiatrists. The defendant has been subject to a number of allegations of and charges relating to verbal and physical abuse and sexual assault in the context of historical intimate relationships (spanning from 1997-present).
Issues: Whether the Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.
Decision and reasoning: Extended Supervision Order made for a five-years including the requirement of electronic monitoring and reporting and restrictions on changing personal details (including the defendant’s name).
Allegations (not charged or prosecuted), withdrawn charges and/or dropped prosecutions are able to be relied upon by psychiatrists in assessing risk of re-offending. There is a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.
Note: The offender in this matter lodged an appeal against imposition of the Extended Supervision order, which he has not pursued, and has also sought an order revoking the imposition of the Extended Supervision Order imposed in this matter. Orders were made in respect of that matter on 24 February 2022 including an order that the self-represented applicant regularise the proceedings by filing a summons as initiating process in accordance with Rule 6.4(1)(h) UCPR stating the grounds upon which the revocation of the extended supervision order is sought. (Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 148 (24 February 2022)).
Transport Accident Commission v Haimour [2020] NSWSC 868 (8 July 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Legal error’ – ‘Motor Accidents Compensation (MAC) ACT 1999’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Permanent impairment guidelines for pre-existing or subsequent condition’
Proceedings: Judicial review of the Medical Assessment Review Panel assessment that the female first defendant’s whole person impairment (WPI) for psychiatric and/or psychological injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident was 21%.
Facts: The plaintiff argued that the assessment of the first defendant’s pre-existing and/or subsequent impairment for injuries unrelated to the motor vehicle accident was flawed because the domestic violence she was exposed to before and after the accident contributed significantly to the exacerbation of her symptomology. Based on collateral materials, the Review Panel found the first defendant was ‘subjected to a pattern of both physical and emotional abuse in a dysfunctional marriage which both pre-dated and post-dated the accident’. The first defendant ‘maintain[ed] that she was not the victim of any domestic violence before or after the accident’.
The Review Panel did not determine what percentage of the WPI was attributable to the motor vehicle accident and what percentage to domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Medical Assessment Review Panel decision set aside. Matter to be returned to the Review Panel. There was an error of law in:
the Panel’s failure to undertake for themselves an assessment of the degree to which one episode of trauma versus an unrelated episode of trauma or, in this case episodic trauma, contributed to the first defendant’s WPI for the purposes of the MAC Act.
Rakielbakhour v DPP [2020] NSWSC 323 (31 March 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Bail application - covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm - relevance of covid-19 pandemic to application for bail’
Offences: Common assault x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x1.
Proceedings: Application for bail
Issues: Whether to grant bail; Relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic
Facts: The female victim was married to the accused man and it is alleged that he believed she was conducting an affair with another man (his mother told him she exchanged telephone numbers with a real estate agent) at the time of the alleged offending. It is alleged that the accused became jealous and "punched the victim repeatedly to the face and body, before tackling her to the ground and continuing to punch her." [3] The accused then allegedly hit the victim in the head and face with a hair dryer. The victim had significant bruising and swelling as well as a laceration across the forehead and scratches to her neck.
The victim told police "she fell in the shower and hit her head on the step" [8] while the offender claimed to have not been home at the victim sustained the injuries and refused to give evidence. The offender pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Judgment: Bail granted subject to conditions. The judge noted that in some domestic violence cases, a victim’s refusal to provide evidence may be "a reason for hesitating before granting bail" due to the concern "that the psychology of the victim of domestic abuse is such that they do not want to implicate their intimate partner out of fear or out of love or loyalty. The release of the alleged perpetrator may heighten those emotions" [7].
The judge found that the applicant had a relatively minor criminal history and enjoyed significant family and community support. He accepted evidence demonstrating that the applicant and his father suffer from various illnesses, and that the applicant’s business was experiencing a significant downturn due to his incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic. Justice Hamill acknowledged that the pandemic and its associated risks were "matters properly to be taken into account" when considering a release application under s 18 of the Bail Act [15]. "Without attempting to be exhaustive, the pandemic may be relevant to the following paragraphs within s 18(1):
•
Section 18(1)(m) says it is relevant to consider "the need for an accused person to be free for any other lawful reason". That might (or must) include the need for an applicant to protect themselves from infection and to support their family if there is evidence to support such a finding. It is relevant to the present application because of the applicant’s father’s ill-health.
•
Section 18(1)(h) is also relevant. The length of time a person will remain in custody will often be affected by the measures courts are taking to ensure that participants in litigation are safe. As has been seen, many cases have been, and will be, adjourned or delayed.
•
Section 18(1)(l) relates to the need for the accused to prepare for their appearance in court or obtain legal advice. At present, all legal visits in NSW prisons are being conducted by video-link. While the same is probably true of most conferences between lawyers and their clients, the facilities within the prison system must be under great strain because so many court cases are being conducted by video link and the number of available audio-visual suites is finite.
•
Section 18(1)(k) refers to any "special vulnerability the accused person has". While not relevant to present application, the literature published by the Health authorities suggest Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are particularly susceptible to the spread of the virus."[15]
R v Edwards (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 1815 (18 December 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Controlling, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Lack of evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Sentencing -separation -following, harrassing, monitoring’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused was found to have killed his estranged wife in an unknown manner after she ended their relationship and rekindled a relationship with a man she had an affair with early in the marriage. The accused frequently monitored his estranged wife’s life.
Issues: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 18 years. At [67] Hulme J said: "Punishment, denunciation, and deterrence are particularly important aspects of the assessment of sentence in a case such as this. I endorse the following observations recently made by Wilson J: [in R v Keith Owen Goodbun [2018] NSWSC 1025 at [202]-[204]]
"[D]omestic violence is a profoundly serious problem in this community, extending, not infrequently, to the murder of a spouse or partner …
Too often, these are crimes committed by men against women who have chosen to live a separate life – a decision the male partner is not prepared to accept …
… The courts must ensure that those who commit offences like those now before this Court pay a heavy price for their crimes, to punish them, to denounce the crime, and to deter others. The victims of domestic violence must be protected insofar as the courts are able to afford them protection."
R v June Oh Seo [2019] NSWSC 639 (31 May 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor literacy skills’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim were in a ‘romantic’ relationship and lived together at the victim’s apartment. The victim found the offender to be possessive and controlling. The victim tried to end the relationship, but the offender threatened to commit suicide if she did. The offender eventually moved out of the victim’s apartment, but continued to contact her. On 7 October 2017, the offender went to the victim’s apartment. He punched her in the face, and then threw her body over the balcony railing. He did not call for help. The precise cause of death is not entirely clear. The offender had two prior convictions for common assault and contravention of an apprehended domestic violence order for which he was placed on bonds ([43]-[44]). The bond imposed on the offender for the assault was current at the time of the offending, and thus was breached ([45]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Wilson J convicted the offender of murder. Taking into account a further offence of assaulting and occasioning actual bodily harm to the victim, and his guilty plea, the offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 22 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 16 years and 10 months. Wilson J took into account the objective gravity of the crimes, the personal circumstances of the offender, and the relevant principles of sentencing.
The murder was found to be serious ([51]) and brutal ([57]). The victim was physically smaller than the offender, and was unable to sufficiently defend herself. An aggravating circumstance was that she was attacked in her own home – a place of peace and safety ([53]). The offender’s moral culpability was found to be high, as his conduct demonstrated a violent disregard for the victim’s right to autonomy, that is, to choose to end their relationship if she wishes ([59]). He acted from a profound sense of entitlement ([79]). Her Honour noted the ‘distressing frequency’ of the offender’s crime, and the significant role of general and specific deterrence in determining his sentence [79]-[84].
The offender’s background and the breach of his bond suggested that he had relatively poor prospects of rehabilitation ([85]-[86]). Further, the offender was a Korean national with limited English skills and no family locally. Although Wilson J took this into account when fixing the sentence, she was not persuaded that the offender’s circumstances were special or that the statutory ratio of the sentence should be varied ([87]-[88]).
R v Ahmed (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 517 (8 May 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Abnormality of mind’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Judge alone trial.
Facts: Mr Ahmed allegedly murdered his wife (the victim) by inflicting 14 stab wounds. He called 000, and told the operator that he had stabbed and killed his wife. He told police that he assaulted and threatened to kill her if she did not give him access to her phone, and that it was only after he read her recent text messages, which confirmed the continuation of an affair she had with Mr Khan, that he lost control and stabbed her. He also said that he did not intend to kill her. When Mr Ahmed killed the victim, he was suffering a mental illness, which the experts agreed was likely to have been an adjustment disorder, that being a form of depressive illness ([13]). He later offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, but this was not accepted by the Crown. At his trial, Mr Ahmed advanced a partial defence of substantial impairment under section 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which would, if established, reduce the conviction of murder to manslaughter ([1]-[5]).
Section 23A requires that Mr Ahmed establish, on the balance of probabilities, that at the time that he killed the victim:
•
He suffered an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition;
•
That abnormality substantially impaired his capacity to control himself; and
•
That his impairment was so substantial as to warrant his liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter.
Issues: The issue before the Court was whether the partial defence of substantial impairment could be established. There were also issues as to what should be made of Mr Ahmed’s various accounts and which expert’s opinion should be preferred.
Decision and reasoning: Mr Ahmed was convicted of murder and did not discharge his onus of establishing the partial defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind. In coming to this conclusion, Schmidt J considered the facts, as well as the issues about Mr Ahmed’s accounts and the experts’ competing opinions ([35]). His Honour noted that it was difficult to determine whether the stabbing was a result of Mr Ahmed’s ‘abnormality of mind’ or his deliberately acting on his feelings of humiliation and fury ([221]). This was explained by the diverging expert opinions ([222]).
Schmidt J agreed that Mr Ahmed suffered from an ‘abnormality of mind’ when he killed the victim ([25]), but held that this did not ‘substantially impair’ his capacity to control himself ([200]-[253]). He was satisfied that it had been established on the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that he deliberately acted on an intention, formed when he read the text messages, to kill the victim, instead of having an impaired capacity to control himself ([253]). Not only was Mr Ahmed well aware that the victim was intent on divorce, but he also suspected that it was the continuation of her relationship with Mr Khan which was driving her desire for a divorce. This led him to assault and threaten her in order to gain access to her phone, and then kill her when he read the text messages which confirmed his suspicions ([246]).
His Honour held that his sentence could not, in any event, be reduced to manslaughter, particularly in light of community standards. Mr Ahmed neither had a criminal record, nor any history of domestic violence, apart from one occasion in 2016 when he admitted to punching a wall in an argument. However, despite his prior good character, Mr Ahmed was found to have deliberately acted on his intention to kill his wife, evidenced by his deliberate delay in calling 000 until he was certain she had stopped breathing ([255]).
R v Ahmed [2019] NSWSC 55 (8 February 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Adverse media’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prejudice’ – ‘Social media’ – ‘Trial by jury’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for trial by judge alone.
Facts: Mr Ahmed allegedly murdered his wife (the victim) by inflicting 14 stab wounds. He called 000, and told the operator that he had stabbed and killed his wife. He told police that he assaulted and threatened to kill her if she did not give him access to her phone, and that it was only after he read her recent text messages, which confirmed the continuation of an affair she had with Mr Khan, that he lost control and stabbed her. He also said that he did not intend to kill her. When Mr Ahmed killed the victim, he was suffering a mental illness, which the experts agreed was likely to have been an adjustment disorder, that being a form of depressive illness. He pleaded not guilty to murder, but later offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, which was not accepted by the Crown. At his trial, Mr Ahmed advanced a partial defence of substantial impairment under section 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which would, if established, reduce the conviction of murder to manslaughter.
Issue: A key issue was that a fair trial was unlikely before a jury because of the significant general and social media posts about the accused and the homicide. There was a risk of prejudice from the adverse media and social media commentary about his racial background and faith.
Held: Schmidt J dismissed the application for a trial by judge alone.
The killing attracted substantial social media coverage, with such coverage being shared on Facebook pages of media organisations and ‘professed anti-Islamic’ groups. Many Facebook users shared ‘negatively biased views against Mr Ahmed’ ([26]), and the majority of comments were either directly or indirectly racist ([27]). Some of this adverse coverage focused on his background as a Bangladeshi immigrant and presumed membership of the Muslim faith ([32]). However, as per the Court in Hughes v R [2015] NSWCCA 330, an offender who is subject to intense community interest may still be able to receive a fair trial ([33]). The Court in Hughes v R stated that the modern world is one of instant, largely unregulated communication of opinions, ranging from mild to extreme, which can be accessed and responded to by others. However, there is good reason to continue in the expectation that, notwithstanding advances in technology and what they permit, jurors will decide cases on the basis of evidence, the judge’s directions, and the submissions advanced at trial.
Schmidt J held that a jury would be required to be directed at trial to impartially approach the issue as to whether he has a partial defence, and to make its decision only on the evidence, the parties’ submissions and the judge’s directions, rather than on the basis of their own enquires on the internet ([35]). His Honour held that ‘there is no question that there is a risk, which exists at every trial, that a member of the jury will not adhere to such directions, but will access prejudicial material of the kind on which Mr Ahmed relies, to advance this application’ ([36]). Nevertheless, as observed in Hughes v R, it has been long settled that jurors will ‘approach their tasks conscientiously’. In Schmidt J’s view, the stereotypical opinions expressed on social media about Mr Ahmed would not necessarily deprive him of a fair trial before the jury, even though it may have to consider some distressing photographs of the victim’s injuries ([38]). The issues for determination in relation to the domestic violence killing had nothing to do with his racial background or religion, but on his mental state and whether that entitles him to a partial defence ([37]).
Note: Schmidt J refused Mr Ahmed’s application for a judge alone trial. However, only days before the trial was due to commence, a large volume of documents was served, which included internet searches by Mr Ahmed about punishing adulterous wives. The Crown consented to the offender being tried by a judge alone. Therefore, a trial by judge alone order was made under section 132(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). See R v Ahmed (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 517 (8 May 2019).
R v Raquel Hutchinson [2019] NSWSC 25 (31 January 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender, with the help of her new fiancé, murdered her ex-husband after luring him to his townhouse, where she was lying in wait for him. When he returned home, he was struck and punched many times, resulting in a broken nose. There was also evidence that an electrical prod or Taser was used during the assault. He later died of asphyxia. The major perpetrator of the violence was found to be the offender due to the anger and hatred she had for the victim as he had custody of their two children. One of those children, their son, was present in the house at the time of the offence and witnessed many of the events leading to his father’s death ([4]-[11]).
Issues: The issue was the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. In Hamill J’s opinion, this was a serious example of manslaughter because of the planning and premeditation involved in the assault. Even though there was no intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, the fact that the intention was formed whilst the offender was in a rage adds to the gravity of the manslaughter. There were various aggravating features, the most serious being the fact that the offence was committed in the presence of a child ([26]). She exposed her son to the extreme brutality of the assault and killing of his father, which resulted in emotional and psychological damage. Another powerful aggravating feature was the fact that the offence was committed inside the victim’s home – a place where people are entitled to feel protected and safe ([27]). The psychiatric incapacity of the offender also played an important role in reducing her liability from murder to manslaughter, and was relevant to the subjective component of self-defence and to her defence of substantial impairment. The offender’s personal circumstances were considered. She was a victim of child sexual abuse, had a long-standing substance abuse disorder and a history of psychiatric problems ([36]). Although it was found that she tried to be a good mother, Hamill J was not satisfied that she was a person of good character due to her bad associations, erratic behaviour and chronic drug dependence ([38]). However, given her lack of significant prior offences and the efforts she made in custody, his Honour was satisfied that she had good prospects of rehabilitation and was unlikely to reoffend. She also made an early plea of guilty to manslaughter.
R v AKB [2018] NSWSC 1628 (2 November 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender and deceased married in Iran. The offender started a fire in his wife’s bedroom in the family home. She died in the fire. Their relationship prior to the fire had ‘deteriorated’ [5]. Davies J accepted that the offender became aware of the deceased’s intention to leave him. This was confirmed by the offender’s visit to the Department of Human services the day before the fire where he made a claim for a benefit, on the basis that he was separated. His Honour also accepted beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was responsible for the fire in the presence of their two young children.
Issues: Davies J determined the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 36 years with a non-parole period of 27 years. His Honour remarked that ‘[t]he murder of any person is intolerable and unacceptable, but the circumstances of this murder can only be described as confronting, shocking and gruesome to a marked degree’ ([24]). The murder was aggravated by the fact that it was carried out in the presence of their two young children, in circumstances where the offender actively prevented one of their children from trying to save his mother, and at the deceased’s home where she was entitled to feel safe. It also involved gratuitous cruelty and planning and preparation (albeit minimal, [32]). However, his level of culpability was not so extreme so as to attract a life sentence. Whilst specific and general deterrence are important factors in sentencing for murder in a domestic setting (see Hiron v R [2007] NSWCCA 336), specific deterrence was not significant because of the offender’s low risk of reoffending. This was consolidated by the fact that the offender had no prior criminal record, the offence was committed against a person known to the offender (rather than the public at large) and his older age. His Honour concluded at [37] –
‘This was a very bad murder, but the limited planning, the absence of the need to give significant weight to community protection, and the fact that a lengthy sentence will meet the need for specific deterrence, mean that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can be met by other than the imposition of life sentence.’
Although his Honour noted that the offender had no prior convictions, he was not able to mitigate the enormity of the crime against the deceased ([46]). Further, his Honour found it difficult to see how the offender could be fully rehabilitated without acknowledging the shocking act against his wife and the impact that it continued to have on their children and the deceased’s family. Accordingly, his prospects of rehabilitation were only average.
R v Cahill (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 2025 (12 October 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Trial.
Facts: The accused and the victim were in a relationship, characterised by incidents of violence by both sides. They immigrated to Australia from Ireland and shared accommodation with different people over a period of time. The accused stabbed the victim in the neck, resulting in his death. This matter relates to the additional evidence that Johnson J demanded from the Crown in R v Cahill (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1531. This evidence related to things said by the victim to other persons with respect to events concerning the accused ([2]). Firstly, the Crown sought to tender a statement by a man who claimed that the victim told him that the accused hit him when he was sleep ([3]). He also stated that the victim told him that the accused had sent him a text that she would kill him ([25]). Secondly, the Crown sought to tender evidence arising from another man’s statement that the victim told him that he was attacked by the accused with a screwdriver ([16]).
Issues: Whether certain evidence is admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The decision involved rulings made on admissibility of evidence (see [12], [14], [24] and [28]). With respect to the first statement, the Court held that the passage of time and the lack of precision as to the incident to which the statement related affected the question as to whether or not it ought to be admitted as evidence of truth of the fact ([10]). However, the Court held that this evidence will be admitted at the trial, but the jury will be directed that it cannot be used as evidence of the truth of the facts of the matters asserted in the representation ([11]-[12]). The Court did not allow the Crown to adduce the additional statement about the text message as there was no indication as to when it was sent. The absence of any time when it was said to have occurred significantly reduced the evidentiary use of the material ([25]-[28]). With respect to the second statement, the Court considered s 65 of the Evidence Act 1995 and admitted it as evidence of the truth of the fact ([21]-[24]).
R v Cahill (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1531 (11 October 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Trial.
Facts: The accused and the victim were in a relationship, characterised by incidents of violence by both sides. They immigrated to Australia from Ireland and shared accommodation with different people over a period of time. The accused stabbed the victim in the neck, resulting in his death. The defence adduced evidence from various people, such as an ex-partner of the victim and the father of another ex-partner. Both provided supporting evidence of incidents of violence during the relationships ([92]-[93]). The Crown submitted that the material lacked significant probative value as it was expressed vaguely and was remote in time from the events in the trial ([94]). The Crown also sought to have admitted as relationship evidence the totality of the evidence sought to be tendered for tendency purposes together with additional evidence of the accused’s various roommates ([96]-[98]).
Issues: Whether certain evidence of the Crown and defence was able to be adduced.
Decision and reasoning: The judgment by Johnson J deals with a number of evidentiary issues, involving tendency and relationship evidence ([99]-[123]). With respect to the statements by an ex-partner and the father of another ex-partner, the events to which they referred were significantly remote in time from those relevant to the trial and did not involve the accused. Consequently, his Honour did not allow the accused to rely upon this evidence for tendency purposes ([114]-[119]). Further, Johnson J was satisfied that the evidence tendered by the Crown should be admitted as relationship evidence ([99]-[103]). At [120]-[122], Johnson J sought further submissions about particular areas of the tendered material. These areas related to the Crown’s intention to adduce evidence of things said by the victim to other persons with respect to events concerning the accused.
R v Jenkin (No 10) [2018] NSWSC 705 (18 May 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Audio visual link’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of witnesses’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Applications to adduce evidence from former partner of accused and to give evidence via video link.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for murder of an associate. The prosecution sought to adduce evidence from the defendant’s former partner describing assaults he committed against her while he was on drugs ([5]). The prosecution sought to establish a tendency to ‘detain persons and to intimidate and physically assault them’ ([3]).
Issues: Whether the evidence should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: Most of the evidence was not admitted because it did not show that the accused had a tendency to detain persons ([8]). One paragraph of the evidence was admitted because it evidenced the defendant locking her in a room and making sure she couldn’t leave ([14]). While the evidence concerned uncharged acts of violence, the judge considered that there was little risk of prejudice given that the trial is a judge-alone trial ([14]).
The former partner applied to give evidence via videolink after evidence from psychologists stated that giving evidence would be an extremely stressful situation. The judge accepted that using the videolink facility would reduce her trauma. The defence’s ability to assess her credibility was not significantly compromised ([18]).
R v TP [2018] NSWSC 369 (23 March 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Negligent manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender’s partner, JK, committed serious acts of physical and psychological violence against the defendant and her two daughters for years ([4]), including striking them with sticks, tying one of them (CN) to a bed and hitting her with wooden slats ([13]-19], [36]-[38]). The worst of the violence was directed towards CN, which eventually resulted in her death. By her plea of guilty, the offender acknowledged that her failure to remove CN from the violence and obtain medical treatment for her serious injuries was the cause of her death ([3], [25]). Expert evidence established that the offender suffered from ‘battered wife syndrome’ - a syndrome likely to exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression caused by repeated exposure to violence ([5], [40]-[41]).
Issues: The issue was the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: Hamill J remarked that ‘[the] criminal law is a blunt tool in circumstances such as these’ ([8]). The offender’s psychological conditions substantially impacted the application of the principles of sentencing, the purpose of punishment and reduced the ultimate sentence. The impact was significant for various reasons. Firstly, there was a clear and direct link between the violence suffered by the offender and her criminal neglect of CN ([55]). Secondly, the weight afforded to general deterrence was greatly reduced ([56]-[57]). Thirdly, the offender’s rehabilitation through regular visits to psychologists and psychiatrists would be interrupted if a full-time custodial sentence was imposed ([58]). Fourthly, a custodial sentence would weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person who does not suffer from the severe depression, grief and post-traumatic stress disorder ([59]). Fifthly, the offender was unlikely to re-offend ([60]). The offending was aggravated by CN’s young age and fragility after her long-term exposure to abuse ([62]). Having considered all possible alternatives, including a fine, bond or community service order, Hamill J concluded that only a period of imprisonment was appropriate ([78]). His Honour sentenced the offender to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months ([79]-[80]). Annexed to the judgement, at [82], is a useful summary of comparable cases. However, there are no cases in the annexure that had precisely the same features as this one.
Franklin v Commissioner of Police [2018] NSWSC 310 (14 March 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Scope of subpoenas’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault x 1.
Case type: Application
Facts: The Plaintiff was charged with assaulting his wife ([2]). The Plaintiff issued a number of subpoenas to the Commissioner of Police and a hospital, seeking material including all police records for the immediate proceeding, the victim, all attendances at their home, all records of complaints proceedings instigated by the Plaintiff against the police, copies of notebooks of certain officers, and copies of all internal police communications in relation to the proceedings ([3], [28]).
At a hearing on 5 April 2017 in a Local Court, the police objected to the subpoenas on the basis that they were too wide ([29]). The Plaintiff then issued two more subpoenas to prosecution witnesses, which were also objected to on the grounds of absence of legitimate forensic purpose and public interest immunity ([34]). At a hearing on 18 and 19 July 2017, the magistrate allowed access to some documents but refused access to others ([36]).
Issues: The Plaintiff appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on 5 April 2017 on 5 grounds outlined at [37]. The Plaintiff appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on 19 July 2017 on 8 grounds outlined at [51].
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed because there was no error of law and no basis for a grant of leave for the Plaintiff to rely upon the grounds of appeal ([46], [81]).
Justice Johnson appeared to refer to the Plaintiff being self-represented at [80]:
I provided the Plaintiff with ample opportunity at the hearing on 2 and 10 November 2017 to advance arguments in support of his claim for relief. I have considered those arguments in this judgment, perhaps in greater detail than is called for by the limited statutory avenue of appeal which is available. One reason for taking this approach was to resolve what appeared to be a heavily litigated issue by the Plaintiff at the interlocutory level ahead of the summary hearing in the Local Court. It is appropriate that the way be cleared for the hearing and determination of the charge against him.
R v Fesus (No 9) [2018] NSWSC 176 (23 February 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Factors effecting risk’ – ‘Historical offence’ – ‘Historical sentencing practice’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant was convicted of the 1997 murder of his 18-year-old wife. The judge found that the defendant strangled his wife after she proposed to leave him and take the children with her ([50]). The defendant denied the allegations and attempted to cover up the murder, but later made admissions to an undercover police officer in 2013 ([23]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Johnson had regard to sentences imposed for similar cases in 1997 ([88]-[93]) and imposed a head sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years and 6 months ([98)). At [50]-[51] Johnson J explained:
The Offender murdered his young wife in the course of a domestic dispute arising from her declaration that she proposed to leave him and take the children with her. Although the Offender and Jodie had lived together for about two years, they had only been married for three months at the time of her death. Jodie was a young mother who, despite her considerable life experience at that time, was barely an adult. The Offender was 26 years old at the time of the offence.
The fact that the marriage was breaking down (after only three months) does not assist the Offender. It has been observed that killings within a domestic situation occur very often when there has been a build-up of tension between the killer and victim over a period of years: R v Whitmore [1998] NSWCCA 75 at [16]. That is not the position in this case. Here, the Offender murdered his very young wife at a time of marital strain after just three months of marriage.
Justice Johnson also noted the lack of previous domestic violence, and the prevalence of choking in domestic violence:
The evidence does not suggest a prior history of domestic violence on the part of the Offender towards Jodie. That said, their relationship was not a particularly long one and his response to Jodie’s desire to leave was a savage and homicidal one.
The use of choking in the course of domestic violence is now well recognised as a gross form of control with a capacity (as occurred here) to cause death: Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 at [75].
R v Stephen (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 167 (6 February 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Abused person’ – ‘Court processes’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Application by the accused to sit outside the dock.
Facts: The accused was on trial for murder for stabbing the victim, who was her husband. It was undisputed that at the time of stabbing, she had been subjected to severe violence at the time of the offence, and for over a year prior to the stabbing (see R v Stephen (No. 3) [2018] NSWSC 168 (20 February 2018) ). The accused made an application to sit outside the dock, next to her legal team. The Crown supported the application ([1]-[2]).
Issues: Whether the judge should exercise his discretion to grant the request pursuant to s 34 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused.
Justice Button weighed up the countervailing factors. Factors in favour of granting the application were that the accused had been on bail for many months, she was not a security risk, she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, and she argued that sitting in the dock will be prejudicial for the jury ([3]-[6], [9]). Factors weighing against granting the application were that the accused is not a child or a person suffering from a disability, that the dock is a traditional symbol of the gravity of the proceedings, that there is no inconvenience for the accused being in the dock, and she is charged with a very serious offence ([8], [10]-[14]).
Justice Button concluded that there was nothing exceptional about the matter to justify the request being granted. The next day, his Honour received further submissions with more detailed evidence about the accused’s mental health issues but declined to alter the ruling ([18]).
R v McMaster [2017] NSWSC 1063 (16 August 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Co-operation with police’ – ‘Drug abuse’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Firearms’
Charges: Possession of unauthorised firearm x 1; Intimidation x 1; Handling firearm while intoxicated x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: While under the influence of alcohol and cocaine, the defendant repeatedly called and texted the complainant, his ex-partner ([5]). He drove to her house with the gun in the passenger seat (of which she took photographs). He aimed the gun at her with his finger on the trigger. He ultimately returned to his vehicle ([3]). The defendant refused to co-operate with the police or disclose the location of the firearm ([5]). The defendant had been in custody for four months ([6]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted. The application was opposed by police.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Harrison refused bail. The decisive matter was that the complainant had not revealed the location of the firearm, so there was a real possibility that he would have unrestricted access to it if he was released. But for this matter, Harrison J would have granted bail with appropriate conditions.
R v Walker (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 1049 (10 August 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Not unfairly prejudicial’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Voir dire.
Facts: The accused was on trial for murdering his de facto partner. During the relationship, neither the victim nor the police had obtained an AVO against the accused, despite evidence of injuries caused by the accused ([3]). The Crown sought to adduce hearsay evidence of statements the victim had made to her doctor. In a discussion about the victim taking out an AVO, the victim had said ‘I don’t deserve it’ and ‘don’t want to cause trouble’ ([1]).
Issues: Whether the evidence was admissible.
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence was admitted.
The statements fell within an exception to the hearsay rule because they were evidence of the victim’s state of mind (s 66A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) ([5]). Nevertheless, the accused argued that the statements should not be admitted for three reasons:
•
the statements were not relevant because they could not affect an assessment of the probability of the existence of a disputed fact ([5]);
•
the statements would result in unfair prejudice, because the victim had made contradictory statements that were not admitted ([6]); and
•
the statements were simply likely to invoke sympathy for the deceased ([7]).
However, Schmidt J held that the statements should be admitted for three reasons:
•
the statements allowed the jury to consider why the victim never sought an AVO despite complaints of violence ([9]);
•
the statements allowed the jury to consider the reliability of other hearsay representations to establish the tendency evidence led by the Crown ([9]); and
•
the doctor to whom the representations were made was available to be cross-examined (citing R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494, per Heydon JA at [12]).
Therefore, the statements were not unfairly prejudicial ([11]).
Romero v DPP [2017] NSWSC 1190 (17 July 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Error of law’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Orders’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Procedure’ – ‘Remitted to local court’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of common assault against his former partner ([1]). The police applied for an apprehended domestic violence order ([3]). The Magistrate conducted the summary trial on the basis that the Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to hear the criminal proceedings and civil proceedings for apprehended violence orders concurrently, which was incorrect ([5], [15]).
Issues: Orders to be made.
Decision and Reasoning: The DPP conceded that the Magistrate erred in law, so the only contentious point was in relation to the orders to be made. First, McCallum J ordered the DPP to pay half of the plaintiff’s costs, since the plaintiff had been denied a hearing according to law ([22]). Second, the parties sought an order remitting the matter to a ‘differently constituted Local Court’ ([23]). Judge McCallum considered that there was no need for an order to a ‘differently constituted’ Court in the absence of apprehended bias or prejudgement ([24]). Judge McCallum remitted the matter of the assault charge to the Local Court to be heard and determined according to law.
R v De Beyer [2017] NSWSC 752 (13 June 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children's evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Judgement on the admissibility of relationship evidence.
Facts: The accused and deceased were married. The accused was on trial for her murder. It was the Crown case that the accused had stabbed his wife. He gave evidence that she stabbed herself. The prosecution case was circumstantial ([1]).
Issues: Whether evidence of the accused and deceased’s relationship was admissible ([2]).
Decision and Reasoning:
Evidence that was admitted without objection:
•
Eyewitness evidence from the accused and deceased’s son and daughter, including witnessing the accused punching and kicking the deceased, throwing things at the deceased and threatening to kill her ([3], [17]).
•
Statements made to the police by one child, the deceased and police officers after police attendance at a violent incident ([9]-[10], [15]).
•
Parts of recordings made by the deceased of arguments between her and the deceased ([13], [25]).
Evidence that was objected to, and admitted:
•
A conversation between the deceased and her sister, including statements that the accused would not let the deceased out of the house or have a phone “because he was scared she would call the police”, and that she would not leave him “because if he found her he would kill her” [23]. The statements were objected to on the basis that they were representations of the accused state of mind ([23]). The Court held that they were expressions of fear, and were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule ([24]).
•
Notes and diary entries made by the deceased, which included assertions of fact about episodes of abuse, and statements about the deceased’s state of mind about the relationship ([31]). Only general statements of fact were admitted, because they were not hearsay evidence ([30]).
Evidence that was not admitted:
•
Statements made by the deceased to her daughter that the accused attempted to drown her. The daughter only recollected these statements once she was shown the deceased’s diary. The daughter’s recollection did not appear to be firm. Therefore, Hidden AJ held that evidence was not highly probable to be reliable ([20]-[22]-[22]).
R v Biles (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 525 (3 May 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Pattern of behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender was found guilty at trial of murdering the victim, his 18-year-old girlfriend and mother of his child ([2]). Both were of Aboriginal descent ([32]). He had frequently been violent towards her over their relationship of two years ([8]). The murder occurred after both had consumed alcohol throughout the day ([13]). Six other women were in the house ([4]). The offender dragged her from the kitchen into the bedroom ([15]). There were no witnesses to the attack in the bedroom, but witnesses gave evidence that the deceased screamed for approximately twenty minutes before falling silent ([17]). When the police arrived, the bedroom was covered in blood, and she was declared dead at the scene ([21]). She had injuries consistent with multiple blows to the head ([24]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Fagan J sentenced the offender to 24 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years.
His Honour considered that the murder was in the middle of the range of objective seriousness ([31]). He considered that the deceased’s young age, vulnerability, and the fact that the offender lied to other women who tried to intervene, all contributed to the seriousness of the offence ([31]).
His Honour examined the offender’s personal circumstances ([32]-[38]). His verbal comprehension was in the lowest 1% of the general population, a circumstance which contributes to a higher propensity to violence ([34]). He had a criminal history since 15 years old ([39]), but he proved unresponsive to good behaviour bonds and community service orders ([42]-[47]).
His Honour considered that these offences were the culmination of a course of domestic violence (see from [52]). His Honour remarked at [52]:
‘The experience of courts in this State has shown that men who perpetrate violence against their female partners do not stop after one occurrence. Often they become accustomed to inflicting violence of escalating severity.’
On the failure of the other women in the house to call the police, his Honour said [55]:
‘The apparent lack of a sense of urgency amongst the other women in the house … may have been due to resignation amongst them; a feeling that to some extent domestic violence is inevitable and must be endured and, perhaps, that it is a matter private to the couple, in which others should not interfere. None of that is so.’
R v Adams (No 6) [2016] NSWSC 1565 (4 November 2016) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Judge-alone trial’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Tendency’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Judge-alone trial judgment.
Facts: On 27 September 2016, the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder of Mary Wallace (the deceased) on 24 September 1983. A significant part of the Crown’s circumstantial case was that the accused possessed a tendency at the time of the alleged murder to choke or strangle women in order to force them to submit to having penile/vaginal sexual intercourse with him. The Crown led evidence of three women who had alleged that they had been sexually assaulted by the accused.
Issue/s: Whether the accused was guilty of the charge of murder.
Decision and Reasoning: In reaching this decision, His Honour first listed the legal matters he took into account in reaching the verdict (see [320]-[359]). Most relevantly, Justice Button noted that it would have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of offence the accused possessed a tendency to strangle women to cause them to submit to intercourse with him. This was for at least two reasons: (1) there was authority that tendency must be proven to the criminal standard in order to be taken into account (see the discussion of HML v The Queen in DJV v R at [30], and R v Matonwal & Amood at [92]). (2) In the circumstances of this case, it was agreed between parties that the alleged tendency was an indispensible intermediate fact with regard to the guilt of the accused (Shepherd v The Queen)(see [337]-[339]).
Justice Button then stepped through his sequential reasoning for reaching the verdict of guilty (see [360]-[493]). One of the steps in this reasoning was that His Honour found that the accused possessed a tendency to rape women and to strangle them ancillary to that crime. This was after considering the evidence of three women (see [419]-[420]).
In light of the following evidence, at [491]-[492], Justice Button held that the accused’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt:
‘the proven tendency of the accused to rape and strangle women; the marked similarities between his interaction with the deceased and his interactions with women whom, I am satisfied, he had raped and strangled; the fact that the deceased has never been seen again after she was in the company of the accused; the fact that, within 48 hours of his interaction with the deceased, the accused undertook an activity relating to his boot that featured the use of a hose; the fact that hairs (which shared a reasonably rare profile with those of the deceased) were seized from the boot of his vehicle, and not disputed at trial to be from the deceased; and the fact that, on any analysis, the accused had ample time to dispose of the body’.
Justice Button concluded: ‘the accused treated the deceased very much as an object, just as he had treated three other young women’.
R v Silva [2015] NSWSC 148 (6 March 2015) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist’ – ‘Manslaughter by excessive self-defence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sentence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter by excessive self-defence.
Hearing: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender stabbed and killed her partner, James Polkinghorne. The relationship had been characterised by escalating physical and verbal abuse from the deceased towards the offender. On the 13 May 2012, the deceased made increasingly threatening and abusive telephone calls and messages to the offender. That night, he went to the home of the offender’s parents, where the offender was present. He was highly aggressive and high on methylamphetamine. The facts of what followed were confused and confusing (see [29]-[36]). In summary, the deceased threatened to kill the offender, he assaulted the offender, and the offender’s brother and father intervened. They began fighting with the deceased. The offender retrieved a knife from inside and, while the offender was on top of her brother, stabbed and killed the deceased. The offender was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 18 months imprisonment, wholly suspended was imposed. Hoeben CJ first made a number of factual findings. At [38] His Honour found that:
‘the offender stabbed the deceased with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm because she believed her act was necessary to defend not only herself but her brother and father. However, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, the offender’s conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as she perceived them, thereby rendering her guilty of the crime of manslaughter by way of excessive self-defence’.
His Honour also had regard, with some qualifications, to the evidence of Associate Professor Quadrio, a consultant psychiatrist. In her report, Professor Quadrio concluded that during her relationship with the deceased, the offender developed chronic and complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with particular features which were described as ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’. She also concluded that the offender continued to suffer from PTSD. Hoeben CJ found at [40]:
‘In the absence of any psychiatric opinion to the contrary, I would normally accept such a diagnosis. In this case I am not prepared to do so. This is because the diagnosis is based upon significant pieces of history from the offender which are different to the evidence at trial and to what the offender said in her ERISP. I am prepared to accept that the offender currently suffers from PTSD. The events of the night of 13 May 2012 would of themselves be sufficient to bring about such a condition and there is no reason to doubt the existence of the symptoms which the offender described following the deceased’s death. What I am not prepared to accept is that the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was due to the offender’s relationship with the deceased and was in existence before the deceased’s death’.
However, His Honour did accept that the offender stabbed the deceased when she was in a highly emotional and hysterical state (see [41]-[43]).
In reaching an appropriate sentence, Hoeben CJ took into account a number of considerations. These included that specific deterrence were not relevant in light of the offender’s rehabilitation and the unlikelihood of re-offending (see [58]). General deterrence was not accorded substantial weight in light of exceptional factual circumstances (the deceased had made escalating threats of violence approaching the offender’s home and the offender’s state of mind was affected by being already brutally assaulted and witnessing the struggle between her family members and the deceased) (see [59]). The objective seriousness was at the lower end of the range as was the offender’s culpability (see [60]-[61]).
As against these matters, Hoeben CJ had regard to the sanctity of human life, the need to denounce the conduct of the offender and hold her accountable for her actions (see [62]).
The offender successfully appealed against her conviction to the Court of Appeal. See Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284 (7 December 2016).
DPP (NSW) v Lucas [2014] NSWSC 1441 (20 October 2014) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intentionally or recklessly damaging property’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Relationship/context evidence’
Charge/s: Intentionally or recklessly damaging property, intimidation.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against the dismissal of the charges.
Facts: The male defendant had been in a domestic relationship with the female complainant that had ended some years prior to the offence. Since that time, the complainant had taken steps to conceal where she was living with her children from the defendant. He found where they were living and was permitted to have contact and access to children. One evening, the defendant turned up to the complainant’s home uninvited and unannounced. She locked herself and the children inside the house while the defendant was yelling and screaming and making threats, including threatening to deflate the tyres on her car. It was alleged that he then deflated a tyre on her car. These charges were dismissed by a magistrate.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate erred in excluding evidence of a ‘pattern of violence’, such evidence being relevant to the intimidation charge under s 7(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act.
Decision and Reasoning: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was upheld on other grounds (failure to give reasons and error as to what constituted damage). Examination of the transcript indicated that the magistrate’s approach was that the prosecutor should lead evidence of the actual incident itself before leading any other evidence under s 7(2), if it was then considered necessary (See [24]-[30]).
R v Gittany (No 5) [2014] NSWSC 49 (11 February 2014) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Character evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was found guilty for the murder of his female de facto partner after a judge only trial. While the relationship was, at times, loving and happy it was also tumultuous as the offender was a jealous and possessive partner. The offender scrutinised the victim’s conduct openly and covertly, keeping track of her movements through surveillance cameras and secretly monitoring her mobile phone. On 30 July 2011, the victim had decided she was leaving the offender and attempted to leave their apartment. She was physically dragged back into the apartment by the offender and sixty-nine seconds later she fell to her death from the balcony. McCallum J was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, in a state of rage, the offender carried the unconscious complainant to the balcony and ‘unloaded’ her over the edge.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 26 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years was appropriate in the circumstances. McCallum J took into account of a number of considerations in imposing this sentence. Her Honour assessed the objective seriousness of the offence. McCallum J was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the act of unloading the complainant’s body over the balcony was done with intent to kill and that, although unconscious, the complainant was undoubtedly in a state of complete terror in the last moments before her death (See [16]-[18]).
A further relevant issue in assessing objective seriousness was whether the killing was planned or premeditated. The Crown tried to adduce evidence establishing that the offender had long had in mind the possibility of committing such an act, and making it look like suicide, in the event of her leaving him. Although witness testimony substantiating this assertion was excluded for its prejudicial content, other evidence was relevant to assessing the offender’s state of mind. During the relationship, the offender engaged in an extraordinary degree of manipulative behaviour and while he was not to be punished for this conduct nor did this conduct aggravate the offence, it did inform the state of mind in which he committed the offence. McCallum J was not satisfied that the offence was planned or premeditated in the traditional sense; however, she was satisfied that the offender must have anticipated the prospect that he would fly into a rage if ever she were to leave him (See [19]-[39]). Her Honour concluded:
‘In my view, that history informs the degree of moral culpability of the offence. The arrogance and sense of entitlement with which Mr Gittany sought to control Lisa Harnum throughout their relationship deny the characterisation of his state of mind in killing her as one of complete and unexpected spontaneity. By an attritional process, he allowed possessiveness and insecurity to overwhelm the most basic respect for her right to live her life as she chose. Although I accept that the intention to kill was formed suddenly and in a state of rage, it was facilitated by a sense of ownership and a lack of any true respect for the autonomy of the woman he claimed to love’ at [40].
In sum, the objective seriousness of the offence committed was not above the middle of the notional range, having regard to the fact that the murder was not premeditated or planned. However, the offence was of sufficient seriousness that the standard non-parole period of twenty years was to be regarded as a strong guide in this case (See [43]).
McCallum J also noted the offender’s personal circumstances, including a troubling prior conviction for malicious wounding (See [44]-[59]) and noted that the complainant was vulnerable. She took into account good character references provided (noting though the contradiction posed by the way he treated the complainant) but was not persuaded that any prospect of rehabilitation existed in this case (See [65]-[74]).
This case was unsuccessfully appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. See Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 (19 August 2016).
R v Yeoman [2003] NSWSC 194 (21 March 2003) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Difficulty leaving an abusive relationship’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychosocial report - specific experience in drug and alcohol related domestic violence issues’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Hearing: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender had lived with her male de facto partner, the deceased, for 25 years (since she was 17 years old). The deceased had been violent towards the offender throughout their relationship, including hitting her in the eye with a baseball bat, but she did not have the means to leave the relationship. The deceased would often taunt the offender and dare her to stab him. They both suffered from alcoholism. One evening, the offender was heavily intoxicated and stabbed the deceased in the chest, killing him. At the time, she did not intend to kill him nor did she realise he was dead and she went to bed. The next morning she called the police and made full admissions. The offender’s recollection of events was imperfect because of her intoxication.
Decision and Reasoning: Buddin J had extensive regard to a psychological report prepared by Ms Danielle Castles, who had 17 years’ experience working in the social welfare field, with particular expertise about drug and alcohol issues and domestic violence (See [32]-[35]). Ms Castles commenced her report by explaining the nature of domestic violence and stated at [32] that:
‘domestic violence is the term used to describe the violence and abuse perpetrated upon a partner in a marriage or marriage like relationship. It is essentially the misuse of power and the exercise of control by one person, usually the man, over another, usually the woman. “Women experiencing domestic violence are often subjected to physical, sexual, emotional/psychological, social and economic abuse. Abuse may be overt (physical violence) or it might be deceptively subtle (emotional abuse). It is the interplay between making the woman fearful and reducing her self-esteem which results in the abuse having significant and prolonged effects on the woman.”
The effects of domestic violence are such that women in violent relationships are convinced they are hopeless, that they need to be dependent upon the abuser and could not possibly survive without him. The most significant aspect of prolonged abuse is the gradual breaking down of a woman’s autonomy’.
Ms Castles then set out the ways in which domestic violence impacted upon the offender here (See [33]-[34]).
Buddin J ultimately found that the offender’s criminality was at the lower end of the scale of culpability of an offence of this kind i.e. non-intentional homicide in circumstances of tragic misadventure. Her intention was no more and no less than to engage in a desperate and objectively dangerous gesture, without intending any real harm or worse to the deceased. This, in conjunction with the very powerful subjective case advanced on behalf of the offender, meant that an exceptional sentence of a good behaviour bond for four years was appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that a life was taken (See [50]). The subjective factors that mitigated sentence included that ‘the offence took place against the background of continuing domestic violence over a prolonged period of time, the impact upon her of which cannot, for the reasons advanced by Ms Castles and others, be underestimated’ (See [45]). Buddin J also derived assistance from cases involving ‘battered spouse or partner syndrome’ (See [48]).
District Court
R v Evatt (A Pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 113 (12 April 2024) – New South Wales District Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family Law’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Rape x 2; entering a building with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married but separated in 2020, 18 months prior to the offences. In 2021, the victim sought a protection order against the defendant, prohibiting the defendant from locating/attempting to locate her. However, following parenting orders in 2021, the offender and victim were required to communicate about parenting issues.
In October 2021, the offender located the victim’s home and entered it at 2AM. The offender grabbed the victim by throat, asking her questions about her new boyfriend and where he lived before threatening to kill him and rape his daughter. The offender proceeded to demand oral sex and used the victim’s phone to send messages portraying him in a good light (e.g., ‘you are a good dad’). [20] The offender then demanded sexual intercourse. [24]–[25]
The children were in the house when the offending occurred.
Decision and Reasoning: Aggregate sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 ½ years. [98]
District Court Judge Priestley SC assessed the objective seriousness of the offending to be ‘in the high mid-range’. [44] Though remorseful, the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation remain low. This is because the ‘violence occurs when he is in as he says such a state of “rage” that some earlier expressed remorse is unlikely … to temper his irrational uncontrolled rage’. [82]
R v Reid [2023] NSWDC 161 (17 May 2023) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Crimes (sentencing procedure) act 1999 (nsw), s 10(1)(b)’ – ‘Discharge without conviction’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘Intentionally distributing intimate image without consent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Predominant victim’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Psychologist report’ – ‘Revenge porn’ – ‘Severity appeal’ – ‘State and federal offences’ – ‘Using a carriage service to menace or harass’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Intentionally distributing intimate image without consent x 1, Using a carriage service to menace or harass.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and severity of sentence.
Facts: The female appellant was in a relationship with the male complainant for about a year from mid-2021 to mid-2022 and had one child together. During their relationship they consensually recorded intimate sexual acts performed individually or together. After the end of the relationship, despite obtaining a protection order protecting her and her two children, communication in relation to their child led to some episodes of intimacy, one of which was recorded by the complainant on the appellant’s phone. Recognising the complainant was commencing a relationship with another woman, the appellant texted the intimate video to her former partner with the message “Does she suck you like this?” He responded that he was not interested and she subsequently distributed the video by Facebook to her former partner’s new girlfriend with the message “Bet ya don’t make him cum like this lol”. She admitted she did this both in hopes it would encourage the breakdown of the complainant’s new relationship and in frustration with his lack of parental responsibility. The subsequent charge related to the appellant repeatedly messaging the complainant via Facebook messenger over two days, questioning his intention to be involved in his daughter’s life.
A psychologist report indicated that the appellant had an “emotionally defective upbringing”, likely had ADHD, and that the assessment conducted indicated that the best account for her symptomatology and offending was a Bipolar II Disorder. The psychologist presented a detailed treatment plan and proposed a referral to a psychiatrist to confirm his diagnoses and prescribe necessary medication. The psychologist and police both appeared impressed with the appellant’s insight into her actions and reasons.
Ground: The appellant should be diverted into the mental health system s 14 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (the MHCIFP Act) and s 20BQ of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (the “Cth Crimes Act”).
Issues:
(a)
whether the appellant had, at the dates of offending, a mental health impairment or mental illness; and (if she did)
(b)
discretionary considerations as to whether she should be diverted (enumerated, especially, under s 15 of the MHCIFP Act).
Reasoning and decision:
1.
The severity appeal is allowed.
2.
In relation to sentence for sequence 1, I set aside the sentence and in lieu, impose a conditional release order for 7 months, commencing today, subject to an additional condition in being a rehabilitation or treatment condition that the appellant abide by the treatment plan identified in section 11 of the report of Mr George Dieter.
3.
In relation to the sentence for sequence 2, set aside the sentence and in lieu, order that the appellant be discharged, without proceeding to conviction, of the charge upon her giving security in the amount of $100 and complies with the condition that she be of good behaviour for a period of 7 months.
4.
Direct the appellant’s legal representative to explain to the appellant her obligations under the conditional release order imposed under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act(1999) (NSW).
In considering whether to allow the appeal, Abadee DCJ noted the appellant’s emotional dependence on the complainant in the context of his abuse of the complainant:
I acknowledge harm to the victim, Mr Pobje, who was disgusted by this offence, but that does not appear substantially manifested by his delayed report of it to police. But as I have indicated, due to the clear emotional dependence that she had upon the victim who, the evidence indicates, abused her, the considerations of general deterrence, denunciation and retribution are substantially moderated as to weight. There were some extenuating circumstances. The appellant is a single mother with two young children, from separate relationships, with certain unconfirmed mental conditions, who has applied herself to her studies and is doing well in her job, which involves looking after children. Although the Court has not received the victim, Mr Pobje’s, side of the story, as indicated, there is a consistent thread of a narrative in which the appellant was in an abusive relationship with that victim. Coupled with evidence from her psychologist of her sensitivity and anxiety towards slights and the fear of rejection, and a sliding scale of emotion, there are extenuating circumstances concerning sequence 1 [52].
Abadee DCJ also noted that a conviction could “severely prejudice” the appellant’s employment prospects and educational aspirations given her work with children [53] and that the second sequence of offending was “of a trivial kind” [55].
R v Grech (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWDC 721 (15 December 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Non-consensual sexual intercourse withing marriage’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Possession of child abuse material’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Threats to implicate victim's child’ – ‘Victim illness’ – ‘Vulnerable victim’
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Charges: 3 x sexual intercourse without consent, 1 x intentionally choke, 1 x possession of child abuse material.
Facts: The sexual assault and choking offences were committed by the offender against his wife. Several years into their relationship, the complaint’s behaviour changed significantly and he began making derogatory comments about and sexual demands of his wife which she could not meet due to her cancer and treatment.
The offender engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with his wife on four occasions over a number of years and attempted to do so on others. In December 2015 the offender held his wife against a wall and verbally abused her resulting in criminal charges. After his wife found pornography on his phone he threatened to implicate one of her sons, intimidated her by starting a chainsaw and said he could kill her by putting a spider in her bed. He was physically violent to her on three occasions, including placing his hands around her neck and strangling her.
After the victim went to the police, a police investigation found discs and video files including 30 video images that were classified as child abuse material.
Reasoning and decision: An aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with a 5 year minimum and 3 year parole period.
Haesler SC DCJ identified a level of violence, pain, humiliation and degradation involved in the sexual assaults that occurred in the victim’s own home, while she was vulnerable as a cancer survivor. HH considered the domestic relationship significant, noting that the victim was personally targeted and the offences occurred as part of a larger pattern of violence and control. Additionally, the evidence revealed that the offender felt justified in his conduct and his behaviour was therefore a continued threat.
His Honour emphasised the seriousness of possessing child pornography, which supports the industry of child abuse and encourages a distorted reality.
The offender’s depression and poor physical health condition were considered, His Honour determining that he would be more vulnerable in prison because of his illness as well as his lack of experience, demeanour and previous good character. While he showed some emotional response and his sister expressed remorse on his behalf, HH did not accept his remorse given the evidence that he continued to victim-blame his wife throughout their relationship. The duration and nature of the offending also weighed against his previously good character, as he put his own sexual needs above that of his wife and her autonomy.
Haesler SC DCJ observed:
[40] The offences, both the sexual offence and the choking offence, occurred in the context of a domestic relationship. They were domestic violence offences. Sexual assault is an offence of violence. In each matter the complainant was personally targeted, and it is clear from my brief recitation of the facts that the offences were part of a larger picture of physical and mental violence and the exercise of control. While the offender accused the complainant of controlling him, his behaviour demonstrated the lie of that statement.
[41] There is material before me which shows that he felt what he did he was justified or excused in doing what he did. In continued beliefs of this nature, beliefs that the person inflicting the violence is the person wronged, carries with it a continued threat. As a consequence, I accept, that the complainant in this matter would never have felt safe in his presence.
[42] Each of these matters is treated with real seriousness because of the exercise of coercive power and the other matters I have reviewed. Denunciation is also required. Men cannot behave as this offender did.
Day (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWDC 594 (24 November 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Magistrate's credibility findings’ – ‘Resolving 'oath on oath' domestic violence on appeal’ – ‘Reviewing credibility findings on appeal’ – ‘Self-serving evidence’
Charges: common assault x 1; sexually touch another without consent x 1; intimidate intending to cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against convictions.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of three offences against his partner: common assault s61 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); sexually touch another without consent s61KC(a) Crimes Act (NSW); intimidate intending to cause fear s13(1) Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The magistrate preferred the complainant’s evidence, rejecting the appellant’s version of the sexual touching as ‘self-serving and lacking credibility’ [42].
The appellant was acquitted of three offences relating to assaulting, intimidating and intentionally choking their daughter with a pillow (‘the pillow incident’). The magistrate found the appellant’s evidence in relation to how the pillow came up over the child’s face ‘lacked credibility and was overall self-serving and implausible’ [36].
Grounds: The complainant’s evidence was inconsistent (police Fact Sheet and Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) notes [61]). The appellant argued that this led to a finding of not guilty on three charges related to the pillow incident. Further, the magistrate should have returned a verdict of not guilty in relation to the three charges being appealed as the magistrate had found the appellant not guilty in relation to the pillow incident.
Decision and Reasoning: appeal dismissed.
Haesler SC DCJ held in relation to the magistrate’s findings on credibility:
1.
I do not accept that his Honour rejected the complainant’s evidence in relation to the pillow incident. That is not what he said at [112]; nor did he make adverse findings in relation to her reliability and credibility as a witness. To the contrary, he correctly directed himself that different verdicts could be returned in relation to different counts. And early in his judgment he noted that a reasonable doubt about one part of the prosecution evidence on one charge had to be considered as to whether it caused him to have a reasonable doubt about another charge: at [16].
2.
His Honour’s approach to the acquittals indicated that he was aware of the need to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, even if his version did not impress him. Ultimately, his decision came down to the fundamental element that had to be proved - “intention.” He concluded, “I cannot be satisfied to the required standard that the appellant intentionally placed the pillow over the face of the child with an intention of suffocating her ….”
1.
… It would, with hindsight, have been prudent to mention the Markulevski [2001] NSWCCA 290 (1 August 2001) direction specifically when he made his credibility findings about the race day evidence, if only to forestall attack on appeal. Much time would have been saved had his Honour added a 10th issue - Given my findings in acquitting the appellant what impact do those findings have on the credibility of the complainant?
1.
Criticism was made of his Honour’s use on several occasions of the term “self-serving” to describe the appellant’s evidence. As I understand it “self-serving” refers to; a form of bias; being the tendency of witnesses to give evidence in ways that advance their self-interest but which the trier of fact, on review, regards as indefensible or unethical or a distortion of what really happened to suit their own ends.
2.
Having reviewed the judgment I reject the submission that his Honour simply concluded - that having seen and heard the witnesses he believed the evidence of the one over the other: O'Connell v DPP [2021] NSWSC 1519 (26 November 2021) at [37]. His credibility findings are of use to me.
3.
I too was unimpressed by his [the appellant’s] evidence and would reject it. I too was impressed by the response of the complainant under sustained and ardent cross-examination and the consistency of her accounts. I would accept her testimony. Having rejected the appellant’s account that evidence satisfied each element of the charges subject to appeal beyond reasonable doubt.
R v Lonergan [2022] NSWDC 423 (21 September 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘'revenge porn'’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Distribute intimate image’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘Image offence’ – ‘Intimidate’ – ‘Severity appeal’
Charges: distributing intimate image x 1; intimidate with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm x 1.
Proceedings: DPP appeal against sentence.
Facts: The perpetrator pleaded guilty to one charge of distributing an intimate image contrary to s 91Q(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The victim had sent her 3-4 pictures of his penis during their affair. After the perpetrator became aware that the victim was in an ongoing relationship, she forwarded one of these pictures to the victim’s partner, who had blocked the perpetrator so did not receive it. The perpetrator also pleaded guilty to intimidating with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm under s13(1) of theCrimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). This charge related to an excessive number of text messages the perpetrator had sent to the victim.
Grounds of appeal: the DPP argued the Magistrate erred in his assessment of the severity of the offences.
Held: appeal upheld.
Charge 1 (image offence): Abadee DCJ imposed a conditional release order for 18 months whilst proceeding to conviction (the Local Court had not ordered a conviction to be recorded).
His Honour said that the offence was not trivial, that it was ‘malicious’ and ‘unnecessary’ [45]. He acknowledged that a conviction might mean that the perpetrator could lose her mortgage broking licence and be unable to work. However, he cited R v Beissel [1996], stating that ‘[t]he Court should not attempt to minimise the seriousness of criminal conduct with a view to influencing third parties, such as licensing authorities…’.[47]
Charge 2 (intimidate offence): same terms as Local Court ie conditional release for 18 months, no conviction recorded.
His Honour also noted that charge 2 was a domestic violence offence under the Crimes (Personal and Domestic Violence) Act 2007 but was satisfied that the sentence imposed was appropriate.
R v SS [2022] NSWDC 399 (1 September 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘Child present’ – ‘Mental impairment’ – ‘Reduced moral capability’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sexual assault without consent’
Charges: aggravated sexual assault x 1; sexual assault without consent x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; intentionally choke x 1.
Proceedings: sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); sexual assault without consent contrary to s61I; assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) and intentionally choke a person without consent s 37(1A).
The victim wife and the offender husband had been in a relationship since 2015. In November 2018 the wife and her two children moved out of the family home. About three weeks later, she returned to collect her daughter who had stayed overnight with the offender. When the victim went upstairs to collect her belongings, the offender followed her and punched her in the face three times, knocking her to the ground. Their young daughter was standing nearby screaming, ‘Mummy, mummy…stop, mummy!’ The offender straddled the victim, grabbed her neck with both hands and squeezed. The victim was struggling to breathe and called for help. Their daughter was still screaming. The offender punched the victim in the face a fourth time, causing her to lose consciousness.
When the victim regained consciousness, the offender was on top of her, raping her. Their daughter was not there. The victim said, we need to check on her. They both got up and walked into the bedroom. Their daughter was hiding in the walk-in robe, crying. The victim sat down, feeling extreme pain, dizzy, and disoriented. The perpetrator pushed her onto her back on the bed and started to rape her again. When he finished, the victim tried to keep him calm, fearing for her life and that of her daughter, so she suggested they have a cigarette. She then ran out of the house into the street wearing only a singlet top and carrying her daughter. She flagged down a passing car and the driver called the police.
The offender was located almost 24 hours later. He was disoriented, had some deep cuts on his face and leg and claimed that he had been lost in the bush for four days. The offender suffered a stroke following the offending.
Held: Wilson SC DCJ sentenced the offender to 8 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. He said at [48]:
the offending occurred in the context of the breakdown of the marriage. In my opinion whilst this provides context it does not reduce the objective seriousness of the offending. In a sense, it heightens the objective seriousness as the offending took place in a domestic violence setting.
His Honour also found at [78] that, due to the offender’s diagnosis of an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression, the offender was impaired at the time of the offending so as to attract the moderation of the sentence considered by the court in De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 (17 September 2010) I find that the offender’s moral culpability is reduced and that he would be an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. I also find the need for specific deterrence is reduced.
R v Pattinson [2022] NSWDC 475 (27 May 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Bdsm’ – ‘Choking, suffocation or strangulation’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Home of victim’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Violent offence’
Charges: choking x 1; sexual intercourse without consent x 7; incite to sexually touch without consent x 1.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male perpetrator had been acquitted of 7 counts of sexual intercourse without consent and 1 count of incite to sexually touch without consent. He had offered to plead guilty only to choking contrary to s 37(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
The perpetrator lived in Dubai. When he visited Sydney from time to time, he and the victim had a sexual relationship characterised by bondage, domination, sado-masochism (BDSM). The perpetrator took the dominant role and the victim the submissive role. The charges arose after the sexual conduct had ceased and after the victim had said the safe word. The perpetrator held the victim up against the wall, grabbed her throat and choked her until she lost consciousness. The victim had been saying, ‘stop’ ‘enough’ ‘I can’t breathe’ and using the safe word, ‘Leigh’. This occurred when the victim was bleeding and injured.
Decision and Reasoning: Sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months. Protection order imposed protecting the victim or person with whom she has a domestic relationship.
Buscombe DCJ held that the choking was ‘always serious’ because of its ‘life-threatening nature’ and this offence was ‘a serious example of such an offence.’ [14]
An offence of choking a person to the point of unconsciousness is a very serious offence because of the risk of death that accompanies such a violent act. To do that to a woman who is bleeding and injured in her own home, who does not consent to that conduct, knowing she did not consent, is a particularly serious form of the offence, in my opinion. The sentence that is to be imposed here needs to have a significant component of general deterrence reflected in it in order to send the message to the community that such offences will receive significant sentences, to deter not just this offender but others in our community who seek to engage in such conduct. The maximum penalty has been taken into account as a legislative guidepost. I have had some regard to the fact that if this offence stood on its own, the offender may have been sentenced in the Local Court, although the offence is a very serious one in my opinion. [27]
The submission was advanced that the offence did not call for a sentence of imprisonment. In my opinion, the offence is far too serious an offence to call for anything other than a sentence of imprisonment. There is nothing before me that in any way reduces the offender's moral culpability for the offence. The submission was advanced that if a sentence of imprisonment was to be imposed then the offender should be extended leniency and allowed to serve it in the community by way of an intensive correction order. It will shortly be seen that I do not consider that a sentence of two years or less is an appropriate sentence to impose, so that sentencing option is simply not available. [28]
R v Campbell-Buck [2022] NSWDC 60 (1 March 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Image-based abuse’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threats’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Sexually touch another person without consent x 3, sexual intercourse without consent x 1, intentionally recording an intimate image without consent x 1, intentionally choke a person with recklessness x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Facts: The female complainant and male defendant were in an intimate relationship. The complainant experienced pain due to a shoulder injury and took pain medication to enable her to sleep soundly. The effects of this medication were exploited by the defendant. On several occasions the defendant filmed himself performing sexual acts, including sexual intercourse, on the complainant while she was asleep. The complainant usually awoke during these incidents and made it clear that she did not consent to what had occurred. On one occasion, when the parties were arguing, the defendant strangled the complainant until she lost consciousness. When the complainant regained consciousness, the defendant threatened to commit suicide if she reported the incidents [9]-[21]. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to four years and three months imprisonment, with a non‐parole period of two years and six months [78]. The defendant’s sentence was reduced to take into account the utilitarian value of his guilty pleas [4]. Justice Haesler noted the objective seriousness of the offending [22]-[32]. His Honour highlighted the complainant’s victim impact statement, which detailed her fears of ‘a lifetime of pain, suffering, anxiety and therapy’, a fear of going to sleep and ‘difficulty enjoying life’ [35]-[38]. His Honour noted that the defendant had a history of anxiety, depression and bipolar disorder, and was experiencing manic symptoms during all or part of his offending [42]. His Honour stated that the defendant’s ‘mental health condition, particularly his bipolar disorder… has a mitigatory effect’, and ‘to some modest degree’ ameliorates ‘his moral culpability’ but ‘does not mean that what he did cannot and should not be denounced’ [54].
In sentencing the defendant Haesler SC DCJ: ‘Any assault in a domestic context carries with it undertones, sometimes overtones, of control and targeting. All these offences are part of a larger picture of physical, sexual and mental violence. When someone is assaulted, as the complainant was, there is serious risk of significant harm can be caused. This is one reason why this is a separate offence and why it carries a maximum penalty of ten years.’ [29]
R v Trisic [2021] NSWDC 687 (14 December 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: common assault x2; stalking, intimidating, or intending to cause fear of physical or mental harm x1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was convicted of domestic violence offences against his wife, who he was separated from, and adult son. Following an argument with his son the intoxicated appellant threatened to slit his wife’s throat (intimidation) and struck her right shoulder causing her to fall against the wall and bang her head (assault) [13]. The son interposed himself between his parents and the appellant struck the top of his son’s head with an open hand (assault) [14]. The wife struggled to understand trial questioning despite an interpreter [25] and the son gave conflicting statements as to the timeline of events [21].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. Abadee DCJ was satisfied the offending conduct occurred [94].
Justice Abadee found it was clear the Magistrate considered all the evidence [92]. The court granted leave for the appellant to adduce fresh evidence showing good character. His Honour held that assessing the dynamic of the relationships between the appellant and victims is “more probative than the absence of prior convictions” [81]. The appellant’s intoxication diminished the weight of his prior good character when evaluating his likelihood of offending [88].
Justice Abadee acknowledged the trauma of the incident compounded with the wife’s language difficulties meant the Magistrate was entitled to express misgivings in relation to her initial interview [67]. He did not regard this as fundamentally undermining her reliability or credibility [68]. The extent of discrepancies between the son’s account to police and evidence in Court over 4 months later was immaterial as the narrative of the mistreatment of the wife was consistent [73].
The Appellant submissions as to the possibility of collusion through the victims discussing their evidence was undercut due to his submissions that their testimonies had inconsistencies [72].
R v Mulquin [2021] NSWDC 662 (19 August 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Limited prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Common assault x 4, intentionally choke x 1, stalk and intimidate x 2, contravene prohibition in an apprehended violence order x 1, damage property x 1.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty of several domestic violence offences perpetrated in the context of his relationship with the female victim. On several occasions, the defendant made derogatory comments and threats during assaults that included pushing and punching the victim, slamming her head into a wall, strangling her with a vacuum cleaner pole by forcibly placing it on her throat until she vomited, and preventing the victim from leaving her home by making threats towards her and her pets that included threats to kill [5]-[16] in contravention of protection order.
Decision and Reasoning: 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Haesler SC DCJ noted the objective seriousness of the offending, referring to it as a serious and persistent course of domestic violence that included derogatory comments, threats to kill, attacks to the victim’s head, and choking which carried a risk of death [5]-[16]. The defendant’s breach of the apprehended violence order was an aggravating factor [33]. The defendant’s personal circumstances, which included a long history of alcohol abuse, failed attempts at rehabilitation, anxiety, and prior domestic violence offences [3], [30]. The defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation were limited [27] as while the defendant had shown remorse and an intention to engage in rehabilitation he had not acted in accordance with these aspirations [26]. His Honour considered the physical and emotional harm caused by the offending and found that there was a need for accumulation and the imposition of a significant sentence due to the course of conduct and objective seriousness of the offending [24], making a finding of special circumstances [36]. The sentence imposed should express community’s disapproval for reoffending in the context of domestic violence [33].
Perrin v R [2021] NSWDC 408 (17 August 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Age disparity’ – ‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Use of weapon’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Common assault (DV) x 9; Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (DV) x 6; Stalking and or Intimidating x 3; Destroying or damaging Property (DV) x 3; Reckless Grievous Bodily Harm (DV) x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant pleaded guilty to 19 offences committed against his female partner. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 2 months [2]. The offender appealed under s11 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [5].
The appellant is an Aboriginal man who was 19 years old when he met the victim in 2015. The victim was 28 years old when they met and had a 4-year-old son. They had a child together in 2016. The victim was pregnant with another child in November 2017.
The appellant used drugs, was controlling and jealous [15]and suffered delusions including seeing “demons”, “receiving messages from the television” and feelings the victim was cheating on him [100]. On 19 February 2015, after the appellant placed his hands around the victim’s throat and squeezed until she became dizzy and could not breathe, police obtained a protection order for the victim [37]. The offending included repeated punching, kicking, and spitting on the victim, leaving bruises on her body. The violence was frequently accompanied by the appellant screaming derogatory comments at the victim, leaving her ears ringing and sore. On two occasions the victim’s son witnessed the offending and attempted to intervene on one occasion.
Decision & Reasoning: Haesler SC DCJ confirmed the convictions but varied the sentence. His Honour imposed an aggregate sentence of 4 years 6 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years 9 months.
Justice Haesler held that with few exceptions, each offence was a serious example of the type of offence charged [59]. The lack of long-term physical injuries recorded and Victim Impact Statement did not mean the offending had little or no impact on the victim [58]. The number and severity of offences meant that even making allowances for the appellant’s undiagnosed mental illness and background of deprivation, an aggregate sentence of 5 years was justifiable [116].
His Honour found the sentencing Magistrate erred in her application of s58 of Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 by exceeding the 5-year limit on any continuous series of sentences. The offences were not crimes that so offended the public interest that the maximum sentence, without any discount for any purpose, was appropriate [121]. He found that a guilty plea in the context of COVID-19 was “worthy of greater weight in mitigation and amelioration” [120].
Note: In re-sentencing, Haesler DCJ referred questions in this matter to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal [R v Perrin [2022] NSWCCA 170 (15 August 2022)] pursuant to s 5B(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). The questions posed concerned the operation of s 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the “CSP Act”). Wright J (Ward P and Harris J agreeing) held Haesler SC DCJ was wrong to engage s 58 as there was no ‘existing sentence’ when either the Local Court or District Court imposed its sentence. Therefore, there was no requirement that Mr Perrin’s sentence expire 5 years from 22 September 2019 [87]. As the sentence was affected by an error of law, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed Haesler SC DCJ’s sentence and remitted the matter back to the District Court for the appeal to be determined according to the proper construction of s 58 of the CSP Act (NSW) [89].
R v Argyle (a pseudonym) [2021] NSWDC 267 (18 June 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People who have experienced trauma’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender was in a relationship with the co-accused. The co-accused forced himself on the offender’s younger sister, aged 17. The younger sister was visiting the house of the offender and co-accused to assist with the offender’s pregnancy. The offender assisted the co-accused, or interacted with the victim in certain ways, such as holding the victim’s hands, at the co-accused’s request.
Issue: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The judge refused to impose a custodial sentence and instead imposed a community corrections order for a period of 2 years: [101]. The judge accepted that the objective gravity of the offending was low: [64]. This was so despite the fact that the offences occurred in the offender’s home and that the offending amounted to a breach of trust that the offender’s younger sister was owed: [63]. The offender acted spontaneously in response to the co-accused’s actions and was unable to control the situation: [65].
The offender had diminished moral culpability due to the untreated sexual abuse she faced as a child, her own cognitive impairment and the causal connection between her intellectual capacity and her offending: [67]–[70]. Further, she was operating under duress due to her own experiences of the ‘coercive controlling behaviour’ of the accused and her fear that he would harm her or her unborn child: [69]. This diminished moral culpability indicated that specific and general deterrence were not relevant sentencing factors: [75]. The judge considered that moral culpability was a more appropriate touchstone for sentencing, as opposed to objective gravity of the offending: [85].
In addition, the co-accused would have succeeded in the offending regardless of the complicity of the offender, the offender was in genuine fear of the co-accused and the offender, keeping in mind her cognitive impairment, was trying to make the situation better for her sister: [72]–[74]. Further factors tending towards a non-custodial sentence were that the offending was almost 15 years ago ([92]), hardship would be caused to the offender and her two young children ([96]), the offender’s physical and intellectual disabilities would make custody more onerous and treatment for her trauma was only readily available in the community ([99]).
Barber v DPP [2021] NSWDC 7 (3 February 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Victim experiences of court processes’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was convicted of assaulting his then female partner by strangulation. The appellant alleged that the complainant was the initial aggressor. He also gave evidence of past incidents, alleging that the complainant was “prone to act erratically or unpredictably.”
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The complainant was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her evidence and, accordingly, the prosecution did not prove that the assault occurred to the requisite standard.
2.
If an assault did occur, it was done in self-defence and the Crown did not negative that defence to the requisite standard.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: The appellant’s argument that the Crown did not prove that the elements of the offence of common assault beyond reasonable doubt was rejected, notwithstanding some differences in detail in the complainant’s evidence. “As to the suggested materiality of inconsistencies in detail in the complainant’s account, the Magistrate observed that the complainant had certain issues with her language, which she was entitled to take into account”: at [9].
Ground 2: In light of recent instances of the complainant throwing items at the accused and his laptop, “there was a reasonable possibility that the appellant subjectively perceived the prospect of further attack.” However, “a reasonable person would not have shared the same belief. There was, in truth, nothing to stop him from diffusing the situation simply by leaving the room”: at [30].
R v Corak Phan [2021] NSWDC 3 (28 January 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Bugmy principles’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sibling abuse’
Charges: Common assault x 2; Knowingly contravene a prohibition or restriction in an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and the female first victim had previously been in a domestic relationship (they had a child together) and had separated. The offender breached a protection order by being in the vicinity of the victim, and subsequently punched her a number of times to the head and upper body. The second victim was the offender’s sister. The offender pulled his sister by her ankles off a couch. The offender had an extensive criminal history and was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. He had a dysfunctional childhood, and an extensive history of drug and alcohol misuse. A psychologist opined that he met the criteria for Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Decision and reasoning: An aggregate sentence of 20 months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
The offences against the offender’s former partner fell in the mid-range of objective seriousness, as she was protected by an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order at the time and there was clear contravention of a court order ([43]-[44]). The assault of the offender’s sister fell in the lower range of objective seriousness ([45]).
Mahoney SC DCJ noted at [46]-[47], discussing the principles in Bugmy v R:
“That the offending occurred whilst the offender was in the grip of a drug addiction, does not mitigate the seriousness of the offending. Notwithstanding that the offender gave no evidence, and the court must approach self-serving reports to psychologists with some caution, I do take into account the subjective matters outlined in the report of Ms Minovski, namely, a dysfunctional childhood marred with neglect, physical and sexual abuse and exposure from an early age to drug and alcohol abuse, together with domestic violence, giving rise to the principles outlined by the High Court in Bugmy v R……
“I am therefore satisfied that the offender’s recourse to violence in the circumstances outlined above, albeit fuelled by his drug addiction, are such that the offender’s moral culpability for his inability to control his impulses must be somewhat reduced.”
R v French [2020] NSWDC 767 (17 December 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Step-children’
Charges: Animal cruelty x 1; Detain for advantage x 1; Intimidation x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence (and two related offences of stalking/intimidation and maliciously damaging property) x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and the female victim (who had two children) had been in an on-off relationship for 12 months. The offender killed the victim’s cat in a planned way (animal cruelty). Two weeks later, the offender, while affected by drugs and alcohol, forcibly took the victim from a neighbour’s home and detained her for 1-2 minutes (detain for advantage). Later, the offender’s behaviour caused the victim to hide in the toilet and wardrobe of her home (intimidation), and when the offender started punching a wall, another person present who tried to stop him and the offender struck the bystander on the head (common assault). The victim told the offender that the relationship was over, and to move out. One month later, the offender damaged his sister’s car while she was at the victim’s house, and later sent persistent calls/texts to the victim (malicious damage and stalk/intimidate). That same evening, the offender broke into the victim’s house and intimidated her and her children (aggravated break and enter). Sentence and reasoning: A non-parole period of 2 years, with a balance term of 15 months.
The animal cruelty offence was just below the mid-range of objective seriousness ([14]).
The objective seriousness of the other offences ranged from the lower-end to just below mid-range. Relevant factors included repeated attempts to control and intimidate the victim (a form of domestic violence) ([16]-[32]). The offender’s subjective circumstances were given some weight (including his family history, mental health issues, and drug and alcohol misuse at [35]-[50]), but did not result in any marked reduced need for both general and specific deterrence ([57]). Priestley SC DCJ took into account the totality principle ([51]-[53]), and special circumstances due to the need for rehabilitation with drug/alcohol issues and counselling ([54]).
James v James No 3 [2020] NSWDC 797 (16 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault and assault and battery’ – ‘Assessment of damages’ – ‘Civil matter’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Tort’
Proceedings: Assessment of damages for the torts of assault and assault and battery.
Facts: The plaintiff woman brought proceedings against her former husband, and obtained default judgment, which the court refused to set aside ([1]). The plaintiff and the defendant had two children, and previously lived on a farm (the subject of settlement proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court) ([4], [18]).
The first torts occurred on 26 September 2017. The defendant caused the plaintiff to fear that she would be battered by calling her names in an aggressive and violent manner, restrained the defendant by her shoulders and arms, and then ordered her to leave the property with her daughter ([2], [5]-[8]). The defendant was prosecuted but the charges were dropped by way of an apparent plea bargain ([7]).
The second torts occurred on 20 February 2018. There was an audio recording of these events, which the plaintiff was permitted to tender despite a ‘technical breach’ of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (see decision in James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020)) ([11]). The defendant physically assaulted and verbally assaulted the plaintiff ([10]-[17]). The defendant was also prosecuted for this offending, and sentenced to an Intensive Corrections Order for 16 months and an Apprehended Violence Order for two years ([19]).
Issues: Assessment of damages.
Decision and reasoning: Judgment for the plaintiff, damages of $358,520 plus costs.
For the torts on 26 September 2017, the court held at [9] that “[t]he tort of assault and the tort of assault and battery are actions which do not depend upon proof of damage. In any event there was actual bodily harm sustained by the plaintiff”. For the torts on 20 February 2018, the court again held that the torts were actionable per se without proof of damage but here there was “grave damage proven to the Court’s satisfaction”. This included evidence of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, a recurrent major depressive disorder, and recurrent panic attacks caused by the events of 20 February 2018 ([28]-[32]). The court noted that the plaintiff’s ongoing psychiatric problems would have a continuing impact on her (including her earning capacity) and that (at [29]):
“When this case is finished no doubt she can try to put the events of the past behind her and try to get on with her life. Not having to relive the events by coming to Court and telling the Court of them will no doubt assist in her recovery”.
The plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages ([9], [32]). The plaintiff was also awarded damages for past and future economic loss ([33]-[35]).
See also: James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court.
James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Application to tender recordings’ – ‘Assessment of damages’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Tort’
Proceedings: Application to tender recordings.
Facts: The recordings were made of the interactions between the plaintiff and the defendant on 20 February 2018 at their former home. The recordings were of a private conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant made without the defendant’s consent, thereby in contravention of s 7(1)(b) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007.
Issues:
1.
Whether it was reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to make the recording for the protection of her lawful interests, per the exception in s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007.
2.
Whether the recording nonetheless admissible as the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in an unlawful manner, per the exception in s 138(3) of the Evidence Act 1995.
Decision and reasoning: The recording did not fall within the exception under s s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007. The meaning of “lawful interest”, referring to the decisions in DW v R [2014] NSWCCA 28 and Corby v Corby [2015] FCCA 1099, did not extend to the plaintiff’s purpose which was to record the abuse to replay to the defendant later and change his behaviour: (at [3]-[4]). The recording was instead admitted into evidence in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 138(3) of the Evidence Act 1995: at [7]-[9]. It had probative value of the extent of the plaintiff’s damages for her claim in tort. The impropriety of the contravention was not great. The recordings were referred to in the assessment of damages judgment: see James v James No 3 NSWDC 797 (16 November 2020).
R v Collins [2020] NSWDC 276 (5 June 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Separation’
Offences: Indecent assault; The appellant requested that the learned Magistrate take into account two additional offences on a Form 1, they being, that on the same date and in the same place, the appellant:
(a)
intimidated Kristy Rochester with the intention of causing her to fear physical or mental harm, contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW); and
(b)
assaulted Kristy Rochester, contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been married since 2003 and had a child together. They divorced in 2008 but recommenced a relationship in 2014 and started living together. In 2015, the appellant assaulted the victim, giving rise to an Apprehended Violence Order. In July 2017, their relationship began to deteriorate. In the lead up to the offending, the victim obtained alternative accommodation and was in the process of moving her belongings. One night, the appellant exchanged text messages with the victim, requesting they have sex (though acknowledging that the victim was moving on), but the victim refused. The appellant went to the lounge room where the victim was on the couch listening to music on her phone, took her phone and refused to give it back unless they talked. The couple began yelling and the victim felt scared so she picked up a knife and told the appellant that she would stab him if he came near her. The appellant left the home with the victim’s phone and refused to return it. The victim slashed two tyres on the appellant’s car then went back inside and locked all the windows and doors, except for a window in her bedroom. The appellant accessed the victim’s phone then returned to the house and demanded she speak to him outside. The victim complied as she was afraid of the appellant, the appellant throwing a beer over her when she got there.
After this, the victim drove to a nearby lookout and fell asleep. The appellant arrived in his truck and parked the victim in so she could not drive away. The appellant demanded that the victim open the doors. She complied as she was afraid. The appellant grabbed the victim’s hair and told her that she had to talk to him to get her phone back. They returned to the house separately and the appellant told the victim he wanted to talk to her in the bedroom. He told her to lie on the bed; she complied. He then started touching her, took her clothes off, pinned her wrists above her head, rubbed his groin all over her and ejaculated on her, despite her cries that she did not want to engage in sexual activity. The appellant told the victim to leave, which she did. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment with a 12-month non-parole period.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence could be regarded as "lenient" [65]. Her Honour rejected that the appellant’s conduct involved a low level of criminality [59] and further held that there was a greater need for personal deterrence and retribution in this case [61]. Her Honour held that, "whilst acknowledging the relevance of the appellant’s rehabilitation, that consideration is subordinate to the considerations of general deterrence, denunciation and the imposition of adequate punishment, which factor recognises the indignity inflicted upon the complainant" and that "the safety to the community is not seriously imperilled by the appellant if a penalty other than full-time incarceration is imposed. But that consideration is not, in my opinion, paramount in the circumstances of this case" [64].
Her Honour found that the appellant’s contention that the sex occurred as ‘make-up sex’ was a "rank distortion" of what objectively occurred, because the relationship had completely broken down [27]. The appellant did not wish for the relationship to have ended as it did, "So he resorted to the exertion of psychological and physical force against the complainant in order to get her to do what he wanted her to do" [28]. Her Honour found that the appellant knew his conduct was non-consensual and there was nothing to suggest the victim wanted to make up with the appellant [30], and that there was a "humiliating overtone" to the activity [31]. As such, her Honour held the conduct to be above the mid-range of objective gravity [32].
Her Honour rejected the contention that the appellant was sorry for his conduct and had acquired real insight into the wrongfulness of his conduct [47]. However, her Honour found that the likelihood of reoffending was low [55].
R v Shepherd [2020] NSWDC 273 (3 June 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection orders’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Significant criminal history’
Charges: Contravening a prohibition or restriction under an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) x 2
Case type: Appeal against severity of sentence
Facts: The appellant man was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 months. He pleaded guilty to 2 charges that he contravened a prohibition or restriction under an AVO. The appellant has remained in custody for a period of around 2 months. Although he lodged an appeal in May 2020, he was refused bail.
The appellant was in a relationship with his then female partner (the victim). As at 26 March 2020, there was an enforceable AVO for her protection which named the appellant as the defendant. A condition of the order was that the appellant not approach or be in her company for at least 12 hours after drinking alcohol or taking illicit drugs. At about 1:00 am on 26 March 2020, police attended the couple’s residence after a domestic dispute. The appellant admitted that he had breached the AVO and had consumed a large quantity of alcohol. There was no suggestion that the appellant was likely to inflict imminent violence or commit some other more serious contravention of the AVO at that time. He was arrested and released on conditional bail at 3:00 am. At about 4:00 am on the same day, police returned to the same address following another complaint of a domestic dispute, and found the appellant intoxicated again.
Grounds: Whether an Intensive Correction Order (ICO) is more appropriate than a period of full time custody; whether there are special circumstances to justify variation of non-parole period.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, but the Court varied the statutory ratio for the non-parole period on account of special circumstances in order to assist with rehabilitative efforts with respect to the appellant’s alcohol consumption issues. Consequently, the Court varied each sentence to 1 year imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 months, to be served concurrently ([43]-[47]).
Held: Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the offending conduct occurred not only in contravention of an AVO, but whilst the appellant was subject to an ICO. Further, the second offence occurred when he was on conditional bail after having committed the first offence ([12]-[15]). There was little evidence of the appellant’s circumstances that directly explained why he acted as he did. In May, the appellant acknowledged to a community corrections officer that he breached the condition of the AVO because he had "no choice". However, the Court accepted the characterisation of the community corrections officer that he "blatantly disregarded" the condition twice on the one night ([16]-[18]). The appellant also has a significant criminal history, and has been convicted of several domestic violence offences in the past. Most of these offences were the product of alcohol consumption ([22]). There was no evidence before the Court to indicate remorse or contrition: the appellant blamed the victim and was said to have showed no insight into his offending ([24]). The appellant had a long history of alcohol dependence, and had been diagnosed with depression, post-traumatic stress and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He made attempts to rehabilitate himself, but relapsed into consuming alcohol on a regular basis ([25]-[27]).
The ICO breach report noted that since the order had been imposed, the appellant had minimal engagement with community corrections, which impeded his attempts to treat his alcohol usage. The report also expressed concerns for the victim’s safety. The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were no more than reasonable. Despite his demonstrated ability to overcome illicit substance abuse, he has struggled to deal with his alcoholism. The Court also noted that the level of community service work that the appellant needs to undertake may be reduced or altered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic ([28]-[33]).
The ICO breach report noted that since the order had been imposed, the appellant had minimal engagement with community corrections, which impeded his attempts to treat his alcohol usage. The report also expressed concerns for the victim’s safety. The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were no more than reasonable. Despite his demonstrated ability to overcome illicit substance abuse, he has struggled to deal with his alcoholism. The Court also noted that the level of community service work that the appellant needs to undertake may be reduced or altered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic ([28]-[33]).
R v Ragg [2020] NSWDC 210 (18 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Step-children in home’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threat to set on fire’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Common assault; Reckless wounding; Intimidation; Using explosive fluid; Attempted cause grievous bodily harm to person with intent x 2; Aggravated sexual assault x 4; Contravene Apprehended Violence Order; Threaten witness to withhold true evidence; Aggravated detention with the intention of assaulting and intimidating the victim (at the time of the detention actual bodily harm was occasioned to the victim)
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male offender and female victim were in an on and off domestic relationship for 12 years. The victim had three children, one of which was the son of the offender. Throughout the relationship, the offender was physically and mentally abusive towards the victim and both parties used drugs. One night, the offender and victim stayed up smoking marijuana and ice. The next morning, the couple were in their car and the offender accused the victim of sleeping with up to 20 men at one time while the offender had been in custody for other charges. The victim denied this, but the offender got angry and cut the victim’s hair with scissors before punching her in the face multiple times, one of these being so hard that the victim’s head hit the windscreen (Common assault). The offender then ordered the victim into the back seat and told her that every time she lied, he would stab her with the scissors (which were small and blunt, not sharp). The offender stabbed the victim on her legs about 30 times (four of which punctured her skin – the others resulted in bruises only) whenever she gave an answer he did not like (Reckless wounding). He also stabbed her left ear and cut open her shirt, exposing her breasts and stomach (Reckless wounding).
The offender than threatened to cut off the victim’s nipples and vagina/clitoris (after removing her pants). The victim tried to deflect the offender and pleaded for him to stop (Intimidation). The offender locked the windows and doors of the vehicle to stop the victim from escaping. A while after a man walked past the vehicle and looked inside, the offender unlocked the car and the victim ran outside screaming for help, although the man could not be seen. The victim ran down the riverbank and saw the offender get out of the car with a jerry can. The offender tipped the can containing diesel over the victim’s head and body (Using explosive fluid). The victim ran down to the river and hid, but the offender chased the victim and told her she needed to wash the diesel out of her hair. The victim complied.
The offender told the victim to go back to the car and she complied. When there, the offender tried to light the victim’s hair on fire with a cigarette lighter (Attempted cause GBH with intent). The victim put it out with her hands, but the offender lit her hair another two times (Attempted cause GBH with intent). The offender and victim then travelled to the offender’s friend’s house, stopping at various places along the way. The offender threatened to harm or kill the victim if she drove off, so the victim complied and did not leave. After visiting the friend’s house, the offender and victim drove to a deserted scrub area where the offender continued to question the victim. The victim told the offender false stories to keep him happy, then the offender told the victim to get in the backseat because he was going to do what they did to her (implying that he would rape her but she would like it). The offender got some lubricant and put this in the victim’s vagina and anus. He then penetrated her vagina and anus, the victim crying the whole time (Aggravated sexual assault x 2). The offender then inserted his entire first into the victim’s vagina and then anus, while the victim screamed in pain and begged the offender to stop (Aggravated sexual assault x 2). The offender could see blood on the ground, running down her legs and on the offender’s hand. The offender then punched the victim in the throat and told her he would do it again to knock her out. He then left her in the bush and drove off. She made it to a road and was picked up by a man passing by in a ute who took her to the police station. When the victim was recovering in hospital later, the offender called her and threatened to shoot the victim’s mum and dad if she pressed charges (Threaten witness to withhold true evidence).
Medical reports showed that the victim may suffer long term issues as a result of her injuries and were potentially life threatening if they had not been treated.
Judgment: The judge convicted the offender of all charges and sentenced him to an aggregate of 24 years’ imprisonment, with an 18-year non-parole period. Although a discount was given for the utilitarian value of the offender’s early pleas, His Honour found that most offences were in the mid-range of objective seriousness, with the Aggravated sexual assault charges being in the highest range of seriousness, having been committed as "deliberate sadistic torture" [36]. His Honour further emphasised that the offender’s "warped and sadistic desire to gratuitously inflict pain, dominate and terrorise overcame any empathy or concern for the wellbeing of his long-time partner, the mother of his child" [7].
All of the offences were committed in the context of a long-term relationship, so were each domestic violence offences. His Honour held that "It has long been recognised that such offences, particularly where the offender is a repeat domestic violence offender, require emphasis in sentencing on specific and general deterrence, together with powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for the protection of the community" [54].
The judge accepted that the offender’s "long history of emotional and behavioural dysregulation, emanating from his early adolescence, and his complex trauma background, including a history of physical and sexual abuse, loss of family stability and structure from his childhood and a lack of positive and nurturing influences, his exposure to drug and alcohol abuse" had normalised his offending behaviour and desensitised him to the anti-sociality of his crimes, so the offender’s moral culpability should be reduced according to principle in Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37 [77]. However, His Honour held that, due to the nature of the offending, the offender’s antecedents and his criminal history, there was a need in this case to give significant weight to retribution, specific deterrence and protection of the community, over and above diminution of the sentence by virtue of lessened weight to general deterrence and reduced moral culpability [79].
The judge specifically noted that the offender still blamed the victim for his violent offending, had no insight into his offending, had no compassion, and continued to hold negative attitudes towards interventions [80]. Furthermore, the offender lacked genuine remorse, with all representations on this point being entirely self-serving [91]. His Honour held that the offender had extremely poor prospects of rehabilitation and his risk of reoffending was medium to high [98], finding that he had "a significant history of hostility and aggression towards women, especially his female family members and intimate partners, including expressions of intention to kill" [82].
R v Barnett [2020] NSWDC 193 (12 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic to sentencing considerations- breach protection order.’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Aggravated detention of a person with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; Reckless wounding causing actual bodily harm x 1; Contravention of a prohibition/restriction under an AVO x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issues: The relevance of a pre-existing alcohol disorder to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending; relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic to sentencing considerations.
Facts: The female victim was married to the offender man, although they had not resided together for eight to nine years. The victim was the subject of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (AVO) that protected her from the offender. A condition of the order prohibited the offender from approaching the victim or being in her company for at least 12 hours after drinking alcohol or taking illicit drugs. The offender asked the victim to stay with him for a few days at a caravan park where he lived. The victim agreed. On one night, the victim and offender met with Mr Wallace at his caravan and drank alcohol. The offender left earlier than the victim, but later returned and accused Mr Wallace and the victim of being unfaithful together. The offender produced a knife and pressed it to Mr Wallace’s chest before placing it on Mr Wallace’s throat, creating a superficial laceration. The victim attempted to grab the offender’s arm but the offender pushed her backwards where she fell and hit furniture, losing consciousness. Every time the victim tried to get up, the offender hit her against the walls and furniture. He also cut her right leg, causing three wounds. Mr Wallace tried to remove the knife from the offender, but the offender lacerated Mr Wallace’s finger. He told the victim that if she screamed, he would kill Mr Wallace, and told them both that they could not leave.
During the period when the victim and Mr Wallace were detained, the victim also suffered a subdural haematoma, bruising under her right eye, a fractured rib and many abrasions. The offender was heavily intoxicated at the time, having suffered from an alcohol use disorder since he was nine years old.
Held: The offender was sentenced to seven years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. The sentencing judge found that the prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable to good [62] because the offender entered an early plea, his conduct was out of character (he had not previously engaged in violent conduct) [49], he was sincerely remorseful, he was suffering significant grief over the death of his wife [53], he behaved in an exemplary fashion whilst in custody [56], and he had agreed to avail himself of alcohol and drug treatment programs upon his release [58].
However, His Honour held that the offending was objectively very serious [70]. The Detention charges fell at the mid-range of objective seriousness for that kind of offence as the detention was relatively short and its purpose was to exert "psychological control" and "emotional ascendency" [21]-[22]. Furthermore, the offender made numerous threats to kill the victim and Mr Wallace when he was unstable. His Honour held that the Wounding charges fell above mid-range as the victim was conscious at the time the wounds were inflicted but was unable to resist [25]-[26]. Breach of the AVO was held to be an aggravating factor [27], as was the use of a weapon [28].
His Honour held that there was a causal connection between the Offender’s alcohol use disorder and the offending, because the disorder led him to misperceive the dealings between the victim and Mr Wallace [11]. As such, His Honour held that the disorder "mitigate[d] to some degree the level of the objective seriousness of the offending" and also had implications for the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation [11]. However, His Honour found that the offender was still culpable for his actions because he had not previously engaged in violent conduct and had stopped making efforts to manage his alcoholism six years earlier [33]. The judge further held that the offender’s culpability was not reduced because of a combination of intoxication and sexual jealousy because he had previously managed these conditions prior to the offending [38].
In relation to the relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic as a sentencing consideration, His Honour provided that "in the short term, the [offender] is likely to find custody generally more onerous to some degree as a result of the general restrictions imposed because of the pandemic" [70], however, "because of the objective gravity of his conduct, he will receive a very substantial period of incarceration" [71]. His Honour further stated that "It is realistic and not unfair to say that the incidence and effect of the pandemic may be more keenly felt for an offender who has a short non-parole period … in comparison to someone who will receive a significant head sentence" [71] and warned that "courts should not be too ready, in the absence of express legislative action, to be unduly influenced by the pandemic when weighting its significance in the sentencing exercise" [71].
R v Aumash [2020] NSWDC 168 (1 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 to sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Women’
Offences: Entering dwelling-house (aggravated offence) x 2; Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender had been in a relationship with the female victim (who had a child from a previous relationship). The victim ended the relationship after a year due to the offender’s controlling behaviour and anger, but the offender refused to accept that the relationship was over. He continued to contact the victim via telephone and text message (the messages were abusive, controlling and threatening) and attended her home uninvited. One night, the offender repeatedly called the victim and demanded to know who was in her home, threatening to kill anyone who was there. He then went to her house and entered it without her permission. The victim threatened to call police so the offender left the house, but remained outside yelling at her and knocking on doors and windows. He then climbed in through her bedroom window and confronted the victim, standing over her and frightening her (first entering dwelling house offence). The offender threatened to stab the victim’s male friend and searched the victim’s house. He then picked up a pocket-knife and accused the victim of trying to stab him with it. The victim tried to leave the house and the offender stopped her, but she was ultimately able to get away. The offender followed her into the street and continued to yell at her, despite the victim telling the offender that they were no longer together. The victim ran away and hid in a nearby park, and had a friend call 000. The offender searched for her using the victim’s car but when police arrived, they were unable to find him. An Interim Apprehend Violence Order was obtained by police.
The next day, the victim and her friend, Mick, were in the victim’s backyard when the offender came out of the garage carrying a piece of wood. He took the victim to her car (where he left it the night before) and she drove it home. The offender remained at the victim’s home but the victim would not let him inside. Later that day, the victim found the offender in her kitchen. The offender left after the victim threatened to call police, but he continued to send her text messages. That afternoon, the victim found the offender under her son’s bed (second entering dwelling house offence). She locked him in the room and ran to her car, but the offender jumped out the window and entered the car and would not leave. The victim continuously sounded the car horn and police arrived.
The offender continued to return to the victim’s house over the next few days, threatening to hurt her and her family, and yelling abuse at the victim and anyone she was with. He also continued to send her text messages and make phone calls to her. During the course of one day, the offender made 488 calls to the victim and sent 98 text messages. Many of these messages sought to cajole her into dropping the charges against him and excusing his criminal actions towards her. The police eventually found the offender at the victim’s home, served him with an Apprehended Violence Order and arrested him.
Sentence: The judge sentenced the offender to three years and three months’ imprisonment for the entering a dwelling-house offences, with a non-parole period of two years, and nine months’ imprisonment for the using a carriage service offence. The judge emphasised that the offender’s conduct constituted a "sustained attack on [the victim’s] physical and psychological integrity over a period of weeks" [54] and that "his crimes were so serious he must be removed from the community for a time" [62]. His Honour found that the offender had no concern for the victim’s emotional state and sought to exercise coercive control over her by putting her in fear [31].
When determining the appropriate sentence for each offence, His Honour also took into account other offences that the offender committed. Regarding the offender’s entry into the victim’s bedroom via the window when he knew the victim would be home, His Honour took into account the offender’s crime of intimidation, taking of the victim’s car, and two entries to the victim’s property without her consent [36]. Regarding the offender being found under the victim’s son’s bed, His Honour also took into account the offender’s three acts of intimidation, entry to the victim’s property without her consent and remaining on her property without her consent [37].
His Honour specifically noted that the number and content of the calls and text messages showed that the offender’s intention was to seek to control, threaten and demean the victim, and this was part of a pattern of behaviour [33]. His Honour stated that "the extent of [the offender’s] harassment and motivations for his actions make this a particularly serious example of this type of offence [the using a carriage service offence]" and therefore a custodial sentence was required [34].
His Honour found that the offender had committed previous domestic violence offences, so was not entitled to any leniency [43]. Although the offender had a history of drug use and mental illness, His Honour held that neither of these mitigated his offending [47]. However, each sentence was reduced to reflect the utilitarian value of the offender’s early pleas.
His Honour also commented on the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that "these concerns and considerations [regarding COVID-19 and its restrictions] apply to every prisoner sentenced" [52]. His Honour considered that "if/when COVID-19 enters gaols, early parole may be given to some but not all prisoners" and that the offender is in a category that can be considered for early release [53].
R v Misdale [2019] NSWDC 858 (16 December 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; reckless wounding x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The male offender pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and reckless wounding. Neilson DCJ also took into account 2 matters on a Form 1, namely, offences of common assault and intimidation. The female complainant (in respect of the charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, intimidation, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault) was in an intimate relationship with the offender, which ended in October 2017 but recommenced a year later. The victim (in respect of the charge of reckless wounding) was a male friend of the offender and complainant. All but one offence (reckless wounding) were domestic violence offences. The offender’s relationship with the complainant was described as ‘toxic’.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Held: The offender’s extensive criminal history evidenced a pattern of alcohol-fueled violence and, more recently, offences committed against the current complainant ([28]-[38]). The offender’s personal circumstances were discussed at [39]-[48]: he had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse; he had a problematic pattern of gambling when under the influence of alcohol and cocaine; he only had intermittent and low paying employment; he struggled to maintain stable intimate relationships and his relationship with the complainant was marred by verbal and physical arguments; and he displayed insight into his need for treatment for his addictions and showed no impairment in cognition when he was free of alcohol and drugs. Further, the offender was assessed as being at a high risk of re-offending ([49]), and was considered as requiring ‘as much supervision…and assistance as he can obtain from Community Corrections…to stay free of drugs and alcohol and turn his life around’ ([53]). The Court noted the importance of denunciation, as well as deterrence ‘both of the offender and of others who might want to practise violence, in particular domestic violence’ ([56]). Consequently, the offender was convicted of the 3 charges to which he pleaded guilty, and sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months ([66]). Special circumstances were established because of the offender’s need for treatment and support for his drug and alcohol addiction ([64]).
R v Brisbane (a pseudonym) [2019] NSWDC 785 (12 December 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 1 x sexual intercourse without consent; 1 x general offence of perverting the course of justice; 1 x contravention of an apprehended violence order (AVO)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender was in a domestic relationship with the female victim for 3 years, during the course of which the victim had a child. The relationship was marred by domestic abuse, which eventually led to its termination ([7]-[10]). The offender attended the victim’s house in breach of his bail, told her that she would be raped, and proceeded to have non-consensual intercourse with her ([13]-[20]). The offender also attempted to get the victim to withdraw her cooperation with police, which constituted the breach of the AVO and the pervert course of justice offences ([25]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 7 years, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 3 months ([47]). The sexual assault offence was aggravated because it occurred in the victim’s home, was committed while the offender was on conditional liberty, and involved threats and the use of actual violence ([27]). The Court addressed the offender’s personal circumstances at [30]-[34]: he was 28 years old, had a criminal history, and used various drugs for a long period of time. His Honour described the offender as a ‘vicious’ sex offender ([32]). Although the offender pleaded guilty, he did not express remorse ([35]-[37]). The material before his Honour did not indicate that the offender was interested in rehabilitation, and thus his prospects were found to be poor ([38]). Further, specific and general deterrence, and the need for community protection were highly relevant ([39]).
R v Edwards [2019] NSWDC 825 (13 November 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of bond’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Breach of s12 bond by reason of offences of common assault, intimidation, and use of a carriage service to threaten to kill
Case type: Breach hearing and sentence
Facts: The male offender was called up in respect of alleged breaches of a s 12 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act bond that was imposed by Norrish QC DCJ in 2017 in relation to an offence contrary to s 25A Drug (Misuse and Trafficking) Act 1985 ([1]). The offences that constituted the breaches involved elements of domestic violence, and included offences of common assault, intimidation, and use of a carriage service to threaten to kill, to which the offender pleaded guilty ([4]). Material presented to the Court included an apology letter from the offender and a report from a psychiatrist working with the Aboriginal Legal Service ([3]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the breaches were proven and, if so, the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Held: The offences constituting the breach were the offender’s first domestic violence offences but were considered to be serious matters. Norrish QC DCJ noted that the offender’s mental health significantly deteriorated since 2017: he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, a form of schizophrenia or schizoid condition and a polysubstance abuse disorder ([3]). The offender was un-medicated at the time of the offending and exhibited a motivation to address his drug use and a willingness to comply with the requirements of supervision. While the offender’s deteriorating mental condition did not provide a basis for excusing the breaches, it assisted his Honour in determining the non-parole period. He was assessed as being a medium to high risk of reoffending ([10]). Consequently, the Court found the breaches to be proven, revoked the s 12 bond and fixed a term of imprisonment of 1 year 9 months, with a non-parole period of 6 months.
R v Cranston [2019] NSWDC 619 (1 November 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault police’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Step-child’
Charges: Common assault x 1; assaulting a police officer x 3; attempting to use an offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1; chocking a police officer and being reckless as to render the officer incapable of resistance x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused pushed his partner during an argument, causing her to stumble. Concerned by the accused’s actions, his partner instructed one of their children to call the police. The accused became further enraged when the police arrived, kicking one of the officers while being questioned. Two of the officers wrestled with the accused while he continued to physically lash out. The accused then grabbed the cord of one of the officer’s radio as she called for assistance and attempted to choke her. As the officers tried to handcuff him the accused attempted to obtain one of their firearms, threatening to use the gun on the police and then bit the officer. When other officers arrived another officer was also bitten by the accused. The accused was intoxicated at the time of offending. The accused pleaded guilty to all charges.
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 1 year and 9 months.
Objective Seriousness: Regarding the assault against the police officers, Abadee J thought that the assault occurring during a violent struggle and in the presence of children were aggravating factors [32]. Consequently, the conduct was assessed as falling within the mid-range of seriousness for the offence.
The presence of children when the accused threatened to use the firearm on the officers was considered to be an aggravating factor along with the context of escalating violence. Abadee J ‘characterise[d] the conduct as falling beyond the mid-range and toward the high range of objective seriousness’ [35]. The same circumstances were aggravating factors for the offence of chocking on of the officer, with the conduct also falling within the high range of objective seriousness.
Subjective Circumstances The accused was 50 at the time of offending and had a criminal history which included some offences of a violent character. The guilty pleas entered by the accused were not made at the earliest opportunity. As the accused was intoxicated, ‘his offending was impulsive or spontaneous; and not pre-planned’. ‘The most significant issue in the sentencing hearing concerned the offender’s background’ of a dysfunctional childhood marked with sexual abuse and moderate alcoholism.
In considering these circumstances, the objective seriousness of the offences and the general principles of deterrence, Abadee J ordered ‘an aggregate sentence to fit the totality of the criminal conduct overall’ discounted by 15% [76].
R v Bohun [2019] NSWDC 807 (25 October 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: 1x aggravated steal from a person; 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm; 1x aggravated break, enter and commit serious offence; 1x dangerous driving; 1x assault; 1x drive while disqualified; 1x take and drive; 1x contravene apprehended violence order; 1x possess prohibited weapon.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender was convicted of ten charges, relating to two separate courses of conduct against his then girlfriend. At the time of the offending, he was affected by illicit non-prescription drugs and was also on a suspended sentence and subject to a protection order.
The offender and victim argued in a vehicle driven by the offender’s friend and the victim got out of the vehicle. The offender ran after her, pushed her to the ground, pushed her down a set of stairs, and punched her in the back, rib and head multiple times (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). Bystanders intervened. The victim suffered ‘bruising, swelling to her face, lips, head, shoulders, ribs, back and arms’: [9]. The offender walked away, and then returned to steal the victim’s handbag (aggravated steal from a person). When the offender went back to the car, the friend drove away in order to protect the victim from him and asked him to get out of the vehicle. He did so, leaving the handbag behind.
The remainder of charges related to an unrelated series of incidents.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning:
Haesler SC DCJ imposed an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment, with a three years and six months’ non-parole period [77].
The fact that the offender and victim were in a domestic relationship showed that there was a pattern of personally targeted violence that required denunciation: [33]. This was coercive power and control that should be denounced, regardless of whether the offender thought he was justified: [34]. Denunciation was necessary, despite recognition that jails are violent environments that can have a crime-producing effect: [35]. Stealing the handbag from the victim was spontaneous and not the most serious of the offences committed: [36].
Best v Rosamond [2019] NSWDC 344 (24 July 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Bipolar affective disorder’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Offences: recklessly causing grievous bodily harm; assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV).
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male perpetrator and female victim were married at the time of offending and the male victim was a friend of theirs. The offender became angered after seeing the female and male victims sharing an ‘intimate’ kiss. He punched the male victim in the left eye before pushing the female victim to the ground. He continued to punch the male victim several times in the head and kick him on the left side of his torso until the female victim asked him to stop. The offender turned to the female victim, slapped her forcefully across the face and kicked her thigh while she lay on the ground. The offender left the scene after punching the male victim a few more times. Neither victim provided a statement to police until a year after the offending, despite the male victim being left with substantial injuries requiring surgical treatment.
The offender was heavily intoxicated at the time of offending.
Decision: The offender was sentenced to Intensive Corrections Order for 1 year and 10 months’ and to a Community Release Order or 1 year and 8 months’.
The Court noted that while the offence is a domestic violence offence, the offender’s violence was "primarily directed at the male victim" [53]. The assault occasioning actual bodily harm was at the lower end of the scale. The female victim suffered minor injuries and the forced used against her was considerably less than that used against the male victim. Furthermore, while the Court acknowledged her victim impact statement, they found its length and detail to be "disproportionate to the seriousness of the harm that could reasonably be considered to have been caused" [31].
In assessing the objective gravity of the offending and sentencing purposes, the Court considered the fact that the offence was unplanned and in response to some form of provocation, the offending was uncharacteristic of the offender, and that the offender’s bipolar affective disorder had some underlying relevance. A discount was given to recognise the utilitarian benefit of the offender’s guilty plea.
R v AK [2019] NSWDC 456 (19 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Detention’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 2 x detain a person with the intent of obtaining an advantage; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x influencing witness; 2 x common assault; 1 x stalking/intimidating with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm; 1 x contravening Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The victim and offender were married and had a child who was 2 years old at the time of the offending. The victim had 2 children from a previous marriage, who were 20 and 15 years of age. The offender pleaded guilty to the charges of detaining his wife and his 15 year old stepdaughter without her consent, with the intention of obtaining an advantage (that is, psychological gratification), and the charge of sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent. He also pleaded guilty to the charge of communicating with his wife, who was to be called as a witness, to persuade her to withhold true evidence with the intent of procuring his acquittal of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In addition, the offender also requested that the Court sentence him in respect to the charges of common assault, stalking/intimidating with the intent to cause fear of physical harm, and contravening an ADVO.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years. In relation to the objective seriousness of the detention charges, it was submitted that the Court should consider a number of factors, such as the persons being detained, the period of detention, the circumstances of detention, and the purpose of the detention ([41]). The detainees included his wife, and her 15 year old daughter and 2 year old son. The detention lasted around 10 hours. As part of the detention, there were acts of violence perpetrated against his wife and step-daughter. His wife was also intimidated into changing her story before going to court. Additionally, the offender had sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent while she was being detained ([43]). The purpose of the detention was difficult to ascertain as the offender refused to give evidence on the question. Therefore, the Court could merely speculate ([45]).
Wilson SC DCJ analysed the offender’s medical history. In 2016, he had been diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder with possibilities of a dementia type illness with psychotic symptoms. Another expert opined that the offender likely suffered from major depression at the time of the offending ([56]-60]).
Aggravating factors affecting the sentence included ([61]):
•
The actual or threatened use of violence;
•
The offences were committed in the presence of his wife’s children, aged 2 and 15 respectively. The 15 year old child was also assaulted, and that offending occurred in the presence of the 2 year old child;
•
The offending was committed in the victims’ home, a place where they are entitled to expect to be safe, particularly in light of the fact that an ADVO had been taken out which prevented the offender from attending the premises; and
•
The offences were committed while the offender was the subject of conditional liberty.
The offender’s prior criminal history did not aggravate the objective seriousness of the offences, however, it did disentitle him to any leniency resulting from a finding of good character ([65]). His Honour declined to find statutory remorse as a mitigating factor ([66]).
R v Wyatt [2019] NSWDC 490 (21 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 1 x wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm; 1 x reckless wounding
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender initially pleaded not guilty to the charges of reckless wounding and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. On the fifth and final day of trial, the offender pleaded guilty to the alternative Count 2. The victim was in an intimate relationship with a woman for about 13 years, with whom he had 2 children. On the day of the offending, the offender stabbed the victim around 3 times.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was sentenced to 3 years’ and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 2 months. The objective seriousness of the offending was deemed as being in the middle of the range, given the nature of the violence, the nature and extent of the injuries, the fact that the wounds were inflicted by the use of a knife, and the fact that the wounding was completely unprovoked by the victim ([23]-[24]). Aggravating features of the offending included: the use of a weapon, the offending occurred in the victim’s home, and the offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. Although the offender had previous convictions for violent offences and the conduct was an act of gratuitous violence, the Court did not take these matters into account as aggravating features ([25]-[29]). The offender had a long-standing history of drug use ([50]), as well as an extensive criminal history ([30]). He identifies as Aboriginal, and reportedly witnessed domestic violence as a child and had been assaulted ([44]-[46]). There was no evidence of any mental disorder, although the offender reported symptoms of anxiety ([51]). Given his lengthy drug and criminal history, the Court was unable to find that he was unlikely to re-offend ([53]). The offender’s expression of remorse was given limited weight ([54]). Further, the Court was satisfied that special circumstances existed as it was clear that the offender would need extensive supervision on parole to ensure that he did not relapse into drug use ([55]-[56]).
R v Yee (a pseudonym) [2019] NSWDC 326 (19 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence related offences’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with poor literacy skills’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Charges: 1 x causing grievous bodily harm to a person with intent; 1 x intentionally choking a person with recklessness
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim, with whom he started communicating on a social media app, married in China. After relocating to Australia, the relationship deteriorated. The victim formed a romantic attachment to a customer while she was working as a sex worker. When she was asleep, the offender struck the victim 5 times to her head with a hammer and choked her. He suddenly stopped this attack and immediately assisted the victim. He also called his employer, told him that he had seriously injured his wife and asked him to call an ambulance as his English was poor. The victim was physically and psychologically injured. As a result of the incident, she could not work and was in ‘a state of confusion, helplessness, anxiety and panic’ ([35]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The grievous bodily harm was a mid-range offence, and the choking with recklessness was slightly below a mid-range offence. Each offence was aggravated by the fact that they occurred in the victim’s home. The offender had no issues with alcohol or drugs, expressed genuine remorse, and the offending was ‘completely out of…character’ and was a result of ‘a perfect storm of a mixture of conflicting emotions’ ([37]-[44]). A psychologist highlighted the need for the offender to continue psychological treatment for a persistent depressive disorder, which was in an acute state leading up to the offence ([45]). The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were found to be ‘very good’ ([46]). The sentence imposed on the offender sought to discourage others from committing similar offences, and encourage his rehabilitation ([47]). He pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity ([48]), and given his problems with English and his social isolation, the Court made a finding of ‘special circumstances’ ([52]). For the offence of causing grievous bodily harm, the offender was sentenced to 7 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years. For the offence of intentionally choking a person with recklessness, the offender was sentenced to a fixed term of 3 years’ imprisonment. Both sentences were ordered to be served totally concurrently.
R v Casini [2019] NSWDC 376 (18 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’
Charges: 1 x aggravated detention, causing actual bodily harm (kidnapping)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated detention, causing actual bodily harm. The victim and offender had been in an intimate relationship for 5 months and were living together at the time of the offending. The offender was formerly married for 22 years and had 2 children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was convicted, and sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, Bright DCJ took into account the following factors ([27]):
•
The conduct was a serious instance of domestic violence;
•
The assault was vicious and sustained, involving multiple forceful blows and punches to the victim’s head and body. The offender would have known that the victim was unlikely to physically retaliate;
•
The offending involved significant emotional intimidation and verbal threats;
•
The nature of the victim’s injuries;
•
The length of the detention was for a period of 2 hours; and
•
The offender sought psychological gratification.
The objective seriousness of the offending was found to be at the higher end of the mid-range ([28]). An aggravating feature was that the offence occurred at the victim’s home ([29]). The offender began using drugs after separating from his former wife, but otherwise described no use of drugs in his adult life ([47]). While the offender’s self-induced intoxication was not a mitigating factor, his underlying Adjustment Disorder was found to have had an impact on his moral culpability ([60]). He was also remorseful, as evidenced by his letter to the Court ([61]-[63]). His Honour was satisfied that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation, having regard to his motivation to participate in counselling and rehabilitation, previous employment, insight into his offending behaviour and commitment to being a good father upon release ([64]).
R v Halacoglu [2019] NSWDC 384 (7 May 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Good character’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 1 x use of a carriage service to menace
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to one count of using a carriage service to menace. The offender moved to Australia in 2010 on a student visa sponsored by the victim, with whom he was in a relationship. They lived together, with the victim’s 2 children from a previous relationship. ‘Troubles’ in their relationship emerged, and the victim entered into another relationship in the beginning of 2016. A few months later, the parties exchanged a series of text messages. The offender sent a text in Turkish, saying ‘If I’m not going to live, you are not going to live either’. The victim reported feeling threatened by the offender. Although he admitted to using those words, he claimed that they had a different meaning.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offence was at the very low end of the scale of objective seriousness. The offender had no previous convictions ([5]). Given the fact that he was on bail with strict conditions and had the matter ‘hanging over his head for almost 3 years without any offending’, Williams SC DCJ dismissed the charges under s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([7]).
R v Amante [2019] NSWDC 222 (1 May 2019) – New South Wales District Court
(This decision was the subject of an unsuccessful appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal Amante v R [2020] NSWCCA 34 (11 March 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court)
‘Arson’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Charges: Destroying or damaging property x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: As at January 2018, the offender had been in a turbulent domestic relationship with the victim. The situation between them deteriorated to a point where the victim had obtained an apprehended violence order against the offender. The offender started a fire in the victim’s unit ([16]). As a consequence, the fire caused serious damage to the limited personal belongings of the victim, who was in a somewhat perilous financial situation so as to require Housing Commission accommodation ([25]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: An important consideration in sentencing the offender was the fact that it was a domestic violence offence ([45]). Colefax SC DCJ noted the offender’s long history of offending, and unresolved drug abuse and psychological issues. His Honour stated that the offender is a ‘man of intelligence’, who has been able to work hard and has the support of his immediate family ([51]). The offender’s father was a violent man and he was sexually abused by his brother ([32]-[33]). His mental health problems and excessive drug consumption contributed to the commission of the offence. No rational person would have reacted to a break-up by setting fire to another person’s house, threatening other people’s lives ([42]). Because of his mental health issues, he was not seen as an ‘appropriate vehicle for the full application of general deterrence’ ([44]). The offending was aggravated by the fact that the offender was on bail and that the property damaged was the victim’s home ([28]). He pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity, indicating an element of remorse ([46]). However, remorse is an important but not determinative factor. It was also important to note that the offender had not received effective treatment for his underlying mental health or drug addiction issues ([48]).
Taking into account his guilty plea, reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and the fact that he was in protection, the offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years and 9 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
R v Phillip Michael Summerfield [2019] NSWDC 126 (16 April 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: The offender pleaded guilty to 3 charges, namely, stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm (Count 1), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Count 2), and sexual intercourse without consent (Count 3). There was also a charge of driving while suspended.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The victim had been in an intimate domestic relationship with the offender for approximately 2 years, during which time the offender sometimes lived at the victim’s home. The relationship was characterised by violence. On 10 May 2017, the offender carried out the attack after picking the victim up from her home. He began shouting at the victim about a man named Adam. The victim tried to escape from the car. The offender stopped the car, opened the passenger’s door and punched the victim several times in the face, causing bleeding (Count 2). The victim moved to the back seat of the car and called 000 on 3 separate occasions in the hope that the operator would hear what was happening. The offender drove to an address in Young, where he committed Count 3. Count 1 related to the offender’s ongoing threatening and violent behaviour towards the victim. The offender later drove the victim to her home, and apologised to her. When he was arrested, he agreed to be interviewed and admitted to assaulting the victim.
The offender asked the Court to also deal with his appeal against sentence severity in relation to an aggregate sentence of 26 months with a non-parole period of 15 months which had been imposed at the Local Court in respect of two offences (one of which was contravention of a domestic violence order). That offending was committed while the offender was on bail for the other offences for which the offender appeared for sentence.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held:
Severity appeal from the Local Court:
His Honour dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the convictions and the aggregate sentence of 26 months with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Sentence matters:
Judge Lerve noted that the offending was committed in contravention of an apprehended domestic violence order, and highlighted the need for general deterrence in such cases ([35]-[42]). The circumstances in which Count 2 was committed were relevant to the assessment. It was particularly nasty and cowardly as it occurred on the side of the road; however the injuries were limited to bleeding ([19]). Count 1 was found to be serious, as it involved an ongoing course of violent and aggressive threats ([20]). In relation to Count 3, his Honour noted that, in light of the victim’s reaction and the violence which occurred that day, it must have been obvious to the offender that the victim was not consenting ([21]).
Further, the offender’s criminal history was extensive, and he had previously been convicted of offences including contraventions of domestic violence orders, intimidation of a police officer, damage to property, and a number of assault matters. However, the offender had not previously been charged with a sexual offence ([43]-[48]). He also regularly uses drugs, and self-reported that he was diagnosed with PTSD and experienced trauma as a child. He attended a rehabilitation facility while on bail in 2018, but was discharged because of non-compliance with the requirements of the facility ([54]). Judge Lerve could not be satisfied on balance that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation ([58]). The evidence before his Honour suggested that, given his lack of treatment, he is at an increased risk of violent re-offending in the future ([57]).
His Honour recorded a conviction for each of the matters to which the offender pleaded guilty, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 7 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 5 years. He also recommended that the offender participate in the Violent Offenders Treatment Programme while in custody. The total effective sentence was one of 8 years and 4 months with a period of 6 years in actual custody.
R v Lumsden [2019] NSWDC 149 (15 March 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Burden of proof’ – ‘Credible witness’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Intentionally or recklessly destroy/damage property x 1; common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant had separated and have a child together. They had ongoing issues regarding the complainant’s use of a phone and their separation in general. The appellant grabbed the complainant’s handbag, containing her phone. In cross-examination, he confirmed that he held the bag to taunt her about the phone because he was upset ([11]). The altercation resulted in the complainant suffering bruises and a scratch on her leg.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the conviction, pursuant to section 18 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001.
Held: Grant DCJ allowed the appeal. He quashed the conviction, set aside all other orders of the Local Court, found the appellant not guilty and dismissed the charges.
The appellant gave sworn evidence of his good character which was uncontested ([10]). The magistrate was faced with a single witness with no independent supportive evidence ([12]). The appellant had the presumption of innocence ([22]).
Grant DCJ found that, in determining the guilt of the appellant, the Magistrate engaged in ‘illogical, speculative, reverse reasoning’ that led him into error. The Magistrate’s reasoning in respect of the matters listed at para [14] was found to be flawed. He wrongly inferred that because the complainant had not been cross-examined about any inconsistency with a statement made to police, the evidence she gave must be consistent with that statement, therefore supporting her credibility. Such an inference was found to be entirely speculative as no one knew the contents of the statement. Further, Grant DCJ held that making a self-serving statement, or any statement to the police, and giving evidence in accordance with that statement, does not automatically add to a witness’ credibility ([15]-[16]).
The appellant was given the opportunity to conduct an electronic record of interview which he declined. Grant DCJ found that the Magistrate correctly set out the law in that the refusal to participate in a record of interview cannot be construed as an admission of guilt. However, the Magistrate went on to say that such a refusal was relevant in assessing the accuracy of memories in relation to a certain account noted in [19]. Grant DCJ found that this reasoning would lead to the proposition that ‘if a defendant engaged in a record of interview and it was consistent with his evidence, then a witness could be looked upon as a more credible witness.’ This finding would undermine the appellant’s right to silence and may shift the onus on the appellant to demonstrate his credibility by participating in a record of interview ([18]-[20]).
To find the appellant guilty, the magistrate would have to disbelieve his account beyond reasonable doubt ([23]). Grant DCJ was not persuaded that the Magistrate could have properly convicted the appellant ([23]).
R v Smethurst [2018] NSWDC 488 (9 November 2018) – New South Wales District Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Options’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender had known the complainant for a number of years. In the course of a dispute between the parties at the complainant’s residence, the offender put a pillow over her face (common assault). The complainant then ran out of the house, followed by the offender. The offender pushed her on the ground and started to drag her towards the house by the shirt which caused a graze to her back (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). The complainant ran onto the neighbour’s driveway and told the neighbour to ‘call the police’. The police attended the complainant’s residence soon after the incident and recorded her statement on camera.
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The Court sentenced the offender to an aggregate period of imprisonment of 22 months which, after a discount of 15% for his guilty plea, was a sentence of 18 months ([64]). A non-parole period of 12 months was imposed.
The Court assessed the objective seriousness of the offending, and found that aggravating factors included the offender’s five good behaviour bonds and a string of intensive corrections orders at the time of offending, the place of the offending (complainant’s home), and the brutality of the consecutive acts committed over a short period of time ([13]-[17]).
The Court must be satisfied that imprisonment is more appropriate than all other alternatives, such as non-custodial sentences ([54]). The benefits of rehabilitation in the community were found to be outweighed by the fact that the offender previously had the benefit of conditional liberty orders and failed to comply with them ([56]). General principles of sentencing, such as denunciation, accountability, punishment, deterrence and protection were considered at [46]-[52]. The offender had a number of prior convictions, including common assault, contravention of an AVO, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm ([21]). The matter before the Court was the fourth domestic violence type offence for which the offender had been charged ([30]). Although the number of previous offences was a relevant factor, they were of moderate application as there was no evidence of any present risk. Nevertheless, the court observed at [33] that the offender had a history of domestic violence and non-compliance with court-ordered community based sentencing options.
Although the offender pleaded guilty, the Court was reluctant to accept his expressions of remorse, particularly given his partial attribution of blame to the victim in the Sentencing Assessment Report. The Court referred Munda v Western Australia (2013) 649 CLR 600 at [54]-[55] which held that the State has an obligation to ‘vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’. The Court noted the offender’s history of drug abuse at [24]-[29], but did not accept that a piece of oral evidence at [29] was sufficient to establish a connection between his domestic violence offending and his substance abuse. The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were also seen to be ‘guarded’ ([45]).
Degampathi Jayasekra [2018] NSWDC 59 (23 March 2018) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Gifts’ – ‘Presumption of advancement’ – ‘Property ownership’ – ‘Trusts’
Charges: Destroy or damage property x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In the course of an argument with the complainant, his wife, the appellant damaged a laptop and mobile phone ([4]). The appellant’s case was that he was the sole owner of the items, and thus could not be convicted of the offence ([5]). The appellant had purchased the items and had given them to his wife and did not say they were gifts ([6]). The complainant had day to day use of both items ([7]).
Issues: Whether the items were the property of the appellant or another person.
Decision and reasoning: In reliance on the law of trusts, Scotting J inferred from the actions of the parties that the items were intended to be gifts ([21]-[26]). The presumption of advancement could not be rebutted. The Magistrate’s decision that the items belonged to both the appellant and complainant was affirmed ([28]). Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for property damage is upheld.
R v MJ [2016] NSWDC 272 (12 May 2016) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Myths and misunderstandings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 5, sexual intercourse without consent, common assault x 4, breach of AVO x 5.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After being found guilty in a trial by jury, the offender was sentenced for 10 domestic violence offences committed against his former female partner. The offender was also sentenced for a number of other charges namely, driving disqualified and numerous breaches of an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO).
Decision and Reasoning: Berman J imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 and a half years. At the outset, His Honour noted that: ‘Women, and it is usually women, too often find themselves subjugated to the demands of their partners, who seem to regard it as entirely acceptable for them to control and manipulate someone with whom they are in a relationship through violent and degrading means’ (see [1]).
Berman J noted that the offender here felt a sense of entitlement and ownership over the victim and blamed her for his violent behaviour. His manipulation of the victim, using violence and protestations of love, was so effective that she did not leave the relationship (even after she had been repeatedly beaten and raped) until she received counselling (see [4]). She was left with significant physical and psychological injury (see [26]).
Moreover, there were a number of serious features of this offending. The victim was assaulted in her own home. Many of the offences occurred in context of offender’s demands that the victim withdraw a complaint she made to the police about him. There were similarities in the way he had treated a previous partner. Some offences were committed in the presence of the victim’s daughter. Many offences constituted breaches of an AVO and demonstrated contempt of these orders (see [28]-[30]).
In the context of mitigating factors, His Honour acknowledged that the offender grew up with domestic violence as a feature of his early life. However, this was not a case in which the offender thought that such behaviour was normal and acceptable because his stepfather was a good role model for him (see [33]-[40]). The offender had taken some steps towards rehabilitation and some references spoke positively of his character (showing how an offender can have a very different face in private life) but there was still need for the sentence to reflect an element of specific deterrence (see [42]-[43]). More importantly, the sentence needed to take into account general deterrence. As per Berman J:
‘Offences such as these cause enormous harm, both to the individual victims concerned and to the community generally. Offenders who commit crimes such as I have described, particularly after they have been subject to apprehended violence orders, put in place to protect their partners from precisely such conduct, need to be given in sentences which will deter others who may be tempted to act in a similar way. Most fundamentally in assessing the relevant sentence to impose upon the offender is, of course, the objective gravity of what he has done’ (see [42]).
Rich v The Queen [2015] NSWDC 71 (18 May 2015) – New South Wales District Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Service’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order, common assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: A Provisional Apprehended Order was made nominating the appellant’s partner as the protected person and the appellant as the defendant. This was served on the appellant by the police. The appellant then appeared in court represented by counsel from the Aboriginal Legal Service and an interim Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) was made. The appellant assaulted the protected person and was charged. There was a hearing in the Local Court where a plea of guilty was entered with respect to the assault charge and the appellant defended the contravene AVO charge. The Local Court found the appellant guilty of the contravene AVO.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The prosecution was unable to prove service of the Provisional Apprehended Order on the appellant because the Statement of Service submitted breached the hearsay rule in s 59 of Evidence Act 1995.
2.
The magistrate in the Local Court should not have informed himself of the events of the appellant’s appearances in court for the interim AVO.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the Statement of Service complied with the Local Court Rules. It did not need to be signed as it was served by a police officer and it was sufficient that the officer wrote ‘Dubbo’ in the space for the address (r 5.12 Local Court Rules). Rule 5.12 exists to serve the purpose of facilitating proof of service of the process (See [29]-[36]). In any event, the appellant was present in court when the Interim Order was made (See [48]). Second, the magistrate informed himself of the course of events by reading the bench sheet. He was entitled to do so (See [49], [57]).
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
DUD v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2019] NSWCATAD 163 (15 August 2019) – New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative review’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Civil and administrative tribunal’ – ‘Eggshell psyche’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Psychological injury’
Charges: Act of domestic/family violence
Case type: Application for Administrative Review
Facts: The applicant sought administrative review of a decision in respect of an application for Victims Support. In 2015, the applicant’s solicitor lodged an Application for Victims Support which alleged that she was the primary victim of an act of domestic/family violence. She also alleged to have suffered a psychological injury as a result of the violent conduct, and she sought counselling, financial assistance for immediate needs or economic loss, and a recognition payment ([2]-[3]).
At first instance, the Assessor approved a Category D recognition payment in the sum of $1500 on the basis that the evidence indicated that the applicant was a victim of an assault that did not result in grievous bodily harm ([7]). Subsequently, the applicant’s lawyer signed an Internal Review request form, submitting that she had suffered grievous bodily harm as a result of the violence and that a Category C recognition payment should have been approved ([9]). The Senior Assessor, however, re-affirmed that the applicant was the primary victim of an act of violence, and was only eligible for a Category D recognition payment in the sum of $1500 ([12]).
Issue: The Tribunal was required to determine an application for an administrative review. Its powers derive from s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
Held: The applicant’s solicitor cited Helm v Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd and BWQ v Commissioner of Victims Rights in the Internal Review form, both of which relate to the characterisation of psychological injury as ‘bodily harm’. The Senior Assessor determined that ‘as [the applicant] relies on a psychological injury as evidence of grievous bodily harm in order to be eligible for a Category C recognition payment’, it is necessary to consider ‘whether the evidence establishes a “really serious” psychological injury’. The Senior Assessor was not satisfied that the applicant’s functioning had been impacted solely as a ‘direct result’ of the domestic violence, or that her psychological injury was sufficiently serious to justify the approval of a Category C recognition payment ([12]).
Ultimately, the decision of the Senior Assessor was set aside, and the Tribunal decided that the applicant was eligible for a Category C recognition payment in the sum of $5000. The Tribunal discussed CZU v Commissioner of Victims Rights and DEL v Commissioner of Victims Rights, which provide some guidance on the types of evidence which may assist in determining whether a psychological injury is sufficiently serious to be considered grievous bodily harm, in order to approve a Category C recognition payment ([11]-[13]). Although the applicant had experienced prior psychological issues, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not support a finding that she required any ongoing psychological treatment for these issues when the act of violence occurred ([32]). Further, the Tribunal was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant’s current psychological injury resulted from the act of violence ([37]), and that it could properly be considered as being ‘really serious’ ([44]). The applicant was found to have suffered grievous bodily harm, thereby satisfying the eligibility requirement for a Category C recognition payment. Even if the Tribunal had been incorrect in its finding as to the causation of her current psychological condition, it was satisfied that the ‘eggshell psyche’ principle applied and that her pre-existing ‘eggshell psyche’ was aggravated as a direct result of the violent act ([39]).
Northern Territory
Court of Appeal
SE v Masani [2024] NTCA 7 (3 December 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Young people’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Aggravated assault x1.
Case type: Application for an extension of time to appeal sentence.
Facts: The appellant SE (aged 16) and the complainant GM (aged 17) were in a relationship. While GM was walking with relatives, SE approached and assaulted her by punching her twice to the body. He then kicked her legs, causing her to fall. While GM was on the ground, SE continued the assault by forcibly kicking her another three times. He then struck GM over the head and body with a steel [dish] rack, causing her to fall again when she tried to get up. SE then threatened further assault if GM did not follow him. Fearful, GM complied and followed SE to the Council lawns. Here, she washed blood from her face before police arrived. GM suffered pain all over her body and a 1 cm laceration to the back of her head.
Procedural history: The Youth Justice Court sentenced SE to 15 months’ detention (fully suspended) for aggravated assault, with no conviction recorded. SE appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. In this application, SE applied for an extension of time to appeal the sentence in the Court of Appeal.
Ground of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the primary judge erred by finding that the sentence imposed by the Youth Justice Court was not manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances. This ground was supported by four specific particulars of error.
Reasoning and decision: In this application, the Court of Appeal dismissed SE’s application for an extension of time to appeal the sentence, concluding that neither the particulars of error nor the substance of SE’s sole ground of appeal demonstrated a valid basis for further consideration.
Particular 1: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred in finding that his offending was "adult-like." The Court rejected this, noting the finding was made by the sentencing judge, not the primary judge and this finding was not challenged previously by the applicant. Additionally, the primary judge correctly reasoned that the offending was adult-like, as violence within a domestic relationship inherently carries adult responsibilities [30].
Particular 2: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred by considering the prevalence of domestic violence among adults, despite both he and the complainant being youths. The Court found this argument unmeritorious, noting it erroneously assumed that the primary judge was the sentencing judge, and had not been raised before the primary judge. SE’s lawyer had conceded during submissions that the prevalence of domestic violence in Alice Springs justified general deterrence, even in the Youth Court context. The sentencing judge had relied on this concession, highlighting that general deterrence was necessary to protect young female victims and deter similar conduct by young male offenders [33]-[39].
Particular 3: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred by finding there was "no practical difference" between different sentencing options. The Court rejected this argument, finding the primary judge did not state there was no difference, but rather clarified that the practical difference was how the sentence would appear on SE’s record [45].
Particular 4: The applicant argued that the primary judge misapplied youth sentencing principles, suggesting they were less relevant when the sentence was fully suspended. However, the Court found this argument unmeritorious, noting that the primary judge correctly applied these principles [54].
Ground 1: The Court noted that an appeal for manifestly excessive sentences requires showing that the sentence was ‘clearly and obviously’ excessive, not just arguably so. Sentencing judges are allowed flexibility in applying consistent principles, and an appellate court should not substitute its judgment merely because it would have decided differently. The Court found no error in the primary judge’s decision, concluding that the sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offence and the importance of rehabilitation. As a result, the Court found the sentence was not manifestly excessive and upheld the dismissal of the appeal [59-60].
Olsen v Sims [2010] NTCA 8 (30 November 2010) – Northern Territory Court of Appeal
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Repeal of statute’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of restraining order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted of breaching a restraining order. Some months later he was convicted of failing to comply with the terms of the order. Contrary to the order, the appellant visited the victim at her home and entered in a verbal argument with her after consuming alcohol. The restraining order was made and the offences were against the Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT) (the former Act). This Act was repealed on 1 July 2008 and replaced by the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the current Act). The appellant’s trial in respect to the second offence did not occur until after the current Act came into force. The magistrate found that sentencing provisions under the former Act applied to the appellant. Under s 10(1A) of the former Act, where a person is found guilty of a second offence the Court must impose a minimum sentence of at least seven days’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the magistrate imposed a sentence of seven days’ imprisonment. Section 121 of the current Act provides no mandatory minimum sentence for a second breach where no harm is caused and the court is satisfied it is not appropriate to record a conviction and sentence in the circumstances.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Riley J held the magistrate did not err in sentencing the appellant.
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in punishing the appellant to a greater extent than was authorised by the current Act by imposing the mandatory sentence of imprisonment of seven days under s 10(1A) of the former Act.
Decision and Reasoning: All three judges on the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The sentence was quashed and the matter was referred back to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction for the appellant to be resentenced.
Section 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT) provides that while the appellant could be sentenced under the former Act for his second breach of the restraining order, he could not be punished to any greater extent than was authorised by both the former Act and the current Act.
Mildren J concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’ imprisonment under s 10(1A) of the former Act is a punishment ‘to any greater extent than is authorised by the current law’ pursuant to s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT). The Magistrate’s discretion to impose a lesser sentence than seven days under the current Act conferred a punishment to a greater extent than authorised by the current Act.
Southwood J, agreeing with Mildren J, held that the sentence of seven days imprisonment imposed on the appellant was a greater punishment than authorised by ss 121(1) and (3) of the current Act. Those provisions of the current Act decreased the severity of the penalty required to be imposed for a second breach of a restraining order for the purposes of s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT). The sentence imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending. Had the magistrate sentenced the appellant pursuant to s 121, he would not have imposed a sentence of seven days’ imprisonment. As a result, the Magistrate failed to sentence the appellant in accordance with s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT).
Blokland J held that s 121(3) of the current Act does not authorise a sentencing magistrate to sentence on the basis that its starting point is a conviction and seven days’ imprisonment unless that penalty is appropriate and just in all the circumstances. This was the approach of the magistrate in finding he was bound to apply the mandatory minimum term under s 10(1A) of the former Act. The sentence imposed by the magistrate was not authorised when considering the application of s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT).
Court of Criminal Appeal
The King v Wilson [2024] NTCCA 14 (18 December 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Damaging property’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ –‘threats’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent (counts 1 and 3) (x2), property damage (count 2) (x1), aggravated assault (count 4) (x1) and breach of domestic violence order (x1).
Case type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, Wilson, was the victim’s former domestic partner within a violent and coercive relationship spanning six years. A domestic violence order (DVO) was issued against Wilson on 21 December 2021 and served on 5 January 2022, but he repeatedly breached it through abusive messages and threats, pressuring the victim to withdraw the order.
•
Count 1 - Sexual intercourse without consent (17 January 2022): Wilson lured the victim to Ilparpa Camp, claiming he would repay $150 he had taken from her. Upon arrival, he forced her inside, injected her with methamphetamine ("ice") against her will, forced her to perform oral sex and then had penile-vaginal intercourse with her while she repeatedly protested and cried. When she resisted, he punched her in the head, told her to be quiet and threatened her life, warning she would end up like his ex-partner (whom he had killed in 2008). He did not wear a condom and ejaculated inside her.
•
Count 2 - Property damage (19 January 2022): Between 17-21 January 2022, Wilson held the victim captive. She tried to contact police but was prevented from doing so. On 19 January 2022, Wilson saw Detective Senior Constable Ship returning the victims calls. Enraged, he then smashed her phone, cracking its screen and rendering it unusable.
•
Count 3 - Sexual intercourse without consent (21 January 2022): Wilson woke the victim at 6 am demanding sexual intercourse. She refused, saying she was too tired. He threatened to rip off her underwear, hit her with a steel fan and kill her. Scared she complied out of fear. Wilson forced her to perform oral sex and then had penile-vaginal intercourse without consent. He did not wear a condom and he ejaculated inside her vagina. Later that day, he raped her again.
•
Count 4 - Aggravated assault (21 January 2022): Wilson forced the victim to smoke some marijuana that he had with him and, while she did not want to, she complied out of fear because the respondent was angry. Wilson tried to hit the victim. When she tried to escape Wilson threw a lighter and a pair of scissors at her, causing bruising to her back. Wilson then chased her into the lounge room, forced her to drink alcohol, poured Jim Beam over her, wrestled her to the ground and started stomping on her. As she struggled to defend herself, the victim grabbed his testicles, prompting him to slam her ankles into the ground multiple times, making her fear he was trying to break her arms and legs. A witness ran to a neighbour’s house and called police. Wilson left before officers arrived.
Grounds of Appeal:
1.
The individual sentences imposed for counts 1 and 3 are manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
2.
The total effective sentence and non-parole period imposed are manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
Notice of contention:
The respondent argued that the sentencing judge improperly relied on uncharged acts including:
1.
The forcible administration of methamphetamine to the victim before the conduct of count 1.
2.
Additional uncharged sexual assaults that occurred between 15-21 January 2022.
Decision and reasoning:
Respondent’s notice of contention:
The Court (Kelly, Huntingford and Burns JJ) dismissed the respondent’s argument holding that the sentencing judge made it clear that they were not imposing additional punishment for uncharged acts. Instead, those acts were used to establish the violent, controlling and coercive nature of Wilson’s relationship with the victim, a relevant factor in sentencing [59]. Given that the maximum penalty for rape is life imprisonment, there was no risk that the judge relied on uncharged acts to impose a more severe penalty than permitted.
Ground 1 (Count 1 and 3 (8 years imprisonment each, 1 year of accumulation, 9 years and 2 months total) manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that the sentencing judge failed to give proper regard to the maximum sentence of life imprisonment when determining the individual sentences. Wilson’s conduct was an example of the most serious type of offending. The Court in Forrest v The Queen established that serious rape offences typically warrant sentences of 10–13 years, demonstrating that Wilson’s 8-year sentences were inadequate. Similarly, McKay v The Queen confirmed that multiple rapes require significant accumulation, yet Wilson’s sentences were only accumulated by 1 year, failing to reflect the distinct criminality of each offence.
“Given the objective seriousness of the offences at the higher end of the range, the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the lack of any mitigating circumstances and the respondent’s age and prior criminal history, a sentence of 8 years each for counts 1 and 3 is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience and demonstrate error in principle” [72].
Ground 2 (total effective sentence (9 years, 2 months) and parole period (6 years, 5 months) (manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that an accumulation of only one year between the two rape sentences failed to reflect the total criminality of the respondents conduct and resulted in a total effective sentence that was manifestly inadequate [77]. The rapes occurred on different days, in different locations, with separate instances of coercion and violence. In McKay v The Queen, where two sexual offences were committed in a single incident, 6 years of accumulation was applied, yet Wilson’s crimes were separate and days apart. The failure to impose a higher cumulative sentence led to an inadequate total effective sentence.
Resentencing:
Count 1 (Rape – 17 Jan 2022): 12 years' imprisonment.
Count 3 (Rape – 21 Jan 2022): 12 years' imprisonment (4 years cumulative).
Total effective sentence: 16 years' imprisonment.
New non-parole period: 11 years and 3 months.
The King v Mamarika [2024] NTCCA 5 (16 April 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Arson x 1; reckless endangerment of life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for offences committed against his-then domestic female partner (the complainant). The offending occurred in December 2020: the respondent punched the complainant to the back her head. The complainant locked herself inside the bedroom and called police. The respondent dragged a nearby mattress to the door, lighting it on fire and stating, ‘I am going to make you suffocate and you will die’. [7] The primary judge accepted the respondent was serious. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The Crown appealed the sentence on one ground: namely, the sentence of arson, and the total effective sentence, were manifestly inadequate having regard to all circumstances. In particular, the complainant was pregnant at the time of the offending [22] and the respondent had significant prior criminal history of violence. [24]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The Court (Grant CJ., Brownhill and Burns JJ) held that the sentence imposed for the arson offence, ‘although low, was [not] so manifestly inadequate to bespeak error’. [50] The respondent’s profound disadvantage, including childhood deprivation and cognitive dysfunction reduced his moral culpability. [50] Further, the fire was confined to the mattress, bearing ‘little risk’ of spreading to the building. [50]
Further, the Court upheld the respondent’s submission that he was entitled to not be sentenced on the basis that he intended to kill the victim. [51] This is despite the respondent’s stating, at the time of offending, that he was going ‘make [the complainant] suffocate and [she] will die’. [7] To do otherwise would be to sentence the respondent on the basis of the elements of the crime of attempted murder. [51]
Ultimately, the Court held the total effective sentence of six years to not be manifestly inadequate. [53]
Joran v The King [2024] NTCCA 1 (24 January 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 3; contravention of protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant assaulted his children and female partner (the complainant) on multiple occasions, doing so in breach of a protection order. The assaults were physical, verbal and threatening. [4]–[13]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on three grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in his treatment of the onerousness of the applicant’s experience of custody;
•
The sentencing judge erred in applying the principle of totality; and
•
The sentencing judge erred in his treatment of the applicant’s profound childhood deprivation and associated complex PTSD. [56]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed. Justice Barr (with whom Hiley AJ agreed) held that ‘no other, less severe, sentence’ to that imposed by the sentencing judge was warranted. [77] The sentence imposed was ‘very lenient as to reflect moderation on account of reduced moral culpability’. [74]; [76].
Further, Barr J found no error in the sentencing judge’s consideration of the Bugmy principles, accepting the sentencing judge’s finding that the applicant’s moral culpability remained high even taking into account the applicant’s violent and dysfunctional upbringing. [71]
The Queen v Bonney [2022] NTCCA 3 (25 February 2022) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1, property damage x 1, unlawfully cause serious harm x 1.
Proceedings: Crown manifest inadequacy appeal against sentence.
Issue: Whether sentence manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a de-facto relationship and had three primary school aged children [24]. On 19 November 2020, while intoxicated, the respondent became angry and punched the victim in the face twice. The following day, the respondent punched, kicked, and repeatedly hit the victim with a cricket bat and frying pan. The victim sustained multiple injuries, including a hand fracture that amounted to serious physical harm [8]-[9]. The respondent had previous domestic violence convictions and a history of alcohol misuse [26]. The respondent pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 8 months [2]-[3]. The Crown appealed the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The appellant emphasised ‘principles enunciated by… Courts in relation to domestic violence offending and the need… to impose sentences which serve to protect the victim and the community and… serve as a deterrent’, citing The Queen v Wurramara [2011] NTSC 89 (21 October 2011): ‘The courts have been concerned to send what has been described as ‘the correct message’ to all concerned, that is that Aboriginal women, children and the weak will be protected against personal violence insofar as it is within the power of the court to do so’ [32].
The appellant also cited Emitja v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 4 (21 October 2016): ‘As this Court has repeatedly observed before and since that statement was made, such conduct must be dealt with in a manner which reflects the serious nature of the offending and its corrosive effect on well-being in Aboriginal communities. While it may be accepted that some Aboriginal communities have an unusually high incidence of serious crimes of violence, and that the courts are powerless to alleviate the dysfunction and deprivation which underlies that violence, Aboriginal women and children living in those communities “are entitled to equality of treatment in the law’s responses to offences against them”. The protection which the law affords includes the imposition of sentences which include a component designed to deter other members of the community from committing crimes of that nature’ [33].
The Court concluded that ‘the sentence, while lenient, perhaps even very lenient, does not fall outside the legitimate limits of the sentencing discretion. The appellant has not identified any error of principle and the sentence is not so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience and demonstrate error in principle. It is not unreasonable or plainly unjust’ [44].
Morton v The Queen [2020] NTCCA 2 (25 May 2020) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Judicial error’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Substance misuse’ – ‘Weapons’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction
Ground: The trial judge erred in directions that were given to the jury bearing on the burden and standard of proof.
Facts: The female victim and male applicant had been in a domestic relationship for a number of years and were staying together at the applicant’s mother’s home the night before the offending. On the morning of the offending, the applicant and victim were alone together at the house. The applicant beat the victim and caused at least 28 injuries, many of which required severe force, including impacts to the scalp and face, impacts to the trunk (corresponding to three fractured ribs), impacts to the arms (causing a complete break in one arm), and impacts to the legs (including stab wounds). Afterwards, the applicant went to a neighbouring house to get help, telling the neighbour that the applicant’s wife was in pain and had been hitting herself. The neighbour took the applicant to the nurse’s residence where the applicant told the nurse that his wife had been drinking, had a sore arm and felt sick. The nurse told the applicant to bring his wife to the clinic at 8:30am as it was not an emergency. The neighbour dropped the applicant back at the house before going back there himself where he saw that the victim was not moving. They fetched the nurse who confirmed that the victim had died.
When police arrived, the applicant told them that his wife "went crazy" after drinking alcohol and hit herself on the head with rocks. He also told them that she started to go a bit crazy and make him angry so he "picked up a knife and stabbed her in the bum and the leg and her hand" and "grabbed [his] axe and hit her on the arm, the leg and the top of the head" [7]-[8]. An axe and knife were found in the applicant’s bedroom. The applicant was found guilty of murder (but argued at trial that it should only have been manslaughter). He appealed this conviction on the ground that the trial judge erred in directions that were given to the jury bearing on the burden and standard of proof.
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific directions given by the trial judge were not attended by error nor did they give rise to any miscarriage of justice. The court found that at trial, defence counsel did not raise any query in relation to the first impugned direction and held that "The direction was not at that time considered inconsistent with or inimical to the legal and forensic basis of the defence case" [24]. Furthermore, while the court found that it may have been appropriate to remind the jury, at the point the direction was made, that the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause the victim at least serious harm and in that context that the jury should take into account all of the evidence, the court considered that it was unnecessary to do so because of the directions given elsewhere [30].
The court further held that no error was made in relation to the second impugned direction. The court held that it was open to the jury to make no conclusive finding on the issue of whether the applicant thought he was hitting the victim with a stick and still nonetheless be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant meant to cause serious harm, simply because of the prolonged nature of the beating and the multiple impacts involved [36].
The court also held that no error was made in relation to the third impugned direction, finding that "the trial judge’s summing up adequately conveyed to the jury that the ultimate question was whether, in the light of the evidence of intoxication and all other relevant circumstances, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the intent necessary for the crime of murder" [47].
Deacon v The Queen [2019] NTCCA 21 (11 October 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility of admissions’ – ‘Mr big operation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Whether admissions made to undercover police influenced by "oppressive conduct"’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man pleaded not guilty to an ex officio indictment charging him with the murder of his female de facto partner (the deceased). Prior to the jury trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of admissions made to undercover police and in a police interview. The trial judge ruled these admissions admissible. The applicant was later found guilty of murder by majority verdict and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 21 year and 6 month non-parole period.
A key issue on appeal related to the evidence in relation to the undercover police operation. The Court detailed how undercover police established a fake criminal operation and used various tactics to gain the applicant’s trust. The applicant had participated in various tasks or scenarios, none of which were illegal. These scenarios were designed to make the applicant believe that the group had power, by virtue of its links, to corrupt law enforcement officers, and to destroy incriminating evidence. The applicant then met with a fictitious crime boss. The ‘boss’ utilised the interview technique of ‘minimization’, by which he sought to devalue the deceased and other women in order to create a bond of misogyny to gain the applicant’s trust. The applicant eventually admitted to killing the deceased by punching her to the head and then choking her, and led the operatives to the site of the remains. He subsequently gave evidence at trial that he had killed her under provocation.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to appeal against the conviction on the grounds that:
•
the trial judge erred in assessing the conduct of the undercover operatives only in terms of its bearing and effect on the applicant, rather than by reference to the fact that it was oppressive conduct because it involved deception, subverted the right to silence, and was directed solely to obtaining a confession;
•
the covert operatives were exercising the authority of the state during the time they placed pressure on and offered inducements to the applicant;
•
the trial judge misdirected himself as to the meaning of oppressive conduct.
Held: The application for leave to appeal was refused. The trial judge observed that there was no evidence that the scenarios in which the applicant participated involved violence and held that the undercover police did not engage in oppressive conduct. His Honour had contrasted that position with the scenarios in some of the Mr Big operations in Canada which employed violence to create an impression that the fictitious criminal organisation tolerated and was prepared to use violence. The Canadian approach did not assist the applicant as there was no issue that the applicant made a false or unreliable confession.
The Queen v Deacon [2019] NTCCA 22 (11 October 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Child - criminal history’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Grounds: The non-parole period fixed by the sentencing judge is manifestly inadequate:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to give primacy to the sentencing objectives of general deterrence and denunciation in the sentencing synthesis;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the respondent’s prospects for rehabilitation.
Facts: The respondent man was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a non-parole period of 21 years and six months for the murder of his de facto partner. While initially pleading not guilty, the respondent admitted to killing the deceased during the trial but ‘asserted that he had done so under provocation’ [3]. The trial judge found that a longer non-parole period was warranted because the respondent ‘killed the deceased specifically to ensure that she would have no role in their son’s upbringing…That the respondent engaged in detailed and calculated planning prior to the killing, and a complex cover-up after the event…The respondent positively obstructed and misled police investigating the disappearance of the deceased…[and] that the respondent demonstrated no remorse for killing the deceased’ [5].
Decision and reasoning:
The appeal was dismissed.
‘In our opinion, the sentencing judge was no doubt correct in determining that a longer non-parole period was warranted because the objective and subjective factors affecting the relative seriousness of the crime placed the offending above the middle of the range of objective seriousness even allowing for mitigating factors. The question is whether the non-parole period fixed as part of that assessment was manifestly inadequate.’ The court provided that because the crime committed ‘did not involve the use of a weapon; it was not committed in company; the attack upon the victim was relatively swift and did not involve a prolonged physical assault upon her; the victim was not mutilated; the victim was not psychologically tormented prior to being killed; and the victim was not made to suffer physically prior to being killed’ [56], the non-parole period was not manifestly inadequate. They also provided that ‘the respondent’s lack of remorse did not operate as a ground for increasing the length of the non-parole period’ [56], and that the respondent’s criminal history and personal circumstances were not aggravating factors.
Scrutton v The Queen [2019] NTCCA 9 (18 April 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Extension of time’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for an extension of time and leave to appeal.
Facts: It was alleged that the applicant and the deceased were drinking with others and became heavily intoxicated. They began arguing over jealousy issues. They made their way to a shed in which the applicant was staying at the time. The following morning, the applicant told an officer at the police station that he had a fight with his wife the previous evening, but did not disclose the nature of the fight or the deceased’s condition. At that time the deceased was lying dead on a mattress in the shed. Forensic testing detected the deceased’s blood on the jeans and boots that the applicant was wearing at the time of his arrest. It is important to note that the Crown adduced evidence of 10 assaults between 2005 and 2013 by the applicant on the deceased to which the applicant had pleaded guilty before the Local Court. The trial judge ruled that the evidence of the assault was admissible as relationship evidence. The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal, as well as an application for an extension of time.
The applicant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that:
•
The forensic and expert evidence concerning the bloodstains on his boots and jeans was false, misleading, flawed and/or inconsistent with the prosecution case and guilt;
•
The trial judge’s direction to the jury concerning the bloodstains was inconsistent with the evidence;
•
The trial judge wrongly admitted evidence of the assaults previously committed by the applicant upon the deceased ([17]).
Issue: Whether extension of time should be granted; Whether forensic evidence concerning bloodstains were false, misleading, inconsistent, flawed and/or inconsistent with the prosecution case and guilt; Whether the trial judge’s direction to the jury concerning the bloodstains were inconsistent with the evidence; Whether the trial judge wrongly admitted relationship evidence.
Held: By reference to the principles in Green v The Queen [1989] NTCCA 5, the Court dismissed the application to extend time. The applicant did not provide any reason for the delay beyond the fact that he ‘could not find a lawyer’, and there were no exceptional circumstances or special reasons to warrant granting an extension ([31]). The Court also held that no viable grounds of appeal were established. Notably, their Honours upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence of 10 prior domestic assaults as relationship evidence under Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act. They held that the relationship evidence provided insight into the nature of the applicant’s and deceased’s relationship. Such evidence would potentially assist the jury to determine if they were in a ‘harmonious and caring relationship or a relationship marred by anger and violence’, and whether the applicant killed the deceased and, if so, his intention at the time. The probative value of the relationship evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused. The trial judge’s directions in relation to the jury’s use of the relationship evidence were therefore correct in law ([46]).
Emitja v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 4 (21 October 2016) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Personal deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charge/s: Unlawfully causing serious harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim had been married in a traditional Aboriginal manner for 13 years before separating in 2013. The relationship had been blighted by domestic violence, one consequence of which was the issue of a domestic violence order in 2013 protecting the victim. In 2014, the applicant entered the victim’s house without permission. The applicant kicked the victim at the bottom of her left leg, causing her compound fractures. The applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment without a non-parole period.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Grant CJ and Kelly J concurring, Barr J in dissent). The majority made relevant statements about domestic violence in Aboriginal communities. Grant CJ and Kelly J quoted from Amagula v White (unreported, Northern Territory Supreme Court, 7 January 1998): ‘The courts must do what they can to see that the pervasive violence against women in Aboriginal communities is reduced. There is a fairly widespread belief that it is acceptable for men to bash their wives in some circumstances; this belief must be erased’.
Their Honours continued:
‘As this Court has repeatedly observed before and since that statement was made, such conduct must be dealt with in a manner which reflects the serious nature of the offending and its corrosive effect on well-being in Aboriginal communities’ (at [32]).
They note that while ‘some Aboriginal communities have an unusually high incidence of serious crimes of violence and that the courts are powerless to alleviate the dysfunction and deprivation which underlies that violence. Aboriginal women and children living in those communities ‘are entitled to equality of treatment in the law’s responses to offences against them’. The protection which the law affords includes the imposition of sentences which include a component designed to deter other members of the community from committing crimes of that nature’ (see [33]-[34]). There are also practical societal reasons to consider personal and general deterrence. As in The Queen v Haji-Noor:
‘The offender’s crime against Mr Ellis was committed in a domestic context. Domestic violence is a leading contributor to death, disability and illness in the community. Such violence affects the whole community. Medical and hospital treatment for the victims of domestic violence is extremely costly and imposes a considerable strain on the health system and those who work in it’.
Finally, Their Honours described the offending as ‘a deliberate and violent pattern of behaviour engaged in… for the purposes of intimidating and controlling the victim’ and noted that due to the patterned nature of the appellant’s violence, the spontaneity of his conduct was ‘less relevant to the assessment of… objective seriousness’ [52].
R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2 (9 February 2015) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’ – ‘Victim’
Charge: Unlawfully causing serious harm
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and the victim were in a domestic relationship and had a young daughter. After drinking together near the remote community of Kalkarindji, the respondent and victim got in an argument. The respondent, who was intoxicated, threatened to stab the victim with a pen and subsequently stabbed him in the back with a knife.
Following an early guilty plea the respondent was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, suspended immediately. The respondent is an Aboriginal woman who attended school until the end of year 6. She had never been employed and lived with the victim, their child and family. She received parenting payments from Centrelink. The trial judge found the respondent’s remorse was genuine. She waited for emergency services to arrive, made immediate admissions to police and subsequent formal admissions. The respondent continued to look after her young child while living with the victim, who had forgiven her. Finally, the trial judge found she had reasonable to good prospects of rehabilitation having not consumed alcohol since she committed the offence.
Issues:
•
Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.
•
Whether the circumstances of the case were ‘exceptional’ pursuant to section 78DI of the Sentencing Act to displace the minimum mandatory term of 3 months imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent was resentenced.
•
The sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate. The offending was objectively very serious, with the respondent’s violent response to the verbal argument being ‘utterly disproportionate’ ([18]). The Court noted that alcohol-related violent crimes are ‘a great drain on the medical resources of the Northern Territory and are an enormous cost to the community’ ([18]). In light of this and the objective seriousness of the offending, the sentence imposed was ‘so manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending that it shocks the public conscience’ ([19]). While the respondent’s subjective circumstances entitled her to considerable leniency, they could not justify a sentence disproportionate to the offending. As such, the sentence was increased to a term of three years imprisonment, to be suspended after six months with an operational period of two years and six months. In determining this sentence, the Court took into account the respondent’s age of 19, her responsibility for her child and other mitigating factors referred to by the trial judge.
•
As the Court upheld the sentence as manifestly inadequate and imposed a sentence that involved actual imprisonment for more than three months, it did not consider whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ for the purposes of section 78DI were present on the facts. However, the Court noted in obiter that what amounts to ‘exceptional circumstances’ will be a matter for the court in considering the facts of each individual case. The Court considered that whether the victim’s wishes with respect to sentencing should be taken into account as exceptional circumstances is for the discretion of the court in each case ([24]).
The Queen v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7 (18 May 2007) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘New partner’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code (NT)’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Intentionally causing grievous bodily harm x 1; Aggravated assault x 1; Possession of cannabis x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attacked his former girlfriend and her new partner with a baseball bat ([22]-[23]). The aggravated assault charge was in relation to the respondent attacking his former girlfriend, leaving her with bruises, and the grievous bodily harm charge was in relation to the attack on the former girlfriend’s new partner, leaving him with permanent disability ([25]). There had been a history of domestic violence in the relationship between the defendant and his former girlfriend ([9]-[18]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment ([4]). In relation to the aggravated assault charge, the respondent was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment ([34]).
Issues: One issue was whether the sentence for the aggravated assault charge was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court held that the sentence for the aggravated assault charge was within range.
Justice Angel at [31] quoted the sentencing judge:
The crimes of violence of the type you have committed are prevalent and too often occur against the background of a breakdown in a domestic relationship complicated by problems of access to children. Women in these situations are particularly vulnerable. They are entitled to such protection as the law can give them. Deterring you and other men who are minded to behave like you towards their female partners is an important factor in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
I need to add this. It is not uncommon for men in your position to harbour a belief that their former partner had been unreasonable. Nor is it uncommon for violent men in your position to harbour a belief that the former partner has brought the violence on themselves by being unreasonable. You and others like you must learn that only you are to blame for the situation in which you now find yourself.
Justice Southwood added at [183]:
Domestic violence is a leading contributor to death, disability and illness in the community. Such violence affects the whole community. Medical and hospital treatment for the victims of domestic violence is extremely costly and imposes a considerable strain on the health system and those who work in it.
The violence perpetrated by the respondent ‘was part of a pattern of fundamentally oppressive and coercive behaviour in which the respondent deliberately engaged to dominate and control Ms Hawksworth’ [185].
R v Secretary [1996] NTCCA 18 (2 April 1996) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation (s 28(f) Criminal Code Act 1986 (NT)) however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Substance abuse’
Charge: Murder
Appeal type: Question of law under s 408(1) Criminal Code (NT)
Facts: The accused was charged and pleaded not guilty to murdering her husband (the deceased). For eight years leading up to this incident, the deceased had verbally, mentally and physically abused the accused and their children. The violence and abuse increased substantially in the months prior to the killing. During this time, the deceased threatened to kill the accused, beat her with his hands and a belt and sexually assaulted her. The deceased was a chronic drug abuser. On a road trip the accused noticed a rifle in the back of the car. Upon returning home, the deceased threatened to beat the accused with a belt, punched her in the head, throttled her, and made further threats of abuse. Fearing for her life, the accused retrieved the gun and shot the deceased while he was asleep. At trial, the judge ruled that the issue of self-defence should not be left to the jury. Following this, the accused’s counsel made an application that the subject of the ruling be reserved for the consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Subsequently, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder, but pleaded guilty to the charge of manslaughter by reason of provocation. The indictment was amended accordingly and the jury found the accused guilty of manslaughter. No conviction was recorded; the trial judge postponed judgment until the Court of Appeal returned an answer on the reserved question of law.
Issue: Whether the trial judge was correct in ruling that self-defence was not open for consideration by the jury in the circumstances of the case.
Decision and Reasoning: In a 2:1 majority, the question was answered in the negative. The conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.
The defence counsel contended that as the deceased was asleep at the time he was shot, the accused could not have been acting in self-defence. The trial judge had accepted this reasoning: that because the deceased was asleep he had no ability to implement earlier threats. Mildren J of the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal found that self-defence as provided under s 28(f) of the Criminal Code (NT) does not require a temporal connection between the assault and the force used to defend the assault: ‘The lack of any specific requirement for an apprehension of immediate personal violence, so far as the Code definition of assault is concerned, reinforces the view that an assault is a continuing one so long as the threat remains and the factors relevant to the apparent ability to carry out the threat in the sense explained have not changed’ ([16]-[17]). Accordingly, it was open to the jury to find the deceased’s threat was an assault that continued while he was asleep. Having regard to the history of the domestic violence, it could also be inferred that, upon waking, the deceased intended to kill or cause grievous harm to the accused, and he had the ability to do so. It was also open for the jury to consider that the force used was not unnecessary in the circumstances. Mildren J regarded the jury’s verdict as a conviction despite no conviction being formally recorded by the trial judge. Having found the trial judge was incorrect in ruling self-defence was not open, Mildren J quashed the conviction and ordered a re-trial.
Angel J, agreeing with Mildren J, held that self-defence extends to taking action to defend oneself from threatened assault even if this action is ‘a pre-emptive strike’. It was open to the jury to find the threat of the deceased constituted an assault and this assault continued to exist at the time of the shooting. Therefore, self-defence should have been left to the jury.
In his dissenting judgement, Martin CJ found the trial judge was correct in his ruling. He considered the word ‘being’ in s 28(f) of the Criminal Code (NT) to require a contemporaneous connection between the assault and the act of self-defence. As the accused was asleep at the time of the shooting, no such connection could exist.
Supreme Court
The King v Kopp [2024] NTSC 22 (5 April 2024) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ - ‘Arson and fire’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Vulnerable groups’ - ‘Pregnant people’ - ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 4; rape x 2; deprivation of liberty (over course of three days) x 1.
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant had been in ‘an intermittent and dysfunctional relationship since 2015’. [2] Both were recreational users of illicit substances. The accused is alleged to have sexually and physically assaulted the complainant, slapping, strangling and raping her on multiple occasions. [3]–[4] The offending culminated in the accused forcing the complainant into his car and detaining her as he travelled to various locations. [6]
The Crown intends to adduce evidence of the visible injuries sustained by the complainant when she presented at the Emergency Department. [7] In response, the defendant filed notice of its intention to adduce evidence of previous incidents involving the complainant to establish that she has a tendency to act in a particular way/to adopt a particular state of mind, such that the injuries she sustained were ‘self-inflicted’. [1]
Decision and Reasoning: Application dismissed. The evidence is inadmissible for tendency purposes. [35] Chief Justice Grant held the evidence did not ‘sustain the inference of the tendencies asserted’, lacking the requisite significant probative value to be admissible as tendency evidence. [33]
For Grant CJ, the incidents constituting the charged offending did ‘not involve any necessary element of self-harm or suicidal ideation’. [24] In this capacity, the proposed tendency bore ‘very little’, if any, commonality with the nature of the injuries sustained by the complainant. Further, incidents wherein the complainant threatened or actually committed self-harm did not involve the complainant ‘seeking falsely to blame some other person for that harm’: [26]
The fact that the complainant experienced suicidal ideation on 27 December 2022 during the course of the incidents the subject of these charges also has nothing to say, either by itself or in combination with the other evidence identified for tendency purposes, about whether she has a general tendency either to engage in self-harming behaviour or to consider suicide [28]
The King v Hennessy [2023] NTSC 67 (1 August 2023) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Tendency evidence’ - ‘Application to adduce tendency evidence’ - ‘Vulnerable group’ - ‘Multiple domestic partners’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Rape x 4; aggravated assault x 3.
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in a domestic relationship from 2013 to 2016. Throughout, the accused demonstrated ‘controlling and jealous’ behaviour toward the complainant which worsened with the birth of their first child. [4]–[5] The abuse transformed into physical and sexual violence, with the accused raping and strangling the complainant on numerous occasions. [7]–[12]
Following the breakdown of their relationship, the accused commenced a relationship with another woman (second complainant), towards who the accused was equally controlling, jealous and physically abusive. [13]–[8]
The Crown seeks to adduce evidence from both complainants to establish four tendencies; particularly, that the accused has a tendency to commit acts of physical and sexual violence against domestic partners. [20]
Decision and Reasoning: Application approved to prove tendency two and four. [21]
•
‘Suggested tendency two would allow the evidence to be used to show the accused “act[ed] in a particular way, namely, to commit acts of physical violence against females with whom the accused is in a relationship and with whom he resides, using physical strength and force”.’’ [22]
•
‘Suggested tendency four, seeks to show the accused acted in a particular way, namely, to have sexual intercourse with females with whom the accused is in a relationship and with whom he resides, despite the fact that the other person does not consent to the sexual activity’ [23]
Justice Blokland held the second and fourth tendencies readily possessed the requisite ‘significant probative value’ to be relevant and admissible: [30]
The evidence proposed in alleged tendencies two and four clearly fulfil this criteria. If an accused is shown to have a tendency to act in a very particular controlling or threatening or violent way as alleged in particular relationships, that is important evidence. The conduct forming the basis of the charges is denied. Here, the evidence is confined to two relationships. How the accused acted in one of those relationships is relevant circumstantially to how he acted, in accordance with the particulars in the Tendency Notice, in the other relationship [31]
Justice Blokland dismissed two other proposed tendencies, which rely ‘almost solely on proof of very charges from which the tendency is derived’. For example, ‘to commit acts of physical violence against [the first complainant]’. [38]
The establishment of the tendency cannot start from an assumption that unproven evidence as a whole gives rise to the tendency. This employs dangerously circular reasoning [40]
The Queen v Lyncha [2021] NTSC SCC22033629 (4 October 2021) (Sentence) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural, and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x12; aggravated assault x3.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was found guilty of 12 counts of sexual intercourse without consent and 3 counts of aggravated assault committed against his female partner between 2017 and 2018. The relationship between the offender and the victim began in 2005 but after the birth of their first child in 2010 the relationship deteriorated.
The offender was controlling, demanding and repeatedly used threats to coerce compliance with his demands for unwanted sex acts, including threats to use a firearm pointed at the victim and also a cattle prod (which was actually used to shock her on the stomach). The offender blamed the victim for the couple’s financial troubles and the victim was forced to not only work full time but also financially manage the offender’s business and earn additional money repairing and selling second-hand items as well as attend to all of the domestic duties.
The Victim Impact Statement described the offender’s physical, emotional, and financial control over her and her ongoing fear of the offender; she lives in a motor home so she can leave in a hurry if the offender is released from prison as she is scared the offender will seek revenge.
Decision and Reasoning: the offender was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, with a fixed non-parole period of 12 years. The Domestic Violence Order was altered to forbid the offender from having any direct or indirect contact with the victim for 20 years.
Justice Mildren found there were no mitigating circumstances. His Honour considered the offender’s prior convictions for assaults against the victim and aggravated assault against his son. His Honour classified the offences as really serious, and a significant sentence of imprisonment was needed for both personal and general deterrence. He found the offender’s behaviour to be ‘callous, controlling and sadistic.’
The Queen v Lynch [2021] NTSC SCC22033629 (4 October 2021) (Sentence) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling and/or jealous behaviour’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Unlawful deprivation of liberty’
Charges: 1x unlawful deprivation of liberty; 1x assault; 1x driving disqualified; 2x breaching a protection order.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The victim was in a relationship with the offender which ended when the offender became controlling and jealous over the victim seeing her previous partner. She had a young daughter from a previous relationship and also had a child with the offender. A protection order was in place.
The offending occurred in Alice Springs. The offender, driven by his ex-wife, went to Tennant Creek where the victim was living. The offender asked the victim to go home with him with her children but she refused. He then asked her to go to the nearby petrol station to buy items for the children, which she agreed to, taking both her children, not taking any of her valuables or necessities. The offender again demanded that the victim come home with her and he refused. She suggested leaving the offender’s child with him and walking home with her daughter. The offender made threats.
The offender’s ex-wife began driving towards Alice Springs, away from the victim’s home. She asked to be taken home and the offender refused. The offender engaged the victim in a fight regarding her resuming her relationship with her ex-partner which culminated in the offender pushed the victim’s her head against the window and punching the victim in her ear while she was holding her son on her lap (aggravated assault).
Instead of driving to Alice Springs, the offender decided to have his ex-wife drive the victim and her two children to the outstation (where he was living) and the victim wanted to go home (deprivation of liberty). The charge ceased when the offender left the outstation in the morning.
Issues: Sentence
Decision and Reasoning: The overall sentence was 2 years, with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Aggravating factors included multiple prior convictions for breaches of protection order and aggravated assaults on a female, subject to current order. The fact the offender was not affected by alcohol at time of offending indicated possessive and controlling urges while sober.
The Queen v Lewis [2021] NTSC 40 (6 May 2021) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 1; Recklessly engaging in conduct giving rise to danger of serious harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application to adduce evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in a relationship. The Crown’s case was that the accused “flipped her” to the ground twice, threatened to kill her, and stamped his foot on her head, dragged, kicked and punched her. The Crown applied to adduce evidence of two prior charged assaults by the accused against the complainant (aggravated assault and contravention of a domestic violence order relating to her) as tendency or context (relationship) evidence.
Issues:
1.
Whether the evidence ought to be adduced as tendency evidence.
2.
Whether the evidence ought to be adduced as relationship evidence.
Decision and reasoning: Application to admit the evidence as tendency evidence was dismissed. Application to admit the evidence as relationship evidence was upheld.
Tendency evidence: The evidence did not have significant probative value. Additionally, on prejudice, the only other substantial evidence supporting the Crown’s case was to be given by the complainant. There was consequently a risk that the jury might place too much reliance on the fact that the accused had tendencies and acted on them. This potential prejudice was virtually impossible to address by a direction to the jury as the concept of “not giving too much weight” would be very difficult for the jury to comprehend and follow.
Relationship evidence: The evidence was relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. While the defence argued that evidence of two physical assaults against the complainant in their 2.5 year relationship was more appropriately characterised as “transient flare-ups of anger or annoyance” not ongoing hostility, the court disagreed stating: “Physical assaults are not part of the ordinary incidents of a domestic relationship, and the second of those assaults occurred in the same month as the alleged offending.”
Additionally, unlike the risk of unfair prejudice with the tendency evidence, the jury could be directed that they must not use the relationship evidence to engage in propensity or tendency reasoning, and that it was only tendered to ensure that they had a true and proper context to understand what the complainant said happened, rather than thinking what she said was unlikely because it happened “out of the blue”. This would obviate any risk of unfair prejudice.
Arnott v Blitner [2020] NTSC 63 (1 October 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of bail conditions’ – ‘Contravention of protection order’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by the perpetrator’ – ‘No harm caused to protected person’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravening a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) x 1; Breach of bail x 1.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent breached a DVO protecting his female partner by being heavily intoxicated in her company. There was no harm to the protected person. The respondent later breached bail by consuming alcohol. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 4 days imprisonment for breach of the DVO and 3 days imprisonment for the breach of bail, to be served cumulatively.
Grounds of appeal: In relation to the sentence for breaching the DVO –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in applying s 121(2) and 121(3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT).
2.
The learned sentencing judge erred in imposing a sentence which was manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no error in applying s 121(2) and (3) of the Act. The words “in the particular circumstances of the offence” do not set a standard which the circumstances must meet or impose an additional test. The legislative purpose of s 121(3) is to ameliorate potential injustice arising from mandatory sentencing. It maintains the court’s discretion not to impose the mandatory minimum in circumstances where the breach of a DVO does not result in harm to the protected person and where the court is satisfied it is not appropriate to record a conviction and sentence the person “in the particular circumstances of the offence” (meaning the specific, individual circumstances of the offence).
Ground 2: The sentence was not manifestly inadequate. The respondent’s breach of the DVO did not display the kind of aggravating features that would merit the term “contemptuous”. The conduct occurred 3½ months after the DVO was served in circumstances where the respondent believed the order was finished, no harm was caused to the protected person (despite police being called to respond to a disturbance), and the respondent’s 2 previous convictions for breaching DVOs were 4 years previously.
Carter v Firth [2020] NTSC 62 (16 September 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Using a carriage service to make threat to kill x 1; Unlawfully entering a building with intent to commit assault x 1; Unlawful assault x 1; Threat to kill x 2; Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and KC had been in a domestic relationship for 18 months. KC ended the relationship. The offending escalated over a 2-hour period and included threats to kill, physical violence and use of weapons. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an overall effective sentence of 4 years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months.
Grounds of appeal: The overall sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The sentences could not be said to be manifestly excessive. While the appellant had compelling subjective circumstances, “the subjective circumstances of an offender can never justify a sentence that does not adequately reflect the objective seriousness of the offences. In the present case, the objective circumstances reveal[ed] serious criminal offending, including significant violence utilising weapons, in the context of threats having been made by the appellant to kill his former domestic partner”: at [60].
The Queen v Anzac [2020] NTSC 58 (7 August 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by the perpetrator’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Breach domestic violence order (DVO) x 1.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent contravened a DVO protecting his female partner by being intoxicated in her presence. As the respondent had previous convictions for breaching DVOs, he was required to be sentenced under s 121(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (“the Act”), unless the court was satisfied of the matters set out in s 121(3). The respondent was sentenced to a 6-month good behaviour bond on conditions.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in applying ss 121(2) and (3) of the Act.
2.
The sentencing judge failed to accord the complainant procedural fairness by not requesting submissions on proceeding without recording a conviction, where the sentencing judge had previously indicated he would impose a conviction.
3.
The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Held: Appeal allowed on ground 2 and the appellant re-sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour bond on conditions. Section 121(3) applied in this case. The offence did not result in harm being caused to the protected person, and, in the particular circumstances of the offence, it was not appropriate to record a conviction and impose a sentence of 7 days or more on the respondent under s 121(2) of the Act. The particular circumstances of the offence (which lowered the respondent’s moral culpability) included his deprived background, chronic misuse of alcohol (including early exposure, inability to control drinking in town, mutual misuse in the relationship, and lack of treatment). The respondent was also genuinely remorseful.
Hardy v Rigby [2020] NTSC 42 (10 July 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting his wife. The offending involved threats to kill, squeezing his wife’s throat with both hands and dragging her by the throat, removing access to telephones, and exposing their child to the offending. The appellant was sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour bond and a conviction was recorded.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive because it included the recording of the conviction. Specifically –
1.
Too much weight was given to “denunciation”.
2.
Insufficient weight was given to evidence of positive good character including contrition and remorse.
3.
The sentencing judge failed to take into account the views of the victim.
4.
The sentencing judge erred by choosing to record a conviction.
5.
Insufficient weight was given to evidence concerning the appellant’s mental health, and the sentence failed to include appropriate conditions to address his mental health.
6.
The sentencing judge took into account the irrelevant consideration of prospective legislation increasing the penalty for assaults by strangulation.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. While the court acknowledged that the appellant did not have a prior criminal history of domestic violence offending and no evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence, the offending was still appropriately characterised as an instance of domestic violence: “It involved the use and threats of violence to control and dominate the appellant’s wife so she would ‘tell [him] the answer’” (at [50]). The offending was very serious including the fact that the appellant “grabbed SH by the throat and squeezed her throat was a significant factor in the sentencing calculus.” As per the Court in DPP v Foster [2019] TASCCA 15:
“Lest it be thought that grabbing the complainant by the throat and applying pressure is somehow less insidious than punching or kicking, it has been noted in an article by Heather Douglas and Robin Fitzgerald entitled “Strangulation, Domestic Violence and the Legal Response”, published in the [2014] SydLawRw 11; (2014) 36 (2) Sydney Law Review 231, that strangulation is a form of power and control that can have devastating psychological long-term effects on its victims in addition to a potentially fatal outcome.
“[Strangulation] can cause loss of consciousness and can cause death quickly. It has been suggested that death can occur within seven to fourteen seconds. Additionally, underlying internal injuries caused by the pressure applied to the throat can cause swelling which may develop gradually over days and airways obstruction causing death may be delayed.”
It was also significant that the appellant removed the victim’s access to telephones and outside help before strangling her, and that their child was exposed to domestic violence.
Williams v Firth & Anor [2020] NTSC 9 (24 February 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault x2; Breach of bail x1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds:
1.
That the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive; and
2.
That the learned sentencing Judge erred in finding that the circumstances of the case were not exceptional pursuant to s 78DI of the Sentencing Act.
Facts: The appellant woman, a 28 year old Wurrumiyanga woman and the male second victim of aggravated assault (Elton Limbiari) had been in a domestic relationship for three years and had two children together. Their relationship ended in 2015, and Limbiari later commenced a 2-week relationship with the first aggravated assault victim (Raggett). On the night of offending, the appellant went to Raggett’s property where she found both victims asleep on the veranda. She approached Raggett, grabbed her by the hair and dragged her down from the bed before punching her numerous times in the face, causing immediate pain and minor bruising. Limbiari was woken by the noise and, upon seeing Raggett being assaulted, tried to walk away but was stopped by the appellant punching him from behind. The punch caused minor swelling and bruising to his jaw.
The appellant was arrested and charged the next day. She pleaded guilty to both charges of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. While on bail to appear, the appellant did not appear and a warrant issued, thus breaching one of her bail conditions. The appellant also pleaded guilty to breach of bail and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 1 month to be served cumulatively with the other sentences. The sentencing judge gave consideration to some matters put in mitigation on the appellant’s behalf, but very little consideration to the fact that she was the mother of four children.
Judgment:
The Appellant’s circumstances were truly exceptional when all relevant circumstances were considered, "including the relatively minor offending, the lack of any serious injuries to the victims, the fact that the appellant has apologised to both victims and the apologies have been accepted, her limited criminal history, the previous assault conviction was a long time ago and only resulted in a good behaviour bond, the extraordinary efforts she has made voluntarily to give up alcohol and attend family violence courses, the fact that she has left Tennant Creek with her children to start a new life away from influences which have got her into trouble in the past and the fact that she is a sole parent of four young children" [30]. His Honour rejected counsel for the respondent’s submission that "to establish one of the exceptions in R v Nagas, it is necessary to produce cogent evidence that imprisonment would effectively deprive the children of parental care", holding that "where the parent is a sole parent, particularly where the children are young and the appellant is the mother and sole carer of the children… different considerations arise. It is relevant that the children have someone close to them to look after them if the appellant is imprisoned, but a term of imprisonment which separates a mother from her young children can have a devastating effect on a child’s welfare and upbringing."[29]
His honour rejected the submissions that the sentence in relation to the breach of bail was manifestly excessive, finding that the offender’s "criminality was properly reflected in the sentences imposed" [31].
Queen v Pamkal [2019] NTSC 80 (15 October 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive violence’ – ‘Tendency purposes’
Proceedings: Voir dire on admissibility of evidence of past violent conduct by the accused against the complainant
Issues: Admissibility of tendency evidence; whether probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any potential prejudicial effect on the accused
Facts: One of the facts in issue is whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse with the accused. The complainant alleged that the accused demanded she have sex with him and threatened her when she refused. The complainant complied by removing her shorts and underwear and lying down on the cement.
The Crown intended to lead evidence of past violent conduct by the accused towards to complainant [2]. The accused would resort "to violence against the [complainant] whenever she displeased him…or he had a state of mind in which he believed he was permitted to discipline her for any perceived failing – and that he was prepared to and did act on that state of mind." [3]. The Defence counsel conceded that the "evidence of past assaults is relevant for this ‘relationship’ or ‘context’ purpose but contends that it should be excluded under Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) ('UEA') s 137 because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Judgment:
The evidence was admitted both as relationship or context evidence and as tendency evidence and will not be excluded under UEA s 137.
The Judge disagreed with the Defence’s contention that the evidence of past violence by the accused against the complainant should be limited to mere references of past assaults without revealing any details. Kelly J provided that restricting the evidence in this way would conceal the nature of the relationship rather than explain why the complainant submitted in the way she did. His Honour also rejected the claim that the evidence should be excluded under the UAE s 137 as it had high probative value. Namely, it "explains something that may otherwise be inexplicable" [5]. While the risks of rank propensity reasoning and the jury being emotionally repelled by the accused were acknowledged, Justice Kelly believed that the probative value of the evidence outweighed them and thus admitted the evidence of prior assaults as relationship evidence.
Justice Kelly then turned to the Prosecution’s request to use the evidence of prior assaults as tendency evidence. The Prosecution sought to Sought to use the tendency evidence to demonstrate the accused’s tendency to engage in violent conduct against the complainant; to have a violent and controlling disposition towards his domestic partner; to believe that he is permitted to discipline his domestic partner for any of her perceived ‘failings’ [13]. Court noted that under UEA s 97, tendency evidence is not admissible unless ‘appropriate notice has been given and the court thinks that the evidence will…have significant probative value’ [14]. Applying the principles established in Hughes v The Queen, Kelly J concluded that the evidence of prior assaults satisfied the threshold test in UEA s 97, in that it supported "proof of a tendency to engage in violent behaviour, especially after consuming alcohol, for the purpose of controlling his partner’s behaviour and/or punishing her for perceived failings"[18] and "if the jury accepts that the accused had this tendency (or tendencies) that "strongly supports proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged"… It explains what might otherwise be inexplicable and strongly supports proof of a fact in issue – namely whether the complainant consented to have sex with the accused and also, to perhaps a slightly lesser extent, proof that he knew of or was reckless as to her lack of consent."[19]. His Honour also concluded that the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect (as required by s 101 UEA) as the risks were "largely mitigated" by appropriate directions and warning to the jury. The tendency evidence was therefore admitted.
Douglas v Dole & Ors [2019] NTSC 80 (15 October 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Evidence of domestic violence history’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm sentence’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 2; Criminal damage x 1; Breach of bail x 3
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the first victim were in a domestic relationship for six years (since the appellant was 13), during which the appellant had allegedly been subjected to significant domestic violence at the hands of the victim. On the night of the incident, the appellant started verbally abusing the victim while intoxicated. The victim left the room, but shortly returned to get his wallet. The appellant had found the victim’s wallet and started to cut up his licence. As the victim took and wallet back and tried to leave again the appellant stabbed him behind the knee with the scissors, preventing the victim from being able to walk. During the sentencing hearing, the appellant submitted ‘that on the night the appellant attacked [the first victim] her emotions which had been built up over an extended period of time overflowed and she could not control herself’, claiming the violence to be an exceptional circumstance.
The appellant (and her co-offender) assaulted the second victim a week later. The two offenders were intoxicated and engaged in a verbal argument with the victim. The co-offender then punched the victim in the side of her face with the appellant then punching the victim’s forehead, causing a large haematoma. The two offenders threw rocks at the glass door of the building the victim escaped to, causing the glass panel to break.
Issues:Two grounds of appeal – whether the sentencing Judge failed to properly exercise his discretion to find exceptional circumstances; and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Descision and reasoning: The appeal on the first ground was allowed and the three months actual imprisonment set aside. The appeals on the other grounds were dismissed.
Ground 1:
The appellant had submitted that the violence characterising her relationship with the first appellant amounted to exceptional circumstances. While the sentencing judge had accepted that the appellant had been exposed to domestic violence, he concluded that ‘the material placed before him was not sufficiently specific to allow a firm conclusion to be drawn that the appellant’s background of domestic violence was operative on the appellant at, or generally around the time of offending’ [42]. Southwood J agreed with the sentencing judge, providing that ‘the difficulty with [the appellant’s] submission was that ‘there was no evidence before the Local Court or [the Supreme Court] that violence had become normalised for the appellant. To the contrary, the facts of the offending and the appellant’s criminal record established that the violence was out of character for the appellant and the main criminogenic factors in her offending were the consumption of alcohol and jealousy’ [46]. However, Southwood J still found that the sentencing judge had failed to consider the appellant’s other ‘exceptional’ personal circumstances such as her young age and no prior convictions for criminal offences. As such, the sentence imposed was unjust.
Ground 2:
The sentence of one-month imprisonment is appropriate as it does not crush the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation and gives necessary and appropriate consideration to the principles of deterrence and denunciation.
Anderson v Nicholas [2019] NTSC 55 (5 July 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence against former partners’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, committing aggravated assault against his female ex-partner with a knife, and threatening to kill another person who tried to assist his ex-partner with her injury. The appellant had 14 prior convictions, including 12 for aggravated assault, most on women and some of whom were his previous partners, as well as numerous breaches of domestic violence orders and orders suspending sentences. The offending occurred whilst he was intoxicated and angry. The sentencing judge found the conduct to be intentional, and imposed a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue:
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the appellant’s moral culpability and in finding intoxication to be an aggravating circumstance;
•
The sentencing judge failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, as neither the head sentence nor the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The appellant’s extensive criminal history of violent conduct, particularly drunken violence, was relevant as it demonstrated a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law and the need to impose condign punishment for specific or general deterrence. It also indicated that the appellant had poor prospects of rehabilitation, and that community protection was a paramount consideration. Further, the Court noted that the offences, although taking place around the same time, involved two different victims and two different violent acts. It was therefore appropriate for the sentencing judge to reflect those differences in the way she did by fixing a total sentence and allowing for some concurrency ([60]-[61]). In relation to the non-parole period, the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his age, criminal record and the protection of the community were particularly relevant. The non-parole period was justified, given his very poor prospects of rehabilitation and his "dreadful criminal history" ([67]). Further, the sentencing judge did not err in finding that intoxication was an aggravating circumstance of the appellant’s "brazen, excessive and egregious" conduct ([43]-[44]).
O’Neill v Roy [2019] NTSC 23 (12 April 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence against former partners’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, committing aggravated assault against his female ex-partner with a knife, and threatening to kill another person who tried to assist his ex-partner with her injury. The appellant had 14 prior convictions, including 12 for aggravated assault, most on women and some of whom were his previous partners, as well as numerous breaches of domestic violence orders and orders suspending sentences. The offending occurred whilst he was intoxicated and angry. The sentencing judge found the conduct to be intentional, and imposed a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue: The appellant appealed his sentence on the grounds that:
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the appellant’s moral culpability and in finding intoxication to be an aggravating circumstance;
•
The sentencing judge failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, as neither the head sentence nor the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The appellant’s extensive criminal history of violent conduct, particularly drunken violence, was relevant as it demonstrated a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law and the need to impose condign punishment for specific or general deterrence. It also indicated that the appellant had poor prospects of rehabilitation, and that community protection was a paramount consideration. Further, the Court noted that the offences, although taking place around the same time, involved two different victims and two different violent acts. It was therefore appropriate for the sentencing judge to reflect those differences in the way she did by fixing a total sentence and allowing for some concurrency ([60]-[61]). In relation to the non-parole period, the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his age, criminal record and the protection of the community were particularly relevant. The non-parole period was justified, given his very poor prospects of rehabilitation and his "dreadful criminal history" ([67]). Further, the sentencing judge did not err in finding that intoxication was an aggravating circumstance of the appellant’s "brazen, excessive and egregious" conduct ([43]-[44]).
AB v Hayes & Anor [2019] NTSC 13 (6 March 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Conditions’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexually explicit images’
Case type: Appeal about domestic violence orders.
Facts: The appellant is an NT police officer stationed in Alice Springs. In 2016, the NT police applied to the Local Court for 2 domestic violence orders. The two applications were heard together.
The two protected persons named in the applications were the appellant’s wife and her daughter from a previous relationship. Both persons immigrated from South East Asia, and started living with the appellant in 2011. The appellant and his wife also had a child together, but separated in 2016. The Local Court in Alice Springs ordered that the appellant be restrained from contacting or approaching the protected persons, either directly or indirectly (‘first order’). In a different proceeding on the same day, the Local Court ordered that the appellant delete and destroy all sexually explicit images of the protected person in his possession or control, and not deal with or publish those images in any other way for a period of 2 months (‘second order’) ([3]-[4]).
The appellant filed 2 appeals in the Supreme Court, one for each of the Local Court proceedings. On 22 June 2017, Southwood J set aside the first order on the basis that the Local Court Judge could not reasonably infer from the facts that the appellant’s wife’s daughter feared the commission of domestic violence from the appellant, and there was no evidence that the appellant harassed her by engaging in regular and unwanted contact ([13]).
His Honour considered the appeal against the second order. The grounds of appeal included that:
•
The order was ultra vires as the Local Court did not have power to compel the appellant to destroy his property;
•
There was no proper evidential basis for the Local Court to conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear the commission of domestic violence arising out of the appellant’s possession of the images ([6])
Issue: Whether Local Court acted ultra vires in making an order to compel the destruction of sexually explicit images; whether there was a proper evidential basis for the Local Court to conclude there were reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear the commission of domestic violence arising out of the possession of the images.
Held: Southwood J allowed the appeals and set aside both domestic violence orders. His Honour held that the Local Court did not have the power to make the second order. Section 21 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act (the Act) does not grant the Local Court power to order a defendant to destroy his or her personal property. Rather, it enables the Local Court to impose conditions on a defendant’s behaviour with the aim of ensuring that the defendant does not engage in domestic violence. Further, the Act makes specific provision for circumstances in which property rights may be interfered with by the Local Court, none of which applied in this case ([46]-[48]). His Honour was satisfied that the appellant was the owner of the sexually explicit images and that his wife consented to him taking them ([45]).
His Honour also held that the Local Court erred in concluding that there was a reasonable fear that the appellant may use, or threaten to use, the sexually explicit images to continue to control his wife. This conclusion was ‘unreasonable and irrational’ ([54]). Further, the evidence showed that the appellant and his wife took sexually explicit images over a number of years for their own enjoyment ([50]).
Bush v Lyons [2018] NTSC 20 (28 April 2018) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1; Contravention of alcohol prevention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was subject to an alcohol prevention order and a domestic violence order which named his wife and daughter as protected persons. The appellant attended the house at which his wife and daughter were residing, under the influence of alcohol, and caused a disturbance ([2]). The Local Court restored a previously suspended sentence and imposed cumulative terms of imprisonment of 4 months for the breach of domestic violence order and 5 days for the breach of alcohol protection order ([3]). The appellant had a history of breaching the same domestic violence and alcohol prevention orders ([5]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on the grounds that the sentencing judge erred by:
•
misusing the appellant’s previous convictions in the sentencing process;
•
failing to include a rehabilitative component in the sentence;
•
failing to partially suspend the sentence; and
•
imposing a manifestly excessive sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The first, second and third grounds were dismissed (see [11], [19] and [25] respectively). The fourth ground, manifest excess, was upheld. Grant CJ outlined the following mitigating factors:
•
the low objective seriousness of the offending;
•
the maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment;
•
the fact that the appellant has no record of violent offending against the protected persons; and
•
his early plea of guilty ([27], [35]).
His Honour characterised the appellant’s repeated breaches as spontaneous and triggered by alcohol abuse, rather than premeditated ([32]). Quoting from Manakgu v Russell [2013] NTSC 48, his Honour agreed that penalties of more than 3 months’ imprisonment are properly reserved for conduct which constitutes physical assault or serious intimidation and threats ([31], [34]). His Honour reduced the sentence for breach of domestic violence order from 4 months to 2 months’ imprisonment ([37]).
Andalong v O’Neill [2017] NTSC 77 (19 October 2017)– Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Autrefois acquit’ – ‘Autrefois convict’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Driving unregistered vehicle x 1; driving uninsured or improperly insured vehicle x 1; driving whilst disqualified x 1; driving with a high range breath alcohol content x 1.
Case type: Appeal
Facts: On 25 November 2015, the appellant was apprehended while driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The appellant was charged with a range of offences under the Traffic Act (NT) (the Act), including driving an unregistered vehicle on a public street (section 33(1)), and driving a vehicle in relation to which a current compensation contribution had not been paid (section 34(1)). The appellant indicated that he would plead guilty to the offence of driving an unregistered motor vehicle, but contended that the offence of driving an uninsured vehicle was a ‘similar offence’ and thus entitled him to the defence under section 18(b) of the Criminal Code (NT). The Local Court found the appellant guilty of these offences.
Issue: The issue for determination is whether the offence under section 33(1) of the Act is a ‘similar offence’, within the meaning of section 18 of the Criminal Code (NT), to the offence under section 34(1).
Held: The Court held that the offence under section 33(1) was not a ‘similar offence’ to the offence under section 34(1). While it may be accepted that the 2 offences shared common features, they nevertheless remained distinct and addressed separate obligations imposed under traffic laws for the protection of the community ([53]-[54]).
The fundamental principle is that a person cannot be prosecuted twice for the same criminal conduct ([16]). The double jeopardy doctrine has a number of different aspects with different operation, including the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and the rule against double punishment ([17]). The availability of the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict will depend on a comparison between the elements of the two offences under consideration. It is insufficient that the two offences arise out of the same conduct, or out of a single event or connected series of events ([21]). The question is whether the elements of the offences charged are identical, or substantially the same in the sense that all the elements of one offence are wholly included in the other ([23]). The Court considered Ashley v Marinov [2007] NTCA 1, and adopted the principles expressed by the High Court in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57 where it was held that no double prosecution arises if the offences with which the accused was charged required proof of a fact which the other did not ([33]).
Note: This case is relevant in terms of domestic and family violence matters in the NT as it considers the law surrounding double punishment.
Fernando v Firth [2017] NTSC 67 (25 August 2017) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Particularise breach’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1; aggravated unlawful assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship for approximately 15 years. The offences occurred after the relationship ended ([10]). The appellant allegedly threatened to kill the complainant if she found another partner ([11]). At trial, the prosecutor did not particularise the words spoken by the appellant ([7]). The appellant denied threatening to kill her, but admitted to threatening to punch the complainant if she came near him, and telling her to stay away from him. The Magistrate accepted the defendant’s evidence, and convicted him of the charge on that basis ([32]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Magistrate convicted the defendant based on his admissions, which evinced less serious conduct than the threats alleged by the prosecution ([49]). The charge required the complainant to have a ‘reasonable apprehension of violence’ ([50]). Since the prosecution did not specify the particular words used, held that the Magistrate did not accord the defendant procedural fairness by going outside the prosecution case ([49]).
R v Grant [2016] NTSC 54 (31 October 2016) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Unlawfully causing harm’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charge/s: Unlawfully causing serious harm or unlawfully causing harm.
Hearing: Voir dire hearing.
Facts: The accused was charged with the offence of unlawfully causing serious harm to his female partner, the complainant, or, in the alternative, unlawfully causing harm to the complainant. The Crown sought the admission of tendency evidence related to the following fact in issue: whether the accused applied physical violence to the complainant in the early morning of 26 January 2016 and/or caused injuries to the complainant. The tendency sought to be proved was the tendency of the accused:
(a)
To act in a particular way, namely engaging in verbal abuse and physically violent behaviour towards the complainant; and/or
(b)
To have a particular state of mind, namely a violent and controlling disposition towards the complainant which he sometimes acted upon when he had been consuming alcohol.
If the evidence (detailed at [5]) was not admissible as tendency evidence, the Crown sought to have it admitted as relationship evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The rulings on the voir dire hearing were –
1.
Evidence of incidents on 25 May 2013, 7-8 June 2013, 12 July 2013, 10 December 2013 and 18 June 2015 were admissible in the trial as tendency evidence (see [61]-[72]).
In order to be admitted for tendency purposes, the evidence had to satisfy the requirements in ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) (‘ENULA’). Two questions arose in determining the admissibility of the evidence: (1) did the evidence have significant probative value? The relevant test is whether ‘the features of commonality or peculiarity which are relied upon are significant enough logically to imply that because the offender committed previous acts or committed them in particular circumstances, he or she is likely to have committed the act or acts in question’: CEG v The Queen [2012] VSCA 55 (see [30]-[60]); (2) did the probative value of that evidence substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused? As per the Court, ‘[t]he test of a danger of unfair prejudice is not satisfied by the mere possibility of such prejudice. There must be a real risk of unfair prejudice by reason of the admission of the evidence’ R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364.
2.
Evidence of incidents on 25 May 2013, 7-8 June 2013, 12 July 2013, 10 December 2013 and 18 June 2015 were admissible as ‘relationship’ or ‘context evidence’ (see [73]-[82]).
Evidence may also be admitted for non-tendency purposes. One example of non-tendency purpose is ‘relationship’ or ‘context’ evidence that is not relied on for a tendency inference. The High Court in HML v The Queen is authority for the proposition that evidence of other conduct by an accused may, depending upon the circumstances, be admissible for non-tendency purposes, including the following purposes (see [75]):
(a)
as affecting the plausibility of other evidence or to assess the credibility and coherence of the complainant’s evidence (at [6], [155]–[156]);
(b)
as essential background against which the evidence of the complainant and the accused necessarily falls to be evaluated, to show the continuing nature of the conduct and to explain the offences charged (at [425], [431]);
(c)
to overcome a false impression that the event was an isolated one, that the offence happened “out of the blue”, where the acts are closely and inextricably mixed up with the history of the offence (at [500], [513]);
(d)
to ensure that the jury are not required to decide issues in a vacuum (at [428], [498]); and
(e)
as negativing issues raised such as accident or mistake (at [430]).
Although HML was a case involving sexual offences, relationship evidence may also be admissible in cases involving violence, including assault-type offences (see examples at [76]).
The admissibility of relationship evidence is governed by the general test of relevance in s 55 of the ENULA and the directions and obligations contained in Part 3.11 (especially ss 135 and 137). The Crown contended that the evidence was relevant and admissible as relationship or context evidence because it was necessary to:
(a)
Avoid the circumstances of the alleged offence appearing inexplicable or being misunderstood in isolation; see Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 at [45]
(b)
Negative the defence case of self-inflicted injury; R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519; (2002) 137 A Crim R 345 at [15], [22]-[45]; Bryant v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 26 at [92]; McDonald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 80 at [28]- [29]
(c)
Show the state of mind of the accused at the time of the alleged offence. R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 at [33], [45], [47]; Boney v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 165 at [29]
The relationship evidence here was both relevant ([79]-[80]) and not excluded (its probative value was neither outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused nor substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the accused) ([81]-[82]).
Houseman v Higgins [2015] NTSC 88 (7 December 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Formalities in making domestic violence order’ – ‘Service’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against acquittal, validity of domestic violence order
Facts: The respondent was served with a police domestic violence order under s 41 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the Act). The order set out the reasons for making the order and conditions of full non-contact. However, it did not provide a specified period for which the order was in force. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction confirmed and varied the order to be in force for 12 months.
After being in contact with the protected person, the respondent was subsequently arrested for breaching the domestic violence order. However, at the time of arrest the respondent had not been served with the court confirmed and varied domestic violence order. The magistrate found the respondent was not guilty on the basis that the domestic violence order made by the police ceased to be in force once confirmed by the court and the respondent had not been served with the court order.
Issues:
•
Whether the domestic violence order was invalid because it did not state the period the order was to be in force.
•
If the order was valid, whether the magistrate erred in finding the respondent not guilty in failing to apply s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
•
Southwood J found it is not necessary for police to state the duration of a domestic violence order for it to be valid. A police domestic violence order continues in force until it is revoked. Under s 27 of the Act a domestic violence order is in force for the period stated in it. This section does not state that an order cannot be made for an unspecified or unlimited period, nor does any other provision in the Act. Further, s 42 contained in Part 2.6 of the Act, provides the police must record the reasons for making the order and the time and place for its return. Again, this provision does not require police to specify the period for which the order is to be in force. The purpose of Part 2.6 is to protect the protected person until a court can consider the matter. Consistent with this purpose, a police domestic violence order is to remain in force until further order or until the order is revoked. This is made clear by s 82 of the Act which states that at a show cause hearing the court may either confirm the order with or without variations or revoke it.
•
Given the order was valid, the respondent’s conduct in contacting the protected person constituted a breach of both the domestic violence order made by the police and the confirmed and varied order made by the court under s 120(1) of the Act. The fact the respondent had not received a copy of the court order at the time of arrest was not a defence under s 120(2)(a) of the Act, as the police domestic violence order was still in force: s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the charge should not have been dismissed and the magistrate erred in dismissing the charge and in failing to consider s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Gorey v O’Neill [2015] NTSC 66 (1 October 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Purpose of domestic violence order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Situational breach’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order restraining him from, among other conditions, approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of his wife (the victim) when consuming or under the influence of alcohol. On the day of offending, the appellant had been drinking and travelled in the car with the victim. His blood alcohol level was 0.05 per cent. The appellant claimed he was in the car with the victim to attend to matters in the administration of the estate of the victim’s father-in-law. He also denied knowing that the domestic violence order was still in force. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of breaching the domestic violence order.
The appellant had an extensive offending history, including 16 convictions for aggravated assault, one conviction for causing grievous bodily harm and eight convictions for breaching domestic violence orders. Of these, 22 of the offences were committed against the victim. The magistrate considered this history of domestic violence offending and the need for specific deterrence together with the mitigating factor that the victim suffered no harm. The appellant was sentenced to three months imprisonment, taking into account a discount of 25 per cent for the early guilty plea.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
While a starting point of four months imprisonment seemed high for a ‘situational breach’ in which no harm was caused, it was necessary to consider the preventative and protective role of domestic violence orders. Barr J noted that ‘Given the preventative purpose of DVO, the fact that the parties may have been drinking while sitting down ‘in a good way’, or that the offender has on the particular occasion not been aggressive or threatening or violent to the protected person, does not necessarily result in a lenient sentencing outcome for a recidivist offender’ ([28]). The appellant’s criminal history demonstrated that while no harm resulted from the breach, there was a real risk that physical or emotional injury could occur and protection was needed to prevent such harm. Further, it established that he had a ‘continuing attitude of disobedience of the law’ ([33]). Therefore, the magistrate’s starting point of four months imprisonment, while on the high end of the range for the nature of the breach, was not outside the bounds of sentencing discretion.
R v Stevenson [2015] NTSC – Sentencing Remarks 21353266 (Kelly J) (14 September 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Murder (sentenced for manslaughter)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife (the victim) after hitting her with a crate twice, kicking her in the back, and subsequently bashing her for three hours then leaving her on the sidewalk. The next morning the defendant went to find the victim to discover she was dead. This occurred after the defendant and the victim had a fight over his drinking habits. He was intoxicated at the time the assaults occurred. A domestic violence order was previously made against the defendant in order to prevent him from being with, assaulting or threatening the victim. The Crown accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to manslaughter on the basis that intention to kill or cause serious harm could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt due to the defendant’s intoxication at the time of the violent assaults.
Issue: What sentence should the defendant receive?
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years.
The defendant had a history of domestic violence assaults against his wife. He had previously been convicted of three aggravated assault offences and one breach of a domestic violence order offence. Kelly J noted that each assault followed a similar pattern, with an argument resulting in the defendant ‘savagely’ bashing his wife. These attacks always involved alcohol and usually involved a weapon. These convictions meant the defendant was not a person of good character and was not entitled to a lighter sentence for being a first offender.
The defendant is a Walpiri man who speaks Walpiri and some Gurindji. He left school in year 9 and speaks English but cannot read or write. The defendant has not worked since his first wife committed suicide in 2002. He began drinking as a teenager and was drinking heavily at the time of the offence.
In providing her reasoning for sentencing, Kelly J highlighted the prominence of alcohol related violence in the Northern Territory: ‘Drunken violence is far too common in our community. It is particularly common, unfortunately, in Aboriginal communities and vulnerable Aboriginal women, vulnerable people of all kinds, deserve the fullest protection that the law can give them.’ The need to punish and for specific deterrence to prevent the defendant from reoffending, as well as the need to protect the community and other women from being hurt by the defendant, were emphasised. There were also a number of aggravating factors that made the offending more serious. The defendant used several weapons when attacking his wife, rather than just losing his temper and lashing out. He also went looking for his wife, having pre-planned the attack, and did not stop bashing her even when she begged him to.
In the factually similar case of R v Wheeler [2005] NTSC – Sentencing Remarks 20505473 (Southwood J), the defendant (Mr Wheeler) received a sentence of 10 years and 6 months imprisonment. However, Kelly J found the defendant’s conduct in the present case was more serious. Unlike Mr Wheeler, he was not provoked by his wife, showed no remorse after he finished bashing her, and did nothing to help her. He also only pleaded guilty after a preliminary hearing had already occurred with 36 witnesses, whereas Mr Wheeler pleaded guilty immediately. These circumstances taken together resulted in Kelly J finding a proper sentence of 16 years imprisonment. A reduction of about 12 percent was given as a result of the guilty plea.
Mamarika v Rourke [2015] NTSC 42 (23 July 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, who was intoxicated at the time, pushed and punched his pregnant wife (the victim) in the stomach and head. After handing himself into police, he pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting the victim with the aggravation of male-on-female assault (under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT)). When asked why he assaulted the victim he said it was because his wife told him to stop drinking. The appellant was initially convicted and sentenced to a term of 10 months imprisonment, to be served cumulatively upon a restored sentence of seven months for previous offending including assaulting the same victim. This earlier assault involved the appellant striking the victim with a sword, then punching and kicking her.
In sentencing, the magistrate emphasised that the victim was pregnant at the time the assault occurred: ‘Women of course deserve to be safe whether they are in Darwin, whether they are at home, and they do not deserve to be treated in this way, particularly – and it is an aggravating factor – when she was 28 weeks pregnant.’ (at [7]). A reduction to the sentence was given when considering the principle of totality and the presence of the appellant’s guilty plea.
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to properly give effect to the principle of totality.
•
Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
The appellant argued that the magistrate did not assess the overall sentence and consider whether any further adjustment was warranted, as required by Mill v R [1988] HCA 70. That is, she did not make the sentence concurrent or partially concurrent with the restored sentence. Rather, the magistrate applied the principle of totality by reducing the sentence for the fresh offending. Barr J rejected this argument in finding the magistrate clearly stated she had applied the principle of totality and whilst the method was not preferable, it was nonetheless appropriate.
•
In determining whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, Barr J considered the previous offending of the appellant. In addition to a significant number of property offences, he had been convicted five times for aggravated assault and once for a breach of a domestic violence order. When considering this history of offending and the present assault, the objectives of denunciation, punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence were relevant to the sentencing of the appellant. Barr J found when taking all these factors into consideration and characterising the offending as ‘mid range’ (at [16]), the appropriate starting point was 18 months. A discount of one third for the guilty plea, as given by the Magistrate, was justified in the circumstances, resulting in a sentence of 12 months. When applying the principle of totality to this sentence, there was some basis for concurrency of three months. This hypothetical sentencing exercise resulted in a total effective sentence of 16 months. Therefore, the sentence of 10 months imprisonment was not manifestly excessive in its own right or when fully accumulated with the restored sentence of seven months imprisonment.
Namundja v Schaefe-Lee [2015] NTSC 36 (12 June 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of alcohol protection order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Repeat offender’
Charges: Aggravated assault, breach of alcohol protection order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, who was intoxicated at the time, had an argument with his wife (the victim). He subsequently dragged the victim outside, punched her in the face multiple times, shoved her into a shelf and punched her twice in the stomach. He was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) (victim suffered harm and male-on-female assault) and one count of breaching a police issued Alcohol Protection Order. The appellant had a number of previous convictions, including three counts of aggravated assault against the victim, four counts of breach of a domestic violence order and nine counts of breaching an Alcohol Protection Order. He resided in Oenpelli and had been an artist member of Injalak Arts for around 20 years. This job would continue on the appellant’s release. His counsel argued his prospects of rehabilitation would be improved if he participated in the Family Violence Program. At trial, the magistrate relied on the seriousness of the offending and his past history to conclude the appellant needed to be specifically deterred, despite any positive attributes, and the community needed to know such conduct is unacceptable. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment after a reduction of four months for pleading guilty. A non-parole period was not fixed due to the seriousness of the offending and continued ongoing breaches of court orders.
Issues: Some issues on appeal were whether the magistrate:
•
Failed to adequately consider the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation;
•
Failed to adequately consider the principles outlined in Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54 that all relevant sentencing considerations must be reconsidered in determining whether to suspend a sentence; and
•
Failed to adequately consider the sentencing disposition of parole.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground 3. Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed.
Blokland J began by noting that ‘Offending of this kind, men assaulting their wives or partners, is an intractable problem in the Northern Territory. With few exceptions, imprisonment is often the appropriate punishment… In most cases, particularly with respect to repeat offenders, positive subjective features generally need to be very carefully balanced as rarely will they outweigh the significance of the gravity of offending of this kind.’ ([19])
•
The fact the magistrate did not specifically refer to the appellant’s job history and prospective employment did not mean that he failed to adequately consider these factors. Given the severity of the offending, previous convictions, the need to protect the victim and the prevalence of domestic violence in the particular case, such factors would not have resulted in a lesser sentence.
•
While the magistrate did not explain every consideration taken, he was entitled to refuse a suspended sentence due to the appellant’s poor history of complying with orders.
•
There was no sufficient basis to decline to set a non-parole period in accordance with s 54(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). Under s 53(1), a court must set a non-parole period in cases of imprisonment for 12 months or more ‘unless it considers the nature of the offence, the past history of the offender or the circumstances of the particular case make the fixing of such period inappropriate’. The magistrate failed to consider these factors, basing his decision primarily on the previous breaches of orders. Therefore, this ground of appeal succeeded and a non-parole period of 8 months was ordered.
Orsto v Grotherr [2015] NTSC 18 (31 March 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Mandatory minimum sentence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained her from harming the victim. On the day of offending, the appellant and the victim got in an argument after the victim returned home from work for lunch against the appellant’s wishes. The appellant was upset that the victim woke up their daughter. She then forcefully struck the victim’s head. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of aggravated assault, with the circumstance of aggravation that the victim suffered harm. The victim had a prior conviction for aggravated assault (weapon-harm) in respect to the same victim. In his victim impact statement, the victim said he did not wish the appellant serve gaol time, as she was pregnant. A character reference was also provided by aboriginal community members that outlined the appellant’s positive characteristics as a mother who had suffered hardship throughout her life. The magistrate heard the appellant had previously been the victim of domestic violence in the relationship and grew up in a household with her parents who had domestic violence issues.
Section 78D of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) requires a mandatory minimum sentence of three months actual imprisonment for aggravated assault, unless exceptional circumstances exist under s 78DI. The appellant’s counsel submitted exceptional circumstances existed on the facts. These circumstances were constituted by a combination of factors including that the victim did not wish the victim to go to gaol; the appellant had sought counselling; she was suffering hardship having attempted suicide the previous year and losing a child two months prior to sentencing; she had previously been the victim of domestic violence herself; and she had ongoing employment within the community. After determining these factors did not amount to exceptional circumstances, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to three months imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in finding the circumstances of the case were not exceptional for the purposes of s 78DI.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
Referring to the obiter comments made in R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2, Blokland J stated that exceptional circumstances do not exist unless the minimum term is greater than the term that would ordinarily be imposed ([37]). This was the case on the facts, as the magistrate noted he would have suspended the sentence but for the mandatory prescribed minimum. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court must consider the whole of the circumstances in the case. The individual factors do not need to be exceptional. Rather, the factors considered together must amount to exceptional circumstances.
The magistrate erred in his consideration of whether exceptional circumstances existed. The remarks were ‘unnecessarily constrained’ and the magistrate failed to consider a number of mitigating factors. In support of the magistrate’s reasoning, Blokland J emphasised the need for general and specific deterrence given the offence occurred in the vicinity of a young child. Further, the victim’s wish that the appellant not be imprisoned has little weight in domestic violence cases. The fact the victim was previously a victim of domestic violence herself without additional information about the duration and extent of the abuse also carried little weight towards exceptional circumstances existing. However, Blokland J concluded that the appellant’s personal circumstances of having just lost a child at the time of sentencing and attempting suicide the year prior made the case exceptional. These personal circumstances were such that being away from family and community support whilst grieving meant imprisonment would be more burdensome on the appellant than other offenders. The sentence was quashed, and the appellant was resentenced to three months imprisonment wholly suspended with an operational period of six months.
Kassman v Dwyer & Anor [2014] NTSC 60 (10 December 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Procedure: Making of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against imposition of domestic violence order
Facts: The plaintiff, an Aboriginal Community Police Officer, was in a relationship with the victim. The victim made a number of allegations of domestic violence. As a result, a police domestic violence order was imposed against the plaintiff pursuant to s 41 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). In relation to this order, the plaintiff received a notice ordering him to appear before the court on 8 August 2014 to show cause as to why the order should not be confirmed. After the victim expressed an intention to leave Darwin, the plaintiff was informed that the order would stay in force to ‘keep the peace’ and would be revoked once the victim moved. The victim informed the plaintiff she would be leaving Darwin on 13 August 2014. As a result of this and advice given by the officer who made the police order, the plaintiff did not attend court on 8 August 2014 as required. The magistrate refused a short adjournment to enable the legal counsel to obtain further information to explain the absence of the plaintiff and confirmed the order for 12 months.
Issue: Was the plaintiff denied natural justice?
Decision and reasoning: Through the ‘unfortunate combination of events’ the plaintiff was denied natural justice. His superiors in the Police Force left him with the understanding that he was not required to attend court on 8 August 2014. As a result, the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to show cause as to why the order should not be confirmed. The magistrate confirmed the order without providing reasons for refusing the adjournment or confirming the order for 12 months. Additionally, the magistrate failed to provide the plaintiff the opportunity to make submissions, contrary to s 82(2) Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). The decision was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction for determination.
R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 26 (15 July 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Jury’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Presumption of innocence’
Charge: Murder
Proceeding: Reasons for rulings given during trial as to admissibility of evidence, discharge of jury member
Facts: The accused was charged with murdering his ex-partner. He denied any involvement with her death and told police he believed another man or bikies associated with him likely murdered the victim. During the course of the trial, several witnesses were asked what they knew of the other man and his association with the victim and the accused. The prosecution sought to partially exclude evidence of three witnesses about what the accused had told them about people, including the other man, behaving suspiciously around him.
During the trial Blokland J received a note from a juror that alleged three of the other jurors considered the accused guilty until convinced otherwise (Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2, [10]). The accused’s Counsel requested the jury be discharged.
Issues:
•
Was the evidence of the three witnesses admissible?
•
Should the jury be discharged because of the juror’s note?
Decision and reasoning:
•
The evidence of the three witnesses was hearsay. However, it was admissible as the exception in s 66 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) applied. While an accused is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution, they are ‘available’ for the purposes of s 66 to give evidence in their own case. However, subsequent to this ruling during the trial the accused’s Counsel advised the court that the accused would not give evidence. Therefore, the jury were directed to disregard the evidence initially admitted under s 66.
•
Blokland J refused to discharge the jury and rather provided directions to the jury reminding them of the presumption of innocence, the need to remain impartial and the duty to keep an open mind when hearing the evidence.
NB: The ruling not to discharge the jury was held to be an error on appeal in Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2. The conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.
R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 15 (10 July 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Murder’
Charge: Murder
Proceeding: Pre-trial rulings on evidence
Facts: The accused was charged with murdering his ex-partner with whom he had two children. The prosecution sought to adduce evidence relating to the state of the accused and victim’s relationship from the time of separation until the victim’s death. The prosecution was attempting to argue that motive could be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the parties contained within such evidence. Some of this evidence comprised hearsay representations made by the victim to other witnesses.
Issue: Whether the evidence relating to the accused and victim’s relationship was admissible.
Decision and reasoning: Evidence as to the state of the relationship is admissible if it is relevant to the accused’s anger towards the victim by the use of controlling behaviours and frustration directed towards the victim. This kind of evidence is relevant at common law and within the meaning of s 55 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) as evidence that could rationally affect the assessment of a fact in issue. However, hearsay evidence can only be admitted under s 67 if the representations made by the deceased occurred when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred in circumstances where it was unlikely to be fabricated (s 65(2)(b)), or if it is highly probable the representations were reliable (s 65(2)(c)).
Blokland J considered whether 31 pieces of hearsay evidence were admissible. The evidence included representations made by the victim to police officers prior to her murder, to the practitioner for the Department of Children and Families who was managing the case, and to her daughter. The representations related to the accused’s physical or emotional control over the victim and his history of assaulting her.
One item considered was a statement the victim made to the police describing an assault by the accused. Representations contained within this statement regarding the assault and the accused taking the victim’s car keys were admitted. Text messages and statements regarding the accused’s threat to kill himself were also admitted. However, a statement made by their son was not admitted, as it was not a representation made by the victim as required by s 65. The statement also contained representations about the accused visiting the victim’s brother’s house and allegations that the accused was violent towards his daughter. These representations were also not admitted as evidence as their probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice against the accused.
Some other representations that were not admitted included those made to the case management practitioner that the victim attempted to leave the accused but he would not let her; that the accused was not physically but emotionally abusive towards the victim; and that the accused was harassing the victim at her brother’s house.
Note: Subsequent to this ruling, the accused stood trial and was found guilty of murder. Blokland J provided additional reasoning on two procedural matters that arose during the trial in R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 26. The accused subsequently successfully appealed the conviction in Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2 on procedural grounds amounting to a miscarriage of justice. The conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
Manakgu v Russell [2013] NTSC 48 (14 August 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Situational breach’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order in favour of his wife (the protected person) that restrained him from ‘approaching, entering or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol… or when under the influence of alcohol’. After attending the Gunbalunya Sports and Social Club and drinking 13 cans of beer, the appellant went to the protected person’s home. He was arrested and pleaded guilty to breaching the domestic violence order, which had been in force for nine months. The order had been complied with for the previous nine months, but the appellant had been in prison for five of them. The appellant had two prior convictions for breach of domestic violence orders. In considering this repeat offending and history of failing to comply with orders, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to 3 months imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Barr J observed: ‘Generally speaking, a breach where harm or fear of harm is caused to the protected person is worse than a merely ‘situational’ breach. The appellant’s breach was a low order ‘situational’ breach. No harm or fear of harm was caused’ ([16]). Barr J noted that in general, ‘the more egregious the conduct in terms of causing harm or fear of harm to the protected person, the greater the probable degree of contempt for the court’s order or orders’ ([17]). On the facts, the magistrate erred in assessing the appellant’s conduct as more than a ‘minor case’. While some actual imprisonment was justified for reasons of specific and general deterrence, the offending was at the low end of the scale of seriousness at [23]. The sentence of three months’ imprisonment was quashed, and a sentence of 15 days’ imprisonment was imposed.
JCM v LJN [2013] NTSC 50 (13 August 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Both parties in vulnerable situation’ – ‘Domestic violence order conditions’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Myths and misunderstanding - not leaving violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Variation of domestic violence order’ – ‘Victim’
Appeal type: Variation of domestic violence order
Facts: A domestic violence order was taken out by police in favour of the appellant and her daughter (the protected persons). The order restrained the respondent from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the appellant or any place she was living, working, staying, visiting or is located. All parties consented to vary this non-contact order to a non-violence order restraining the respondent from ‘causing harm or attempting or threatening to cause harm to the protected persons; causing or attempting to cause damage to the property of the protected persons; and intimidating or harassing or verbally abusing the protected persons’ ([3]). At hearing, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction refused to grant the variation.
The respondent subsequently presented fresh evidence in support of the variation from a non-contact to a non-violence domestic violence order. The appellant and her daughter briefly moved to a shelter after the domestic violence order was originally taken out. They then moved back into their home, leaving the respondent to move out in order to comply with the non-contact order. This was against the wishes of the appellant and their child, who wanted to continue living with the respondent. With nowhere else to stay, the respondent slept in his car while continuing to support the appellant and their child financially. He was unable to access tools needed for his work that were left in the house. The respondent suffered from a mental illness and had commenced treatment with the support of the appellant. In the circumstances, the police were satisfied a non-violence order was appropriate.
Issues: One relevant issue concerned whether the Court of Summary Jurisdiction failed to properly consider and give due weight to the matters to be considered in making a domestic violence order under s 19(2)(e) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
The appellant’s wish to remain in a relationship with the respondent is not in itself enough to grant a variation of the domestic violence order. Blokland J noted that ‘the desire to stay in the relationship may be an indication of ongoing dependence, violence or intimation’ ([9]). However, this factor had to be considered in combination with the fact the original order was made on incomplete information, the respondent had not been in breach of a domestic violence order for five years, and the fresh evidence established that the non-contact order placed the appellant, the respondent and their child in vulnerable situations. While this was a situation where there was a need for a domestic violence order, a non-violence order would be more effective than a non-contact order and would continue to provide protection for the appellant and their daughter. The non-violence order would likely result in the respondent continuing treatment for his mental illness and taking further responsibility, thereby supporting protection in the context of an ongoing family relationship.
Watson v Chambers [2013] NTSC 7 (12 February 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Cumulative sentences’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (two counts), aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a relationship and resided together in the remote town of Maningrida. A domestic violence order was in place to protect the victim from the appellant harassing, threatening or verbally abusing her or assaulting or threatening to assault her. One afternoon the victim left their house when the appellant became angry and demanded she stay, saying ‘Don’t you move, I’m going to get a hammer and smash you in the arm’ (count 2). Several days later the appellant accused the victim of having an affair. He subsequently struck her in the arm with a metal cup, grabbed her hair and dragged her to their room where he threw her on the ground, punched her twice in the face and struck her with a steel mop handle (counts 4 and 6). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of contravening a domestic violence order (counts 2 and 4) and one count of aggravated assault with the circumstances of aggravation under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) that the victim suffered harm, it was a male-on-female offence and the victim was threatened with a weapon (count 6). The effective head sentence imposed by the magistrate was 11 months’ imprisonment to be suspended after the service of 6 months’ imprisonment, subject to the appellant completing the Indigenous Family Violence Offender Program (IFVOP). This head sentence comprised of:
•
Count 2: two months’ imprisonment
•
Count 6: six months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 2
•
Count 4: three months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 6
The magistrate initially made the sentence on count 4 concurrent with count 6, making the effective sentence 8 months imprisonment. However, this was adjusted as a result of s 121(7) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) and the effective sentence was increased to 11 months.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were whether the magistrate:
•
Erred by finding the appellant guilty on count 4 and count 6 on the same facts; and
•
Erred in her application of the totality principle.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on both grounds and the appellant was resentenced.
•
Counts 4 and 6 referred to the same incident. Citing Ashley v Marinov [2007] NTCA 1, Blokland J noted that where the facts of the breach of the domestic violence order were the same or similar to the facts constituting the assault, the two findings cannot stand. To do so would violate the principle against double jeopardy. The conduct of the appellant in accusing the victim of having an affair did not constitute ‘harassing, threatening or verbally abusing’ as provided in the domestic violence order. The conduct was not particularised at trial and the magistrate erred in convicting the appellant on count 4. Blokland J ordered the quashing of the conviction and sentence in respect to count 4.
•
Blokland J agreed with Barr J’s remarks in Idai v Malogorski [2011] NTSC 102 in finding that the mandatory accumulation of sentences does not displace the principle of totality. The conduct that constituted counts 4 and 6 was a continuation of the offending of count 2. Therefore, while the sentences had to be accumulated, there should have been an adjustment to the individual sentences when the magistrate made the correction.
The appellant was resentenced to 14 days’ imprisonment on count 2 and 6 months’ imprisonment on count 6. The total effective term of imprisonment of 6 months and 14 days was suspended after the service of five months and one week imprisonment. The condition of the appellant completing the IFVOP was upheld.
Palmer-Peckham v Westphal [2012] NTSC 74 (28 September 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and victim had previously been in a relationship. The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained him from harassing or harming the victim and approaching, entering or remaining in her company or in her place of residence or work when under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating substance. After consuming alcohol one day, the appellant went to the victim’s mother’s house where she was living at the time. The victim was not home. He returned later that afternoon after consuming more alcohol. When the victim arrived home, the appellant allegedly assaulted her. However, there was not enough evidence to conclude this beyond reasonable doubt. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and was convicted of breaching the domestic violence order. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to two months’ imprisonment, suspended immediately with an operation period of 12 months.
In sentencing, the magistrate noted that the appellant had breached the domestic violence order in three respects and considered the conduct as the upper end of offending. However, the appellant had no substantial offending history and entered his guilty plea early. The magistrate accepted that while the appellant had a problem with alcohol, he had work available and had good prospects of rehabilitation. He considered the starting point of six months’ imprisonment, reduced to two months’ imprisonment wholly suspended when considering the mitigating and aggravating factors.
Issues: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
Olsson AJ considered the general approach adopted by the magistrate in order to promote general deterrence was reasonable. However, the magistrate’s starting point of six months’ imprisonment was very high for a first conviction when considering the victim suffered no physical or lasting emotional harm. It is not clear from the magistrate’s sentencing remarks how he arrived at the ultimate reduction from six to two months’ imprisonment. A reduction of 30 per cent was given for the timely plea. Beyond this, the magistrate only noted the appellant’s character and prospects for rehabilitation for the further reduction. Accordingly, the sentence was so excessive as to manifest error on the part of the magistrate. Olsson AJ resentenced the appellant to 21 days’ imprisonment, suspended immediately with an operation period of 12 months.
Blitner v Vanzella [2012] NTSC 72 (26 September 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Lapse of domestic violence order’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a police domestic violence order that restrained him from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol or under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction made restraining orders against the appellant. These orders did not include any ‘non-intoxication conditions’. Four days after the restraining orders were made, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction allowed the police domestic violence order to lapse. The appellant was subsequently charged with breaching this order. He pleaded guilty to these offences and was convicted and fined.
Issue: Whether the police domestic violence order was in force and capable of being breached.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence was quashed.
Under s 82 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) the court must either confirm or revoke a police domestic violence order. The magistrate’s order to allow the police domestic violence order to lapse was an effective revocation under s 82. As a result, the appellant was not restrained by a domestic violence order from being or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol or being under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, he could not be in breach of the revoked police domestic violence order.
Carne v Wride; Carne v Nicholas [2012] NTSC 33 (15 May 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Cumulative sentences’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in an ‘on again off again’ relationship for approximately 18 years and had four children together. One evening the appellant went to the victim’s house where all four children were residing. The appellant threw the television over the balcony and forcibly took a ring off the victim’s finger. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and a domestic violence order was made restraining him from contacting, approaching, intimidating or harassing the victim and exposing the children to domestic violence. Nine days later the appellant phoned the victim and visited her at the house. When she refused to let him in, the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to hang himself from the veranda. This was witnessed by his 14 year old son. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and pleaded guilty to breaching the domestic violence order.
The two charges were sentenced together. After stating the need for general and specific deterrence in the circumstances, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to eight months’ imprisonment for breaching the domestic violence order and two months’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault. The sentences were to be served cumulatively, suspended after six months on conditions including supervision, counselling and abstinence from alcohol and drugs.
Issues: Some of the grounds of appeal included:
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Whether the magistrate had regard to irrelevant facts and circumstances in accepting the attempted suicide was within the definition of domestic violence;
•
Whether the magistrate erred in cumulating the sentences; and
•
Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on grounds 1 and 3. The appellant was resentenced.
•
Under s 5 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) domestic violence includes causing harm and intimidation. Further, s 6 defines intimidation to include any conduct that has the effect of unreasonably controlling or causing mental harm. It is probable that the appellant’s son suffered psychological harm as a result of witnessing his father attempting to hang himself and having to cut him down. However, no evidence was adduced to establish mental harm was actually suffered. In the absence of such evidence, Kelly J found it was not open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the attempted suicide was conduct that caused mental harm to the son in order to amount to domestic violence under s 6(1)(c). It was also not open to the magistrate to conclude the appellant attempted to cause mental harm under s 5(f). There was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the attempted suicide was aimed at the victim and her children.
•
As a general rule, cumulative penalties should not be imposed when a number of offences arise from substantially the same conduct or a series of occurrences. The appellant’s two offences of aggravated assault and breach of the domestic violence orders did not arise out of such a closely related series of events. Rather, the conduct constituting the separate offences occurred on different days and were totally different acts. Therefore, the magistrate did not err in ordering the sentences to be served cumulatively rather than concurrently.
•
As ground 1 of the appeal was successful, the only actions by the appellant that constituted the breach of the domestic violence order were the conduct of phoning the victim and visiting her home. In these circumstances, the sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. Kelly J set aside the sentence and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for one month for the breach of the domestic violence order. The sentence was to be served cumulatively on the aggravated assault sentence, suspended after one month.
Idai v Malogorski [2011] NTSC 102 (14 December 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent sentences’ – ‘Drugs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (two counts), aggravated assault (two counts), administration of a dangerous drug (cannabis)
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim had been in a relationship for three to four years. After self-administering cannabis one afternoon (count 2), the appellant became abusive and called the victim a slut (count 4). Early the next morning the victim locked herself in the bathroom to get away from the appellant. In response, the appellant banged and kicked the door, demanding the victim come out (count 5). When she did the appellant threw the contents of a bong and a flour tin over her (count 1). Later that day the appellant shouted at the victim, grabbed her chin and squeezed her cheeks to force her to face him (count 3). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of contravening a domestic violence order (counts 4 and 5), two counts of aggravated male-on-female assault (counts 1 and 3) and one count of administering a dangerous drug (count 2). The effective head sentence imposed by the magistrate was 15 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months. This head sentence comprised of:
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Count 4: five months’ imprisonment
•
Count 5: five months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 4
•
Count 1: five months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 5
•
Count 3: five months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence imposed on count 1
•
Count 2: $200 fine
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate erred in the application of the totality principle.
•
Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in relation to counts 4 and 5.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2 and the appellant was resentenced.
•
The conduct that constituted the breaches of the domestic violence order (counts 4 and 5) occurred very closely together in time. They could be seen as facets of the one course of conduct leading up to the aggravated assaults that occurred later that day (counts 1 and 3). Therefore, the sentences imposed for counts 4 and 5 would ordinarily have been made concurrent or substantially so under the general principle of totality. However, in a process of statutory interpretation, Barr J found s 121(7) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) requires the court to order the term of imprisonment for a domestic violence order offence to be served cumulatively on any other sentence. Therefore, the magistrate did not err in ordering that the sentences on both the domestic violence order offences (counts 4 and 5) had to be cumulative on one another and on the sentences on the aggravated assault offences (counts 1 and 3).
•
The magistrate allowed a discount of 25 per cent for the appellant’s guilty pleas, suggesting a point for each offence of approximately seven months imprisonment. Considering the offending was at the lower end of the scale, the individual sentences were manifestly excessive. Barr J found an appropriate starting point for each domestic violence offence (counts 4 and 5) was a sentence of four months, reduced to three months allowing for a 25 per cent discount for the guilty pleas. Each domestic violence order sentence (counts 4 and 5) should further be reduced to two months’ imprisonment, applying the principle of totality. Barr J ordered the appellant be resentenced on counts 4 and 5 to:
•
Count 4: two months’ imprisonment
•
Count 5: two months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 4
The effective head sentence for all counts was therefore nine months’ imprisonment.
Malogorski v Peart [2011] NTSC 86 (21 October 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘External orders’ – ‘Registration of interstate domestic violence order’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Proceeding: Question of law under s 96 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT)
Facts: The defendant was the subject of an interim violence restraining order made under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (the WA Act). The interim order was registered as an external order in the Northern Territory pursuant to the procedures in Chapter 3 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the NT Act). Subsequently the interim order was made into a final order in Western Australia, however this was never registered in the Northern Territory. The defendant came into contact with the protected person in the Northern Territory, in breach of the external order. At trial, it was argued that there was no case to answer because the interim order made in Western Australia had ceased to be in force once the final order was made. Therefore, the interim order was also no longer registered in the Northern Territory as an external order under s 96 and could not be enforced.
Issue: Whether an interim order under the WA Act continues to be ‘in force’ within the meaning of s 96 of the NT Act after the interim order is made final.
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J answered the question in the negative.
Under the WA Act, an interim order remains in force until one of the specified events in s 16(4) occurs, including when a final order comes into force. Section 96 of the NT Act provides that an external order is registered ‘for the period during which it is in force’. Therefore, on the date of the alleged offence the interim order was not ‘in force’ in WA; accordingly, there was no external order enforceable under the NT Act.
Bonney v Thompson [2011] NTSC 81 (7 October 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Extension of domestic violence order’ – ‘History of abuse’
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to extend domestic violence order
Facts: The respondent, the appellant’s ex-partner, was the subject of a non-contact domestic violence order. The order was initially to be in force for 12 months, but the appellant applied for the order to be extended for a further two years. This application was dismissed. In deciding whether to grant the extension, the magistrate refused to consider the past history of domestic violence. The magistrate did not consider that a history of domestic violence is sufficient for the court to continue an order.
The magistrate also refused to have regard to events that occurred after the making of the original order. The appellant alleged the respondent had approached her daughter, asked for money and threatened to hit her. The magistrate concluded this threat was not relevant because it related to ‘a different adult, not in the company of the complainant, not living with the complainant’ ([22]). The respondent also told his and the appellant’s children to tell the appellant that it was dangerous staying in town, and that she was ‘looking for trouble by living in town’.
Issue: Some of the grounds of appeal included whether the magistrate erred in:
•
Finding that previous evidence of violence is insufficient to extend an order; and
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Failing to have regard to statement made to the appellant’s family members in considering the reasonable fear of the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the domestic violence order was extended.
•
The magistrate erred in failing to consider the history of domestic violence that led to making the original domestic violence order. In failing to do so, the magistrate made an error of law in failing to take into account relevant facts as required by s 53 and s 19(2)(d) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). The question is whether the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear domestic violence. This question may be satisfied based solely on past conduct of domestic violence: ‘To hold that an application to extend a DVO could never be granted solely on evidence of past domestic violence occurring before the date of the original order, would be tantamount to saying that a DVO can never be extended unless it has been breached.’ ([19)].
•
The magistrate also erred in failing to take into account the evidence of threats made by the respondent to the appellant’s daughter and their children. The threat to the appellant’s daughter was relevant to show the defendant had not reformed and was still prone to threats of violence. Further, the remarks to the children taken in context with the past history of domestic violence support that the appellant had reasonable grounds to fear the commission of domestic violence against her.
Parnell v Verity [2011] NTSC 47 (24 June 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Assaulting police’ – ‘Resisting arrest’
Charge: Resisting arrest, Assaulting police in the execution of duty
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: After speaking with the victim, two police officers decided there were grounds to order a police domestic violence order against the appellant. When driving to the station, they saw the appellant outside his mother’s house. After failed attempts to communicate with the appellant, one of the police officers drew his taser, but did not point it at the appellant. After the appellant was notified of his arrest for the purposes of making a domestic violence order against him, he was handcuffed. He then became aggressive, screaming to his mother for help and alleging the police were assaulting him. The appellant attempted to kick one of the police officers. As a result, the officer put his foot on the appellant’s leg. The appellant screamed out in pain and his family started to approach the officers aggressively. One officer again drew his taser and pointed it at the family and the other officer took out his pepper spray. The appellant then kicked one officer in the shin, who then pepper sprayed the appellant.
In relation to this conduct, the appellant was convicted of resisting arrest and unlawfully assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty with the circumstance of aggravation that the police officer suffered harm.
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate’s findings of guilt were unsafe and unsatisfactory;
•
Whether the magistrate made findings of fact that were not reasonably open on the evidence; and
•
Whether the magistrate erred in the interpretation of s 84(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act (2007) NT.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was acquitted of both charges. In order for the police to remove and detain a person under s 84 of the Act there must be a reasonable belief that there are grounds for making a domestic violence order and it is necessary to remove the person to prevent an imminent risk of harm to another. There was no evidence before the magistrate of ‘domestic violence’ defined by s 5 of the Act. Therefore, the magistrate erred in finding the police officers had a reasonable belief that grounds existed for making a domestic violence order against the appellant. Further, there was no evidence that the appellant was likely to harm anyone as required by s 84(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the police officers did not have the power to arrest the appellant in order to impose the domestic violence order. The arrest was unlawful and the appellant was justified in resisting arrest and acted in self-defence when kicking the police officer.
Semkin v Verity [2011] NTSC 12 (15 February 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order to protect his former partner (the victim). While serving a sentence of imprisonment for previous offences committed against the victim, the appellant breached the domestic violence order by sending the victim a letter. The content of the letter included apologising for his actions and for harming the victim. When asked why he sent the letter, the appellant replied ‘Broken heart, saying sorry and all that’ and that he was not aware it was a contravention of the domestic violence order. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment to commence at the end of his prior sentence.
The full no-contact domestic violence order was initially ordered after the appellant entered the victim’s house, removed all her clothes and burned them in the garden while she was not home. Following this, the appellant breached the order by texting the victim 17 times. The messages included threatening the victim, threatening self-harm and declaring his ‘undying love’. As a result of this conduct, the appellant was fined $750 and placed on a good behaviour bond. Sometime after recommencing their relationship, the appellant went to the victim’s workplace with two knives and a hammer and subsequently chased, punched and kicked the victim and threatened to kill her. The appellant was charged and convicted of aggravated assault, for which he was serving a term of imprisonment at the time of the current offending.
Issues:
•
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
Whether the magistrate erred in applying the principle of totality.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Riley CJ rejected the argument that the appellant’s moral culpability was reduced because he claimed to be unaware that sending the letter was a breach of the domestic violence order. He had repeatedly breached the domestic violence order, on one occasion for sending text messages to the victim. Therefore, he should have known the conditions of the order and that sending a letter constituted a breach of it. The fact that his offending occurred while in custody for another offence against the victim was an aggravating factor. While the appellant had made efforts to rehabilitate whilst in prison, the need for personal deterrence was still a significant factor in sentencing considering his history of offending. When considering these circumstances as a whole, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
•
The magistrate did not err in applying the principle of totality. The current offending was not part of a course of offending. Sending the letter in breach of the domestic violence order was a separate incident to the aggravated assault that the appellant was in custody for. Therefore, the current offending required a separate sentence and the magistrate did not err in ordering the sentence to be served cumulatively.
Atkinson v Eaton [2010] NTSC 72 (17 December 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of good behaviour bond’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, breach of good behaviour bond, resisting arrest
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a de facto relationship and resided together with their child and two children from the victim’s previous relationships. The appellant was the subject of a good behaviour bond with a condition that he not approach the victim when consuming or under the influence of alcohol. He was also the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained the appellant from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the victim or her three children (the protected persons) when consuming or under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating drug or substance.
On the day of offending, the appellant consumed alcohol whilst in the presence of all four of the protected persons. The appellant resisted arrest and attempted to escape custody. After he was arrested the police determined his blood alcohol level was 0.172 per cent. When asked his reasons for breaching the domestic violence order, the appellant replied ‘it was her choice’. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of one count of breaching the good behaviour bond, one count of breaching the domestic violence order and one count of resisting arrest. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to 21 days’ imprisonment, 21 days’ imprisonment and seven days’ imprisonment, respectively. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, with the total effective sentence of 21 days’ imprisonment.
The appellant had previously breached the good behaviour bond and received a warning. He had also been convicted of breaching the domestic violence order, assault and aggravated assault.
Issue: Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
The magistrate erred in imposing a term of imprisonment for the breach of the good behaviour bond. Although there had been two breaches of the bond, Blokland J held that without knowing additional information on the initial breach that received a warning, imprisonment could not be justified for the breach in question. The sentence of 21 days’ imprisonment was therefore manifestly excessive and ordered to be set aside.
The magistrate also erred in imposing a term of 21 days’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order. Blokland J recognised that this was the appellant’s second breach of the domestic violence order. However, although the protected persons were placed in fear, no harm resulted from the breach. Therefore, the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The appellant was re-sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order and seven days’ imprisonment for resisting arrest to be served concurrently. When considering the circumstances of the offence, a short term of imprisonment was justified under s 121 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). Blokland J emphasised the appellant’s blood alcohol reading was significant and whilst he pleaded guilty, it was not an immediate plea ([25]). Blokland J refused to suspend the sentence when considering the appellant’s history of offending and the need for personal deterrence. No further sentence was imposed for breach of the good behaviour bond, as the breach occurred out of the same conduct as the breach of domestic violence order.
Walker v Verity [2010] NTSC 68 (7 December 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Multiple breach charges’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Victim’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (6 counts), threatening to kill with intent to cause fear, resisting arrest, unlawfully assault of a police officer in the execution of duty, behaving in a disorderly manner, unlawfully possessing cannabis
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order in force to protect his daughter (the victim). The order restricted the appellant, among other conditions, from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the victim or at any place where the victim resided, worked or stayed while consuming or under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating drug or substance. After consuming alcohol one day, the appellant sent a text to the victim (charge 1). He then resent this message four times before going to the victim’s home (charge 2). The victim was not home, but the appellant waited several hours for her to return (charge 3). After the victim left her home, the appellant rang the victim and swore at her (charge 4). The appellant eventually left the victim’s home after being asked several times only to return several hours later. The appellant then scratched the victim’s face (charge 5) and said ‘I love you, but I want to kill you’ (charge 6). He subsequently called her again and blamed the victim for his arrest (charge 8). Charge 7 was not referred to or specified.
In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and convicted of (inter alia) 6 counts of breaching a domestic violence order (charges 1-5, 8) and threatening to kill with intent to cause fear (charge 6), resisting arrest, unlawfully assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty, behaving in a disorderly manner, and unlawfully possessing cannabis. The appellant was sentenced on charges 1 to 4, to a fine of $1000; on charges 5 and 8, to 12 weeks’ imprisonment; and on charge 6, to 12 weeks’ imprisonment, each to be served concurrently with the aggregate sentence on charges 5 and 8.
In the victim impact statement, the victim explained the physical and emotional injuries she suffered as a result of her father’s domestic violence ([27]). However, the victim expressed her wish that the appellant be ordered into rehabilitation rather than sentenced to imprisonment. The magistrate did not mention this wish of the victim in his sentencing remarks.
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to take into account the victim’s wishes as expressed in the victim impact statement; and
•
Whether the sentences imposed for charges 5, 6 and 8 were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
The magistrate did not err by merely failing to expressly refer to the victim impact statement. The magistrate was informed that the appellant had previously unsuccessfully attempted rehabilitation in the only two rehabilitation programs available to non-Indigenous males in the Northern Territory. Further, the victim’s wishes for the appellant not to be imprisoned should not have carried great weight when considering the aggravating factor of the appellant’s extensive offending history, and the need for specific and general deterrence. Barr J concluded that in domestic violence cases, the importance of general deterrence likely overrides any forgiveness on the part of the victim ([40-41]).
•
The effective sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment for charges 5, 6 and 8 was not manifestly excessive in the circumstances. The magistrate was entitled to regard charges 5, 6 and 8 as serious. Further, the magistrate gave due consideration to the appellant’s previous history of offending, including a previous threat to kill, offences of physical violence, and numerous breaches of domestic violence orders. The appellant established no error by the magistrate in sentencing, nor that theeffective sentence was manifestly excessive. Therefore, both grounds failed and the appeal was dismissed.
AB v Northern Territory of Australia [2010] NTSC 8 (18 March 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Compensation to victim’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault, unlawfully causing serious harm, rape
Appeal type: Appeal against amount of compensation ordered for victim
Facts: The appellant and the offender were living together in a domestic relationship. On the first occasion, the offender assaulted the appellant with a curtain rod, causing severe lacerations to her head, arms and body, substantial blood loss, broken teeth, and swelling and bruising to her face and lower back. In relation to this conduct, the offender was charged with aggravated assault. The appellant was again assaulted by the offender several weeks later, resulting in a fractured clavicle. The pattern of assaults continued when approximately three months later the offender followed the victim home, dragged her outside, bashed her with a stick and fists, verbally abused her and raped her twice. As a result, the victim suffered extensive injuries to her face and scalp, a fractured jaw and bruises all over her body. The offender was found guilty of unlawfully causing serious harm to the victim and two counts of sexual intercourse without consent.
The victim made an application for compensation under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) (the Act) and was awarded $35,000 for the compensable violent act, as determined by an assessor. She subsequently appealed to the Local Court on the basis that the compensation awarded was inadequate when considering the injuries suffered. It was argued that the respondent erred in considering the three incidents constituted a single violent act and in failing to assess her psychological injuries. Alternatively, it was argued that the respondent erred in determining the award quantum under Schedule 3, Part 1(c) of the Act.
Issue: Several questions of law were reserved for the Supreme Court including:
•
Were the criminal acts committed against the appellant on the three separate days a single violent act for the purposes of s 5 of the Act?
•
Does s 25 of the Act prevent the appellant from obtaining an assessment for psychological injury?
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J first detailed the operation of the Act and its application to victims of domestic violence ([9]-[44]).
•
Kelly J answered this question in the negative. Section 5(4) of the Act provides that a series of related criminal acts constitutes a single violent act. Whether the three assaults constituted a series of related criminal acts depended on whether they could be said to ‘occur over a period of time’ under s 5(3)(b(ii). For this to be the case, the criminal acts must have been continuing in the sense of forming a single episode of offending. The assaults committed by Mr Barnes occurred months apart and each resulted in separate injuries. Therefore, the three sets of criminal acts were not committed ‘over a period of time’ within the meaning of s 5(3)(b)(ii).
•
Nothing in s 25 prevents the appellant from obtaining compensation for psychological or psychiatric injury suffered as a result of the assaults. The first two assaults are not ‘compensable violent acts’ within the Act however the appellant is entitled to claim an award for the ‘compensable injuries’ suffered as a result of those acts. As these offences are not included in Schedule 2 to the Regulations, she could only include a psychological or psychiatric injury as one of the three compensable injuries under Regulation 18 Victims of Crime Assistance Regulations (NT) if the recognisable psychological or psychiatric disorder was severely disabling (Reg 15(2)). The third incident involving raping the appellant is a compensable violent act and therefore she could apply for an award for the assault per se (s 10(4)(a)(i)) or an award for compensable injuries suffered as a result of the violent act. The appellant chose to do the latter, and therefore the assessor was obliged to take into account all of her injuries including any psychological or psychiatric disorders that resulted from the attack as part of the common law assessment of damages.
Midjumbani v Moore [2009] NTSC 27 (26 June 2009) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Gender of offender’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained her from contacting or approaching her former partner (the victim) directly or indirectly while intoxicated, among other restrictions. On the day of offending, the appellant went to the victim’s home while intoxicated, verbally abused him and threatened to arrange for the victim to be harmed and killed. Approximately two hours later, the appellant returned and threatened that her family would kill the victim. She then picked up a large rock causing the victim to retreat back inside his home. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of two counts of breaching a domestic violence order. She was sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment on each charge, to be served concurrently.
The appellant had previously been convicted of breaching a domestic violence order, possession of cannabis, and two offences involving being armed with an offensive weapon. In support of the appellant, it was submitted she occasionally cared for the victim who was suffering from cancer, she entered an early plea of guilty and she had shown remorse.
Issues: The grounds of appeal were:
•
The magistrate erred in interpreting s 121(3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) and failed to consider whether ‘particular circumstances’ existed under s 121(3)(b);
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive; and
•
The magistrate failed to properly consider the gender of the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Section 121 of the Act must be read altogether. Subject to s 121(3), a court must record a conviction and sentence a person to at least seven days’ imprisonment if that person has previously been found guilty of breaching a domestic violence order. This mandatory minimum sentence will always apply unless no harm has been caused to the victim: s 121(3)(a). If harm is not caused, the court must consider the particular circumstances of the offence to determine if it is appropriate to record a conviction and sentence the person to at least seven days’ imprisonment: s 121(3)(b). The magistrate did not err in its interpretation or application of this provision.
•
The magistrate did not err in sentencing the appellant in accordance with s 121 of the Act. However, Riley J noted that even if he did find error he would not have interfered with the sentence imposed. The sentence of seven days to be served concurrently for each breach of the domestic violence order was appropriate. The appellant failed to establish that the magistrate erred in sentencing or that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive.
•
The appellant submitted that the magistrate failed to properly consider her gender as a female. Riley J did not accept that the gender of the offender is a relevant matter that should have been taken into consideration by the magistrate.
Norris v Sanderson [2007] NTSC 1 (12 January 2007) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle in relation to sentencing.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Offending while on bail’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful damage’
Charges: Unlawful damage, breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order to protect his girlfriend (the victim) made under the repealed Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT). He had a history of repeatedly breaching domestic violence orders both in relation to the victim and a previous girlfriend. The offending subject to the appeal was constituted by a series of events. On the first occasion the appellant went to visit the victim. In an attempt to prevent him from entering, the victim locked the door. As a result, the appellant punched the front window causing it to shatter and kicked the security door (count 1). A few days later the appellant telephoned the victim and then approached her at a nightclub (counts 2 and 3). He was subsequently arrested and granted bail. While on bail he again breached the domestic violence order by driving with the victim (count 4). He was arrested and remanded in custody only to be released on bail again. One month later he drove to the victim’s house, entered her front yard and yelled and swore at the victim (count 5). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of one count of unlawful damage (count 1) and four counts of breaching a domestic violence order (counts 2-5). The effective sentence imposed by the magistrate was 140 days’ imprisonment, of which 70 days’ were suspended upon conditions providing for supervision. This comprised of:
•
Count 1: 60 days’ imprisonment
•
Counts 2 and 3: 30 days’ imprisonment, 20 days to be concurrent on the sentenced imposed on count 1
•
Count 4: 30 days’ imprisonment cumulative upon counts 1-3, wholly suspended on commencement
•
Count 5: 40 days’ imprisonment cumulative upon counts 1-3, wholly suspended on commencement
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The magistrate did not err in his considerations and the sentence imposed was open to him to make.
The offending in relation to count 1 was made more serious when considering the surrounding circumstances of the offending. The appellant’s response to being locked out by the victim was an ‘immediate, frightening and explosive outburst of violence’ ([19]). While the appellant did not have any prior convictions for unlawful damage, he had several convictions for offences of violence and it was the violent nature of this conduct that made the offending so serious in the circumstances.
In relation to the breaches of the domestic violence order, the submission that the magistrate placed too much weight on the appellant’s criminal history was rejected. The prior convictions provided context for the offending and highlighted the culpability of the appellant. The appellant’s counsel also submitted the appellant had good prospects of rehabilitating when considering, amongst other factors, his youth, willingness to undertake counselling, good employment record and the ongoing support of the victim. While the magistrate regarded the appellant’s chances of rehabilitation with caution, he nonetheless considered these relevant factors and did not err in doing so.
The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had a total of 11 prior convictions for failing to comply with a domestic violence order and one prior conviction of aggravated assault. Despite this history, he continued to act in defiance of the orders with full awareness of the consequences. This conflicts with the objective that victims ‘have confidence that restraining orders made are backed by penalties that will be applied in the event of a breach’ ([33]). In the circumstances of this prior offending, a period of imprisonment was reasonable to deter the appellant and others from committing such offences.
Hales v Stevens [2000] NTSC 97 (14 December 2000) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intermediate sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and the victim had previously been in a relationship. After the relationship ended, the respondent visited the victim’s home where he punched her in the head 10 times, kicked her in the ribs and chest several times and pushed her head into the floor. After the victim temporarily escaped to another room, the respondent struck her again several times and subsequently attempted to strangle her, placing one hand around her throat and the other over her mouth and nose. The attack lasted for approximately 20 minutes and involved about 30 punches. At the time of the offending, the respondent was on bail. In relation to this conduct the respondent was convicted of aggravated assault under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT), with the circumstances of aggravation that the victim suffered harm, the assault was of male-on-female, and the victim was under the age of 16 years old.
The magistrate, in taking a ‘rehabilitative course’ ([5]), sentenced the respondent to 12 months’ imprisonment suspended the day after imprisonment commenced for 3 years. The release of the respondent was subject to conditions including that he obey the directions of the Director of Correctional Services for 12 months, that he reside at the Council for Aboriginal Alcohol Program Services and complete the Indigenous Family Violence Program, that he then live with the Salvation Army in Darwin and complete the Bridge program, and that for a period of 12 months he supply urine or blood samples to be tested for drugs.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
The circumstances of the offence were very serious and resulted in severe physical and psychological harm to the victim. This was further aggravated by the fact the offending occurred while the respondent was on bail in relation to another assault.
The magistrate’s consideration of the respondent’s chances of rehabilitation and personal hardships was appropriate in the circumstances. The respondent had been attending alcohol and drug education programs and had enrolled in the Indigenous Family Violence Program. According to the magistrate, this was the first step along the road to rehabilitation.
However, the magistrate did not expressly address the issue of deterrence that ought to have been afforded significant weight in sentencing. Despite the guilty plea, there was no indication of remorse with the respondent telling his psychologist he believed he ‘had a degree of legitimacy’ ([22]) for his actions. Therefore, Riley J considered there was a need for specific deterrence. In addition there was a need for general deterrence: ‘Men in the position of the respondent should be aware that if they resort to violence upon another… in all but the most exceptional case that will be met with a period of actual imprisonment ([24]).’ While the magistrate impliedly considered specific deterrence with rehabilitation, there was no consideration of general deterrence during sentencing. The magistrate’s main focus was to provide the respondent every opportunity to be rehabilitated. Riley J concluded that the magistrate erred in neglecting to consider the need for general deterrence and the respondent’s lack of remorse.
The sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was not in itself manifestly inadequate. However, it was manifestly inadequate to suspend the sentence from one day after commencing imprisonment. In the circumstance, a term of actual imprisonment was required. Riley J resentenced the respondent to 12 months’ imprisonment to be suspended after 3 months. The respondent’s release was subject to several conditions, including accepting supervision and obeying reasonable directions of the Director of Correctional Services as to reporting, residence, employment and counselling for a period of 12 months and completing the Bridge program with the Salvation Army.
Coroners Court
Inquest into the Death of HD (Name Suppressed) [2021] NTLC 029 – Northern Territory Coroners Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling and/or jealous behaviour’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Coroner's inquest’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Proceedings: Coroner’s Inquest.
Facts: An inquest was conducted into the death of a 38-year-old woman, whose partner was a police officer. NT Police did not declare a crime scene in relation to the victim’s death as they believed the cause of her death to be an overdose: [92]. However, there was a significant history of domestic violence, which justified further investigation. The coroner concluded that the cause of death was not substance abuse but a subdural haemorrhage that had begun bleeding three to five days prior to her death, which requires some form of trauma, likely a hit to the head: [66]–[67]. In the five years prior, seventeen complaints had been made to the police of domestic disturbances and violence in her relationship: [8].
The victim had previously been a police officer: [3]. During her relationship with another police officer, she went into labour at 21.5 weeks gestation and her baby passed away, leading to post-traumatic stress-disorder that was never resolved: [5]. After she conceived again, she became dependent on alcohol due to this PTSD: [6]. Due to her alcohol dependence, she was subsequently dismissed as a police officer: [7].
The seventeen reported instances of domestic violence demonstrate a pattern of coercive control by the police officer: [70]. His abuse of the victim was both psychological and physical. Physical violence and domestic disturbances were reported by doctors ([9], [39]), neighbours ([14]–[15], [21], [31]), the victim herself ([16],[36]), rehabilitation providers and services ([18], [37]), bystanders ([23]) and police officers ([32]), as well as the victim’s cousin ([11]), friend ([13]) and coworkers ([48], [53]). These reports included explicit reports of physical violence against the victim: [13], [14], [18], [29], [31], [32], [40], [49]. Co-workers reported to police that the partner had threatened to kill the victim with a knife: [49].
In one of the earliest instances of reported abuse, a protection order was issued against the victim for the protection of her partner and children. No protection order was taken out to protect the victim: [11]. The victim repeatedly refused to give statements or pursue action against her partner: [10], [18], [2]. She repeatedly went back and forth in relation to statements, downplaying previous reports of violence or reneging on them: [19], [22], [36]. She would refuse to explain injuries or would explain them using a fall: [29], [30], [32], [36]. She sought a protection order application but decided not to proceed within a month of initiating that request: [16]–[17]. One aspect of this was that she thought police would do nothing because her partner is a police officer: [51].
The victim’s partner used the victim’s alcoholism as a reason for justifying coercion. He provided stories to the police that focused on her intoxication and that explained his violence using narratives that put the blame on the victim such as using a narrative of self-defence: [14], [19], [42]. He tracked the victim’s social media accounts and sought to control her through constant messaging: [70]–[71]. He repeatedly stalked her and tried to follow her when she attempted to leave him, for example, when she was visiting her father and also when she was at work: [51]. The victim’s partner also used systems abuse against her. For example, he took her to the police station and demanded that she be breached for being intoxicated. At this time she had a wound to the left side of her forehead that was not noted as a potential domestic violence risk: [28].
Decision and Reasoning: The Coroner found that the cause of the victim’s death was ‘subdural haemmorhage in the context of chronic alcoholism due to post traumatic stress disorder after the death of her first-born child’: [94]. He referred his belief that offences may have been committed in connection with the death: [99].
The Coroner also made four recommendations to improve the handling of domestic violence involving police officers: that the Assistant Commissioner responsible for the Domestic and Family Violence Unit oversee all complaints of domestic violence involving police officers ([95]), that processes and procedures be implemented to allow investigating officers to have access to all relevant history and prior matters in relation to investigation of domestic violence ([96]), that all police officers have training and information available to them allowing in the identification of ‘red flags’ for coercive control’ ([97]) and that a risk assessment tool be developed to identify physical and non-physical aspects of domestic and family violence ([98]).
The following extract provides an example of the way in which the deceased’s vulnerabilities were used by the partner to justify his controlling behaviour:
[70] HD’s partner was from time to time said to be manipulative and controlling. When questioned about his controlling ways he generally indicated that HD was an alcoholic and he needed to know where she was to either stop her drinking or so as to assist her when she was intoxicated. It appeared to explain his tracking her phone. Her alcoholism was provided as the reason he removed her from the house or used force to keep her there. The same might be said when he escorted her to the police station and asked that her bail be breached for drinking. Perhaps it might be seen in his insistence that he pick her up from work or when he intercepted her at the bus stop.
[71] It is difficult however to see her alcoholism as the reason for him reading her texts and having access to her social media accounts. There are instances where he attempted to warn off a person he thought she was having an affair with using her own Messenger account. It also doesn’t explain the constant messaging and telephone calls when she was with her father in Queensland. It appears they were more to do with his belief that she may be talking to another male.
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Inkamala v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Act [2022] NTCAT 20 (8 December 2022) – Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Complex post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Consultant psychiatrist evidence’ – ‘Contributory negligence’ – ‘Financial assistance’ – ‘Learned helplessness’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Victims of crime’
Matter: Application for review of a decision to award the applicant financial assistance of $13,170.99 under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) arising from injuries sustained by the applicant as a result of violent acts committed by her sometime domestic partner.
Facts: The applicant is a Western Arrarnta woman who is a “deeply traumatised survivor of sustained, repeated and brutal intimate partner violence” which resulted in two children (now teenagers) and numerous incidents of violence resulting in medical or hospital treatment, numerous protection orders to protect the applicant from the offender and numerous sentences of imprisonment imposed on the offender. Many of the documented offences occurred when either or both of the offender and applicant were intoxicated. In 2010 the applicant was awarded $18,750 for physical injuries (partial loss of vision, fractured forearm, scarring to the right arm) caused by the offender between 2006 and 2009.
A second application was received on 18 December 2014 in relation to physical injuries from assaults by the offender on about 3 occasions, which was amended on 15 January 2015 to include a claim for psychological or psychiatric injuries. The claim took seven years to process, and the offender continued to assault the applicant causing the claim to continue to increase. A consultant psychiatrist provided reports and it was not in dispute that the applicant has sustained a Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD) and a Major Depressive Disorder “as a direct result of domestic violence perpetrated buy the offender between 2006 and 2020”, attributing 30 per cent of the CPTSD to the assaults between 2006 and 2009 and 70 per cent to the assaults between 2009 and 2020 [12]. The initial assessment awarded the applicant $13,170.99, with the amount awarded for her physical and psychological injuries reduced by 50 per cent due to the applicant’s contribution to the injuries.
Grounds:
1.
The initial assessment of $35,000 for psychiatric or psychological disorder is inadequate;
2.
the award of $110.99 for financial loss is inadequate; and
3.
the reduction of 50% of the compensation for injuries is excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
The decision of the respondent to award the applicant $13,170.99 be set aside.
2.
An award of $21,006.99 to the applicant be substituted.
[63] The Victorian Court of Appeal has recently described battered wife syndrome as “a learned helplessness process in which women who have been abused repeatedly within a relationship they believe they cannot escape from, learn ‘good coping skills as a trade-off for escape.’
Battered woman syndrome is a subset of PTSD. The label “battered wife syndrome” has not been applied to the applicant in this case. However, in my view the evidence supports a finding that the applicant, who has sustained CPTSD as a result of violence perpetrated against her by a coercively controlling partner over many years, is likely a person whose behaviour in repeatedly returning to live with the offender is in large part due to learned helplessness. Accordingly, this case is to be distinguished on its facts from Lankin v Northern Territory of Australia [(Local Court of the Northern Territory, unreported case number 21337307, 1 September 2015].
[64] In her written submissions on behalf of the respondent and the intervener, Ms Thompson submits that the applicant “willingly recommenced her relationship with the offender at various times”. I reject that submission. I am satisfied that the applicant recommenced her relationship with the offender reluctantly and unwillingly, and that her decisions to do so were to a significant extent a consequence of the psychological injury the offender had inflicted on her.
[65] In my opinion, a reduction of 50% of the award to which the applicant is entitled would be unfair and inequitable. The offender and the applicant are not equally culpable or responsible for the injuries she sustained. I consider that the applicant’s behaviour in resuming her relationship with the victim and engaging in the harmful consumption of liquor contributed indirectly to her injuries. In my view, a fair and equitable apportionment of responsibility for the applicant’s injuries is to attribute the offender’s responsibility as being 80%, and the applicant’s as 20%. I find accordingly.”
Queensland
Court of Appeal
R v CDO [2025] QCA 56 (17 April 2025) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Stalking’ - ‘breach of domestic violence order (DVO)’ - ‘contravention of police protection notice’ - ‘application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘double punishment’ - ‘whether conduct constituted the same act or omission’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Unlawful stalking with a circumstance of aggravation (x1)
Facts: The applicant had pleaded guilty to the stalking offence in the District Court. Prior to this, the applicant pleaded guilty (and was sentenced) to 3 offences of contravening a domestic violence order and one offence of contravening a police protection notice (the Orders) in the Ipswich Magistrates Court. On appeal, the applicant alleged that because the Magistrates Court offences constituted the same factual basis for the District Court stalking offence, punishing him for the stalking offence would constitute double punishment.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal:
•
That the learned sentencing judge erred in ruling that the sentence would not doubly punish the defendant contrary to s 16 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (the Code) [4].
Chronology : There were multiple applications under s 590AA of the Code (pre-trial directions and rulings). The first application was to narrow the prosecution’s particulars of the stalking offence, on the basis that the particulars for that offence coincided with the particulars of the other offences applicant previously pleaded guilty to in the Ipswich Magistrates Court [17]. The first application was refused [22]. The applicant reagitated the issue in a subsequent application [24]. The second application was partly successful in the sense that while the conducting constituting the stalking offence was found to be distinct from the conduct at issue earlier in the Magistrates Court, punishment for the circumstance of aggravation (i.e. being in breach of the Orders) would be double punishment prohibited by s 16 of the Code [31].
Decision and reasoning : The Court held that s 16 of the Code does not apply to the offence of unlawful stalking in this instance [75]. The Court held that s 16 did apply to the circumstance of aggravation (which was the fact that the conduct constituting the stalking had breached the Orders) [70], so that the applicant could not be punished again for those breaches. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed [76].
The reason that s 16 did not apply was because, in relation to the stalking offence, the punishable acts constituted a connected series of acts [61]. This was contrasted with the individual acts upon which the breaches of the Orders were established. In the Court’s words, “[t]he stalking offence did not depend on the individual conduct alone, constituting each of the Magistrate Court offences, but on the connection and accumulation of acts along with a specific outcome” [62].
R v JAL [2025] QCA 17 (28 February 2025) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Choking’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘inconsistent verdicts’ - ‘credibility’ - ‘appeal against conviction’ - ‘delay in reporting’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: Choking in a domestic relationship (x1).
Facts: The complainant and the appellant had known each other for about 20 years and were married in 2005. They divorced in 2019. The complainant recalled an incident that occurred shortly after she had informed the appellant that she wanted to separate. She was sleeping, and woke up to the feeling of a hand on her throat and a little pulling of her hair. She then felt her throat being squeezed and pressure being applied for 3 to 4 seconds, during which time she struggled to breathe. She woke up to find it was the appellant. He immediately let go, and she sat up and asked why he had done that. She did not give an account of an answer. She told the appellant she had not given him permission to do that.
When asked about her delay in reporting choking (one year) the complainant stated the change was due to years of counselling and that she now “felt safe”. [50]
Grounds of Appeal : The appellant was convicted at trial by a jury of choking in a domestic setting. The appellant relied on two grounds of appeal:
(a)
That the verdict was unreasonable because it was not supported by evidence [21].
1.
In respect of this ground of appeal, the appellant pointed to specific parts of the complainant’s evidence such as the inconsistencies as to the dates on which the choking incident occurred; the cheery tone of a text message she sent on the same day as the choking; the failure to complain of the incident to a doctor or during Family Court proceedings [117].
(b)
The guilty verdict was consistent with the not guilty verdicts on two other counts (wilful damage and assault occasioning bodily harm, while armed) [21].
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed.
The Court was not persuaded that it was not open to the jury on the whole of the evidence to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt on count 1, nor that it was not open to the jury to acquit the appellant on counts 2 and 4 [128]. The Court found it reasonable that the jury could have not been satisfied that the elements of counts 2 and 4 were established beyond reasonable doubt, without completely rejecting the complainant’s evidence [111], [103]. The Court pointed out that in relation to both counts 2 and 4, the jury had to be satisfied that the appellant had the relevant intent, which may have been the stumbling block for those counts [108], [109].
The Court noted that the jury had had the benefit of seeing and hearing the complainant who was the subject of skilled and intense cross-examination [127]. The jury also had the benefit of judicial instructions to consider whether the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence affected the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence [127].
R v MEJ [2024] QCA 249 (10 December 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People with children’
Charges:
•
Count 1: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm, whilst armed with a dangerous weapon (knife).
•
Count 2: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with an offensive instrument (bottle).
•
Count 3: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with a dangerous instrument (pliers).
•
Count 4: held a loaded rifle under her chin, with the act likely to cause her to fear bodily harm.
•
Count 5: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (stomped on her throat).
•
Count 6: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (twisted ankle).
•
Count 7: unlawfully assaulted the complainant (punched and kicked her when she refused to participate in sexual interactions).
•
Count 8: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm, whilst armed with an offensive instrument (plastic chair).
•
Count 9: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (pushed from behind).
•
Count 10: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with a dangerous weapon (sword).
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The case involves allegations of domestic violence by the appellant (MEJ) against the complainant, his de-facto partner (with whom he had three children), spanning nearly a decade (2004-2013). The complainant alleged repeated assaults, often involving weapons and household objects, leading to bodily harm.
The key incidents included:
•
Count 1: The appellant allegedly cut the complainants left jawbone with a knife.
•
Count 2: The appellant allegedly threw a bottle, at her, striking her head and causing it to bleed.
•
Count 3: The appellant allegedly accused the complainant of infidelity and then gripped the flesh of her left upper arm in the jaws of a pair of pliers, twisting them to cause bruising and grazing.
•
Count 4 (Acquitted): The appellant allegedly held a loaded rifle under her chin, with the intention of making her fear bodily harm.
•
Count 5 (Acquitted): After the complainant allegedly refused to give the appellant her phone PIN, he threw her to the floor and stomped on her throat, restricting her breathing and leaving footprints on her neck.
•
Count 6: While the complainant was putting their children to bed, the appellant allegedly yelled at her, pushed her onto the bed, grabbed her ankle and twisted it until it cracked.
•
Count 7: The appellant allegedly punched and kicked the complainant, leaving welts on her legs, after she refused to participate in sexual interactions with a female friend.
•
Count 8: The appellant allegedly threw a plastic chair at the complainant’s face, damaging her front teeth, breaking one and causing pain and bleeding.
•
Count 9: The appellant allegedly pushed the complainant from behind, causing her head to strike a shelf and resulting in a forehead cut.
•
Count 10: The appellant allegedly knocked the complainant into a wall and held a sword to her throat, causing a graze.
The jury found the appellant guilty of counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 10, acquitting him on counts 4, 5 and 9.
Grounds of appeal :
1.
The verdicts are unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the whole of the evidence.
2.
The verdicts of guilty are unreasonable due to their inconsistency with the acquittals.
3.
The verdicts on one of the counts of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed and one of the counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, cannot be supported by the evidence, as they were not proven to have occurred on or within the dates charged.
4.
The trial judge’s written directions to the jury erred at law in respect of the offences involving the use of a weapon.
5.
The trial judge failed to give a direction to the jury as to how to use the complainant’s prior consistent and inconsistent statements.
6.
The trial judge failed to give any or an adequate warning against propensity reasoning, to guard against a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and reasoning : The Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ and Boddice JA and Doyle AJA) allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10, and ordered a new trial.
Grounds upheld:
•
Ground 4 (erroneous jury directions): The appellant argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the element of being “armed with a dangerous or offensive weapon” in Counts 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10. The written jury directions incorrectly stated that this element was “not in dispute,” implying that the appellant was armed, rather than only acknowledging that the specified objects were capable of being classified as weapons. This error was reinforced in the oral summing up, particularly for Count 1, where the judge explicitly stated that the appellant was armed with a knife, misrepresenting the defence argument, which denied both the assault and the weapon’s use. While similar wording was used for Counts 2, 3, 8, and 10, it may have led the jury to wrongly assume the only issue in dispute was whether the appellant inflicted harm, not whether he was actually armed. The Court found this misdirection prejudicial, as it created a real chance of affecting the verdicts. The error constituted a miscarriage of justice, warranting the appeal’s success on this ground [77].
Grounds not considered:
•
Ground 5 and 6: As Ground 4 was upheld, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on Grounds 5 and 6. However, in a new trial, the judge may need to consider directions on consistent and inconsistent statements, as well as a warning against propensity reasoning [79].
Ground dismissed:
•
Ground 1 (unreasonable verdicts): The appellant contended that the guilty verdicts were unsupported by evidence, as the complainant’s testimony was the only direct evidence of the offences. While inconsistencies existed, the Court found the complainant’s core allegations remained consistent across Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10, allowing the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt [56].
•
Ground 2 (inconsistent verdicts): The appellant argued the mixed verdicts were illogical, given his acquittal on some counts and conviction on others. The Court rejected this, finding a rational basis for the differing outcomes [59]. The acquittals on Counts 4 and 5 were justified, police found no rifle (Count 4) and the complainant’s delayed recall of steel-capped boots (Count 5) may have raised doubt [60]. For Count 9, the complainant’s account was consistent, but the jury may have questioned whether photos showed a scar [61]. In contrast, the guilty verdicts on Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10 reflected the jury’s confidence in the core allegations. Since each charge was considered separately, the verdicts were neither illogical nor unreasonable.
•
Ground 3 (date of offending not proven): The appellant claimed the evidence did not establish Count 3 (pliers incident) within the specified date range. However, the complainant's chronological testimony, supported by formal admissions regarding residence dates, aligned with the charge period. The Court concluded it was open to the jury to find the offence occurred within the alleged timeframe, dismissing the ground [67].
CDL v Commissioner of Police [2024] QCA 245 (6 December 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’– ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (x5).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The applicant, CDL, was in a two-and-a-half-year relationship with the complainant. On 24 March 2022, a domestic violence protection order (‘DVO’) was imposed against him. This order required CDL to be of good behaviour towards the complainant and not commit domestic violence. The DVO was subsequently varied twice to prohibit contact and impose a 100-metre distance restriction. The order remained in force until 24 March 2027. Before the offences in this case, CDL had breached the DVO 13 times between March 2022 and February 2024, leading to multiple convictions. For these breaches, CDL was fined and sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, including a six-month sentence on 12 February 2024, with parole granted on 9 April 2024.
In the current case, CDL The case concerned five additional breaches of the same DVO:
1.
15 December 2023 – Visited the complainant’s home after she initially invited him but revoked the invitation
2.
5-12 January 2024 – Called the complainant 55 times, leaving abusive voice messages.
3.
5-12 January 2024 – Called the complainant 55 times, leaving abusive voice messages.
4.
11 January 2024 – Sent five abusive text messages.
5.
10 April 2024 – One day after release on parole, called the complainant three times, threatening her by stating “you are f***ed and I am coming to get you” and “you know who this is” (before hanging up).
6.
22-25 April 2024 – Visited the complainant’s home, engaged in sexual intercourse, and recorded it. The complainant later sent recordings to a third party, who reported it to police.
CDL was arrested on 27 April 2024 and remained in custody for 70 days before being sentenced on 5 July 2024.
Procedural history :
•
Magistrate Court: Imposed a two-year head sentence (on the final charge) to reflect the combined criminality of all five breaches, given CDL’s persistent non-compliance and the fact he offended while on parole.
•
District Court Appeal: CDL argued manifest excess and factual errors. Judge Clare SC upheld the sentence, emphasizing CDL’s “sustained contempt” for DVOs and the need for deterrence [8].
Grounds of appeal : CDL sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on two grounds:
1.
The applicant contended that the District Court judge (Judge Clare SC) erred in failing to find that two years’ imprisonment was not excessive, having regard to the totality of the applicant’s offending.
2.
The applicant argued that her Honour erred by failing to find that the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending conduct, due to the sentencing Magistrate placing too much emphasis on the applicant’s criminal history.
Decision and reasoning : The Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ and Boddice and Brown JJA) refused the application for leave to appeal.
Ground 1 (manifestly excessive sentence):
The Court reiterated that an appellate court will not intervene merely because a more lenient sentence could have been imposed. It must be shown the sentence was so unreasonable as to suggest an error in principle (Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 605 [58]) [53]. Referring to R v Wood [1994] QCA 297 and R v Fairbrother; Ex parte A-G [2005] QCA 105, the Court emphasised DVOs must be enforced with “appropriate severity” to maintain their protective function and to protect victims. [24]
CDL argued there was no physical violence occurred in the breaches. The Court, however, emphasised that the seriousness of threats, particularly a menacing phone call one day after parole, the four prior, shorter sentences which had failed to deter CDL and the escalating non-compliance justified the sentence. [21]
The Court examined similar District Court cases with like offending, the Court distinguished CDL’s history as more persistent and escalatory than those cases. Given his repeated disregard for the DVO, a two-year term was within the appropriate range [23-25].
The Court concluded the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive and was “open” on the facts and was justified given the statutory maximum of five years. [26
Ground 2 (sentence disproportionate to gravity of offending):
The Court cited Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477, affirming that while sentencing must reflect the gravity of the current offences, a court can properly increase the penalty if an offender’s record shows “a continuing attitude of disobedience”.
CDL’s 18 total breaches (13 prior + 5 new) indicated an “entrenched disregard” for the DVO, justifying a longer sentence when lesser penalties had proven inadequate [62]. The Court found CDL’s repeated breaches demonstrated ongoing contempt for court orders, reinforcing the need for retribution, deterrence, and community protection [65]. The two-year sentence was not a fresh penalty for past offences but a measured response to CDL’s escalating recidivism. The Court rejected the argument that too much weight was placed on past offending. Deterrence and public protection justified the sentence imposed.
The Court of Appeal found no error on either ground. Leave to appeal was refused.
R v RBO [2024] QCA 214 (8 November 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: The appellant stood trial for seven alleged offences of domestic violence upon his wife. The verdicts and charges were:
•
Count 1: rape (not guilty)
•
Count 2: assault occasioning bodily harm (guilty)
•
Count 3: common assault (guilty)
•
Count 4: assault occasioning bodily harm (guilty)
•
Count 5: common assault (guilty)
•
Count 6: assault occasioning bodily harm (not guilty)
•
Count 7:: common assault (not guilty)
Case type: Appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The appellant, RBO, was convicted of four assaults against his wife and was acquitted of three other charges.
The complainant and the appellant were married in 2011 and had three children. Their relationship was marked by a history of domestic violence, including verbal degradation, physical violence, controlling behaviour, financial restriction and sexual aggression. They separated in 2019
The charged assaults occurred in a single episode on 1 August 2019. The appellant discovered the complainant had withdrawn $160 from a bank account without telling him. After the complainant went to bed that night, the appellant discovered she had the money and became enraged. In a sequence of four physical assaults, the appellant:
•
Count 2: Forced open a barricaded bedroom door and pushed the complainant, causing her to fall into and break a chest of drawers.
•
Count 3: Pushed her forcefully in the back as she tried to leave, causing her to hit a bookcase.
•
Count 4: Pushed her again, causing her to step on broken glass, cutting her foot.
•
Count 5: Pushed her out the sliding door, making her fall onto the concrete patio.
These events were partly witnessed by their daughter (aged 7). Injuries were medically verified the next day. The police were called by a neighbour and took photographs at the scene.
The other allegations on which the appellant was acquitted included:
•
Count 1: The complainant alleged she awoke during an incident in July 2018 to find the appellant having sex with her while unconscious. The jury acquitted, likely due to uncertainty about the date and lack of corroboration.
•
Count 6 & 7: The complainant alleged that the appellant stomped on her ankle and later slammed her head into a wall during the 1 August 2019 episode. The jury acquitted, possibly due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration and an absence of physical evidence.
Grounds of appeal :
1.
Appeal against conviction: on the ground that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
2.
Appeal against sentence: Sought leave to appeal against sentence: on the ground the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning :
1.Appeal against conviction dismissed.
The appellant argued the guilty verdicts (counts 2–5) were unreasonable, given the reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence. The Court (Mullins P and Brown JA and Henry J) conducted an independent assessment of the evidence and found the convictions were reasonably open to the jury (M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 493 [7].
The jury had been properly instructed they had to consider each count separately and that their verdicts could be different [8]. The mixed verdicts (acquittals on counts 1, 6, and 7; convictions on 2–5) were not inconsistent, but instead reflected a careful evaluation of the varying reliability of the evidence across the charges [9-10].
The appellant raised on several credibility issues, including inconsistencies in the timing of the rape allegation, discrepancies between the complainants and her daughters account of the assaults and video evidence that suggested the complainant was not fearful.
The Court held that these matters had been fully explored at trial, were known to the jury, and did not undermine the core reliability of the complainant’s evidence regarding the four assaults for which the appellant was convicted. The medical evidence confirmed her injuries and her daughter’s testimony, despite some inconsistencies, generally supported the assaults.
None of the reliability issues, individually or cumulatively, rendered the verdicts unreasonable. It was reasonably open to the jury to convict. The appeal was dismissed.
2.Application for leave to appeal sentence granted.
The appellant was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 8 months, for four domestic violence offences involving pushes causing minor injuries. He sought leave to appeal on the ground the sentence was manifestly excessive. The Court granted leave and upheld the appeal, finding that the sentence was disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the offending and did not properly account for key mitigating factors [78-80].
The offending arose from a single episode of domestic violence involving four consecutive assaults in the family home, partially witnessed by the parties’ children. The complainant was pushed into furniture, onto broken glass and out onto a patio. Her injuries were limited to bruises and a minor foot laceration. The Court acknowledged the domestic context and presence of children as aggravating features under s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) but emphasised that the violence and resulting harm were at the lower end of the scale for assault occasioning bodily harm [108-109].
While the sentencing judge appropriately treated the domestic violence context as aggravating, the Court reiterated that s 9(10A) does not displace other sentencing considerations (R v Pham (2009) 197 A Crim R 246 [7]. [121] The Court confirmed the sentencing discretion must be exercised by reference to all relevant factors including proportionality, delay and rehabilitation by reference to the totality of the circumstances.
The appellant was a first-time offender, with no relevant prior history and a longstanding employment record. He had maintained steady employment, complied with bail conditions for nearly four years and had no contact with the complainant or children since early 2020. These circumstances supported rehabilitation and did not suggest a risk of recidivism [87].
The Court found the 16-month sentence was unsupported by comparable decisions. Additionally, that the extraordinary delay in prosecution had substantial mitigating value. The offences occurred in 2019, but trial and sentencing did not occur until May 2024. It allowed the Court to observe the appellant’s rehabilitative progress, acknowledged the stress and uncertainty the delay imposed, reduced the need for personal deterrence and justified less weight on general deterrence.
The Court concluded the 16-month sentence was manifestly excessive. A sentence of 12. months’ imprisonment, suspended after six months for an operational period of 12 months, was more appropriate in light of the nature of the offending, the delay, the appellant’s personal circumstances, and relevant precedent. Orders were made accordingly.
R v LBG [2024] QCA 205 (17 October 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with children’ - ‘Misdirection’
Charges:
•
Count 1: unlawfully choked the complainant without consent in a domestic setting.
•
Count 2: unlawfully choked the complainant without consent in a domestic setting.
•
Count 3: raped the complainant.
•
Count 4: procured the complainant without her consent, to commit an act of gross indecency, the indecent assault included bringing into contact part of the anus of the appellant with the mouth of the complainant (this occurred in a domestic setting).
Case Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant were married and had two children. The offences allegedly occurred in July 2022 in the course of that domestic relationship.
•
Counts 1 & 2: The complainant alleged that during a domestic argument, the appellant first choked her by lifting her off the ground by the throat for 15–20 seconds (Count 1). He then allegedly threw her onto the bed and choked her again with one hand while leaning over her (Count 2). Both acts were said to have occurred in close succession.
•
Counts 3 & 4: On a separate occasion, the complainant alleged that during another argument, the appellant said he was going to “fuck her in the arse.” Despite her refusal, he allegedly forced his penis into her mouth without consent (Count 3) and then forced her to lick his anus (Count 4).
Grounds of Appeal :
(a)
Miscarriage of justice: The jury was misdirected regarding text messages. The jury was not properly told that only the fact of the messages was admitted, not the truth of the complainant’s allegations in them.
(b)
Inconsistent verdicts: The verdict of guilty on count two was unreasonable due to inconsistency with the acquittal on count one, which related to the same incident.
Decision and Reasoning : The Court (Bond JA and Vaughan AJA and Davis J) allowed the appeal. Convictions on counts 2-4 were set aside and a retrial was ordered on counts 2-4.
1. Miscarriage of justice (upheld)
The appellant argued that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to misdirection relating to the use of text messages contained in a joint admissions document (Exhibit 2).
The admissions recorded that certain text messages had been sent and received between the complainant and the appellant [14]. However, there was no admission by the appellant as to the truth of the assertions made in those messages, many of which alleged serious emotional and physical abuse [15].
Despite this, the trial judge directed the jury that “everything in the admissions document is true” and “proved beyond reasonable doubt” [18];[20]. These directions failed to distinguish between what was admitted (the sending of messages) and what was alleged (the content of those messages).
This created a serious risk of misuse of the evidence. The messages were not tendered as confessions, and in the absence of clear judicial directions limiting their use, the jury may have improperly treated the assertions in the messages as proven facts [32]-[33].
Given that the case turned entirely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the appellant and that the jury had already rejected part of the complainant’s evidence by acquitting on Count 1, this misdirection was a serious defect that resulted in a miscarriage of justice [33]. Accordingly, the convictions on Counts 2–4 were set aside.
2. Inconsistent verdicts (dismissed)
The appellant submitted that the verdict of guilty on Count 2 was unreasonable given the acquittal on Count 1, and therefore pressed for an acquittal rather than a retrial on that count [35].
The Court reaffirmed that a jury is required to return a verdict on each count in an indictment and is entitled to return different verdicts on different counts. It is obliged to do so if it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on some counts and not others [36].
A guilty verdict will only be unreasonable due to inconsistency with a not guilty verdict where there is no logical basis upon which the jury could have delivered different verdicts on the two counts in question (R v Brown [2020] QCA 159 at [53]; and R v Bond [2018] QCA 130) [37].
It was easy to see why the jury may have acquitted on Count 1, the complainant’s account of being lifted off the ground for 15–20 seconds may have seemed unlikely, raising a reasonable doubt [38].
While a jury may consider a doubt on one count when assessing another, it does not follow that disbelieving a witness on one count means their evidence must be rejected on all counts (R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82) [39].
Given both acts occurred during the same argument, the jury could have found the complainant misdescribed the first act but accepted her evidence about the second [40].
The verdict on Count 2 was not inconsistent with the acquittal on Count 1. Ground (e) failed and a retrial on Count 2 was appropriate [41].
R v MEB [2024] QCA 188 (11 October 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
’Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Misdirection’
Charges:
•
Count 1: common assault
•
Count 2: assault occasioning bodily harm
•
Count 3: deprivation of liberty
All offences were classified as domestic violence offences.
Case type: appeal against conviction and seeking leave to appeal sentence
Facts:
•
The appellant and the complainant were in a new relationship, having met in March 2022 and moved in together on 14 June 2022.
•
On the night of 17 June 2022, they spent the evening drinking at various venues before returning home.
◦
Count 1: At the Federal Hotel, the complainant said something to the appellant, who appeared to be in a "really bad mood" and responded by telling her to “fuck off.” As she walked away, the appellant followed and punched in the arm three times.
◦
Count 2: At home, the complainant packed her bags to leave. The appellant said, “you’re not leaving. I don’t want you to go. You’re not going anywhere,” and blocked the only exit.
The complainant asked, “what are you going to do? Are you going to hit me again?”
He replied, “come and have a drink, you’re not going, it’s all right.” She used significant force to push him, causing him to stumble over a recliner. She alleged the appellant then grabbed her, threw her onto another recliner, and punched her at least eight times to the head over 40–50 seconds. She suffered a 2–3 cm eyebrow laceration (requiring sutures) and bruising/swelling to both eyes and the left side of her head. She recalled blacking out. In a police interview, the appellant denied hitting her, claimed she was the aggressor, and suggested she may have injured herself in the bathroom.
◦
Count 3: Following the alleged assault, the complainant opened a window and called for help. She claimed the appellant stood and mocked her. She said that she tried to leave but the appellant would not let her and he stood in front of the door blocking her exit.
Procedural history: The appellant was convicted in the District Court of Queensland of assault occasioning bodily harm (count 2) and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 4 months. The appellant was found not guilty of common assault (count 1) and deprivation of liberty (count 3).
Grounds of appeal: The appellant appealed against the conviction and sought leave to appeal against his sentence.
With regards to the conviction, the appellant contended:
•
Miscarriage of justice: on the grounds that the trial judge failed to leave the defence of provocation for the jury’s consideration.
•
Misdirection/non-direction: in relation to evidence of uncharged injuries (ie, bruising and black eyes).
With regards to the sentence, the appellant contended:
•
Sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision: The Queensland Court of Appeal (Bond, Brown JJA and Kelly J) allowed the appeal against conviction. The conviction on count 2 (assault occasioning bodily harm) was quashed and a new trial was ordered. As a result, the sentence no longer stood and the issue of leave to appeal against sentence became moot.
Reasoning:
Ground 1 – Failure to leave provocation for the jury (upheld)
Principles:
•
Under s 269(1) Criminal Code (Qld), a person is not criminally responsible for an assault if they were in fact deprived of self-control by provocation, acted on the sudden before there was time for passion to cool, and the force used was not disproportionate and not intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm [25].
•
Provocation includes any wrongful act or insult likely to deprive an ordinary person of self-control and induce assault in response (s 268(1)) [26].
•
Whether the conduct was provocative, whether self-control was lost, and whether the response was proportionate are questions of fact for the jury, to be assessed in context and from the accused’s viewpoint [28]. However, whether the defence should be left to the jury is a question for the trial judge [29].
•
The test (from Masciantonio v R) is whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [31]. The test (from Masciantonio v R) is whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [31].
•
If this threshold is met, the trial judge must leave provocation to the jury. The prosecution bears the onus of disproving provocation beyond reasonable doubt. The defence need only point to evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt [30]-[31]. Courts have emphasised a cautious approach, where there is any real doubt, provocation should be left to the jury (Stingel; R v DCE) [32]-[33].
Application:
•
At trial, the defence did not ask the judge to leave provocation to the jury. In his police interview, the appellant denied hitting the complainant. The trial judge stated in summing up told the jury that there was “nothing suggested in relation to [the alleged] assault … that would otherwise make it authorised, justified or excused by law. That is just not an issue” [34].
•
The correct test, however, was whether, on the version of events most favourable to the appellant, a jury might have failed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [34].
•
There was a significant body of evidence relevant to provocation:
◦
The appellant said the complainant belted, punched, slapped, and pushed him.
◦
The complainant denied punching him, but accepted they had sworn, yelled, pushed each other, and that she had used significant force to push him over [35].
◦
Additionally, the complainant described the appellant’s response as immediate [35].
•
The Court held that the truth of the competing accounts was for the jury. It was open to the jury to accept parts of the appellant’s account despite his denial of the assault. The provocative conduct may have consisted of the complainant’s use of significant force or a combination of belting, slapping, punching and pushing [36].
•
The real issues for the jury were whether that conduct was likely to deprive an ordinary person of self-control and whether the response was proportionate. These were questions of fact to be resolved from the appellant’s perspective [37].
•
On the version most favourable to the appellant, an escalating scuffle involving heightened emotions and significant force by the complainant, the jury might reasonably have failed to be satisfied that the assault was unprovoked.
•
There was thus material in the evidence capable of giving rise to a defence of provocation and the trial judge was under a duty to leave it to the jury. The failure to do so constituted a miscarriage of justice [38].
Ground 2 – Alleged failure to properly direct in respect of uncharged injuries (dismissed)
•
The particulars for count two were that the appellant punched the complainant multiple times to the head causing a laceration to her left eyebrow. There was evidence of other injuries comprising bruising to the left side of the complainant’s head and two black eyes [39].
•
The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to direct the jury as to “how to have regard to” the evidence of bruising, which was not part of the particularised bodily harm (which was a laceration to the left eyebrow) [39].
•
Two main points were raised:
(a)
The judge should have made it clear that the bruising was not to be substituted for the laceration as the harm relied on for count 2.
(b)
While the bruising was admissible as narrative evidence, it was not part of the Crown’s particulars and should not have been used to prove bodily harm [39].
•
The Court rejected this argument. It held that the suggested risk the jury misused the bruising evidence had to be assessed by reference to the realities of how the trial was conducted [40].
◦
The Crown's case was clearly opened on the basis that the laceration (2–3 cm above the left eyebrow requiring sutures) was the bodily harm [40]–[41].
◦
Medical evidence from Drs Jeffrey and Dr Holyoak supported this. Dr Holyoak noted other bruising consistent with multiple blunt force trauma, but this was not part of the Crown's particulars [40]–[42].
◦
In closing, the prosecutor linked the bruising to support the complainant’s version of repeated punches, but confirmed the laceration was the harm relied on. Defence counsel also clearly highlighted that only the laceration was the subject of the charge [43]–[44].
◦
In summing up, the trial judge referred to the laceration as the bodily harm relied on [45], provided a question trial to the jury that directed them to assess whether the assault caused bodily harm [46] and clarified, in response to the jury’s questions, that only the laceration was the relevant harm for count 2, though the jury could still have regard to the bruising as part of assessing what happened [49]–[50].
•
The Court held the trial judge made it abundantly clear that bruising was not the bodily harm charged and only the laceration was to be considered in question 2 of the question trail [50]–[51].
•
There was no real risk the jury considered the bruising impermissibly and this ground of appeal failed [51].
R v TBD [2024] QCA 182 (1 October 2024) – Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘People with children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Totality principle’
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Charges:
Indictment 1: choking in a domestic setting (x2), assault occasioning bodily harm (x1)
Indictment 2: contravention of a domestic violence order (x5), misuse of prison phone call (x1)
Facts:
The applicant was the subject of a domestic and family violence protection order issued in 2017, protecting his former wife (the complainant) and their five-year-old daughter.
In February 2021, while staying in a hotel with the complainant and child, the applicant committed serious domestic violence offences in breach of this order (Indictment 1).
•
Following an argument, he twice choked the complainant and assaulted her by punching her in the abdomen, torso and jaw. These acts occurred in front of the child, who screamed, “please don’t kill my mummy, I want my mummy.”
•
As a result, the complainant sustained a contusion to her neck, bruising to her right shoulder, right upper arm and left upper arm, bruising and swelling to her left cheek and tenderness to her spine and abdomen. After the assaults, the applicant mocked her, stating, “look at you, nothing is wrong with you. Stop pretending you can’t breathe and you’re dying.” He fled the scene after being informed police had been called.
In addition to this episode of physical violence, the applicant committed five breaches of a domestic violence order (indictment 2).
•
On 23 February 2021, police located the applicant hiding in the complainant’s home.
•
On 27 February 2021, the hotel incident itself breached multiple conditions of the protection order, including good behaviour, not domestic violence, no contact and that the child not be exposed to domestic violence.
•
After being remanded in custody from 28 February 2021, the applicant continued to breach the no-contact condition. Between April and June 2021, he made 14 phone calls instructing his brothers to pressure the complainant not to cooperate with police. In August 2021, he orchestrated further contact through another inmate (Prisoner A), who facilitated illegal conference calls with the complainant and contacted her on the applicant’s behalf. During this time, the applicant used degrading language and expressed a desire to manipulate and silence the complainant.
Procedural history: At first instance, the applicant was sentenced to four years and three months’ imprisonment, cumulative on his existing sentence. This resulted in a total effective sentence of nine years and nine months, with parole eligibility after approximately 3.8 years. The 218 days of pre-sentence custody were not declared as time served.
Grounds of appeal:
(a)
Guilty pleas: the sentencing judge failed to take into account the guilty pleas (s 13 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld))
(b)
Failure to apply the totality principle
(c)
Sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision: The Court (Dalton, Brown JJA and Kelly J) granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence and re-sentence the applicant.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: Guilty pleas (dismissed):
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge failed to treat the guilty pleas as timely and failed to state that they were taken into account [35]. The Court rejected both claims.
Under s 13 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), a sentencing judge a court must take a guilty plea into account and may reduce the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed. The court is not required to specify the extent of the reduction, only to acknowledge the plea in open court [36].
At common law, a guilty plea is a mitigating factor in sentencing because it is usually evidence of some remorse, spares the community the expense of a contested trial and it is sometimes relevant to the aspect of remorse that a victim has been spared the necessity of the pain of giving evidence (Signato v R) [37]. However, it is not the expense saving alone, but depends on a willingness to facilitate the course of justice [38].
In this case, the pleas were entered on the first day of trial, after the child complainant had already given evidence. There was no explanation as to why the plea was not entered earlier. The judge found no evidence of remorse or acceptance of responsibility and correctly treated the pleas as late. Nonetheless, the pleas were acknowledged to have spared other witnesses from giving evidence and the sentencing remarks treated them as a mitigating factor [39].
The Court was satisfied that the judge complied with s 13(3). The sentencing remarks expressly referenced the pleas and their timing, and parole eligibility was set earlier than it otherwise would have been. These factors confirmed that the pleas were taken into account in sentencing. The first ground of appeal therefore failed [45].
Ground 2: Totality principle (upheld):
The Court held that the sentencing judge erred by failing to properly apply the totality principle. As established in Mill v R and Postiglione v R, the principle requires a sentencing judge to “step back” and evaluate whether the total sentence is just and proportionate to the overall criminality, having regard to the overall criminality and the offender’s personal circumstances [46-48].
The judge did not specifically identify how the sentence addressed totality considerations [51]. The sentencing remarks in this case contained no evaluation of the overall criminality involved in the 2016, 2020 and subject offending, nor any consideration of whether the total effective sentence of nine years and nine months bore proper relativity to that criminality. There was no explanation as to how the sentence imposed achieved appropriate relativity between the criminality and the total sentence, no consideration of what the effective head sentence would have been had all offences been sentenced at once, and no assessment of whether the sentence imposed a “crushing” burden inconsistent with the applicant’s record and prospects [50].
On appeal, the Crown properly conceded that the judge had not specifically addressed totality. Totality could not be inferred from the leniency of the sentences imposed for the offending in custody. The fact that offending occurred at different times does not preclude concurrent sentences being imposed where appropriate. The 15-month sentence was lenient but not inappropriate for the in-custody offending viewed in isolation. It was tolerably clear from the sentencing remarks and the sentence structure that the judge had not addressed the substantive aspects of the totality principle [51].
The 2016 and 2020 offending was distinct from the subject offending and involved different criminal conduct. The 2021 offending, while serious, was the applicant’s first conviction for violent offending. A proper application of the totality principle would have resulted in significant concurrency between the subject offending and earlier offences. The sentence structure imposed was disproportionate to the totality of the criminality involved [52].
The sentencing task also required consideration of whether the sentence imposed a “crushing” burden. The applicant had been exposed to significant domestic violence in childhood, had undertaken relevant programs in custody and had family support and an offer of employment. He hoped to maintain and develop a relationship with his other children. The sentence left him serving just shy of a decade, with parole eligibility deferred by approximately 3.8 years. He had already been eligible for parole for 218 days but was being held on remand for the subject charges. In a real and practical sense, that time related to the subject offending. Avoiding a crushing sentence required a shorter total sentence, an earlier parole eligibility date, and a declaration under s 159A(3)(c) for the 218 days of pre-sentence custody [53].
Accordingly, the second ground of appeal was established [54].
Ground 3: Manifestly excessive (upheld):
A sentence is manifestly excessive where it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, such that it might be inferred that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposed in the sentencing court [55].
The Court accepted the applicant’s submission that the manifest excess flowed from the failure to apply the totality principle [57]. Accordingly, the third ground was established [58].
R v RBM [2024] QCA 163 (6 September 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘People with children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Strbak ground’ –‘motor vehicle’
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant pleaded guilty to the following three charges:
1.
Assault occasioning bodily harm (‘AOBH’)
2.
Deprivation of liberty
3.
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle
Facts: On 17 September 2022, the applicant, RBM, assaulted his former partner after she attempted to end their relationship. Following an argument in her vehicle, RBM punched her repeatedly in the face and kneed her in the head, causing her to lose consciousness. When the complainant regained consciousness, she found herself shirtless in the boot of her hatchback, alongside a shovel and duct tape, while RBM drove at speeds of up to 170 kilometres per hour.
During the drive, RBM made a threatening statement to the complainant, saying, “You’ve been asleep for a long time sleeping beauty. We’re gonna go out and dig a little hole.” The complainant feared for her life. After fading in and out of consciousness, the complainant was placed in the passenger seat. RBM then stopped the vehicle in a remote forested area and began digging, claiming to be looking for a gun. When the vehicle became stuck in the sand, he yelled at the complainant to help move it, but she was unable to assist due to her injuries. RBM eventually drove her back to the place where the incident had begun and she drove herself to her mother’s house.
Procedural history : On 19 February 2024, in the District Court at Bundaberg, the applicant pleaded guilty to these offences and was sentenced to:
(a)
six years imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm;
(b)
three years imprisonment for the deprivation of liberty; and
(c)
six years imprisonment for the unlawful use of a motor vehicle.
All terms of imprisonment were concurrent and 384 days of pre-sentence custody were declared time already served under the sentence. A parole eligibility date was set after two years.
Pursuant to s 42 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), the sentencing judge varied the domestic violence order protecting the complainant by extending its operation for another five years.
Grounds of appeal : The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on two bases:
(a)
Strbak ground: The sentencing judge impermissibly made findings of fact which infringed the principles in Strbak v R.
(b)
Manifestly excessive ground: the sentences imposed, in all the circumstances, were manifestly excessive.
Decision : The Queensland Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ, Flanagan JA and Wilson J) dismissed the application for leave to appeal the sentence. Leave to appeal was refused on both grounds.
Reasoning :
Ground 1 – Strbak ground (dismissed)
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge impermissibly inferred a highly aggravating intent “just short of torture”, a finding that was not charged, alleged by the prosecution, or proven, thereby breaching the principles in Strbak v R and s 132C of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) [62]-[63]. He further submitted that this inference contravened the principle in De Simoni, which prohibits sentencing an offender on the basis of an offence more serious than that of which they were convicted [65].
The Court rejected this claim. Under s 132C, a judge may only act on facts that are admitted, unchallenged, or proven on the balance of probabilities, with the standard increasing with the seriousness of the consequence [63].
Here, the sentencing judge relied on the objective circumstances of the offending and on submissions made by the applicant’s own counsel, including acceptance that the infliction of suffering was relevant to sentence [78]; [94]. The Court found that the inference of intent to cause fear was open on the agreed narrative. The applicant’s drug use, while mentioned, was not relied on to dispute intent or mitigate culpability [87]-[90].
As such, the judge’s reasoning complied with the principles in Strbak, De Simoni, and s 132C. The ground was dismissed [95].
Ground 2 – Manifestly excessive (dismissed)
The Court reaffirmed that a sentence will only be set aside as manifestly excessive where it is plainly unjust or involves a misapplication of principle (R v Abdullah), mere disparity with other sentences is insufficient [10u006A0].
The applicant relied on R v West [102]-[104], which suggested that AOBH simpliciter rarely attracts sentences above 18 months. However, the Court distinguished West, noting it predated the legislative recognition of domestic violence as an aggravating factor and involved less serious conduct [105]. In contrast, RBM’s offending involved vicious, prolonged, and degrading violence, including placing the complainant, unconscious and shirtless, in the boot of her car with a shovel and duct tape and threatening to bury her [106]-[112]. The AOBH offence could not be viewed in isolation and the applicant’s prior conviction for similar violence against a former partner, as well as his lack of remorse, further aggravated the offending [107–108]. While the complainant’s injuries did not require surgery or involve a weapon [111], the offending created a terrifying experience, justifying a sentence above the typical range [112]-[115].
The Court held that the sentence could have been validly structured either through elevated concurrent sentences (Nagy methodology) or through cumulative sentencing and under either approach, a total effective sentence of six years was not excessive [116]-[117]. Applying the totality principle, the Court also considered the applicant’s existing 15-month sentence for related offending, including ramming a police car. The final outcome, six years and four months imprisonment, with parole eligibility after slightly more than one-third, was held to be proportionate to the overall criminality [118]-[122]. The sentence was not manifestly excessive and the application was dismissed [123].
The Court made relevant general comments:
‘In this case, the applicant’s offending involved significant, unprovoked violence, aggravated by a serious deprivation of liberty which was objectively terrifying. Further, this was the applicant’s second occasion of violently lashing out when faced with the end of a relationship. He was previously sentenced to three years imprisonment for viciously attacking an ex-partner.’ [106]
‘It is the applicant’s concerning criminal history, along with his protracted conduct (involving a violent assault and a very serious example of depriving the complainant of her liberty) that distinguishes his sentence from other assault cases upon complainants in a domestic violence setting.’ [107]
R v MDU [2024] QCA 113 (14 June 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ - ‘Choking’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘Belief that the victim had died’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘use of motor vehicle’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant had pleaded guilty to attempted murder (x1).
Facts: The applicant had resolved to kill the complainant, his ex-wife of 40 years. He went to her house armed with a chainsaw, knives and some line. He tried to cut his way into the house using the chainsaw, both through the front and rear doors. Realising that the complainant had escaped through the front door while he was at the rear, he chased her in a car. He caught her, punched her in the face several times, then choked her. She could not breathe or speak. Both ended up on the ground, the applicant still choking her.
The applicant briefly relented his grasp, then redoubled his efforts to the point of choking her while her head was off the ground, pulling her towards him. He saw that her eyes had started bulging in the manner he had seen on television before, which scared the applicant. At this point, he stopped choking her and he slapped her face a few times. She regained consciousness. He then let her go, telling her, “I won’t kill you this time”. He drove away, eventually going to a police station to confess what he had done. The complainant’s injuries included bruising to her jaw, bruising to the face and eyes.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant relied on three grounds of appeal [8]:
1.
The sentence is manifestly excessive in all circumstances.
2.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding these was no special leniency to be applied to his sentence as a result of his admissions.
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding these was no special leniency to be applied to his sentence as a result of his admissions.
Ground 3 was not the subject of any submissions in the applicant’s outline. Ground 1 was not advanced except in the context of ground 2.
Decision and Reasoning : Application for leave to appeal against sentence dismissed.
Section 538 of the Criminal Code (Qld) states that, in respect of “a person convicted of attempting to an commit offence, if it is proved that the person desisted of the person’s own motion from the further prosecution of the person’s intention, without its fulfilment being prevented by circumstances independent of the person’s will, the person is liable to one-half only of the punishment to which the person would otherwise be liable”.
Therefore, a key issue at sentencing and on appeal was the factual issue of whether the applicant’s desisting from choking the complainant occurred before or after he had formed the view that she had perished. The sentencing judge had found that at the time the applicant desisted from his plan to kill, he believed the complainant was dead. Therefore, s 538 was not engaged.
On appeal, Morison JA agreed with the sentencing judge that s 538 was, on the facts, not engaged [30], [39]. Dalton JA and Davis J disagreed, finding as a matter of fact that the applicant had at no point believed he had killed the victim [108]. Rather, they found that he got scared when he saw the victim’s eyes bulging and stopped when she was “close to death” [108]. They found no reasonable basis on which the sentencing judge could have concluded that the applicant thought the victim was already dead before he desisted from choking her [108].
Their Honours therefore found that the appeal should succeed on ground 2. However, their Honours ultimately did not grant leave to appeal, nor did they propose imposing any lesser sentence [110]. Their reasons for this also dealt with ground 1 of the proposed appeal [110]. Their Honours found that the acts committed by the applicant and the circumstances in which he committed them were extremely serious [120]. There was significant premeditation, a violent attempted home invasion, pursuit after the victim had left her home, and the catching, severe assault and choking of the victim with the intent to kill her [121]-[123]. He came close to killing her [124]. The sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment with no serious violent offence declaration and an order for parole eligibility six months before the statutorily prescribed period could, in their Honours’ view, draw no proper complaint from the applicant [135].
R v OAC [2024] QCA 52 (9 April 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Torture' - ‘Threat to kill’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ - ‘Economic and financial abuse’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Prevention order’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘Mental health’
Charges: 5x common assault; 2x strangulation in a domestic setting, 3x assault occasioning bodily harm, 3x deprivation of liberty, 1x torture, 1x contravention of protection order, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm while armed, 1x wilful damage, 1 x threats, 2x rape, 1x using a carriage service to make a threat to kill
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 32 counts on three separate indictments. The majority of the offences concerned physical domestic violence against the applicant’s female partner between January and August 2019. [16]–[65]; [72] During this period, the applicant was served with and subsequently breached a protection order. [36]–[38] The most serious offending occurred within 16 hours, across two days: the applicant tortured his partner, assaulting, choking and raping her. [2]; [44]–[65]
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
the sentencing judge erred by having regard to uncharged acts; and
2.
the sentence is manifestly excessive. [12]
Decision and Reasoning : Application for leave refused. Morrison JA (with whom Mullins P and Brown J agree) dismissed the applicant’s first ground of appeal. The uncharged acts were expressly confined as forming part of the background, and at no time were framed as relevant to the offending conduct. That the uncharged acts merely provided relevant context to the domestic violence offences was appreciated by the sentencing judge. [99]–[107]
Morrison JA further dismissed the applicant’s second ground of appeal that the imposition of a serious violent offence declaration is inappropriate as the applicant suffered from serious psychological issues at the time of offending. [114] Available medical assessments did not disclose a diagnosis of ‘mental illness or abnormality’. [120]
The absence of such a diagnosis is relevant to the submission that general deterrence did not have such a call on the sentencing process that it meant a serious violent offence declaration should not be made; put another way, that making such a declaration would render the sentence manifestly excessive [121]
As is apparent from Neumann, there must be an assessment of two relevant factors present in order that the consideration of mitigating factors or that of general deterrence are affected. The first is the mental abnormality. The second is a causal link between that abnormality and the offending conduct.
Neither is present in the applicant’s case. What the report reveals is that drug-induced psychosis was a likely operative factor. That is not, in my view, sufficient to call into question the making of the serious violent offence declarations [123]–[124]
R v WBZ [2023] QCA 256 (15 December 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘inconsistent verdicts’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 2x common assault, 2x strangulation in a domestic setting, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x wilful damage.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a domestic relationship from October 2016 to January 2021. On two separate occasions, the applicant physically assaulted the complainant, backhanding, kicking, strangling and throwing her on the floor. On both occasions, the offending took place in the presence of the couple’s baby. [11]–[35]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appeals against his conviction for one count of strangulation on the basis that it was unreasonable, irreconcilable with the verdicts of acquittal.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Flanagan JA (with whom Buss AJA and Kelly J agree) held the inconsistency across the verdicts of guilty and not guilty was reconcilable. According to Flanagan JA, each count was ‘readily explicable by reference’ to different sets of considerations, both factual and legal [67]; notably, the inconsistencies in the evidence provided by the complainant and applicant, and differences in jury directions.
R v MDS [2023] QCA 228 (21 November 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: 4x wilful damage, 2x common assault, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x strangulation in a domestic setting.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a long-term de facto relationship, having five children together, prior to separation in 2015. The applicant and the complainant, both intoxicated, had a verbal argument which turned into a physical altercation. The applicant physically assaulted the complainant, including smashing her headphones with a golf club [4], assaulting the complainant with ‘cane knives’ and strangling her with a wicker basket. [3]–[13] The incident occurred in front of the couple’s 16 year old son, who called the police. [12]
The applicant was found guilty of the offences and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for each count of wilful damage, 18 months imprisonment for each count of common assault, 2 years imprisonment for the count of assault occasioning bodily harm and 3 years imprisonment for the count of strangulation in a domestic setting – where all sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
the sentence was manifestly excessive; and
2.
the sentencing judge made a specific error (ie, the judge’s statement that ‘someone in the victim’s position could have been dead within a short space of time’ was ‘factually inapposite’) [26]
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Justice of Appeal Dalton (with whom Morrison and Boddice JJA agree) found the sentence to neither be manifestly excessive or erroneous with respect to the sentencing judge’s treatment of the offence of strangulation:
The sentencing judge obviously regarded strangulation as the most serious of these offences, although it must be noted that the common assault with the cane knives was also a very serious offence [14]
That the primary judge took a balanced view of the strangulation is plain from the remarks which I have extracted above. In particular her Honour recognised that the period of strangulation was short; that bare hands were not used, and that the force used was not such as to cause loss of consciousness or control of the bladder. Her Honour expressly recognised that this choking was not of the most serious kind. [28]
R v LBB [2023] QCA 162 (11 August 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Threat’ - ‘Medical evidence’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 1x strangulation in a domestic setting, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x threatening violence. The offending occurred in one episode of domestic violence, against the applicant’s wife.
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on four counts of domestic violence offences; all of which occurred on 16 January 2019 against the applicant’s wife (the complainant). The complainant’s evidence was that the applicant strangled her, after she refused to allow him access to her mobile phone. As the complainant attempted to leave, the applicant grabbed her and threw her onto the floor and threatened to kill her and their child. [4]–[6] The complainant attended the doctor later that day.
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The wrongful admission of medical evidence concerning the complainant’s injuries; and
2.
The false prosecutorial claims concerning the medical evidence.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and retrial ordered. Judge Dalton (with whom Boddice JA and Bradley J agree) held ‘almost all’ of the evidence led from the doctor’s consultation notes with the complainant to be inadmissible and highly prejudicial to the applicant. [21] Such evidence led from the notes included (and were not limited to):
•
A detailed narrative amounting a complaint against the appellant and a description of his physically assaulting her …
•
sympathetically recorded details as to the complainant’s general domestic circumstances …
•
a hearsay history of the appellant’s having been angry and having pushed and shoved the complainant in the past …. [21]
Judge Dalton equally regarded the prosecution’s address to the jury concerning this evidence improper, as too the prosecution’s reliance upon the existence of a fracture (suffered by the complainant) which was not established [55]–[56]:
It was improper for the prosecutor to seek to use the inadmissible narrative evidence she had led from the doctor to attempt to bolster the complainant’s credit as if the narrative given to the doctor on 7 October 2021 was a fresh complaint in a sexual assault case. The prosecutor expressly used this evidence to try to bolster the credit of the complainant and urged the jury not to have a reasonable doubt because of what the appellant had told police [27]
R v WBX [2023] QCA 151 (28 July 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Prevention order’ - ‘Breach of protection order’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 7x contravention of prevention order
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on domestic violence offences and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and an order for compensatory payment ($10,000 to the complainant).
The applicant and female complainant had been in a ‘toxic’ domestic relationship for two years.[9] A temporary protection order was placed against the applicant in May 2021: interaction between the complainant and applicant was conditional on it being agreed upon in writing. [15] The offending took place on June 2021, when the complainant and applicant were together at the applicant’s residence: an argument turned into a physical altercation, with the applicant physically assaulting and strangling/choking the complainant. Following the incident, the applicant proceeded to contact the complainant for the next six days, contrary to the protection order. [13]–[16]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, having regard to the applicant’s: previously undiagnosed medical condition; plea of guilty; lack of prior criminal history; and ‘new and functioning domestic relationship’. [21]
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Justice of Appeal Boddice (with whom Dalton and Flanagan JJA agree) found the sentencing judge to have made no error:
The protracted nature of the applicant’s criminal conduct, including the repeated contraventions of the domestic violence order in the following days, was of a nature where the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion, notwithstanding the early pleas of guilty, lack of criminal history, psychological conditions, prospects of rehabilitation and the payment of compensation. Such a conclusion is supported by a consideration of the relevant authorities [35]–[36]
R v RBJ [2023] QCA 162 (13 June 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Inconsistent verdict’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 3 x rape.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with three counts of rape; all of which were domestic violence offences. Following a trial before a jury, the applicant was only convicted of one count (and acquitted of two counts).
At the time of offending, the male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship. On 10 October 2022, the applicant attended the complainant’s mother’s house and entered the complainant’s bedroom uninvited while she was asleep. Despite the complainant’s protest, the applicant forcibly removed her clothes and raped her three times. Between the first and second time (ie, count 1 and 2), the complainant went to the bathroom to have a shower.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
The verdict on count 1 is unreasonable and inconsistent with the verdicts of acquittal on counts 2 and 3; and
2.
Miscarriage of justice (ie, trial judge did not provide jury directions on the use of text-message evidence).
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and new trial ordered on count 1. Drawing on the principles of inconsistent verdicts set out in MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348, 365–8, the Court (Mullins P and Morrison and Flanagan JJA) regarded the jury’s treatment of count 1 as distinct from counts 2 and 3 to not be unreasonable:
It could not be said to be unreasonable that the jury treated the circumstances in which count 1 was committed when the appellant arrived in the complainant’s bedroom uninvited as different from the circumstances of counts 2 and 3 when the complainant returned to the bedroom without wearing clothes while the appellant was still there [39]
It was open for the jury to regard the complainant’s evidence, relating to the text messages sent following the offending, as only constituting count 1:
The text exchange immediately after the complainant arrived at work, in which she confirmed that it was not acceptable for the appellant to show up in her house unannounced and to have sexual intercourse with her after she said “no” 100 times was more referable to count 1 than the other counts. When the appellant then sent a message reminding the complainant that she said she did not want him to go, the complainant’s response was “that was way after” which could also be taken as referable to “way after” the act of sexual intercourse when he first arrived that constituted count 1 [38]
R v Kynuna [2023] QCA 112 (30 May 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of Justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ - ‘Choking/strangulation’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Threat to kill’ - ‘Evidence’ - ‘Expert opinion’ - ‘Jury directions’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 3 x rape, 1 x attempted rape
Facts: The male applicant was convicted of one count of attempted rape. The applicant and complainant were in a sexual relationship, which after some time the complainant did not wish to continue. Despite the relationship ending, the applicant continued to pursue the complainant via text messages and loitering at her place of work throughout May 2020. On 3 June 2020, the applicant physically grabbed the complainant by the neck at her place of work and threatened to ‘kill’ her if she continued to ignore him. [16]–[17] Following the applicant’s demands, the complainant drove her vehicle to a deserted place and was physically forced to perform oral and anal sex. [18]–[25]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
The trial judge failed to discharge a jury following the admission of inadmissible and/or highly prejudicial evidence;
2.
The trial judge failed to provide adequate jury directions on opinion evidence; and
3.
The verdict is unreasonable.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed. Verdict set aside and retrial ordered.
Morrison JA (with whom Mullins P and Boddice JA agree) held the trial judge’s treatment of opinion evidence — specifically the opinion of a forensic nurse that ‘it was unusual to find multiple lacerations to the fourchette in consensual sex’ [48] — to be inadequate.
The Crown prosecutor failed to make reference to the evidence in their opening address [54] and to confine the use of the evidence to the relevant charge (ie, attempted anal rape). [56]–[57] The trial judge failed to correct any misuse of the evidence by the jury through an appropriate direction: ‘The only direction given was one concerned with how to deal with expert evidence. In itself, that was a misdirection because the forensic nurse examiner’s evidence was not expert evidence.’ [58] Consequently, the evidence should have been excluded as both ‘inadmissible’ and ‘prejudicial’ to the applicant. [60]
However, Morrison JA did not find the verdict to be unreasonable. [69] The ‘identified weaknesses in the evidence’ did not reduce the ‘probative value’ of the evidence so as to create ‘a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted’. [76]
R v WBV [2023] QCA 79 (26 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Choking/strangulation’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘Parole’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed; 1x wilful damage; 2x choking in a domestic setting; 1x assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) 1x wilful damage (domestic violence setting); 1x assault occasioning bodily harm; 1x suppling a dangerous drug with a circumstance of aggravation.
Facts: The male applicant entered early pleas to four indictments and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The offending was perpetrated against the applicant’s female partner in their home. On 6 August 2020, the applicant verbally assaulted the complainant, threatening her with a knife. [30] On 19 November 2021, the applicant physically and verbally assaulted the complainant, punching her in the face, and strangling her twice, causing her to lose consciousness multiple times. [19]–[23] On 19 May 2022, the applicant assaulted a male co-worker. [33]–[34]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Particularly, the applicant contended that the primary judge:
1.
started ‘too high’ in calculating the appropriate global sentence for the most serious offending — the two counts of choking in a domestic setting;
2.
departed from the ‘rule of thumb of one-third in imposing a parole eligibility date at the 40% mark of the head sentence’; and
3.
did not accede to the submission of defence counsel in respect of certainty of release [11]
Decision and Reasoning : Application to leave dismissed. Crow J (with whom Dalton and Boddice JJA agree) dismissed the applicant’s submission that the head sentence was ‘too high’, having regard to the applicant’s ‘antecedents, the serious nature of the offending of 19 November 2021, and the accumulation of the criminality of the offending of 6 August 2020 and 19 May 2022’. [36]
With respect to the non-parole date, Crow J (with whom Dalton and Boddice JJA agree) held that the ‘common practice of a one third reduction is not a rule’. [39] Rather, the determination of a non-parole period is made with regard to ‘the specific circumstances of the offender including his antecedents, character, and any prior criminal history’. [40]
Applying these factors to the present case, Crow J held the date to be appropriate:
The applicant’s prior criminal history of serious violence, his lack of anger control, his serious difficulty with alcohol and drugs, his poor prison record, his offence of supplying dangerous drugs in a correctional facility are each a circumstance supporting the parole eligibility date being set at two years [51]
R v BEA [2023] QCA 78 (26 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Unsafe/unreasonable jury verdict’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Protection order’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘victim’s mental health’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 13x rape, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 3x common assault.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male applicant was found guilty of thirteen counts of rape, two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm and three counts of common assaults. Each count involved the aggravating circumstance of being a domestic violence offence [3]: the applicant and female complainant were in a de facto relationship between 2013 and 2015. In this period, the complainant had received a protection order against the applicant. In 2014, the applicant contravened the protection order thrice and was imprisoned for nine months. [74] The female complainant reported the applicant’s offending in 2018. [29] The applicant was sentenced to (11 years head sentence for two counts of rape).
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed against his conviction on several grounds.
1.
Unsafe and unsatisfactory jury verdicts (ie, complainant’s evidence was uncorroborated, ‘inconsistent [and] improbable’ and the complainant suffered from a mental illness). [6]
2.
Manifestly excessive head sentence for two counts of rape (11 years’ imprisonment).
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed.
With respect to the first ground of appeal, Bradley J (with whom Dalton JA and Gotterson AJA agree) held the evidence of the complainant (on which the verdict rested) to not be ‘improbable or incredible’ [10]. Further, the applicant’s evidence concerning the complainant’s mental health was erroneous and misleading. [22] Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the complainant suffered from depression (not bipolar disorder) which ‘does not raise a reasonable doubt about her credit or the reliability of her evidence’. [26]
Bradley J further held that the complainant’s two year delay in reporting the offences did not constitute a ‘significant forensic disadvantage’ to the applicant [34]–[35]:
The statute excludes the mere fact of delay as sufficient to show such a disadvantage and requires the nature of the disadvantage to be identified.7 The accused bears the onus of establishing there is a significant forensic disadvantage and that it is a consequence of the delay. The disadvantage must be forensic, so it must be a disadvantage in challenging, producing, or giving evidence in the conduct of the case
In the present case, no evidence likely to assist the appellant, which earlier existed, had been lost, gone missing, or become unavailable to him. No witness had died or become unlocatable. No one’s memory had been lost. The medical tests and photographs adverted to by the appellant were never within his power to obtain without the complainant’s consent. There was no evidence before the trial judge that the appellant had suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the delay in reporting the offences.
R v FBC [2023] QCA 74 (24 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threats to children’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: 3x common assault, 2x wilful damage, 1x strangulation in domestic setting, 2 x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x rape, 3x dangerous conduct using a weapon (all domestic violence offences except 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for rape and lesser concurrent periods of imprisonment for the remaining charges, being eligible for parole after serving 6 years. The applicant contended that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The majority of the offending was committed against the applicant’s former partner over a 2.5-year period. During the relationship, the complainant had taken out protection orders against the applicant and he had been physically abusive, including incidents where he placed her in a headlock, choked her and punched her in the face.
The complainant left the family home after discovering that the applicant had been unfaithful. Following this, there was an incident where the applicant came to the complainant’s home and violently anally raped her, causing injury. Several months later the complainant asked the police to conduct a welfare check on the applicant. He then came to her house with a gun, aiming it at their two young children and threatening to shoot her, the children and himself.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal dismissed.
Boddice JA (Mullins P and Flanagan JA agreeing) held that the sentence was not unreasonable or unjust given the ‘depravity and persistence’ of the offending [31], which occurred over a significant period and included serious violence, protracted rape and aiming a loaded weapon at very young children. The authorities supported the sentencing judge’s observation that protracted rape would in itself attract a 10-year head sentence, using the case of R v TAQ [2020] QCA 200 as the most helpful yardstick but noting its distinguishing features. Boddice JA concluded that the period of actual custody reflected the criminality of the applicant, particularly the need for deterrence and denunciation in relation to the threats to the children [30].
R v SDI [2023] QCA 67 (18 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of monitoring’ – ‘Evidence of stalking’ – ‘Evidence of technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘False complaints’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Inference drawn from nature of searches’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘Judicial notice that mobile phones and laptops are prima facie accurate’ – ‘Rebuttable presumption of the accuracy of 'notorious' technical instruments’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Proceedings: Application to adduce further evidence, appeal against conviction for stalking.
Charges: 1x stalking, 1x attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
Verdicts unreasonable or unsupported by evidence
2.
Error in law in admitting documents
3.
Error in law in directing that it was open to find that the appellant caused ‘detriment’
4.
Error in fact in finding without evidence that the appellant and complainant had been married, renewed their lease and other matters
5.
Error in law by failing to rule on admissibility of two exhibits
6.
Denial of fair trial in refusal to adduce evidence
Facts: The complainant woman and defendant man were married but after the relationship deteriorated the complainant left the family home with their son and her daughter from a previous relationship. The defendant was alleged to have made intimidating phone-calls to the complainant, followed her, made false complaints and accusations, and the complainant also alleged the defendant planted drugs in her car.
(The attempt to pervert the course of justice conviction was not in question on appeal. Whilst in custody the defendant had made a number of phone calls to his brother and a friend (“Arunta calls”) asking them to contact a number of people and request those people provide false statements/statutory declarations admitting responsibility for the Crime Stoppers and PoliceLink submissions in order to assist him get bail and to support his acquittal [5].)
The admissibility of Exhibits 5 and 42 were central to the appeal. Exhibit 5 was a screenshot of the daughter’s computer screen showing that the respondent’s iPhone was synched with her Gmail account. Exhibit 42 was a series of printouts from the search history on the daughter’s Gmail account, including ‘how to pay to find someone,’ ‘what will happen if I take my children against a court order?’ and ‘mobile phone locater.’
Decision: The application to adduce further evidence refused; appeal dismissed.
Morrison JA (Mullins P and Flanagan JA agreeing), held that while neither of exhibits 5 and 42 could establish that it was the appellant who synchronised the phone or conducted the searches, this did not make them inadmissible [43]. The exhibits were at least admissible as visual records of what the complainant said she saw on the screen (R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284) [44]. Additionally, Exhibit 5 was admissible for the purposes of showing that one device was synchronised with another [45].
The trial judge’s use of Exhibit 42 was restricted to the searches where the only reasonable inference was that the appellant had conducted them [62] and that even had it been wrongly admitted there was no basis for finding a miscarriage of justice as it only affected one act of stalking [63]. While the appellant submitted that the complainant had fabricated the screenshot, this was not put to the complainant during cross-examination and in the circumstances there was a strong inference to be drawn from the nature of the searches that they were conducted by the appellant [116].
Consideration was also given to the rebuttable presumption of the accuracy of ‘notorious’ technical instruments, amounting to judicial notice of the fact that a device that is generally used and known to be trustworthy is prima facie accurate (Bevan v the State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 101) [30]. Mobile phones and laptops were said to fall into this category and there was no evidence suggesting the complainant’s computer or her daughter’s iPad were other than accurate and trustworthy. The exhibits were therefore admissible as circumstantial evidence going to the question of whether the appellant had synchronised the phone and Gmail, and whether the appellant had conducted the searches [48].
The submission that no ruling on Exhibit 5 was made was said to be a misstatement as the trial judge had proceeded on the basis that the exhibit was to be admitted as record of what the complainant had seen on the computer and noted a reservation that the defence might wish to argue what it proved [53]. The appellant was also found to be bound by the defence counsel’s agreement that the admissibility of Exhibit 42 be deferred to the end of trial.
The appellant’s attempts to adduce further evidence were refused as they could have sought to adduce the evidence at trial and the evidence amounted to no more than a general attack on the complainant’s credit and therefore would not have affected the outcome.
R v Robbins [2023] QCA 18 (17 February 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Dated allegations of historical violence’ – ‘History of violence to third party’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Partial defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship’ – ‘S304b criminal code (qld)’ – ‘Siblings’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against murder conviction.
Grounds: The trial judge erred in not directing the jury in relation to the partial defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship (s304B Criminal Code (Qld)).
Facts: The male appellant and homicide victim were brothers. The victim, his partner and the appellant’s daughter had come to stay with the appellant and his fiancée prior to the appellant’s wedding. During the course of dinner at the appellant’s home, an aggressive verbal argument broke out between the appellant and victim. At one point, the victim asked the appellant’s fiancé if she was really marrying the appellant and she responded that she wouldn’t if he continued to behave this way.
The appellant told the victim and his partner to leave and made further abusive comments towards the victim, apparently angered by his comment to his fiancé. They broke into a physical confrontation and both parties threw punches. During the struggle, the appellant grabbed a knife and stabbed the victim seven times. He died of knife wounds the following day.
The appellant gave evidence that the victim had been an abusive family member, making allegations of witnessing 3 separate assaults against his father. He contended that the victim had been verbally abusive towards the appellant, his father and other brother throughout his life.
Reasoning and decision: The partial defence did not arise fairly on the evidence; appeal dismissed.
A history of domestic violence in the relationship was required, necessitating a previous tendency by either party to engage in acts of serious domestic violence repeatedly or habitually against the other ([30]). The appellant’s claims regarding the victim’s past behaviour lacked an evidentiary basis and any available evidence did not clarify the nature of his conduct.
The age of the alleged incidents involving violence towards their father (occurring over 40 years ago) and fact that the conduct was not targeted at the appellant meant they did not support a history of an abusive relationship between the brothers. While it was possible for actual or threatened violence to a third person to be domestic violence against the second person in certain narrow circumstances, these were clearly not made out.
A ‘bare statement’ that verbal abuse had occurred was not enough to find family violence [39]. Repeated, habitual oral statements in certain circumstances could constitute domestic violence but this would require detail and evidence of impact. Additionally, verbal abuse was not found meet the required threshold of ‘serious’ domestic violence.
R v KBB [2022] QCA 273 (23 December 2022) (23 December 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘S132b of the evidence act 1977 (qld)’ – ‘Similar fact evidence’
Proceeding: Appeal against conviction for 1x strangulation in domestic setting.
Facts: The male appellant was charged with 1x strangulation in domestic setting, 1x suffocation in a domestic setting and 1x assault occasioning bodily harm while armed against his female partner. He was convicted on the first charge and acquitted on charges 2 and 3.
The complainant gave evidence that the appellant accused the complainant of infidelity, and the complainant slapped the appellant. The appellant he grabbed the complainant by the hair and throat, threw her onto the bed and covered her nose and mouth. When the complainant tried to leave the house, the appellant grabbed her by the throat and hit her on the head with a glass, knocking her unconscious. Medical evidence of bruising around her neck and head was submitted and the complainant gave evidence of four previous instances of physical violence.
Grounds:
1.
The verdict of the jury was unreasonable in that it was inconsistent with the verdicts of acquittal.
2.
There was an error of law in the admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence to demonstrate his propensity to commit domestic violence (under s132B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)).
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: McMurdo JA held that it was open to the jury to accept the evidence supporting the complainant’s testimony for the first charge while determining that they required independent evidentiary support before being satisfied about her credibility in relation to counts 2 and 3.
Ground 2: McMurdo JA noted that s132B has a wide operation and that ‘[o]nce the evidence is relevant, it is admissible (under s132B) subject only to the discretion to exclude it on the ground of unfairness according to s130 (Qld).’ Propensity evidence was held to constitute a relevant use, there was no requirement to satisfy the Pfennig test (Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 (4 May 2011)) and there was no argument as to unfairness under s 130 or a miscarriage of justice.
R v CCU [2022] QCA 92 (27 May 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Absence of remorse’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: 5 x assault occasioning bodily harm; 1 x common assault; 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm, while armed; 7 x common assault (a domestic violence offence); 4 x assault occasioning bodily harm (a domestic violence offence); 1 x torture (a domestic violence offence); 2 x strangulation in a domestic setting; 1 x suffocation in a domestic setting; 1 x attempting to pervert justice (a domestic violence offence).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: On the second day of trial, the applicant was sentenced after pleading guilty to 20 counts of violence perpetrated over eight years towards his then-partner, K, and her son. As a result of a plea bargain, three counts were withdrawn. The learned sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of six years imprisonment, declaring 53 days as pre-sentence custody, and set a parole eligibility date at two years and four months from the date of sentence. The applicant’s offending was described by the learned sentencing judge as “violent, demeaning and an appalling attempt to exercise power over K” ([34]).
Issue: Whether the learned sentencing judge erred in taking into account the applicant’s uncharged acts? Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive?
Held: In sentencing the applicant, the learned sentencing judge considered his late guilty pleas, his absence of remorse and lack of relevant criminal history, his age at the time of offending, the nature of the offending, the significant effect that the conduct had on K, her son and daughter, his background, the fact that the offences were domestic violence offences and the character references. His Honour also had regard to the fact that domestic violence crimes demean society and are to be condemned and denounced ([34]).
The Court of Appeal (Mullins, Morrison and Fraser JJA) refused leave to appeal. The applicant argued that the learned sentencing judge erred in taking into account the applicant’s uncharged acts, because, inter alia, the Crown’s statement of facts included uncharged acts that were serious and should not have been included. The first ground of appeal was rejected on the basis that:
•
The statement of facts tendered on the sentencing hearing was an agreed statement.
•
Reference to the transcript and sentencing remarks revealed that His Honour only sentenced the applicant for the offences charged.
The second ground of appeal was rejected on the basis that:
•
The offending was “protracted, violent, demeaning and controlling”. It extended beyond the complainant and some of the offending was committed in view of her children. Importantly, “it involved an ultimate degradation, the threat of elimination of life itself”, and was committed with a lack of insight and remorse ([58]).
•
The conduct can be considered worse, given that it was broken by periods of time, because the threat was “always there” ([59]).
•
The applicant attempted to pervert the course of justice to protect himself from exposure to criminal charges ([61]).
R v GBI [2022] QCA 28 (7 March 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Accusations of infidelity’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Torture’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1 (count 1), torture x 1 (count 2).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in an intimate relationship. The charges arose out of two separate assaults. During the first, the applicant punched the victim in the face. During the second, the applicant subjected the victim to several violent assaults over a 48-hour period. The assaults included kicking and punching in the face and stomach, stabbing with scissors, verbal abuse that included threats against the victim’s life, and repeated strangulation. The victim sustained serious physical and psychological injuries. The assaults accompanied accusations of infidelity by the applicant, who expressed feelings of jealousy on both occasions. The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on count 1 and six and a half years imprisonment on count 2. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the ground that his sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was rejected.
Justice Morrison found that the matters raised by the applicant as demonstrating manifest excess had been considered by the sentencing judge. These matters included the applicant’s ‘remorse’, ‘good custodial behaviour’, ‘father’s poor health’, child support obligations, debts owed to his employer, ‘limited use of weapons’, the fact that the victim’s injuries did not require ongoing treatment, and the reduction in risk by a DVO and because the relationship had ceased. His Honour affirmed the sentencing judge’s conclusion that these matters did not warrant a further reduction in the sentence to be imposed, nor justify a finding that the risk of reoffending was reduced.
R v Lewis; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2022] QCA 14 (15 February 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Burning threat’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Victim impact statement’ – ‘Weapon’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: The domestic violence charges were:
1.
Common assault,
2.
unlawful assault occasioning bodily harm
3.
causing grievous bodily harm with intent (malicious act with intent) x 1 and
4.
Causing grievous bodily harm (in the alternative to count 3).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence by Attorney-General.
Issues: Whether sentence manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a two-year relationship that was characterised as ‘troubled’ and involving physical violence [2]-[4]. Both parties were users of methylamphetamine and were aged 17 at the time of the offences. On one occasion, the respondent threw petrol on the victim and threatened to set her on fire. On another occasion, the respondent threw a screwdriver at the victim, which was embedded in her hip [3]-[4]. In May 2016, during verbal argument, the respondent used petrol to set the victim on fire [5]. The respondent fled when confronted by a neighbour [14]. The victim required surgery and was hospitalised for four weeks. She was left with ongoing pain and nerve damage [22]. In January 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty to common assault (count 1) and assault occasioning bodily harm (count 2) and was found guilty in relation to causing grievous bodily harm with intent (count 3). He successfully appealed against conviction regarding count 3 but was later resentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment [30]. The Attorney General of Queensland appealed on the basis that that sentence was manifestly inadequate [57].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justices Sofronoff, Morrison and Flanagan affirmed the decision and reasoning of the sentencing Judge. Their Honours endorsed the sentencing Judge’s consideration of the appellant’s plea of guilty, expressions of remorse, insight, youth and disadvantaged upbringing [67]-[70]. Their Honours agreed with the sentencing Judge’s characterisation of the offending ‘horrendous and disgraceful offending’ and ‘abominable behaviour’ [39]-[40], with ‘devastating consequences’ for the victim that included ‘significant and life-long physical, mental and emotional difficulties’ [72]. Their Honours continued that the sentencing Judge had correctly stated that ‘the sentence had to be “just having regard to all of the circumstances”, but in particular to punish, express community denunciation, meet general and specific deterrence, provide community protection, but also, in light of the offender’s youth, have regard to his prospects of rehabilitation’ [73]. Their Honours concluded that there was ‘no demonstrated error of principle… the sentence imposed was one derived by a careful balancing of competing requirements in an overall integrated sentencing approach’ [75]. This approach ‘was in accordance with what this Court said in R v Free; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2020] QCA 58 was one of the available approaches, namely to sentence towards the top of the bounds of appropriate discretion and not reduce the parole eligibility date, rather than sentence towards the bottom and impose a serious violent offence declaration’ [75].
R v EQ [2021] QCA 257 (30 November 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Bomb threat’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Limited criminal history’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Breach of protection order x 1, assault of police officer x 1, making a bomb hoax x 1, stalking x 1, common assault x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and resentence.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married for 17 years and had two school aged daughters. The family immigrated to Australia from Egypt in 2011. After the couple separated, a domestic violence order was served on the appellant that prevented him from contacting the victim. In February 2019, the appellant repeatedly texted the victim before confronting her and their daughters at an airport. The appellant argued with the victim, before threatening her and airport staff with a knife, fake bomb, and electric shock device [12]-[17]. The appellant later admitted to police that he had been tracking the victim’s movements [19]. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charges and received a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing Judge erred in law by wrongly limiting the use to be made of evidence of the applicant’s mental health;
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive; and
3.
In sentencing the applicant for count 2, the learned sentencing Judge mistook the offence to which he had pleaded guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: Application for leave to appeal allowed, charge 3 dismissed, resentenced for charge 2.
Due to an administrative error the appellant was sentenced for an offence with which he had not been charged and to which he had not pleaded guilty [52]. Therefore, the proceedings had miscarried, and the appeal was allowed. As ground three was made out, the court allowed the appeal and proceeded to resentence the applicant for count 2 to 5 years imprisonment with and non-parole period of 2 years 6 months. Justices Sofronoff, Davis and Williams noted that the offending was serious, with significant impact on the commercial operations of the airport, the distress experienced by witnesses, and ongoing psychological suffering of the victim and her daughters [57]. Their Honours noted that there were mitigating circumstances, such as the appellant’s limited prior convictions, cooperation with police, early guilty plea, expression of remorse and low risk of reoffending [58]. Their Honours summarised the appellant’s psychological report, which included details of the applicant’s diminishing symptoms of anxiety and depression, and noted the relevance of mental impairment under s 16A(2)(n) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) [59]-[61]. Their Honours found that there were no comparative sentences [64]. Their Honours considered the maximum sentence for the offence, the sentencing considerations in s 16A of the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991.
R v Hartas [2021] QCA 178 (27 August 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’
Charges: Arson x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 27-year-old male applicant and female victim were in a 6-week relationship. Shortly after the relationship ended, the intoxicated applicant used a petrol bomb to set fire to cars owned by the victim and her partner. The cars were parked directly in front of the victim’s house, where the victim, her partner, and her 6-year-old daughter were sleeping. In February 2021, the applicant was found guilty of one count of arson, constituting a domestic violence offence, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months [1]-[8]. The applicant’s psychological report detailed ‘a complex medical history’ and ‘significant psychological problems’, which included chronic pain due to a spinal condition, alcohol misuse and a ‘longstanding mood disorder’ [25].
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s personal circumstances, specifically those evidenced by his psychological report
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive [9].
Decision and Reasoning: Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Fraser, Morrison and Applegarth JJ held the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The sentencing Judge had given appropriate weight to the applicant’s personal circumstances and mitigated the sentence accordingly [42]. The contents of the psychological report had not shown that the applicant’s mental state at the time of the offence or at the time of sentence warranted substantial weight according to R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 (23 May 2007).The applicant’s mental state did not reduce his moral culpability, nor make imprisonment more burdensome such that it ‘became an inappropriate vehicle for’ general deterrence and specific deterrence [40], and his physical condition did not make imprisonment ‘unduly onerous’ [41]. The offence was serious, as indicated by its maximum penalty of life imprisonment with the aggravating factor that it was a domestic violence offence [50]. The victim impact statement indicated serious psychological harm caused to the victim and her daughter [51]. Their Honours accepted the sentencing Judge’s characterisation as ‘an extremely serious act of domestic violence’ due to ‘its grave potential’ impact on ‘life and property’, and the psychological harm that it has caused the victim and her six-year-old daughter [51].
R v RBE [2021] QCA 146 (20 July 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Arson threats’ – ‘Error of fact’ – ‘Inference as to motive’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Section 132c evidence act 1977’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Arson of a dwelling x 1 (domestic violence offence).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: As the complainant woman and applicant man were separating the applicant threatened to burn down the former matrimonial home. A protection order was granted protecting the complainant. The applicant has a history of major depression and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. On the date of the offence the applicant sent text messages to his son saying “goodbye” and that the house was alight. He also attempted to call the complainant and sent messages to a friend who went to the house, observed smoke, spoke to the appellant who was inside and called emergency services, then unsuccessfully attempted entry. The appellant’s evidence was that his intention was to commit suicide, but he fled the burning home having changed his mind after an unsuccessful attempted suicide. The sentencing judge expressed the view that the appellant’s expressed motives of suicide were not credible, despite accepting evidence of ligature marks on his neck supporting the appellant’s evidence he had attempted to hang himself during the incident. The judge found the appellant was seeking attention and acted vindictively to hurt his wife. The prosecution made no positive submission on motive and had submitted that all three motivations were open on the facts, advancing suicide or attention-seeking but not vindictiveness.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal, appeal allowed, sentence varied by:
•
Substituting three (3) years imprisonment; and
•
Suspending the sentence forthwith for an operational period of three (3) years.
Burns J (Morrison and McMurdo JJA concurring):
[26] ….it was not for the sentencing judge to decide what inferences arose from the agreed facts and, having done so, her Honour erred (and in a critical way) by determining a fact that was not in issue between the parties. Indeed, the procedure for resolving disputed facts provided in s 132C of the Evidence Act was not even engaged, the prosecutor having made no positive allegation about motive.
R v FBA [2021] QCA 142 (16 July 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Adequacy of jury directions’ – ‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Attempt to withdraw allegations’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Robinson direction’ – ‘S132b(2) evidence act 1977 (qld)’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Non-fatal Strangulation x 4.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship but maintained separate residences. The complainant had been staying with the complainant for 3 days when the alleged incidents occurred. The appellant made allegations of infidelity against the complainant, and they argued about that and money, the appellant refusing to drive the complainant home despite her giving him money for fuel. The complainant gave evidence that the appellant accused the complainant of stealing from him and that in four discrete incidents of physical altercations he applied pressure to her throat so that she could not breathe. She also alleged he made multiple threats to kill her and members of her extended family, locked her in the house and that she escaped with assistance from others. She went to hospital and photographs were taken of marks on her neck which were not there prior to the incident. The complainant also gave evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the appellant towards her. The complainant admitted using methylamphetamine at the time of the incidents and to attempting to withdraw her complaints, stating the reasons given for the withdrawal were false.
Grounds:
1.
The learned trial judge erred, causing the trial to miscarry, in:
(a) failing to clearly direct the jury as to the identification, purpose, and use of relationship evidence;
(b) admitting the evidence of the complainant’s daughter that she had ‘seen bruises on mum’ (the year prior to the instant allegations) as relationship evidence.
2.
The complainant’s evidence required a ‘Robinson direction’ and the failure to direct in those terms caused a miscarriage of justice.
3.
The complainant’s evidence in chief was inaudible in parts, which in the circumstances of the trial, caused the trial to miscarry.
4.
When regard is had to all the evidence, the jury verdicts are unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1(a) – rejected - further direction on relationship evidence would not have assisted the defence case (Sofronoff P [11], McMurdo JA agreeing, Boddice JA dissenting – the second paragraph of directions on the use of relationship evidence gave rise to a real risk of impermissible propensity reasoning).
Ground 1(b) – dismissed –the evidence was plainly admissible and relevant (Sofronoff P [13], MdMurdo JA agreeing Boddice JA dissenting – the evidence was inconsistent with the complainant’s evidence the appellant was only violent towards her in 2019).
Ground 2 – dismissed – it was clear why a ‘Robinson direction’ (pursuant to Criminal Code, s632(3)) wasn’t given, firstly the defence did not request one, and secondly “There was nothing in the present case which would have suggested to the learned judge that the jury required specific assistance in order to assess the complainant’s credibility and/or to suggest that, in the absence of such assistance, there was a risk that the jury might be unable to appreciate some exculpatory factor.” (Sofronoff P [14], McMurdo JA agreeing).
Ground 3 – dismissed – in absence of complaint at the trial it is impossible to conclude based on the transcript that evidence was inaudible (Sofronoff P [16], McMurdo JA agreeing).
Ground 4 – dismissed – while there was good reason for the jury to carefully scrutinise the complainant’s evidence (her drug use and its affects on her mental health, inconsistencies in her evidence and her attempts to withdraw the charges) it does not follow that it was not open to the jury to find her evidence as to the allegations of choking to be credible and reliable, especially as it was supported by medical evidence of injuries consistent with the allegations and her timely complaint to police. (Boddice JA [89]-[91], Sofronoff P and McMurdo JA agreeing).
R v Blockey [2021] QCA 77 (21 April 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Parole eligibility’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter (domestic violence offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male deceased had committed acts of domestic violence against the female applicant during their relationship. He was the subject of a domestic violence order. The applicant stabbed the deceased with a hunting knife. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, with parole eligibility after 3 years and 9 months imprisonment.
Grounds of appeal: Whether refusal to give parole eligibility date at one third of the sentence rendered the sentence manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal against sentence allowed. Parole eligibility date was set on 22 April 2021, rather than 22 January 2022.
The Court noted the sentencing judge’s remarks, including the relevance of the applicant’s history as a repeated victim of domestic violence in sentencing:
The sentencing Judge found that: “The fact that you were such a victim of domestic violence as well as a perpetrator of domestic violence is, to my mind, sufficient to enable me to reach the conclusion that it is not reasonable in the present circumstances to treat the fact that your offending was a domestic violence offence as an aggravating feature.
Nevertheless, the sentencing judge’s conclusion that “the applicant’s cooperation was tempered by her failure to provide any comprehensive, reliable detail concerning the stabbing” was inconsistent with the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to find that “the applicant ‘engaged in consciously-informed obfuscation or denial’ designed to minimise culpability.” The applicant was under no obligation to provide a comprehensive, detailed account of the sequence of events concerning the stabbing. She accepted unlawfully causing the victim’s death by stabbing him when she pleaded guilty to his manslaughter.
In these circumstances, finding that the applicant’s cooperation in entering a timely plea of guilty was to be tempered by her failure to provide such an account of the stabbing was a misapplication of sentencing principles, particularly where there was an acceptance that the applicant was sincerely remorseful for her conduct. It was therefore necessary to re-sentence the applicant. Parole eligibility was fixed after having served 3 years of the sentence.
MS v Commissioner of Police [2021] QCA 31 (2 March 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: A protection order prevented the male applicant from contacting, attempting to contact, or asking someone else to contact his female former partner except under strict circumstances. A Family Court order was also in place granting the mother sole parental responsibility for their child and restricting contact between the parties. The applicant breached the protection order by sending an email addressed to a number of people including his former partner and solicitor titled, “[The child] need to know about my mental health diagnosis.” The applicant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to 6 months imprisonment, suspended after 2 years. The applicant’s appeal to the District Court was dismissed.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The primary judge erred in not allowing the appeal based on the existence of parental responsibility in the applicant’s communications.
2.
The primary judge erred in not applying s 24 of the Criminal Code (Qld).
Held: Application for leave to appeal was refused. There was no inconsistency: condition 6 of the protection order did not preclude the application of the exception in paragraph 18 of the Family Court order. The email was appropriately characterised as not for the “sole purpose of communication regarding parental responsibility,” and did not fall within the condition/exception in the protection order and Family Court order. On that basis, there was no room for the operation of s 24 of the Code which could not apply to a mistake by the applicant in the interpretation of the Family Court order.
R v Luxford [2020] QCA 272 (4 December 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 2; Assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) x 8; Threat of actual bodily harm (domestic violence offence) x 1; Common assault (domestic violence offence) x 2; Wilful damage (domestic violence offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man spent 15 years in the army, with several overseas deployments. He left on medical grounds with a shoulder injury, chronic pain, tinnitus and post-traumatic stress disorder, and was awarded compensation. He had no prior criminal history (except for a failure to secure storage of weapons charge in 2017). He participated in a Men’s Behavioural Change Program, and was accepted into a program to treat PTSD. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a period of three years and six months imprisonment for the most serious offences on the indictment (choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 2, Counts 12 and 13), to be served concurrently with the remaining sentences. The date for parole was fixed at 29 September 2021. The expiry date for a protection order granted to the complainant in 2017 was extended to 7 October 2025.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive as the applicant was required to serve actual time in custody.
Held: The sentencing judge erred in the imposition of a sentence that required actual custody, and the applicant was re-sentenced.
The court held that the applicant’s offending could not be separated from his PTSD and also his PTSD caused custody to be a greater burden on him. While the sentencing judge applied the principles in R v Rix [2014] QCA 278 where the reduction in moral culpability due to an offender’s PTSD was taken into account, the sentencing judge failed to recognise in the sentence that a custodial sentence would have a hasher effect on him than a person not suffering PTSD. The sentence did not give sufficient weight to both factors relevant in the applicant’s case due to his PTSD (at [38]).
To reflect the gravity of the offending, the most serious offence was choking causing the complainant to lose consciousness (see R v MCW [2018] QCA 241) (Count 13), a higher head sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed to accommodate a sentence structure that provided for the applicant’s immediate release from actual custody. This reflected the totality of the offending, but adjusted in recognition of the effect of the PTSD as a cause of the offending. For the choking that lasted three seconds, a sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment was imposed (Count 12). The effect of the applicant’s PTSD was further accommodated by suspending the sentence on Count 13 after 60 days and releasing him at the same time on parole for other offences (parole for 2 years and 4 months to provide supervision in the community). Supervision on parole was to ensure the applicant continued to access counselling and other treatment for his PTSD (at [39]).
R v Thomas [2020] QCA 236 (30 October 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application to adduce further evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction; application to adduce further evidence.
Facts: The appellant man was found guilty of the murder of his female partner following a trial confined to the issue of intent. On 24 October 2015, the victim was found with injuries to her neck consistent with strangulation and rib fractures consistent with resuscitation or blunt trauma. Evidence at trial included: evidence from several of the victim’s former partners and her aunt; records of text messages/phone calls between the appellant and the victim commencing on 9 May 2015 (showing a volatile relationship); the appellant arranging to purchase a flight ticket overseas after the victim’s death; the appellant’s confession he killed the victim to a friend (that he had been humiliated and had “grabbed her and…squeezed”, accompanied demonstrating use of two hands); and evidence from a forensic pathologist of the victim’s injuries.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge erred in law by admitting exhibit 41, which contained six inadmissible photographs, causing a miscarriage of justice.
2.
The trial judge failed to direct the jury as to how exhibit 41 could be used, thus creating the danger of impermissible reasoning by the jury.
3.
The trial judge failed to direct in relation to motive.
4.
The verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence.
5.
The trial judge failed to leave the partial defence of provocation.
6.
The trial judge’s failure to direct the jury in relation to opinion evidence may have caused a miscarriage of justice.
7.
A collation of faults caused the trial to miscarry.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
Grounds 1 and 2: Exhibit 41 (photographs of bruising suffered by the victim in November 2014, identified by a former partner of the victim) was tendered by the prosecutor at the request of the appellant’s trial counsel for a forensic purpose. The fact that the appellant’s counsel abandoned the forensic purpose he had in mind for exhibit 41 did not mean that the evidence became prejudicial ([32]-[38]).
Ground 3: The trial judge did not fail to give a direction concerning motive which was requested by the appellant’s counsel, stating in summing up: “Any positive evidence that the defendant lacked a motive to cause [Jane’s] death or to do her grievous bodily harm is also relevant. It would be another circumstance to be taken into account in his favour in a case based on circumstantial evidence” ([39]-[42]).
Ground 5: The trial judge did not err in failing to leave open to the jury the partial defence of provocation (where the act was caused “in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation…before there is time for the person’s passion to cool”). First, the appellant’s trial counsel expressly disavowed reliance on provocation, making it clear that the only live issue was intention. Second, there was no evidence of acts of provocation which might have led to loss of self-control. The evidence did not show any particular link between the alleged humiliation and strangulation. Third, there was no evidence to suggest provocation would have caused a loss of control in a reasonable person ([43]-[48]).
Ground 6: There was no merit in the appellant’s contention that evidence from the victim’s aunt that “whether she was an alcoholic or not…she didn’t deserve…what she got” may have introduced factors of prejudice or emotion to the jury, or influenced their decision, and the trial judge should have directed the jury to disregard those claims. The jury would not have been concerned that the victim’s aunt made a personal comment, and no direction was sought by the appellant’s counsel ([49]-[53]).
Ground 7: None of the failures of defence counsel to object to the prosecution’s case demonstrated that defence counsel’s conduct denied the appellant a fair trial ([54]-[62]).
Ground 4: The principles relevant to the role of the appellate court, and pre-eminence of the jury were recently re-stated in Pell v The Queen and R v Baden-Clay. There was ample evidence (from the pathologist and the appellant’s friend) to support the jury’s conclusion that when the appellant squeezed the victim’s neck, he did so with the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. He applied pressure to her neck, and with two hands. In particular, “[t]he level of force necessary, the length of time it was applied for, the fact that the fingers moved around and the fractures to the neck all provide a foundation to infer the requisite intent”. It was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of murder ([63]-[71]).
The appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence was refused. The evidence requested to be adduced would have been in the hands of the defence counsel at the time of the trial, or it was irrelevant ([72]-[76]).
R v TAQ [2020] QCA 200 (15 September 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Tendency/relationship evidence’
Charges: Common assault x 9; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm while armed x 4; Rape x 1 (Charge 15).
Proceedings: Appeal against rape conviction (Charge 15); Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant was the male appellant’s former de facto partner. From 2006 the appellant became increasingly violent and controlling and committed numerous charged and uncharged assaults between 2006 and 2011. In October 2011, the appellant said to the complainant, “If you love me, darling, you’ll do it [anal]. If you don’t do it, I am going to turn you over and rape you”. The appellant then anally raped the complainant, after which he demanded oral sex and then hit her in the head. In December 2012, the complainant left the appellant but did not report the rape and assault to police until December 2016. In 2012, the appellant said to Mr P (a witness) that “he’d raped [the complainant]” and “if he didn’t get what he wanted, he’d take it”.
Grounds: (1) Mr P’s evidence of the conversation with the appellant should not have been admitted.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal against conviction dismissed. Appeal against sentence allowed due to a calculation error.
The prosecutor at trial argued that Mr P’s evidence that the appellant had said he’d raped the complainant could amount to an admission. The trial judge expressed doubt as to whether the jury could infer that it was an admission to the specific incident (Charge 15). In the summing up, the trial judge explained to the jury that Mr P’s evidence related more generally to “other incidents in which the [appellant] has through his actions, demonstrated a sexual interest in the complainant even when she is not consenting and was prepared to act on that interest” [28]. The respondent relies on R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 as making the evidence of Mr P admissible on the basis that an admission to a rape which is not charged can be used as evidence of the nature of the relationship relevant to the charged rape:
[32] Where the act in issue for [rape] count 15 was the act of anal intercourse without the consent of the complainant, evidence of other sexual acts between the appellant and the complainant as a result of the appellant’s threats or without the consent of the complainant was evidence that could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the occurrence of the anal rape, as described by the complainant. The direction given by the trial judge focused on the nature of the conduct to which the appellant admitted in his conversation with Mr P which was a willingness to act on his sexual interest in the complainant in the absence of her consent. The evidence of Mr P was admissible as relationship evidence that revealed a tendency of the appellant to engage in sexual acts with the complainant without her consent.
[33] The appellant does not succeed on the ground of appeal that Mr P’s evidence was inadmissible.
R v SDJ [2020] QCA 157 (24 July 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Section 93a evidence act statement’ – ‘Stepchild in the family’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unreasonable verdict’
Charges: Common assault x 1 (DFV offence); Choking in a domestic setting x 1 (DFV offence).
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant (10 years old) was the male appellant’s stepson. The appellant kicked the complainant and hit him on the side of the face two or three times with an open hand. The appellant then choked the complainant with ‘a neck lock’. The complainant’s mother and a friend of the family witnessed the assault. The appellant gave evidence that he did not assault the complainant.
Ground: Verdict was unreasonable.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. There were inconsistencies between the child complainant’s s93A Evidence Act statement (taken in a timely way after the incident) and the cross-examination (conducted 16 months after the incident) as during the latter the ‘complainant had little recollection’ of the events. However, this did not preclude the jury from relying on the s 93A statement, especially considering that the complainant’s statement was supported by evidence given by his mother and the family friend, as well as consistent medical evidence. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the jury to find the appellant guilty.
R v Young [2020] QCA 140 (26 June 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Inconsistent verdicts’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reliability’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1; choking in a domestic setting x 1
Case type:Appeal against conviction, application to adduce evidence on appeal
Facts: The appellant man was charged on indictment with one count of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed (Count 1), one count of common assault (Count 2) and one count of choking in a domestic setting (Count 3). The Crown entered a nolle prosequi in respect of Count 1. All counts were domestic violence offences against the appellant’s female domestic partner. The complainant’s evidence at trial was that it was a mutually abusive relationship against a background of excessive drinking. A temporary protection order was made against the appellant in favour of the complainant in 2017. In relation to Count 2, it was alleged that the appellant kicked the complainant on the legs, causing her to fall. With respect to Count 3, it was argued that he grabbed the complainant around the throat. A jury found the appellant not guilty of Count 2, but guilty of Count 3. He was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, with the conviction recorded as a domestic violence offence.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence and appealed his conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence. He also submitted that the evidence against him was unreliable, inconsistent and not capable of supporting a verdict of guilty on Count 3, and that there was no corroborative evidence in relation to the complainant’s allegations as to how the strangulation occurred. The Crown argued that whilst there were weaknesses in the complainant’s evidence in terms of her reliability, those factors were fairly outlined by the trial judge in the summing up, and that the complainant’s evidence was able to be supported by other evidence.
Held: The application for leave to adduce further evidence was refused, and the appeal against conviction was dismissed. The Court found that the jury was undoubtedly fully aware of the inconsistencies in the evidence ([99]). Taking into account all of the appellant’s arguments, there was nothing which led the Court to doubt the appellant’s guilt. It was open to the jury, on the whole of the evidence, to be satisfied of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant’s account of the choking after a sustained argument in the kitchen was compelling ([102]). That account of the attack and the pressure she felt was substantiated by the medical evidence, which also indicated that the injuries were consistent with choking ([103]). Further, the evidence of witnesses was substantially consistent with the complainant’s account. Whilst there is "no requirement that a complainant’s evidence be corroborated before a jury may return a verdict of guilty upon it" (Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12 (7 April 2020), there was in fact strong corroborative evidence here. Despite some inconsistencies, particularly in relation to the time of the choking, the Court was satisfied that the jury acting rationally would not have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of guilt. Given the complainant’s level of distress at the time and her acceptance during the course of her evidence that her memory of some events of that day were unclear, a mistake as to the time the choking event occurred was understandable ([104]-[105]).
R v Castel [2020] QCA 91 (6 May 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Manslaughter (domestic violence offence)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The woman applicant and her husband and victim had been married since 2010. Throughout this time, they argued occasionally, particularly about the husband arriving home from work after 6pm. On the day of the offending, the husband arrived home after 8pm and an argument developed while the couple were in the kitchen. The applicant threw the husband’s laptop at him, then picked up a 20.5cm long kitchen knife and threw it at him from 2-3m away. It landed in his chest region and either he pulled it out or it fell out. The applicant immediately said she was sorry, used a towel to cover the wound and called 000. Despite medical intervention, the husband died. The applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with no fixed date for parole eligibility. She appealed against her sentence.
Judgment: The majority (Sofronoff P and Mullins JA) held that the head sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was not inappropriate, but that failing to fix an eligibility date for parole was "unreasonable or plainly unjust" and was manifestly excessive [38]. They emphasised that the applicant had no criminal history, showed immediate remorse for her conduct, entered an early plea of guilty and was not at high risk of reoffending, and therefore ordered that her sentence be mitigated by including a date for eligibility for parole that was one-third of the sentence in custody [38].
Mullins JA (with whom Sofranoff P agreed) further provided that "section 9(10A) of the [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)] is a legislatively prescribed aggravating factor that must be taken into account in arriving at the appropriate sentence for the offence of manslaughter that is a domestic violence offence, unless the exception within the provision due to the exceptional circumstances of the case applies" [35]. Section 9(10A) refers to offenders convicted of domestic violence offences. In such cases, the fact that the offence is a domestic violence offence is an aggravating factor that is added to the other aggravating factors and balanced with any mitigating factors [35].
Boddice J (dissenting) dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant’s offending was "an extraordinary act of violence" and was a "very dangerous action" [42] that occurred in circumstances where the applicant was sober, sane, not provoked and not acting in self-defence [43]. He considered the applicant’s offending to be a very serious example of a domestic violence offence, making the circumstance of aggravation a very relevant factor in sentencing [44]. He contended that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating features [45] and that the sentence "fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion" [46].
R v HBZ [2020] QCA 73(17 April 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Step-children’
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of choking the female complainant in a domestic setting (domestic violence offence) (count 1) and common assault (domestic violence offence) (count 2) after trial before a jury in the District Court. He was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months on count 1 to be suspended after serving 15 months’ imprisonment for an operational period of three years. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for count 2.
The appellant often stayed at the complainant’s home where she lived with her five children; the appellant was the father of the youngest child. The appellant and his dog were staying at the complainant’s home when the appellant’s dog urinated on the floor and the complainant asked her son to tell the appellant.
The complainant’s evidence in chief was that:
•
The appellant hit the dog on the floor, rubbed it’s face in the urine and told the complainant his abuse of the dog was her fault. She asked him to leave, locked him out and went into a bedroom. He let himself back in with a spare key.
Re Count 1:
•
She dialled 000 and then: "[The appellant] moved the camp beds and he grabbed me, and he grabbed the phone, and then he put his hands around my neck – his right hand, and then he pushed on my shoulder at the same time to knock me onto the bed, and then he pinned me to the bed with his hand to stop me from speaking. So when I first started speaking, I could ask for help, but then the words wouldn’t come out, and I struggled to breathe."
•
The appellant grabbed the phone and smashed it. The appellant’s right hand was almost in a "V" around her throat and "instead of squeezing, he just was on top of me and used his body weight as the force to stop me from speaking". She couldn’t speak, felt pains in her chest and had black spots in her vision. She asked him to stop 3 or 4 times before she ran out of breath. She could not breathe for probably 70 seconds. She asked him to call an ambulance because she couldn’t breathe. [5]
Re Count 2:
•
"He grabbed my shoulders. When I was having difficulty breathing before he left, he grabbed my shoulders and shaked me and…. he shook me so hard that I was just flicking back and forth, and I could feel my neck – like, the back of my head hitting the back of my shoulders…."
•
He gave her "a really, really tight hug" and grabbed her by the shoulders. She told him to leave and he left.
•
She made a video diary of the incident and her injuries.
In cross-examination:
•
"The complainant denied, when it was put to her, that after the incident she was having trouble breathing due to a panic attack."
•
When it was put to the complainant that the appellant did not have his hand on her neck or throat "that much" she disagreed; "He pushed the air out of me and I thought I was going to die." [10]
•
She recorded in her video diary: "I’m finding it hard to breathe. I think it’s just a panic attack. Because he didn’t have his hand around my neck and throat that much." [11]
•
She did not call the ambulance immediately: "I was still having trouble breathing, which is why, on the video, I said I felt like I was having a panic attack during the video. Because I couldn’t understand, after his hand had been removed, why I was still having difficulty breathing.""[11]
•
She denied moving the camp beds into the bedroom after he left. [12]
Medical records included a note: "the patient states her partner pushed her onto the bed and strangled her with both hand pushing downwards then made multiple blows with fists to the shoulder and head. Patient unsure if knocked out."
In the complainant’s video record of interview he said there was a struggle for the phone. "He then sat down, gave her a big hug and got her to calm down. He denied choking her or trying to do that. He thought his thumb may have made contact with her during the struggle for the phone."[20]
Against the objection of defence counsel [21] the jury were given both a handout and direction in the terms: "‘Choked’ is an English word that bears its ordinary, everyday meaning – that is – ‘to hinder or stop the breathing of a person’."[20] Defence counsel argued there was only one definition given to the jury whereas dictionaries gave various definitions. [23]
Grounds: The grounds of appeal against conviction were:
1.
the learned trial judge erred in the direction given to the jury on the definition of choking;
2.
the appellant was deprived of a fair trial, because of the manner in which the allegations of fact in count 1 were particularised;
3.
the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were unreasonable and cannot be supported, having regarded to the evidence.
The sole ground of the application for leave to appeal against sentence was that the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Held:
1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.
Ground 1: Mullins JA considered the construction of s 315A Criminal Code (Qld) in light of s14A Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the purpose given for the introduction of the offence in the relevant Bill Explanatory Notes referring to recommendation 120 of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (Queensland) in its Report Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland.
"In order to amount to choking, there must be some pressure that results at least in the restriction of the victim’s breathing. As the evidence in this trial illustrated, there were overt signs in the consequences the complainant described of her struggle to breathe, her inability to speak, the black dots in her vision, the pain in her chest, and her feeling disoriented from which it could be inferred there was some restriction of her breathing, as a result of the appellant’s hand around her neck. The consequence of the restriction of the complainant’s breathing was not a separate element of the offence, but the evidence required to prove the act of choking."
The direction given by the trial judge on the meaning of "choked" was correct. It was a direction on the law. The meaning of the word "choked" for the purpose of count 1 was a matter of legal interpretation and it was appropriate that the judge directed the jury to apply the meaning "to hinder or stop the breathing of a person"." [58]-[59]
Ground 2: The appellant’s argument was that as the particulars specified alternative conduct for each count they failed to sufficiently inform him of the case against him (Count 1: "stopped and/or hindered [the complainant’s] breathing and, in doing so, choked her"; Count 2: "shook and/or applied force to [the complainant’s] shoulders and, in doing so, he unlawfully assaulted her" [60]). The complaint re Count 1 was resolved by the conclusion as to meaning of "choke" re ground 1; it was sufficient that the jury be satisfied the complainant putting his hand around her neck hindered her breathing [62]. There was no substance to the complaint re Count 2 [63].
Ground 3: The jury were given extensive and appropriate directions that they could not convict unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was "a reliable and truthful witness"… "that she was choked by the [appellant] by him placing his right hand around her throat and squeezed in the way that she described" and similar directions were given re Count 2 [65]. The jury’s verdicts were not unreasonable [66].
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted.
3. Appeal against sentence allowed.
The trial judge considered the sentencing decisions in R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 and R v MDB [2018] QCA 283. Mullins JA said: "Objectively, the appellant’s offending was less serious than the offending in MCW and MDB. The appellant also was younger than those offenders and without the relevant prior criminal history. It was therefore surprising that the prosecutor at the trial submitted to the trial judge that a sentence in the order of three years and six months or four years’ imprisonment was appropriate. It does not assist a sentencing judge, when the prosecutor’s submissions propose a sentence that is outside the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion for the offending committed by the particular offender." [71]
4. Set aside the sentence imposed at first instance for count 1 and, in lieu, the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years with the parole release date fixed at 5 June 2020.
5. The declaration as to pre-sentence custody and other orders made at first instance are confirmed.
R v Ridgeway [2020] QCA 38 (10 March 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Alternative hypothesis’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Post-offence conduct as evidence of consciousness of guilt’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Verdict unreasonable or insupportable having regard to evidence’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1 (aggravating circumstance of being a domestic violence offence).
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of one count of attempted murder (domestic violence offence) and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years. The appellant, an electronics engineer, was alleged to have attempted to murder his wife (the victim) by connecting a garden hose to a nitrogen gas cylinder which was then attached to the inside of the caravan where the victim slept. There was evidence that the appellant had motive to kill the victim because she was taking preliminary steps to divorce him and had demanded that he leave the matrimonial home. She had also left a will making him her beneficiary. In his police interview, the appellant denied knowledge of the contraption. At trial, however, he admitted that he constructed the contraption as a drainage system ([74]). Further, the appellant acknowledged his relationship difficulties with the victim and told police that they had an argument concerning their daughter. According to the victim, that argument led to the appellant pushing her against a wall while threatening to punch her. As a result, she called the Domestic Violence Hotline.
In summary, the appellant’s case was that the Crown had failed to exclude the hypothesis that the victim had constructed the apparatus, because there was evidence that:
•
She had a motive to implicate her husband falsely in a murder attempt.
•
The appellant must have appreciated that the apparatus could not have killed his wife.
•
The contraption was ineffective to kill.
Issue: The appellant appealed against conviction. He submitted that the guilty verdict could not be supported by the evidence or was unreasonable ([52]) (Ground 1). He also claimed that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that an essential step in the chain of reasoning was that the appellant believed that introducing nitrogen into the caravan would kill his wife ([97]) (Ground 2), and complained about the trial judge directions as to the use of post-offence conduct as proof of his intention ([107]) (Ground 3). His appeal also included the claim that there was a failure to distinguish attempted murder from other offending based on the same physical acts, but with different mental elements, which might have explained the post-offence conduct ([114]) (Ground 4).
Held: All four grounds of appeal were dismissed. Sofronoff P (with Philippides JA and Flanagan J agreeing) noted that it was open to the jury to reject the appellant’s explanation for constructing the contraption. His credit was impaired by his failure to offer this explanation when first interviewed by police. Further, the verisimilitude of his explanation was reduced by the uselessness of the contraption as a drainage system, and the inconsistencies in his reasons for erecting the drainage system. The jury was therefore entitled to accept the victim’s evidence and be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant constructed the apparatus to deliver gas into the caravan in which his wife was sleeping ([81]-[82]). The evidence that the victim had informed the appellant that she wanted a divorce, together with the evidence of lies to police, supported a conclusion that the appellant believed that he had built a system that would be effective to kill ([88]). His Honour therefore held that the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
As to the second ground of appeal, the appellant was unable to establish a miscarriage of justice by merely asserting that the trial judge miscarried through a lack of proper directions about proof of the appellant’s intention ([106]). A redirection was not sought ([101]). Whilst the trial judge did not identify the series of evidentiary steps that the jury could take to find guilty intent, doing so would have assisted the prosecution, not the defence ([106]).
Further, the appellant submitted that there was an alternative hypothesis that he had set up the apparatus to harass his wife, and therefore, his post-offence conduct was indicative of his sense of guilt for trying to harass her ([109]). This submission failed because harassment by the use of nitrogen, as an alternative hypothesis, did not arise as an issue in the case ([110]).
Ground 4 was also rejected. Citing R v Baden-Clay, the Court stated that "it is not necessary for a jury to consider a hypothesis which was not put to it for tactical reasons, which is directly contrary to the evidence that the accused gave at the trial and which is directly contrary to the way in which the accused’s counsel conducted the defence". Any intention on the appellant’s part to do anything other than kill his wife or drain water did not arise on the evidence and did not have to be considered ([120]).
R v Toweel [2019] QCA 303 (20 December 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prior acts of domestic violence’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1 x unlawful strangulation; 1 x unlawful assault
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was charged with 2 offences, committed on the same day against a woman (the complainant) with whom he was in a domestic relationship and had a child. Count 1 involved the appellant strangling the complainant ‘really tight’ for a period of about 15 seconds, stopping only when their son fell from a couch. Count 2 occurred shortly afterwards. The appellant grabbed the complainant’s hair and repeatedly said ‘bitch’ while she held their son. The appellant then destroyed her phone ([4]-[5]). The complainant also gave evidence of 5 previous incidents of domestic violence ([11]-[17]); however, the appellant did not give or call evidence ([18]). The jury convicted the appellant on both counts.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the appeal against the convictions should be allowed. The appellant appealed against each conviction on the ground that the trial judge wrongly admitted evidence of prior acts of domestic violence by him against the complainant. He also appealed against the conviction on the strangulation charge on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal. The evidence summarised at [4]-[18] was admitted under s 132B(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). The question for the Court was whether the admission of the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice ([34]). The Court held that the evidence of prior events was relevant to establish that the alleged offending did not occur randomly and to demonstrate the nature of the relationship between the appellant and complainant. To minimise any risk of the jury engaging in propensity reasoning, the trial judge warned them that they were not to use the evidence as demonstrating the appellant’s propensity to commit similar offences ([37]-[38]). Overall, the jury directions avoided the misuse of the evidence, and no miscarriage of justice was caused by its admission ([40]).
Vital v DPP (Qld) [2019] QCA 290 (6 December 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1; assault occasioning bodily harm while armed and in company x 1; burglary at night x 1; common assault x 1; and robbery with personal violence as a domestic violence offence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The accused was a 19-year-old male with no prior criminal history. He was in an abusive relationship with the daughter of a man he was charged with murdering at the time of offending.
On the day of the offending, the daughter told the accused their relationship was over. That night, the appellant was in the daughter’s bedroom when she came home but was asked to leave by her flatmate. After leaving the apartment he began to make a nuisance of himself, causing the flatmate to call the daughter’s father (the victim) who soon arrived with another man. The appellant fled by car with his companion and was followed by the victim and the other man. The appellant eventually stopped the car and his companion went onto the road and took out a pistol which he pointed at the victim’s car. The victim’s companion approached the appellant, who was still in the car, and began to punch the window.
The appellant’s companion hit the victim with his pistol and knocked him unconscious. This blow ultimately killed the victim. The appellant and his companion then took off, briefly returning to the daughter’s home and punching her two or three times in the face before fleeing again.
The appellant submitted that the judge who refused his bail application ‘must not have given consideration to the appellant’s youth, his lack of criminal history and, as the appellant asserts, the weakness of the Crown case against him, the weight that these matters deserved’. He submits that it should be inferred that Justice Davis made an error, and in oral argument, he has also submitted, that Justice Davis must have overlooked the extraordinary delay of about 18 months until there can be a trial in this matter. (per Soffronoff P at [7-8]).
Issue: Whether to grant leave to appeal.
Decision and reasoning: Sofronoff P stated that ‘in an appeal against a discretionary decision, it is not a valid ground of appeal to contend that the judge did not give sufficient weight to a relevant factor or gave too much weight to a factor. Weight is a matter for the decision-maker alone’ [7]. His Honour thus dismissed the appellant’s related claims.
The submission that the judge must have overlooked the delay was not accepted as a delay of that order was to be expected [12]. Furthermore, regarding the appellant’s claim of error, Sofronoff P concluded that ‘[i]n an application for bail, the appellant’s actions after he returned to Jane’s house could, on their own, justify a refusal of bail. When they are taken into account in a case in which the applicant is also awaiting trial for murder, refusal of bail can hardly be regarded as so unreasonable that an error of some kind in the judge’s reasoning has to be inferred. Yet that is what the appellant must show in order to persuade this Curt to disturb the decision of Justice Davis. In my view, he has failed to do so, and the appeal should be dismissed’ [13].
R v O'Malley [2019] QCA 130 (28 June 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Dysfunctional upbringing’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: 1 x manslaughter
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter by unlawfully killing the deceased, with whom he was in a domestic relationship for some 18 months. The applicant was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The conviction was declared to be a domestic violence offence and a serious violent offence.
The applicant told ambulance offices that the deceased fell off the toilet shortly before he had called them, and that she had also fallen in the shower the night before ([11]). However, a post-mortem of the deceased’s body revealed that the most likely cause of death was multiple injuries, including multiple rib fractures and liver lacerations. Such injuries were inconsistent with a fall in a shower, and were most likely to have resulted from a ‘focused and severe force, such as kicking or stomping’ ([14]). Although the applicant disagreed with the pathology report ([21]), his mobile phone records demonstrated that he knew the deceased had broken ribs ([22]). The agreed statement of facts recorded that the applicant was to be sentenced on the basis that he (1) unlawfully assaulted the deceased causing the injuries which led to her death; (2) kneed her to the stomach and to the back; (3) caused head and facial injuries; and (4) assaulted her in the past as evidenced by the facial bruising previously observed by witnesses and the healing fractures, which demonstrate that this was not an isolated violent incident ([24]).
Issue: The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against his sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, and wished to add an additional ground of appeal, namely, ‘that the learned sentencing judge erred in finding that his post-offence conduct demonstrated a complete disregard for the deceased and did not demonstrate remorse or concern for the deceased’ ([48]).
Held: The applicant’s antecedents and criminal history is discussed at [25]-[36]). The applicant has Aboriginal heritage. He also had a history of criminal offending, including convictions for breaking and entering, and property damage, and, most importantly, for offences against his former partner for property damage, common assault, contravention of a prohibition or restriction in an apprehended violence order, and use of a carriage service to menace, harass or offend. He claimed to have had a ‘socially deprived upbringing’ - his father was a ‘professional and serial criminal’ and his step-mother was emotionally abusive. His biological mother was not involved in his care due to very heavy alcohol dependency and abuse. He also claimed to have been sexually abused when he was 11 years old. Psychological testing suggested that the applicant’s intellectual level likely fell in the intellectually disabled range. A psychologist observed that his dysfunctional and abusive upbringing likely significantly influenced his offending behaviour.
The Court distinguished the present case from DeSalvo, Murray, West and Heazlewood where the courts did not consider a domestic violence offence ([89]). The applicant had a relevant prior criminal history, including convictions for prior domestic violence episodes, which distinguished him from the offenders in Sebo, Baggott, Pringle and Hutchinson ([91]). Given the ‘seriousness of the offending manifested by the brutality of the applicant’s assault and the relative defencelessness of the deceased, the applicant’s remorse after the assault, his timely plea of guilty, his antecedents, his deprived social upbringing, his intellectual disability and the state of his mental health, and bearing in mind the need for some personal deterrence due to his past domestic violence offences and his moderate risk of reoffending, the related need for community protection, and the importance of denunciation of domestic violence offences causing death’, the sentence imposed by the trial judge was just in all the circumstances, and thus stood as ‘the appropriate sentence for the offender and the offence’ ([95]-[96]). Consequently, leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed on both grounds.
R v Sprott; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2019] QCA 116 (14 June 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Leniency’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and his partner had an argument after the respondent came home from the pub. The respondent later walked to his mother’s house, where his mother lived with her partner, and violently assaulted them. The respondent’s mother suffered multiple injuries, including a fracture to her eye socket, while her partner suffered fractures, 2 broken ribs and an injured liver. The respondent pleaded guilty to 2 counts of attempted murder. Crow J, the sentencing judge, sentenced the respondent to 2 concurrent sentences of 9 and a half years imprisonment.
Issue: The Attorney-General appealed against the 2 sentences on the ground of manifest inadequacy. Key questions included whether Crow J gave appropriate weight to the mitigating and aggravating factors of the offence and the respondent’s personal circumstances, and whether a sentence below 10 years imprisonment for 2 counts of attempted murder was manifestly inadequate.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal. Appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases ([15]). Rather, the Attorney-General was required to demonstrate actual error with Crow J’s reasoning.
The Attorney-General’s submissions included that the attacks were premeditated, that the respondent lacked remorse, that his guilty pleas were late, and that he carried out the offending while he was subject to a Domestic Violence Order ([20]). The respondent had previously assaulted his mother. It was submitted that the Crow J did not give these matters appropriate weight ([21]).
The Court noted that the case involved substantial mitigating factors that were personal to the respondent ([23]). The respondent’s current state of health was partly caused by his mother’s lifelong neglect of him, and was significantly exacerbated by both of his victims’ irresponsibility over the respondent’s son’s death, and by their callousness afterwards ([40]).
It was in these circumstances that Crow J viewed the respondent’s case as ‘far from general.’ The most relevant circumstance was the killing of the respondent’s son by the victims’ dog ([37]). The offending was motivated by the son’s death ‘in a most violent fashion’ ([35]). The Court held that it was open for Crow J to give substantial weight to the mitigating factors and, subsequently, impose a somewhat ‘lenient’ sentence. It was not for the Court of Appeal to substitute its own views about these matters ([41]).
R v Black [2019] QCA 114 (11 June 2019)– Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’
Charges: Assaults occasioning bodily harm x 3; Rape x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of 2 counts of assault occasioning bodily harm and one count of rape. He was acquitted of another charge of assault. For the offence of rape, the appellant was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 27 months with an operational period of 5 years. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 months’ imprisonment on the other counts.
The appellant and complainant were married and had 2 children when the offending allegedly occurred. They separated around one year later. The first count of assault occasioning bodily harm involved allegations that the appellant pushed the complainant against a staircase, verbally abused her, ripped off her clothes and grabbed her breasts. The complainant said that she suffered bruising as a result of this event. The second count involved allegations that the appellant unlawfully assaulted and caused bodily harm to the complainant by slamming a door closed, hitting her fingers. The appellant also allegedly raped the complainant. It was alleged that the appellant and complainant were on good terms for many years after the couple had divorced. The complaint was made to the police over 8 years after the alleged events occurred and at a time when the complainant and the appellant were in litigation about their children.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the convictions on the ground that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence.
Held: The appellant submitted that the complainant’s attitude towards the appellant after separation was not that which would be expected of someone who had suffered the conduct alleged ([24]). The Court held that the cordial relationship between the parties provided a substantial basis for challenging her testimony, and may have justified a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury in relation to the count of rape ([35]).
However the question for the Court was whether it was open, on the whole of the evidence, for the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt, having regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over the Court, which had not seen or heard the complainant’s evidence being given ([36]).
Their Honours noted the importance of the timing of the complaint to police. While it strongly indicated that it was affected by the litigation between the couple about their children, it did not require the jury to have a doubt about the credibility of the complainant’s complaints. It was open to the jury to accept the complainant’s evidence, and the Court ordered the appeals against conviction to be dismissed ([37]-[38]).
R v ABE [2019] QCA 83 (14 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Primary carer’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: Stalking x 1 (Count 1); malicious act with intent x 1 (Count 2); grievous bodily harm x 1 (Count 3).
Case type: Sentence application and appeal.
Facts: The applicant experienced domestic violence from her husband (the complainant) from 2005. Cross-protection orders prohibited them from living together. The applicant arrived at the matrimonial residence with two children of the marriage. Her husband was residing at that residence. That night, the complainant sustained 4 stab wounds at the hands of the applicant. He also suffered 2 lacerations to the right hand that caused tendon and nerve damage. These events constituted Counts 2 and 3. The applicant and complainant were separated, and their severely disabled daughter, AA, was in hospital at the time of the offending. The applicant is her primary carer. The complainant for Count 1 was a family friend who was having an affair with the complainant.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges. She was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for Count 1, and six years’ imprisonment with a parole eligibility date fixed after serving 15 months in custody for each of the other counts.
As the sentence for the stalking was already served, the purpose of the application was to review the sentence imposed for the other counts. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against her sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge erred in failing to find that the circumstances of AA were exceptional and therefore justified a non-custodial sentence. The applicant also applied for leave to adduce further evidence, namely an affidavit from her adult daughter which detailed the care arrangements for AA since the applicant went into custody.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account the applicant’s disabled daughter’s needs.
Held: The appeal against the sentence was allowed, and the sentence was varied. Mullins J noted that the offences were committed in circumstances where the applicant was AA’s primary carer. When imposing an appropriate sentence, a balancing exercise needs to be undertaken which fulfils the purposes of ‘sentencing for serious offending involving premeditated use of a weapon to inflict injury in a domestic setting, but also [to] allow for the mitigating circumstances and particularly the applicant’s role in relation to the special needs of AA’. The period served in custody should be sufficiently long to reflect appropriate punishment for the crime, without separating the applicant from AA for any longer than is necessary ([47]). Her Honour held that, in light of AA’s needs, the custodial component of the sentence should have been reduced by a further period of 6 months. Therefore, the sentence was manifestly excessive to the extent of fixing the parole eligibility date after 15 months in custody rather than after a period of 9 months ([48]). Davis J and Sofronoff P agreed with the reasons of Mullins J. Citing R v Chong; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2008] QCA 22, Davis J noted that although hardship to an offender’s family resulting from the offender’s imprisonment cannot override all other sentencing considerations, there will be some cases where family hardship results in a substantial reduction either in the sentence, or the period to be served before parole eligibility even where the offending is serious ([52]).
The Court also refused the application for leave to adduce further evidence because it was neither necessary nor expedient, in the interests of justice, to receive further affidavits of the adult daughter ([37]).
R v Lan [2019] QCA 76 (7 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-serving statements’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1 x attempted murder
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was convicted on his plea of guilty of attempted murder (domestic violence offence) and sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment with no further order ([1]). The applicant and complainant were involved in a relationship for approximately one year prior to separating, but remained friends. The offending conduct took place when the applicant attended the complainant’s unit. He made unwanted advances towards her, punched her and threatened to kill her. The complainant lost consciousness for a period and, upon regaining consciousness, saw the applicant standing over her with his pants and underwear down. He also strangled the complainant. The applicant later provided self-serving statements to the police which sought to blame the complainant for violent behaviour towards him ([3]-[13]).
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.
Held: The applicant made a number of written submissions in support of his application ([22]). He maintained that she had burned his face with a lighter ([23]), which was not part of the agreed statement of facts. He also asserted that the complainant suffered from a mental illness ([24]), and sought to minimise the seriousness of his conduct, which demonstrated a lack of remorse or insight ([25]).
The application for leave to appeal against the sentence for attempted murder was refused. Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Mullins J found that the applicant’s assertions conflicted with the agreed facts and partly reiterated the self-serving statements he made to police ([26]). Their Honours agreed with the respondent’s submissions that the sentence imposed was within the sentencing discretion and supported by authorities such as R v Sauvao, R v Ali, R v Seijbel-Chocmingkwan and R v Kerwin. After analysing these authorities at [28]-[31], their Honours found that they demonstrated that the 9 year sentence was within the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion ([32]).
R v Kau [2019] QCA 73 (3 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Corroborative evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Mistake direction’ – ‘Rape -sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 2 x rape (domestic violence offence)
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was charged with 4 counts of rape, and convicted on 2 counts as a domestic violence offence. He was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 2 and a half years in custody. The complainant was the appellant’s wife. Counts 1 and 3 (subjects of the guilty verdicts) were particularised as vaginal rapes, while Counts 2 and 4 (subjects of the not guilty verdicts) were alleged anal rapes ([4]).
Issue: The appellant appealed against his conviction on 2 grounds ([5]):
•
‘The convictions should be set aside as unreasonable because the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on the other counts’;
•
‘There was a miscarriage of justice because the…trial judge ought to have directed the jury to consider whether they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act under a mistake of fact as to the complainant’s consent on the two counts the subject of the guilty verdicts’.
Held: To succeed on the first appeal ground, the appellant must prove the verdicts were inconsistent as a matter of logic and reasonableness. The test is that ‘no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion’ ([6]). There were 3 differences in the quality of the evidence considered by the jury ([9]), namely, the difference in what the complainant told her confidantes before she reported to the police ([10]), the difference in her report to the police ([11]), and a recording of a conversation between the complainant and appellant in which she made no mention to anal penetration ([12]). There was also evidence that might have corroborated Counts 1 and 3 ([15]), but there was no such evidence about Count 2 or 4 ([20]). The Court held that it was open for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt on Counts 1 and 3. The differences in the quality of the complainant’s evidence and appellant’s corroborative evidence provided a logical and reasonable basis for the jury to arrive at different conclusions and return different verdicts for Counts 1 and 3 and Counts 2 and 4 ([23]).
The second appeal ground argued that the jury ought to have been directed to consider whether the Crown had satisfied them beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had not acted under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that the complainant had consented to the vaginal penetrations. To succeed on this proposed ground, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial judge should have given a mistake direction and that it is reasonably possible that the failure to do so may have affected the verdict ([24]). In light of the evidence, there was a negligible prospect of the jury, having accepted the occurrence of the vaginal penetrations, having a reasonable doubt whether the appellant acted under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief as to the complainant’s consent. In the circumstances, the trial judge was under no duty to give such a direction ([39]). The appellant was therefore not deprived of a real chance of an acquittal by the failure of the trial judge to give a mistake direction to the jury.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
R v Sollitt [2019] QCA 44 (19 February 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; contravention of a domestic violence order; rape.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for an extension of time.
Facts: The appellant was charged with a number of offences against the complainant, his then de facto partner. The complainant’s daughter and son gave evidence of the events ([33]-[40]). The complainant herself gave evidence asserting that she was in a ‘domestic violence cycle’ ([23]). After a trial, the appellant was convicted of two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) and contravention of a domestic violence order. The jury acquitted the appellant of a charge of torture and was unable to reach a verdict in relation to a charge of rape. After a retrial on the charge of rape, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment ([1]-[4]). The appellant submitted that consent was given by the complainant and that sexual intercourse in the context of the violent circumstances was not a departure from the usual dynamics of the relationship. The Crown contended that if there was any ostensible consent by the complainant, it was induced by force and invalid at law, and that the appellant could not have held a mistake of fact as to consent ([46]). The appellant appealed against his conviction of rape on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable and unsafe, and there was a miscarriage of justice, resulting from the trial judge’s misdirection of the jury on the defence of mistake of fact ([5]).
Further, the appellant sought an extension of time in which to appeal his sentence ([6]). The applicant’s explanation for delay in filing the application for leave to appeal against sentence was that his lawyer did not provide him with any information about appealing his sentence and that he thought he would be able to get more time ([69]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable. Whether the appeal should be allowed. The predominant issue at trial was the issue of consent, including a mistake of fact as to the complainant’s consent.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed and the application for an extension of time was refused.
Appeal against conviction:
In relation to the appellant’s contention that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, the Court considered whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty based on the whole of the evidence. In determining this question, the Court undertook its own independent assessment of the evidence, assessing its sufficiency and quality ([45]). As to the issue of consent, the Court held that it was entirely open to a jury to find that the complainant gave an honest and reliable account, and it was not surprising that the jury were satisfied that the prosecution had negatived any mistake of fact as to consent on the part of the appellant. There was no evidence from the appellant that he held an honest but mistaken belief as to voluntary consent. Moreover, the appellant’s conduct immediately following the offence and his admission to the complainant’s daughter undermined any assertion that the appellant honestly and reasonably believed that the complainant consented ([51]-[52]). It was also appropriate for the jury to have regard to the ‘ongoing domestic violence in the relationship’ and the complainant’s continuation of the relationship in considering the issues raised by the case ([53]).
The appellant also made a number of complaints about the trial judge’s directions, such as the fact that his Honour used a number of terms interchangeably regarding consent ([58]) and, in giving his final direction on mistake of fact, failed to give a repeat direction on the standard of proof required of the prosecution to negate the defence of mistake of fact beyond reasonable doubt ([64]). The trial judge’s use of the words other than ‘consent’ was not found to constitute a miscarriage of justice ([60]). Further, there was no error in failing to specifically mention the standard of proof in the final redirection, as it was given in conjunction with the aide memoire, which itself identified the requisite standard of proof ([66]).
Extension of time:
In considering whether an extension of time should be granted, the court examined whether there was any good reason to account for the delay and considered whether it was in the interests of justice to grant the extension ([68]). The Court was not persuaded that there was any good reason for the delay to grant an extension ([69]). Moreover, the applicant was 43 years old at the time of the sentence and had repeatedly been convicted of offences of violence, particularly in a domestic setting. These factors supported the sentence imposed and indicated that the sentence was not manifestly excessive ([70]).
R v ABB [2019] QCA 22 (19 February 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Expert or opinion evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Charges: Assault, constituting a domestic offence x 4.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for extension of time.
Facts: The applicant was convicted on four counts of assault, each of which constituted a domestic offence. All four counts were committed against the applicant’s wife on the same day. The applicant grabbed the complainant’s hair and pulled her to the ground, put his hands around her throat and choked her, and punched her on the jaw with both fists, which resulted in a fracture and required her teeth to be wired together and the fracture closed with a plate and screws ([4]). At the trial, Dr Webster gave evidence, based on the complainant’s medical records, that the injury had been caused by a blunt force trauma to a significant extent ([30]). The applicant lodged a notice of appeal against his conviction when the time for lodging an appeal had expired over three weeks prior. As a result, the applicant also filed an application for extension of time within which to appeal.
The applicant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory ([32]). He also raised a number of specific grounds, including that
•
The prosecution led propensity evidence, the prejudicial effect of which outweighed any probative force, and created an unfair trial ([33]-[36]);
•
The evidence of Dr Webster was fabricated, causing a miscarriage of justice ([37]-[43]);
•
The complainant at trial had previously practiced her evidence and amended the part of the evidence that would have been harmful to the prosecution case ([44]-[45]);
•
A prejudicial answer was given by the complainant during the trial and there was no direction given to the jury to disregard it ([46]-[51]);
•
There was discrepancy in the complainant’s evidence as to how she was punched;
•
Dr Webster was not qualified to give an opinion that the injury constituted grievous bodily harm as he was merely a trainee as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon ([54]).
Issues: Whether the grounds of the applicant’s proposed appeal had reasonable prospects of success to justify granting an extension of time.
Decision and reasoning: When considering an application for extension of time, the court will examine whether there is good reason for the delay and whether it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension. Length of delay is also a relevant consideration ([7]). Although the length of the delay was not significant, the applicant was well aware of the time limit for filing and allowed the time to pass without taking steps to file a notice of appeal. The Court was inclined to grant the extension of time if the matter had been confined to these considerations; however as the merits of the proposed appeal could not be substantiated, the court refused the application ([22]-[23]).
The applicant’s grounds of appeal failed for several reasons. First, the jury was expressly directed that the evidence was not led as propensity evidence and therefore the trial did not miscarry on the basis that the prosecution led such evidence ([36]). Second, the applicant’s contention that Dr Webster’s alteration of his opinion constituted some sort of fabrication of his evidence, causing a miscarriage of justice, was misconceived ([37]). Third, any suggestion that the complainant was able to rehearse or practice her evidence at the first trial was simply the result of the fact that the first trial was aborted. Whatever benefit she got from giving evidence on that occasion was balanced by the fact that the defence counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine her more than once, and so no prejudice was caused ([45]). Fourth, the Court found that an answer by the complainant, which the applicant argued caused him prejudice as it revealed his infidelity, was unlikely to have carried much weight with the jury and did not deprive the applicant of a fair chance of acquittal ([51]). Fifth, the applicant contended that there were discrepancies in the complainant’s evidence because in her evidence in chief, she said that she was punched after she fell; however in cross-examination, she said she did not scream when she was punched, but when she fell. The Court held that there was no real inconsistency as the first piece of evidence related to when she was punched and the second to when she screamed ([52])-([53]). Sixth, it was admitted at the trial that the injury constituted grievous bodily harm. The fact that Dr Webster was a trainee did not mean that he was not a relevant expert ([54]-[58]).
In reviewing the evidence ([94]-[107]), the Court held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied of the applicant’s guilt. As all the grounds of the applicant’s appeal lacked merit, the appeal had no reasonable prospect of succeeding and the application for an extension of time was refused ([108]). The Court also took into account the fact that the applicant was self-represented ([59]).
R v MDB [2018] QCA 283 (19 October 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating feature’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1x common assault, 1x threatening violence, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x choking in a domestic setting, and 1x wilful damage.
Appeal type: application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the complainant from August 2016. On 22 December 2016, a protection order requiring that the applicant be of good behaviour and not commit acts of domestic violence against the complainant was issued pursuant to the Domestic and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). On 17 February 2017, the applicant attacked the complainant. Consequently, the applicant was charged with five offences (common assault, threatening violence, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, choking in a domestic setting, wilful damage) and three summary offences (deprivation of liberty, breach protection order, unlawful possession of a weapon). On 15 February 2018, the applicant was convicted and sentenced on the five indicted offences and convicted of the three summary offences without any further punishment.
Issues: there were four grounds of the applicant’s appeal:
•
Four-year sentence imposed for the offence of choking was manifestly excessive
•
The sentencing judge erred by relying upon the protection order as evidence that the offending was not isolated.
•
The sentencing judge erred by finding that the applicant had made a threat to kill.
•
The sentencing judge erred by finding that the applicant was generally not credible because he told police it wasn’t illegal to possess a “flick knife” in a private place in circumstances where he was previously convicted of possessing a knife in a public place.
Decision and reasoning: application for leave to appeal against the sentence refused.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive was determined by Gotterson JA through a consideration of relevant authority, the nature and purpose of the offence of choking, and the circumstances of the case at hand. Both R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 and Bennet were referred to by his Honour to illustrate the seriousness of the offence and the factors relevant to sentencing offenders under the offence (see [44]-[50]). His Honour then noted there were five material facts that warranted the severity of the punishment; these factors included, among others, the disturbing circumstances of the offending, the physical, emotional and financial impact it had on the complainant, and the applicant’s concerning criminal history (see [52]).
As to the second ground of appeal, his Honour initially notes that the order was part of the agreed facts which formed the basis of the sentence proceedings. Gotterson JA then refers to s 9(3)(g) and s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 in asserting that the existence and contravention of an order is a key consideration for the sentencing judge and forms an aggravating feature respectively. In doing so, his Honour dismisses the foundation of this contention that the order cannot be referred to as evidence. In addressing the applicant’s specific contention, his Honour observes that orders are only made on the basis of evidence of previous difficulties in a relationship and that accordingly, the sentencing judge’s inference that the order was a result of previous relationship difficulties was a reasonable one. Taking this into account, his Honour then affirms that it was correct for the sentencing judge to state that the offences committed on 17 February 2017 were not “an isolated and exceptional incident” (see [26]).
Gotterson JA rejected the third ground of appeal on the basis that the applicant’s contention mis-interpreted the sentencing judge’s remarks in coming to the finding that the applicant threatened to kill her (see [27]). Having regard to the seriousness and criminality of the applicant’s conduct, his Honour perceives the sentencing judge’s finding as reflecting no error at all (see [28]).
Similarly, his Honour also rejected the fourth ground of appeal on the basis that it was a misconstruction of the sentencing judge’s comments. Gotterson JA was of the view the judge made no error in his assessment of the reliability of the matters at hand on the basis of the applicant’s instructions (see [33]).
R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 (28 September 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection orders’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 1; Contravention of domestic violence order x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, one count of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting and one summary charge of contravention of domestic violence order ([4]). The prosecutor, relying on R v West [2006] QCA 252, R v King [2006] QCA 466 and R v RAP [2014] QCA 228, submitted to the sentencing judge that three years’ imprisonment was appropriate. A variation of the protection order was also sought so as to extend its operation and add a further ‘no contact’ condition.
The sentencing judge held that the offences were ‘cowardly, prolonged and particularly violent’ ([23]) and that the offender posed a genuine threat to the community and particularly, to the complainant ([25]). In respect of each of the assault occasioning bodily harm counts, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months. Sentences of imprisonment for three years and six months was imposed for the offence of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting, and three months for the summary charge. All sentences were concurrent. No date for eligibility for parole was specified. The applicant was therefore ineligible to apply for parole prior to having served half of the effective sentence of imprisonment of three and a half years ([4]).
The applicant appealed on the basis that the sentencing judge had denied him procedural fairness by failing to forewarn the parties of his intention to reduce the head sentence slightly to reflect the guilty plea, and to provide him with an opportunity for a parole at earlier than half the sentence. He also appealed on the basis that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether there was a denial of procedural fairness.
Decision and reasoning: Application was refused on the basis that no procedural unfairness arose on the facts and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
•
Manifestly excessive sentence
The applicant submitted that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and that the notional starting point of four years’ imprisonment for the offence against s 315A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (the ‘Code’) was too high ([33]). Conversely, the respondent contended that consideration must not only be given to the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, but also to the legislative intention for enacting s 315A to provide for specific liability, and a potentially increased maximum penalty, for offences involving choking (and similar conduct) committed in a domestic setting ([34]). Prior to the sentencing, the Code was amended to create a specific offence of strangulation in a domestic setting (see s 315A). That section prescribes a maximum penalty of seven years to deter the increasing frequency of such behaviour. The Court referred to the Explanatory Notes for the Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Bill (No 2) 2015 at [39] –
‘The new strangulation offence and the significant penalty attached, reflect that this behaviour is not only inherently dangerous, but is a predictive indicator of escalation in domestic violence offending, including homicide…’
The Court was cautious to apply authorities for sentences for offences constituted by conduct comparable to choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting, prior to the enactment of s 315A. R v West [2006] QCA 252, R v King [2006] QCA 466 and R v RAP [2014] QCA 228 involved assaults occasioning bodily harm, the maximum penalty for which was seven years’ imprisonment. The Court found that it was not useful to consider the sentences in those cases as comparable authorities for an offence of strangulation in a domestic setting, having regard to the legislature’s intention for enacting s 315A and the seriousness of that offence.
The test of manifest excessiveness depends on whether the sentence is unreasonable or unjust, in light of all the factors relevant to the sentence (see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45). The fact that the complainant lost consciousness, and that the offending occurred only 18 days after his release from custody for breach of a previous domestic violence order, increased the severity of the offence. The applicant’s criminality was also increased by the fact that the choking incident was preceded, and then followed, by an assault occasioning bodily harm. Further, the applicant showed no remorse for the offending and refused to undergo counselling. Boddice J concluded that the circumstances indicated that the applicant’s offending amounted to ‘an episode of sustained violence undertaken by a recidivist who expressed no remorse’ ([47]). Therefore, the Court found that the sentencing judge did not err in sentencing the offender to three years and six months without any further mitigation, and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive in the circumstances ([44]).
R v Ellis [2018] QCA 70 (17 April 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Risk factors - controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Torture x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Malicious act with intent x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant and the applicant had been in a relationship for two months ([4]). The complainant ended the relationship. The next day, the applicant attended at her home and she let him inside. He accused her of being unfaithful to him ([4]). Over the next four hours, the applicant did the following acts to the complainant: slapped her; ripped an earring from her ear; punched her; struck her with a garden trowel; locked her in a cupboard; heated the trowel and a butter knife over the flame of a gas stove and struck her on the legs and near her vulva, causing burns; and forced her to shower, exacerbating the burns ([5]).
The applicant was sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment for the torture charge, 18 months’ imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm charge, and 6 years’ imprisonment for the malicious act with intent charge. A serious violent offence declaration was made in respect of the torture charge.
Issues: Whether the sentence of six and a half years’ imprisonment for the torture charge was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused. It was within the trial judge’s discretion to sentence the applicant and also make a serious violent offence declaration ([19]). The trial judge appropriately balanced the applicant’s personal circumstances, including the fact that he was subject to domestic violence as a child, with the fact that he had a criminal history including domestic violence ([12]).
Harvey v Queensland Police Service [2018] QCA 64 (6 April 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Protection orders’ – ‘Related family law proceedings’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Contravention of temporary protection order x 9; Public nuisance x 1; Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence x 1; Failure to surrender into custody in accordance with an undertaking x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against refusal to grant extension of time to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant had been in a parenting dispute with the mother of his son. There were 5 proceedings in which the applicant sought extensions of time to appeal against his conviction:
1.
Six contraventions of temporary protection orders, involving sending threatening emails to the aggrieved.
2.
Public nuisance, involving swearing at police officers outside a police station.
3.
Two contraventions of domestic violence order, involving emailing the aggrieved.
4.
One contravention of domestic violence order and one charge of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence, involving emailing and telephoning the aggrieved.
5.
Failure to surrender into custody in accordance with an undertaking.
The applicant sought to justify the breaches of domestic violence orders on the basis that they were justified under an order of the Family Court (which allowed the applicant to contact the aggrieved for the purpose of communicating in relation to contact with the child of the relationship) ([11]).
Issues: Whether the appeal should be allowed. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the basis that the District Court Judge erred in:
•
not having regard to exculpatory evidence of the applicant’s mental health issues;
•
not allowing exculpatory new evidence;
•
stating that the emails were not relevant to s 286 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld);
•
not following Supreme Court authority ([25]).
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave was dismissed. Sofronoff JA held that none of the grounds were supported by evidence or could justify granted leave to appeal ([26]-[29]).
R v Hutchinson [2018] QCA 29 (9 March 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Domestic violence as an aggravating factor’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Retrospective operation of sentencing considerations’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1; Fraud x 1;
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The deceased and the appellant had been married for a lengthy period. The fraud charge occurred when the appellant mortgaged the family home by using a third party to pretend to be the deceased ([5]). The deceased disappeared, and the appellant was charged with her murder. The appellant deceived the deceased’s family and friends in the days after she disappeared and never revealed how she died or the whereabouts of her body ([6]-[12]). At trial, the appellant was acquitted of murder, but convicted of manslaughter. He pleaded guilty to the fraud charge on the first day of the trial ([3]). The appellant was sentenced to 15 years and six months, and the manslaughter offence was declared a serious violence offence and a domestic violence offence under s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (‘the Act’).
Issues: Whether the sentencing judge erred in retrospectively applying s 9(10A) of the Act or whether the sentence was otherwise manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appellant argued that s 9(10A) of the Act, which has the effect that a context of domestic violence is an aggravating factor in sentencing, should not apply because it should not have retrospective operation ([24]). The Court held that the section is a procedural provision and does not attract the common law presumption against retrospectivity. Therefore, the section applies to all sentencing from its commencement ([43]).
Justice Mullins, Fraser and Morrison JJA agreeing, stated that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, taking into account the context of domestic violence, the appellant’s deceit in impersonating the deceased and failing to disclose the whereabouts of the deceased’s body, his lack of plea of guilty, his lack of remorse and the unchallenged finding that the deceased died a violent death ([53]).
R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17 (27 February 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Revenge porn’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Stalking x 1; Attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 18 months. There were 2 instances of violence ([2]). After the relationship ended, the applicant followed the complainant and sent her a total of 77 text messages, 5 emails and phone calls by which the complainant felt threatened and harassed ([7]). After the complainant made a complaint to the police, the applicant sent further emails to her threatening to release recordings and videos of them having sex if she did not withdraw the charge ([9]).
The appellant was sentenced to a head sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, with a parole release date after 3 months ([12]).
Issues: Whether the conviction should be set aside and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
In relation to the appeal against conviction, the appellant had argued that he was not provided with proper legal advice ([30]). Justice Morrison (Sofronoff P and Phillip McMurdo JA agreeing) dismissed this argument as having ‘no merit’ ([44]).
In relation to the appeal against sentence, the appellant relied on the impact of the sentence on his ability to obtain licences to work in the financial services industry ([45]). Justice Morrison dismissed this argument because it could only be relevant to whether a conviction is recorded ([48]).
R v Stephens [2017] QCA 173 (15 August 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children present’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Firearms’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant were separated ([6]). After they separated, the complainant obtained a domestic violence order against the applicant because he had sent her text messages threatening to kill her. On the date of the offence, the applicant followed the complainant and her children to a shopping centre, armed with a rifle and 13 rounds of ammunition ([7]). He shot her in the temple at close range, then attempted to strangle her. The four children in the car saw every detail of what had occurred ([8]-[9]). He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Justice Douglas, Holmes CJ and Gotterson J agreeing, found that the sentencing judge properly weighed the relevant factors. The applicant’s mental health disorders did not bear on his moral culpability ([43]). This was a ‘horrific example of the crime of attempted murder’. The victim continues to suffer severely. There was a strong need for protection and general and specific deterrence. The appropriate range would have been 13 to 17 years ([44]).
SCT v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2017] QCA 31 (13 June 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Bail’ – ‘Choke hold’ – ‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 2; Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic relationship x 1.
Case type: Renewed application for bail.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a domestic relationship. A domestic violence order had been granted ([7]). The complainant made the following allegations: the applicant went to the complainant’s house and punched her in the leg ([7]); he threw a pillow at the complainant; and put her in a choke hold ([8]). Bail was originally refused ([9]). Since then, new evidence of a demonstrated that a trial in the District Court would be more than a year away ([10]).
Issues: Whether the evidence of a new trial date justified a grant of bail.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted with conditions that he not have contact with the complainant, that he reside at a specified address, and that he report to the police daily.
Under s 16(3)(g) Bail Act 1980 (Qld), for which the new offence of strangulation is a ‘relevant offence’, the onus was on the applicant to show cause why bail should be granted ([13]). The Court explained that on one hand, there was a real risk that he would reoffend because the applicant and complainant lived in the same town, and they may contact each other ([14]). On the other hand, he had accommodation with family members available, an offer of employment ([15]), and there was a real prospect that he would spend longer on remand than he would serve in custody ([16]). On balance, the risk of reoffending was not unacceptable (s 16).
Ackland v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2017] QCA 75 (28 April 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Risk of re-offending’
Charges: 1 x Assault occasioning bodily harm; 1 x Choking.
Appeal type: Defendant’s appeal against denial of bail application.
Facts: The victim alleged that, during an argument, the appellant: threatened to knock her out; grabbed her by the throat; punched her in the face; and, when she indicated that she was going to call the police, destroyed photographs in the house (see [8]-[10]).
The trial judge refused bail on the basis that:
•
12 months earlier, the appellant had committed a breach of a domestic violence order against a former girlfriend (see [12]);
•
the Crown case appeared to be strong, by evidence of photographs of cuts and abrasions (see [14]); and
•
there was a danger to female victims in such domestic violence situations (see [18]).
His Honour referred to, but did not place weight on, a handwritten note from the victim indicating that she wanted to withdraw the charges (see [15]-[16]).
Issues: Whether the trial judge erred in denying bail to the defendant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Atkinson J, with whom Morrison JA and Douglas J agreed, considered that the trial judge’s discretion had not been improperly exercised (see [27]). The appellant had submitted that the trial judge based the risk of re-offending on an irrelevant ground, namely a generalised risk to victims of repeated offences. However, Atkinson J considered that the trial judge properly considered the particular risk to the victim, evidenced by two assaults being committed 10 hours apart, the victim’s concern, and the previous breach of domestic violence order (see [28]-[29])
At the time of the bail application, amendments to the Bail Act which reversed the presumption of bail for domestic violence offences had not come into effect (see [30]). By the time of the appeal against bail, the amendments had come into effect. Giving effect to the reversed onus, Atkinson J considered that the appellant had not satisfied the court that he did not represent an unacceptable risk of re-offending (particularly against the victim) while on bail (see [35]).
R v KAP [2016] QCA 349 (23 December 2016) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Visible injury’
Charges: Rape x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The accused and the complainant were married, but separated. The accused went to the home of the deceased, and sexual intercourse took place. The complainant said that the accused had held her down and threatened her, but the accused said that the intercourse was consensual ([1]).
Issues: Whether the conviction should be overturned on the grounds that expert evidence about the frequency of visible injury in sexual assault cases should not have been adduced, and the jury should have been given directions as to how to use that evidence ([2]-[3]).
Decision and Reasoning: The expert witness gave evidence that, according to cohort studies and his own personal experience, the absence of visible injury to genitalia is not determinative of whether sexual assault has occurred ([22]-[29]). Morrison JA (with whom Philip McMurdo JA and Mullins J agreed) held that the evidence:
•
was relevant ([31]-[32]);
•
was based on admissible data ([33]-[34]);
•
fell within the scope of expert evidence because injury arising out of sexual assault is accepted as being part “of a body of knowledge or experience” which ordinary lay people would not have (citing Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 ([35]-[37]);
•
was necessary to dispel a common fallacy that physical injury normally follows rape ([41]).
ZXA v Commissioner of Police [2016] QCA 295 (15 November 2016) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Rights of appeal’
Appeal Type: Appeal against domestic violence protection order.
Facts: The applicant was named as the respondent in a domestic violence protection order under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld). He filed an appeal to the District Court under s 164 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed. The applicant then attended the Supreme Court registry to file an application for leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). Despite being told that there was no right of appeal, the applicant persisted until the registry acceded to his demands.
Issue/s: Whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under s 169(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) to hear the appeal?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Under s 169(2) of the Act, the decision from which the applicant seeks leave to appeal ‘shall be final and conclusive’. While s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act allows a party to appeal, it does not apply to a decision of the District Court in its appellate jurisdiction under s 169(1): see CAO v HAT & Ors [2014] QCA 61 [25] – [27]. The President concluded:
‘The scheme under the Act contemplates that domestic violence protection orders can be made by a wide variety of courts with a right of appeal from such orders…The scheme does, however, clearly contemplate only one level of appeal. The plain words of s 169(2) that such an appeal is “final and conclusive” indicate that the legislature intended that there be no further appeal. The applicant has exhausted his single right of appeal from the Magistrates Court to the District Court. He can, of course, apply to vary the domestic violence protection order under s 86 of the Act, including to vary the duration of the order: see s 86(3)(b) of the Act’.
R v Williams [2015] QCA 276 (18 December 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, burglary.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had separated from his wife, and had recently found out that she was in a new relationship. He broke into her home, stabbed her while she was sleeping on her back next to her two year old daughter and then ran off. She immediately awoke to find a knife sticking out of her chest, which she removed, at which point she collapsed. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and declared to be a serious violent offender.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted that the trend of sentences for attempted murder cases shows that the appropriate range is 10 to 17 years, and that 15 years is excessive compared with analogous cases. This argument was rejected. Bond J (with whom Jackson J and Philip McMurdo JA agreed) at [17]-[30] provided a useful summary of previous attempted murder cases involving domestic violence. The Court acknowledged that the offence of attempted murder attracts a wide variety of punishments. However, consistent with the approach articulated by the High Court in Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, where comparable sentences can provide assistance, but do not set a range of permissible sentences, the Court held that the original sentence was within the discretion open to the trial judge.
R v Johnson [2015] QCA 270 (11 December 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Consent’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant met the complainant on Facebook and was in a relationship with her for seven weeks. During sexual intercourse, the complainant withdrew her consent and alleged she was then raped by the appellant. The appellant was convicted of rape following a trial.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the verdict was unreasonable and unsupportable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Morrison JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Philippides JA agreed) held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by the complainant saying ‘no’ and ‘stop’ multiple times, he was not under any mistake as to whether she had consented to sex.
R v Leedie [2015] QCA 216 (6 November 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pre-recorded evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Torture’
Charge/s: Rape, deprivation of liberty, torture.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of eight offences including rape, deprivation of liberty and torture. The appellant had been in an ‘off and on’ romantic relationship with the complainant. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the complainant or other parties. There was no history of violence in the relationship. The offending arose after the appellant asked the complainant to visit his house to have sex. Consensual sex then occurred. However, following the appellant seeing a message from his brother on the complainant’s phone, he became angry, proceeded to become extremely violent, and raped the complainant multiple times across the night. He did not let her out of the house, and tortured her. The complainant was deemed a ‘special witness’, and gave pre-recorded evidence two days before trial, with her mother present as a support person (pursuant to s 21AK of the Evidence Act 1977). Her mother was made aware by the judge during the recording that she was not to have any participation in the proceedings other than as a support person. The mother then made comments to the complainant which reminded her about the details of one of the rape offences. It was accepted at [55] that her mother’s conduct was ‘inappropriate’. However, the trial judge, in response to defence counsel’s application for a mistrial, made detailed warnings to the jury about the caution they needed to apply when considering the complainant’s evidence.
Issue/s: One ground of appeal concerned whether the trial judge erred by failing to discharge the jury after the complainant’s mother suggested to the complainant what she might say in her evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that these directions were sufficient to warn the jury that the reliability of the complainant’s evidence may have been undermined by her mother’s reminder of the details of the appellant’s offending. Furthermore, at trial, the judge offered to order a further pre-recording of the complainant’s evidence, which was declined by the appellant.
R v Andres [2015] QCA 167 (11 September 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Whether guilty verdict unreasonable’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of the murder of his wife. His version of events included, (among other things) the contention that the deceased had injured him with a fork and he was placed in fear of his life. (See at [4]-[113]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife.
Issue/s: The appellant admitted that he had caused his wife’s death, but maintained that he did not have the requisite intention to prove murder. As such, the question for the Court was whether on the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. More specifically, the issue was whether the accused had the requisite intention to prove murder. Also at issue was whether he had killed his wife by accident or in self-defence.
Decision and Reasoning:
The appeal was dismissed, with the Court finding that a guilty verdict was open to the jury on the evidence. Boddice J, (with whom Morrison JA and Carmody J agreed), found that the only evidence to support the conclusion that the death occurred by accident or in self-defence was the appellant’s own evidence, which lacked probative force. This was because, among other things, the appellant admitted he had deliberately lied and changed his story, and he had dissolved the deceased’s body in acid, which made it difficult to determine the cause of death. While the case was wholly circumstantial, it was noted that intent can be proved by inference, by considering the probative value of the evidence as a whole.
R v Jones [2015] QCA 161 (1 September 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Killing for preservation in an abusive relationship’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the murder of his mother. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the victim or other parties. The issues at trial related substantially to self-defence and provocation. Evidence of the history of the relationship was admitted in the context of the defence under s 304B of the Queensland Criminal Code of killing in an abusive domestic relationship (See further at [3]-[13]).
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred by not admitting expert psychiatric evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. North J (with whom Holmes JA and Henry J agreed) held firstly that this evidence was not admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. It was not relationship evidence. The Court also held that the matters that the psychiatrist spoke of were not complex in a scientific sense, and the jury, properly instructed, were able to understand them without needing to hear the expert evidence itself. The psychiatrist did not identify that the appellant was suffering from any recognised psychiatric illness. Rather, he only spoke generally that the appellant had developed coping strategies in response to his mother’s violent and difficult behaviour. The jury, in applying common sense, would have been able to reach this conclusion themselves. North J, comparing the ‘battered wife defence’, noted that there is no ‘battered child defence’ in law. That is, there is no defence where, ‘insults and abuse may be relied upon by a child by way of excuse for a fatal attack upon an abusive parent’ (See at [19]).
R v Pearson [2015] QCA 157 (28 August 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife (See further at [2]-[5]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife. The issues at trial concerned whether he had the requisite intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm, and whether the defence of provocation arose.
Issue/s: One issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misdirected the jury in regards to the relevance of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and discreditable conduct. In particular, the appellant submitted that the jury were misdirected about how they could use the evidence when deciding whether the appellant had the requisite intent for murder.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. At trial, the jury was directed to the effect that the evidence was relevant to explain the nature and animosity of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased. They were specifically directed that if they were to use that evidence to assist in determining the appellant’s state of mind at the time of the offence, they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the past acts occurred. Holmes JA (Morrison JA and Henry J agreeing) held that s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 can be used to show a particular propensity of the accused to commit acts of a similar nature, as well for specific issues like intent. Her Honour, applying the approach of the High Court in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12, noted that these two uses are distinct. In this case, the domestic violence evidence was only relevant as relationship evidence to prove intent. Propensity was not relevant because it was not in dispute that the appellant had caused the death of his wife. The jury were directed to this effect. A general propensity warning was not needed for the same reasons.
R v Piper [2015] QCA 129 (17 July 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant’s wife attended a hotel with a male friend. He falsely believed his wife to be in a romantic relationship with the friend. In an unprovoked attack, he stabbed the friend forcefully multiple times. The victim sustained six stab wounds, including one to his neck. The victim suffers lasting psychological difficulties as a result of the attack. There was a domestic violence order in place which prevented the applicant from coming within five metres of his wife. The attack breached this order, which became an aggravating feature in sentencing. He had no criminal history. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole after three years.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted. The offending was very serious. It was ‘a sustained, severe and premeditated attack, whilst armed with a knife, on a victim who had done nothing by way of provocation’ (See at [36]). It was committed in the context of a domestic violence order being in place. As such, the head sentence, whilst at the upper end of the scale, was within range, taking into account his lack of criminal history and plea of guilty. However, the Court concluded that the parole eligibility date should be brought forward. The applicant’s guilty plea, while late, ensured that witnesses did not have to give evidence, which was particularly important for the victim. The parole eligibility date was close to the ‘half-way mark’ in the sentence. This did not reflect the significance of his guilty plea, remorse and cooperation and lack of criminal history. As such, the parole eligibility date was changed and set at the one-third mark in the sentence.
R v Wallace [2015] QCA 62 (21 April 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Fraud’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Six counts of fraud.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty at trial to six counts of fraud. See at [3]-[11]. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order in place against the applicant’s ex-husband in favour of the applicant or other parties.
Issue/s: Whether the applicant could adduce fresh evidence not led at the original sentencing hearing.
Decision and Reasoning: The fresh evidence involved long term domestic violence that the applicant suffered from her ex-husband, including controlling behaviour such as taking the applicant’s phone and keys to prevent her from seeking help, threatening her children, stealing money from her business, and severe physical violence. It also included evidence from a psychiatrist detailing the effect of the abuse on her, to the extent that she did not fully understand the repercussions of her offending. This was found to be consistent with what has come to be known as the ‘battered person’s syndrome’. The appeal was allowed and the evidence was admitted. The head sentence was reduced by one year.
McMurdo P, (with whom Gotterson JA and Douglas J agreed) noted that lawyers acting for clients charged with criminal offences who claim to be the victim of domestic violence should take such claims very seriously to determine the relevance to their client’s alleged offending. They should then put such evidence before the primary court either as a defence, or in sentence mitigation.
See in particular the following remarks of McMurdo P at [37] -
'… The further evidence led in this application established that at the time of the offending the applicant was in an abusive, exploitive relationship which impaired her capacity to realise the full repercussions of her fraudulent behaviour and her ability to formulate a mature response to her financial and personal difficulties as she continued to take more and more money from the nursing home in the impossible hope that she would eventually repay it. As Dr Schramm (a psychiatrist) explained, she was not acting completely rationally. She was exhibiting behavioural disturbances following her prolonged and significant physical and emotional abuse, commonly known as “battered persons syndrome.” This took her offending behaviour out of the worst category of fraudulent offending in which the sentencing judge placed it. The further evidence raises the possibility that some other sentence than that imposed may be warranted; if so, its exclusion would result in a miscarriage of justice. '
R v Davidson [2014] QCA 348 (19 December 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim credibility’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offending involved an incident where the appellant asked the complainant to perform a sexual act on his male friend. The appellant also engaged in sexual activity with the friend. The case at trial was based on the complainant’s version of events, which included that the appellant kicked and punched the complainant (the appellant’s partner) for a long period. There was a history of domestic violence in the relationship. A domestic violence order was made some six years prior. The appellant had a long criminal history of similar offences, including a breach of a domestic violence order. However, there was no associated breach of a domestic violence order in this matter. The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 2.5 years.
Issue/s: Whether the failure to call new evidence from witnesses who challenged the complainant’s credibility established a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant contended specifically that the failure to call a particular witness established a miscarriage of justice and noted that his defence counsel did not explore the detail of the evidence in cross-examination. The Court rejected that argument – the failure of counsel to adduce this new evidence was justifiable as a strategic decision in the trial context to not risk other unfavourable evidence being admitted. The appeal against sentence was also dismissed.
R v Aplin [2014] QCA 332 (16 December 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Grievous Bodily Harm.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander man, caused catastrophic harm to the 21 year old complainant, with whom he had recently commenced a relationship. She was in a ‘vegetative state’ at the time of trial. He made full admissions to police. He sought to have evidence of these admissions excluded, which was refused. He then pleaded guilty. The applicant had a long history of domestic violence including multiple breaches of domestic violence orders. The sentencing judge mentioned the need to have regard to this history, as well as the extent of the injuries and the need for deterrence (see at [12]). He was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment and a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The applicant submitted that various mitigating factors applied including that no weapon was involved, there was no premeditation, he attempted to administer aid, requested that an ambulance be called and there was a degree of provocation. He also submitted that the sentencing judge was in error in using a 10 year head sentence as a starting point. Fraser JA (with whom McMurdo P and Morrison JA agreed) held that there was nothing to indicate the primary judge overlooked these factors or the applicant’s disadvantaged background. Indeed, given the ‘seriousness of the offence, the catastrophic consequences for the complainant, and the applicant’s bad history of violent offending in broadly similar circumstances’ (See at [16]), it was open to the primary judge to attach relatively light weight to the mitigating factors. Furthermore, the trial judge was correct in using a previous decision with a head sentence of 10 years for ‘guidance’. While the Court acknowledged that this sentence was severe given the maximum penalty, the guilty plea, the offender’s age and other mitigating circumstances, it was justified for this ‘extreme example of domestic violence by a repeat offender’,([26]) where general deterrence and community protection were very relevant.
R v Warradoo [2014] QCA 299 (25 November 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. (See further at [3]-[7]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the victim. At trial, evidence relating to conversations with the deceased’s niece and mother which detailed instances of prior violence committed by the appellant was admitted. No warning was given by the trial judge as to the potential unreliability of this evidence as hearsay.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred by not giving adequate warnings with respect to evidence admitted under section 93B of the Evidence Act 1977.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Holmes JA stated (at [8]) that section 93B operates to, ‘(render) the hearsay rule inapplicable to evidence of a representation of fact made by a person who is dead, if the representation was made shortly after the asserted fact happened and in circumstances making it unlikely to be a fabrication, or was made in circumstances making it highly probable it was reliable.’ It was held that a direction from the trial judge about the unreliability of the evidence as hearsay would not have been particularly helpful, and may have even been disadvantageous to the appellant. Also, the evidence was admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 as evidence of the history of a domestic relationship.
R v RAP [2014] QCA 228 (11 September 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charge/s: Unlawful assault causing bodily harm, unlawfully damaging property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting his wife, causing her bodily harm and unlawfully damaging property. The appellant had a relevant criminal history involving a breach of a domestic violence order. However, this was effectively ignored by the sentencing judge. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife. In mitigation, the sentencing judge considered a psychiatrist’s report indicating that at the time of the incident, the appellant was likely suffering from, ‘a major depressive episode and, probably, a form of alcohol dependence’. There was also a report from a psychologist who had treated the appellant before the offences and diagnosed him with, ‘an acute, moderate to severe adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety depressed moods at that time.’ A later review by that psychologist indicated he suffered a ‘chronic and mild adjustment disorder with anxiety’ and a year later ‘a mild borderline adjustment disorder’ was diagnosed. He was sentenced for the assault charge to two years imprisonment, suspended after eight months with an operational period of 2.5 years. He was sentenced to two months imprisonment for the property damage charge to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The couple had previously separated, and the incident arose when the appellant returned to the matrimonial home. The complainant’s injuries were significant and she was in fear of her life during the attack. Wilson J (with whom McMurdo P and Fraser JA agreed) at [39] – [46] provided a useful summary of comparable cases. The Court held that a serious assault in the domestic context warrants imprisonment for two years or more. The suspension imposed was a correct application of the mitigating factors, and the serious nature of the violence.
R v Foster [2014] QCA 226 (9 September 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Preliminary complaint’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim disclosure and consent’
Charge/s: Rape, Assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted at trial of two counts of the rape of his partner, after he was found to have penetrated the complainant with a hairbrush, an aerosol can and a water bottle. He pleaded guilty to other charges including assault occasioning bodily harm and deprivation of liberty. There was no domestic violence order in place.
Issue/s: Whether evidence of the complainant’s response in a state of distress, to the question of ‘Had you been raped?’ amounted to an admissible preliminary complaint of rape. The complainant had not directly answered the question but ‘looked sad’ and ‘slumped her shoulders, to look as if she was about to burst into tears and to look beaten’. (See at [33]).
Decision and Reasoning: The Court found that this amounted to a complaint, within the meaning of Section 4A of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978. Importantly, Gotterson JA (with whom McMurdo P Morrison JA agreed) noted that an admissible complaint need not require a verbal response. In particular, ‘A meaningful response may be signalled by conduct other than speech. That conduct may include the absence of a verbal rejection of the proposition’. However, Gotterson JA noted that the acceptance could have been clearer, and this was a ‘borderline’ example of a complaint. Furthermore, it is not necessary for a preliminary complaint of rape to refer to any specific incidence of penetration. Simply stating, ‘I was raped’ is sufficient to amount to a preliminary complaint.
R v Reed [2014] QCA 207 (26 August 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Purpose of evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm, murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the assault occasioning bodily harm and murder of his partner’s 16 month old child. See further at [6]-[17].
Issue: Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior facial grazing injuries suffered by the child.
Decision and Reasoning: Henry J (with whom Gotterson JA and McMurdo P agreed) firstly held that this evidence was not inadmissible purely because of a possible innocent explanation for the injuries. His Honour considered all the non-fatal injuries on the child in their totality, and found that the probability that they occurred accidentally became too remote. The evidence was capable of supporting an inference (in combination with the other evidence) that the non-fatal injuries were the result of deliberate violence by the appellant. This evidence, of itself, was not indispensable to a finding of guilt – it assisted as ‘strands of a cable rather than as indispensable links in a chain’ (See at [39]). The evidence was also relevant to the proof of the charges as relationship evidence pursuant to 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. The trial judge correctly found that injuries can be probative of the history of a domestic relationship. It also potentially showed a propensity of the appellant to commit similar violence. However, the trial judge did not rule on this and in fact gave a warning against propensity reasoning. Notwithstanding, the trial judge did make an error of law in failing to sufficiently instruct the jury about the purpose of the evidence of the uncharged injuries, applying the High Court decision in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12. The trial judge did tell the jury that the evidence could be used to show that the nature of the relationship was violent, but he did not go further to explain that the purpose of putting this history of violence before the jury was to provide an ‘informed context’ (See at [69] – [70]) for the jury’s consideration of the charges. Notwithstanding, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso.
R v HBL [2014] QCA 270 (24 October 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Abduction’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Family law orders’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Abduction, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a long-term, intermittent relationship and had one child. His partner sought and obtained a domestic violence order (DVO) in 2011. In 2012, an order in the Federal Magistrates’ Court was made that the child was to live with the mother. Limited contact was allowed with the mother’s consent. The mother left the child at a friend’s house, whereupon the applicant arrived unannounced and took the child, drove away, and held the child for a period of time, in breach of the DVO. He made repeated calls stating he would not return the child if the child was to be handed back to the mother or her friend. The applicant had a long criminal history of over fourteen court appearances, including a previous breach of a child protection order (albeit towards the lower end of seriousness). The applicant pleaded guilty to the abduction and breach offences and was sentenced in the District Court to 4 years’ imprisonment for abduction. He was convicted but not further punished for the breach. The primary judge implicitly accepted the Crown’s submission that this conduct was in the worst category of offending.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. While the applicant had a long criminal history, Fraser JA (with whom Mullins J and Gotterson JA agreed), compared analogous decisions and highlighted factors which made them distinguishable. His Honour noted that the child was not unrelated or unknown, there was no sexual motivation and the taking was non-violent. As such, the Court held that this was not within the worst category of offending. Notwithstanding, the Court noted that such conduct (including the fact that the appellant was motivated to be with his son and breaching court orders) cannot be condoned and deterrence is important. As such, a custodial sentence was imposed but was reduced to 18 months’ imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility.
R v Francis [2014] QCA 258 (14 October 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Arson.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The arson was targeted at the appellant’s ex-wife’s new partner’s mother’s car. The offence constituted a breach of a domestic violence order (See further at [3]-[18]).
Issue/s: Appeal against conviction: Whether the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, and whether the appellant could adduce further evidence not led at trial.
Appeal against sentence: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. McMurdo P noted that while the case was circumstantial, it was strong, and a guilty verdict was open to the jury. The application to adduce further evidence was also dismissed. The court held that while an affidavit from the appellant’s former partner was somewhat inconsistent with her evidence at trial, there was no significant possibility that the jury would have acquitted him on this basis. However, the appeal against sentence was allowed, reducing the head sentence from 4.5 to 4 years. Defence counsel submitted that the sentence was excessive for arson of a car rather than a house, while the prosecution submitted that it was a flagrant breach of a domestic violence order and general deterrence was necessary for an arson committed as a jealous rage due to a relationship breakdown. McMurdo P held that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The trial judge did not take into account pre-sentence custody, and the appellant only had a minor criminal history prior to this offending.
R v Murray [2014] QCA 160 (18 July 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recidivism’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’ – ‘Weapons’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Application for an extension of time to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant, an aboriginal man with a dysfunctional background, pleaded guilty to the grievous bodily harm of his girlfriend. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim. He ripped off a door handle with which he struck her on the head, then punched her and struck her with a frying pan, causing severe injuries.
Issue/s: Whether an extension of time should be granted on the basis that the applicant only pleaded guilty due to the strong urging of his lawyers, and that he was denied the right to present his defence.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused - the applicant was an adult, of sound mind who understood the charge and entered a guilty plea after obtaining legal advice. An application for leave to appeal against sentence was also refused. McMurdo P (Fraser JA and Morrison JA agreeing) held that notwithstanding that he told the complainant to go to hospital, he had failed to demonstrate compassion or insight into the injury that he had caused. He had a substantial history of domestic violence and this recidivism made the protection of future intimate partners important. This was a serious example of grievous bodily harm in the context of domestic violence. General deterrence and denunciation were key considerations. McMurdo P described his girlfriend as a ‘reluctant complainant’. However, this was not a mitigating factor. The only mitigating factors were his guilty plea and dysfunctional background.
R v Seijbel-Chocmingkwan [2014] QCA 119 (27 May 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Attempted strangulation’ – ‘Dangerous operation of motor vehicle’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offender’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: While on parole for assault offences committed against her daughter, the applicant drove into her former husband’s car twice. She then stabbed her husband’s new partner in the shoulder and attempted to strangle her. There was no domestic violence order in place. She pleaded guilty to attempted murder and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, for which she was sentenced to ten years’ and 12 months’ imprisonment respectively.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Morrison JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Martin J agreed) at [41] – [79] provided a useful summary of past Court of Appeal authority regarding sentencing of attempted murder offences which have an element of domestic violence. The Court considered factors such as premeditation, cooperation with authorities, remorse, the gravity of the attack and prior convictions. (See full list at [79]). The applicant was also suffering from a mental disorder, namely an ‘adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood’. While this was a mitigating factor, the Court held that the original sentence did adequately recognise this and other mitigating features such as her efforts at rehabilitation by enrolling in study and other courses, which were correctly balanced with the need for denunciation and general deterrence.
R v Martin [2014] QCA 80 (14 April 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Consistency of sentence with other orders’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Using carriage service’
Charge/s: 41 offences, including stalking, 26 counts of breaches of domestic violence orders, two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, five counts of using a carriage service to make a threat to kill and six counts of using a carriage service to menace or harass.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court to all offences. The stalking was committed against the applicant’s ex-partner. A head sentence of two years imprisonment was imposed in the Magistrates’ Court, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The applicant was also placed on a domestic violence order in favour of his ex-partner for 5 years. The Magistrate made adverse findings in relation to the applicant’s offending, his lack of remorse and the real risk of him re-offending. Mitigating factors included pleas of guilty and completion of a domestic abuse program while in custody. His parole release date was set after he had served one third of the head sentence, taking into account pre-sentence custody.
Issue/s: Whether the remaining period on parole should be substituted with a suspended sentence, due to the comparative administrative ease of a suspended sentence in obtaining permission to leave the state.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. A previous appeal to the District Court was struck out due to the applicant’s uncooperative nature, and the many opportunities that were given to him through adjournments to allow him to appear personally in Court, as well as the primary judge’s finding of fact that he had misled the Court. The Court found that the primary judge acted appropriately.
R v MBY [2014] QCA 17 (18 February 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, maintaining a sexual relationship with a child under 16.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant, an Aboriginal man committed the offences against his daughter. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim or other parties. (See further at [6]-[20]).
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge failed to give appropriate weight to circumstances of deprivation in his upbringing, including the social and economic disadvantage associated with his Aboriginality and the physical, sexual and emotional abuse that he had suffered as a child. Another issue was whether the primary judge failed to have regard to the applicant’s rehabilitative prospects.
Decision and Reasoning: In dismissing the appeal, Morrison JA (Muir JA and Daubney J agreeing) discussed the relevance of the applicant’s Aboriginality in sentencing. See in particular at [60]-[73] where his Honour provides a detailed summary of relevant authority including the High Court decision of Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38. Essentially, his Honour accepted that social, economic and other disadvantages (including alcohol and drug abuse) which may be related to an offender’s Aboriginality, should be taken into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Indeed, there is authority to suggest that when an Aboriginal offender is being sentenced, the Court should, ‘sentence (the offender) as leniently as the circumstances of his offence admitted’. (See R v Bell [1994] QCA 220). However, this cannot undermine individualised justice. That is, the deprived background of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offender may be given appropriate weight in sentence mitigation, but it cannot be given undue primacy. It cannot result in a punishment being imposed that does not reflect the gravity of the offending, or which does not pay sufficient regard to considerations such as specific and general deterrence, which are particularly important in domestic violence cases. The second ground of appeal, that the applicant’s rehabilitative prospects were not given enough weight was also dismissed.
R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent criminal proceeding’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Permanent stay’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against a permanent stay of proceedings.
Facts: This decision was not directly related to domestic violence. However, it is relevant to situations where the Court is dealing with a breach of a domestic violence order and another criminal offence concurrently. The respondent was originally charged with public nuisance, which was dealt with summarily. However, following a formal statement made by the complainant to police and a medical opinion received, he was charged with grievous bodily harm (GBH). At trial, an application was made for a permanent stay on the basis of Section 16 of the Queensland Criminal Code, which provides that a person cannot be punished twice for the same act or omission. The application was granted, with the primary judge holding that the act which formed the basis of the GBH charge was the same act which formed the basis of the public nuisance charge.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge was correct in granting the permanent stay based on the rule against double punishment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed, with the Court applying the approach previously articulated in R v Gordon where Hanger CJ stated - “Section 16, in saying that a person cannot be twice punished for the same act or omission, must be referring to punishable acts or omissions; and the prohibition applies though the acts or omission would constitute two different offences. It is to these cases that the section is directed.” Hanger CJ held that a punishable act of being in charge of a motor vehicle while under the influence of a substance was not the same as the punishable act of dangerous driving causing GBH with which the offender in that case was subsequently charged. In the present matter, the Court held that the punishable acts for which the respondent was convicted in the Magistrates Court included punches which landed on the complainant, causing harm. It therefore followed that s 16 would be violated if the respondent was to be punished a second time for those acts.
Prima facie, the same test would apply when considering whether a breach of a DVO constitutes the same act for which another criminal charge is based. However, it should be noted that there is uncertainty about the application of Section 138 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) in this context, particularly as to whether Section 138 allows double punishment. For further information, see pages 111-113 of the Queensland Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (2012) Bench Book, which considers various District and Magistrates’ Court decisions and the summary of R v MKW [2014] QDC 300 (18 June 2014).
R v Bartram [2013] QCA 361 (6 December 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Defence of dwelling’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Unlawful wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for unlawful wounding. The offence was committed in the following circumstances: the appellant had obtained a domestic violence order against the complainant; the complainant had previously been convicted for breaches of that order; according to evidence at trial, the complainant kicked down a door in breach of the DVO and, on the appellant’s evidence, the complainant had threatened violence towards her on the previous evening. The jury was directed about self-defence, but was not directed about the possibility of the ‘defence of a dwelling defence’ under s 267 of the Queensland Criminal Code.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant was denied the possibility of an acquittal under 267 of the Queensland Criminal Code.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld – Muir JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Daubney J agreed) held that there was ‘ample evidence’ that the complainant unlawfully entered and remained in the dwelling, which could support the elements of the defence. The offending occurred under the house, but his Honour held that the definition of ‘dwelling’ in s 1 of the Code was broad enough to encompass underneath the house. As such, a retrial was ordered.
R v Brennan [2013] QCA 316 (25 October 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder (two counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of murdering his estranged wife and her daughter in their home. Prior to the killings, the appellant made threats to his wife and to witnesses. These threats occurred in person and over the phone, resulting in a domestic violence order being served and two charges of using a carriage service to make threats. Several witnesses testified that the appellant made threatening remarks to his wife at the hearing for these charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on both counts of murder, with a 22 year non-parole period ordered, which was two years above the statutory minimum. The crime was also in breach of a domestic violence order in place to safeguard his wife.
Issue/s: Whether the circumstances of the killings warranted the non-parole period to be extended beyond the 20 year statutory minimum, so as to make the sentence manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. In the appellant’s favour, the killing was not drawn out, there was no prolonged suffering and there was minimal planning involved. On the other hand, he killed not only his estranged wife, but a defenceless 14 year old girl in defiance of a domestic violence order which was intended for his wife’s protection. Also, the appellant displayed no remorse and pleaded not guilty which had made the process agonising for those affected. These factors warranted a strong element of denunciation and vindication for the victims in the sentence. The appeal against conviction was also dismissed.
R v Postchild [2013] QCA 227 (20 August 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the rape of his girlfriend and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim. The applicant had an extensive criminal history, consisting of street and property offences, as well as a previous conviction for carnal knowledge of a 13 year old girl. He had previously breached a reporting condition associated with this conviction. He committed the rape while on parole for unrelated offending. The primary judge described the rape as a ‘brutal act’, and that the applicant had treated his girlfriend as, ‘an object for his own sexual gratification and had had no regard for her feelings’ (See at [15]).
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Chief Justice, (with whom Gotterson JA agreed) held that the sentence was appropriate, and upheld the trial judge’s findings in relation to the brutality of the act.
However, Holmes JA dissented and was of the view that the sentence should be reduced to 5 years with the non-parole period shortened. Her Honour’s judgment contains very useful summaries of all comparable cases, (see [17]-[32]). Holmes JA noted factors including that this was a single incident of a short duration, and was not a ‘protracted exercise in humiliation’ (at [33]). There was no forced entry or weapons used. Her Honour also noted that the, ‘offence did not occur in a context of fear or intimidation’, as the relationship was still on foot. Holmes JA was of the view that the nature of the relationship made these circumstances distinguishable from rapes performed by strangers (See at [34]). It was also noted that the victim was, ‘a strong minded young woman who was left humiliated and angry by what occurred, but not terrified’ and, ‘There was no evidence of lasting psychological harm’.
R v Susec [2013] QCA 77 (12 April 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury for the murder of his wife, and sentenced to life imprisonment (see further at [5]-[25]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge should have admitted evidence of a previous incident of the appellant sharpening a knife in the presence of the deceased and two witnesses.
2.
Whether evidence of the victim’s statement that she believed her husband was going to kill her was admissible.
3.
Whether evidence of a conversation between the deceased and a co-worker, which was initially held to be hearsay evidence because it was too vague and unreliable but later inadvertently admitted during the questioning of the co-worker at trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
4.
Whether a conclusion that the appellant’s post-offence conduct involved inflicting wounds on himself, putting pepper in his own eyes and exaggerating the seriousness of his condition was open on the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
Gotterson JA (with whom McMurdo P and Muir JA agreed) held that such evidence was admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. Its probative force was not outweighed by its potential prejudice to the accused. It was relevant to the state of the relationship, as well as to self-defence and provocation. It did have subjective elements, (such as the witnesses’ descriptions of their emotions during the incident), but this was not such as to enliven the s 130 discretion to exclude it, and the trial judge gave a sufficiently clear warning against its use as propensity evidence.
2.
The Court held that this evidence was admissible. The deceased’s fear of the appellant was relevant to the jury’s consideration of whether the deceased initiated an assault or provoked the attack.
3.
While the Court held that this evidence should not have been admitted, it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice so this ground was dismissed.
4.
The Court held that this conclusion was clearly open on the evidence (see at [70]).
R v James [2012] QCA 256 (24 September2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant (the appellant’s de facto partner) was receiving treatment at a hospital necessitated by an earlier assault by the appellant. The appellant then waited outside a toilet door at the hospital and punched her in the face which caused pain, discomfort and swelling. He was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for contravening a domestic violence order. He had a long criminal history including six prior breaches of domestic violence orders and convictions for other offences.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused, with the Court upholding the 9 month sentence. The maximum penalty for breaching a domestic violence order applicable at the time was 12 months imprisonment. This was later increased to two years (three years if the accused has prior convictions). Also, Henry J observed that there ought not exist an expectation that a one third discount to the head sentence will be applied where there is a plea of guilty, although such an outcome may be common (Holmes JA and McMurdo P agreed). McMurdo P (Holmes JA agreed) found that a further exacerbating feature was that the offence occurred in a hospital where the victim and other patients should be entitled to freedom from exposure to such violence.
R v Murgha [2012] QCA 255 (24 September 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to doing grievous bodily harm (GBH) to his de facto partner and breaching a domestic violence order. The offending was committed during the operational period of six suspended sentences. It involved the applicant throwing a knife at his partner who was pregnant. The knife became embedded in her skull. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the GBH offence and was convicted but not further punished for the breach offence.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: McMurdo P (Holmes JA and Henry J agreeing) dismissed the appeal and held that the sentence was appropriate. Mitigating factors included his remorse and corporation with police, his lack of similar criminal history, good rehabilitation prospects and his good standing in the community. The complainant also tendered a letter stating that: she wanted their child to grow up knowing their father; they planned to reconcile and that she found it hard to cope as a single parent. Notwithstanding, the sentencing judge correctly imposed a deterrent sentence. The primary judge noted that ‘the use of knives in domestic disputes on Palm Island was all too common’, which required a deterrent sentence. Other relevant factors included the fact the offence constituted a breach of a DVO and occurred while the applicant was subject to suspended prison sentences.
R v Pringle; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 223 (24 August 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his partner. He was in a long term relationship with the deceased, with whom he had three young children. He was a heavy cannabis user. In the weeks leading up to the killing, the deceased had confided to others about problems in the relationship. The respondent believed the deceased was having an affair and was upset as the deceased’s sister owed him $15 000. He was concerned the deceased was preparing to leave him and take his children – he claimed that she was ‘messing with my head’ (See at [10]). On the day of the killing, the respondent spoke to his parents who both encouraged him to seek help from a counsellor or psychiatrist. He then strangled the deceased until she was unconscious in the presence of the children. After moving the children to another room, he stabbed the deceased twice in the chest, killing her. He also stabbed himself but the injuries were not life threatening. After being declared fit to stand trial, but of diminished responsibility (under section 304A of the Queensland Criminal Code) by the Mental Health Court, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The psychiatrist stated that the respondent, ‘suffered from a personality disorder with paranoid traits.’ This, as well as his drug abuse and the viciousness of the killing suggested that his condition was likely to endure after being released from custody (see at [29]). However, gradual improvement may be expected with regular treatment (See at [15]). He had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Parole release would depend on his illness and progress of rehabilitation while in prison.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate and whether the sentencing judge should have made a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. McMurdo P (with whom Muir JA and Gotterson JA agreed) held that as deterrence and denunciation were of less importance in this case due to the limited moral culpability of the respondent (because of his mental illness), the primary purposes of sentencing were the protection of the Queensland community and punishment of the offender. However, the Court found that a nine year sentence with no serious violent offence declaration and no parole eligibility date was within range for a spousal manslaughter based on diminished responsibility. There was a plea of guilty, no evidence of further danger to the community and evidence of remorse. A recovery was not certain, but the respondent was responding positively to medication and treatment. Also, the fact that he strangled the deceased in front of the children was an aggravating feature, but this had to be considered in the context of diminished responsibility which reduced his moral culpability for the crime.
R v Hughes [2012] QCA 208 (14 August 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of murdering her de facto partner. There was a history of domestic violence between the appellant and the deceased and multiple domestic violence orders were taken out against each other on separate occasions. (See further at [5]-[49]).
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred by admitting evidence of statements made by the deceased to various witnesses that he suspected the appellant had drugged him and whether the verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: Both grounds of appeal were dismissed. The appellant submitted that the statements made by the deceased were not admissible because no relevant inference could be drawn from them, so they were hearsay statements and therefore inadmissible. This submission was rejected – the Court held that unlike in R v Lester [2008] QCA 354, the statements were not ‘reports of statements made to (the deceased) by others’. Instead, they were statements about the deceased’s own physical sensations after falling asleep in an unusual manner, and came after an episode of domestic violence between the appellant and the deceased. Such evidence was relevant to the ‘deceased’s relationship with the appellant, their mutual dealings and their attitudes for each other’, and to whether the appellant drugged the deceased (See at [64]). As such, it was admissible under section 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 as an exception to the hearsay rule. The other ground of appeal that the verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence was also dismissed.
R v Amery [2011] QCA 383 (23 December 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Malicious act with intent’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pre-sentence custody’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Malicious act with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In breach of a domestic violence order made that morning, the appellant returned to his de facto partner’s house and hit her head twice with a sledgehammer while she was sleeping, causing substantial injuries. The applicant pleaded guilty to a malicious act with intent and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, with no parole eligibility date set. No adjustment of the sentence was made for time already served in pre-sentence custody.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court noted that the head sentence was not outside the permissible range. The offending was very serious, was not a spontaneous response, and was committed in breach of the DVO. Also, he had a serious criminal history, including a similar breach of a domestic violence order. However, the trial judge erred in not adjusting the sentence for pre-sentence custody and not imposing a parole eligibility date. As such, also taking into account the (albeit late) plea of guilty, the sentence was reduced to seven years, seven months’ imprisonment, with the appellant becoming eligible for parole after three years.
R v Rowe [2011] QCA 372 (16 December 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Burglary with violence’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charge/s: Stalking with violence, burglary with violence, assault occasioning bodily harm, common assault and wilful damage.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the complainant for 6 years and had one child. The relationship ended, at which point the stalking began via telephone and text messages. There had been some conflict in the relationship about the care of the child. He broke into her home, demanded to see her phone and punched her on the head multiple times. He pushed a lighted cigarette on her leg, causing burns. He threatened to kill her. He tackled her to the ground to prevent her from seeking help and punched her again multiple times. He drove her to the hospital after she had cleaned up at his request. He yelled and threatened her while in the car, drove dangerously, and backhanded her to the side of her face. All of this occurred in front of their two year old child. Once the complainant was released from hospital he attended her workplace and caused significant damage to her car. He had a criminal history, including previous break and enter and assault occasioning bodily harm offences. The sentencing judge noted that the stalking was not prolonged, but it was very intense and violent. It was also noted that the child and the complainant must have been terrified.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the above offences, and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for stalking with violence, two years’ imprisonment for burglary with violence and assault occasioning bodily harm and 12 months’ imprisonment for common assault and wilful damage. The sentences were to be served concurrently. He was on parole at the time for a prior violent offence. This resulted in a head sentence of three years which was cumulative on an existing term of three years imprisonment, with parole eligibility set at one year after the cumulative term had been served.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted that as the head sentence was reduced for the totality principle, the sentencing judge must have used a starting point of over three years which was not consistent with the comparable authorities. This was rejected. While the offending was short, it was intense, and was accompanied by actual and threatened violence, in the presence of a terrified child. The applicant’s stalking was more serious than in any of the relevant comparable authorities, and a head sentence of three years was appropriate given the circumstances of the offending and the appellant’s history, including that he was on parole for prior offences. The parole eligibility date was also found to be appropriate, given the offender was already subject to an existing term of imprisonment.
R v. Major; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] QCA 210 (30 August 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Seven counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, threatening violence at night, wounding, assault occasioning bodily harm while armed and various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to the above charges. The offending included 8 episodes of domestic violence over a three year period, involving severe physical abuse such as punching, cutting off the tip of the victim’s finger, choking, wrestling, smashing objects on the victim’s head and verbal abuse. There were lasting physical impacts on the victim including nerve injuries, loss of sensation to her finger-tip and depression and anxiety. He was sentenced for the unlawful wounding offence to 3 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 741 days (the period already served) with an operational period of 5 years. He was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for the remaining counts.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld, with the Court holding that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court noted that when concurrent sentences are imposed, it is important to ensure that the primary term adequately reflects the nature of each individual feature of the offending. This was not reflected in the trial judge’s sentence. The mitigating factors were not particularly powerful. For example, the absence of any prior history of violence was outweighed by the prolonged duration of the offences. The fact that the respondent was not subject to a domestic violence order was not a mitigating factor but merely a distinguishing feature from analogous cases. The Court noted that the original sentence should have been in the range of six to eight years. However, given that the defendant had commenced rehabilitation, it was deemed that imposing such a sentence on appeal would be inappropriate. Also, the respondent had no prior history of violence, and was not subject to any court order at the time of the offending. Nevertheless, the sentence was increased to 5 years with the same suspension period. Probation was added for another count.
See in particular the useful remarks of McMurdo P at [53], regarding the considerations the courts should take into account for sentencing domestic violence offences – ‘The dreadful effects of prolonged episodes of domestic violence are notorious…Deterrence, both personal and general, is an important factor in sentencing in domestic violence cases. So too is denunciation. The community through the courts seeks sentences which show the public disapprobation of such conduct. The effects of domestic violence go beyond the trauma suffered by victims, survivors and their children to their extended families, and friends. Domestic violence also detrimentally affects the wider community, causing lost economic productivity and added financial strain to community funded social security and health systems.’
R v McMullen [2011] QCA 153 (1 July 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Threatening violence’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty, rape and threatening violence.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The offences were committed against the appellant’s de facto partner. There was a current domestic violence order in place. The complainant alleged the appellant breached that order the night before he raped her.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant’s previous history of domestic violence and drug use, as well as other discreditable conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: McMurdo P (with whom Cullinane J and Jones J agreed) held that the evidence of prior domestic violence was admissible to assist the jury in understanding the nature of their relationship, and was particularly relevant to the rape charges, where the lack of consent was the critical issue. However, her Honour noted that its admissibility remained ‘extraordinary and exceptional’ (at [83]) and warranted careful directions from the trial judge to warn the jury against propensity reasoning, applying the High Court decision of Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12. See in particular at [84], where her Honour referenced a model direction from the Queensland Supreme and District Court Bench Book. In this case, while the trial judge went ‘part way’ in warning the jury about the limits of the use of the evidence, he did not specifically give a warning against propensity reasoning. This amounted to an error of law. However, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso, with McMurdo P taking into account the ‘discerning’ verdicts of the jury on each count and the fact that defence counsel did not ask for a redirection during the trial.
R v Harold [2011] QCA 99 (17 May 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Character’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Cumulation of sentence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Manslaughter, assault occasioning bodily harm, various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The circumstances of the offending included the applicant stabbing his de facto partner multiple times and striking her with a cricket bat (See further at [3]-[9]). The applicant had a substantial and relevant criminal history of violence against the deceased committed over a 10 year period. He was convicted a number of times for severe assaults (both common assaults and assaults occasioning bodily harm) on the deceased, including punching her and hitting her over the head with an iron bar. He had previously been the subject of multiple domestic violence orders in her favour, which he had often breached. The applicant was convicted for the manslaughter of the deceased and was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment, including 12 years for manslaughter. The extra two years took into account 9 summary offences and two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm to which he had pleaded guilty.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Martin J (with whom Chesterman JA and White JA agreed) held that the sentencing judge correctly made the 2 year sentence for the two charges of assault occasioning bodily harm cumulative because they were separate offences committed at different times, even though they were committed in a 10 year course of conduct. The total effective sentence was appropriate and within range. The sentencing judge observed this was a repetitive and prolonged attack with a knife making it a serious case of manslaughter.
R v Murray [2010] QCA 266 (8 October 2010) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’ – ‘Stealing’ – ‘Threatening to enter premises with intent to intimidate’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, stealing, grievous bodily harm with intent, breach of domestic violence order (two counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending involved continued harassment of the complainant (the former partner of the applicant), culminating in the charge of grievous bodily harm with intent. The applicant broke into the complainant’s home which she shared with her new partner and children. He hit her on the head with a frying pan, causing her to fall to the ground. He held a knife against her throat, tied her wrists and ankles and dragged her into the car. She then threw herself out of the car, at which point the applicant stabbed her in the left side then on her right side. He had a relevant criminal history, including prior offences of violence as well as a breach of a domestic violence order. Two of these offences involved violence against his mother as well as a former partner. Two psychiatric reports detailing the mental issues suffered by the applicant were put before the sentencing judge. The total effective sentence imposed at trial was 8 years’ imprisonment. A ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in not giving reasons for making a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused.
1.
In relation to the serious violence offence declaration, the applicant’s counsel at trial conceded that it would be impossible to submit that the declaration should not be made. The sentencing judge referred to this concession, in applying the ‘integrated approach to sentencing’ which is required in cases where a serious violent offence declaration is appropriate (See at [22]-[23]).
2.
Counsel for the applicant contended that 8 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive, as it was outside of the range established by comparable authorities and it did not have regard to the psychiatric problems suffered by the applicant. This argument was dismissed, with Cullinane J (Fraser JA and Chesterman JA agreeing) finding that eight years was not outside the permissible range. The mental health issues were considered at trial, as the sentencing judge expressly referred to them.
R v Clark [2009] QCA 2 (6 February 2009) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Attempted Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the attempted murder of his former wife. There were cross domestic violence orders in place against each other. He was sentenced at trial to 16 years’ imprisonment. The case turned on purely circumstantial evidence. See further at [3]-[38].
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge made errors by -
1.
Not issuing a Shepherd v R [1990] HCA 56 direction which deals with the how the jury must use pieces of evidence individually.
2.
Allowing the jury to consider evidence of the history of the relationship between the parties.
The other issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The Court noted that in a case turning on circumstantial evidence alone, it is not necessary that every intermediate conclusion of fact made by the jury be proven beyond reasonable doubt. There may be some instances, as McMurdo P observed (at [40]) if it is necessary to ‘reach a conclusion of fact as an indispensable intermediate step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt, that conclusion must be established beyond reasonable doubt’. However, generally, only the offence as a whole needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In regards to the relationship evidence, the primary judge directed the jury to the effect that such evidence was not directly relevant to the alleged offence, but only to put the relationship between the parties in context. The Court held that this direction was adequate. The Court also refused leave to appeal against sentence, finding that the premediated nature of the offending and the lack of mitigating factors meant that this was at the highest end of the scale of attempted murders.
R v Chong; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2008] QCA 22 (22 February 2008) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breastfeeding mother’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Hardship on children’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Orders affecting children’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge/s: Unlawful wounding, breach of intensive correction order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the respondent’s mother. They lived on the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community of Mornington Island. Following an argument, the respondent stabbed the complainant three times, causing no lasting injuries. The respondent was sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment with immediate court ordered parole for the wounding offence.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate, particularly in relation to the order of immediate parole.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The respondent had a substantial and relevant criminal history. In mitigation, the respondent had performed well on the intensive correction order, had pleaded guilty and was committed to looking after her seven children, including breastfeeding a baby and ensuring that those of school age attend school. She was an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander woman who had suffered abuse as a child. Atkinson J (with whom Keane JA and Fraser JA agreed) held that the head sentence was not manifestly inadequate. In considering whether the immediate parole order was appropriate, her Honour considered various factors, including the respondent’s disadvantage associated with her Aboriginality. Her Honour observed that, ‘The fact that the respondent is an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander woman living on Mornington Island is relevant to the question of the effect on her family’. (See at [36]). While the Court noted that the effect on an offender’s children can only be one relevant circumstance in determining sentence, the Court considered that exceptional circumstances were present. The respondent was a breastfeeding mother. Imprisonment would necessitate moving to the mainland, which would remove any practical means of maintaining the breastfeeding of the baby and personal contact with her other children. Her Honour quoted various secondary sources which discuss the substantial effect of incarceration on families, particularly on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families. (See at [37] – [42]). The original sentence sufficiently incorporated deterrent and punitive elements, while the immediate parole allowed for rehabilitation.
R v Sauvao [2006] QCA 331 (1 September 2006) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his de facto wife and to a breach of a domestic violence order. The couple had separated. The complainant initially obtained an apprehended violence order in 2003 in New South Wales, which was then registered in Queensland upon moving to that state. In May 2005, at a railway station, the applicant attempted to stab the complainant with a small knife. The knife snapped on the complainant’s jacket, causing her no harm. He continued to punch and kick her, and hit her head into a chair and a pole. He was then stopped by bystanders. He admitted that if they had not intervened he would have persevered. He surrendered to police and made full admissions. He gave a full account and added details to his disadvantage. It is unlikely without his interview that anyone would have known about the use of the knife (the complainant herself was not aware of it), or about the applicant’s intention to kill as opposed to assault the complainant. The applicant’s only relevant criminal history was a breach of the domestic violence order in the preceding year, when he attended the house of the complainant. The applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. A ‘serious violent offence’ (SVO) declaration was made.
Issue/s: Whether the ‘serious violent offence’ declaration should have been made.
Decision and Reasoning: Firstly, the Court held that the head sentence was ‘unremarkable’. However, Holmes JA (with whom McPherson JA and Douglas J agreed) upheld the appeal. The applicant showed profound and sincere remorse and the case involved ‘unusual’ mitigating factors. The Court found the SVO declaration should not have been made for two reasons. Firstly, there was nothing in the offence itself in terms of, ‘duration, its force or its consequences which took it out of the ordinary run of cases’. The offender had almost no criminal history. There was no element of community protection as the likelihood of repetition was remote. Secondly, he had cooperated utterly. However, the only sentence reduction he received for this cooperation and remorse was 9 and a half months (the difference between the nine year sentence with an SVO declaration, and a 10 year sentence). This was a minor reduction in the circumstances and made the SVO declaration manifestly excessive.
R v HAC [2006] QCA 291 (11 August 2006) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Torture’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Torture, assault occasioning bodily harm, rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant held a longstanding belief in his wife’s infidelity. The acts relied on to constitute the offence of torture included abusive and humiliating acts such as: insisting that the children refer to the complainant as a slut or a whore rather than Mum, not allowing the children to show physical or verbal affection to her; forcing her to chew and swallow chillies in the appellant’s presence and forcing her to lick her vomit up; insisting that she perform sexual acts on his friends for money; insisting that she sleep outside the house without amenities; demanding that she drink his urine and attempting to persuade her to engage in a sexual act with a dog. The assault occasioning bodily harm conviction occurred when the appellant broke the complainant’s arm after she denied having sexual dealings with a neighbour. The rape conviction involved the appellant inserting the wooden handle of a ‘gaff hook’ into the complainant’s vagina. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for torture, two years’ imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm and five years’ imprisonment for rape. A ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the directions given by the trial judge in respect of torture were inadequate.
2.
Whether the proviso should be applied.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed in respect of issue 2.
1.
It was accepted that the directions given by the trial judge were not consistent with McMurdo P’s judgment in R v LM [2004] QCA 192 which requires that when more than one act in a series is relied upon to prove the elements of torture, the jury must be unanimously satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed at least one of the particularised acts. In this case, the trial judge’s directions, ‘effectively permitted the jury to convict of torture even though the jury might not have been unanimously satisfied as to which act or series of acts were intentionally inflicted to cause severe pain or suffering’ (see at [2]).
2.
The Court held that notwithstanding this error, no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred and the proviso should be applied. Jerrard JA (Holmes JA agreeing) held that it was clear which acts amounted to torture and this evidence was substantiated by unchallenged evidence from the complainant’s daughters. Williams JA (Holmes JA agreeing) held (despite some initial concerns with applying the proviso) – ‘The offence of torture was clearly established beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence; the relevant particulars being the conduct sworn to by the complainant, supported by the evidence of her daughters, and admitted by the appellant’ (see at [11]).
R v Friday [2005] QCA 440 (30 November 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were in a de facto relationship. While intoxicated early in the morning, an argument started after the applicant alleged that she was seeing other men. The applicant got off the bed then stabbed her through the upper arm and side of the chest. The wound did not damage internal organs, but required deep and superficial stiches. He had a criminal history, consisting of various violent offences, and one offence of breaking and entering and committing an indictable offence. He pleaded guilty to wounding and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with no recommendation for post-prison community based released. This sentence was made cumulative upon an existing six month sentence that he was already serving. The sentencing judge referred to the need to deter others from obtaining a knife and stabbing someone just because of an argument. This conduct was prevalent on Palm Island, where the offence occurred. He was also sentenced for breaches of an intensive correction order and a domestic violence order.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The applicant submitted that if the sentencing judge had moderated the sentence for the mitigating factors (such as the guilty plea, the applicant’s age and an apology made to the complainant), then the starting point must have been four years, which is outside the permissible range of sentences for this type of offence. The Court agreed and suspended the three year sentence after nine months, with an operational period of three years.
R v Collins [2005] QCA 172 (27 May 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted by a jury for the grievous bodily harm of his then partner. The applicant beat his then partner so severely that she suffered a ‘life-threatening subdural haematoma’ (See further at [2]). He was severely intoxicated at the time of the offence. The offence was committed in breach of a domestic violence order. The appellant also pleaded guilty to several other violent offences. These offences demonstrated a history of domestic violence committed against his then partner. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, suspended after two years with an operational period of five years. This sentence for grievous bodily harm was ‘intended to reflect the applicant's criminality for all the offences to which he had pleaded guilty’ (See at [27]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the guilty verdict was unreasonable.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
The appeal against conviction was dismissed – see at [21]-[25].
Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant did not take his partner to hospital for treatment until one day after the injuries were sustained, which showed a complete disregard for her welfare. The fact that the offence was committed in breach of a domestic violence order was described as a ‘matter of concern’ (see at [31]). The applicant showed no remorse for the life-threatening injuries he inflicted on his partner, who is the mother of at least one of his children. Even though he had no memory of inflicting the injuries as a result of his intoxication, the Court stated that with ‘sober hindsight’ he ought to have been shocked at the injuries he caused (See at [31]). Deterrence was an important factor for the safety of the complainant as well as the interests of the community. The Court held at [37] that the applicant’s small prospects of rehabilitation were not such as to warrant a more lenient approach. The sentence for grievous bodily harm, when considered in isolation was not excessive. Therefore, considering the fact that it was a sentence intended to take into account all of the offending behaviour, it was actually at the lower end of the range of appropriate sentences.
R v Fairbrother; ex parte AG (Qld) [2005] QCA 105 (15 April 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following being released from police custody subject to conditions imposed under the then Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act 1989 that the respondent not have contact with the complainant (his domestic partner) and that he not go to her residence, the respondent returned to her home and threw boiling water onto her twice. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the complainant. He pleaded guilty on the second day of trial and was sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm, wholly suspended with an operational period of four years.
Issue/s: Whether the full suspension of the sentence made it manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The injuries caused the complainant severe pain over a long period and also caused some mental health issues. The respondent had some history of domestic violence. This was a ‘reasonably bad’ (at [21]) example of the offence which occurred hours after the appellant had been removed from the complainant’s home by police. However, mitigating factors included his guilty plea, his good work history and his efforts at rehabilitation. Furthermore, the respondent was not sentenced at trial for deliberately pouring boiling water on the complainant. If it had been deliberate, he would have been sentenced to actual imprisonment of at least 12 months before suspension. This was nevertheless a ‘serious example of domestic violence’ with the sentence imposed at trial being a correspondingly ‘substantial penalty’ (See at [24]).
See in particular McMurdo P’s (Jerrard JA and Cullinane J agreeing) comments on the impacts of domestic violence and the approach to sentencing at [23] –
‘Domestic violence is an insidious, prevalent and serious problem in our society. Victims are often too ashamed to publicly complain, partly because of misguided feelings of guilt and responsibility for the perpetrator's actions. Members of the community are often reluctant to become involved in the personal relationships of others where domestic violence is concerned. Perpetrators of domestic violence often fail to have insight into the seriousness of their offending, claiming an entitlement to behave in that way or at least to be forgiven by the victim and to evade punishment by society. Domestic violence has a deleterious on-going impact not only on the immediate victim but on the victim's wider family and ultimately on the whole of society. It is not solely a domestic issue; it is a crime against the State warranting salutary punishment. The cost to the community in terms of lost income and productivity, medical and psychological treatment and on-going social problems is immense. Perpetrators of serious acts of domestic violence must know that society will not tolerate such behaviour. They can expect the courts to impose significant sentences of imprisonment involving actual custody to deter not only individual offenders but also others who might otherwise think they can commit such acts with near impunity.’
R v Gill; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2004] QCA 139 (30 April 2004) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted rape’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Stalking’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, attempted rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated stalking and attempted rape and was sentenced to two years and three years’ imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently. There was no domestic violence order in place at the time of the offence. The Court recommended consideration of post-prison community based release after 12 months (See further at [2]-[3]).
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority. Holmes J (with whom Davies JA agreed) discussed R v Stephens [1994] QCA 507 and noted that it is not correct to approach rapes occurring in an existing relationship more leniently. However, this is not to say that that in the circumstances of a particular case, a sexual assault committed by a current or former partner will necessarily be equivalent to a sexual assault committed by a stranger. In comparing this case to R v McNamara, her Honour stated at [16], ‘I do not think that the traumatic effect of sexual assault in a case such as this, where the complainant had, albeit without enthusiasm, admitted the respondent to the house and gone to sleep with him present, is readily equated with the likely shock and fear of a woman sleeping in her home who without warning is assaulted by an intruder; as happened in McNamara.’ As such, also taking into account the respondent’s plea of guilty and comparable cases, her Honour held that the sentence, while ‘lenient’ ([21]), was adequate. However, de Jersey CJ dissented. His Honour also discussed Stephens. His view was that the statement in Stephens about an ‘honest but unreasonable’ mistake as to consent in the relationship context as a mitigating factor did not apply. The complainant had made her lack of consent clearly known and had previously shown reluctance to let the respondent into the house. His Honour stated, ‘This is a case where the circumstance of the prior relationship should in no degree have led to more lenient treatment than would otherwise be accorded’ (See at [5]). His Honour then went onto consider the respondent’s serious and relevant criminal history, including stalking offences as well as breaches of domestic violence orders (on four occasions over an eight year period with other partners). As such, having regard to this context, his view was that the sentence for attempted rape should be increased to four and a half years and that the order for community release should be removed. Nevertheless, he was in dissent and the appeal was dismissed.
R v AN [2003] QCA 349 (11 August 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Cumulative sentencing’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstances of aggravation.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant met the complainant while on remand and they lived together for a short period until the relationship broke down. The stalking occurred over the phone and included death threats and threats to the complainant’s children. There was a psychologist’s report before the trial judge, indicating that the applicant presented with a borderline personality disorder and would not be able to alter his behaviour without counselling. The applicant had a long criminal history of stalking, stealing, breaches of domestic violence orders and other offences. The applicant pleaded guilty to the stalking of the complainant with circumstances of aggravation and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the three year sentence offended the totality principle and was therefore manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years. The effect of the conviction was that an existing suspended sentence for other offences was activated. The applicant had also been sentenced previously for common assault and wilful damage charges. The effect of this was that the applicant was liable to four years and two months imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole at eighteen months. There was no error in the cumulative term being imposed. However, the Court did conclude that the three year term offended the totality principle. In citing comparable cases, the Court found that a three year sentence is at the top of the range for offending of this nature. Lesser sentences were imposed in comparable cases which involved more serious stalking in the domestic context, such as surveillance, letters and attempts to run the victim off the road. Such conduct was not present in this case.
R v Foodey [2003] QCA 310 (25 July 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstance of aggravation (violence), wilful damage.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant separated from his wife after an eight year marriage and fourteen year relationship. Temporary protection orders were in place against the applicant in favour of his ex-wife. In breach of those orders, he stalked her on a number of separate occasions by assaulting her, driving his car at her, making threats against her and their children and following her car. His criminal history involved drug offences committed a considerable time ago. He pleaded guilty. The sentencing judge noted that the applicant showed no remorse and his conduct was of such seriousness that a deterrent sentence was more important than is normally the case. He was sentenced to 12 and a half months imprisonment, suspended for five years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused. Jerrard JA (with whom Davies JA and Helman J agreed) stated at [11] that, ‘The applicant's behaviour towards Jennifer Foodey in the two and a half months between their separation and his incarceration was persistently cruel and aggressive. At different times he insulted, degraded, and terrified her. His conduct throughout was in breach of court orders intended to give her protection. Considered in isolation, the sentence imposed by the learned judge does not appear manifestly excessive, and indeed far from it. The same result occurs if regard is had to other sentences for unlawful stalking imposed or approved by this court.’ The sentence was upheld.
R v Layfield [2003] QCA 3 (29 January 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’
Charge/s: Stalking with a circumstance of aggravation (threats of violence).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of stalking his former fiancee with the aggravating circumstance that he threatened to use violence against her. A previous domestic violence order was obtained by the complainant and the relationship deteriorated about a year after this. The stalking occurred over a period of less than one year. It occurred over the telephone, as well as by following and loitering outside of her place of employment. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge should have exercised the option of suspending the sentence after twelve months, on the basis of several factors including the applicant’s youth, lack of criminal history and a strong support network.
Decision and Reasoning: Davies JA (with whom McPherson JA and Mullins J agreed), refused the application, holding that while the trial judge could have imposed the lesser sentence, it was not argued for at trial, and the sentence that was imposed did not demonstrate any error. Davies JA also noted the applicant’s lack of remorse as a relevant factor.
R v Millar [2002] QCA 382 (25 September 2002) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Irrelevant considerations’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstances of aggravation, common assault, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the complainant for nine months. They then lived together as a married couple for two weeks until the complainant moved out due to physical and verbal abuse by the applicant. The complainant indicated that she wished to cease all contact with the applicant. There was a domestic violence order in place, which was subsequently breached by the applicant. The stalking (committed when the order was in place) ‘involved menacing telephone calls, banging on her door, threats and letters and other items left at her residence culminating in the applicant's attempting to run the complainant off the road during the day’. This caused the complainant to veer to the wrong side of a busy rode. He then drove his car into hers and assaulted an off duty police officer who was trying to help the complainant. The applicant’s criminal history was comprised of dishonesty offences which had resulted in prison terms. Concurrent sentences of two years imprisonment (with the full activation of an unrelated nine month suspended sentence) were imposed. The complainant indicated that she was still in fear for her safety.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused. The applicant submitted, inter alia that his criminal history was confined to dishonesty offences, he was young and a psychological report indicated he was remorseful. He stressed that the comparable decisions before the Court concerned situations where there was no emotional relationship between the complainant and the offender, so that in his case, a more lenient penalty should have been imposed. This argument was rejected. de Jersey CJ (with whom Helman J and Jones J agreed) held – ‘I would say for my part that that (the presence of an emotional relationship between the offender and the victim) is not a feature which should necessarily lead to a lower penalty being imposed, where the stalking follows the break-up of an emotional relationship.’
R v M [2001] QCA 166 (1 May 2001) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Burglary, rape, assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty, two counts of aggravated indecent assault and assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: One week prior to the offences the victim had removed her former partner’s name from their joint lease, terminating his right to enter. He (the appellant) then broke into the victim’s house, after cutting the telephone wires. He then pulled her into the bedroom, punched her, tied her up and forced her to perform oral sex on him at knife point on two separate occasions. He waved his knife at her and said that if the police were called, he would cut off her breasts and have anal sex with her. He then raped her. The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order obtained by the complainant a month before the offences were committed. He was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to infer that it was the appellant who cut the telephone lines.
3.
Whether the trial judge erred by failing to direct the jury that they needed to be satisfied that the appellant cut the phone lines beyond reasonable doubt.
4.
Whether evidence of a domestic violence order being in place could be a relevant factor in determining whether the appellant had the requisite intent to commit an offence when he entered the house.
5.
Whether the appellant could rely on the defence of an honest and mistaken belief for the purposes of consent.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
McPherson JA noted that a sentence of less than seven years could not have been expected – the appellant had a substantial history of domestic violence (including against the complainant’s mother) and breaches of these orders.
2.
McPherson JA held that the judge was correct in allowing the jury to infer that the appellant had caused the damage. There was uncontradicted circumstantial evidence to this effect.
3.
This argument was dismissed. Only each element of the offence needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, not every piece of circumstantial evidence.
4.
The Court held that evidence of a domestic violence order being in place could be a relevant factor for the jury to determine intent for the purposes of the burglary charge.
5.
This argument was dismissed. In fact, the trial judge had omitted the requirement of a ‘reasonable’ belief, which was favourable to the appellant.
R v Matamua; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2000] QCA 400 (28 September 2000) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Going armed in public in such a manner as to cause fear’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm while armed’
Charge/s: Unlawful assault, unlawful assault causing bodily harm while armed, going armed in public in such a manner as to cause fear.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent became involved in an argument with the complainant, with whom he was in a de facto relationship. The respondent smashed a stubby of beer on his forehead which broke. He then pushed the complainant onto the bonnet of a car and held the broken bottle on her throat and threatened to slice her with it. Another argument ensued, at which point the respondent swung an axe at the complainant. He hit her on the back of the head with the handle while yelling abuse at her. She was knocked to the ground. Then, he swung the axe to the ground so that the axe head became stuck in the ground next to the complainant’s head. After a struggle, he winded the complainant and held the axe to her throat, while threatening to kill her. He was severely intoxicated. The relationship ended after the offences. The complainant experienced severe pain, but suffered no permanent physical injury. However, she suffered lasting psychological injuries. The respondent’s criminal history consisted of drug and traffic offences, as well as one offence of behaving in a threatening manner. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended with an operational period of two and a half years. A $1000 fine and $1000 compensation was also ordered.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate. In particular, whether a custodial sentence was required.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Pincus JA (with whom Thomas JA and de Jersey CJ agreed) held that the degree of violence was such as to warrant a term of actual imprisonment. A deterrent sentence was needed. His conduct was prolonged. The axe could quite easily have gone through someone’s head. It involved other people as well as his partner. The sentence was increased on the principal charge of assault occasioning bodily harm to 18 months’ imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after six months. It was recommended that the respondent receive counselling for his alcohol problems.
R v MacKenzie [2000] QCA 324 (11 August 2000) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Battered wife syndrome’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Negligent manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was married to her husband for 39 years and was subjected to severe domestic violence during that time. She pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband. She was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years. (See further at [26]-[30]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred because of advice the appellant was given to plead guilty to manslaughter, instead of pleading not guilty to murder and seeking an acquittal on the basis of self-defence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
This argument was dismissed – the applicant never claimed she was acting in self-defence, and there was minimal evidence to that effect. However, McPherson JA did note that evidence of ‘battered wife’s syndrome’, can be relevant as expert evidence for the purposes of self-defence (or provocation), as demonstrating the heightened awareness and arousal which may be experienced by ‘battered women’, which would be relevant to whether they had reasonable grounds to use the level of force they did.
2.
The appeal against sentence was upheld. McMurdo P (Dutney J concurring as to the orders made) held that notwithstanding that the applicant’s conduct was negligent and not a willed act, a substantial period of imprisonment was required to deter people from handling guns negligently, particularly in the context of domestic violence. Such conduct was not excused by the ‘grim history’ of domestic violence the appellant suffered. Nevertheless, this history did impact upon the appellant in that it contributed to (as a psychologist who interviewed her put it at [21]), ‘ineffective problem solving behaviour and a perception by [the applicant] of the narrowing of her options over time. A perception of narrowed options can often result in decisions made by the abused woman that from the outside look like poor judgment.’ This grave history of abuse was therefore an additional mitigating factor which partly explains how her behaviour came about. As such, taking into account all of the unusual circumstances, the sentence was reduced to 5 years, with a non-parole period of 1 year. McPherson JA agreed that the sentence should be reduced but proposed a slightly longer term.
R v Lane [1998] QCA 167 (8 May 1998) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against the recording of a conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm. She was released and placed on a good behaviour bond for two years. For a number of years, the applicant had been the subject of severe physical and emotional abuse by her de facto partner. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order in place between the applicant and her de facto partner. The incident involved the applicant hitting her de facto partner on the head with a heavy mortar bowl when he was sleeping. She later shot him, after a struggle for the gun. She was acquitted of the shooting charges on the basis that the jury found there was a reasonable doubt as to whether self-defence was available due to a reasonable fear of serious attack. However, she was convicted for the striking incident, with self-defence being excluded beyond reasonable doubt. The sentencing judge commented on the need for a ‘deterrent aspect in the element of sentencing in a case such as this’ (and noted) ‘Little point…would be served at this stage by not recording a conviction’ (See at page 6).
Issue/s: Whether the conviction should have been recorded.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. Derrington J noted at [4] that the ‘(trial judge) made full allowance for the applicant's suffering at the hands of the complainant and for all other features favourable to her. With this approach I agree unreservedly.’
R v Stephens & Attorney-General of Queensland [1994] QCA 507 (28 November 1994) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Consent’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, indecent assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of indecent assault of his de facto partner. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the victim. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a recommendation for parole eligibility after six months. The context of the relationship was one of intimidation and fear.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court upheld the appeal, holding that while the trial judge was correct to take into account the respondent’s youth, irrelevant considerations were taken into account. The sentence was increased to five years imprisonment with a recommendation for parole eligibility after two years. The Court found that the primary judge erred by approaching rapes occurring within an existing relationship in a more lenient way. The Court stated that generally, it is not correct to approach rapes occurring in existing relationships more leniently. There may be circumstances where the existence of such a relationship may be relevant to the sentence imposed due to the offender’s state of mind, in that, ‘there may be greater scope for a genuine belief on the part of the man that the woman has or is likely to consent to sexual intercourse. And where that mistake is honest but unreasonable, it may be relevant to take it into account in sentencing the offender.’ (Note: This statement has been both distinguished and applied in subsequent Court of Appeal decisions - In R v Conway [2012] QCA 142, Henry J (with whom Muir JA and McMurdo P agreed) stated in obiter that Stephens is ‘of limited utility given its age'. However, the case has been discussed after Conway such as in R v Postchild [2013] QCA 227.) In Stephens itself, the Court of Appeal found that the circumstances of the relationship in that case did not give reason to distinguish it from a rape between strangers. There was a high degree of violence and the complainant made it clear through her protests and tears that she was not consenting.
R v Bell & Anor; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1994] QCA 220 (20 June 1994) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Unlawful Wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was intoxicated and following an argument with the complainant (his de facto partner), stabbed her in the thigh, punched her in the mouth twice and continued to shout and threaten her. He pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding and was sentenced to two years’ probation and ordered to perform 120 hours of community service, with no conviction recorded. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the complainant. The complainant was supportive of the respondent, but did not wish to see him in prison.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The respondent was re-sentenced to a suspended period of imprisonment for one year, with an operational period of two years. A conviction was recorded. The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 1 year despite the wishes of the complainant, the fact that the relationship had resumed and the fact the respondent had returned to his community and returned to work. However, the operational period of the sentence was suspended. Fitzgerald P (at 6) made the following comments relating to how social and economic disadvantage (both generally and in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities) is relevant when sentencing domestic violence offenders –
“It was right for (the trial judge) to have regard to the respondent’s disadvantages and open to him, as a result, to sentence the respondent as leniently as the circumstances of his offence admitted. However, such disadvantages do not justify or excuse violence against women or, to take another example, abuse of children. Women and children who live in deprived communities or circumstances should not also be deprived of the law’s protection. A proposition that such offences should not be adequately penalised because of disadvantages experienced by a group of which the offender is a member is not one which is acceptable to the general community or one which we would expect to be accepted by the particular community of which an offender and complainant are members.”
R v Kina [1993] QCA 480 (29 November 1993) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - social worker’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In September 1988, after a trial which lasted less than a day, the female appellant, an Aboriginal woman, was convicted of murder for killing her abusive male partner of three years and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant did not give or call evidence at her trial. It was only five years later, after the appellant had spent years speaking to a particular social worker (Mr Berry) in prison, that evidence of the abuse she suffered emerged. Kina applied to the Governor in Council for the exercise in her favour of the royal prerogative of mercy. Section 672A of the Criminal Code preserves the pardoning power of the Governor, adding in para. (a) ‘that the Crown Law Officer may refer the whole case to the Court of Appeal, to be heard and determined as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted.’ Under this provision on 24 May 1993 the Attorney General referred to the Court of Appeal ‘the whole case with respect to the conviction of … Robyn Bella Kina on the charge of murder …’ of Anthony David Black.
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant did not receive a fair trial and a miscarriage of justice occurred because of problems of communication between the appellant and her lawyers which led to fundamental errors at trial.
2.
There was fresh evidence of such a nature that, had it been placed before the jury who decided the case, there was a substantial possibility of acquittal.
3.
The fresh evidence was of such a nature that refusal of it would lead to a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, the conviction and verdict set aside and a new trial ordered. Evidence of Mr Berry, the social worker, was important in this case. Mr Berry first saw the appellant before her trial in April 1988. Over the following months, the appellant slowly disclosed her story to Mr Berry – that the deceased had continually beaten her up, forced her to have anal sex with him and that he tied her up. Mr Berry tried to communicate with the appellant’s lawyers before the trial but was advised that her legal representatives wished that he ‘would not interfere with proceedings’. After the trial, the social worker saw the appellant in a counselling capacity. The appellant’s self-esteem improved and in 1991 she was able to give evidence about the deceased’s threat to anally rape her 14 year old niece.
In finding there was a miscarriage of justice, Fitzgerald P and Davis JA held that:
“In this matter, there were, insufficiently recognised, a number of complex factors interacting which presented exceptional difficulties of communication between her legal representatives and the appellant because of: (i) her aboriginality; (ii) the battered woman syndrome; and (iii) the shameful (to her) nature of the events which characterised her relationship with the deceased. These cultural, psychological and personal factors bore upon the adequacy of the advice and legal representation which the appellant received and effectively denied her satisfactory representation or the capacity to make informed decisions on the basis of proper advice”.
Supreme Court
Gardiner v Doer [2022] QSC 188 (11 November 2022) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Civil claim for post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Defendant acquitted at criminal trial’ – ‘Interference with the person’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Tort law’ – ‘Trespass to the person’ – ‘What constitutes assault and/or battery’
Matter: civil claim for damages for assault/and or battery and post- traumatic stress disorder.
Facts: The defendant was found not guilty at a criminal trial. The plaintiff then sued him in tort.
The plaintiff and defendant had been married for 15 years and had two children together. The defendant had been verbally and physically abusive to the plaintiff. They had recently separated when the defendant told the plaintiff he would send someone to rape and sodomise her. That night, he broke into the house dressed in black including a black balaclava. He jumped on top of her, sat on her chest, covered her mouth, held her nose and started shoving the fingers of latex gloves into her mouth. She struggled and he forced her head off the couch and bumped her head on the tiled floor. He put cloth in her mouth and tape over it then did the same with her eyes. He started to tie her hands together with plastic bags. She struggled more and managed to pull off his mask. When he said that he would come for her family, he would burn down her mother’s house, he would come for her sister and that her family was evil, she recognised him as her husband the defendant. She called him by his name and after that the violence diminished.
Held: Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $967,113.40
Cooper J found the elements of the tort of battery made out [287]. Most of his judgment addressed the question of damages. His Honour included the following heads of damage in his assessment: General damages: $8,410; Past economic loss: $358,123; Interest on past economic loss: $58,302; Future economic loss: $343,081; Gratuitous services: $35,560; Special damages: $13,412.40; Interest on special damages: $1,899; Future special damages: $13,126, Aggravated damages: $50,000; Interest on aggravated damages: $17,600; Exemplary damages: $50,000: Interest on exemplary damages: $17,600 [389].
R v Peniamina (No 2) [2021] QSC 282 (25 October 2021) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘Partial defence of provocation’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Reasonable belief’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1, Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty of manslaughter following jury retrial (his conviction for murder having been set aside by the High Court in Peniamina v The Queen [2020] HCA 47 (9 December 2020)). The defendant was in a relationship with the female victim for 16 years and the couple shared four school aged children. In 2020, the defendant confronted the victim with allegations of infidelity. When the victim denied these allegations, the defendant struck her, before stabbing her 29 times and hitting her head with a cement bollard which resulted in her death [14], [11]. During the assault, the victim had armed herself with a kitchen knife and cut the defendant’s hand when he attempted to disarm her. The jury found that this act provoked the defendant’s murderous intention [10], accepting the partial defence of provocation. The jury had also found that the defendant’s belief about the victim’s infidelity was reasonable [7].
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole after serving 80% of the sentence. Justice Davis declared that the offence was a serious violence offence and a domestic violence offence]. In sentencing, His Honour was guided by s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (‘the Act’) and comparative cases [35]-[39]. His Honour noted the defendant’s early plea of guilty and genuine remorse [23], [25]. Due to the defendant’s lack of prior convictions, His Honour placed less importance on personal deterrence as a sentencing purpose [26]. His Honour took evidence of the defendant’s intention to kill his wife into account as a relevant sentencing consideration [40]-[41] and emphasised that domestic violence was an aggravating factor under s 10A of the Act.
Attorney-General for the State of Qld v Sagiba [2020] QSC 254 (21 August 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Contravention of supervision order’ – ‘Sentencing orders’
Charges: Contravening supervision order x 5; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1 (DFV offence); Deprivation of liberty x 1 (DFV offence).
Proceedings: Contravention of supervision order.
Facts: The respondent was subject to a supervision order made under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act (DPSOA). The applicant alleged the respondent contravened a supervision order and sought to extend the period of the supervision order. In early 2020, the respondent was reported to police for allegedly committing domestic violence. The respondent put his female domestic partner in a headlock, strangled and punched her, attempted to prevent her leaving the house and threatened to rape her. The respondent claimed he ‘did not commit an offence of a sexual nature’ on the basis that there was a sexual element to the latest offences, but they were not sexual offences. The psychiatric evidence was that the risk factors that were present when the original supervision order was made remain present.
Issues: Whether adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the release of the respondent subject to a supervision order.
Decision and reasoning: Supervision order extended for a further five years.
The respondent has not demonstrated that the adequate protection of the community – specifically from the commission by the respondent of a ‘serious sexual offence’ – can be ensured by his release without him being subject to supervision.
Johnson v Parole Board of Queensland [2020] QSC 108 (11 May 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Application for judicial review’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Good behaviour’ – ‘Improper exercise of power’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Parole application’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Rehabilitation programs’ – ‘Stepchildren in the family’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Murder x 4; Attempted murder x 1; Rape x 1
Proceedings: Application for judicial review
Issue: Whether parole should be granted.
Facts: The male applicant plead guilty to murdering his female partner and three of her four children from her earlier marriage. He also plead guilty to the attempted murder and the rape of the fourth child of that marriage. The applicant had used a hammer to inflict head injuries on the victims, and scalded the fourth child with boiling water. The fourth child was not found for five days and suffered permanent injuries. The applicant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder charges and 14 years’ imprisonment for the rape charge.
After serving 13 years in custody, the applicant became eligible for parole. He made several applications for a parole order, but all were refused. The applicant applied for judicial review of the latest decision refusing parole, contending that the decision was affected by an improper exercise of power because: the refusal was unreasonable, the Parole Board failed to take relevant considerations into account, and the Board applied a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the case. The applicant also contended that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice.
Held: The judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision. His Honour held that the Board’s decision, as evidenced by its statement of reasons, did not lack an evident and intelligible justification when all the relevant matters were considered, and therefore the decision was not unreasonable [35]. His Honour noted that "the Board is not compelled to grant parole to a prisoner who has served any particular length of timer in custody or in residential accommodation, who has completed any particular number (or all) of the available recommended rehabilitation programs or who has been of good behaviour for any particular length of time" [32] – what is important is whether the offender shows "internal change, in the sense of the development of an understanding by the offender of the pathways to offending, the triggers that lead along that path and the steps the offender can take …" [33]. In this case, the applicant had not, and still posed a risk to the community.
His Honour also held that the Board did not fail to take a relevant consideration into account, namely a program completion report, as the Board expressly referred to extracts from this report in its statement of reasons [39]-[40]. Nor did the Board apply the policy asserted by the applicant (that the Board followed the commissioned psychiatric opinion without considering alternate views by other experts) inflexibly as the Board’s statement of reasons demonstrated that it considered alternate views of a range of other experts [42], [48].
The judge further held that the Board’s decision was not affected by any breach of the rules of natural justice [55]. The applicant was invited to make submissions to the Board on multiple occasions, and no complaint was made that the applicant had inadequate time to effectively prepare [54].
R v Coman [2020] QSC 60 (3 April 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Dangerous operation of a vehicle’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘History of emotional abuse’ – ‘Judge only trial’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perceived position of danger’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Offences: Manslaughter x 1; Dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance x 1.
Case type: Judge only trial
Facts: The female accused pleaded not guilty to manslaughter and the dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. The victim, her male fiancè, died of traumatic asphyxiation after the accused drove her motor vehicle over him as he lay on the ground. It was uncontroversial that the incident was preceded by an alcohol-fueled argument between the two parties. The accused felt threatened and decided to remove herself from what she believed to be a position of danger by attempting to drive away to a place of safety ([11]). The Crown alleged that the accused knew that the deceased was on the ground and deliberately drove her motor vehicle over the deceased, albeit without any intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.
At the close of the Crown case, the accused’s counsel made a no case submission with respect to the count of manslaughter. In particular, it was submitted that there was no evidence from which an inference of knowledge or intention could be made. Given the fact that there had been an unexplained deviation of the accused’s car from the driveway to the position where the victim’s body was found, the no case submission was unsuccessful. The accused then elected to give evidence, and claimed that the victim ran into her car as she was driving away from the house. Two defences were raised, namely, unforeseen consequence and one of extraordinary emergency or compulsion.
Issue: Whether the accused was guilty of the offences charged.
Held: Burns J considered the significant body of evidence regarding the victim’s relationship with his former wife, his subsequent partner and the accused. The accused and victim lived in a semi-rural town and had been in a relationship for approximately 2 years. Like the victim’s prior relationships, his relationship with the accused was marred by frequent and excessive alcohol consumption. As a result of his "chronic drinking problem", there were regular outbursts of anger, emotional abuse (including belittling accusations, vile language and intimidation), and, on occasion, actual violence ([18]).
The accused was acquitted on the count of manslaughter. His Honour accepted the accused’s evidence as it was entirely consistent with the physical evidence found at the scene, as well as the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries ([36]), and found that she did not deliberately drive over the victim’s body ([52]). His Honour was also not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused substantially or significantly caused the victim’s death. The real and effective cause of his death was his decision to place himself in front of the accused’s moving car ([54]). The accused was also acquitted on the alternative count of dangerous operation of a vehicle ([65]).
R v Arumugam [2018] QSC 312 (14 December 2018) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder x 1
Facts: The offender met the victim, a Singaporean national living in Australia, through an arranged marriage website. The victim had reservations and formed another relationship. The offender threatened to kill himself if she did not marry him. The offender travelled to Australia from South Africa with the intention of killing the victim if she did not proceed with the arranged marriage. This was evidenced by a statement he made in South Africa to that effect. The offender stabbed the victim 32 times in a hotel room, and claimed that she asked him to kill her. The offender pleaded guilty to the charges. By doing so, he cooperated with the administration of justice because he saved the deceased’s family the trauma of a trial, as well as substantial court time and resources.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was convicted of one count of murder, being a domestic violence offence, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. His Honour found that his conduct was planned and persistent ([20]), and involved a high degree of brutality and ferocity. Following his arrest, medical examinations found that, during his incarceration, he experienced periods of active psychosis, auditory hallucinations and paranoid and grandiose beliefs. Although the offender was diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder and borderline personality disorder, his Honour held that he was neither deprived nor impaired of full capacity at the relevant time.
R v Storie [2018] QSC 298 (30 November 2018) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Murder x 1; Burglary by breaking, in the night, whilst armed x 1; Entering premises, doing wilful damage x 1
Facts: In the early hours of the morning, the offender drove to his ex-partner’s house. No one was home. He broke into the garage, slashed the front tyres of her car, stole a child’s bicycle and returned home. He later returned, entered her house and sliced her throat with a knife.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was found guilty of ‘premeditated conduct of the very worst kind’ by taking the life of his former partner in a ‘brutal’ manner in circumstances where he was subject to a protection order ([4]). Eleven years prior he had been convicted of breaching a protection order that the victim had taken out. Premeditation was evidenced by numerous statements to the effect that his ex-partner would be ‘a dead woman’ and that the protection order would not stop him. The offender took active steps to dispose of the evidence of the murder, however later made admissions of his involvement in the victim’s death. Boddice J found that, by pleading guilty, he cooperated with the administration of justice because he saved the community the cost of a lengthy trial. He also facilitated the administration of justice by making extensive admissions to police after the discovery of the deceased’s body, which preserved police resources. He was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for entering the premises and doing wilful damage, and to 10 years’ imprisonment for burglary by breaking, in the night, whilst armed.
R v Ney a[2011] QSC Indictment No 597 of 2008 (8 March 2011)/a sentence - unreported – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Diminished responsibility’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist - psychologist’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’
Charge: Manslaughter
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: Ney killed her partner, Haynes, striking him in the head and face with an axe. Haynes was hospitalised and died two days later. Initially charged with murder she pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced to nine years imprisonment - eligible for release on parole after serving three years. In sentencing Ney, Dick AJ referred to the reports of a psychologist (Dr Sundin) and a psychiatrist (Associate Professor Carolyn Quadrio):
‘As you know, I have been given a number of psychiatric and psychological reports. The prosecution tendered the report of Dr Josephine Sundin. Dr Sundin has come to the opinion that as a result of the multiple traumas you have suffered in your life since your young teenage years and the series of violent intimate relationships that you have endured since that time, and the fact that you have suffered physical, sexual and psychological abuse over a long period of time, you suffer chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder.
The connection between those two matters is explained in her report and in other reports. Associate Professor Carolyn Quadrio, spells it out in her addendum report. She said, "Trauma and abuse have profound effects on mental processes and on psycho-social and psychological functions so that a disorganisation of personality occurs and leads to lasting disorder. Similarly, substance abuse which commonly develops in the context of adolescent trauma, also has a profound effect on mental and psycho-social processes and secondly, incapacitates the person so they are rendered highly vulnerable to further traumas and abuse thus creating a vicious cycle…
I have been assisted by the addendum report of Associate Professor Quadrio where she says that, "At times, however, she returned when she may have been able to escape because she experienced him as someone who loved her. This is explained as traumatic attachment relationship. Further it is also the case that in chronic or complex post-traumatic stress disorder there is both paralysis of initiative whereby the person is greatly compromised in her capacity to take action and there are alterations in perception so they have difficulty perceiving themselves accurately or others and thus in perceiving the true nature of the relationship with an abuser."
Later on she says, "If this psycho physiological disturbance is sustained over time and especially when it occurs in the crucial development years of childhood and adolescence, it eventually leads to disorganisation of personality, sustained hyper vigilance and hyper reactivity become chronic and irreversible."
Further on, "The inability to leave can be explained, partly, as a manifestation of personality disturbance but it is also the case that in domestic violence a woman feels trapped and unable to leave and knows it is not safe to leave so she remains captive and experiences more abuse and trauma and undergoes more personality disorganisation."
I have also noted from the report of Associate Professor Quadrio that those matters which are described as chronic or complex PTSD personality disorder with poly substance dependence or abuse, she says, "These disturbances reflected a lifetime of trauma, a highly chaotic and unsustainable lifestyle and both past and present intimate partner violence."
R v Falls, Coupe, Cummings-Creed & Hoare a[2010] QSC (3 June 2010)/a summing up - unreported – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Abused person’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Self defence’
Charge: Murder.
Result: Acquitted.
Facts: In May 2006, the accused, Susan Falls, shot and killed her husband, Rodney Falls. Throughout their relationship, Susan Falls was subject to significant physical and emotional abuse. This included: numerous incidents of physical violence, beating one of the family’s dogs to death; numerous incidents of sexual violence and rape; threatening to kill her or harm the couple’s children. Susan Falls drugged the deceased and shot him twice as he dozed in a chair. She was charged with murder. Both self-defence, ss 271(2), 273 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and the defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship, s 304B Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) were raised at trial. Two forensic psychiatrists (Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio) were called by the defence and gave evidence about the history of violence and its effect on the offender. (Note Coupe, Cumming-Creed and Hoare were charged with being accessories to the murder but were also acquitted).
Applegarth J, summing up (3 June 2010):
‘Evidence of what, for want of a better expression, is referred to as "battered woman syndrome", is admitted, not because battered woman syndrome is a disorder, or because battered woman syndrome is a defence. Battered woman syndrome isn't a defence. The fact that someone is battered for years doesn't automatically give them a defence. Whether they have a defence depends on whether they acted as they did in circumstances that the law provides is a defence.
However, what is conveniently, and perhaps somewhat inaccurately, described as "battered woman syndrome" is relevant to legal defences.
It doesn't have to be a psychological disorder to be relevant to behaviour and to the defences in this case. It's relevant to the mental state of Ms Falls, and whether she exhibited hyperarousal and other symptoms that are recognised in such cases.
I won't repeat it. You will remember the evidence of Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio about the mental state of persons who are subjected to prolonged abuse, their vigilance and so on. Associate Professor Quadrio summed it up pretty simply in saying they're “revved up all the time”.
The behaviour of people, be they soldiers or civilians who are subjected to trauma, has been the subject of organised study. It's not every form of behaviour that is or needs to be the subject of expert evidence. Someone's grief reaction when a loved one dies, or the anxiety that most of us feel when we talk in public, or the anxiety that most people experience when they sit exams, these are things that are familiar to us because we might remember sitting exams or we've had children who sit exams. So we don't need expert evidence to tell us about how people become anxious in certain circumstances, when they're going for an exam or a driver's licence or something of that kind, that we all know about or most of us know about. But because battered wife syndrome is relatively rare it is a legitimate matter for expert evidence and it is the proper subject for expert evidence because, without the assistance of expert evidence, ordinary people who don't know or study these things, might find the behaviour perplexing, counterintuitive or unreasonable.
It might seem odd why there would be a bond between the abuser and the abused. Why there might be, what Dr Lawrence referred to as, an ambivalent relationship, or what Associate Professor Quadrio referred to as a traumatic attachment. The behaviour of someone with a vulnerability because of past abuse who remains with their abuser.
Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio, who are experts in their field, were able to address what was described as the "cycle of violence". How, over time the situation worsens. How often it's the case that the abuser isolates the partner. The common symptoms of a variation in mental state. The loss of self-esteem. The belief that the person who is being abused is somehow at fault. The shame they feel when they return, contrary to the advice of police. The belief that in those circumstances the police won't help them again. The reasons they don't leave: children; lack of support; lack of financial support; threats to the woman; threats to people they love; threats over the custody of children.
And apart from giving you evidence about those characteristics and observed behaviours, Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio gave you evidence about the fact that victims of prolonged abuse can have quite correct perceptions as to the risks that are posed to them if they try to leave….
Battered wife syndrome isn't a psychological disorder. As Dr Lawrence and Dr Quadrio explained it's a pattern of behaviours. It's been the subject of research, and it's a field of study by practitioners and scholars whose research and reports are open to contest, as you'd expect scientific inquiry and research to be in a proper field of scientific study.
Dr Quadrio described how there is what she described as a "learned helplessness". How abused women are afraid to leave because they correctly assess that they're at risk. That there may have been past attempts to leave. She referred to the triggers that occur for a violent response. That the level of risk is perceived to increase or has in fact increased. Often there are threats to harm children, and the threats become specific in terms of how, when and where they will be carried out.
District Court
EJB v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 246 (30 January 2024) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ - ‘Breach of protection order’ - ‘Parole’
Charges: Contravention of protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on his own plea of guilty for contravening a protection order and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment (served cumulatively upon a nine months’ imprisonment imposed on other domestic violence offences). [2] The contraventions were committed whilst on parole after serving a sentence for other domestic violence related offences.
Appeal: The appellant contends that the three month sentence was manifestly excessive. [3]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. District Court Judge Farr SC had regard to the appellant’s ‘very lengthy criminal history’, and the fact that the offending occurred while the appellant was released on parole. [6]–[8] Accordingly, the sentence was not excessive in the circumstances. [18]
The King v ADP [2023] QDC 183 (5 October 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Judge alone trial’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Honest and reasonable mistake’ - ‘separation’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘deprivation of liberty’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; deprivation of liberty x 2; strangulation x 1; common assault x 2; rape x 2.
Proceedings: Trial by judge alone.
Facts: The male defendant pleaded guilty to offences — excluding rape — committed against his former female partner, throughout their eight month relationship. [1]
The defendant was physically abusive, barricading her in a room after she had packed her bags to leave, biting and pushing her and strangling and rendering unconscious the complainant on multiple occasions. [4]–[7] The defendant often threatened to self-harm or commit suicide. [11] The complainant alleges the defendant raped her twice at his house one afternoon. [12]
Issue: Whether the prosecution can prove the complainant did not consent, and if so, whether the prosecution can exclude beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not honestly but mistakenly believe she consented. [10]
Decision and Reasoning: Not guilty of two counts of rape. The complainant was ‘an honest witness’. However, certain features of her evidence ‘reflect adversely on her reliability’; [35] namely, the complainant not challenging the defendant’s recollection of consent during a pretext call: [36]
For example, she did not challenge defendant’s recollection by suggesting to him that she had told him to stop a number of times, that she said no, that she pushed him away when he was trying to have sexual intercourse, that she was crying before he stopped having sex with her or that he had admitted to her later that day that he had raped her [36]
Accordingly McGinness DCJ was not satisfied that the complainant ‘reliably recalled when and how she communicated to the defendant that she was not consenting’. [38]
Further, McGinness DCJ was not satisfied that the prosecution that excluded beyond reasonable doubt the defence of honest and reasonable mistake: evidence of the defendant indicated his honest belief that he did not rape the complainant. [52]–[54]
SK (A Child) v Commissioner of Queensland Police & Anor [2023] QDC 65 (17 April 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and torres strait islander person’ – ‘Appeal against protection order made after childrens court sentencing’ – ‘Child perpetrator’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Couple relationship’ – ‘Couple relationship between children’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevant relationship’ – ‘Section 37 domestic and family violence protection act 2012 (qld)’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Appeal against temporary protection order.
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate did not have jurisdiction to make a protection order.
2.
The appellant was not afforded procedural fairness in terms of representation and an opportunity to be heard.
3.
The learned magistrate did not provide adequate reasons for the decision.
4.
The children are not in a “relevant relationship” being a “couple relationship” within the meaning of the Act.
5.
A domestic violence protection order was not necessary or desirable.
Facts: The appellant was a 12-year-old boy who had been found to be in a ‘couple relationship’ with his 12-year-old ‘girlfriend.’
After sentencing the appellant in the Childrens Court in relation to a series of offences for assaulting the aggrieved, including choking her, striking her with a broom handle and threatening her the learned Magistrate heard and determined the protection order application on a final basis, when it had only been listed for mention.
The Commissioner conceded that the learned Magistrate failed to give proper reasoned consideration to the s 37 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) factors pre-requisite to the making of the order.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal allowed, application for protection order dismissed.
Morzone KC, DCJ observed:
[7] However, in my respectful opinion that hearing, and determination was premature and deeply flawed in several ways.
[8] Firstly, the proceeding was only set for “mention” on that day and was neither intended nor ready for a final hearing and orders. The material consisted of the initiating application with some narrative of the circumstances attested to by the investigating police. Nevertheless, the hearing morphed into final orders without adequate reasons.
[9] Secondly, the appellant child was not afforded procedural fairness due to inadequate representation absent a guardian and not being afforded any reasonable opportunity to be heard. I do not accept that the child can be said to have retained the duty lawyer, instead the representation was effectively appointed by the court ad hoc and in the nature of amicus curiae. After taking account of court procedures, I estimate that the child had barely 5 minutes with the duty lawyer via the video-link between the courtroom and the youth detention centre. The appellant child did not have the benefit of a guardian or parent. The learned magistrate proceeded as if the appellant consented to final orders, despite both parties urging the court to adjourn the hearing pending completion of the probation order. The duty lawyer’s submissions fell well short of informed consent, and any final orders were premature and ill-founded.
[10] Thirdly, the reasons for the decision below were inadequate.
[11] Fourthly, and in any event, there was and is insufficient and inadequate evidence to establish a requisite “couple relationship” between the two children. At best, the immature relationship between the children could be colloquially described as ‘puppy love’ and falling well short of the characteristic maturity of a ‘couple relationship’ caught by the Act.
[12] Fifthly, a domestic violence protection order is neither necessary nor desirable under the Act. Instead, “necessary or desirable” orders were, and remain, available under the Youth Justice Act1992, which provides appropriate safeguards and considerations pursuant to the youth justice principles. The Childrens Court sentence proceedings may be re-opened to amend the conditions of the appellant’s probation order, but that is beyond the remit of this appellate court.
[13] Sixthly, in the absence of any proper and sufficient evidentiary basis for the making of a protection order – neither the temporary nor final order (as amended) should have been made, nor should the application be entertained where the Youth Justice Act1992 caters for the circumstances. All orders should be set aside, and the application should be dismissed.
Queensland Police Service v KBH [2023] QDC 26 (16 February 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Use of children in abuse’
Charges: 4x breaches of protection order.
Proceedings: Sentencing appeal pursuant to section 222 Justices Act 1886.
Grounds: The penalty of $300 for the first two counts, and $200 for the remaining charges, was manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The respondent man and aggrieved woman had been in a relationship but had separated. The offending involved multiple breaches/contraventions of a protection order, where the aggrieved was the person protected. On the first occasion, the respondent approached the aggrieved at a football match and used derogatory language before later letting himself into her house and refusing to leave until police were called. On another occasion he called their child and asked to speak to the aggrieved, accusing her of drinking and seeing other men. The final incident was when he was invited to the aggrieved’s home on the condition he leave after dinner and then refused to do so until police were again called.
The respondent had previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for contravention of a protection order.
Decision: The original sentence was set aside as an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion and the respondent was resentenced to three months imprisonment.
Coker DJC found that the Magistrate had erroneously misconstrued the offending as minor breaches, evidencing a ‘total misunderstanding of the nature of domestic violence and the nature of control and dominion exercised in relation to a former intimate partner’ [25]. Where the respondent knew of his obligation not to approach the aggrieved and continued to do so, attending her home when he had been specifically directed not to, accusing her of seeing other men and refusing to leave her house when asked, the breaches were not inconsequential [25], [27], [29].
Coker DJC characterised the breaches as controlling and coercive, being ‘significant indications of a lack of appreciation or respect by the respondent of the orders previously made, and of the opportunities given to change the direction of his ways,’ particularly given the repetition of conduct for which he had previously been sentenced [28], [30].
The ‘lenient’ fine was manifestly inadequate and unreasonable in all of the circumstances [31]. Coker DJC emphasised the need to impose penalties reflecting the importance of ensuring that controlling domestic violence behaviours do not continue [32] and that while not a serious act of domestic violence, the repeated conduct of the respondent and 10 previous domestic violence convictions justified significant penalty [34].
Coker DJC stated: ‘Again, these are by no means minor matters that arise in relation to the breaches. They are controlling. They are coercive and, most importantly, they are significant indications of a lack of appreciation or respect by the respondent of the orders previously made, and of the opportunities given to change the direction of his ways.’ [28]
Wylie v AMN [2022] QDC 241 (26 October 2022) (26 October 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Civil’ – ‘Court's own motion’ – ‘Failure to give reasonable opportunity to consider and respond to summary dismissal’ – ‘Police officer alleged perpetrator’ – ‘Protection order sought against serving police officer’ – ‘Summary dismissal of application for protection order’ – ‘Whether magistrate has jurisdiction to hear protection order application by police protection notice if notice not filed in the district’
Proceedings: Appeal against summary dismissal of application for protection order.
Facts: Senior Constable Wylie filed an application for a Police Protection Order under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (DFVP Act). Notice was served at the Caboolture police station but filed in the Pine Rivers Magistrate’s Court. The DFVP Act s 111(1) states that Notice must be filed in the local Magistrate’s Court. The respondent argued that the case had been commenced in the wrong court so proceedings were a nullity.
The magistrate dismissed the proceedings summarily without either party raising this or having an opportunity to make submissions on this [14]. The Magistrate was concerned that the matter be decided quickly as the respondent was a serving police officer and referred repeatedly to the potential for the proceedings to waste the court’s time [17].
The aggrieved had been married to the respondent for 2.5 years and they had one son. The aggrieved applied for a protection order on the basis that the respondent had threatened to jump in front of a truck holding the child; had told her to remember that he carried a gun all day at work; and had said that no one would believe her over him, among other things.
Grounds
(a)
Jurisdiction: Whether the learned Magistrate had erred in assuming she had jurisdiction to hear the application where the Police Protection Notice initiating the proceeding was served at the Caboolture Police Station, but was filed in the Pine Rivers Magistrates Court; and
(b)
summary dismissal: Whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the application summarily, without giving the appellant/applicant the opportunity to cross examine witnesses for the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal upheld; order for summary dismissal set aside; matter remitted for rehearing by a different magistrate.
On jurisdiction, Porter KC DCJ held that jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly [40] and resolved a conflict between ss 136 and 111 of the DFVP Act by upholding the precedence of s136 which gives courts jurisdiction to ‘hear and decide any application made to the court under this Act’ (s136(1)(a)).
On summary dismissal, his Honour found that the Magistrate had erred in three ways:
1.
Her Honour should have declined to consider the application for summary dismissal until the evidence before her was tested at trial [76].
2.
She erred in placing weight on the fact that the respondent was a serving police officer when deciding to dismiss the application [78].
3.
She initiated the dismissal of the application of her own volition. The one day’s notice given failed to accord procedural fairness [79].
He referred to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Rules 2014, Rule 22, which gives plenary power to determine applications. This is subject to Rule 23, which sets out a list of conditions to which this power is subject. Relevant here are that ‘each party is entitled to a fair hearing’ (Rule 23 (2)(b)) and ‘each party must be given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and cross examine witnesses’ (Rule 23 (2)(i)). [60]
His Honour continued at [61]:
Turning to the Act itself, apart from s. 51, there does not appear to be any statutory provision which expressly, or by necessary implication, authorises hearing and determination of an application for a (final) protection order other than by “trial” of the application. It is to be noted of course that the Act does not expressly say that a protection order is to be determined by trial. However, where the Act creates a right and confers civil jurisdiction on a court to hear and decide an application to enforce that right, it must necessarily imply that the application be determined by procedurally fair process apposite to a hearing which results in a final order. At the least, that must include a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, cross examine and otherwise test another party’s evidence and address the Court on the findings of fact that the Court should make on the evidentiary record and the law that applies to those facts.
He held that the Magistrate did not have an express statutory power summarily to dismiss the application [66]. While statutory courts do not have inherent jurisdiction, they have implied powers to do whatever is necessary to perform their function [67]. While a court would have jurisdiction summarily to dismiss frivolous or vexatious cases that amount to an abuse of process, this power does not extend to cases ‘where there is a real question of fact to be determined’ [72].
LJV v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 220 (13 September 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Appeal against conviction dismissed’ – ‘Appeal against sentence upheld’ – ‘Appellant convicted of contravening a domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Whether magistrate interfered with evidence of a witness’ – ‘Whether magistrate's involvement in conduct of trial went beyond their role as trial judge’ – ‘Whether the appellant received a fair trial’
Matter: appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was subject to a domestic violence order and due to attend court for a breach thereof when he sent the following text to the respondent:
You will need to pick up the kids from school today as I need to prepare for court tomorrow morning to contest the bogus claims you have laid against their father in yet another alienation attempt. I will pick up the children as normal from school on Friday depening [a typographical error, I infer] on the decision from the judge.
The prosecution argued that the text breached the requirement for the applicant to be of good behaviour and not commit domestic violence and the requirement not to contact the respondent except concerning parental or contact issues.
Grounds:
1.
The Magistrate’s examination of the aggrieved was a miscarriage of justice as it led evidence on her behalf on which the accused had no notice [15]. His Honour’s examination of the applicant relied on knowledge of previous actions before the court and risked his being identified with one of the parties [20]. The trial was unfair and the conviction should not stand.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal against conviction dismissed; appeal against sentence upheld; sentence set aside; order that the offender be convicted but that no conviction be recorded and the offender not be further punished.
Porter QC DCJ found that a portion of the text message breached the requirement in the domestic violence order not to contact the respondent except concerning parental or contact issues [22]. His Honour deliberately did not make a finding as to whether the requirement to be of good behaviour was breached due to the unfairness of the trial on that issue [21]. He agreed with the prosecution submission that the sentence of one month’s imprisonment suspended after serving 5 days was manifestly excessive [23].
HFL v PLL [2022] QDC 219 (5 August 2022)- Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against variation of protection order to include named persons’ – ‘Appeal and new trial’ – ‘Appeal pursuant to s222 of the justices act 1886 (qld)’ – ‘Appeal unopposed’ – ‘Application to vary domestic violence order’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Grounds for interference’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Whether the magistrate erred by varying a protection order to include two named persons where parties had agreed that aspect of the proceedings would not proceed’
Case type: Appeal pursuant to s222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
Facts: The applicant appealed against an order by a magistrate under s 52 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) including two named persons as protected persons in a domestic violence protection order where the respondent (to the current action) had withdrawn the issue. The respondent did not attend the appeal hearing in order to save costs.
Grounds:
1.
The learned magistrate erred by varying a 2019 domestic violence order to include two named persons where the respondent indicated she was no longer seeking to have the two named persons included; no evidence was given by them about a complaint about the appellant; the court proceedings were conducted without addressing the issue; and there was no other basis to vary the 2019 order to include them;
2.
The magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for including the two named persons; and
3.
The magistrate failed to afford procedural fairness, particularly to the appellant, by failing to allow opportunity to address his Honour about whether the order ought to have been varied.
Held: Appeal allowed.
Deardon DCJ held that the lack of reasons given and the failure to afford procedural fairness were legal errors [10]. The errors should be remedied in light of the consequences of the Magistrate varying the order: the appellant was at risk of being charged with a criminal offence if he tried to contact the named persons or approached within 100 m of where they live, work or are [13]-[14]. His Honour further ordered that the respondent pay a fixed amount of costs and granted her an indemnity certificate.
DLM v WER & The Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 79 (6 April 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Child custody’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant man and first respondent woman separated after living together with their child for several years [9]. In September 2020, a Magistrate granted a protection order with non-contact conditions in the first respondent’s favour and dismissed a temporary protection order that had been granted in the appellant’s favour in July 2019. In October 2020, the appellant appealed the decision and applied to adduce ‘fresh’ evidence to establish that the first respondent had perpetrated acts of domestic violence [1]-[2].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justice Cash considered the evidence adduced at trial and affirmed the Magistrate’s findings that ‘there had been no acts of domestic violence by the first respondent’ and that ‘there had been acts of domestic violence by the appellant’ [80]. Accordingly, His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s decision to award a protection order in the first respondent’s favour and dismissed the appellants application to adduce evidence.
His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s findings as to the appellant’s lack of credibility. The Magistrate had not accepted the appellant’s evidence, having found that the appellant’s claim that the first respondent deliberately had nightmares to antagonise him ‘seriously undermined [his] credibility’, which did not improve during cross-examination [36], [70]. His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s finding that the appellant had engaged in acts of domestic violence. Firstly, the appellant had limited the first respondent’s access to their child in a manner that was manipulative and controlling [42], [70]-[72]. Secondly, the appellant had taken sexually explicit photographs of the first respondent without her knowledge or consent [38]. His Honour stated that this was an act of domestic violence that was sexually abusive and done in an attempt to ‘dominate’, ‘control’ and ‘punish’ the first respondent by causing her to fear that the images would be released during court proceedings, as the appellant had previously done [38], [42]. His Honour continued: ‘The appellant had by his conduct demonstrated a pattern of domestic violence. There was the real prospect of future domestic violence, especially where the parties shared a child, and it was likely they would have to maintain some contact’ [72]. Therefore, ‘there was no error in the Magistrate’s conclusion that a protection order should be made in favour of the first respondent’ [72].
FLC v MRT [2021] QDC 264 (1 November 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Adverse inference’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Failure to provide adequate reasons’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Rule in jones v dunkel’
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The appellant man is the respondent man’s uncle. The 29 year-old respondent gave evidence he was diagnosed with autism in 2017. The respondent’s mother (the appellant’s sister) has a lengthy history of serious mental illness and alcoholism and the respondent resided with the appellant and his partner for a time when he was a child. In the circumstances the appellant has provided a degree of support to the respondent from time to time. There was vague evidence in relation to ongoing Supreme Court proceedings in relation to trusts and the estate of the appellant’s father/respondent’s grandfather between the respondent and his siblings.
The respondent gave evidence of what he said were multiple incidents over a number of years where the appellant was emotionally and psychologically abusive towards him. The appellant’s evidence disputed many of the respondent’s allegations. There were submissions made by the respondent’s counsel at trial that it would be inappropriate to draw Jones v Dunkel ((1959) 101 CLR 298) inferences in relation to the failure to call the respondent’s mother and sister and the magistrate did not indicate a decision in that respect. The trial magistrate seemed to make findings on the basis of the demeanour of the respondent’s sister in circumstances where she was not called as a witness.
Issue: Whether the learned Magistrate failed to give sufficient reasons for the decision to grant the application for a protection order; whether the learned Magistrate took into account extraneous matters including the demeanour of the respondent’s support person; whether the learned Magistrate failed to properly consider or direct himself in line with the principle from Jones v Dunkel; whether the learned Magistrate erred in failing to make sufficient findings of fact and in failing to explain how he concluded that the requirements for making a protection order had been established.
Decision and Reasoning: Orders set aside, matter remitted for rehearing by a different Magistrate.
The trial Magistrate’s reasons failed to sufficiently address any of the conflicting versions of the appellant and respondent, the legal issues as to whether domestic violence arose and if so what kind and whether an order was necessary.
Porter QC DCJ observed:
[58] ….[W]here there are contested facts, and the circumstances are such as to make both the identification of acts of domestic violence and the need for an order open to serious question, it is necessary for properly considered reasons to be given. Those reasons must, at a minimum, cover the following matters:
(a)
The Court must make findings of fact on the principal contested factual issues with some explanation of the basis for the finding by reference to the evidence;
(b)
The Court must identify expressly what acts are found to comprise acts of domestic violence and why;
(c)
The Court must explain the basis for concluding that an order is necessary and desirable in the light of the acts found and the other relevant circumstances;
(d)
The Court must explain why the principal submissions made by the unsuccessful party on these issues have been rejected.
[59] The reasons in this case failed to address any of those matters.
SHW v ABC [2021] QDC 151 (13 August 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Cross-applications’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Failure to report’ – ‘Police officer victim’ – ‘Protection order’
Matter: Appeal against dismissal of application for protection order.
Ground: The Magistrate erred in determining that no act of domestic violence had been committed by the respondent against the appellant.
Facts: The appellant police officer woman and respondent man were in a relationship which had broken down. The appellant usually had access to assets and records of the respondent’s company. The appellant’s evidence included several alleged incidents:
•
The respondent did not talk to the appellant after the appellant’s sister died;
•
The respondent had taken the appellant’s Mercedes Benz, which was company property;
•
The respondent did not allow the appellant access to the company finances;
•
The respondent attended a joint property in Paluma at a time they had agreed only she would access the property and disconnected solar panels and gas bottles;
•
The respondent refused to hand over the appellant’s furniture (despite police being present), and handed over the wrong keys to his solicitors so that when the appellant did attend Paluma, she would be unable to enter the cabin.
The appellant was a police officer. Her failure to report any abuse despite her occupation was considered by the Magistrate as evidence that the alleged domestic abuse had not occurred.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, protection order issued. The Magistrate erred in finding that it was not necessary or desirable to protect the appellant from future domestic violence, and the appeal was allowed.
While the respondent’s behaviour in relation to the appellant’s sister’s death, the company Mercedes Benz, and the company finances were all explicable by innocent reasons, his conduct in relation to the Paluma property, the furniture, and the keys were all evidence of ‘controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour that has the potential to be repeated during the course of the property settlement’, during which ‘contact [between the parties] is inevitable’. [37]
QKL v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 195 (18 June 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Denial of natural justice’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The appellant (respondent) and aggrieved were sisters. The Magistrate hearing the application, pursued by police, did not allow the appellant sister a hearing or opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, in particular the aggrieved sister and both the appellant and aggrieved had submitted that they did not believe a protection order was necessary. The decision was made upon the papers and the appellant was not afforded the opportunity to give evidence as to her insight and the need for the orders. The appellant’s solicitor sought a listing for half-day hearing on counsel’s instructions, but the Magistrate proceeded to hear the matter on the papers. The Magistrate in his decision acknowledged that in the absence of evidence he was unable to make a determination as to whether the aggrieved was a particularly vulnerable person requiring extra consideration, or give weight to the aggrieved’s request an order not be made without explanation why the aggrieved did not see the order as necessary or desirable. The Magistrate made adverse findings against the appellant, finding the extensive differences between the appellant and aggrieved’s affidavit evidence indicated a lack of insight in the appellant, which suggestion the appellant was not given any opportunity to respond to. Adverse findings were made which seemed to have no basis in evidence, but if there was evidence of those matters they were not put to the appellant and she did not have an opportunity to respond to them.
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate erred in finding the matter without a hearing resulting in a denial of natural justice; and
2.
The magistrate erred in finding a domestic and family violence protection order was desirable in the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
Appeal allowed;
2.
Order of the Magistrate of 10 September 2020 set aside;
3.
Application remitted for hearing to the Brisbane Magistrates Court;
Burnett AM DCJ held that the ruling was made before the appellant’s solicitor was able to obtain instructions from counsel, and at the very least the matter ought to have been stood down to obtain instructions from counsel. The appellant has been denied natural justice as there were critical disputed matters going to the only issue in the matter, whether a protection order was necessary or desirable, which cross-examination of the parties could have resolved. The appellant was also denied the opportunity to put relevant evidence before the court.
Bailey (a pseudonym) v Bailey (a pseudonym) [2021] QDC 99 (9 June 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Orders made by consent’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Solicitor party’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of the Domestic & Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (the Act) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The respondent husband (a solicitor) appealed against the making of a protection order which the Magistrate purported to make by consent, arguing he had not consented to the making of the order. He was represented at the hearing by a barrister on a direct brief and it was apparent his counsel understood the nature of the proceedings and matters before the court. The appellant argued that nothing in the hearing transcript indicated the appellant’s personal consent to the orders, and he was silent throughout the hearing, although his counsel did engage in discussion in relation to what is understood to be a standard set of orders.
Issue: Whether the Magistrate complied with the requirement of s84(2) Domestic & Family Violence Protection Act 2012 that a Magistrate about to make an order where the respondent is present “must ensure” the respondent understands the listed matters.
Decision and Reasoning: Decision appealed from confirmed, appeal dismissed.
Dick SC DCJ was satisfied that the Magistrate ensured the appellant consented or did not object to the orders because he was present in court, the Magistrate engaged in discussion with counsel and Dick SC DCJ did not believe the appellant’s counsel would not have obtained instructions on the orders handed down from the bench to counsel.
Dick SC DCJ noted:
[41] In this case the following points must be recognised.
•
The Act does not require that the Magistrate engage personally with the respondent.
•
Sub-section 84(4) of the Act provides that a court can use services or help from other persons to assist the court in discharging its obligations under s 84. Some examples are provided and for the most part, if not all, the person giving the explanation is not a legally qualified person.
•
The Appellant is a qualified solicitor.
•
The Appellant was represented in court by competent counsel.
•
The Appellant was in court at the time the order was made.
•
There was a discussion between the bench and the two barristers concerning the order.
•
The order was made by consent or without objection.
•
Section 85 of the Act provides the court must include with a copy of the orders served on the respondent, a written explanation containing the relevant material that is referred to in s 85.
NJB v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 42 (4 March 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The critical issues that had to be determined by the magistrate below were whether the male appellant, as stated by the female respondent, punched her to the side of her head after a series of arguments or, whether because of her lengthy and serious history of seizures, the court could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the injury was not the consequence of the respondent having a seizure, falling and thereby injuring herself. The appellant was found guilty and sentenced to four months imprisonment, with a parole release date set after two months.
Grounds of appeal:
Appeal against conviction:
1.
The magistrate’s findings of the respondent’s credibility or reliability were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence (Grounds 1 and 2).
2.
The magistrate erred in permitting the appellant to be asked about bad character without leave being sought and granted, and against objection (Ground 3).
Appeal against sentence: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held:
Appeal against conviction dismissed.
Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Contrary to the appellant’s submission that the respondent was intoxicated on the night of the offending, the evidence supported the fact that she was no more than ‘tipsy’. The argument that the respondent had a motive to lie about the assault was also unclear and implausible.
The appellant further submitted that the magistrate failed to give sufficient weight to the respondent’s evidence minimising the frequency of her seizures. In dismissing this argument, his Honour said:
“It can be accepted that at times, the respondent did tend to downplay the frequency of those seizures. That, of course, is not to her credit. That said, the nature and extent of the seizures were clearly distressing to her and, quite likely, a source of embarrassment. That the respondent might tend to downplay her condition does not, in my view, materially damage her credit. Further, the cross-examination of the respondent on this topic was not only distressing for the respondent, it was also, at times, quite confusing. That may also be another reason which goes some way to explaining the conflicting evidence on this issue.”
There was no room for a reasonable doubt that the injury suffered by the respondent was the result of the respondent having a seizure and falling or otherwise sustaining the injury as a result thereof. It followed that the court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of committing the offence charged.
Ground 3 was also dismissed. The cross-examination of the respondent and the evidence led from the appellant by his solicitor clearly left it open for the prosecutor to raise an alleged prior incident and put it to the appellant. In any event, the appellant denied the matter and the magistrate observed that that was as far as the matter could go.
Appeal against sentence allowed.
His Honour recognised that the cross-examination of the respondent about her medical history was prolonged and distressing, however this had to be seen in light of her somewhat confusing evidence. His Honour recognised that: “I have no doubt that the cross-examination could have been carried out much more efficiently and greatly shortened both the length of the cross-examination and the distress caused to the respondent.” That said, it was wrong to describe the cross-examination as largely unnecessary and irrelevant.
None of the appellant’s favourable antecedents were mentioned or given weight by the magistrate (appellant’s strong work ethic, employment, character references, and relationships with his mother and children). This was an error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and the appellant re-sentenced to 30 days imprisonment.
PRH v LPL [2021] QDC 17 (3 February 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against orders made in a domestic violence proceeding’ – ‘Ouster condition’ – ‘Protection orders’
Proceedings: Appeal against orders made in a domestic violence proceeding.
Facts: The appellant was prohibited from entering, remaining, approaching etc within 500 metres of the first respondent’s (aggrieved) usual place of residence and from following or approaching within 500 metres of the aggrieved. The appellant was also prohibited from entering, remaining, approaching etc to within 200 metres of premises where the named person usually lived, worked or frequented. The magistrate further ordered that the first respondent have sole right of occupancy of the Buddina residence.
Grounds of appeal: 15 grounds of appeal centred around the court below denying procedural fairness to the appellant by refusing to permit evidence to be led and wrongfully accepting false and misleading evidence given by the first respondent.
Held: Appeal dismissed, subject to a number of variations.
In particular, the imposition of a seven-year ouster condition was neither necessary to protect the first respondent nor desirable. The first respondent did not want to move as the property “was her home, she felt safe there”. However, the appellant was the registered proprietor of the property. The first respondent had had the benefit of the ouster condition for two years and three months. She also had the financial capacity to purchase alternative premises/rent.
MB v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 325 (18 December 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach bail conditions’ – ‘Breach protection orders’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charges: Contravention of a police protection notice x 1; Wilful damage (domestic violence offence) x 1; Breach of bail condition x 7; Contravention of a domestic violence order x 4.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant repeatedly breached orders protecting his former female partner and her son. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years’ probation and ordered to pay $611.70. Convictions were recorded on all counts.
Grounds of appeal: Fresh evidence was sought to be admitted arguing that recording a conviction would have a significant effect on the appellant’s employment overseas, and the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application to admit fresh evidence was refused and the appeal dismissed.
It was appropriate to record convictions in light of the number of convictions and their serious nature (prolonged over 4 months, including more serious examples, continuation after release from custody). As at [57]: “When one considers s 12 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, the seriousness of the offences in combination outweighed any economic effect or wellbeing effect of the recording of convictions.”
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Despite being given many chances, the appellant had “continued to ‘thumb his nose’ at the bail conditions and the domestic violence order”. Aggravating features included that these were instances of domestic violence and “the emotional harm done to the victims and the damage, loss and injury caused.” Voluntary intoxication was no excuse. The guilty pleas were sufficiently taken into account (at [59]-[61]).
It was noted at [22], [26]-[28]:
“Charge 12 occurred on 27 August 2020 which was a contravention of domestic violence order. The appellant updated his profile status making threatening comments about the complainant, SH. The post named SH and contained threats and disclosed her sexual preferences to several friends. This had a significant emotional impact on the complainant SH. The appellant was interviewed on 29 August 2020 and said he didn’t remember posting the comment but went on to say it was true.
“A victim impact statement was tendered as Exhibit 4. The offending caused distress and inconvenience to the complainant SH. She had to move regularly as a result of the conduct of the appellant and suffered defamation to her character. She alleged that total out of pocket expenses was $16,748.84.”
GRP v ABQ [2020] QDC 272 (28 October 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against order not to grant a temporary protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against order not to grant a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Facts: The appellant man and respondent woman were in a domestic relationship, and each had children from previous relationships. There was a prior history of protection orders ordered against the appellant, with the respondent as the aggrieved. In June 2019, a protection order was made against the appellant to protect the respondent with mandatory conditions and no contact conditions except with the respondent’s written consent. The parties continued to have contact. In August 2019, following a complaint by the respondent to police, the appellant was charged with breach of a domestic violence order, common assault and choking/suffocation/strangulation x 2 (domestic violence offences). He was released on bail. This appeal concerned the appellant’s cross-application for a TPO. In November 2019, the appellant filed a private application for a protection order against the respondent. Four incidents of emotional abuse and one incident of physical abuse (scratches from August 2019) were alleged. The Magistrate declined to make a TPO.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The Magistrate wrongly decided and erred in law by not granting a TPO.
2.
The Magistrate wrongly decided and erred in fact and law by determining that the appellant’s allegations of domestic violence against the respondent did not satisfy the definition under the Act.
3.
The Magistrate erred by failing to give adequate reasons for not granting the TPO.
4.
The Magistrate erred in fact and law in that he allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect his decision; mistook the facts; and did not take into account material considerations.
Held: An error of law occurred as the Magistrate did not provide adequate reasons namely, the Magistrate’s reasons only referred to the four incidents of alleged verbal abuse, but did not refer to the incident of physical violence alleged in the appellant’s application of November 2019 ([26], [30]). Further, the Magistrate erred when he stated he heard from both the appellant and the respondent in June 2019, as the appellant was not present ([31]). Her Honour set aside the Magistrate’s order.
There was sufficient evidence to warrant granting a TPO in favour of the appellant. Having regard to the temporary nature of the order, her Honour considered that the evidence of alleged physical violence was sufficient to be satisfied of the respondent committing domestic violence against the appellant (at [38]-[40]). A date for the hearing of whether a protection order should be made was already set in the Magistrates’ Court.
ARTE v Nugent & Anor [2020] QDC 268 (23 October 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against grant of protection order’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘No prior history of domestic or family violence’ – ‘Ouster condition’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Suicide threat’
Proceedings: Appeal against making of a protection order; whether the protection order was necessary or desirable; whether the Magistrate erred in imposing an ouster condition; whether the Magistrate’s conduct amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
Facts: A protection order was made on 3 February 2020 against the male appellant after a contested hearing, including an ouster condition in relation to his female former partner’s usual place of residence.
The first respondent (the police prosecutor applicant for the order at first instance) opposes the appeal but concedes (1) the Magistrate’s reasons for judgment disclose a House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 error and (2) it is appropriate for the order to be varied such that the ouster condition is removed.
The second respondent (protected person) is supportive of the appeal and the relief sought. The appellant and protected person were married for 32 years. Prior to 11 October 2019, there had been no previous incidences of domestic violence. The parties were in financial stress after the collapse of a business. On 11 October 2019 the protected person called 000, telling the operator: ‘My husband has gone to the gun cabinet to do a murder suicide…He’s got a gun to kill us.’ The second respondent locked herself in a bathroom. The operator heard the second respondent yell: ‘Get away, get away’. A Police Protection Notice was issued on 11 October 2019, with a condition that the appellant surrender his weapons licence and firearms. An application for a protection order to benefit the protected person was made by the first respondent on 11 October 2019. No ouster condition was sought in the application. On 15 October 2019, the application was adjourned; a temporary protection order was made in the favour of the protected person with the standard conditions.
A protection order was made on 3 February 2020 against the appellant after a contested hearing, including an ouster condition in relation to the protected person’s usual place of residence.
The appellant contended:-
•
The appellant’s conduct did not meet the definition of domestic violence - there was no threat of violence; rather the second respondent was intoxicated, stressed and emotional which resulted in her overacting to a bad joke made by the appellant; and
•
In the alternative, a protection order is not necessary or desirable (i) appellant and protected person lived in the same residence during the term of the TPO and no domestic violence had occurred; (ii) prior to 11 October 2019, there had never been any other act of domestic violence in 32 years of the relationship; (iii) the risk of future domestic violence was remote and not sufficient to establish a need for protection.
On 3 February 2020, the Magistrate heard the application and made the order, delivering ex tempore reasons revealing that each limb of section 37(1) was satisfied and it was appropriate to impose an ouster condition. Central to the Magistrate’s reasoning were three findings:-
1.
the appellant was engaging in victim shaming;
2.
the appellant had not taken any steps to address the underlying reasons for the incident on 11 October 2019; and
3.
the relationship between the appellant and second respondent involved a power imbalance such that the later would subjugate her wellbeing to that of the former.
Grounds of appeal
1.
Did the Magistrate err in holding that it was necessary or desirable to protect the second respondent from domestic violence? Error 1
2.
Did the Magistrate err in imposing an ouster condition under s.63? Error 2
3.
Whether there were irregularities in the conduct of the trial that occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice? Miscarriage of justice
Held: Order set aside; application remitted to the Magistrate’s Court for a new trial before a different Magistrate.
Error 1 – Did the Magistrate err in finding a protection order was necessary or desirable?
Observing Horneman-Wren SC DCJ in ACP v McAulliffe [2017] QDC 294, s.37(1)(c) invokes a very wide and general power and is to be construed liberally, having regard to s.37(2) and the s.4 principles of the Act. This required the Magistrate to have regard to the wishes and views of the people who fear or experience domestic violence to the extent appropriate and practicable (s.4(2)(b)) [at 27].
At [29], His Honour reflected on the reasons for judgment and stated that the Magistrate was satisfied s.37(1)(c) was engaged because the second respondent was not adversely affected by alcohol and the 11 October 2019 incident was a very distressing one. His Honour noted the reasons did not disclose if the considerations mandated by section 37(2) were taken into account. His Honour found this to be an error of law and warrants the order being set aside.
His Honour also found the Magistrate’s assertion of the existence of the power imbalance and reference to the Duluth model and the power and control wheel had no application to this case and amounted to an error of law.
The first respondent submitted, despite the errors in the reasons for judgment that there was in any event sufficient evidence to find the order was necessary or desirable in the circumstances. His Honour did not agree, finding, at [34], that the evidence going to this very issue is incomplete (see [65] to [85] – no sworn affidavit of the second respondent and there was no application to lead fresh evidence in this appeal).
Therefore, this should be determined in a new trial.
Error 2 – Did the Magistrate err in imposing an ouster condition?
In finding an error had been made by the Magistrate, His Honour noted that an ouster condition had not been sought by the first respondent in the initial application and that the views and wishes of the “aggrieved” had not been sought, as was required by s.64(1).
His Honour considered s.57(1)(a) and s.63 and the mandatory considerations in s.64(1)(a) and (b) regarding whether the aggrieved can safely live in the residence if the ouster is not made and any views or wishes of the aggrieved.
His Honour, at [40], did not accept the Magistrate correctly assessed the risk of future violence occurring and the need for an ouster condition because:
1.
The Magistrate’s earlier finding in relation to the significant power imbalance, in the absence of evidence (an irrelevant consideration); and
2.
The second respondent was not afforded the opportunity to express her wishes by way of sworn evidence (a mandatory consideration).
The exercise of discretion to impose an ouster order miscarried [at 41]. Both errors represent a proper basis for interfering with the exercise of discretion in the manner contemplated by House v The King (this was conceded by the first respondent in relation to (1) above).
Miscarriage of Justice
His Honour agreed there were five irregularities in the conduct of the trial at first instance such to establish a substantial miscarriage of justice:-
1.
The Magistrate spoke about, and directly to, the appellant in terms that were pejorative, and unnecessary, having regard to the evidence in proper context, (at [46] eg accusing the appellant of “bad manners”, calling him the respondent’s “gun-toting husband”);
2.
The Magistrate permitted unfair cross-examination of the appellant, (at [47] not allowing the recording to be replayed at the appellant’s request to clarify his understanding of the question and then describing this as being demonstrative of an uncooperative witness);
3.
The Magistrate was unnecessarily aggressive towards the appellant’s legal representative which adversely impacted upon the proper presentation of the appellant’s case, (at [54] accusing the appellant’s solicitor of professional discourtesy which was not borne out in the transcript);
4.
The Magistrate materially interfered with the conduct of the second respondent’s case, ( at [65] by refusing the second respondent leave to file an affidavit on the day of the hearing);
5.
An exchange between the solicitor for the first respondent and the Magistrate regarding a domestic violence stakeholders group meeting, taken with the other irregularities, is indicative of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Magistrate.
Osborne v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 249 (30 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Appellant's belief that his girlfriend and her children were victims of domestic violence perpetrated by the complainant’ – ‘Effect of deportation / visa cancellation on sentencing’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Vigilantism’
Charges: Forcible entry x 1; Wilful damage x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence (appeal against conviction abandoned).
Facts: The appellant believed that Ms MB was his girlfriend. Ms MB was in fact in a relationship with the complainant. On the date of the offence the complainant telephoned the appellant and told him that he (the complainant) was in a relationship with Ms MB. The appellant then went to the complainant’s house. He banged on the front door and said, “I’m going to kill you, cunt”; “You want war, brother? You got war.” The complainant approached his front door holding a knife which he had been using to prepare food. A verbal argument ensued, the appellant became enraged and ripped the screen door off the hinges. He lunged at the complainant grabbing him around the shirt. Both the appellant and complainant were cut with the knife during the struggle. The appellant put his left elbow and forearm around the complainant’s neck and pressed it into the complainant’s neck, choking him. The appellant continued to threaten the complainant saying, “I will kill you, cunt”. He did not stop his attack until police arrived. Prior to the incident, Ms MB and her children had told the appellant that there had been episodes of domestic violence committed by the complainant towards her. The appellant said that he went to the complainant’s house to talk to him about his behaviour and to protect the children. The appellant made full admissions to the police. The appellant was admitting to a mental health unit following the incident.
Issues: (1) Whether the sentence was excessive; (2) Whether the magistrate failed to take into account the appellant’s guilty plea and mitigating factors.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed. Appellant resentenced.
The respondent concedes that the magistrate failed to take into account a number of relevant mitigating factors including: the appellant’s mental health condition, the appellant’s physical health, his mistaken belief and the likely consequence of the appellant’s conviction on his visa (see [39]-[41]). The respondent further concedes that the sentence imposed was excessive. There was no reference to any mitigating factors in the reasons of the magistrate, which tends to suggest that he failed to take those factors into account.
ATD v TBC [2020] QDC 236 (17 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Female partner respondent subject to protection order’ – ‘Male partner aggrieved party under protection order’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant (wife) filed a private application for a protection order against her husband. The respondent (husband) filed a cross application against his wife. In September 2018, a temporary protection order (TPO) was made naming the respondent (husband) as the aggrieved and the appellant (wife) as the respondent. In February 2019, the appellant was described as ‘paranoid, delusional, denigrating towards the respondent, and neglectful of the children’. The appellant also published a number of Facebook posts accusing the respondent of abducting the children and accusing him of being abusive and corrupt. In February 2019, the TPO was amended to prevent the appellant from attending the respondent’s home. In March 2019, the Federal Circuit Court made orders requiring the children live with the respondent, the appellant have two hours of supervised visitation per week, and the appellant commence therapeutic care with a Consultant Psychiatrist. In March 2019, the TPO was amended to prevent the appellant from contacting the respondent or publishing adverse comments about him online. In March 2019, the police referred the appellant to the Acute Care Team due to concerns they held regarding her mental health after she made over 100 unsubstantiated police complaints accusing the respondent of protection order breaches and other criminal behaviour. In May 2019, the appellant breached the TPO by publishing a post on Facebook which suggested the respondent broke into her house and placed a water pistol in her cupboard ‘as a threat that [she] will be killed’. In June 2019, the appellant pleaded guilty to breaches of the TPO. A full list of the appellant’s abusive communications and unsubstantiated allegations are set out in para [15]-[16] of the judgment.
Issues: Whether the magistrate’s decisions making a protection order naming the male former partner as the aggrieved and the female partner as the respondent and dismissing the appellant’s application for a protection order should be upheld.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
There was a proper basis for the Magistrate finding that a protection order was necessary and desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
[74] The appellant has committed numerous acts constituting domestic violence against the respondent over the relevant period. Section 8 of the Act defines domestic violence for the purposes of the Act. It includes behaviour by a person towards another person which is emotionally or psychologically abusive, and behaviour that torments, harasses or is offensive. During the relevant period, the appellant sent abusive and intimidating messages to the respondent, published abusive and malicious Facebook posts, and sent numerous messages denigrating the respondent to others. The email and text communications between the appellant and the respondent clearly show a pattern of the appellant harassing and denigrating the respondent. I have summarized some of examples of these earlier in this judgment. The appellant did not and could not challenge that she had sent the relevant material to the respondent and others. The appellant sent some of this material in breach of a Temporary Protection Order and after being convicted of earlier breaches of the Temporary Protection Order.
…
It is clear from reading the transcript of the original hearing that the appellant continued to express resentment and animosity towards the respondent. Under cross-examination, the appellant refused to accept that she was in any way at fault for sending or posting the abusive and false material. The appellant’s state of mind at the time of the original hearing was relevant as to whether it was necessary or desirable to make a protection order.
[75] At the appeal hearing, the appellant continued to have little if any insight into the fact her behaviour has been unacceptable. She made clear her intention was to pursue the respondent further through the courts. I am satisfied a protection order was and is clearly necessary and desirable to protect the respondent from further domestic violence.
[76] With respect to the appellant’s application for a protection order against the respondent, the appellant has failed to show the Magistrate erred by concluding she could not be satisfied that the respondent had committed any act of domestic violence … other than some verbal abuse during the incident of 29 January 2018. It was open on the evidence for the Magistrate to prefer the respondent’s evidence over the appellant’s evidence. The evidence supported her conclusion that the respondent’s behaviour on that one occasion was out of character. In my view, although the respondent’s verbal outburst on 29 January 2018 may well have constituted emotional or psychological abuse under section 8(1)(b) of the Act, there was no credible or reliable evidence that, prior to or since that date, the respondent behaved in any way which could satisfy a court that it was necessary or desirable to make a protection order against him. The uncontested evidence was that the respondent had made no contact, directly or indirectly, with the appellant except in compliance with Family Court orders.
SRV v Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service & Anor [2020] QDC 208 (1 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against making of protection order’ – ‘Appeal against refusal to grant protection order (cross application)’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Person most in need of protection’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘S. 4 of the domestic and family violence protection act 2012’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Proceedings: Appeal against making of protection order and refusal to grant protection order (cross application).
Facts: The appellant and the second respondent were in an intimate relationship for a period of three months between October 2018 and January 2019. Following an incident on 21 January 2019, a Police Protection Notice (PPN) was issued and on 23 January 2019 a temporary protection order (TPO) was made against the appellant. On 29 January 2019, the appellant pleaded guilty to two charges of contravening the PPN.
At the mention of the police application on 17 June 2019, the appellant made a number of serious allegations against the respondent to the effect that she has conspired to have him murdered. The appellant then made an application for a protection order and temporary protection orders were made in each application. At the hearing of the applications on 19 August 2019, the police commissioner was legally represented in relation to the application for the benefit of the second respondent; the appellant was self-represented; and the second respondent did not appear. The Magistrate made an order, pursuant to s.151(2) that the appellant may not cross-examine the second respondent and that this would be the rules of engagement for the resumed hearing on 2 December 2019.
At the resumed hearing on 2 December 2019, the appellant tendered affidavits containing screen shots of various Facebook messages as evidence of his allegations against the second respondent that she had conspired to have him murdered. The second respondent gave short oral evidence by phone, being questioned solely by the magistrate. The magistrate granted the protection order in favour of the second respondent and refused the appellant’s cross application. In making the decision, the magistrate was not satisfied the second respondent was responsible for the threats and accepted the second respondent’s version of events over the appellant’s version.
Issues: Whether the magistrate was correct in determining that, upon identification of the person most in need of protection, it followed that a protection order could not then also be made against that person; whether the cross-applications should be granted.
Held: Appeal against making of protection order dismissed; appeal against refusal to grant protection order (cross application allowed).
The case clarifies the interpretation of s. 4 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (the Act). The Act does not exclude orders being made in both cross applications. Cross applications require the consideration of the matters referred to in s.37 and should not be decided on the basis of the principle in s.4(2)(e) (the identification of the person most in need of protection).
Decision on cross applications:
Her Honour considered the evidence and found it clear there was an event of domestic violence perpetrated towards the second respondent by the appellant and was satisfied the circumstances justified a protection order was necessary against the appellant, even when accepting the second respondent was not a reliable witness and prone to exaggeration. This appeal against the making of the protection order was dismissed.
Her Honour then considered the appellant’s application for a protection order against the second respondent, namely the allegations of the threats contained in Facebook messages. Her Honour stated she had no reason to doubt that the messages alleged to have been sent by the second respondent were in fact sent by her. In any event, their authenticity was not challenged. Her Honour found the messages satisfied the requirements of the definition of domestic violence in s.8(1) and s.37(1)(b). In her view, the magistrate should have found it necessary or desirable to protect the appellant from domestic violence and should have made a protection order. The second respondent did not swear any affidavit in response to the appellant’s affidavit alleging serious matters.
EKL v Commissioner of Police & PEL [2020] QDC 194 (12 August 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Complainant a protected witness’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Trial proceeded without the appellant present’
Matter: Protection order appeal.
Facts: Discussion between the magistrate and the prosecutor about the protection order took place in the absence of the appellant and/or his legal representative. The prosecution made an application for the complainant to be a protected witness under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (DFVP Act). The appellant’s legal representative informed the court that they did not have instructions in relation to any matter other than to request an adjournment, which application was refused by the magistrate. The appellant’s representative sought leave to withdraw. The magistrate granted the protected witness application.
Issues: (1) The appellant was not afforded procedural fairness; (2) the Magistrate erred in failing to comply with the DFVP Act; (3) the Magistrate erred in finding that the protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, protection order set aside. Application for protection order remitted to magistrate’s court before a different magistrate.
(1) The discussion of substantive matters by the magistrate in the absence of the appellant is a ‘clear breach of the obligation of procedural fairness’ [20]. (2) In prohibiting the appellant from cross-examining the complainant, the magistrate did not comply with the pre-conditions in s 151 of the DFVP Act which include ‘requiring the court to inform the respondent that he could not cross-examine the aggrieved’ [33]. (3) Unnecessary to consider.
R v RT (No 2) [2020] QDC 158 (13 July 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Judge-only trial’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Choking x 1.
Proceedings: Judge-only trial.
Facts: The defendant man was charged with unlawfully choking without consent while he and the female complainant were in a domestic relationship.
The complainant’s daughter’s partner intervened. Later, the complainant attempted to pursue a DFV protection order but ‘none of the police to whom she spoke did anything’. The complainant and defendant later reconciled. In December 2017, the defendant is alleged to have ‘put his right forearm across her neck and applied pressure’, pinning down the complainant so that she could not breathe. After the incident, the police attended the house.
1.
During the complainant’s initial conversation with police, she ‘did not describe being choked by the defendant’. The defendant stated that he did not choke her but had held her by her arms/shoulders to ‘settle her down’.
2.
When meeting with a doctor after the incident, the complainant told the doctor she felt safe at home. The doctor gave expert evidence that the complainant’s injuries were consistent with the alleged choking.
3.
The relevant Constable testified that it was not until May 2020 that they were made aware of any allegation of domestic violence prior to December 2017. When asked about allegations of earlier violence, the complainant said that she had raised this with police on numerous occasions. The police were not able to get in contact with the complainant’s daughter’s partner who witnessed the January 2015 incident.
Issues: Whether the evidence of the complainant can be accepted beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: Not guilty.
The defendant argued that there were:
[39] a constellation of features inconsistent with [the complainant’s] account being truthful. These included her demeanour when speaking to police that night, her failure to immediately mention being choked and her preparedness to remain living at the house and tell the Doctor she felt safe.
The judge held that:
[39] The first and last of these matters do not in my view undermine the credit of the complainant. We are far past the days where the law expected an immediate and uncontrolled emotional reaction to an assault, and adversely viewed the credit of those who did not behave as expected. And, as noted above, staying in the house is understandable for other reasons.
However, the judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant choked the complainant in December 2017 as alleged. The fact that the complainant did not mention choking at that time raised doubts about the accuracy of her evidence.
[41] … it seems to me to be very surprising that if the complaint had been choked she did not mention that in her first interactions with police on the night. This is especially so if she had been violently assaulted by the defendant in the past, including by being choked or strangled … it seems to me unlikely that a person in the position of the complainant would have failed to mention being choked to the extent and for the duration alleged when first asked to give an account of the events … There is no reason apparent to me why she could not have mentioned or demonstrated the alleged choking at this point.
[42] I do not mean by what I have written to imply there can be any universal judgement as to how alleged victims of domestic violence should behave.
[45] It is impossible to think that an experienced police officer investigating an allegation of choking in 2018 would ignore a claim that a similar event occurred, in front of witnesses, less than three years before … [It is] unlikely that the absence of reference to the earlier incidents was the product of deliberate choice by the police officer, rather than omission by the complainant. It is reasonable to conclude that, having realised failing to refer to the other incidents at an earlier time was to her disadvantage, the complainant sought to deflect this by suggesting it was the fault of the police. That she was prepared to do so substantially damages her credit.
MNT v MEE [2020] QDC 126 (20 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Ouster order’ – ‘Protection order’
Matter: Appeal against making of protection order.
Grounds:
1.
A finding of economic abuse was not open on the evidence.
2.
The learned Magistrate failed to properly consider whether it was necessary or desirable to make a domestic violence order.
3.
The learned Magistrate erred in law by making an ouster order.
4.
The learned Magistrate erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons.
Facts: There was evidence that the respondent’s property had been misused and misappropriated by the appellant since she left the home to live with her son. Examples include removing the respondent’s go-cart from the home and placing it in the weather, telling the respondent which chairs she could sit on, moving the respondent’s clothing and other property from the residence to the garage and into the weather; and having work done on the house without approval from the respondent.
Further, the appellant got into a bed already occupied by the respondent at a time after they had commenced living apart on the one property. The appellant also unilaterally forgave a debt owed by the appellant’s son and the respondent alleged he applied unnecessary force to a horse.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The way in which the appellant dealt with the respondent’s property, including his failure to rectify damage to the respondent’s property, was considered controlling behaviour in the overall context of the relationship and contributed to the respondent’s fear for her own wellbeing and safety. The various behaviours were aspects of “controlling behaviour or emotional or psychological abuse”. [75-79] The respondent’s account of the incident with the horse was accepted but the court was not satisfied that it constituted violence directed at the respondent.
HBY v WBI and Anor [2020] QDC 81 (14 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Application to set aside interlocutory order’ – ‘Availability of documents at trial’ – ‘Judicial discretion’ – ‘Order that appeal be heard afresh in whole’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unjust order’
Proceedings: Second respondent’s application to set aside interlocutory order that the appellant’s appeal be heard afresh in whole.
Facts: The male appellant and female first respondent (LAP) were in a domestic relationship. The second respondent (WBI), a police officer, issued a protection notice to the appellant in favour of LAP and a protection order was subsequently issued by a Magistrate. The appellant filed a notice of appeal and also applied for an order that the appeal be heard afresh in whole, contending that certain documents were not available at trial that showed that statements made by LAP regarding her financial position were not true (a matter going to her credit). The appellate judge allowed the application. WBI subsequently applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal that order, contending that the documents were in the possession of the appellant at the time of the trial, could have been obtained with reasonable diligence or would not have had an important influence on the rest of the case. The Court of Appeal struck out the application for want of jurisdiction (WBI v HBY and Anor [2020] QCA 24). WBI then made an application for an order that the order that the appeal be heard afresh in whole be discharged and in substitution thereof it be ordered that the appeal be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the court that made the decision being appealed.
Held: Moynihan QC DCJ allowed the application, setting aside the interlocutory order that the appellant’s appeal be heard afresh in whole with the result that the appeal has to be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the court that made the decision. His Honour held that he had jurisdiction to review and set aside an interlocutory order concerning a procedural matter where there was a mistake or irregularity and it would be unjust not to set it aside [12]. In this case, the exercise of the Judge’s discretion (to issue the interlocutory order) miscarried because he took into account facts which were in part erroneous (that is, the Judge was mistaken as to the availability of the documents at trial and the appellant’s opportunity to obtain disclosure of them) [12]. It would be unjust not to set aside the order where the mistake was material and led to such an extraordinary order [12].
His Honour further held that there was "no good reason" (see R v A2 (2019) 373 ALR 214) to order that the appeal be heard afresh in part [21]. The documents would have been available to the appellant at the time of the trial with reasonable diligence, or he was in fact in possession of the documents at the time of the trial [22]-[23].
HDI v HJQ [2020] QDC 83 (14 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of Process’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Variation of protection order’
Proceedings: Appeal of a decision to order a permanent stay of an application to vary a protection order.
Issues:
•
Does a Magistrate have power under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVP Act) to order a stay of an application under the Act as an abuse of process?
•
Should the application to vary the protection order be allowed, dismissed or referred back to the Magistrates Court for further hearing?
Facts: The male appellant respondent (appellant) and female respondent aggrieved (respondent) were married for 23 years and had two children together. They separated after an alleged incident of choking, the respondent applying for a Protection Order under the DFVP Act. A Temporary Protection Order, including the children as named persons, was granted and the matter was set down for a hearing. The respondent then applied to vary its terms, seeking an order ousting the appellant from the former matrimonial home (this was later dismissed). The appellant then filed a cross application seeking a Protection Order against the respondent, but this was later withdrawn. At the hearing, the Magistrate accepted the respondent’s evidence and rejected the applicant’s version of events regarding the choking incident, making a two-year Final Protection Order. Two applications were then made to vary the Final Order, one by the appellant (to set aside the Order) and one by the respondent after the appellant breached the Order, in response to which a Magistrate made a Second Temporary Order against the appellant. The appellant then made a second application for a Protection Order against the respondent.
At the hearing of these last three applications, the Magistrate ordered that: the appellant was guilty of breaching the Final Order, the appellant’s application to vary be dismissed, the Second Temporary Order be revoked and replaced with a Varied Order, and the appellant’s Second Application for a Protection Order be adjourned. The appellant appealed these orders. At the hearing for the appellant’s Second Application for a Protection Order, the respondent sought that the application be estopped or stayed for abuse of process. The Magistrate agreed that the application constituted an abuse of process and it was permanently stayed.
The appellant further applied to vary the Varied Order. The Magistrate granted a permanent stay of this application on the ground that it was an abuse of process. The appellant appealed this decision on numerous grounds, including that the Magistrate erred in: a) allowing an oral application to permanently stay the application to vary on the basis it was an abuse of process, and b) not allowing the application to vary to proceed to full hearing.
Judgment: The judge held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order a permanent stay and therefore that the order to stay had to be set aside as a nullity. Her Honour found that the DFVP Act and Rules provide expressly or by implication for applications that are an abuse of its process to be summarily dismissed by the Magistrates Court, but there is no express reference to a power to stay such proceedings on these bases [75], [77], [83]. After examining several pieces of legislation, Her Honour also found that there was no explicit power to order a stay of an application under the DFVP Act [91], and that such a power did not need to be implied for the effective exercise of the jurisdiction to summarily dismiss applications that are an abuse of court process [94].
However, Her Honour noted that, as an appellate court, it had the power to allow, dismiss or refer the application to vary back to the Magistrates Court [99]. Reviewing all the material before her, Her Honour held that, while there was no basis to allow the application in full, two variations ought to be made to the Varied Order, both minor [103].
Rathbone v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 76 (30 April 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factor’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats of suicide’
Offences: Contravention of DVO x 7; Wilful damage; Obstruct police officer; Serious assault; Attempted stealing
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the appellant’s sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The appellant man committed a series of offences in the course of an attempt to commit suicide by having police officers shoot him. The offences occurred in the context of the recent and highly distressing breakdown of his marriage. The appellant approached a police officer and assaulted her from behind, restraining her, pushing her against the police vehicle and attempting to remove her firearm from her holster (Attempted stealing). Other police officers intervened and restrained the appellant. He was arrested and later released on bail. After his release, he attended the police station and provided a personal apology and a gift, recognising the distress he caused to the officers.
While the appellant was in custody, his wife obtained a Temporary Protection Order which included a condition that he have no contact with her. He contravened this order and sent his wife short emails or text messages expressing affection for her and his desire to continue their relationship.
The appellant further applied to vary the Varied Order. The Magistrate granted a permanent stay of this application on the ground that it was an abuse of process. The appellant appealed this decision on numerous grounds, including that the Magistrate erred in: a) allowing an oThe appellant entered early pleas of guilty to all charges, was convicted and received the following sentences:
•
Contravention of a domestic violence order offences – fined $750 and no conviction was recorded
•
Wilful damage – convicted but no further penalty imposed
•
Obstruct police officer – fined $500 and no conviction was recorded
•
Serious assault – 2 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, for an operational period of 9 months and the conviction was recorded
•
Attempted stealing – 3 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, for an operational period of 9 months and the conviction was recorded.
The appellant appealed the sentences for Serious Assault and Attempted stealing on grounds that they were manifestly excessive, and the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the sentencing principle of rehabilitation.
Held: The judge allowed the appeal and referred the matter back for re-sentencing, holding that the imposition of a period of imprisonment was manifestly excessive. His Honour accepted that rehabilitation was a significant consideration in this case and the sentencing judge did not appropriately include it in his determination of a proper sentence [68]. Rather, the sentencing judge, by imposing a custodial sentence, "negatived [the rehabilitation considerations], in that they were excluded specifically with regard to their value" [69] and therefore the judge did not "fully consider and balance the issue of rehabilitation, in relation to the penalty imposed" [70].
In considering whether the appeal should be allowed, His Honour accepted a psychiatrist’s report that confirmed a "causal relationship between the appellant’s acute adjustment disorder with suicidal ideation upon the sudden breakdown of his marriage which led to the commission of the offences" [12]. His Honour also accepted that the appellant had exemplary antecedents and there was a negligible need for deterrence and punishment. The appellant further had a reduced moral culpability (having regard to the principles in R v Yarwood [2011] QCA 367).
His Honour ultimately accepted that the appellant’s rehabilitation and employment were likely to be adversely affected by a sentence of imprisonment and the recording of a conviction due to his inability to travel internationally to complete his PhD studies, and his vulnerable psychological state would be adversely impacted by such a sentence [13]. His Honour further concluded that "It was significant that [his two step-daughters – ie: children of his former wife] constituted part of the appellant’s support network available to the appellant" [32].
DYN v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 47 (27 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Error of law’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Persistent menacing conduct’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 2.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to 2 charges of contravening a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) and was sentenced to 18 months and 12 months imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently with each other, but cumulative on a term of imprisonment that he was already serving. At the time of the offending, he was separated from the complainant, and was subject to a protection order which required him to be of good behaviour, not to approach the complainant woman within 50m and not to contact her. During their 8-year relationship, they had a child.
Issue: The issues on appeal were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive because the learned magistrate erred by:
•
Placing too much weight on the appellant’s criminal history;
•
Failing to properly take into account the appellant’s plea of guilty by not setting a parole eligibility date at a point sooner than one half;
•
Miscalculating the setting of the parole eligibility date; and
•
Failing to take into account the principles of totality such that the sentence imposed was proportionate to his offending.
Held: Morzone QC DJC allowed the appeal and substituted the terms of imprisonment with 12 months for Charge 1 and 15 months for Charge 2. The appellant contravened the domestic violence order by texting and calling the complainant excessively, and by engaging in physically intimidatory and aggressive behaviour by going to the complainant’s home at night, rushing at her, bashing the window and later making a death threat over the telephone despite police interest. Whilst the offending did not involve physical violence, it was serious in that it involved "persistent menacing conduct in serious breach of the no contact and geographical limiting conditions" of the protection order. His Honour acknowledged the prevalence of domestic violence in the community, and was particularly concerned about the continuation of violence despite police or court intervention by protection orders ([22]-[23]). Further, the appellant’s previous convictions for like offences, especially against the complainant, were found to be an aggravating factor as it showed that his attitude of disobeying the law was not isolated ([26]). His Honour therefore held that imprisonment was the necessary punishment, and that 12 and 15 months imprisonment would provide "appropriate moderation according to the sentencing considerations and balancing aspects of specific deterrence, and further rehabilitative processes serving out the sentence within the community under the auspices of parole" ([31]).
R v Skey [2020] QDC 27 (9 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Choking’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence by video-link’ – ‘Pre-recording evidence’ – ‘Special witness declaration’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Proceedings: Application for orders to permit the complainant to give evidence over video-link, for her to be supported by another person when she testified, and to have her evidence recorded before the commencement of the trial.
Issue: The correct interpretation of s21A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)
Facts: Defendant man was charged with choking his female partner without consent and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. A week before trial, the prosecution made an application for orders to permit the complainant to give evidence over video-link, for her to be supported by another person when she testified, and to have her evidence recorded before commencement of the trial. The defendant opposed the victim giving evidence over video-link and the pre-recording of her evidence.
Judgment: Cash DCJ made orders permitting the complainant to testify at the trial over video-link and with a support person.
The Court rejected the Prosecution’s submission that "by not enacting a requirement to show likely disadvantage or trauma in section 21A(1)(d), parliament intended there to be a presumption of disadvantage which is itself sufficient to warrant departure from normal procedures". This submission was rejected for two reasons. First, the common law principle "that the defendant in a criminal trial should be confronted by their accuser in order to challenge their evidence was not displaced by s12A". Second, "there is nothing in s21A which compels the conclusion that any of the measures permitted by section 21A(2) are to be adopted automatically for any special witness" [9].
Regarding the order to permit giving evidence via video-link, the judge was satisfied that the capacity of the complainant to give evidence would be improved if she did not give the evidence in the defendant’s presence. The Court rejected the defendant’s submission that the defendant would suffer ‘impermissible disadvantage’ if evidence was given over video-link and provided that there is research to suggest that an average person’s ability to detect lies based on ‘demeanour’ is little better than chance.
The judge rejected the Crown’s request to pre-record the evidence as His Honour "not prepared to assume that a retrial would be such a likely outcome as to justify the order sought" [20].
EPN v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 34 (4 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Contravening domestic violence order’ – ‘Female offender’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with poor literacy skills’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 1; dangerously operating a motor vehicle x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant wife offended by contravening a domestic violence order and dangerously operating a motor vehicle, whilst being adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. Both offences arose out of the same incident at the residence of the complainant, the appellant’s estranged husband. The appellant migrated from Thailand and could not read or write in English. On the date of the incident, the appellant attended the complainant’s residence in contravention of the protection order and caused extensive damage to the property by driving her car into the front wall of the house. The appellant pleaded guilty and was ultimately sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and 18 months driving disqualification.
Issue: The appellant appealed the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive because:
•
The learned Magistrate mischaracterised the nature and extent of the offending conduct;
•
The learned Magistrate misdirected himself by considering that appellant offending fell within in the same broad category of the comparative cases; and
•
Taking into account the period of pre-sentence custody, the period of time to be served in actual custody was excessive.
Held: Morzone QC DCJ found that the learned Magistrate mischaracterised the offending as falling in the most serious of categories. Although the appellant used the vehicle as a weapon, it did not fall within ‘the most serious of categories where an offender weaponises a vehicle in a direct personal attack with potential serious injury of an unprotected victim’. The offending occurred in the context of a volatile marriage breakdown, where she moved out of the matrimonial home and went on ‘a rage of wilful destruction of matrimonial assets whilst intoxicated’. The appellant willingly caused extensive damage, with the potential of indirectly causing injury to the complainant. Morzone QC DCJ held that the offending was aggravated by her intoxicated state, domestic violence and contravention of the protection order ([33]).
Further, the learned Magistrate referred to 5 cases in his decision as to the appropriate penalty. Morzone QC DCJ considered each case in light of the appellant’s offending ([40]-[50]. The cited cases were distinguishable from the appellant’s offending as they involved the serious feature of a direct personal attack with a vehicle being used as a weapon on an unprotected victim. As the applicant’s offending did not fall within the same serious category, such cases could not provide any comparative guidance ([50]).
Morzone QC DCJ also held that the learned Magistrate erred by failing to take into account some material considerations and the suitability of a suspended sentence ([64]). His Honour considered the nature and extent of the offending and mitigating factors, such as lack of criminal history, good character, guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, and cooperation with police. Whilst the appellant clearly ‘deserved’ a prison sentence, which would further the sentencing principles of punishment, and personal and general deterrence, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered the possibility of a suspended sentence. The appellant’s conduct was contextual and situational, she did not require close supervision upon release into the community, and she actively took steps to self-rehabilitate and refrain from alcohol ([63], [71]).
Consequently, Morzone QC DCJ allowed the appeal and varied the sentence by making the prison term partly suspended after the appellant serves 60 days imprisonment.
BKA v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 10 (19 February 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Lengthy criminal history’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’
Charges: 1 x contravention of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man was convicted, on his own plea of guilty, of one offence of contravention of a DVO, and was sentenced to a term of 6 months’ imprisonment, cumulative on the terms of imprisonment he was then serving relating to domestic violence offences against the same woman. The contravention in question was attending the home of his former partner (the protected person) when subject to a protection order. She was clearly scared, being found by attending police hiding in a manhole in the ceiling. The present offending occurred whilst on parole and very shortly after being granted parole ([16]).
The appellant had an ‘unenviable criminal history’ and had been imprisoned for drug and violent offences, and had been re-sentenced on numerous occasions for breaches of bail, suspended sentences and an intensive correction order ([8]).
Issue: The sentence was manifestly excessive. Three specific errors were alleged:
•
The learned Magistrate erred by not inviting submissions on a cumulative sentence
•
The learned Magistrate failed to take into account the totality when setting the parole eligibility date; and
•
The learned Magistrate erred by setting a parole eligibility date at the full-time date of the appellant’s current sentence.
Although the submissions largely focused on the parole eligibility date, it was also contended that the head sentence should have been ordered to be served concurrently ([2]-[4]).
Held:
Byrne DCJ allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the sentencing Magistrate insofar as it related to the appellant’s parole eligibility, and ordered that the appellant be eligible for parole on the date of the delivery of the judgment instead ([27]). Byrne DCJ accepted that it was an error to impose the cumulative sentence without first inviting submissions as to that possibility. It was noted at [18] that the Magistrate raised concerns about imposing another suspended sentence given the appellant’s past history of breaching such orders, but did not raise the possibility of ordering that the term be served cumulatively on the current period of imprisonment. According to Byrne DCJ, if the Magistrate did this, it would inevitably have elicited submissions as to the appropriate point for parole eligibility. It could not be said that this was an ‘error without consequence’.
The offending clearly affected the aggrieved’s safety and welfare, although the appellant did not inflict any actual physical violence on her on that occasion. Given that the offending occurred so soon after the appellant had been released on parole for offending involving the same woman, and in light of the need for specific deterrence given the appellant’s history for breaching court orders, Byrne DCJ held that a head sentence of 6 months cumulative on the period of imprisonment the appellant was already serving was appropriate ([19]). However, the extension of the parole release date was excessive, especially in light of the head sentence of 6 months. His Honour considered that this in itself would be sufficient grounds to allow the appeal ([21]). The lengthy deferral of the parole eligibility date failed to reflect the appellant’s guilty plea, that he did not inflict any physical violence and that he had served about 3 months of pre-sentence custody that could not be declared as time already served under the sentence ([24]).
Baker v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 258 (17 December 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘History of contravention’ – ‘Mitigating factors’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 1; Possessing dangerous drugs x 4; Failure to appear in accordance with an undertaking x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted and sentenced for contravening a domestic violence order during the operational period of a suspended sentence. He was also sentenced in relation to other drug and violence offences. The appellant hit the aggrieved (whom the order was made in favour of) during an argument. The strike caused a small cut to her lip. The appellant then left the address but shortly returned holding a crate and threatened to bash her dog. The couple had another argument later in the evening before the aggrieved escaped and called police. The appellant denied being at the address and hitting the aggrieved when later questioned.
The appellant filed his notice of appeal five weeks late. The delay was not significant and was caused by the appellant’s attempts to seek legal advice.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The court found that the sentence was not excessive and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant relevantly argued that the contravention offence was his first breach of a domestic violence order against this particular complainant however, Fantin DCJ observed at [41] ‘The fact that this was the appellant’s first contravention against this particular woman is not a matter in his favour. What is relevant is that he had previously been convicted on earlier occasions of breaching domestic violence orders and of domestic violence offences, but continued to reoffend.’
CTC v Commissioner of Police [2019] QDC 250 (29 November 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The complainant and applicant were married but did not live together. The complainant was pregnant with their second child at the time of offending and there was a domestic violence order in place preventing the applicant from engaging with the complainant in any way without her consent. On the day of the offending, the applicant had become enraged and assaulted the complainant after finding communications between her and another male on her phone. The attack left the complainant with a swollen and cut lip.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the charge and was originally sentenced to three months imprisonment wholly suspended for two years with the conviction recorded.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The learned magistrate erred in failing to have proper regard to the principles of ‘parsimony’; and
•
The learned magistrate failed to give due weight to the appellant’s mitigating circumstances.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the magistrate erred in his reasoning.
Decision and reasoning: Jarro DCJ concluded that the sentence imposed was not excessive.
Ground 1: ‘The applicant came before the court with a relevant criminal history. He is a mature man. He used actual violence and a physical injury was sustained by the complainant, albeit of a limited nature. The offending was aggravated as the complainant was 23 weeks pregnant at the time and the violence was unprovoked’ (pg 5). In considering these aggravating features and the need for general deterrence to be reflected in the sentence given the prevalence of domestic violence in the community, Jarro DCJ considered the sentence imposed to be within the appropriate range.
Ground 2: Jarro DCJ provided that ‘the principle of "parsimony" is not a governing principle used in the exercise of discretion in sentencing and therefore the sentencing judge was not in error by not having regard to the principle.
Ground 3: Jarro DCJ found that the magistrate appropriately balanced the applicant’s mitigating circumstances against the applicant’s aggravating factors and the need for deterrence.
AMB v TMP & Anor [2019] QDC 100 (21 June 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Insults’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Domestic violence charges, resulting in a Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order
Case type: Appeal against making of order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)
Facts: The appellant challenged a decision made pursuant to s 37 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, granting the aggrieved a protection order for 5 years. The order was made after a contested hearing. The aggrieved claimed that she was not in a relationship with the appellant, but that they had a daughter. Her affidavit provided details about her contact with the appellant, which involved insults by him and several unpleasant interactions, including via text ([16]).
Issue: The appellant appealed the decision on the ground that the learned magistrate erred in finding that 1) the appellant committed domestic violence against the aggrieved within the meaning of Part 2, Division 2 of the Act; and 2) the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence pursuant to s 37 of the Act.
Held: The appellant submitted that the evidence did not support a finding of domestic violence, and that the magistrate erred in relying on the evidence as the credit of the aggrieved was fatally damaged ([23]-[24]), [35]).
Kent DCJ dismissed the appeal. The magistrate’s analysis relied on uncontentious matters. Given the fact that the appellant did not deny sending the various text messages and that they clearly showed insulting language, the credit of the aggrieved was not central to the analysis and result ([35]). It was somewhat difficult to assess whether the events constituted domestic violence in the form of emotional abuse because there appeared to be a mutual exchange of insults between the parties ([36]). Where the communication between the parties involves the ‘trading’ of insults, it is more difficult to conclude that mere insults amount to ‘emotional abuse’. In his Honour’s opinion, insults ‘fall on a continuum of seriousness, from completely trivial to very serious; and at a certain point on the continuum it becomes clear that emotional abuse is involved’ ([37]).
The Court held that there was no appealable error by the magistrate. There was no error demonstrated in any step set out in MBE v MLG in that: 1) there was a risk of future domestic violence, which was more than a mere possibility; 2) there was a need to protect the aggrieved from that risk; and 3) an order was necessary or desirable, particularly considering the factors in s 4(1) ([41]).
CSN v The Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 43 (3 April 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Obstruct police’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Obstruction of a police officer x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of obstructing a police officer, for which he was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment with immediate parole release. It was alleged that the appellant made previous threats to kill his ex-wife and daughter. When the police came to his house to serve him with a police protection notice, he became aggressive and verbally abusive. The police feared a risk of serious injury, even though the appellant was not armed. He fled the property, maintaining that ‘he was not going to be served with anything and was throwing his phone away’. When he returned to the property, he continued to be abusive towards the officers. He was restrained and arrested for obstructing police ([5]-[9]). The Magistrate regarded the offence to be ‘amongst the most serious of obstruct police charges, given the facts presented here and the escalation of the situation’, and sentenced the appellant to 4 months’ imprisonment with an immediate parole release ([20]-[21]). The appellant appealed against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate had overestimated the seriousness of his offending behaviour.
Issue: The issue is whether the sentence that the Magistrate imposed was excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offending, the appellant’s antecedents, his prior criminal history, his mental health issues, his endeavours to rehabilitate and other relevant sentencing principles and guidelines ([29]).
Held: McGinness DCJ noted the appellant’s extensive criminal history, which commenced when he was a child and included breaching domestic violence orders, common assault and stalking ([10]). The offence was found to have serious features, including the nature of the appellant’s verbal abuse, his actions of leaving the property and saying he would continue to refuse service of the protection order. However, the Magistrate’s finding that the offence was ‘amongst the most serious of obstruct police charges’ was an error which led to the sentence imposed being excessive ([31]). The appellant did not physically struggle with the police, and complied with police directions once he returned to the house. He also was not armed. His Honour noted that the offending must be viewed against the appellant’s mental health issues at the time of offending, and childhood histories of sexual abuse at the hands of authoritative figures in a custodial setting. Other relevant factors include his genuine efforts to receive treatment and rehabilitate ([32]). Therefore, because of his criminal history, financial circumstances and his continuing efforts to rehabilitate, a probation or community service order would have been within range. His Honour allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 2 months’ imprisonment suspended forthwith for operational period of 2 months. Even though, at first glance, this order could be mistaken for ‘tinkering’, his Honour maintained that reducing the sentence to 2 months was substantial ([33]).
JWD v The Commissioner of Police [2019] QDC 29 (8 March 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Four charges including stalking and using a listening device in breach of a domestic violence protection order, and breach of a bail condition.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for extension of time.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had previously been in a relationship. The first charge related to the use of a listening device to record a private conversation, which the applicant installed in the complainant’s vehicle during the course of their relationship. The final three charges occurred when the relationship had apparently ended. As the complainant prepared to go to sleep one night, she noticed the applicant standing on her patio, peering through a bedroom window. The behaviour was in breach of a domestic violence protection order and constituted stalking. Further, it was aggravated by being in breach of court orders ([9]-[12]).
The Magistrate took into account the fact that the applicant was 47 years old, had no relevant criminal history and was a New Zealand native. He obtained a tertiary qualification and stable employment. He also had a number of positive references attesting to his good character and sought counselling while in custody. Her Honour placed the applicant on three years’ probation. No conviction was recorded, except for the offence of unlawful stalking, as it was the most serious charge ([14]-[16]).
The applicant sought an extension of time within which to appeal, arguing that the delay was attributable to administrative error and was relatively short ([5]). It was argued that the three concurrent probation orders in relation to the stalking, contravention of the domestic violence order and breach of bail, amounted to double punishment contrary to s 16 of the Criminal Code (Qld).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and offended the prohibition on double punishment for the same act.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal and granted the extension of time. The Court held that the Magistrate’s conclusion as to recording of a conviction was free from appealable error. The probation orders for the contravention of a domestic violence order and breach of bail condition were set aside as double punishment. The applicant was convicted and not further punished. Moreover, the sentencing discretion was found to have miscarried in relation to the offence of using a listening device – an offence with a maximum penalty of only two years’ imprisonment and which was relatively minor in the circumstances. The sentence imposed for that offence was reduced from three years’ probation to two years’ probation, with no conviction recorded ([22]-[25]).
CBC v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 3 (30 January 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Parole eligibility date’ – ‘Parole release date’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: 1 x grievous bodily harm, 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1 x contravention of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO), and a further contravention of a DVO (aggravated)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In 2016, the appellant, an Aboriginal woman, was convicted on her guilty plea to domestic violence related offences, namely, grievous bodily harm, assault occasioning bodily harm, contravention of a DVO and a further contravention of a DVO (aggravated offence). When the appellant was released from parole, she formed an intimate relationship with the aggrieved. Their relationship was characterised by alcohol-fuelled domestic violence, which led to its termination ([5]-[7]).
A protection order was issued in 2018, prohibiting the appellant from "following or approaching the aggrieved". The appellant breached this order by attending the aggrieved’s home while he was inside ([9]). The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 1 month imprisonment to be served cumulatively upon a pre-existing 3 year sentence, with immediate release on parole. The prosecution applied to reopen the sentence on the basis that a parole eligibility date was required by s 160C Penalty and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The sentence was reopened in the appellant’s absence and without hearing further substantive submissions about the offending conduct and mitigating circumstances. The Magistrate amended the sentence by fixing a parole eligibility date in lieu of a parole release date ([12]). The appellant was arrested and returned to custody ([13]).
Issue: The appellant appealed the sentence on the grounds of manifest excessiveness. Other grounds were raised in her submissions, such as breach of natural justice and jurisdiction to reopen the sentence ([14]-[15]).
Held:
In Morzone DCJ’s view, the Magistrate ‘erred in exercising the sentencing discretion by initially mistaking the facts, then allowing erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him in re-opening the sentence without regard to matters of totality, and failing to take into account some material considerations as to the nature and extent of the offending’. The sentence was therefore unreasonable and plainly unjust ([37]). While the appellant had previous convictions for serious violent offences, and had reoffended while on parole for those offences, her offending was comparatively trivial and did not involve actual contact with, or any violence towards, the aggrieved ([42]). However, she has found herself in prison as a result of her ongoing alcohol mismanagement. The current offending was at the lowest end of the range, and imprisonment was found to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending and ‘too crushing’ on the appellant ([44]). Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Magistrate’s orders were set aside. The appellant was convicted, but not further punished for the offence ([45]).
ODE v AME [2018] QDC 277 (13 December 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Application for a stay of judgment’ – ‘Principles as to grant or refusal’ – ‘Stay of proceedings’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal type: application for a stay of a judgment given in the Magistrates Court.
Facts: On 20 September 2018, Magistrate Strofield declined to grant a protection order for the benefit of the applicant (ODE) against the respondent (AME) on the basis that his Honour wasn’t satisfied that it was necessary or desirable to make one, as required under s 37(1)(c) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) (see [3]). ODE appealed that decision to the Queensland District Court; she filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 2018 and within it outlined seven grounds of her appeal (see [5]). On that same date, a stay application was brought in the form of an application for a temporary protection order pending hearing of the other appeal. Judge Richards stayed the decision of Magistrate Strofield on 9 November until 23 November 2018 at which time Judge Koppenol dissolved the stay order (see [6]-[7]). This was likely due to the fact he wasn’t satisfied the appeal was of any merit (see [6]-[7]). A further stay application was filed on 6 December 2018 with the aim of extending the temporary protection order until the appeal by staying Magistrate Strofield’s decision to refuse to make a final protection order ([8]).
Issues: The applicant sought a stay on two main grounds. First, her affidavit (filed on 6 December 2018) extended on the points raised in her notice of appeal concerning the merits of her appeal. Second, the respondent had perjured himself in the proceedings before the Magistrate.
Decision and reasoning: application dismissed, appellant restrained from making any application in relation to the proceeding without leave from the court, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
As to the first ground of appeal, Porter QC DCJ explained to the applicant that where a party has applied for a stay but failed and then applies again, it is usually required that the party establish some new matter that has emerged since the last refusal to “justify a second bite at the cherry” ([11]). The applicant accordingly pointed to two matters. The first was that since the judgment on 23 November 2018, the respondent had committed further acts of domestic violence by not returning certain belongings to her (see [8]). Porter QC DCJ dispensed with that matter in stating that the respondent’s conduct didn’t comprise acts of domestic violence and noting the respondent’s actual willingness to return the belongings (see [13]). The second point was that the emails relating to the couple’s daughter and her recent experience in hospital indicate the respondent was involved in acts of domestic violence. After examining the relevant extracts in the circumstances of the case, Porter QC DCJ could see no way in which they would amount to domestic violence on the respondent’s part as defined in the DFVPA.
Finally, his Honour couldn’t see a way in which it could be concluded there was perjury arising out of the proceedings before the Magistrate.
CPD v Ivamy & Anor [2018] QDC 244 (5 December 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against protection order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Necessary or desirable test’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: On 28 October 2015, in seeking parenting and property orders, the second respondent brought Family Court proceedings against the appellant. An incident on 1 November 2015 led to the making of a temporary protection order on 3 November 2015; the second respondent and the couple’s two children were named as the aggrieved. The order included the respective usual conditions: a “no contact” condition and an “ouster” condition under ss 56, 57 and 63 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) (see [21]). There was, however, an exception that allowed for communication via text between the appellant and second respondent with the appellant’s mother acting as the conduit between them (see [21]). The appellant soon applied to vary the order to remove the children’s names ([22]). The application was heard by the Magistrate on 9 December 2015; the second respondent consented to the variation but the police prosecutor denied ([24]). On 18 February 2016, following a mediation in the Family Court proceedings, a resolution as to the parenting and property orders was reached. 11 days later, final consent orders were made by the Family Court to the effect that the original exception to the order was removed and replaced with an allowance for direct communication via email. Both parties also agreed to try to remove the protection order. However, the police prosecution refused the second respondent’s application to remove the order. On 11 March 2016, the domestic violence hearing listed to commence on 14 March 2016 was adjourned so as to provide the appellant with the opportunity to make submissions for the discontinuance of the order. After a four-day summary trial, extending over March and April 2017, the Magistrate gave ex tempore reasons on 10 November 2017 and ultimately granted a five-year protection order against the appellant (see [34]-[47]).
Issues: the appellant’s grounds of appeal were two-fold. First, the Magistrate erred in finding that the emails sent by the appellant’s mother and the conduct of the trial by his counsel constituted further acts of domestic violence. Second, the protection order was not necessary or desirable to protect the second respondent and the children from the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: appeal allowed and the protection order was therefore set aside and the matter was remitted to another Magistrate for re-hearing.
His Honour, after reviewing the exchange of emails between the appellant’s mother and second respondent, concluded that the Magistrate’s finding that the appellant was behind the tone and wording of the emails was based on speculation and not open on the evidence (see [50]-[57]). As to the second part of this ground of appeal, his Honour expressed the view that counsel is entitled to exercise their discretion on how to handle a matter and the Magistrate’s characterisation of the appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of the second respondent as an act of domestic violence was erroneous. The first ground of appeal was therefore allowed.
The second ground of appeal was allowed. His Honour felt that the Magistrate, in coming to their finding on the necessary or desirable condition, failed to consider the material matters such as the fact that the tension between the Magistrate’s courts undertakings and the Family Court had resolved in April 2017 and the appellant’s mother was no longer acting as a conduit and thereby no longer “inflaming” the relationship (see [66]). Accordingly, his Honour concluded that the Magistrate erred in granting the protection order.
NVZ v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 216 (12 November 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order while in custody’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: During proceedings before the Magistrates Court in which a temporary protection order was made, the appellant threatened to kill the aggrieved and her children. The appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of contravening a domestic violence order. He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with an immediate parole eligibility date and 36 days of pre-sentence custody declared as time served. The appellant appealed against the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.
Issues: The appellant submitted that the sentence was excessive having regard to his psychiatric condition, the principles of totality and the comparable case tendered by defence which, in combination with his personal circumstances, supported a shorter head sentence.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant relied on R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377 as justification for a reduction in sentence because of his reduced moral culpability. However, that case was not authority for the proposition that the sentence must be reduced by reason of a psychiatric condition [50]. Kefford DCJ held that there was no compelling evidence that the appellant’s condition at the date of sentencing meant that continued incarceration would have more of an impact on the offender than it would on a person of normal health. There was nothing to suggest that there was a serious risk that imprisonment would have adverse effects on the appellant’s mental health. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not excessive in the circumstances, even though the offending occurred at a time when the appellant could not act on the threats made (as he was in custody) ([71]).
The appellant’s criminal history illustrated his general disregard for the law and court orders. An aggravating circumstance was the fact that he offended whilst in the confines of a court room, demonstrating disrespect not only for the complainant but also the Court ([72]). The sentencing principle of protection to the Queensland community from the offender was significant, given the appellant’s vulgar and bold threats to the aggrieved in the presence of the Court. No submissions were made that indicated that the appellant had taken steps towards rehabilitation. The Court made reference to Singh v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 037, but did not regard that the decision was evidence that the sentence in the present case was excessive. That case was distinguishable because there were no prior convictions for violence or contraventions of a domestic violence order. It also did not involve the aggravating feature of a threat to kill delivered to the aggrieved and her children in the presence of the court.
Caddies v Birchell [2018] QDC 180 (4 September 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Extra-curial punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence), following a two-day trial. Prior to sentencing, he lodged an appeal against conviction. Subsequently, the Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 18 months’ imprisonment on the basis that the appellant serve one half of that term in prison. The appellant appealed against this sentence and was granted bail pending the hearing. The grounds of appeal included that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate failed to (1) identify whether he took into account the extra-curial punishment the appellant received during the offence, in particular the broken foot caused by the complainant; (2) indicate how that extra-curial punishment was taken into account in the sentencing process (if he did take it into account); and (3) consider the appellant’s offer of compensation.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether the sentencing discretion should be re-exercised to take into account the appellant’s injuries; Whether the appellant’s injuries are capable of constituting extra-curial punishment; Whether the sentencing discretion should be re-exercised to take into account the offer of compensation.
Decision and reasoning: The Court was satisfied that the errors identified vitiated the sentence imposed by the Magistrate. There was no explanation as to the Magistrate’s consideration of extra-curial punishment and how it was taken into consideration with regard to the penalty that was imposed. There was also no explanation as to the basis upon which the Magistrate found that there was a complete lack of remorse. The Court concluded that the Magistrate fell into error when he determined that a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was the appropriate penalty. Having referred to comparable cases, such as R v RAP [2014] QCA 228, the Court held that the imprisonment term of 18 months was manifestly excessive. In R v RAP, Justice Wilson held that, in the case of a serious assault in a domestic setting, a sentence of imprisonment for two years or more is, ‘plainly within the proper sentencing range’ and ‘far from excessive’. Similarities between the two cases include the ages of the appellants, their prior criminal records and their otherwise good character ([47]). Although the complainants in both cases suffered physical and psychological injuries, the injuries sustained by the complainant in RAP were more significant. RAP also involved a plea of guilty, whilst this was a matter determined following two days of hearing. Reference was also made to a considerable number of cases with regard to the range that should be considered in relation to a penalty to be imposed, such as R v Pierpoint [2001] QCA 493, R v Johnson [2002] QCA 283, R v Von Pein [2001] QCA 385, R v Fairbrother; ex parte Attorney-General [2005] QCA 105, R v King [2006] QCA 466, R v George [2006] QCA 1 and R v Roach [2009] QCA 360. These cases clearly showed the considerable range of penalties and the need for an independent exercise of discretion. In light of the circumstances of this case, the appeal was allowed, the sentences set aside, the hearing adjourned for sentence on a date to be fixed and the bail enlarged.
RCK v MK [2018] QDC 181 (6 August 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Adjournment of application for protection order’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sufficient evidence to justify protection order’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: At the first hearing of the proceeding, on 9 November 2017, the Magistrate considered it unnecessary to grant a temporary protection order and therefore remanded the matter to 16 November 2017. On that later date, the matter was listed for further mention and management on 18 January 2018. At this hearing, neither the parties nor their representatives were present with the exception of the aggrieved’s representative. Ultimately, the magistrate made a protection order for a period of five years in identical terms to an order made for a separate but related family matter involving the aggrieved and her brother (see [27]).
Issues: the significant grounds of the appeal, which turned upon matters of procedure, were two-fold. First, the Magistrate erred in not adjourning the application under s 39(2)(b) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). Second, the Magistrate erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to justify that the appellant had committed domestic violence against the respondent or that a protection order was necessary or desirable under s 37(1)(c) of DFVPA.
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed. The protection order was set aside, the proceeding was remitted to the Domestic and Family Violence Court to be heard and determined according to law, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs in the appeal.
As to the first ground, the material question posed by Morzone QC DCJ was whether the respondent was denied the opportunity to be heard by the application proceedings in circumstances where it had been previously set for mention only. Applying the relevant authority on this particular issue of procedural fairness (see [37]), Morzone noted there was no adequate and reasonable explanation for the respondent’s absence. Furthermore, Morzone QC DCJ outlined six material elements of the case that his Honour believed the Magistrate ought to have considered in deciding whether to proceed to hearing or grant an adjournment (see [40]). In failing to consider these features of the case, the Magistrate was said to have misdirected herself in proceeding to hearing with the consequence that the orders ultimately made were unreasonable (see [41]).
Given the conclusion Morzone QC DCJ reached as to the above ground of appeal, his Honour considered it unnecessary to consider the second ground of appeal (see [43]).
Recognising that it would be inequitable for the respondent to bear the costs of the appellant’s success, Morzone QC DCJ ordered that each party ought to bear their own costs in the appeal (see [53]).
ECW v ECW [2018] QDC 166 (3 August 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Family law issues’ – ‘Hearing of the variation application according to law’ – ‘Lack of preparation’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Variation of a temporary protection order’
Appeal type: appeal against variation to temporary protection order.
Facts: A temporary protection order was issued against the applicant (Mr ECW) for the benefit of the respondent (Ms ECW) and the couple’s three children. A protection order was later made before Mr ECW applied to remove two of the children as named persons protected under the order and vary, among others, orders 3 and 8. The acting Magistrate made variations to orders 3 and 8 while dismissing the variation to the persons named in the order. Mr ECW appealed against this decision.
Issues: did the acting Magistrate fail to hear and determine Mr ECW’s application for a variation to the protection order according to law?
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate’s Court, to be heard and determined, according to law.
Horneman-Wren SC DCJ revealed a number of issues with the way in which the acting Magistrate heard and determined Mr ECW’s application.
As observed by his Honour, s 91(2)(a) of DFVPA provides that before a Court can vary a protection order, the court must consider the grounds set out in the application for the protection order. However, his Honour recognises that the opening remark of the Magistrate – “Okay. So, whose application is this?” – demonstrates that the Magistrate hadn’t read the grounds for the application or the materials filed by each party prior to the hearing. His Honour further noted that a plain reading of the transcript would highlight that the Magistrate didn’t read the application or affidavit materials at any stage during the hearing.
Horneman-Wren SC DCJ also recognises that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the proposal to remove the two children from the order on the basis that they were matters for the Family Court and not for her Honour (see [32]). His Honour clarifies that the matter was not a matter for the Family Court but for her Honour (see [33]).
The matter was remitted to the Magistrate’s court, as opposed to Horneman-Wren SC DCJ conducting the appeal as a fresh hearing, since his Honour was of the opinion that Mr ECW was entitled to have his application heard and determined in the Magistrates Court and to have appeal rights. Conducting the appeal as a fresh hearing would mean, by virtue of s 169(2) of the DFVPA, that Mr ECW would not have any such appeal rights (see [38]-[39]).
His Honour did not set aside the Magistrate’s variation of orders 3 and 8 since the parties agreed that those variations ought to remain in the interim ([41]).
JMM v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 130 (6 July 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of procedural fairness’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive sentence’
Appeal type: appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 4 August 2016, a protection order was made under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) against the appellant for the benefit of the aggrieved, her de facto partner, and her three children. The order only contained the standard conditions pursuant to 56 of DFVPA including a condition that the appellant must be of good behaviour towards the child, must not commit associated domestic violence against the child and must not expose the child to domestic violence. On 8 November 2018, one of the appellant’s children verbally provoked the intoxicated appellant and pointed a knife at her. The aggrieved disarmed the child, kicked him in the bottom and chased him across the street. Two witnesses recount the aggrieved and appellant hurling verbal abuse at the child. The appellant’s conduct fell within the definition of “domestic violence” under s 8 of the DFVPA since it could be classified as “emotionally or psychologically abusive” (see [45]). Accordingly, the appellant was later charged and convicted of contravention of the protection order in the Magistrate’s court. She was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment. The appellant appealed against this sentence.
Issues: the grounds of the appeal were two-fold: sentence was manifestly excessive and there was a breach of procedural fairness in the magistrate not inviting submissions on imprisonment.
Decision and reasoning: appeal allowed and the sentence was therefore set aside.
The second ground of appeal was allowed. His Honour stated that the magistrate erred in denying the appellant’s solicitor the opportunity to address her on the appropriateness of the sentence of imprisonment. Denying this opportunity and imposing the sentence nonetheless constituted a breach of the rule of natural justice (see [50]). This error, amongst other errors in the Magistrate’s exercise of the sentencing discretion, lead his Honour to set aside the sentence. Accordingly, it was necessary for the appellate court to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, unless doing so lead to the conclusion that no different sentence should be passed (see [14]).
On the basis of the Court’s independent exercise of discretion and analysis of relevant cases, the sentence imposed was considered excessive. The respondent relied upon PFM v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 210 and TZL v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 171 in their submission that the sentence was appropriate since the offending in question was more serious than in each of those cases that yielded similar sentences (see [53]). In response, his Honour stated that the offending was not objectively more serious than in PFM and TZL and is not truly comparable and therefore of little assistance (see [54]-[58]). At the discretion of his Honour, two recent analogous cases were then considered. Taking into account those decisions and the material facts of the case, namely that the contravention involved no violence and was limited to a single instance of provoked verbal abuse, his Honour concluded that the sentence was outside the permissible sentencing range for the offender (see [64]-[65]) and ordered a sentence of probation for six months.
Queensland Police Service v JSB [2018] QDC 120 (28 June 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing options’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 1; Possession of a dangerous drug x 1; Breach of a bail condition x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence; Appeal by way of rehearing on the record
Facts: The respondent and appellant were in a relationship. The respondent pleaded guilty to three charges, one of which was contravention of a domestic violence order. He was fined $1,000.
Issues: Whether the fine of $1,000 was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Fantin DCJ dismissed the appeal. Her Honour considered the respondent’s personal circumstances and criminal history, which included 28 breaches of domestic violence orders, 18 breaches of bail conditions and other court orders ([20]). Whilst the respondent’s previous breaches of domestic violence orders were clearly relevant and increased the need for personal and general deterrence, her Honour found that it should not outweigh the low level of gravity of the offence. Taking into account the relationship between the respondent and appellant, the fact that the contravention of the domestic violence order did not involve violence and was limited to one instance of verbal abuse, that the respondent was not charged with any other offence arising from the contravention, the respondent’s early plea and cooperation with police, that the respondent had spent three days in pre-sentence custody, the activation in full of a suspended sentence of two months’ imprisonment, it was open to the Magistrate to impose the fine of $1,000 for the contravention offence ([73]). She did, however, consider that the sentence may be regarded as generous and another judicial officer may have structured the sentences differently.
ATJ v SLK [2018] QDC 191 (23 April 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Imposition of a domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against imposition of a domestic violence order.
Facts: The respondent applied for a domestic violence order based on the appellant’s alleged behaviours, dating back several years and including a time prior to which a previous order was made. The application was served on the appellant two days prior to the hearing and the appellant did not attend the hearing. The only material placed before the Magistrate was the application itself. No oral evidence was given. The order was made. The appellant appealed against the decision to make the domestic violence order.
Issues: Whether the decision to make a domestic violence order could be set aside.
Decision and reasoning: Farr SC DCJ allowed the appeal, set aside the decision, and remitted the matter to the Magistrates Court. Whilst it appeared unlikely that the behaviour that occurred since the cessation of the previous order could justify and satisfy the test of domestic violence, even if that was the case, the Magistrate would need to take account of that prior behaviour to determine whether that might constitute domestic violence of a continuing nature, such that it is appropriate to make a second order based upon the same evidence. This was a question for that court to determine after hearing all of the appropriate evidence and submissions, and his Honour found that the present court was not in the position to make that decision ([19]).
S v T [2018] QDC 49 (29 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Case type: Application for costs after an appeal against a domestic violence order.
Facts: A protection order was made naming the respondent (T) as the aggrieved and the appellant (S) as the respondent. S successfully appealed against the order. S sought an order for T to pay her costs of the original hearing and the appeal ([1]).
Issues:
1.
Whether s 157(2) Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (‘DFVPA’) applies to an award of costs after an appeal against a domestic violence order.
2.
Whether a costs order should be made in favour of S.
Decision and Reasoning: Richards DCJ made no order as to costs.
In relation to the first issue, the usual position is that each party to a proceeding for a domestic violence order bears their own costs unless the application for the protection order is ‘malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious’ (s 157(2) DFVPA). There is no equivalent section in the DVFPA in relation to appeals. However, r 142(2) DFVPA provides that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (‘UCPR’) applies to appeals. Rule 681 UCPR states that costs follow the event unless the court orders otherwise. Richards DCJ held, applying GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248, that the discretion to award costs should be exercised in light of s 157(2) DVFPA ([5]).
In relation to the second issue, Richards DCJ noted that there was some suspicion that T made the application for a domestic violence order in retaliation for S complaining to the police about him or to have some sort of leverage over her. However, his Honour was unable to find that the application was malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious ([6]).
MKA v WKT [2018] QDC 73(28 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Change of venue’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Appeal type: Appeal against domestic violence order.
Facts: A domestic violence order was made naming the respondent (WKT) as the aggrieved and the appellant (MKA) as the respondent ([2]). MKA appealed against the decision to grant the protection order ([3]). WKT applied to change the venue of the appeal from Cairns to Southport.
Issues: Whether the application for change of venue should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was granted.
WKT applied to transfer the proceedings on the grounds that:
•
she ordinarily resides in Coolangatta;
•
the proceedings at first instance were heard at Coolangatta;
•
she has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood as a result of the domestic violence; and she has been unable to engage legal representation in Cairns ([12]); and
•
she cannot afford to pay her legal representation at the Gold Coast, but was hopeful of obtaining Legal Aid assistance ([13]).
MKA opposed the transfer on the basis that:
•
his legal representatives are based in Cairns;
•
he was put to the expense of flying and accommodating them at Coolangatta in the first instance proceeding;
•
there is no evidence that a timely hearing date would be available in Southport ([14]).
Morzone DCJ emphasised that the exercise of discretion to grant the transfer is governed by the objectives of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld), one of which is to ‘…maximise the … wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, and to minimise disruption to their lives’. His Honour placed emphasis on WKT’s mental health condition, which is likely to be aggravated by the appeal proceedings ([25]-[26]).
ETB v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 26 (6 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing - double jeopardy’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order (‘DVO’) x 2; Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship and raised 5 children together ([14]). The first contravention of DVO occurred when the appellant swore at the appellant and threatened to slice his own throat (‘June contravention of DVO’). The second contravention of DVO occurred when the appellant verbally abused the appellant (‘September contravention of DVO’). The aggrieved slapped the appellant and told him to leave. The common assault charge occurred when, in retaliation for the slap, the appellant punched the aggrieved in the head and ear (together, ‘September charges’) (see [10]).
The appellant was sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment for the June contravention of DVO, 9 months’ imprisonment for the September contravention of DVO, and 9 months’ imprisonment for the common assault ([2]). The magistrate declared 39 days’ pre-sentence custody and set a parole release date after 2 weeks ([4]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on 4 grounds in relation to the September charges (see [7]-[8]):
•
first, that the sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
second, that the sentencing magistrate erred by failing to have proper regard to principles of totality;
•
third, that the sentencing magistrate erred by incorrectly applying relevant case law; and
•
fourth, that the magistrate erred by contravening s 16 of the Criminal Code 1999 (Qld) by imposing imprisonment on each of the offences of contravention of a domestic violence order and common assault.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, the Dearden DCJ held that the September charges could be appropriately separated, because the contravention of DVO was in relation to the verbal abuse, and the common assault was in relation to the physical punch ([18]). However, this meant that the respondent conceded that sentence of 9 months for solely verbal conduct was manifestly excessive ([20]). District Judge Dearden considered that the appropriate sentence for the September contravention of DVO should be 3 months ([21]).
The remaining issue was whether the sentence of 9 months imprisonment for the common assault charge was manifestly excessive ([23]). Considering case law and mitigating circumstances (the fact that the verbal abuse did not involve threats to harm the aggrieved and the assault was precipitated by the aggrieved slapping the appellant), Dearden DCJ held that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([23]-[30]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment ([32]).
ACP v Queensland Police Service (No 2) [2017] QDC 293 (8 December 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’ – ‘Ouster order’ – ‘Particularise a charge’ – ‘Return condition’ – ‘Uncertain in its terms’
Charges: Breach of temporary protection order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: A temporary protection order was made naming ACP as the respondent and MP as the aggrieved. Condition 4 of the order provided that ACP must vacate the family property, and condition 5 allowed ACP to return to the property to collect belongings in the company of a police officer ([10]). The order did not specify the time by which ACP must vacate the property, but ACP gave evidence that the Magistrate said that ACP must vacate the property ‘straight away’ ([58]).
MP returned to the property 3 days later, to find ACP loading belongings onto a truck. ACP had not yet vacated the property ([20]-[21]). ACP gave evidence that he understood the order to mean that he could vacate the property himself, and only needed police attendance to return to the property ([60]).
The bench charge sheet did not set out the particulars of which condition of the order the defendant was alleged to have contravened ([8]), contrary to s 177(4) of the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ([19]).
Issues: Whether the temporary protection order was uncertain in its terms.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside.
Judge Horneman-Wren SC concluded: first, that the charge was not adequately particularised; and second, that the order was uncertain in its terms. First, the charge sheet did not inform the defendant of the factual ingredients of the offence ([72]). Second, even though the order did not provide a timeframe within which ACP was to vacate the property, the Magistrate stated that ‘the order is quite clear on its face and I am satisfied that the appellant was aware that he was to get out straight away’ ([79]). This was an error because ‘straight away’ was not incorporated in the condition ([90]).
ACP v McAulliffe [2017] QDC 294 (8 December 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Family law issues’ – ‘Necessary or desirable test applied to conditions’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of future domestic violence’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: The male appellant and the female aggrieved person (MP) were in a relationship. Commencing in October 2012, there were a number of ‘instances’ of domestic violence (see [28]-[38]). A temporary protection order was made on 15 February 2016. A year later, on 7 March 2017, a Magistrate made a protection order against the appellant for the benefit of MP and her three sons under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)(DFVPA). There were five conditions stipulated under the order; the first and fourth were standard conditions under s 56 of DFVPA:
1.
Appellant be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against her.
2.
Appellant is prohibited from remaining at, entering or attempting to enter, premises or approaching the premises where the aggrieved lives or works.
3.
Subject to four exceptions, appellant is prohibited from contacting, attempting to contact or asking someone else to contact the aggrieved.
4.
Appellant be of good behaviour towards the named children and not commit associated domestic violence against them and not to expose them to domestic violence.
5.
Appellant is prohibited from contacting the named children subject to the same exceptions applicable under condition 3.
Issue: whether the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence?
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed to the extent that a protection order was made but only with the standard conditions. Conditions 2, 3 and 5 were removed and condition 4 was renumbered as condition 2.
Before considering the issue on appeal, Horneman-Wren SC DC’s observed that the Magistrate did not expressly assess either of the first two steps of the three-step process considered by Morzone QC DCJ in MDE v MLG as the necessary approach to determining the requirement, under s 37(1)(c) of the DFVPA, that “the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence” (see [67]). His Honour then took the opportunity to emphasise the discretionary nature of this requirement and that Morzone QC DCJ’s view on how to determine whether an order is necessary or desirable shouldn’t be seen to mandate those three steps (see [68]-[69]). Indeed, his Honour later recognises that it was sufficiently clear from the Magistrate’s reasons that she answered the first question of the three-stage approach in the affirmative (see [76]-[78]).
In relation to the issue on appeal, his Honour considers the Magistrate’s finding that an order was necessary as unreasonable and reached in error. His Honour opined that evidence of risk of future domestic violence in the absence of a protection order (first step) is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the necessary condition is satisfied (see [80]). However, his Honour regarded the Magistrate’s finding that the protection order was desirable as one that ought to have been made (see [81]). In accordance with the requirement under s 37(1)(c) that the court must only be satisfied with one of the two conditions (see [88]), and as reflected in the orders of this appeal, his Honour therefore agreed with the Magistrate in her decision to make the protection order (see [88]).
Ultimately, it was the terms in which the Magistrate made the order that necessitated modification of the protection order. His Honour noted that under s 57(1) of the DFVPA, before the court may impose other conditions in addition to those set out in s 56, it must be satisfied that the condition is both necessary in the circumstances and desirable in the interests of the aggrieved, named person or the respondent. Having recognised this, his Honour then pointed out that the Magistrate failed to explain that she was satisfied that the imposition of other conditions was both necessary and desirable (see [89]-[90]). The order to remove conditions 2, 3 and 5 of the protection order reflect this view of his Honour that the Magistrate erred in imposing those other conditions.
MEG v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 302 (10 November 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing submissions’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order as an aggravated offence x 1; Assault or obstruction of a police officer as a domestic violence offence x 1; Possession of dangerous drugs x 1; Contravene direction x 1; Contravention of a domestic violence order simpliciter x 1; Authority for controlled drugs x 1; Failure to properly dispose of a syringe or needle x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant breached a domestic violence order naming the appellant’s mother as the aggrieved and her son as a named person in the order. The breach occurred when the appellant made threats to kill herself and her son, in the presence of her son ([17]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the contravention of a domestic violence order as an aggravated offence and four months’ imprisonment for the contravention of a domestic violence order simpliciter. For the other charges, the appellant was convicted and not further punished ([2]).
At sentence, the Magistrate indicated that he was considering a prison probation order of 2 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ probation ([5]). After hearing submissions on that sentence, the Magistrate asked the appellant whether she consented to the probation order. MEG asked, ‘what happens if I say no?’ The Magistrate interpreted this question to mean that MEG did not consent to the order, and immediately imposed the four- and six-month sentences of imprisonment ([29]).
Issues: Whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness, and whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was re-sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, which was time already served.
Judge Horneman-Wren SC held that the Magistrate erred in construing MEG’s question (‘what happens if I say no?’) as a refusal to consent. Further, the Magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant to a head sentence of six months without inviting further submissions on the sentence ([32]). The Magistrate did not give reasons for why six months was an appropriate head sentence, and did not refer to any comparable cases ([33]).
PFM v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 210 (11 August 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Extending protection order’ – ‘History of domestic violence offences’ – ‘Parole’ – ‘Post-separation abuse’ – ‘Re-sentence’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant had obtained a domestic violence order with the appellant as the aggrieved. The order contained a condition that the appellant was not to have contact with the complainant. In contravention of this condition, the appellant travelled to the complainant’s house, stood outside, and called out to her and her son ([16]). The appellant had a criminal history including 13 breaches of domestic violence orders, spanning 12 years to 2015. The appellant was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed for two reasons: first, the sentencing judge erred in not applying the principle of totality; and second, the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to totality, the appellant had previously been sentenced for a failure to appear, and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment. Since the appellant was on parole, the imposition of the new sentence automatically cancelled his parole. Therefore, the effect of the sentence was to impose a 9-month sentence. The magistrate did not treat the matter in this way, and calculated the parole eligibility date as one third of the 4-month sentence ([40]-[41]).
In relation to the length of the sentence, the sentence was outside the appropriate range. Morzone QC DCJ stated that ‘it seems that the Court allowed the appellant’s previous offending to overwhelm other material considerations and the nature and seriousness of the offending subject of the sentence’ ([42]). The offending conduct was in the lower range, and would not normally attract a sentence of imprisonment. However, the nature of offending in the context of previous past breaches of domestic violence offences warranted a period of one month’s imprisonment ([64]).
The judge determined that the extension of the protection order to was ‘necessary or desirable for the order to regulate the parties’ communication and contact for that period. By that time, the parties’ parental relationship and need for contact will change as the child matures into his early teens.’ [70]
NAS v QPS [2017] QDC 173 (21 June 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Partially suspended sentence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed with an instrument x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married and had a 5-month-old baby. The appellant was from Papua New Guinea and was staying in Australia on a tourist visa ([2]). The offence occurred when the appellant became angry and threw an apple at the complainant, struck her with a broomstick, and struck the back of her head while she was holding the baby ([3]).
The appellant pleaded guilty on the following day and was immediately sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, suspended after serving a period of 2 months for an operational period of 3 years ([1]). He was represented by a duty lawyer ([5]).
The magistrate stated that the ‘only’ appropriate sentence was 15 months’ imprisonment ([11]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Judge Reid held that the Magistrate erred by stating that 15 months was the ‘only appropriate term’ ([23]). Comparable cases, most relevantly R v Pierpoint [2001] QCA 493, indicated that a lesser sentence was also open ([25]).
On one hand, the offending was serious: it was somewhat protracted, committed against a female partner, and in the presence of a young child. On the other hand, the appellant had no criminal history, the appellant had ceased hitting the complainant before the police arrived, and there was no previous domestic violence order in place ([26]-[27]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment, to be suspended in 10 days, after the appellant had completed serving the sentence of 2 months imprisonment ([30]). Had a pre-sentence custody certificate been provided, a wholly suspended sentence could have been imposed ([30]).
LDS v QRR [2017] QDC 199 (15 June 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Cumulative sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Psychologist’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 3; wilful damage x 1; common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the aggrieved in a domestic violence order taken out against the defendant. The breaches of domestic violence order and common assault charge occurred when the appellant punched and pushed the complainant to the ground on three occasions ([6]). The wilful damage charge occurred when the appellant stomped on her mobile phone while she was trying to contact the police ([7]). Following a plea of guilty, the Magistrate imposed cumulative sentences totalling 18 months’ imprisonment, with a parole release date after 6 months ([3]).
Issues: There were three grounds of appeal: first, that the Magistrate placed disproportionate weight on general community deterrence; second, that the Magistrate disregarded the appellant’s mental health issues; third, that the Magistrate erred in ordering the sentences to run cumulatively without consulting either party.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
In relation to the first ground, the Magistrate described the appellant’s offending as a ‘reign of terror heaped upon the complainant’ ([16]). District Court Judge Muir described this statement as an exaggeration because the violence was at the lower end of the scale and the offences were committed within a short time period ([31]). The Magistrate also referred to statistics that 700 women would be killed in the next 10 years if nothing was done about domestic violence ([19]). District Judge Muir held that using statistics in this way indicated that the Magistrate did not place sufficient weight on the appellant’s mitigating factors.
On the second ground, the appellant asserted that he suffered from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia. However, the psychologist’s letter tendered in evidence did not mention those conditions. The Magistrate enquired as to who gave the diagnoses, but more information could not be tendered ([27]). District Judge Muir held that the Magistrate was entitled to place little weight on the diagnoses.
On the third ground, Muir DCJ held that it was an error for the Magistrate to not invite submissions about the possibility of cumulative sentences ([36]).
On the whole, Muir DCJ concluded that the sentence was outside the appropriate range ([47]). The appellant was re-sentenced to an overall head sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, with the appellant to be released immediately on parole after having served approximately 4 months in prison ([50]).
JC v KP [2017] QDC 175 (26 May 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Consent’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Weapons licence’
Appeal type: Appeal against decision to grant protection order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were brothers. A Magistrate ordered that a protection order be made against the appellant by consent (p 2), with the respondent as the aggrieved. The Magistrate represented to the appellant that the order would not affect the appellant’s weapons license (p 3). In fact, a protection order would limit the applicant’s weapon’s license for five years (p 5). The appellant appealed the decision on the ground that the appellant was induced to consent to the order being made (p 2-3).
Issues: Whether the order should be set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The order was set aside. Judge Long of the District Court concluded that the appellant did not understand the full consequences of the order being made, and the matter was remitted to a contested hearing (p 6-7).
CDX v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 96 (5 April 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Conflating factual issues’ – ‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Text messages’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order (DVO) x 1; Possess restricted items x 1; Possess explosives x 1; Assault or obstruct police officer x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence from Magistrates Court.
Facts: The appellant was subject to a DVO with the complainant named as the aggrieved ([12]). The appellant sent threatening text messages to the complainant, and took their child out of school ([12]). This formed the basis of Charge 1, contravening a DVO. When the police arrived at the appellant’s house, he refused to cooperate, and appeared to reach for a knife while holding the child ([12]). This formed the basis of Charge 4, obstruct police officer.
The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two months ([1]).
Issues: The defendant appealed on the grounds that: the sentence was manifestly excessive; the Magistrate took irrelevant matters into consideration by relying on the documentation from the domestic violence order; the Magistrate fettered her objectivity; and the Magistrate conflated the facts of Charge 1 and Charge 4 ([2]-[3]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Horneman-Wren SC DCJ concluded that the Magistrate erred in conflating the factual issues in charges 1 and 4 ([42]). The other grounds of appeal were not made out. Horneman-Wren SC DCJ considered that a shorter sentence would have been appropriate, but since the appellant had been in custody for 7 weeks, his Honour recorded a conviction and did not further punish the appellant ([47]).
CED v HL [2016] QDC 345 (22 December 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Children’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Vary’
Appeal Type: Appeal against variation to Temporary Protection Order.
Facts: A temporary protection order was made against the appellant which stipulated his former female partner, the respondent, as the protected person. The appellant and the respondent had a son together, K. The terms of the temporary protection order were varied twice. The first variation occurred after the respondent took K out of school (against K’s wishes). The appellant arrived to pick up K, at K’s request. An argument ensued between the appellant and the respondent. The temporary protection order was varied to name K as a protected person.
Second, the respondent reported that her father (the maternal grandfather of K) had made threats against the appellant in the presence of K. The temporary protection order was varied to prevent the appellant from permitting, encouraging or facilitating in-person contact between K and the grandfather. The appellant’s position was that he had never been threatened by the respondent’s father in that way and that K wanted to see his grandfather.
The appellant applied to a magistrate to have these terms varied and removed. The application was refused.
Issue/s: Whether the variations ought to be allowed?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Kent J held that there were insufficient reasons given for the orders made refusing the variations. This was an error of law and the decision had to be set aside on that basis. Further, there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to prove that either of the contested conditions were necessary or desirable. First, K’s presence at the incident between the appellant and respondent was purely incidental. It was upsetting but no more upsetting than other separate actions of the respondent. It was not prolonged or dangerous and not wilfully brought about, or persisted with, by the appellant. Second, the grandfather’s threats against the appellant were out of the appellant’s presence and not initiated by the appellant. They were unlikely to be repeated and did not involve any violence against K. This was too tenuous to substantiate the challenged conditions (see [38]).
RWT v BZX [2016] QDC 246 (30 September 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Cross-application’ – ‘Cross-orders’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a protection order and an order for costs.
Facts: The male appellant and the female respondent were married in India. It was an arranged marriage. They lived in Australia with their son and the appellant’s parents. Each applied for a protection order against the other, making serious allegations which were denied. There were also proceedings in the family court at the time of the protection order hearing.
The respondent’s application and affidavit set out particulars of domestic violence under several headings: verbal abuse, controlling behaviour, psychological abuse using the child, sexual abuse, financial abuse, threats and intimidation. She perceived an alliance against her (the appellant, his parents and the son). She annexed to her affidavit a transcript of a recording she made as she was packing to leave the family home to provide evidence of this. Conversely, the appellant alleged that the respondent had assaulted the child. He had previously taken the child to a doctor and reported the complaint.
The magistrate made an order in favour of the wife. He dismissed the appellant’s application and also made an order for costs. In doing so His Honour stated:
‘Sadly what I say in these proceedings can’t be used in the Family Court. These proceedings are private proceedings. I wish they could. I wish the Family Court could hear what I think about the reliability of [the appellant]. It’s been a scurrilous case. On my view, his application has been deliberately false and vexatious. I can say that, in 12 years as a magistrate, I have never ordered costs in a domestic violence case before. I intend to today for the first time in many hundreds of cases’.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
There was no proper basis on the evidence for the learned Magistrate to make a protection order under s 37 of the [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’);
2.
There was no proper basis for the learned Magistrate to order costs under s 157 of the Act against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Was there a proper basis for the order made against the appellant? (see [4]-[34])
1.
Devereaux SC DCJ held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the appellant had committed acts of domestic violence against the respondent: s 37(1)(b) of the Act.
(a)
The magistrate was correct to use the transcript of the recording made by the respondent as proof of her case and as relevant to the credibility of the appellant. The transcript showed the manner in which the appellant treated the respondent. Further, the ‘startling’ language and attitude of the child towards his mother in the transcript gave rise to the inference that the appellant had treated the respondent in such a way over a lengthy period in front of the child: see [12].
(b)
The magistrate, correctly, interpreted the transcript as confirmation of the respondent’s claim that the discussion was principally about money – the appellant’s demand that she deposit all her wages into the joint account: see [13]. Evidence of the respondent’s friend further corroborated the respondent’s evidence about financial abuse: see [18].
(c)
Devereaux SC DCJ agreed with the magistrate’s analysis of the transcript of the recording (see [14], [29]). It provided evidence of threats by the appellant, that the appellant would shout at her in front of the child, and that the child had been ‘coached and poisoned against his mother’ (see [15]-[24]).
(d)
His Honour further held that: ‘the passages I have referred to in this judgment from His Honour’s reasons reduce to the finding that his Honour rejected utterly the credibility of the appellant and accepted completely the credibility and reliability of the respondent. There is nothing in the materials which objectively suggests that those findings were not open to His Honour or that I should draw different inferences from facts in the record’ at [29].
2.
Devereaux SC DCJ also held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence: s 37(1)(c) of the Act.
(a)
Devereaux SC DCJ noted the magistrate’s conclusions about the appellant’s application, namely that it was ‘an outrageous case and pure nasty, vindictiveness on this woman because she wouldn’t hand over her money to a controlling, bullying husband. I don’t believe she has been anything other than a good mother to her child. I dismiss the [appellant’s] application …, as I said, but I do intend to make an order in favour of the wife’.
(b)
The magistrate continued: ‘[i]n my view, as I mentioned during submissions, the fact that property settlements in family law matters are still contentious and, indeed, the mother still isn’t even getting face-to-face contact with her own child at the moment, there is every opportunity for the husband to continue his bullying behaviour to try and manipulate the wife into caving in to his demands about the child, about financial affairs, and anything else that he might have a penchant to do in his bullying behaviour. She is absolutely in need of protection. He needs to be kept well away from her’ (see [26]).
(c)
Devereaux SC DCJ held that these statements could be properly understood as the magistrate’s reasons for being satisfied that the protection order was ‘necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ (see [28]). This reasoning, that it was necessary or desirable for an order to protect the respondent from domestic violence in the setting of the continuing family court proceedings, was correct: GKE v EUT (see [32]).
Devereaux SC DCJ noted generally that ‘[i]t is advisable that a magistrate make specific findings with respect to the matters set out in s 37 of the DVFP Act’ (see [27]). However, here, ‘the manner in which His Honour reached and set out conclusions is sufficiently clear to be amenable to examination and review’ see [28].
•
The appeal against the costs order (see [35]-[68])
Devereaux SC DCJ held that the magistrate was entitled to thoroughly reject any of the appellant’s assertions. Having done so, it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the appellant’s application was brought to vex the respondent – ‘it was deliberately false and vexatious’, brought because ‘she wouldn’t hand over her money to a controlling bullying husband’’ (see [65]-[66]).
WJ v AT [2016] QDC 211 (19 August 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Cross-application’ – ‘Cross-order’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Purpose of the domestic and family violence protection act 2012 (qld)’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the making of a protection order against the appellant and appeal against the decision of the Court to dismiss the appellant’s application for an order.
Facts: The male appellant and the female respondent were in a relationship. They had two children together, DJ and MJ (aged 3 and 2), and another daughter, LS (aged 8), from the respondent’s previous relationship. The appellant had been abusive to LS in the past. The parties had separated and the three children lived with the respondent. The respondent and the appellant each applied for a protection order against the other. There were also contact/care proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.
The respondent’s case was that on 14 August 2015 the appellant spoke loudly and in an insulting way towards her. Many, if not all, of these statements were made in front of DJ and MJ, upsetting the children. The appellant rubbed his beard against the respondent’s eye area and continued to verbally abuse her. The respondent tried to ignore him. He took her phone and ran outside. There was a struggle. He pushed the respondent, she was thrown onto the car bonnet and the appellant sustained some scratches (see [6]-[32], [112]-[126]). Conversely, the appellant alleged that the respondent ‘went berserk’, pushed him around the balcony, grabbed and attacked him, and he ran away from her. She then physically assaulted him. He sustained scratches and a ripped shirt. He also alleged he was a victim of economic abuse (see [33]-[53]).
The Judicial Registrar (JR) made a protection order against the appellant in favour of the respondent. The JR dismissed the cross-application by the appellant (see [56]-[58]).
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the decisions of the Judicial Registrar were made against the weight of the evidence, namely the making of a protection order against the appellant in favour of the respondent; including the two children, MJ and DJ, in the order; including the child LS in the order; and the refusal to make a protection order against the respondent in favour of the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Should an order have been made against the appellant?
First, Smith DCJA held that a number of the acts committed by the appellant amounted to domestic violence as per s 37(1)(b) of the Act Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’) – ‘the rubbing of the beard was physically abusive, the taking of the phone was physically abusive and the insulting words about the first respondent was in my view emotionally or psychologically abusive’ (see [131]).
Second, in considering whether a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ to protect the aggrieved as per s 37(1)(c), Smith DCJ noted that the reasoning of McGill SC DCJ in GKE v EUT applied here. McGill SC DCJ said:
‘I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made, and then consider whether in view of that the making of an order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved … I also agree that there must be a proper evidentiary basis for concluding that there is such a risk, and the matter does not depend simply upon the mere possibility of such a thing occurring in the future, or the mere fact that the applicant for the order is concerned that such a thing may happen in the future’(see [32]-[33]).
Smith DCJA noted that ‘necessary’ is defined by the dictionary as ‘requiring to be done, achieved; requisite, essential’ and desirable is defined as ‘worth having’. There is therefore a ‘lower threshold when one is concerned with the term ‘desirable’. But both are focused on the need to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ (see [137]-[139]).
His Honour ultimately agreed with the JR’s reasoning that an order was both necessary and desirable to protect the aggrieved from respondent. At [140]:
‘There is no doubt that the parties are embroiled in Federal Circuit Court proceedings. There are children of the relationship about whom contact/care arrangements will need to be made. These will need to be dealt with in a civilised and appropriate fashion. I have considered s 4 of the Act. In light of the history between the parties, the events of 14 August 2015, the nature of the relationship, and degree of animosity expressed by the appellant towards the first respondent, in my view, it was both desirable and necessary that the order be made in favour of the first respondent. Like the JR, I consider without such an order there is a real risk of future domestic violence’.
•
Should MJ and DJ have been included in the order?
Section 53 of the Act provides that the court may name a child ‘if the court is satisfied that naming the child in the order is necessary or desirable to protect the child from (a) associated domestic violence or (b) being exposed to domestic violence committed from the respondent’. Section 10 of the Act defines the meaning of ‘exposed to domestic violence’.
Smith DCJA was satisfied that the children were exposed to domestic violence (see [148]). Further, His Honour stated: ‘I do not consider there is any requirement they understand the words spoke, particularly bearing in mind they were spoken aggressively’(see [149]). Additionally, it was also necessary and desirable for the children to be included in the order because, as the JR found, there was a continued risk of exposure to domestic violence in the future. This was because the parties would continue to be in contact through the children of the relationship and proceedings were on foot in the Federal Circuit Court (see [150]-[151]).
•
Should LS have been included in the order?
His Honour held that:
‘[I]n all of the circumstances, bearing in mind that there is a real possibility of contact between the appellant and LS, and bearing in mind the acrimonious situation between the parties and the events of 9 July 2015 [when the appellant was physically abusive towards LS] and 15 August 2015, I consider the JR was right to add LS to the order to avoid the risk of her being exposed to domestic violence’ at [159].
•
Should an order have been made against the first respondent?
In this regard, Smith DCJA noted the respondent had tried to ignore the appellant and that the scratches sustained by the appellant could have been caused in self-defence or accidently by the respondent. In this regard, His Honour quoted the explanatory notes to the 2011 Bill at [166]:
‘Lastly, the Bill aims to ensure that the person who is most in need of protection is identified. This is particularly important where cross-applications are made, which is where each party to a relationship alleges domestic violence against the other and which often result in cross-orders. During consultation, stakeholders reported a disproportionate number of cross-applications and cross-orders and expressed the concern that in many instances domestic violence orders are made against both people involved. This is inconsistent with the notion that domestic violence is characterised by one person being subjected to an ongoing pattern of abuse by another person who is motivated by the desire to dominate and control them. Both people in a relationship cannot be a victim and perpetrator of this type of violence at the same time. A cross-application may be used by a respondent to continue victimising the aggrieved person, to exact revenge or to gain a tactical advantage in other court proceedings. Also, violence used in self-defence and to protect children can be misconstrued as domestic violence if a broader view of the circumstances is not taken’ (His Honour’s emphasis).
In light of this, Smith DCJA held that there was no ‘physical abuse’ of the respondent by the appellant. Also, on the totality of the evidence, the respondent was most in need of protection (see [167]-[172]).
EAV v Commissioner of Police [2016] QDC 237 (16 September 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Alternatives to imprisonment’ – ‘Community based orders’ – ‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Cross-application for mutual protection orders’ – ‘Magistrates’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Previous breaches of domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic and family violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. They were subject to a domestic violence protection order on 8 July 2015 for a period of two years. These were cross-orders. In October 2015, the appellant breached these orders and was fined $500. On 20 November 2015, police attended their address after reports of a dispute. The appellant told police that he and the complainant were in a heated argument, which the complainant had initiated. The appellant said he bumped into the complainant, causing her to stumble. The complainant slapped the appellant. He then grabbed the complainant, threw her on the bed, and restrained her with his body weight. He released her and the argument continued until police arrived.
In sentencing, the magistrate expressed significant concern about the chronology of events namely, that the domestic violence order had been made in July 2015, breached by the appellant on 27 October 2015, the appellant was sentenced for that breach on 11 November 2015, and he then breached the domestic violence order again on 20 November 2015. The appellant was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, with an operational period of 12 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Dearden DCJ noted that the magistrate failed to give appropriate recognition to a number of relevant factors, namely at [22]:
•
‘there were mutual, cross-orders for domestic violence in place at the time of the offending;
•
‘the initial violence in the incident was, in fact, the complainant slapping the appellant;
•
‘the appellant’s violence, in response, was relatively low level (although nonetheless unacceptable);
•
‘the appellant had been in receipt of medical care in respect of a significant mental health issue, and importantly, had undertaken the Anglicare Living Without Violence Program, which was a substantial program, indicating on his part a significant willingness to change;
•
‘the appellant had expressed his remorse to police immediately after the event’.
His Honour noted that ‘magistrates dealing with breaches of domestic violence are, of course, under significant time pressures and the learned magistrates sentencing remarks are brief’. However, His Honour held that, ‘the transcript does not indicate that the learned magistrate in any way considered alternatives other than imprisonment in respect of this matter, and appears only to have taken into account the chronology (which is obviously significant) and to some very minor extent (referenced at the conclusion of her sentencing remarks) the steps that the appellant had taken in respect of receiving assistance from Dr Calder-Potts and Anglicare’ (see [24]).
The appellant was resentenced to 18 months’ probation with a special condition that he continue treatment and complete 100 hours of community service. No conviction was recorded.
IFM v Queensland Police Service [2016] QDC 140 (17 May 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach bail condition’ – ‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Repeated contraventions’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 2, breach bail condition x 2, and a further contravention charge.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. In relation to the first contravention of a domestic violence order, on 18 March 2015, the appellant pushed the complainant over and punched her to the jaw. No physical injury was alleged. After being arrested and charged, the appellant was released on bail. The second contravention of a domestic violence order occurred on 30 May 2015. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat and hit her, knocking her to the ground. He kicked her, dragged her to her feet and verbally abused her. The appellant then dragged her to a nearby park, knocking her to the ground again, hit her in the head, picked her up and continued to drag her. No physical injury was alleged. A head sentence of 15 months imprisonment was imposed on the second contravention of domestic violence order.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a sentence of 12 months imprisonment with a release after four months was appropriate in light of the authorities of PMB v Kelly [2014] QDC 301 and Singh v QPS [2013] QDC 37. Durward SC DCJ distinguished both of these cases (see [20]).
Here, Durward SC DCJ was satisfied that a sentence of 15 months imprisonment was not manifestly excessive. This was in light of a number of factors. The appellant’s conduct involved significant aggravating circumstances namely, the first contravention of a domestic violence order was committed two weeks after the expiration of an earlier imposed sentence, the second contravention charge occurred while the appellant was on bail for the former offence, and the appellant had previous convictions for breaches of domestic violence orders (including one committed against the same complainant) (see [21]). Further, the conduct of the appellant in the second charge was ‘sustained and patently violent’. It occurred not only in a residence but in a public area (see [22]). Finally, the appellant had a significant criminal history (see [23]).
AJS v KLB v Anor [2016] QDC 103 (13 May 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of future domestic violence’ – ‘Whether a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence’
Appeal Type: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The female respondent and the male appellant began a relationship in March 2014. The appellant gave her a false name, ‘Cray’, and other false details about his life. The respondent ended the relationship on 31 December 2014. From January to May 2015, the respondent received a series of text messages from the appellant. While at first these messages were consistent with someone trying to salvage the relationship, they became increasingly aggressive and abusive. Some included sexually explicit references.
The respondent contacted police in February 2015. The police made contact with the appellant. The appellant asserted that he was not ‘Cray’ and, in a series of phone calls, threatened the police and the respondent with legal action. He then sent the respondent a nine page threatening and intimidating letter. A temporary protection order was made in favour of the respondent. The appellant then instructed his solicitors to write a letter seeking the proceedings to be discontinued. This letter denied that he ever knew the respondent.
On 20 November 2015, the court made a protection order in favour of the respondent against the appellant. The magistrate noted in his findings that the respondent was clearly upset and frightened in court. She had difficulty giving evidence and, even when removed to the vulnerable witness room, she covered her face from the camera. The appellant, on the other hand, appeared confident and in control.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that there was no or no sufficient evidence to support the finding that His Honour was satisfied that an order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Harrison DCJ had regard to the decision of Morzone DCJ in MDE v MLG & Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service where he asserted that the question of whether ‘the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ in s 37(1)(c) of [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’) requires a three-stage process supported by proper evidentiary basis. As per Morzone DCJ at [55]:
•
‘Firstly, the court must assess the risk of future domestic violence between the parties in the absence of any order:
(a)
‘There must evidence to make factual findings or draw inferences of the nature of, and prospect that domestic violence may occur in the future. This will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. Relevant considerations may include evidence of past domestic violence and conduct, genuine remorse, rehabilitation, medical treatment, physiological counselling, compliance with any voluntary temporary orders (s 37(2)(b)), and changes of circumstances.
(b)
‘Unlike, its predecessor provision under the now superseded legislation, the court does not need to be satisfied that future domestic violence is ‘likely’. However, there must be more than a mere possibility or speculation of the prospect of domestic violence’.
•
‘Secondly, the court must assess the need to protect the aggrieved from that domestic violence in the absence of any order. Relevant considerations may include evidence of the parties’ future personal and familial relationships, their places or residence and work, the size of the community in which they reside and the opportunities for direct and indirect contact and future communication, for example, in relation to children’.
•
‘Thirdly, the court must then consider whether imposing a protection order is “necessary or desirable” to protect the aggrieved from the domestic violence. In this regard, pursuant to s 37(2)(a), the court must consider the principles in s 4(1)’.
Harrison DCJ held that although the magistrate did not refer specifically to each of the three stages of the three-stage process described in MDE, the magistrate did not err in finding that it was desirable to make the necessary protection order for the protection of respondent from domestic violence:
1.
There was sufficient evidence to make the finding that there was a risk of future domestic violence in the absence of any order. Here, the magistrate had regard particular regard to the two letters from the appellant. These did not show any remorse or rehabilitation and the mere fact that the appellant had not contacted the respondent since he was caught on 9 June 2015 did not advance the issue of rehabilitation any further. Additionally, it was particularly relevant that the appellant tried to lie his way out of the temporary protection order. These considerations ‘took the matter much further than the mere possibility or speculation of the prospect of domestic violence’ (see [85]-[87]).
2.
The magistrate had regard to the impact of the appellant’s behaviour on the respondent, and the fact that they both lived and worked in the Atherton Tablelands (a relatively small community where there would be real opportunities for direct and indirect contact in the future). This evidence was clearly sufficient to satisfy the second stage in MDE (see [88]).
3.
In relation to the third stage, a number of matters in s 4(1) of the Act were relevant namely, the safety, protection and wellbeing of the respondent; the need to treat her with respect and to ensure minimal disruption to her life; holding the appellant responsible for his domestic violence and the impact it had on the respondent; and the respondent was vulnerable as under paragraph (d), as was demonstrated with her difficulties in giving evidence (see [89]-[90]).
DMK v CAG [2016] QDC 106 (15 April 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Definition of domestic violence’ – ‘Desirability of protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidentiary standard of proof’ – ‘Relevant relationship’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious or frivolous’
Appeal type: Appeal against domestic violence protection order
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a de-facto relationship for almost 10 years and had children together. After separating, the respondent became the children’s primary caregiver. The appellant assisted her in looking after the children and they continued in a parenting relationship. A domestic violence protection order was made against the appellant to protect the respondent in the Magistrates Court. The magistrate had regard to three court orders existing between the parties in making this order. These were a Family Court order, a protection order made against the respondent naming the appellant as aggrieved, and a temporary protection order with the respondent as the aggrieved.
Prior to the making of the domestic violence protection order, the appellant made a complaint to police that his daughter was ‘sexting’. A few weeks later, he made another complaint that the respondent texted him in contravention of the protection order naming him as the aggrieved. However, after investigations the police determined both these complaints were unfounded. The appellant then allegedly threatened to kill their children, the respondent, her new partner and his children. The appellant than made a further complaint that the respondent’s new partner had unregistered firearms. After searching his home, the police did not find any of the alleged firearms. Several months later the appellant complained that the respondent kidnapped his 17-year-old daughter. This complaint was also unfounded. Finally, the appellant allegedly threatened the children that the respondent would be sent to gaol.
The magistrate was satisfied that a protection order was desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence. He accepted that the appellant’s conduct in making complaints to police caused the respondent to live in constant fear of the appellant. In particular, she feared that the appellant would act on his threats to kill her and her family. The magistrate considered that this amounted to domestic violence for the purposes of s 8 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act).
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether magistrate erred in finding the appellant’s conduct in making complaints to the police was ‘domestic violence’ within the meaning of the Act.
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to exercise his discretion reasonably by not finding that the prosecution case was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process.
3.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to exercise his discretion reasonably by making the protection order.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed and the protection order was affirmed.
As a preliminary issue, Morzone QC DCJ denied the appellant’s request for a de novo rehearing as of right ([12]-[23]). Further, His Honour rejected the submission that the evidentiary standard of proof under the Act is higher than on the balance of probabilities ([24]-[27]- discussing Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34).
1.
The magistrate did not err in finding the conduct amounted to domestic violence under the Act. The appellant’s complaints to police were ‘over-reaching, baseless or made for a collateral purpose’ ([44]). They were not made for the purpose of protecting the children as submitted by the appellant, but rather to harass the respondent. This, together with the appellant’s threats to the children, impacted the respondent and caused her to live in substantial fear for her own safety and the safety of her children, her partner and his children. The complaints to police were harassing and intimating to amount to emotional and psychological abuse. They were also threatening and controlling or dominating to cause fear to the respondent’s safety. Therefore, the behaviour fell within the definition of domestic violence under ss 8(1)(b),(d) and (f) of the Act.
In finding that the complaints amounted to domestic violence, the magistrate accepted the uncontested facts and rejected the appellant’s evidence where it conflicted with other witnesses. There were no identifiable incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony to demonstrate the magistrate erred in making these conclusions about the evidence.
2.
The proceeding in making the protection order was not frivolous or vexatious: ‘It could not be characterised as being of little or no weight, worth or importance, and thereby frivolous. It is not usual for proceedings of this nature to trouble, annoy, or distress one of both parties. That may be natural consequence of the proper conduct of proceedings in the context of highly emotional family breakdown and litigation. There is no evidence of vexatious conduct in this case’ ([7]). Nor was the proceeding an abuse of process. The proceeding was commenced and maintained by the prosecution for the ‘substantial and legitimate purpose of obtaining the appropriate remedy under the Act’ ([10]).
3.
The magistrate did not err in concluding that a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence under s 37(1)(c) of the Act. The respondent was fearful of future domestic violence from the appellant. Therefore, the order was desirable. In coming to this conclusion, the magistrate considered and assessed that there was a risk of future domestic violence if an order was not made. The appellant and respondent remained in a dispute before the Family Court, were in contact frequently in relation to their children, and the appellant showed no remorse for his conduct. There was no requirement that the magistrate was satisfied that future domestic violence was ‘likely’. The magistrate also assessed that the appellant’s behaviour in the ongoing parental relationship was inappropriate and that he was misconceived about his ‘responsibility, entitlement and nobility, which manifested in an absence of insight into the consequences of his actions’ ([16]). These findings were open on the facts. Therefore, the magistrate exercised his discretion properly and reasonably in making the protection order against the appellant.
BJH v CJH [2016] QDC 27 (26 February 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Meaning of domestic violence s 8’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Whether it was necessary or desirable to make an order to protect the aggrieved’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a Protection Order.
Facts: The appellant appealed against a magistrate’s decision to make a Protection Order requiring him to be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved (his partner) and her son. The order was made after a disagreement over the family meal. The appellant took the aggrieved’s mobile phone in an attempt to get her to go downstairs to discuss matters with him. The aggrieved tried to get the phone back and the appellant discarded it onto the floor, causing minor but irreparable damage to its cover. At some point, the back of the appellant’s hand came into contact with the aggrieved’s ear, causing relatively low level pain and no injury to the aggrieved. The appellant and the aggrieved continued arguing loudly until the police arrived (see [9]).
The magistrate made the following findings of domestic violence (see [10]):
•
The appellant took the aggrieved’s phone in an attempt to force her downstairs. He threw the phone to the ground in response to the aggrieved’s attempts to retrieve the phone.
•
The appellant slapped the aggrieved in a backhanded motion to the head on purpose.
•
There was constant harassment by the appellant towards the aggrieved that night that was intimidating (causing her to retreat from him). This intimidation and harassment amounted to an act of domestic violence when considered with the yelling and the banging of plates (emotional and psychological abuse).
Issue/s: Whether the magistrate erred in making a protection order under s 37 [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)], specifically:
1.
Whether the magistrate erred in finding that domestic violence had been committed against the aggrieved: s 37(1)(b).
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in finding that it was necessary or desirable to make the order to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence: s 37(1)(c).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Rackemann DCJ held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that there was at least some domestic violence committed by the appellant against the aggrieved. His Honour agreed that the following behaviour amounted to domestic violence under s 8 [of Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)]:
‘The action of the appellant in seizing the aggrieved’s mobile telephone was behaviour which, in the circumstances, was coercive - being designed to compel the aggrieved to do something which she did not wish to do (ie come downstairs to discuss matters of concern to the appellant). Further, the appellant responded to the aggrieved’s attempt to get her telephone back by, amongst other things, throwing the phone onto the floor thereby damaging it. That the phone was discarded in a throwing motion had support in the evidence’ at [11].
However, beyond that, the magistrate erred in her findings of domestic violence. In light of the evidence (see consideration at [14]-[29]), the magistrate’s finding of an ‘intentional back-handed slap’ could not be supported. Further, the magistrate erred in characterising the appellant’s behaviour as emotionally or psychologically abusive – behaviour that, amongst other things, intimidates (a process where the person is made fearful or overawed, particularly with a view to influencing that person’s conduct or behaviour) or harasses (there must be an element of persistence): GKE v EUT. A consideration of the evidence could not support this conclusion (see [30]-[46]).
The finding of more extensive domestic violence on the night in question than what occurred further affected the magistrate’s consideration of whether an order was necessary or desirable. In reconsidering whether an order was necessary or desirable, Rackemann DCJ again noted the decision in GKE v EUT where McGill SC DCJ observed in relation to s 37(1)(c) [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] that:
‘I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made, and then consider whether in view of that the making of an order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved … I also agree that there must be a proper evidentiary basis for concluding that there is such a risk, and the matter does not depend simply upon the mere possibility of such a thing occurring in the future, or the mere fact that the applicant for the order is concerned that such a thing may happen in the future’ (see [32]-[33]).
Here, the risk was not such to conclude that the making of a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ on the facts as established at the time of the hearing before the magistrate in February 2015. This was in circumstances where: there was no demonstrated history of domestic violence prior to the night in question; the event was a single incident involving domestic violence which, whilst in no way acceptable, was not at the most serious end of the scale of such conduct; the aggrieved gave evidence that she was not fearful of the appellant and did not believe that she needed protection from him; and, at the time of the hearing before the magistrate, the appellant and the aggrieved had continued their relationship without suggestion of further incident (see [49]-[50]).
Commissioner of Police v DGM [2016] QDC 022 (15/3279) Kingham DCJ 22 February 2016 – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of temporary protection order’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Victim’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm, breach of temporary protection order (TPO) (4 counts), breach of bail (7 counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Two weeks before the offending, a TPO was served on the respondent (an Aboriginal man) which named the complainant (his partner), their young son and their unborn child as protected persons. The order prohibited him from being in the vicinity of the complainant apart from authorised contact with their child with the complainant’s consent and required that he be of good behaviour towards the protected persons. The offending occurred when the respondent went to the complainant’s house to visit his son without authorisation. He approached the complainant with a metal pole and verbally abused her. He dropped the pole and walked towards the complainant with a clenched fist. He then punched, struck and kicked her which caused her to fall to the ground. She was taken to hospital and released that night. After fleeing, the respondent returned later that night, came into her yard and asked to talk to her. Police found him sitting in a car with a machete at his feet. His criminal history included property, street and driving offences, as well as a history of breaching community based orders. He had a serious drug addiction. He pleaded guilty early and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm. Concurrent lesser terms for the other offences were imposed. The offending also wholly activated an existing suspended sentence. He was released on parole immediately.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Her Honour held that the Magistrate erred in taking considering the respondent’s eventual surrender to police as a mitigating factor. While the surrender was voluntary, it had to be considered in the context of numerous bail breaches leading up to sentence, which was consistent with his history of disregard for court orders. In relation to the complainant’s apparent wish to continue the relationship with the respondent, her Honour noted at [34]-[35] that – ‘Courts in Queensland and in other states of Australia, have recognised the need to approach submissions about reconciliation with real caution, because of the particular features of domestic and family violence. The fact that a victim is a reluctant complainant is not a mitigating factor. Likewise, reconciliation after the victim has complained ought not mitigate the sentence. There may be cases in which reconciliation is relevant to an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. However, that comes from the offender’s conduct, not the victim’s forgiveness. The nature of the relationship means victims may, contrary to their own welfare, forgive their attacker. That does not reduce the risk posed by the offender and, depending on the dynamics in a particular relationship, it could well exacerbate the risk. Necessarily, prospects of rehabilitation must be assessed by reference to the offender’s attitude and conduct, not the victim’s.’
In this case, the Magistrate correctly did not treat the complainant’s support as a mitigating factor. However, the Magistrate did err by immediately releasing the respondent to encourage his rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is an important consideration for young indigenous people with drug addictions. However, given the seriousness of the offence and the vulnerability of the victim, the need for denunciation and deterrence outweighed the need for rehabilitation. In citing comparable authorities, (see from [45]-[62]), her Honour then concluded that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was re-sentenced for assault occasioning bodily harm to 18 months’ imprisonment, with parole release set at the one third mark in the sentence. A conviction for a domestic violence offence was recorded.
Green v Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 341 (27 November 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Prior history of contravention of domestic violence orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Too much emphasis on prior criminal history’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was 24. He had a criminal history, including nine previous convictions for contravention of domestic violence orders. The appellant was hospitalised when his female partner, the aggrieved, stabbed him in the leg and foot with a knife during an argument. A temporary protection order was made prohibiting the appellant from contacting the aggrieved. The stabbing incident was not the subject of any charge. Over the next two days, the appellant contacted the aggrieved on her mobile phone 60 times. These calls did not involve any threats or actual violence. The appellant was on parole for a sentence imposed at an earlier time. The appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment, which was to be served cumulatively upon the 15 month prior sentence.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in two significant respects which resulted in an excessive sentence:
1.
The magistrate placed too much emphasis on the appellant’s criminal history for like offending and imposed a sentence which was disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence; and
2.
In imposing a cumulative term, the magistrate failed to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the total sentence imposed was just and appropriate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, Morzone QC DCJ noted that the surrounding circumstances, the appellant’s criminal history and the stabbing incident, were properly provided by the prosecution by way of context for the subject offending. However, His Honour continued at [17]:
‘[t]he danger was that that context could potentially take on an overwhelming character with the prospect of elevating the nature of the offending the subject of the sentence. It seems to me that that danger was realised and can be demonstrated by the sentencing remarks of the magistrate where she conflated the past criminal history, other intervening behaviour and the subject offending’.
Here, the criminal history and the conduct that constituted it were not as proximate to the subject offending as apprehended by the magistrate. Evidence of the stabbing was accepted in the context that the police did not press charges against the aggrieved but the magistrate determined that the aggrieved was acting in self-defence. Further, there was little or no regard given to any particular findings of fact surrounding the subject offending, namely, the 60 occasions of telephone contact. Rather, this was relegated to almost incident behaviour. Thus, Morzone QC DCJ held that ‘[b]y conflating the historical criminal behaviour and other violent behaviour with the subject offending, it seems to me that Her Honour mistook the facts and allowed erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect her exercise of discretion’ (see [18]-[21]).
Second, Morzone QC DCJ held that at [30]:
‘the magistrate acted on a wrong principle by characterising the pre-existing sentence to a “different issue altogether” because the appellant breached his parole by reoffending. She apparently had no regard to the “period of imprisonment” required by section 160F of the [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)]… and the extension of the totality principle … It seems to me that her approach caused her to fall into error by failing to take into account material considerations of the whole period of imprisonment (including the balance of the previous sentence), reviewing the aggregate sentences and considering whether the latter was just and appropriate’.
The appellant was re-sentenced to three months imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the existing sentence.
TZL v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 171 (3 July 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Minor breach’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted for contravening a domestic violence order and sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. The order prohibited the appellant from contacting the aggrieved apart from matters in relation to their child. He breached this condition by 41 sending emails over an 11 week period, the content of some of which were not solely in relation to their child. He was released on parole on the day of sentence. The appellant had an ‘appalling’ (see at [21]) history of breaching protection orders – consisting of 10 total convictions of which 8 related to the aggrieved. In fact, he was on probation for these offences when this offence was committed.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Kingham DCJ acknowledged at [17] that this was an ‘unusual’ sentence. There was no physical violence, actual or threatened. There was no intimidation or any harassing or controlling behaviour. While there were 41 emails, they were sent over an 11 week period and not all of them breached the order as some were related solely to the child. There was also one very minor personal contact at a child care centre. Kingham DCJ found these facts in combination do not warrant a sentence of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, the appellant’s clear ‘disdain’ ([21]) for protection orders as evidenced by his criminal history warranted a strong element of personal deterrence in the sentence. However, her Honour emphasised that the purpose of the sentence was not to punish the appellant again for prior offending, and that the Magistrate, ‘gave the Appellant’s prior history such weight that it led to the imposition of a penalty which was disproportionate to the gravity of this offending’ (See at [22]). As such, the Court concluded (while also taking into account comparable authorities) that the sentence was excessive. It was reduced to 6 months. The immediate parole release was not changed.
MDE v MLG & Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 151 (2 June 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Necessary or desirable test’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Three stage approach’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: On 17 October 2014, a police officer made an application for a protection order against the appellant (MDE) for the benefit of the first respondent (MLG) under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). MDE had been continually harassing MLG over the phone and outside her apartment (see [1]-[6]). On 23 October 2013, a temporary protection order was issued with the standard condition (under s56 DFVPA) that “the respondent be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against the aggrieved.” Three months later, on 21 January 2015, the Magistrate heard the application and decided to issue a protection order against MDE having been satisfied the requirements under s 37 of DFVPA could be established. The order incorporated the standard condition under s 56 and other conditions under s 57 of the DFVPA ([13]).
Issues: The appellant appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on six grounds, of which the first three questioned the correctness of the Magistrate’s application of s 37 of the DFVPA and the last three concerned procedural and fact-finding errors on the Magistrate’s part (see [18]). Relevantly, the first ground of appeal was that the Magistrate failed to follow, as required, the decision in GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 at [33] which provides that a future ‘risk’ of violence must be considered and, if absent, a protection order should not be issued (see [64]).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the protection order was therefore set aside.
The second and third grounds of the appeal (see [69] and [56] respectively), along with the fourth, fifth and sixth grounds (see [73]-[79]), were rejected by Morzone QC DCJ (see [72] and [63] respectively). The first, however, was allowed.
Morzone QC DCJ found that the Magistrate relied on erroneous or irrelevant matters and principles in their determination of whether the order was “necessary or desirable” ([68]). Specifically, his Honour highlighted at para [65]-[66] that the Magistrate’s reasons confused the requirements set by s 37(1)(a) and s 37(1)(c). His Honour further noted that the Magistrate failed to expressly examine the material considerations relevant to s 37(1)(c) and (2) ([67]). These included the nature and risk of future domestic violence, the protective needs of the aggrieved (if any), and, if a need was found, how imposing a protection order would be “necessary or desirable” to meet those needs ([67]).
The Magistrate’s decision was therefore considered unreasonable by Morzone QC DCJ. This prompted his Honour to re-examine the third element posed by s 37(1)(c), that is, whether a protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence ([84]).
Importantly, earlier in his judgement, Morzone QC DCJ expressed the view that the third element of s 37(1) requires a three-stage process supported by a proper evidentiary basis (adduced pursuant to s 145 of the DFVPA) (see [55]). In short, the three steps involve (1) assessing the risk of future domestic violence between the parties in the absence of any order, (2) the need to protect the aggrieved from that domestic violence in the absence of any order, and (3) whether imposing an order is “necessary or desirable” to protect the aggrieved from the domestic violence (see [55]).
Upon analysis of the evidence in para [85]-[89], Morzone QC DCJ reached the conclusion that the first and second stage cannot be established, meaning the imposition of a protection order was neither necessary nor desirable to protect MLG from the domestic violence and therefore, the protection order ought not remain in force.
SM v AA [2015] QDC 172 (29 May 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Ex parte application’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Appeal Type: Application for an extension of time in which to file an appeal against the variation of a domestic violence order.
Facts: The appellant (the respondent in a domestic violence order) failed to appear at the Magistrates’ Court for an application to extend the order. The Magistrate noted appellant’s absence. The Court proceeded to ‘hear and decide the application’ pursuant to section 94 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld).
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate correctly heard and decided the matter.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Judge Reid considered the remarks of the Magistrate. The remarks did not consider the reasons put before the Court by the applicant as to why the domestic violence order should be extended. These reasons included allegations of physical and verbal abuse and multiple breaches of the order. Instead, the Magistrate simply made the order and considered whether the order should be extended for 18 months or for two years. Judge Reid was concerned that the Magistrate dealt with the matter, ‘merely as a rubber stamp exercise’. There was nothing in the Magistrate’s remarks to indicate that she had read the material to ascertain whether or not the breaches of the order actually occurred. There was little or no particularity in the allegations, specifically about when or where the breaches occurred. In circumstances where parties do not attend, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to ‘hear and decide’ the matter, even if it is entirely upon affidavit evidence. The transcript did not indicate that the Magistrate considered the question at all. As such, the order was set aside.
LKL v BSL [2015] QDC 337 (15 May 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Affidavit evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Appeal Type: Appeal from dismissal of application for protection order.
Facts: The appellant appeared unrepresented in the Magistrates’ Court and filed for a protection order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld). She was initially granted a temporary protection order in the Magistrates’ Court. The Magistrate then made directions to the effect that the evidence of all witnesses in support of the application was to be filed as affidavit evidence. No such affidavit evidence was provided. The appellant believed that the application itself, without further affidavit evidence was sufficient. The application for the protection order was then refused, with the Magistrate concluding that there was no material before the Court (see further at [7]-[9]).
Issue/s: Whether the aggrieved in a protection order application can rely solely on the application without further affidavit evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld) makes clear that the formal rules of evidence do not apply and gives the Court broad powers to ‘inform itself in any way it considers appropriate’ (see s 145). However, the court obviously still has an obligation of procedural fairness. Dick SC DCJ explained that in hearing and determining an application for a protection order, ‘there still must be evidence in the sense of there being some material put before the Court which provides a rational basis for the determination and it must be put before the Court in a way which gives the opposite party the opportunity to challenge that evidence and put the opposite party’s case in relation to the matter’ (See at [11]). The Magistrate’s directions did not exclude the appellant’s sworn application as evidence. Therefore, the Magistrate’s conclusion that there was no material before the Court was an error of law. The Magistrate did not consider and determine the application. As such, it is clear that an aggrieved person can rely solely on the application as evidence without the need for further affidavit evidence. The respondent can then respond to the application if they choose. The application was remitted back to the Magistrates’ Court for determination by a different magistrate.
GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 (27 August 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the making of a domestic violence order.
Facts: A domestic violence order was made in the Magistrates’ Court against the appellant in favour of the respondent. There had already been orders made in the Family Court in relation to arrangements for their three children. The appellant filed for enforcement of these orders in the Family Court. He attended the respondent’s home for the purpose of serving court documents. When the respondent opened the door, she closed it immediately because she felt frightened. This incident and other prior incidents led to the application for the order.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the appellant’s commencement of proceedings in the Family Court and the personal service of documents on the respondent constituted intimidation or harassment sufficient to meet the definition of emotional or psychological abuse and therefore domestic violence within the meaning of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act).
2.
Whether a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
3.
Whether costs should be awarded against the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
McGill DCJ upheld the Magistrate’s finding that the incident at the respondent’s home constituted domestic violence. His Honour considered the definition of ‘emotional and psychological abuse’ in s 11 of the Act. He noted that the issue is whether the behaviour is subjectively intimidating or harassing to the other person. Therefore, evidence of the subjective response of the aggrieved is relevant (see at [21]). His Honour noted at [22] that while examples in the Act refer to persistent conduct, intimidation within the meaning of s 11 could arise from a single incident. However, harassment cannot arise from a single incident. His Honour stated that there has to be ‘some element of persistence’ such that, ‘It is not just a question of whether the aggrieved finds something upsetting’ (see at [23]). As such, while the incident at the house amounted to domestic violence, the Family Court application itself was not an example of domestic violence –
‘I suspect it would be possible for the making of repeated applications to the Family Court without justification to amount to “harassment”, though it would have to be a clear case; it would certainly not be harassment simply because from time to time the respondent denied the appellant access to the children and he made an application to the Family Court to obtain it’ (see at [20]). The mere fact the appellant takes steps to enforce Family Court orders does not and cannot constitute domestic violence. Conversely, the respondent unjustifiably withholding the children cannot justify domestic violence by the appellant.
2.
McGill DCJ noted that this question is concerned with the future. Another relevant consideration was that while the respondent did not want to see the appellant at all, the terms of the Family Court order and the presence of the children dictated that there had to be some continuing contact between the parties.
See at [32] – ‘In my opinion the focus must be on the issue of protecting the aggrieved from future domestic violence, the extent to which on the evidence there is a prospect of such a thing in the future, and of what nature, and whether it can properly be said in the light of that evidence that is necessary or desirable to make an order in order to protect the aggrieved from that…I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made….’
The evidentiary basis for this risk must amount to more than the mere possibility of such conduct occurring (See at [33]). It is also relevant to consider the seriousness of the violence that is threatened, the credibility of the threat and the practical consequences of the order on the person against whom the order is made. For example, a no contact order ought not be made where some contact is necessary in relation to children (see at [42]-[43]). In applying these principles, his Honour found that it was not necessary or desirable to make an order. His Honour noted that while it was possible that circumstances could arise which amount to intimidation, the issues relating to the children remain in the Family Court. It would not be appropriate to make a protection order to interfere with the appellant’s right to enforce his rights in that jurisdiction. There was no real risk of domestic violence as long as the respondent complied with the Family Court orders (see at [67]).
3.
Costs were not ordered in favour of the appellant. Section 157 of the Act provides that each party must bear their own costs unless the court decides that their application was malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious. It is not clear whether this section applies to an appeal. However, his Honour concluded that while the general power to award costs under s 15 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 has not been expressly excluded by the Act, that power should be exercised having regard to the specific costs provision in s 157. Therefore, it is not simply a matter that costs follow the event for this type of proceeding. In any case, an adverse costs order against the respondent was not appropriate.
TND v Queensland Police Service [2014] QDC 154 (18 July 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, assault of a police officer.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the aggrieved were drinking, then returned home (in the Normanton district). Following a dispute, the appellant became agitated and punched the aggrieved, causing a minor injury. After police were called, officers were forced to use capsicum spray to subdue the appellant. He continued to threaten violence after his arrest. He had a long criminal history including many property and drug offences. He had one prior conviction for breaching a domestic violence order, for which he was fined $100. He submitted this matter was not one of ‘significant gravity’ (See at [9]). The appellant submitted in the Magistrates’ Court that the relationship was not one characterised by violence. Following pleading guilty, he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with immediate parole release for the breach offence. He was sentenced to one month imprisonment wholly suspended for an operational period of nine months for the assault offence. In his sentencing remarks, the Magistrate referred to crime statistics and noted the prevalence of breaches of domestic violence orders and offences against police in the Normanton district, which necessitated a strong element of general deterrence in sentencing.
Issue: Whether the sentence for the breach offence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court acknowledged that the Magistrate did err by not properly indicating how he took into account of the plea of guilty, and by using the statistics, which were found to not be reliable. Mitigating factors included the appellant’s youth and his early plea of guilty. The relationship was long-term and was not characterised by actual violence. His criminal history, while relevant, was minor. However, at [35] Bradley DCJ emphasised that domestic violence involving psychical violence is a serious issue and the appellant did cause some injury to the aggrieved. He had been recently convicted of breaching a protection order and general and specific deterrence were important. He was subject to various court orders when he committed the offence. The maximum penalty was three years. As such, the sentence was held to be appropriate.
R v MKW [2014] QDC 300 (18 June 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent criminal proceeding’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Permanent stay of proceedings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Proceeding: Application for a permanent stay of proceedings.
Facts: An indictment before the District Court charged the applicant with grievous bodily harm. The incident involved the applicant drinking alcohol in a group which included the complainant (his de facto partner). An argument ensued. The applicant struck the complainant with a collapsible chair. He was charged with breaching a domestic violence order, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole release after four months. The police then obtained a medical report indicating that the complainant’s injuries, if left untreated were likely to have caused ‘disfigurement or loss of vision’ and could have proved life threatening (see at [3]). As a result, he was then charged with grievous bodily harm (GBH) three days after being released from custody.
Issue/s: Whether the continued prosecution of the GBH charge would constitute an abuse of process under s 16 of the Queensland Criminal Code because the applicant had already been punished for the same act.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed. O’Brien DCJA considered the test as applied in R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014). His Honour concluded at [9] that the applicant was punished in the Magistrates’ Court for the act of striking the complainant with the chair and that it was this same act which formed the basis of the GBH charge. Ordinarily, to punish the defendant again for that same act would contravene s 16 of the Code. However, the Crown submitted that s 138 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act) operates to authorise the continued prosecution of the GBH charge. The Court accepted this argument. The crucial issue was whether the original prosecution for the breach offence against the Act constituted a ‘proceeding’ under that act. If it did, s 138(3)(a) would apply so that the prosecution for the breach offence would not affect any other proceeding against the applicant arising out of the same conduct. His Honour concluded that the prosecution for the breach offence was a proceeding under the Act (see at [15]). As such, R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (where a permanent stay was granted) was distinguished on the basis that the Act specifically authorises continuation of the prosecution. However, this issue has not been authoritatively resolved and uncertainty remains. See at [17] where his Honour states –
‘I should add that, if my tentative view of s 138(4) of the legislation is correct and if the applicant were to be convicted of the indictable offence, then the question remains as to whether s 16 of the Code prohibits him being further punished for that offence. At the very least, I would consider that ordinary and well-established sentencing principles would require that regard be had to the penalty imposed in the Magistrates Court for the breaching offence.’
See pages 111-113 of the Queensland Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (2012) Bench Book and the summary of R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014) for further information.
CPS v CNJ [2014] QDC 47 (21 March 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Establish relationship with victim's former partner’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Meaning of domestic violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection order necessary or desirable’ – ‘S 8(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Appeal against the making of a protection order.
Ground: The magistrate erred in making a protection order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (‘DFVPA’).
Facts: The appellant male and respondent female had been in a relationship from May until late September or early October 2021. The magistrate hearing the original application found that both parties lived as though in ‘a soap opera’, behaving in puerile, immature and childish ways. The conduct of the appellant was identified as ‘repeated early contact amounting to harassment’. Further, complaints about property amounted to harassment. After the relationship between the respondent and appellant came to an end, the appellant sought out the respondent’s ex-partner and struck up a relationship with him.
Decision and Reasoning: The continuous contact with the respondent following the end of the relationship, as well as the contact with the respondent’s ex-partner, were found to be capable of constituting domestic violence. The appellant’s conduct was capable of falling into one or more of the categories enumerated in s 8(1) of the DFVPA, namely, behaviour that is “emotionally or psychologically abusive” and/or “is threatening” and/or “coercive” or “in any other way controls or dominates the second person and causes the second person to fear for the second person’s safety or wellbeing of that of someone else”.
However, the court was not persuaded, on balance, that the actions of the appellant in seeking out and striking up a relationship with the respondent’s ex-partner was sufficient to persuade the magistrate that a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence’ in future. Therefore, it was found that the domestic violence order should not have been made.
W v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 87 (2 May 2013) – Queensland District Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of dangerous drug’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, breach of domestic violence order, possession of dangerous drug.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following an argument with the complainant, the appellant followed her, grabbed her by the harms and threatened her. She broke free, but was punched by the appellant in the right side of the jaw, causing her to bleed profusely. He was highly intoxicated. That constituted the assault offence. He was found to be in possession of cannabis at the time. The breach involved the same complainant. That offence occurred when she was heavily pregnant. The appellant demanded she have sex with him and she refused. He threw her phone at her and punched a door. He was intoxicated. He had a criminal history consisting of various street offences, one conviction for assault occasioning bodily harm and one conviction for breaching a domestic violence order. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for the breach charge and nine months’ imprisonment for the assault charge, and fined $400 for the drug charge.
Issue/s: Whether the penalty was too severe. More specifically, there were issues concerning –
1.
Whether the Magistrate misapplied Earl v Heron [2011] QDC 183.
2.
Whether the Magistrate gave excessive weight to the appellant’s criminal history and the need for specific deterrence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
In relation to Earl v Heron, the appellant submitted inter alia that - in that case the offender committed a random act of violence on a stranger. This case concerned violence during a heated domestic argument between long term spouses, which makes this cases less serious. This argument was dismissed – with Smith DCJ concluding at [44] – ‘I do not accept the submission that an act of violence during a heated domestic argument between spouses is necessarily less serious than a random act of gratuitous violence on a stranger. It all depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.’ His Honour went on to make clear that the courts cannot condone either type of violence.
2.
In relation to the appellant’s criminal history, the Court concluded that the Magistrate was entitled to take into account the relevant prior convictions, and was also entitled to consider the injuries caused (a broken jaw), which were ‘reasonably significant’ (See at [50]). This made it an offence not at the low end of the scale.
MAA v SAG [2013] QDC 31 (28 February 2013) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing, and monitoring’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Use of authorities’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant and the aggrieved were in a domestic relationship from 2007 to 2009 [6]. The appellant sent the aggrieved abusive and derogatory text messages and disturbed the aggrieved’s place of residence, which prompted her to change the locks. The aggrieved accused him of shoving and pushing her when she was pregnant with one of their children in 2008.
The appellant made numerous baseless complaints to a range of governmental bodies to intimidate the aggrieved, including:
1.
the Queensland Ombudsman.
2.
the Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland.
3.
the Registry of Births, Deaths, and Marriages, regarding the registering of their daughter’s name, with the result that this was not registered until the Family Court made an order in relation to her name.
4.
Centrelink, which lead to an investigation of the aggrieved’s parenting payments.
5.
the Commission for Children and Young People.
6.
the Child Guardian.
7.
Queensland Health.
8.
The Health Quality and Complaints Commission.
9.
The Medical Board, against the children’s medical practitioner.
10.
Legal Services Commission, against her legal representatives.
11.
The Family Court where a notice of Child Abuse and subsequent investigation concerning the aggrieved’s three daughters.
12.
Complaints of abuse and her parenting that lead to a police investigation and welfare checks; and
13.
The initiation of two unwarranted and dismissed court proceedings by the appellant against the aggrieved
Grounds of Appeal: The Magistrate erred in finding that the appellant committed an act of domestic violence against the aggrieved and that the appellant is likely to commit an act of domestic violence again or is likely to carry out a threat to commit an act of domestic violence [24].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
It was open to the Magistrate to reject the appellant’s evidence that he committed the acts of complaining to numerous bodies for bona fide reasons [36]. The appellant’s numerous complaints to governmental bodies were unjustified and an abuse of process and were made to and had the effect of harassing and intimidating the aggrieved [38]. That the aggrieved’s children were subject to repeated investigation was further evidence of the harassment caused by the appellant.
The appellant's intimidation and harassment, on the evidence, amounted to acts of domestic violence and there was proper basis that the appellant would likely commit a further act of domestic violence. The aggrieved’s daughters also required protection.
Singh v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 37 (20 February 2013) – Queensland District Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of bail condition’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order (2 counts), breach of bail condition.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court to two counts of breaching a domestic violence order. The order prevented him from directly or indirectly contacting the aggrieved. The parties had been in a de facto relationship for five years. The first count involved the appellant standing over the aggrieved, pointing menacingly at her. He was taken into custody and released on bail with a no contact condition. In breach of this condition, he attended her home, yelled insults at her, broke property, head butted an informant and verbally abused her, all in the presence of their children and a witness. The Magistrate acknowledged that the presence of the three young children was a serious aggravating feature. The appellant had a relevant criminal history, including four previous domestic violence convictions committed against the aggrieved. The Prosecutor provided minimal assistance to the Magistrate as to the appropriate sentence. He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation for each count, to be served concurrently. He was convicted and not further punished for the breach of bail.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was initially dismissed. Robertson DCJ commented that it is ‘regrettable’ (see at [7] & [25]) that the prosecutor did not provide the Magistrate with any assistance as to the appropriate sentence. The Court held that these acts were a ‘nasty and prolonged’ (see at [29]) example of domestic violence against a vulnerable complainant, by an offender who had a long history of violence against the same woman. He had previously shown disregard for court orders, and in this case also showed complete disregard for the bail undertaking. The only mitigating factor was the early plea of guilty. While the sentences were ‘severe’, they were not so severe as to amount to an error by the Magistrate.
(The appeal was then re-opened and upheld due to a procedural issue with taking into account the appellant’s prior convictions following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Miers v Blewett [2013] QCA 23 (22 February 2013). The requisite notice was not given, so the appellant’s prior convictions could not be taken into account. However, the Legislature has now amended s 47 of the Justices Act 1886 to ensure that prior convictions can be taken into account in sentencing whether or not notice has been served.)
LCJ v KGC and Commissioner of Police [2012] QDC 67 (30 March 2012) – Queensland District Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a protection order.
Facts: The appellant applied for and was granted a protection order (under the then Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Qld)). The applicant (the respondent/aggrieved) tendered evidence to the Magistrate that the appellant was physically violent to her on two occasions by grabbing her around the neck. There was also evidence that the appellant threatened to kill her if she went to the police. There was a history of violence in the relationship, which had involved verbal and physical abuse and controlling behaviour since 1992.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied that the appellant committed domestic violence against the aggrieved.
2.
Whether it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied that the appellant was likely to commit further domestic violence against the aggrieved.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the protection order was discharged.
1.
In relation to whether the Magistrate’s conclusion that the appellant committed domestic violence against the applicant was correct, Irwin DCJ concluded that the Magistrate was entitled to prefer the evidence of the applicant’s witnesses over the unsigned statements of the appellant and his witnesses. The statements tendered by the applicant were signed. The appellant’s statements were not. It was also open to the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant had continually harassed and intimidated the applicant.
2.
However, Irwin DCJ concluded that it was not open on the evidence for the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant was likely to commit an act of domestic violence again, or carry out a threat to do so. After the application was made, the applicant stated that the appellant had left the house where they were living, had not returned and there had been minimal contact since a temporary protection order was made. There was no evidence of physical violence and she said she did not feel threatened by him. As such, there was not sufficient evidence to support an inference that domestic violence was likely to occur again. While there were a string of emails that did constitute harassment, the last of these were 12 months before the Magistrate made the protection order. The appellant had also clearly indicated he wished to have no further contact with the applicant.
Magistrates' Court
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
ABC v Assistant Commissioner Maurice Carless [2023] QCAT 85 (8 March 2023) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Discipline finding pursuant to s7.4 of the police service administration act 1990 (qld)’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Police officer offender’ – ‘Protection order’
Proceedings: Police officer’s application for review of the respondent’s decision on a disciplinary finding pursuant to s7.4 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) and proposed sanction made 14 September 2020.
Issue: Whether the findings of domestic violence were valid, and whether the domestic violence constituted misconduct.
Facts: The first allegation was of acts of domestic violence committed against the applicant’s wife following their separation after the discovery of her affair. The applicant was alleged to have read her texts, private emails and Skype account messages and had consented to the grant of a protection order to his wife.
The final four aspects of contravened conduct were unrelated to domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Domestic violence was made out, and held to be unacceptable conduct from a police officer in a private setting and therefore misconduct.
The Tribunal found that the applicant’s consent to the protection order was not evidence of acts of domestic violence, as no admissions were made in the order and its terms had no suggestion of acts of domestic violence. On the evidence, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant accessed his partner’s texts and emails without her permission but was unable to make the same finding relating to her Skype account.
The Tribunal found that a physical altercation had occurred on one occasion over the phone and that this demonstrated that the applicant’s ex-partner was at least offended by the applicant accessing her private emails and texts. Domestic violence was therefore made out under s 8 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (includes conduct that is ‘offensive’).
In assessing whether the domestic violence constituted misconduct, the Tribunal considered whether the conduct that met that which the community could reasonably expect of a police officer. The significance of the deeply personal and distressing context of the applicant’s behaviour was noted, the Tribunal stating it made his relatively low-level behaviour explicable to the community. However, it was nonetheless found to be unacceptable conduct from a police officer in a private setting. The Tribunal confirmed the finding made at the disciplinary hearing in relation to the domestic violence matter.
NK v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 270 (30 July 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Working with children negative notice’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to issue the applicant a negative notice.
Facts: The applicant’s ex-partner had been granted a ‘Protection Order for ongoing physical violence and controlling behaviour’ [13]. Within five months, the applicant was convicted of contravening the Order by being with his ex-partner and her two children, one of whom was the applicant’s son [1]. As a result, the applicant was issued with a ‘negative notice’ to work with children preventing the issue of a positive notice blue card. The applicant applied for administrative review of the Department’s decision. As the applicant had not been convicted of a ‘serious offence’, he was entitled to be issued with a positive notice unless his case was ‘exceptional’ [2]. A case is exceptional if it is not in the best interests of children to issue a positive notice.
Decision and reasoning: The Tribunal confirmed the department’s decision that the applicant’s case was exceptional.
The Tribunal assessed the risk in allowing the applicant to work with children, ‘by identifying and weighing protective factors with risk factors’ [3]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had taken steps to address his issues, as evidenced by his participation in a men’s behavioural change program [9]. However, the applicant was not ‘aware of the psychological and emotional impact of his behaviour on others’ nor able to ‘exercise restraint and self-control… sufficient to work with children’ [28]. The Tribunal noted that applicant’s submissions focused on ‘minimising and not admitting responsibility’ for his actions while failing to demonstrate his ability to identify the triggers for his behaviour or use appropriate coping strategies [10]. Therefore, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had reduced ‘the risk of his susceptibility to [the offending behaviour] in stressful situations’ [20]. The Tribunal noted that the applicant faced recent and serious allegations of ongoing physical violence and controlling behaviour, which included threatening to kill his partner, and subjecting her to physical and verbal abuse in front of children. This behaviour had continued despite the Order, which he had breached within 5 months of its commencement [13]. Therefore, the applicant’s ‘limited insight into the seriousness of his behaviour and its impact on others, together with evidence of ongoing coercive control’ were risk factors that outweighed protective factors and made the applicant an unsuitable candidate for working with children [26].
Applicant SIL v Scheme Manager, Victim Assist Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 237 (13 July 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for financial assistance’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘False police reports’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prior acts of domestic violence’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Visa threats’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to deny an application for financial assistance.
Facts: The male perpetrator and female victim were married and living together with their infant daughter. The perpetrator was sponsoring the victim, a Taiwanese citizen, for a permanent visa. The victim reported being subjected to ‘ongoing incidents of strangulation, financial, emotional, verbal and social abuse’, and ‘control and coercion’, involving threats of deportation and child removal [21]. In December 2017, the victim reported to police that her husband had attacked her with a knife. However, due to the victim speaking ‘very limited English’ police interviewed the perpetrator only, who stated that he had been attacked by the victim [33]. In February 2019, the victim’s application for financial assistance under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the Act’) was refused [5].
Decision and Reasoning: The original decision was set aside and returned for reconsideration with a direction that the victim was eligible for financial assistance.
Under the Act, a person who is directly injured by an act of violence is eligible for financial assistance [9]. The Tribunal reviewed the evidence of the December 2017 incident and found that it had directly resulted in an injury to the victim [39]. The Tribunal’s finding was based on evidence that the victim had been admitted to hospital with lacerations to her hand, while her husband had not required medical attention [37]. The Tribunal acknowledged that there were ‘discrepancies’ in the account provided by the victim to hospital staff but found that this was due to the language barrier and the victim’s physical state, which included dizziness [31]. The Tribunal accepted the victim’s version of events and noted that she had been ‘denied a voice’ by Queensland Police [33]. In addition, the Tribunal noted that the perpetrator’s position as the victim’s sponsor gave him ‘considerable power’ over the victim, as she was required to be in a relationship with him for 2 years to be eligible for a permanent visa [36].
SF v Department of Education [2021] QCAT 10 (13 January 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Applicant and children in hiding to escape domestic violence’ – ‘Application for home education registration’ – ‘Confidentiality provisions’ – ‘Following, harassing monitoring’ – ‘Human rights’ – ‘Non-disclosure of registered address’ – ‘Ongoing risk of harm’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Separation’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to deny an application for home education registration.
Facts: The applicant and her children had moved in an attempt to escape domestic violence and were forced to hide their location to keep the family safe. The applicant’s former partner had used numerous unlikely resources to locate her. One of the applicant’s children had been diagnosed with conditions affecting their ability to learn, and the applicant applied to the Department of Education to home school the child. Although her application met the requirements for home education, the Department did not grant the application as the applicant did not provide her street number, street name and town name. Where the approved form required details of “residential address” and “address where the home education will be delivered”, the applicant inserted “address suppressed (due to privacy, see attached)” with a town name, a postal address and mobile phone number.
Decision and reasoning: The decision of the Department of Education was set aside and substituted with a decision to grant home education registration for the student.
The Tribunal found that none of the provisions of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), read together or in isolation, imposed an express obligation on the applicant to disclose her street number, street name and town name (at [9]-[16]). In addition, while the approved form – which was required for the application – asked the applicant to provide details of her “residential address” and “address where the home education will be delivered”, the Tribunal found that the requirements of this will vary according to the individual circumstances of the case, within the context of the overarching objects and guiding principles. Here, the form could not operate “to require SF to disclose these details in circumstances where it compromises her and her family’s safety contrary to those objects and guiding principles” (at [17]-[26]).
The Department made a number of submissions, including that the confidentiality provisions of the Act and its own internal policies were sufficient to ameliorate the risk of unauthorised disclosure. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that these were sufficient to ameliorate the risk, based on the applicant’s evidence and submissions regarding the circumstances of her and her children (at [29]). As at [30]-[31]:
“The risk for SF is that the confidentiality provisions and policies repose a discretion in departmental officers about the use and disclosure of information, require interpretation by departmental officers and leave it open for a person to apply to the department to access the information under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). Moreover, adding another layer of people with access to SF’s information increases the opportunity for human error or failure, with potentially tragic and irreversible consequences.
The more information SF is required to disclose and the more people who have access to that information, the greater the risk to her and her children…”
Moreover, while it was not strictly necessary to consider the substantial compliance provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) as the Tribunal found that the applicant had provided sufficient information to meet the procedural requirements of the application form, the Tribunal was satisfied of substantial compliance in any event (at [35]-[41]).
Finally, the Tribunal’s decision and interpretation of the statutory provisions was compatible with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). As at [46]-[47]:
“SF and her children have moved to escape domestic violence. They are still at risk of harm. The child she seeks to home school has a dual diagnosis of conditions affecting the child’s ability to learn, sufficient to constitute an impairment and therefore a protected attribute under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). SF has identified that her child learns best with one-on-one educational support and has tailored a detailed, goal-directed home education program suited to the child’s needs. An interpretation that would mandate SF to provide her street number, street name and town name before granting her application for home education in these circumstances, is not an interpretation that least infringes her and her family’s human rights.
Moreover, the Tribunal does not accept this interpretation limits human rights only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. The Tribunal accepts SF’s evidence of the serious risk to her and her family from an interpretation mandating her to disclose her street number, street name and town name. The Tribunal does not accept that the confidentiality provisions of the Act and the Department’s own internal policies are sufficient to uphold her children’s right to protection in their particular circumstances.”
An interpretation requiring the applicant to disclose her street number, street name and town name was not necessary to achieve the purposes of ensuring the child was properly registered and the applicant was able to be contacted in circumstances where she had provided a postal address, mobile number and details of her circumstances (at [48]).
South Australia
Court of Appeal
MT v SE SASCA 8 (7 February 2025) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘collateral abuse of process’ – ‘whether police or complainant initiated intervention order proceedings’ – ‘whether proceedings initiated for improper purpose’ – ‘systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against summary judgment in favour of the respondent
Charge: Malicious prosecution x1, collateral abuse of process x1
Facts: The appellant brought claims for the torts of malicious prosecution and collateral abuse of process against the respondent. The respondent had made a report to the South Australian Police (SAPOL) on the basis of which intervention order proceedings were brought against the respondent. The appellant alleged that the proceedings had prevented him from obtaining employment as a teacher and claimed damages for loss of income as well as aggravated and exemplary damages. The appellant’s claims were dismissed by the primary judge pursuant to an application for summary judgment made by the appellant. The primary judge took the view that SAPOL, not the respondent, had been the party that initiated the intervention order proceedings and that automatically defeated any claim of malicious prosecution or collateral abuse of process against the respondent [4], [6].
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on two grounds of appeal [7]:
1.
The primary judge erred in fact and law by concluding that there was no reasonable basis for contending that the respondent initiated the intervention order proceedings.
2.
The primary judge erred in fact and law by concluding that there was no reasonable basis for contending that the respondent had initiated the intervention order proceedings for an improper purpose.
In addition, the respondent filed a notice of contention alleging that the decision of the primary judge could be upheld on alternative grounds [8]:
1.
The appellant could not prove that the intervention order proceedings terminated favourably to him, and this is fatal to the malicious prosecution claim.
2.
The appellant could not prove he suffered special damage with respect to the collateral abuse of process claim, and this is fatal to that claim.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part: the summary judgment was set aside in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, but it was affirmed regarding the collateral abuse of process claim [11].
Regarding the first ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the application for the intervention order was made by SAPOL, it was necessary consider the substance and not merely the legal form of the proceedings [70]. The mere fact that the police brought the application did not exclude the respondent from being the effective prosecutor. It was necessary to consider whether SAPOL were exercising an independent discretion or were, in effect, agents for the respondent [70].
There was nothing to indicate that the police undertook any independent investigation into the respondent’s allegations of domestic violence [71]. The respondent’s objective in making her statement to SAPOL was to obtain an intervention order [72]. There was no independent exercise of discretion by SAPOL, and therefore there was a reasonable basis for advancing a claim that the respondent was the instigator of the proceedings [72]. The primary judge erred in finding that there was no reasonable basis. This ground of appeal succeeded [77].
In respect of the domestic violence evidence, the Court held that the trial judge’s description of the “only relevance” of the domestic violence evidence did not adequately “identify and explain” the use for which that evidence was not to be used [68] and so did not comply with s 34R(1) [69].
Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Court began by observing that to establish the tort of collateral abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish that the proceedings were instituted for an improper purpose (as the predominant purpose) [79]. To establish this, there needs to be evidence of a demand or threat made in furtherance of the improper purpose [80]. The appellant relied on Facebook messages sent by the respondent to him as evidence of the demand or threat [82]. The Court found that the Facebook messages were not connected with the intervention order proceedings, and therefore there was no reasonable basis for claiming that those proceedings involved a demand, threat or over coercion [83]. This ground of appeal failed [110].
In response to the respondent’s notice of contention, the Court found that the primary judge had been correct to find there was a reasonable basis to argue that the intervention order proceedings had been terminated in favour of the appellant [110]. It also agreed with the primary judge’s finding that, in respect of the collateral abuse of process claim, there was a reasonable basis to argue that the appellant had suffered special damage [110].
Adamson (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] SASCA 91 (1 August 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Discreditable conduct evidence’ – ‘permissible and impermissible uses’ – ‘adequacy of judicial directions’ – ‘delayed complaint’ – ‘domestic violence evidence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Charge: Maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child (x1).
Facts: The applicant was charged with, and convicted of, maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on two grounds of appeal, both of which challenged the trial judge’s directions in relation to evidence of discreditable conduct [46]:
1.
The trial judge failed to adequately identify and explain the impermissible use of the domestic violence evidence such that he did not comply with the obligation in s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
2.
The trial judge failed to adequately identify and explain the permissible use of sexual comments evidence such that he did not comply with the obligation in s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground of appeal relates to evidence about the applicant’s violence towards the complainant’s mother (domestic violence evidence). The second ground relates to evidence from the complainant about sexual comments made by the applicant to the complainant (sexual comments and evidence).
The prosecution had relied on the domestic violence evidence as an explanation for the late timing of the complaint (i.e., the complainant had waited until she and her mother were separated from the applicant before disclosing the offending against her) [32]. The prosecution had adduced the sexual comments evidence on the basis that it was relevant to the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the applicant [33].
Both the domestic violence evidence and the sexual comments evidence constituted evidence of discreditable conduct, the admissibility of which is governed by ss 34P, 34Q and 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Discreditable conduct evidence is only admissible for a permissible use and may not be used for any inadmissible use, including to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence in question [49]. Where discreditable conduct evidence is admitted, the trial judge must give directions as for the purpose for which the evidence may or may not be used [52].
In respect of the domestic violence evidence, the Court held that the trial judge’s description of the “only relevance” of the domestic violence evidence did not adequately “identify and explain” the use for which that evidence was not to be used [68] and so did not comply with s 34R(1) [69].
In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that the accuracy and precision with which the judge describes the permissible use may inform what is necessary to adequately direct in relation to the impermissible use of the evidence, however, it will not ordinarily overcome a failure to give any direction at all in relation to an impermissible use of the evidence [62]. The point of outlining the impermissible uses alongside the permissible uses was explained to be so that the impermissible uses are identified and understood so they may be consciously excluded from the decision-making process [63]. The fact that the judge had given himself a direction as to the impermissible uses of the sexual comments evidence did not discharge the obligation in respect of the domestic violence evidence [64]. A finding that s 34R(1) has not been followed does not turn upon whether there has in fact been some impermissible use of the evidence [67]. Ground 1 of the appeal was made out [69].
In respect of the sexual comments evidence, the Court opined that from the terms of the directions the trial judge gave, the Court had no confidence that the trial judge properly understood the permissible and impermissible uses of the sexual comments evidence [77]. Therefore, the judge did not comply with s 34R(1), and ground 2 was made out [79]-[80].
Millwood v The King [2024] SASCA 84 (28 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol-fuelled offending’ – ‘Baseball bat’ – ‘Grabbing neck’ – ‘No history of family violence’ – ‘Statistics on family violence’ – ‘Insight into offending’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sentencing for greater offence than convicted of’
Proceedings: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Aggravated assault x2
Facts: At the time of the offending, the applicant and the complainant were in a domestic relationship. One night, the applicant had been drinking and there was an argument. The complainant went to bed. The applicant went into the bedroom, grabbed a baseball bat and swung it several times into the bedhead, causing three indentations to the bedhead. This comprised count 1.
On another occasion, the applicant and the complainant had been drinking heavily. Upon learning that the complainant had pawned his fishing reels, the applicant pushed the complainant around the kitchen before grabbing her neck with one hand. This caused bruising on the side of her neck. This comprised count 2.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon four grounds of appeal [25]:
1.
The sentencing judge sentenced on an erroneous factual basis, by finding that the conduct the subject of count 2 carried with it ‘a risk of impeding [the complainant’s] breathing and/or blood flow through her neck’ and that it followed that the conduct involved a risk of ‘serious physical harm’.
2.
The sentencing judge erred by sentencing the applicant on the basis he had committed a more serious offence than he had been convicted of.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by sentencing the applicant on the basis he had no remorse or insight into his offending, and was therefore at some risk of reoffending.
4.
The order that the applicant spend 6 months of the sentence in prison was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Permission to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. The sentence was set aside and the applicant was resentenced.
The Court began by considering the need for denunciation, punishment, and deterrence in relation to family violence offending [30]-[33]. It observed that victims of this kind of offending are usually vulnerable, so offenders can expect to receive harsher sentences compared to offending in other contexts not involving vulnerable victims [33]. The Court found that in this case the sentencing discretion miscarried for three reasons. The sentencing judge had erred:
1.
in finding that the applicant had expressed no insight into his offending (alcohol had played a causal role in the offending, and at the time of the appeal, the applicant had remained abstinent from alcohol for over 2 years) [35];
2.
in finding that they were unable to conclude that there was “no risk” of the applicant reoffending against a future domestic partner (the applicant had not previously been involved in domestic violence, and had expressed insight into his offending) [36]; and
3.
in sentencing the applicant for an offence involving physical and emotional harm while the applicant had pleaded guilty to a lesser offence [37].
The applicant was resentenced to 10 months and 5 days’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on the condition the applicant enter into a good behaviour bond for 18 months [45].
R v Singh [2024] SASCA 81 (27 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘Serious offending’ – ‘Premeditation’ – ‘Cruelty’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Personal circumstances in mitigation for serious offending’ – ‘following, harassing, monitoring’- ‘Sentence so low as to undermine confidence in the administration of justice’
Proceedings: Crown application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Murder x1
Facts: At around 10pm on 5 March 2021, the respondent abducted the victim, his former partner, from her workplace. He drove several hours to Moralana Creek, about 400 kilometres north of Adelaide. Once there, the respondent dug a shallow grave. He placed the victim, blindfolded, in the grave with her hands and feet bound, and buried her alive. The victim died by asphyxiation. It is not known how long it took her to die.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown’s application relied on one ground in its application: that the sentence (life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 22 years and 10 months) was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: Permission to appeal against sentence was granted, and the appeal was allowed.
The Court noted that the principles governing an application for permission to appeal against sentence were well-established that that there will only be a grant of permission in a ‘rare and exceptional case’, such as where a sentence is so manifestly inadequate that it amounts to an error of principle [30]. The Crown challenged the adequacy of the sentence on the basis that to allow the non-parole period to stand would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and erode the sentencing standards for the offence of murder [32]. The sentence was life imprisonment; the non-parole period set by the sentencing judge started at 24 years and was reduced on account of the respondent’s guilty plea to 22 years and 10 months [29]. The mandatory non-parole period for murder is 20 years.
The Court discussed the approach in R v Hallcroft (2016) 126 SASR 415 to fixing a non-parole periods [41]-[49]. It also discussed the impact of the abolition of the ‘partial defence’ of provocation and s 48(1) of the Sentencing Act [50]-[67]. The upshot of this discussion was an observation that the mandatory minimum non-parole period for murder affects the sentencing discretion in fixing the non-parole period in two ways [64]. First, it imposes a floor, which the non-parole period must not go below unless there are exceptional circumstances. Second, the mandatory minimum non-parole period is a “yardstick” or “benchmark” representing the appropriate non-parole period for an offence within the least serious category of offending.
Turning to the offending in question, the Court noted there were several egregious features to the offending [69]. It involved a high level of pre-mediation with the respondent arranging an alibi and purchasing items used in the murder the previous day. The respondent therefore had numerous opportunities to reconsider his decision to offend. Moreover, the offending occurred against a background of repeated attempts to re-establish a relationship with the victim, which involved shaming her, continuing to communicate with her against her wishes, and stalking her. Finally, the way the offence was committed was particularly terrifying and degrading [70].
The Court considered that the respondent’s personal circumstances (youth, major depressive disorder, deprived background, lack of prior convictions, guilty plea, cooperation with police, and good employment history) did little to mitigate the seriousness of the offending, bearing in mind its calculated and pre-meditated nature [71]. The four-year uplift from the mandatory minimum non-parole period was held to be manifestly inadequate, and so low as to justify the grant of permission and the Court’s intervention [72].
In resentencing the respondent, the Court imposed the mandatory life sentence. The Court then adopted a starting point for the non-parole period of 30 years, and reduced it on account of the respondent’s guilty plea to 28 years and six months [74].
Mlakar v The King [2024] SASCA 76 (18 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘appeal against sentence’ – ‘general and personal deterrence’ – ‘manifestly excessive’ – ‘appropriate sentencing range’ – ‘rehabilitation as mitigation’ – ‘courts’ intolerance for domestic violence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Aggravated assault x1.
Facts: The complainant, the applicant’s partner, was lying down on a couch, when the applicant assaulted her for no apparent reason [5]. The applicant pulled the complainant off the couch, hit her with his elbows, slapped and punched her, and slammed her head into the ground. The complainant suffered bruising and pain all over her body, and some of her hair was torn out during the assault [6].
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted; the appeal was dismissed [25].
The applicant submitted that the sentence of 83 percent of the maximum penalty for the offence was outside the appropriate sentencing range given the circumstances of the offence and the applicant’s personal circumstances [11]. Which circumstances in particular were relied upon in mitigation is unclear, but it is noted that the applicant had previously been addicted to methamphetamine prior to being on home detention, when he regularly tested negative for drugs [15]. The applicant also attended an abuse prevention program whilst on home detention [15].
In dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that general and personal deterrence will play a significant role in assessing an appropriate penalty for domestic violence offending [21]. The Court echoed Nicholson J in R v Nedza, who opined that courts must make it plain that they “will not tolerate domestic violence, particularly where, as is typical, it is meted out to physically weaker or defenceless women or children” [21].
The Court opined that the sentence was high, but it matched the severity of the offending, being a vicious attack on a vulnerable victim [24].
Sondhi v King [2024] SASCA 7 (8 February 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Physical and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Reliability’ – ‘Evidence’
Charge: Rape x 5.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by judge alone, the male applicant was found guilty of five counts of rape perpetrated against the female complainant, his wife. Each count occurred between January and March 2021, shortly after the birth of their only child. [2]–[6] At trial, the applicant denied the charges, submitting that the initial complaint was fabricated. [7]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant appealed the conviction on five grounds with significant overlap. Overarchingly, the grounds concerned:
1.
Failure to give adequate reasons and/or adopt adequate reasoning to explain why the conflicting evidence raised by the applicant did not engender reasonable doubt;
2.
Erroneous consideration of the complainant’s credibility and reliability due to a failure to properly evaluate inconsistencies in her testimony and behaviour;
3.
Erroneous approach to the evaluation of the evidence of the initial complaint raised by the complainant and her brother (a witness);
4.
Erroneous application of the burden and standard of proof; and
5.
Failure to consider the complainant’s reliability, as distinct from considerations of credibility [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Doyle, Blue and Kimber JJ) granted the applicant permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal.
The Court held that the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence — concerning the time of day on which the complaint was made (eg, afternoon or evening) — was ‘hardly … significant’ to affect the credibility of the complainant. This finding extended to the inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant and her brother, concerning the date on which the complaint was made. [40]–[46]
It was observed that the trial judge was ‘cognisant of the need to consider the whole of the evidence’ before finding any count proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [77] This included findings of the complainant’s credibility and reliability, the latter of which had limited relevance to the issues in the trial. [78]; [129]
Further, the Court held that the trial judge’s provision of directions to himself, concerning the principle of innocence and the prosecution’s burden, did not constitute preferential reasoning or a misapplication of the onus of proof. [109]–[111]
TM v King [2024] SASCA 5 (8 February 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Physical and sexual abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Adequate Reasoning’
Charge: Rape x 6.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by judge alone, the male applicant was found guilty of six counts of rape perpetrated against the female complainant, his partner. Each count occurred over thirteen years. [1]–[2] According to the complainant, the relationship started off ‘good’ in 2004. However, the applicant became aggressive and sexually violent. The complainant alleged that the accused had raped her on multiple occasions, including while pregnant. The applicant’s aggressive behaviour fluctuated throughout the marriage, and the birth of their first and second children. By 2019, the complainant told the applicant to leave the home. [9]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant appealed the conviction on four grounds:
1.
Erroneous approach to the evaluation of the evidence of the initial complaint;
2.
Erroneous assessment of the credibility and reliability of the complaint;
3.
Engagement in adequate reasoning; and
4.
Inadequate reasons.
5.
Failure to consider the complainant’s reliability, as distinct from considerations of credibility [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Doyle, Bleby and Kimber JJ) granted the applicant permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal.
With respect to ground one, the Court specified that section 34M of the Evidence Act — governing evidence relating to complaint in sexual cases — does ‘not condition the admissibility and use of evidence’ of initial complaints upon the existence of ‘independent support’. [40] Even if it did, the evidence of AT (a witness) provided independent support to the fact that the complainant made the initial complaint. [41]
The Court further clarified R v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522 as not establishing the principle that ‘the absence of support for the making of a complaint means that evidence always has limited weight’. [49] This is a matter dependent on the evidence given in the trial, and it was open to the trial Judge to prefer the evidence of the complainant as to the terms of the initial complaint. [49]
With respect to ground three and four, the Court held that the approach of the trial judge was ‘open’ to him, and subsequently not inadequate. The reasons of the trial judge rationally supported the facts found the final verdicts. [87]; [129]; [136]
Groom v Attorney General [2023] SASCA 5 (1 August 2023) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Abuse of Process’ – ‘Vexatious Litigant’ – ‘Systems Abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against order prohibiting institution of proceedings in relation to protection order.
Facts: In 2011, the male appellant was subject to a protection order, which he ‘sedulously’ sought to overturn in at least eight proceedings; all of which were instituted without reasonable grounds. In 2021, following a referral from the Court of Appeal in Groom v Police [2021] SASCA 1, the Attorney-General commenced proceedings seeking to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant. [1]-[2]
After hearing the application in 2023, Justice Blue of the Supreme Court (see Attorney General v Groom [2023] SASC 18) ordered the appellant to be prohibited, without prior leave of the Court, from instituting proceedings in relation to the protection order.
Grounds of appeal: The appellants advanced the appeal on several grounds concerning procedural failures and inadequate reasoning. [12]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in Blue J’s reasoning, nor merit in any of the appellant’s grounds of appeal.
Blue J gave clear and cogent reasons for all of his findings. Mr Groom was either unwilling, or more likely unable, to point to any error in Blue J’s findings other than asserting that he was “wrong”. [17]
South Australia Police v Hill [2022] SASCA 22 (22 March 2022) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Impermissible double charging’ – ‘Subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)’
Charges: assault aggravated (formerly) in a relationship with the victim x 2, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection in a manner involving physical violence or the threat of physical violence x2.
Proceedings: Police appeal against order of Magistrate allowing the withdrawal of pleas of guilt to and dismissal of two counts in ruling each pair of charges involved impermissible double charging.
Facts: The respondent was charged by Police with assault of the complainant aggravated because he was (formerly) in a relationship with her, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection in a manner involving physical violence or the threat of physical violence, committed on 16 December 2019. The respondent was later charged by Police with assault of the complainant aggravated because he was (formerly) in a relationship with her and/or used an offensive weapon, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection, committed on 29 March 2020. The respondent pleaded guilty to each of these four counts (together with other counts). The Magistrate ruled that each pair of counts involved impermissible double charging. The Magistrate granted permission to the respondent to withdraw his guilty pleas to two of the counts and dismissed them. The Magistrate imposed a single penalty in respect of the remaining counts.
Issue: Firstly, does subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) create a single offence or multiple offences? Secondly, does a conviction for an offence of contravening a condition of an intervention order, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence, preclude a conviction for the substantive offence when the substantive offence is aggravated by another circumstance and vice versa?
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed.
Held by the Court:
1.
(Per Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) Subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) creates a single offence albeit with differential maximum penalties depending on the existence of circumstances of aggravation (at [143] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA (Doyle JA agreeing)).
(Per Kourakis CJ) It is not necessary to decide whether subsection 20(3) creates one or two offences depending on the existence of circumstances of aggravation (at [19] per Kourakis CJ).
2.
(Per Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) A conviction for contravening an intervention order condition, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence, does not preclude a conviction for the substantive offence or vice versa (at [172] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA; at [178] per Doyle JA).
(Per Kourakis CJ) A conviction for contravening an intervention order condition, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence aggravated by another circumstance, does not preclude a conviction for the substantive offence or vice versa (at [19] per Kourakis CJ).
3.
(Per Kourakis CJ, Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) The appeal should be allowed and, subject to hearing the parties, a conviction recorded on the two counts dismissed by the Magistrate with no alteration to the sentence imposed by the Magistrate under section 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (at [174] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA (Kourakis CJ and Doyle JA agreeing)).
Groom v Police [2020] SASCA 1 (22 January 2021) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Application for permission to appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Application for permission to appeal the dismissal of an application for revocation of an intervention order.
Facts: This matter had an extensive history (set out at [7]). The intervention order was originally made on 19 October 2011, and confirmed by consent on 22 February 2012. The applicant’s appeal against confirmation of the interim intervention was upheld on 25 June 2013: Groom v Police (No 3). On 10 December 2013, the application to confirm the intervention order was again confirmed by consent in the Magistrates Court. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by a single judge on 21 March 2014 and an application for permission to appeal to the Full Court refused on 19 November 2014: Groom v Police. In December 2014, the applicant was convicted of contravening a term of the intervention order and an appeal was dismissed in July 2015: Groom v Police. In 2016, the applicant filed an application to revoke the intervention order, which was dismissed by the Magistrate. Various appeals were dismissed by a single judge and the Full Court in 2017. Notwithstanding the Full Court’s judgment, the applicant again applied to a Magistrate to revoke the order made on 19 October 2011 and confirmed on 10 December 2013. The Magistrate dismissed the application on 26 May 2020 and this was affirmed on appeal by Lovell J.
Grounds of appeal: The Magistrate and Lovell J erred in failing to find that there was new and compelling evidence to demonstrate that the order was invalid and should be revoked.
Held: The Court not only dismissed the application for permission to appeal but also held at [10]-[11] that:
“In our view, the latest material filed in support of the application for permission to appeal demonstrates that the applicant continues to attempt to relitigate matters previously ventilated and considered in the Magistrates Court, by the various Judges of this Court and by the Full Court.
We consider the current application for permission to appeal, in the circumstances, to be an abuse of process.”
The Court referred the matter to the Attorney-General to consider whether there were proper grounds for an application to be made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) to stay any further proceedings sought to be instituted by the applicant (at [12]-[13]).
Police v Peel [2021] SASCFC 7 (5 February 2021) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Breach of suspended sentence bond’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against decision to allow appeal’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Several offences including contraventions of an intervention order and breach of suspended sentence bond.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against Supreme Court decision to allow respondent’s appeal against breach of suspended sentence bond: Peel v Police [2020] SASC 48 (7 April 2020).
Facts: The male respondent was convicted of several offences including contraventions of an intervention order protecting his female former partner. He was sentenced to 4 months and 15 days imprisonment, partially suspended on a good behaviour bond. The respondent breached the bond by further contravening the intervention order. The Magistrate declined to excuse the breach and revoked the suspension. A single judge allowed the respondent’s appeal.
Grounds of appeal: Whether “proper grounds” existed for excusing a failure to comply with a suspended sentence bond.
Held: The single judge below erred, but there was no utility granting permission to appeal or allowing the appeal in this case as the respondent had served the unexpired portion of the sentence.
Consideration of whether there are “proper grounds” involves “consideration of the nature of the breach and the circumstances in which it was committed, and of any disproportionality between the nature and extent of the breach and the severity of the consequence of revoking the suspension and requiring the original sentence to be served” (at [38]). Any history of similar offending may be relevant “on the basis that it informs a full understanding of both the seriousness of the breach offending, and of the circumstances in which, and reasons for which, the original suspended sentence was imposed and hence the proportionality or otherwise of revoking the suspension of that sentence”(at [44]).
The Magistrate was entitled to have regard to the respondent’s history of similar offending, which was a “relevant, and indeed quite significant consideration” in the context of the case, and the judge below erred in concluding otherwise (at [46]).
Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 124 (21 December 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against re-sentence’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Basic assault x 1; Aggravated assault causing harm x 2; Possession of a Class A firearm without a licence x 1; Aggravated threatening life x 1; Aggravated assault x 3.
Proceedings: Appeal against re-sentence (re-sentence was imposed following a successful appeal against conviction).
Facts: The offences occurred in connection with a domestic relationship between the appellant man and his female former partner. The appellant was convicted of 8 charges following a trial by jury. He was sentenced to 4 years and 5 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years. The appellant successfully appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault causing harm. The re-sentencing arising from the appeal against conviction was undertaken by a different judge, as the first sentencing judge had retired. The re-sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 4 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 4 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
It was an error to impose a head sentence and a non-parole period that was greater than that which had been imposed prior to the appellant’s successful appeal.
2.
The re-sentencing judge’s starting point was too great.
3.
The re-sentencing judge erred in finding that home detention was not appropriate in all the circumstances.
4.
The re-sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Based on the submissions made to the re-sentencing judge and the content of the sentencing remarks made, Hughes J (with Peek and Stanley JJ agreeing) inferred that the re-sentencing judge overlooked the approach to be taken when imposing subsequent sentences for the same offending identified in R v Baltensperger [2004] SASC 392. In re-sentencing, the judge is “required to firstly have regard to the original sentence and only upon concluding that if there is good reason to depart from it, sentencing in a different manner. Where there is a departure, it would be appropriate to provide some explanation for it and in this case, there was none” (at [41]). This inference gained further support by the lack of significant disparity between the re-sentence and the original sentence (at [42]).
After considering the relevant circumstances, Hughes J held that the original sentence was not manifestly excessive (at [48]-[56]). Hughes J (Peek and Stanley JJ agreeing) noted a controlling course of conduct:
[51] The course of conduct in February 2017 was sustained and violent. The appellant caused injuries to the victim and also sought to control her with frightening and dangerous behaviour tending to place her in fear for her life and to submit. That was reinforced by the explicit threat made by the appellant to the victim whilst he directed a firearm at her at close range. There has been no expression of remorse or contrition by the appellant, or any indication of insight on his part with respect to his conduct.
However, the circumstances concerning the count of aggravated assault causing harm, which was successful on appeal, were to be properly viewed as separate from the other acts as charged, thereby not attracting principles of concurrency. This was therefore the basis for imposing a sentence lower than the original sentence namely, 4 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 8 months (at [57]-[59]).
Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 12 (26 February 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Assault x 1; Aggravated assault x 3; Aggravated assault causing harm x 2; Possessing a firearm without a licence x 1; Aggravated threatening life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant in respect of each of the charges of violent offending was the male appellant’s then female partner. The assault charges were aggravated by reason that they were alleged to have occurred in contravention of an Intervention Order.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to their obligations to decide the case only on the evidence, to not discuss the case with persons other than their fellow jurors, to not make their own enquiries, and to bring to the trial judge’s attention any departure from the above by any member of the jury.
2.
The trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to self-defence.
3.
The trial judge’s directions lacked balance to the extent that they resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
4.
The trial judge erred in failing to adequately direct the jury in relation to the potential implications for the complainant’s credit of the timing of the photographs purportedly showing the injuries alleged to have been sustained during the course of the conduct the subject of count 1.
Held: Permission to appeal in respect of grounds 1 and 2, and allowing the appeal on ground 2, but only to the extent of setting aside the conviction on count 2 (aggravated assault causing harm) and ordering a retrial on that count, and otherwise dismissing the appeal.
Ground 1: The trial judge ought to have given post-empanelment directions to the effect contended for by the appellant. Nevertheless, there was no miscarriage of justice. This was not a case where there had been media publicity and the appellant did not identify any information of significance that might have been available through internet searching. It was speculative to suggest that the jury’s deliberations were infected by extraneous information.
Ground 2: There was a sufficient evidential basis to require that the trial judge leave self-defence to the jury in respect of the charge the subject of count 2 as the alleged assault was immediately preceded by verbal and physical aggressive conduct by the complainant. The trial judge’s directions in this respect were inadequate, falling short of an accurate and clear articulation of the defence.
However, the court did not accept that the evidence as to the generally volatile nature of the parties’ relationship, and instances of aggressive behaviour by the complainant on other occasions (including her use of an axe in the context of the incident leading to count 2), provided a sufficient evidential foundation for self-defence in respect of the balance of the counts of violent offending with which the appellant was charged.
The appeal in respect of ground 2 was allowed, but only to the extent of setting aside the conviction on count 2.
Application for permission to appeal on grounds 3 and 4 was dismissed. The appellant did not demonstrate any lack of balance in the trial judge’s summing up.
Subsequent appeal against re-sentence was allowed: Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 124 (21 December 2020).
SPC v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 43 (28 May 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 8 counts, including aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm, aggravated threatening life, rape
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant an was convicted of 2 counts of aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm, 3 counts of aggravated threatening life and 2 counts of rape. He was acquitted of a charge of aggravated cause harm. The victim was the appellant’s wife, who had migrated from China in 2009, and with whom the appellant had children. The victim testified that their relationship was marred by verbal, physical and sexual abuse, and recounted an incident of violence and rape which had preceded the charged counts (relationship evidence).
Grounds:
•
The judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the use of evidence of the victim’s distress when she reported the offending to a police officer.
•
The judge failed to properly direct the jury on the use of the evidence of the violent relationship on the element of consent on the rape charges.
•
The verdict on the last rape offence (Count 8) was unreasonable because the evidence could not exclude the possibility that the appellant failed to appreciate that the victim was not consenting.
Held: Kourakis CJ (Nicholson and Bampton JJ agreeing) dismissed the appeal.
As to ground 1, the appellant argued that the judge failed to give any directions as to the proper use of the evidence of the victim’s distress when she attended at the police station. It was submitted that the judge should have directed the jury that (1) because of the passage of time and the significance of the reconciliation contended for by the appellant, the distress was not relevant; and (2) if they were to use the distress as circumstantial evidence of consistency with respect to the alleged rape, they would need to be satisfied that distress was not an emotional reaction to the victim’s decision to leave the appellant ([36]). The Court, however, dismissed this ground for 4 reasons. First, it was not put by the prosecutor, nor left to the jury by the judge, that the victim’s distress was corroborative or supportive of her testimony ([44]). Second, the evidence was admissible due to the close temporal connection to the last rape offence, the degree of distress and the circumstances in which the victim abandoned the course in which she had enrolled to report the appellant’s violence against her. The distress was also proximate to the rape the victim alleged occurred the night before ([45]). Third, the alternative explanations for the victim’s distress proposed on appeal were unrealistic ([46]). Fourth, counsel for the appellant at trial consented to the judge’s proposal not to give any directions on the evidence of distress ([47]).
As to ground 2, the appellant’s complaint primarily related to the judge’s failure to give specific directions on how the relationship evidence was relevant to prove the mental element on 2 of the rape counts ([50]). The Court found that the the judge’s directions on the use of the relationship evidence in considering whether the objective elements of the offence had been established were sound ([56]). The judge did not err by omission in not directing the jury to ignore the relationship evidence on the question of the appellant’s appreciation of whether or not the victim was consenting to sexual intercourse on the rape charges. Neither counsel referred to the relationship evidence on that issue. It was common ground that, notwithstanding their violent relationship, consensual sexual intercourse was a feature of their relationship. The proper use of the relationship evidence on the subjective element of the rape charges was, therefore, not a live issue at trial.
The verdict on count 8 was not unreasonable. It was sufficiently supported by the victim’s evidence, and there was no evidentiary matter capable of raising a doubt as to the appellant’s guilt which could not be dissipated by the jury’s evaluation of her testimony ([64]).
R v Roberts [2019] SASCFC 94 (1 August 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court) [Summary prepared by Magistrates’ Associates of the Adelaide Magistrates Court]
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Propensity’ – ‘Relevancy’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The defendant was convicted by jury of causing harm with intent to cause harm to the complainant who he was in a sexual relationship with. The defendant, while intoxicated, grabbed her and dragged her out of the house, pushed her on to the footpath and kicked her body causing various injuries. The appellant’s brothers Stephen and Joe were present at the house. The complainant said that before living with the defendant, a former partner, Ray, had also been violent to her. The defence put to the complainant in cross-examination that it was Ray not the appellant who assaulted the complainant. Ray was deceased by the time of the trial. The complainant gave:
•
General evidence that the appellant was ‘rough to [her] nearly everyday [they] were together’ and ‘slapped’ her around; and
•
Specific evidence that on 14 February 2017 the appellant was angry at her and twisted and broken her arm for which the injury required surgery. The complainant lied to medical staff that she had fallen off a deck.
A police officer who attended the scene gave evidence of two tranches of the appellant’s brother, Stephen’s, statements and conduct:
•
The first tranche was that Stephen ‘loudly told police to leave the property and shut the front door’.
•
The second was that when told the appellant was arrested for assaulting the complainant, Stephen stated ‘If she’s saying those things she needs to be dealt with. She needs to learn the Aboriginal way’.
Grounds of Appeal:
•
Ground 1: Did the Trial Judge err in admitting the specific evidence as to the appellant having broken the arm of the complainant on 14 February 2017, and in doing so cause a miscarriage of justice?
•
Ground 2: Did the Trial Judge err at law in admitting evidence of words spoken out of Court by a person not called as a witness (Stephen Roberts), and in doing so cause a miscarriage of justice?
Held:
•
Ground 1: Peek J and Hughes J allowing the appeal, Kourakis CJ dismissing the appeal.
•
Ground 2: Peek J allowing the appeal, Kourakis CJ and Hughes J concurring.
Reasons:
Ground 1 – Kourakis CJ (dismissing)
•
‘The admissibility of evidence of a violent relationship…between a perpetrator and a victim involved in a domestic relationship has long been held to be admissible on a charge of a violent criminal offence’ citing R v Olasiuki (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263-264 and R v Hissey at [2] (1973) 6 SASR 280.
•
On the admission of the evidence relating to the breaking of the complainant’s wrist by the appellant, the jury ‘could not reason in the appellant’s favour that he was unlikely to be the complainant’s assailant because he was in a romantic relationship with her’ at [4].
•
‘The risk of misuse of discreditable conduct evidence is greatest when it is admitted as propensity evidence. It is more difficult to compartmentalise specific propensity reasoning from bad person reasoning’ at [9]
•
The probative value of the evidence ‘substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect’ as ‘it showed that the appellant’s romantic relationship with the appellant did not inhibit him from bashing and slapping her around and, importantly, causing her serious bodily harm three weeks earlier’ and as such was admissible under s 34P(2)(a) at [10].
•
The evidence of the broken arm assault ‘did not materially add to the prejudicial effect of the evidence that the appellant bashed and slapped around the complainant’ at [10].
•
‘Prejudice is not necessarily accumulated by the arithmetic addition of the occasions of discreditable conduct. The prejudice lies in the error of reasoning’ at [10].
Ground 1 – Peek J (allowing) (Hughes J concurring)
•
In relation to s 34P(2)(a) prosecution often contend in domestic violence matters that there is a ‘permitted use’ under s 34P(2) for the admission of evidence of prior conduct at [74].
•
The only ‘permitted use’ here is said to be that such evidence is relevant to the alleged assault on the basis that ‘the assault did not come out of the blue’ (the out of the blue argument) at [74].
•
The out of the blue argument is often linked to and strengthened by delays in reporting to police due to fears of repercussions and situations where the existence of a violent relationship is established or confirmed by independent evidence at [76].
•
‘If only evidence of the specific allegation is led…it is not unlikely that members of a jury may gain the impression that the assault charged involves an incongruous, unprovoked and unexplained occurrence’ at [75].
•
Tection 34P(2)(a) requires that separate assessments must be made as to both ‘any probative value’ and ‘any prejudicial effect’ of the evidence to determine whether the prosecution have ‘demonstrated that the former substantially outweighs the latter’ at [77].
•
In relation to the probative value: If the 14 February 2017 assault is set aside it may be contended that ‘there is an apparent difference in the evidence of the complainant as between the usual degree of violence (‘rough’ and ‘slapping around’) and ‘the high degree of violence alleged to be involved in the subject assault’ at [79].
•
The out of the blue argument in this matter is narrow. There was no delay in reporting and there is no independent evidence outside of the complainant’s to establish the existence of a violent relationship at [81].
•
In relation to the prejudicial effect: although prosecution eschewed any reliance on s 34P(2)(b), the question arises under s 34P(2)(a) and s 34P(3) ‘as to the extent of the risk that the jury might adopt a process of propensity reasoning due to the doubling of the number of allegations of a high level of violence in circumstances where the allegations appeared superficially similar’ at [82].
•
The prosecution did not call medical evidence in relation to the 14 February 2017 assault and in doing so denied the appellant ‘the ability to cross-examine as to whether such injuries where more consistent with her original history of falling from a deck than her later version of an assault’ at [82].
•
Under s 34P(3) the Judge is ‘specifically required’ to determine whether the permissible use can be kept ‘sufficiently separate and distinct from the impermissible use’ at [83].
•
‘It is quite evident from the transcript that the Judge did not undertake a sufficient analysis of the application of s 34P and did not refer to s 34P(3) at all’ at [83].
Ground 2 - Peek J (allowing) (Kourakis CJ and Hughes J concurring)
•
The prosecution ‘attempted to justify the admission of both tranches of Parkinson’s evidence by citing Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 and R v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 that stand for the proposition that ‘in some circumstances a person’s state of mind may be proved by contemporaneous acts or statements made by that person’ at [27].
•
Although the decisions in Walton and Hendrie are ‘unexceptionable’, ‘…the danger of proliferation of tendering evidence of statements or actions of persons not called as witnesses must be guarded against’ at [36].
•
Evidence of this nature should only be received ‘if it is of direct and immediate relevance to an issue which arises at trial’ (R v Blastland [1986] AC 41, 53 and R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504) at [47].
•
The trial judge admitted the evidence of Parkinson in this case to rebut the suggestion put to the complainant in cross-examination that she was assaulted by someone else other than the complainant at [52].
•
While it was open to the prosecution to call further evidence that it was not Ray that has assaulted the complainant, this evidence had to be admissible at [58].
•
In relation to the first tranche: Stephen’s ‘less than cordial welcome of police arriving at his home was entirely consistent with personal beliefs or feelings he holds about police which could be referable to any number of reasons or previous experiences’ and not necessarily connected to the crime at [60].
•
The second tranche of evidence the prosecution’s position is that Stephen’s statement was’ "Consistent" with knowledge that the appellant did consult the complainant’. However, there was in fact no evidence that Stephen knew who assaulted the complainant
•
The evidence as to Stephen Roberts’ statement and conduct was ‘nebulous and highly speculative’ as distinct from being directly relevant to trial at [60].
•
It ‘is simply not the type of clear and unequivocal "state of mind" evidence’ referred to in Hendrie and Walton. There was no evidence that Stephen knew who assaulted the complainant at [63].
•
The prosecution was ‘simply not permitted to tender evidence of an action or statement of a person who they were not prepared to call, on some sort of ‘prophylactic’ basis that the jury might consider that the words were consistent with a prosecution case theory’ at [64].
Appendix 1: 34P–Evidence of discreditable conduct
•
•
(1) In the trial of a charge of an offence, evidence tending to suggest that a defendant has engaged in discreditable conduct, whether or not constituting an offence, other than conduct constituting the offence (discreditable conduct evidence)–
◦
(a) cannot be used to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence because he or she has engaged in discreditable conduct; and
◦
(b) is inadmissible for that purpose (impermissible use); and
◦
(c) subject to subsection (2), is inadmissible for any other purpose.
•
(2) Discreditable conduct evidence may be admitted for a use (the permissible use) other than the impermissible use if, and only if–
◦
(a) the judge is satisfied that the probative value of the evidence admitted for a permissible use substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant; and
◦
(b) in the case of evidence admitted for a permissible use that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue–the evidence has strong probative value having regard to the particular issue or issues arising at trial.
•
(3) In the determination of the question in subsection (2)(a), the judge must have regard to whether the permissible use is, and can be kept, sufficiently separate and distinct from the impermissible use so as to remove any appreciable risk of the evidence being used for that purpose.
•
(4) Subject to subsection (5), a party seeking to adduce evidence that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue under this section must give reasonable notice in writing to each other party in the proceedings in accordance with the rules of court.
•
(5) The court may, if it thinks fit, dispense with the requirement in subsection (4).
R v Wilton [2019] SASCFC 65 (13 June 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Adequacy of directions to jury’ – ‘Confessions and admissions’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Property offences’
Charges: 1x aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, 1x theft.
Appeal type: appeal against conviction of above charges.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant were in a relationship and two children were born of that relationship. The appellant and the complainant had separated and there were family court orders allowing the appellant fortnightly access to the children and restraining him from being within 50 metres of the complainant’s house. The appellant was found in the complainant’s house in possession of various items belonging to the complainant. Upon the police’s arrival, the appellant stated, “I fucked up” and begged the complainant not to press charges.
Issues: The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal; both grounds were considered together since they were intrinsically linked in both time and context ([42]). The appellant argued that the trial Judge failed to give adequate directions to the jury as to the use that could be made of the purported confessional statement “I fucked up” and the evidence of the appellant begging not to be charged ([3]).
Decision and reasoning: appeal dismissed.
To illustrate that the trial judge’s directions were not deficient, Parker J first made two material observations of the trial proceedings. The first was that the trial Judge reminded the jury of the defence’s submission that the appellant’s remarks were potentially equivocal and couldn’t be regarded as determinative ([47]). The second was that the trial Judge expressly stated that the use that could be made of the appellant’s behaviour was entirely within the jury’s discretion; it could be used for or against him, rejected in whole or in part, or attributed with different degrees of significance ([48]).
His Honour then referred to the observations of the High Court in RPS v The Queen to reflect the absence of any error in the trial Judge’s directions. In the extract, the High Court stated that the facts are to be determined by the jury and the trial Judge may comment on the facts but often the safest course for a trial Judge will be to make no comment on the facts beyond reminding the jury of the arguments of counsel ([49]). In addition, for the same purpose, his Honour referred to similar observations made in R v Golubovic where it was pointed out that in trials such as the one at hand, there may be little need for the judge to identify the issue or explain the cases of the parties ([50]).
Collectively, these observations are said to point towards a key principle relevant to the appeal, that is, when considering the adequacy of the Judge’s directions to the jury, it is important that the factual issues are few and not complex ([49]-[51]).
For these reasons, amongst others, his Honour deemed that it was unnecessary for the Judge to provide more elaborate directions in the terms suggested by the appellant (see [3]). The directions given by the Judge were viewed as sufficient to ensure the jury wasn’t confused about the issues that needed to be determined ([53]).
Police v Heritage [2019] SASCFC 60 (31 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Activation of suspended sentence’ – ‘Breach of conditions of good behaviour bond’ – ‘Sentence’
Charge: Aggravated assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s sentence (excusal of breach of bond).
Facts: In 2016 the respondent assaulted his partner and was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 months, suspended upon entering into a good behaviour bond for 18 months. In 2017 the respondent breached his good behaviour bond by committing a further assault on his partner. The Magistrate excused the breach of bond, extended the bond by 6 months, and sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 28 days for the fresh offending suspended upon the respondent entering into a further good behaviour bond for 18 months. The Police appealed against the excusal of the breach of bond ‘on the ground that, in excusing the breach, the Magistrate erroneously relied on the respondent’s personal circumstances as opposed to the nature and circumstances of the offending’ at [3].
Appeal dismissed by single Judge. Police sought permission to appeal to Full Court.
Issue: Did the Magistrate erroneously rely upon the respondent’s personal circumstances as opposed to the nature and circumstances of the offending when excusing the breach of bond?
Decision and reasoning: Granting permission to appeal and dismissing the appeal, the Full Court held:
‘The approach by the Magistrate to the finding of proper grounds to refrain from revoking the suspension was erroneous, as was the Magistrate’s conclusion that there were proper grounds to refrain from revoking the suspension’ at [41]. ‘The Judge erred in concluding that the Magistrate did not rely on the respondent’s personal circumstances in deciding to refrain from revoking the suspension’ at [47]. Notwithstanding the error, the appeal should be dismissed in the exercise of the court’s residual discretion, as the respondent has been living a law-abiding life in the community for an extended period of time since being sentenced, and the balance of the original period of suspension of the original sentence and the extended period of the suspension has now expired at [63].
Reasoning - proper grounds:
The police relied upon a series of decisions commencing with Norman v Lovegrove [1986] 40 SASR 266and R v Buckman [1988] 47 SASR 303 in which the Supreme Court held that when determining whether there are proper grounds within the meaning of s 58(3) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA)—a largely identical provision is now contained in s 114(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA)—upon which a breach of bond should be excused, those proper grounds must relate to the ‘nature and circumstances of the breaching offence as opposed to the personal circumstances of the defendant’ at [13]. Blue J held in relation to the meaning of the expression proper grounds that ‘it has authoritatively been decided by this Court and it follows from the text, context and evident purpose of subsection 58(3) that those grounds are confined to the nature and circumstances of the breach; they do not extend to personal circumstances of the offender or to circumstances occurring after the breach’ at [22]. His Honour reasoned that the ‘distinction between circumstances of the offence and personal circumstances is well understood in practice although it is more difficult to define in a priori terms. The circumstances of the offence comprise those circumstances existing at the time of commission of the offence which bear on the culpability of the offender in committing the offence’ at [31].His Honour differentiated between a ‘circumstance of the offence’, for example, an offender suffering a mental impairment which contributed to the committing of the offence, and a ‘personal circumstance’, for example, where ‘it is desirable that a defendant receive treatment for a mental impairment which cannot effectively be provided in prison’ or where hardship is caused to the defendant’s dependant at [31].
His Honour, at [35], cited the Magistrates three reasons for refraining from revoking the suspension:
•
That the respondent needed professional assistance to address his mental health and anger management issues;
•
That the respondent was supporting his partner and 10 month old child who would suffer hardship if the respondent were to be imprisoned; and
•
That the revocation of the suspension of the sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate and oppressive to the 2017 offending.
His Honour held that reasons 1 and 2 were personal circumstances. While the third reason related to the circumstances of the breach, his Honour held that ‘there was no basis on which it was open to the Magistrate to conclude that activation of the original sentence would be a disproportionate consequence of the 2017 offending’ at [40].
Reasoning – the reasons of the Judge:
The Judge referred ‘to decisions of single Judges of the Court that the Full Court authorities do not preclude a court taking into account personal circumstances’, however, stated that it was not necessary to decide this as the Magistrate did not take into account the respondent’s personal circumstances when deciding to restrain from revoking the suspension’ at [43]. Blue J held the Judge erred in his conclusion that the Magistrate did not rely on the respondent’s personal circumstances in refraining from revoking the suspension.
Reasoning – permission to appeal:
Permission to bring a second appeal by the Crown against sentence by a magistrate ‘will only be granted in rare and exceptional cases. This will ordinarily only be when it is necessary to establish or maintain correct sentencing principles or adequate sentencing standards or where the error is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime that it demands correction on appeal’ at [49]. Permission to appeal should be granted ‘having regard to the importance of the maintenance of the correct sentencing principles and the availability of the residual discretion’ at [61]. However, as allowing the appeal would have resulted in the defendant’s imprisonment after he had been living a law-abiding life in the community for a sustained period’ at [62], the Court should dismiss the appeal in the exercise of its residual discretion.
R v Dhir [2019] SASCFC 55 (22 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Permissible and impermissible use of evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 1 x digital rape (count 2), 4 x aggravated assault causing harm (counts 1, 3, 4 and 5).
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction of above charges.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married. The appellant allegedly committed the rape by putting his hand under the complainant’s jeans at a train station platform. The assault (count 3) was alleged to have been committed soon after the rape when the couple was walking home from the train station. The remaining offences were committed in the matrimonial home.
Issues: The appellant appealed against the convictions on seven grounds (see [4]), all of which generally concerned the directions given to the jury by the Judge.
Decision and reasoning: appeal was allowed on grounds 3, 4, 5 and 7 and dismissed on grounds 1, 2 and 6. All convictions ordered on the District Court information were quashed and the matter was remitted for a new trial.
For the purposes of convenience, Kourakis CJ first dealt with the fifth ground of appeal in which the appellant contended the Judge erred in directing the jury to ignore a defence submission concerning the plausibility of the digital rape charge (see [49]-[50]). His Honour accepted this ground of appeal, claiming the Judge withdrew a legitimate and factually compelling submission ([50]) with the likely effect of leading the jury to interpret the Judge’s direction as withdrawing the defence counsel’s broader implausibility submission (of which this particular submission formed an integral part of) from their consideration ([51]).
The first ground of appeal was divided into two complaints; his Honour rejected the first complaint, stating it was unnecessary to draw the distinction in order to comply with s 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (see [53]). As to the second complaint, His Honour acknowledges that the Judge ought to have expressly directed the jury in relation to the impermissible use of the discreditable conduct evidence under s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). In failing to do this, the Judge was said to have failed to comply with the obligations laid out under s 34R(1). Nonetheless, such an omission did not occasion any miscarriage of justice and the second complaint was therefore rejected ([58]).
His Honour notes the merit of the second ground of appeal in stating that the Judge should have directed the jury as to the limited use that could be made of the alleged admissions ([59]). However, his Honour discerned no miscarriage of justice in this omission on the Judge’s part, particularly in light of the Judge’s cautionary observations ([45]-[46]) and the fact that the complainant’s evidence was proven unreliable in any event ([59]).
The third, fourth and seventh ground of appeal raised a particular issue that was considered through the relevant authorities (see [61]-[75]). Ultimately, his Honour allowed these grounds of appeal in recognising that the Judge placed undue weight to the evidence of distress.
R v Mark [2019] SASCFC 48 (9 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Grounds for interference’ – ‘Sentence manifestly excessive’
Charges: 1x aggravated assault, 1x breach of a suspended sentence bond.
Appeal type: appeal against sentence for the above offences.
Facts: the appellant punched his domestic partner in the face. In doing so, the appellant breached the intervention order in place at the time which prohibited the appellant from assaulting, threatening or intimidating his domestic partner. The appellant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and the matter was transferred to the District Court for sentencing with the breached bond and other matters. An 11-month sentence was imposed for the aggravated assault while the suspended sentence was revoked and a six-month sentence (subject of the good behaviour bond) was ordered to be served cumulatively on the sentence for the aggravated assault.
Issues: the appellant’s grounds of appeal were two-fold. First, the sentence imposed for the aggravated assault was manifestly excessive ([6]). Second, the judge erred in sentencing the appellant on the basis that the offence was committed against a background of previous domestic violence ([6]).
Decision and reasoning: appeal was allowed, sentence imposed by trial Judge was set aside and the appellant was resentenced (see [36]).
His Honour first set out the authority and principles relevant to determining whether to interfere on appeal with a decision on sentence and whether a sentence is manifestly excessive ([17]-[21]).
His Honour rejected the appellant’s submission that the assault was on the lower end of the scale of seriousness. A single punch to the face was deemed serious by his Honour in light of the fatal consequences such an action may have had ([23]-[24]). It’s seriousness was also heightened by the fact it was committed with an intervention order in place at the time which aimed to protect the victim from the assault that occurred ([27]).
Whether the starting point of 18 months for a first offence of violence produced a sentence outside the permissible range for the offending and offender in question was determined in reference to multiple factors. First, the importance of specific and general deterrence in sentencing for offence of domestic violence lent some justification to the sentence imposed ([26]). Second however, the offender’s poor track record of responding to the leniency extended to him by the courts (see [10]) was considered in light of his personal and mitigating circumstances ([28]). Ultimately, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending, and having regard to the fact that the assault was the appellant’s first offence of violence, his Honour concluded that a starting point of 18 months was too high and outside the permissible range of sentences for this offending and this offender ([31]).
The second ground of appeal was allowed since the factual basis of the judge’s sentence lacked a sufficient foundation on the evidence presented to the court and wasn’t actually conceded by the appellant ([32]).
R v Adamson [2018] SASCFC 114 (11 November 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’
Charges: Arson x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of arson following jury trial. It was alleged that he deliberately lit a fire inside a townhouse in which he and his partner lived until their separation three weeks prior to the fire. His alibi was that he was at a lacrosse club at the time that the fire was lit. The prosecution relied upon a number of items of circumstantial evidence which it argued cumulatively showed the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues: The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, and in particular in consideration of his alibi. He contended that no reasonable jury could have rejected his alibi as a reasonable possibility.
Decision and reasoning: In considering the grounds of appeal, the Court applied the principle set out M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63, namely, whether, on the totality of the evidence, it would be open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. On a thorough analysis of all the evidence, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that:
•
The evidence established that the fire in the townhouse had been deliberately lit. It also established that a few hours prior to the fire being lit, the appellant spoke of burning it down.
•
The strength of the evidence that supported the appellant’s alibi was a matter for the jury, to be considered in light of the other evidence presented in the trial.
•
There was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the jury to reject the appellant’s alibi as a reasonable possibility, and to find beyond reasonable doubt that he deliberately lit the fire.
R v Peet [2018] SASCFC 91 (5 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The circumstances of the offending were that early in the morning, following an argument with the respondent’s partner, during which she slapped, kicked and hit him with a vacuum cleaner pole, the respondent struck her with a crow bar at least six times. The respondent dragged her body to the laundry where he placed a cable tie around her neck and tightened it. The combined effect of the blows and the compression of her neck caused her death. Not long after this occurred the children woke. The respondent made breakfast for them. He then went outside and smoked a cigarette before returning inside. There was a knock at the door. The respondent put the children in their rooms and told them to be quiet. He did not answer the door and the people knocking went away. At some point, and possibly whilst the people were still at the front door, the respondent went back to each child. The respondent restrained the six-year-old with cable ties and placed a sock in her mouth, fixing it in position with packing tape. He placed a cable tie around her neck and tightened it. Her death was caused by the combined effect of suffocation and asphyxiation. The respondent also restrained the five-year-old with cable ties and asphyxiated him. His tongue was bruised suggesting that prior to death he too may have had something placed in his mouth obstructing his airway.
The sentencing Judge sentenced the respondent to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30-years to commence on the day the respondent was taken into custody. The sentencing Judge accepted that the respondent was experiencing a degree of dissociation when he killed the children. On appeal, the DPP contended that the 30-year non-parole period was manifestly inadequate, and submitted that the inadequacy was so great, having regard to the gravity of the offending, that the Court should increase the non-parole period to ensure the maintenance of adequate standards of punishment for the offence of murder. The respondent conceded that the non-parole period was manifestly inadequate and that it should be set aside and a new non-parole period fixed.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The Court took into account the respondent’s personal circumstances ([87]), loss felt by the family ([85]), and the value of human life. At [83]-[84], the Court noted that –
‘A just sentence in the present case must accord due recognition to the human dignity of three victims… It has been said that the value of human life is intrinsic. The murderer denies their victim life and all the potentialities that accompany living which are of inestimable worth. Speaking generally, that denial, that exaction, cost or loss, is magnified where the victim is a child. The younger and more innocent the child the more the murderer repulses us as a community and the more grave or heinous the act of murder because of the value we place on life.’
The punitive, protective and rehabilitative purposes of fixing a non-parole period were also relevant. The punitive purpose in particular reflected the gravity of the offending. The sentencing Judge found that the respondent intended to kill each victim. As King CJ said in R v Stewart (1984) 35 SASR 477, multiple murders fall into the worst category of offending. Therefore, condign punishment was afforded great weight. The Court also noted that the respondent should not be left without hope for spending some time in the community again in the future, as this promotes rehabilitation. The murder was not premeditated in the conventional sense. The murder also occurred in the context of a relationship characterized by domestic violence. The murder was described at [78] as being brutal and the final act cold and lacking in humanity. Citing Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600, ‘A just sentence must accord due recognition to the human dignity of the victim of domestic violence and the legitimate interest of the general community in the denunciation and punishment of a brutal, alcohol-fuelled destruction of a woman by her partner’. Although the sentencing Judge found that the respondent suffered a degree of dissociation at the time of the incident, this neither prevented him from forming the intent to kill nor did it prevent him from understanding the nature and quality of his actions. It helped him to depersonalize his two children, but did not prevent him taking action which he considered necessary for the purposes of his own self-preservation ([80]).
The Court found that the determination of a non-parole period in this case could not be reduced to a formula and that the totality principle was applicable to the setting of a non-parole period in relation to a life sentence for murder. The Court allowed the appeal and held that the non-parole period fixed by the sentencing Judge was manifestly inadequate. A non-parole period of 36 years was substituted. Although the respondent was entitled to a discount of up to 10% on the basis of his guilty pleas, to allow the respondent any further reduction would result in a non-parole period unacceptably disproportionate to the gravity of the offending which would vindicate the dignity of the victims ([90]).
R v Hibeljic [2018] SASCFC 35 (11 May 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Blackmail x 1; Knowingly distributing an invasive image x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the victim. They were both 18 years old. He threatened to distribute a video of the victim with her breasts exposed unless she had sex with him, and in fact distributed it to three people (her friend, new boyfriend and father). He knew that her father was of Syrian background, very strict and was likely to react harshly if he became aware of the video ([10]). Upon watching the video, her father subjected her to ‘significant physical harm’ in a ‘frightening and vicious physical attack’ ([22]). The victim’s relationship with her family was significantly damaged, and she was forced to leave Adelaide and abandon her tertiary education ([24]).
The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant to 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. It was significant that both offences involved a sexually explicit video of the victim, and the appellant’s gross betrayal of trust involved in distributing it ([45]). The blackmail was a ‘particularly serious instance’ of this type of offending ([46]). The appellant was aware of the likelihood of a serious and significant reaction on the part of the victim’s father ([51]).
The appellant submitted the sentencing judge did not properly take into account his youth, lack of criminal history, general good character and likelihood of rehabilitation ([60]). However, the Court held that the sentence of imprisonment, without suspension or home detention, was reasonably imposed ([63], [68] [81]).
R v Taheri [2017] SASCFC 115 (8 September 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Character reference’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of deportation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Written reference’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Aggravated threatening harm x 2; Aggravated threatening life x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married but separated. An intervention order was in place. The appellant broke into the complainant’s house while the complainant and her sister were inside. He cut through a flyscreen window with a knife and put a rope around the complainant’s throat. The appellant threatened to kill the complainant and hurt her sister if she did not withdraw the complaint she made to the police about him ([10]). The appellant came to Australia as a refugee and was living on a permanent residence visa.
The appellant was sentenced to a head sentence of five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years ([5]). The judge ordered partial concurrency to the extent of 12 months ([34]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on 4 grounds, that the judge erred in:
1.
failing to make a finding as to the risk the appellant posed to community safety in declining to make a home detention order under s 33BB Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1998 (SA) ([15]);
2.
the approach in relation to partial concurrency;
3.
her treatment of a written reference provided on behalf of the appellant;
4.
failing to consider the risk of deportation in imposing a sentence of more than 12 months ([7]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
On the first ground, Nicholson J held that s 33BB Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1998 (SA) does not require a sentencing judge to make a specific finding as to the risk that an offender poses to the community. Nicholson J held that declining to order home detention was within the judge’s discretion ([31]).
On the second ground, Nicholson J held that it was open to the judge to discount the written reference as to character. The reference did not consider the appellant’s character apart from how he presented himself in a social setting ([20]-[22]).
On the third ground, Nicholson J held that concurrency between the sentences was within the judge’s discretion ([36])
On the fourth ground, Nicholson J held that on the assumption that the risk of deportation was relevant, the sentencing judge considered those matters ([46]).
R v Saunders [2017] SASCFC 86 (27 July 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’
Charges: Property damage x 1; Breach bail x 1; Contravening term of intervention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant went to the complainant’s residence, knocked on her bedroom window and then smashed the window by punching it ([10]). The appellant was subject a bail agreement and intervention order that prohibited him from approaching the complainant ([11]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 10 months and 22 days ([2]-[3]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed (see [29], [30] and [47]). Justice Stanley commented that ‘the very point’ of the appellant’s bail agreement and intervention order was that the complainant could feel safe and protected in her own home ([26]). His Honour emphasised that ‘the purpose of those instruments is to prevent acts of domestic violence which are often emotional and psychological as much as physical’ and which ‘can have profound consequences for the victim’ ([27]). Justice Hinton added that ‘it is important to the maintenance of confidence in the protection that intervention orders are intended to provide that the courts treat any breach as very serious’ (emphasis added), not only physical violence ([44]). The sentence was at the high end of the permissible range, but was not plainly wrong (see [28], [47]).
R v Sykes [2017] SASCFC 59 (31 May 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Burglary’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Aggravated threaten life x 1; Aggravated indecent assault x 1; Aggravated assault causing harm x 1; Aggravated threaten harm x 2; and threaten harm x 1; Breach intervention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim had been in a relationship ([6]-[7]). Shortly after the relationship had ended, the appellant entered the victim’s house at midnight ([9]). He bound her arms and legs, blindfolded her and removed her clothes ([11]). He told her that he was going to cut off her nipples, breasts and fingers, break her nose, penetrate her with objects, and drive her to a secluded place to make her suffer ([12]-[16]). The offending continued for at least several hours ([22]). The appellant pleaded guilty to the offences. He was sentenced to 11 years and one month imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Parker J, Vanstone J and Blue J agreeing, held that the sentence took into account all relevant factors, and the sentence was within an appropriate range.
Parker J stated at [33]:
‘Every person has a right to feel safe in their house and the appellant had violated the security and safety of the victim and also violated her personally. He had terrorised her for what must have been hours in her own home. In her view his behaviour appeared to have been deliberately designed to inflict the maximum amount of terror.’
Counsel for the appellant referred to two other cases concerning home invasions (R v Siviour [2016] SASCFC 51 and R v Stephen John Forbes DCCRM 15-1418 and 15-340). Parker J emphasised that conduct giving rise to charges of trespass and kidnapping may be extremely varied, and therefore the length of reasonable sentences may differ ([58]). His Honour considered that the appellant’s sexual offending against a former domestic partner was an aggravating factor not present in Siviour and Forbes ([59]). His Honour held that the sentencing judge balanced the appellant’s lack of criminal history, expression of remorse and strong work history, against the serious nature of the offending and the enormous impact on the victim ([62]).
R v Nelson [2017] SASCFC 40 (8 May 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘General and specific deterrence.’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Traumatic brain injury’
Charges: Causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim and defendant were formerly in a domestic partnership. The offences occurred on one occasion. In the presence of other people at their home, the defendant: grabbed the victim and dragged her outside; began to call her names; repeatedly hit her head and kick her head and body ([6]). The victim sustained an extremely severe traumatic brain injury, and was likely to be left with long-term cognitive defects ([7]). The sentencing judge had regard to the defendant’s disadvantaged background and low level of cognitive functioning (attributed to the defendant having sniffed petrol since he was four years old) (see [10]-[20], [26]-[27]).
The defendant was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of one year and six months.
Issues: The prosecution argued that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Court (Parker J, with Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing) found that this was an exceptional case that required intervention by the appellate court ([36]). Parker J considered that the sentence did not give enough weight to the need for general and specific deterrence in domestic violence offences. Parker J stated (at [45]-[47]) that:
“It was necessary for the sentencing judge to take into account, as his Honour did, the defendant’s background of disadvantage and social deprivation arising from his upbringing in a traditional and remote Aboriginal community. However, the fact that … the defendant had very recently been released after a period of imprisonment imposed for two assaults on a different female drinking companion operated to reduce the leniency that his personal circumstances might otherwise have attracted. Moreover, the attack by the defendant upon his domestic partner was particularly brutal and has had grave consequences for her … The sentence did not give appropriate effect to the views consistently expressed by this Court concerning the need to give significant weight to considerations of specific and general deterrence when sentencing defendants who have engaged in serious domestic violence.”
The defendant was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
R v Neilson [2016] SASCFC 90 (19 August 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm x 1; Aggravated assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and one of the complainants (J) were divorced ([8]). The appellant went to the matrimonial house, where J lived with her new partner (M), the other complainant ([10]). The appellant pushed the J and M into the house. The appellant grabbed M around the throat, pushed her against a wall and punched her ([11]). The appellant picked J up off the floor and threw her onto the dining table ([13]). M suffered ongoing damage to her eye and both women suffered psychological consequences ([17]).
Issues: Whether the judge erred in not suspending the sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant had favourable personal circumstances, including his lack of criminal history, little risk of reoffending, remorse and lack of planning in the attack ([25]-[33]). Bampton J held that the sentence was within range, and those factors were reflected in the fixing of the non-parole period at approximately 42 percent of the head sentence ([41]). The favourable factors were appropriately balanced with the unfavourable factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the ongoing injuries, the fact that the offences were committed in the victims’ home, and the fact that the offences constituted domestic violence ([43]).
R v Ritter [2016] SASCFC 88 (16 August 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault causing harm’ – ‘Causing harm with intent’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to children’
Charge/s: Assault causing harm, causing harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim had been in a relationship for two years. His behaviour towards her had been violent and controlling. On 19 March 2014, the applicant was yelling abuse at the victim and she became so fearful she ran into the streets. He chased her and punched her in the face. On 22 April 2014, the applicant verbally abused the victim, hit her around the head with a pillow and punched her to the left side of her mouth. The second assault caused injuries requiring surgery. As a result of the two incidents, the victim had scars on the left and right sides of her mouth. There was also evidence of a number of uncharged acts. The applicant was sentenced to a total head sentence of six years and eleven months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of five years.
Issue/s:
1.
Fresh evidence, a psychologist’s report and a report from an officer of the Department of Correctional Services, ought to be admitted.
2.
The head sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in not having or seeking materials on which a proper assessment could be made of the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, Parker J held that the reports were not to be received as fresh evidence. The psychologist report could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, it added very little to what was before the sentencing judge, and the psychologist was not completely briefed on the applicant’s substantial criminal history. The report from Correctional Services also did not add anything significant to what would have been before the sentencing judge (see [50]-[67]).
Second, the head sentence was not manifestly excessive. This was in light of the gravity of the offending conduct, the abusive nature the relationship and the applicant’s significant criminal history of violence. Parker J further rejected the submission that the two sentences ought to have been served concurrently. The offending conduct occurred almost five weeks apart (see [78]-[86]). The non-parole period was also not manifestly excessive. Considerations of deterrence, prevention and punishment militated towards a relatively higher non-parole period, as did the nature of the offences and the context in which they occurred (see [87]-[91]).
Third, the sentencing judge did not err in concluding that the appellant had extremely poor prospects for rehabilitation. The appellant had a long criminal history, including numerous convictions for assaults (many involving domestic violence). He also had many convictions for breach of restraining orders, failure to comply with bail agreements and breaches of bonds (see [92]-[96]).
Parker J (Lovell and Nicholson JJ concurring) described the coercive control which the appellant subjected the victim to:
[19] When the victim was threatened or attacked by the appellant she would try to leave their flat, often running into nearby streets and parks and attempting to hide. The appellant would frequently chase her or track her down in order to continue his abuse.
[20] The appellant monitored the victim’s movements and rarely let her leave the house without him. He also controlled her finances, regularly forcing her to withdraw money from her account for his benefit, including so that he could buy drugs and alcohol.
[21] The appellant regularly threatened that if the victim reported any abuse to the police or left the relationship he would harm her and her children. She was too frightened to leave or to report the abuse to police, friends and family.
R v Gardiner [2015] SASCFC 107 (5 August 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the murder of his domestic partner. The applicant had camped with the victim in his car in an isolated location. The victim’s body was found in the car. Medical evidence relating to the nature of the injuries and the cause of death was led at trial. The trial judge found on the basis of this evidence that the victim suffered a severe beating. There was no dispute that the injuries were caused by the applicant. The trial was concerned with whether the evidence could prove that the injuries that the applicant inflicted caused her death and whether they were inflicted with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the guilty verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisite intent for murder.
2.
Whether the judge misinterpreted the medical evidence in concluding that severe force was required to cause a certain injury.
3.
Whether the judge misused evidence of the applicant’s post-offence conduct, such as not calling an ambulance while claiming he had.
Decision and Reasoning: L eave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.
1.
There was a long history of violence in the relationship. The applicant had previously been charged with assaulting the victim. In this context and also taking into account the extent and number of injuries suffered by the victim, Kourakis CJ (with whom Blue J and Stanley JJ agreed) held that the trial judge was correct in concluding that the evidence showed beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause grievous bodily harm.
2.
The Court acknowledged that the judge did mistakenly conclude that the doctor’s evidence indicated that severe force was required to cause an injury to the victim’s liver. However, the judge did not reason from this misunderstanding to reach her conclusion. Instead, the judge reasoned that the applicant had the requisite intention from evidence of all the injuries, not just evidence of the liver injury. The judge then correctly reasoned from the nature and extent of the injuries that the applicant had intended to cause grievous bodily harm.
3.
The applicant lied to various witnesses that he had called an ambulance but it had not arrived. In fact, he did not call an ambulance. The Court found that the judge correctly used this evidence to show that he was aware how badly the victim was injured, and that his failure to call an ambulance showed he possessed the requisite intention.
R v McDonald [2015] SASCFC 99 (29 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Contemporaneity between intention and action’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of murdering his de facto partner. It was not in dispute that he inflicted the blows that caused her death. The pathologist’s view was that the appellant inflicted at least 50 blows. The injuries were inflicted over several hours, possibly intermittently. The issue at trial was whether he had inflicted these blows with the requisite intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The appellant was highly intoxicated at the time of the incident.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred by not directing the jury of the following - that it is necessary that the intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm exists contemporaneously with the infliction of the injuries that caused the victim’s death.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [4].
2.
The Court agreed that parts of the judge’s directions amounted to an error of law. A correct direction was initially given by the trial judge. This was – ‘The prosecution must prove that at the time that McDonald struck any collection of blows the combined effect of which was to cause a degree of internal bleeding…which caused LT’s death, he intended to kill her or cause her grievous bodily harm’ (see at [29]). However, the judge then gave subsequent directions to the jury. These directions stated that it was sufficient that the appellant formed an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm when any of the blows were struck, even if that particular blow (struck with the requisite intent) did not contribute to or cause the internal bleeding that led to her death. Other directions given by the judge were not capable of correcting this error. However, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso.
See also at [33] where Kourakis CJ (with whom Sulan J and Parker J agreed) noted that the inference of intention, ‘overwhelmingly supported as it is by the evidence of the beating, is reinforced by the evidence of the prior violence to which the appellant subjected LT in their relationship and his admission that he was enraged at the time. The appellant is more likely by reason of those related circumstances to have formed an intention to cause grievous bodily harm relatively early on in the course of the beating.’
R v Capaldo [2015] SASCFC 56 (28 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of firearm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Various offences relating to the possession of a loaded, semi-automatic handgun.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: At trial, evidence was put before the judge relating to the violent behaviour of the appellant’s former partner. The appellant made a statement to police indicating that she obtained the handgun for her own protection. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence should have been suspended and whether the trial judge demonstrated pre-judgment and an appearance of bias.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. In a joint judgment, Gray and Sulan JJ found that the Judge impermissibly intervened in the trial process, giving rise to an appearance of bias in the eyes of a fair-minded lay observer. The judge constantly interrupted and in cross-examining the appellant, suggested that she was not willing to participate in a police interview, which was false. The Judge was also in error by not accepting the appellant’s explanation for the reasons that she possessed the firearm. The sentencing therefore proceeded on errors of fact. In resentencing, Gray and Sulan JJ acknowledged the serious nature of the offending, particularly that the gun was loaded and easily concealable. Counsel for the appellant conceded that a sentence of imprisonment was warranted. In mitigation, the appellant had no criminal history and had suffered serious abuse at the hands of her former partner, to the extent that she suffers from PTSD. As such, the head sentence was reduced to 17 months with a reduced non-parole period of 4 months and the sentence was also suspended upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour bond for 3 years. Kelly J also upheld the appeal but dissented with respect to re-sentencing and concluded that it should be remitted back to the District Court, given the disputed facts.
Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASCFC 58 (27 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Purpose of intervention orders’
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court who dismissed an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate who refused to make an interim intervention order.
Facts: The applicant brought an application for an interim intervention order in the Magistrates’ Court against the respondent (the applicant’s former girlfriend’s mother). The applicant claimed that the respondent had been bullying, cyber stalking and contacting his psychiatrist online and in person, as well as defaming him on the internet. The basis of his application was that it was reasonable to suspect that the respondent would commit an act of abuse against him by causing personal injury and criminal defamation on the internet. In the original appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court, Peek J dismissed every ground of appeal - see Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASC 37. The applicant had a long history of psychiatric issues, and a psychiatrist’s report detailed the impact of the websites on his general well-being (See at [31] of Peek J’s decision).
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the applicant had a sufficient opportunity to present his application in the Magistrates’ Court.
2.
Whether the Magistrate correctly applied ss 8 and 10 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act) which define different types of abuse and sets out general principles which the Court must follow in considering intervention orders.
3.
Whether the Magistrate correctly exercised her discretion to refuse the applicant’s application and whether she should have found that there was evidence which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the respondent would commit an act of abuse.
4.
Whether the Magistrate correctly applied ss 6, 10 and 28 of the Act which set out what must be proven in an intervention order application.
Decision and Reasoning: All aspects of the Supreme Court decision (Peek J - Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASC 37) were upheld by the Full Court.
1.
This argument had no substance – he appeared before the Magistrate on four occasions. The Magistrate was concerned to ascertain the detail of the case.
2.
Peek J (in the Supreme Court) noted at [14]-[15] that the purpose of the Act is to, ‘protect people when it is reasonable to suspect that somebody…will, without intervention, commit an act of abuse’. His Honour also noted that because abuse is defined so broadly, it is important for the courts to ensure that this does not result in the Act being abused through ‘specious or unwarranted claims’ which will have ‘detrimental consequences’ to the courts and to people who become the subject of unwarranted orders. The Magistrate correctly applied the Act to conclude that it was not reasonable to suspect that without an intervention order there would be any further abuse.
3.
In dismissing ground 3, the Court noted that the crucial issue is not whether acts of abuse had been committed in the past, but whether, without an intervention order, such acts would be committed again, and whether the imposition of such an order is appropriate in the circumstances.
4.
The Court found the Magistrate correctly approached the task in the application which was to decide whether there was a reasonable suspicion that an act of abuse would occur.
R v Koch [2015] SASCFC 31 (27 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Causing serious harm with intent’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of guilty plea’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: C riminal trespass in a place of residence, causing serious harm with intent and using a motor vehicle without consent.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim of the offending was the mother of the respondent’s former partner. After entering her house by the back door, he questioned her about his relationship with her daughter. He became enraged, at which point he restrained her, pushed her to the floor and punched her multiple times to the side of the head. He provided no medical assistance to her and left her lying unconscious on the floor. The victim sustained lasting injuries as a result of the offending. The sentencing judge’s starting point was 6 years’ imprisonment. Taking into account his pleas of guilty, the respondent was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning:
In granting permission and allowing the appeal, the Court noted the high maximum penalties, (life imprisonment for criminal trespass and 20 years for causing serious harm with intent) and the relatively insignificant mitigating factors. The offending was ‘particularly brutal’ (See at [35]). Parker J (Kourakis CJ and Bampton J concurring) held that the notional starting point of 6 years was manifestly inadequate and the sentence itself was not adequate to amount to general deterrence or just punishment. See in particular at [42] – ‘General deterrence is a very important consideration in sentencing for offences of violence committed in the course of domestic disputes. The sentence imposed fails to provide the level of general deterrence necessary to ensure public confidence in the enforcement of the criminal law in this fraught area.’ The Court also found that the trial judge’s 25% discount for the guilty plea was too high. The respondent ‘had no practicable option other than to plead guilty’ (see at [46]), which needed to be taken into account in determining the quantum of the discount. The total effective sentence was therefore increased to six years and eight months (applying a 20% discount for the guilty plea), with the non-parole period set at four years and two months.
Groom v Police [2014] SASCFC 125 (19 November 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Consent to confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court.
Facts: After the appeal in Groom v Police (No 3) was upheld, the matter was remitted back to the Magistrates’ Court, where confirmation of the interim intervention order was again made. The applicant consented to the order following negotiation with the prosecution who agreed to withdraw 31 charges for breach of the order. The applicant then appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court (Kelly J), and argued that consent should be withdrawn because he was under ‘enormous stress’ and had been ‘railroaded’ (See at [7]). Kelly J refused permission to appeal because the applicant’s counsel had been properly briefed to represent him in the Magistrates’ Court, the consent to the confirmation was informed, the applicant was present throughout the process and he raised no objection and confirmed to the Magistrate that he would accept the order. This was different to the hearing considered in Groom v Police (No 3), where the applicant was in custody and believed he could not properly defend the proceedings.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant could withdraw his consent to the intervention order and have the confirmation set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: Permission to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted to the Full Court that he was denied natural justice because he was not provided with a copy of the transcript from the Magistrates’ Court hearing, and questioned the ‘officiality’ of the transcript on which Kelly J had relied. He also questioned the behavior of members of Police Prosecutions in relation to their conduct with the transcript. The appeal was dismissed – the Court held that the applicant did not identify how the missing transcript caused prejudice. The differences in the arguments in this appeal compared to Groom v Police (No 3) were stark. It is likely that the applicant’s ‘ongoing and deeply felt grievance against his former partner’ were the cause of the continuing appeals rather than any legal error.
R v Barnes [2014] SASCFC 79 (18 July 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault causing harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing harm (two counts) – Circumstance of aggravation: that the victim was the defendant’s domestic partner.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant discovered messages from his cousin to his de facto partner on her phone. After waking her up at 3am to question her about these messages, he hit her on the left side of the head before he gave her time to explain. This caused bleeding. He then pinned her down after she tried to break free. Their son, who was sleeping in the same room, witnessed the defendant hitting the complainant. A similar incident occurred the following evening. The defendant punched her to the right of the face with a closed fist and hit her in the right eye. He tried to strangle the complainant who could still breathe so she pretended to pass out. He held up her phone, put it on a coffee table and stomped on it which caused the phone and the table to break. After carrying their son towards his bedroom, he kicked her on the lower back despite her begging him not to hit her again. His criminal history included many driving offences as well as dishonesty and drug offences. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for each count to be served cumulatively, with a non-parole period of 18 months. The judge stated he reduced the sentence by 25% on account of the guilty plea.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the sentences should have been made concurrent.
3.
Whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in respect of concurrency.
1.
Gray J (with whom Peek and Stanley JJ agreed) firstly noted that the offences were unprovoked. The defendant was woken from sleep and defenceless. The Court then acknowledged the various mitigating factors, including the defendant taking steps towards rehabilitation and the fact that he had formed a new relationship with no evidence of domestic violence. However, in applying the authorities which indicate the seriousness of domestic violence and the need for strong personal and general deterrence and noting the defendant’s long criminal history of defying court orders, the Court held that a head sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence was open. See in particular from [17] – [22] for a summary of the relevant authorities.
2.
The Court noted that when there are two truly separate occurrences of criminal conduct, cumulative sentences are likely to be appropriate. When a number of offences form a course of criminal conduct, concurrent sentences are likely to be appropriate. As such, the Court held that the sentence should have included some element of concurrency because the offending was, in substance, a course of conduct separated by a short period of time. Partial concurrency of 6 months was appropriate. As such, the 18 month sentence for the second count was made concurrent for 6 months, so that the total effective sentence became 2 years and 6 months.
3.
This argument was rejected. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to not suspend the sentence notwithstanding the applicable mitigating factors. The offending was extremely serious, cowardly and brutal. Furthermore, it partly took place in the presence of a child, who became distressed on the second occasion.
R v Nedza [2013] SASCFC 142 (18 December 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempting to dissuade a witness’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Concurrency’ – ‘Creating risk of harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Rape (two counts), creating a risk of harm, attempting to dissuade a witness, breach of bail, breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attended the home of his former partner and then proceeded to threaten her with a knife, assault her multiple times, commit two acts of anal rape, threaten her daughter and parents and caused her to swallow petrol. He had possession of a cigarette lighter and threatened to set her alight. He also pressed the knife against their sleeping baby’s cheek. The respondent then, through his sister offered to pay the complainant money if she dropped the charges. All of the conduct was in breach of bail and a domestic violence restraining order. The respondent’s criminal history included multiple instances of prior violent offences committed against the complainant and her mother which demonstrate a pattern of domestic violence. The respondent pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 10 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and six months, imposed concurrently with a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment for different offences.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Permission to appeal was granted and the respondent was re-sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years. The Crown submitted that the sentence failed to reflect the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence (personal and general). Gray J (with whom Stanley J agreed) agreed with this argument and noted the offending involved various aggravating factors including that it was committed in breach of bail and the restraining order, the presence of children, the use of a knife and the putting of a knife on the head of a sleeping baby. His Honour concluded that the sentencing judge did not give sufficient consideration to these mitigating factors.
See in particular at [46] – ‘In seeking and obtaining a restraining order against the defendant, the complainant had sought the law’s protection against violence inflicted by her former partner, the defendant. Despite this and in breach of that restraining order, the complainant was again the victim of violent offending of a most serious nature. The restraining order ought to have demonstrated to the defendant in the clearest terms the seriousness with which domestic violence is regarded both by the courts and by wider society. The fact that the offending occurred in breach of that order is a serious matter of aggravation and a significant factor in my conclusion that the sentence imposed by the Judge was manifestly inadequate.’
Nicholson J also upheld the appeal and made the same orders but made some additional comments regarding concurrency and double punishment in sentencing. His Honour noted that it was appropriate to deal with the breaches of bail and restraining orders (both summary offences) together with the more serious offences. However, it was important to avoid any double punishment in doing so, especially when the more serious offences were ‘aggravated by and assumed colour and context from’ (see at [102]) the summary breach offences. The trial judge ordered separate sentences and made them partially or wholly concurrent. However, ‘the success of this approach depends upon being able to notionally but accurately separate out that component of the sentence nominated for the two summary offences which represents the aggravating feature with respect to the principal offences. Only by being able to do this can a sentencing Judge accurately identify the extent to which, if at all, partial or full concurrency ought to be ordered. Adopting the approach of sentencing separately for the two summary offences where those offences also aggravated the principal offences enhances the risk of an overall under-punishment or over (double) punishment (see at [103])’ – (see further at [105]). His Honour concluded that in this case, the best approach was to impose a single sentence for all offences as opposed to ordering individual sentences with partial and whole concurrency periods. Concurrency and totality however still should not be overlooked when employing that approach.
R v M, AG [2013] SASCFC 39 (24 May 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Rape x 5; Theft x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant was the victim’s (M) former partner ([1]). The defendant had been arrested and granted bail on multiple occasions for offences committed against M ([6]-[10]). The present offences occurred when the defendant attended M’s home while on bail. He pushed her into the house, leaving their baby in the car. He took a sledgehammer that M left inside her house for her own protection. He threatened to rape her with it, and then proceeded to force her to perform fellatio on him, vaginally and anally raped her, and forced the hammer of the sledgehammer into her vagina ([12]).
The defendant initially pleaded not guilty and provided an alibi notice, but after the prosecution presented him with evidence disproving the alibi notice, the defendant pleaded guilty ([15]). The defendant was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. The judge declined to make an intervention order ([2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate and whether the judge erred in failing to make an intervention order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was almost doubled to 13 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years ([55]). The Court also imposed an intervention order with the sentence ([64]).
Sulan J (Vanstone and Peek JJ agreeing) held that the sentencing judge appeared to have overlooked the brutality and seriousness of the offending and placed too much weight on the appellant's personal circumstances ([45]-[46]). His Honour said that ‘personal and general deterrence must take precedence over the personal circumstances of the defendant’ ([46]).
The offences were serious because they occurred in the victim’s own home ([29]), the defendant had a criminal history that suggested a disregard for the law ([34]) and the terrifying nature of the weapon used ([41]). The pleas of guilty did not demonstrate genuine contrition, coming only after his alibi evidence had been disproved ([47]). The fact that the defendant and victim were previously in a relationship was not a mitigating factor ([42]).
R v Maiolo (No 2) [2013] SASCFC 36 (16 May 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence of discreditable conduct’ – ‘Evidence of initial complaint’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unlawful sexual intercourse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault (five counts), Unlawful sexual intercourse (four counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Three of the complainants were sisters. The fourth complainant was the appellant’s daughter. The appellant’s partner was the elder sister of the three complainants but was not a complainant.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned -
1.
Whether the evidence of one of the sisters established an initial complainant within the meaning of s 34M(6) of the Evidence Act 1929.
2.
Whether evidence of previous ‘uncharged acts’ constituted relationship evidence, and whether the trial judge correctly directed the jury in relation to the permissible use of such evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
At trial, there was evidence that one of the sisters had a conversation with police and a counsellor regarding allegations of sexual misbehaviour by the appellant. The content of these conversations were unclear and it was not clear whether the sister was referring to sexual offending against herself or other persons. The trial judge directed the jury to the effect that they could use this evidence to assess (and possibly bolster) her evidence as well as the evidence of the other complainants. This was an error of law – the complaint was not sufficiently clear. The complaint did not make clear who the subject of the offending was. It was also unclear which particular incident it referred to. The convictions were set aside.
2.
Evidence of prior ‘uncharged acts’ were admitted under s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 as relationship evidence. See at [50]-[52] where Peek J, (with whom Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreed) outlined the operation of s 34P in its common law context. Section 34R required the judge to (among other things) explain the purpose for which such evidence can and cannot be used. The trial judge, in her directions to the jury, referred to the evidence in question throwing light on the ‘nature of the relationship’ or providing ‘context’ (see at [110]). She did not elaborate further on the purpose of the evidence. Peek J found that these directions were deficient. See at [111] - ‘With respect, the use of vague words such as “context” or “relationship” without specific elaboration and guidance to the jury was rightly criticised by Doyle CJ in R v Nieterink [1999] SASC 560 where his Honour made the important point that while evidence of uncharged acts may be admissible under heads of relevance which tend to recur in various cases that come before the courts, it is crucial that the Judge, first, positively determines that the particular evidence of discreditable conduct does satisfy a head of relevance in the particular case and, second, gives very clear directions as to how such evidence may, and may not, be used.’ See also at [54]-[57], where his Honour commented on the construction of s 34P and specifically how to determine whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect on the accused.
R v Fleming [2011] SASCFC 41 (10 May 2011) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of domestic violence inadvertently led’ – ‘Persistent sexual exploitation’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Persistent sexual exploitation.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of persistent exploitation of a five-and-a-half-year-old girl. The prosecution alleged that the appellant had been in a relationship with the girl’s mother and that he committed at least more than one act of sexual exploitation. At trial, evidence was inadvertently admitted that the complainant was seeing a domestic violence counsellor. Further evidence about the appellant’s aggressive and sometimes violent behaviour was also put before the Court. Following a question from the jury during deliberations, the judge directed the jury to ignore all of the evidence relating to the domestic violence counsellor and the appellant’s aggressive behaviour because it was not relevant to whether the appellant had committed the offences.
Issue/s: Whether the judge should have discharged the jury after the evidence of alleged domestic violence by the appellant was inadvertently led. Alternatively, whether the directions given by the trial judge when he refused to discharge the jury were inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: David J (Kourakis J and Sulan J concurring) dismissed the appeal. David J firstly noted at [23] that, ‘in cases involving allegations of sexual impropriety in domestic situations evidence of extraneous violence is often allowed for many reasons. Such evidence is often relevant to the question of the relationship between the parties or providing a reason or reasons as to why an alleged victim may not complain.’ This did not apply in this case, as the prosecution did not seek to introduce the evidence. Rather, it came out inadvertently. While David J was concerned that the judge’s direction could have given the jury an impression that there was some ‘sinister impermissible material’ (see at [31]) that had not been introduced, his directions regarding the irrelevance of the evidence were clear and he correctly warned against propensity reasoning. As such, while the situation was not ideal, it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.
R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 53 A Crim R 362; (1992) 56 SASR 114; [1991] SASC 2951 (28 June 1991) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychologist’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The two female appellants were in a relationship with a man named Hill. There was a consistent pattern of domineering and violent conduct by Hill towards both appellants. The appellants were part of a plan to help Hill forcibly confine the complainant and cause her injury. At trial, they sought to admit expert evidence of ‘battered woman syndrome’ to support a claim of duress. The trial judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible on the ground that the test for duress was objective and expert evidence of the state of mind of the appellants was therefore irrelevant.
Issue/s: Whether the expert evidence of battered woman syndrome ought to have been admissible to support a claim of duress.
Decision and Reasoning: King CJ (with whom Bollen and Legoe JJ agreed) held that the evidence ought to have been admissible and a re-trial was ordered. In reaching this decision, King CJ first held that the trial judge’s reason did not provide a sound basis for excluding the evidence. It ignored the subjective aspect of the test for duress and it also misunderstood the main thrust of the proffered evidence. While the expert might have been in a position to comment on the state of mind of the appellants, the primary thrust of such evidence was to establish a pattern of responses commonly exhibited by battered women. At [23]:
‘The proffered evidence is concerned not so much with the particular responses of these appellants as with what would be expected of women generally, that is to say women of reasonable firmness, who should find themselves in a domestic situation such as that in which the appellants were. It is designed to assist the court in assessing whether women of reasonable firmness would succumb to the pressure to participate in the offences. It also serves to explain why even a woman of reasonable firmness would not escape the situation rather than participate in criminal activity. As such it is relevant’.
Second, King CJ considered whether expert evidence of battered woman syndrome met the essential pre-requisite that it had been accepted by experts in the field of psychology or psychiatry as a scientifically accepted facet of psychology. Following significant consideration of scientific literature, at [24] and [26], King CJ held that the evidence was admissible:
‘It is not sufficient, in order to justify the admission of expert evidence of the battered woman syndrome, as was argued by counsel for the appellant, that the ordinary juror would have no experience of the situation of a battered woman. Jurors are constantly expected to judge of situations, and of the behaviour of people in situations, which are outside their experience. Much conduct which occupies the attention of the criminal courts occurs in the criminal underworld, or in sordid conditions and situations, of which jurors would generally have no experience. It is not considered to be beyond the capacity of juries, or of the Court if it is the trier of the facts, to judge of the reactions and behaviour of people in those situations. Expert evidence of how life in criminal or sordid conditions might affect a person's responses to situations, would not be admitted.
‘This is an area in which the courts must move with great caution. The admission of expert evidence of patterns of behaviour of normal human beings, even in abnormal situations or relations, is fraught with danger for the integrity of the trial process. The risk that, by degrees, trials, especially criminal trials, will become battle grounds for experts and that the capacity of juries and courts to discharge their fact-finding functions will be thereby impaired is to be taken seriously. I have considered anxiously whether the situation of the habitually battered woman is so special and so outside ordinary experience that the knowledge of experts should be made available to courts and juries called upon to judge behaviour in such situations. In the end, I have been impressed by what I have read of the insights which have been gained by special study of the subject, insights which I am sure would not be shared or shared fully by ordinary jurors. It seems to me that a just judgment of the actions of women in those situations requires that the court or jury have the benefit of the insights which have been gained’.
Supreme Court
R v Gawel [2021] SASC 67 (1 June 2021) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Covid-19 delays’ – ‘Home detention’ – ‘No prior domestic violence convictions’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 2, Choke, suffocate or strangle a person in a domestic setting x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of bail.
Issues: Whether special circumstances justified bail.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in a domestic relationship. The applicant was convicted of trespass offences and released on home detention bail. Within 48 hours of his release, the applicant was charged with three domestic violence offences, remanded in custody, and denied bail. The applicant applied for a review of the Magistrate’s decision, arguing that if he was denied bail his time spent in custody would likely exceed the sentence imposed if convicted of the alleged domestic violence offences [1]-[3].
Decision and Reasoning: Bail granted.
Justice Parker found that special circumstances existed to justify the applicant’s release on bail for two reasons:
1.
The applicant’s time spent in custody would likely exceed the sentence imposed if convicted.
2.
The applicant was no longer in a relationship with the victim and the proposed home detention bail address was 13 km from the victim’s home [1]-[2].
His Honour granted bail on strict home detention conditions, with electronic monitoring and a guarantee by the applicant’s friend with whom he would be residing [2]. His Honour adopted the reasoning of Livesey J in Homsi v The Queen [2020] SASC 242, who found that a ‘delay of… two years until… trial when combined with the fact that the complainant was no longer in a relationship with the applicant and that her whereabouts were not known to him was sufficient to amount to special circumstances’ [23]. His Honour accepted the applicant’s submission that ‘based on the most recent District Court listings’ the applicant faced two years in custody awaiting trial [10]. His Honour noted that this delay was due to Covid-19. Furthermore, His Honour found that the applicant’s ‘alleged conduct [was] less serious than… in Homsi’ and noted that he had no prior domestic violence convictions [25], [27].
Homsi v The Queen [2020] SASC 242 (8 December 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Impact of covid19’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Unlawful imprisonment’ – ‘Victim credibility’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: 9 charges including aggravated assault, unlawful imprisonment and detention and unlawful choking under s 20A(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), most in circumstances of aggravation, that the applicant committed the offence knowing the complainant was a person with whom he was, or was formerly, in a relationship.
Facts: The applicant was in custody from April 2020. The charges relate to incidents of alleged violence towards the male applicant’s female partner in November and December 2019. The November incidents included allegations of threatening and forcing the complainant to take her to a car using a knife and shooting her with a gel pellet gun repeatedly over a 2 hour period.
The December allegations include refusing the complainant permission to leave her apartment while seriously assaulting her, including hitting the complainant in the head twice with the blunt side of a machete, slapping her in the face, threatening her whilst holding the machete, stating that the applicant was “going to gaol today for murder”, putting a blowtorch near the complainant’s face and, later, holding a pillow against her face, restricting the complainant’s breathing, causing her to fear that she might lose consciousness. On the same day, two superficial lacerations were caused to the complainant’s throat with the machete, together with a large defensive laceration to the complainant’s finger. She escaped and contacted police and a blowtorch and machete were recovered from the scene. Police abandoned a chase for safety reasons and the complainant was subsequently found to be resident in Victoria.
The applicant has a history of failure to comply with bail conditions. A prosecutor initially expressed concerns as to the complainant’s credibility and did not oppose bail in the Magistrates Court, seemingly because the complainant visited the applicant in Victoria and has a serious drug dependency. At the time of the instant application these concerns were expressed as matters for trial.
Proceedings: Application for review of denial of bail.
Issues: As a prescribed applicant within the meaning of s 10(2) of the Bail Act 1985 (SA), the applicant must show "special circumstances" within the meaning of s 10A(1) of the Act.
Held: Application allowed:
1.
Special circumstances exist for two reasons:
(a)
While the alleged offending is very serious, the applicant and the complainant are no longer in a relationship and the complainant's whereabouts are not known to the applicant. The prosecution accepts that there are issues regarding the credibility of the complainant.
(b)
The applicant has been in custody in connection with these matters since April 2020. The matter is unlikely to be tried until the first half of 2022, with the delays exacerbated by the recent lockdowns associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.
Bail is granted on strict home detention conditions, supported by a guarantee.
R v Sumner [2020] SASC 231 (4 December 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault against a child or spouse x 8; Choke, suffocate or strangle a person in a domestic setting x 3; Aggravated threaten to kill or endanger life x 1; Aggravated assault that causes harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of bail.
Facts: The allegations related to the applicant man’s former domestic partner and their two year old daughter. The applicant was originally granted bail by a Magistrate in May 2020, which was then revoked on an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to review the decision. An application for bail before the Chief Magistrate in September 2020 was refused. This review application related to a further refusal of an application for bail made in November 2020. The key factor that the respondent relied on was that the complainants had moved to Queensland.
Issues: Whether the complainants’ move to Queensland altered the position such that it could be said there were “special circumstances”, pursuant to s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA).
Decision and reasoning: Bail was granted under strict home detention conditions.
The applicant was a prescribed person for the purposes of s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) which provides that bail is not to be granted unless the applicant demonstrates the existence of special circumstances justifying release on bail. The court was also required to have regard to the matters specified in s 10, including the gravity of the alleged offences (s 10(1)(a)) and the need that the victim may have, or perceive, for physical protection from the applicant (s 10(4)) (at [11]).
Not without hesitation, the Court was prepared to conclude that there was a fundamental change of circumstances with the complainants’ relocation to Queensland. This, in combination with other matters, particularly the support from the applicant’s father, the proposal of monitored, home detention bail in the applicant’s family home and the applicant’s lack of offending history outside of the relationship, was capable of amounting to special circumstances justifying the applicant’s release on bail (at [31]). Had the complainants not moved to Queensland for their protection the Court would have refused bail (at [32]).
Brook v Police [2020] SASC 131 (16 July 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Appeal against conviction by magistrate’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Stepchild in the family’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal.
Facts: The appellant man and the complainant’s mother were domestic partners. The complainant (child) gave evidence that his mother told him it was not safe for him to be at home and told him to go to his father’s house. The complainant did not leave the house and later had a verbal exchange with the appellant. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat, he then pushed him, and the complainant fell. The appellant straddled the complainant and punched him multiple times. The appellant relied on the defences of removing a trespasser and self-defence.
Grounds for appeal: (1) The magistrate wrongly rejected the appellant’s barrister’s application to appear as amicus curiae; (2) The magistrate erred in refusing to disqualify himself for apprehended bias; (3) The magistrate erred in his approach to witness evidence.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed on Ground 3. Conviction quashed and matter remitted to a different magistrate. (1) Administration of justice overwhelmingly favoured giving leave to counsel to appear as amicus curiae. However, the magistrate’s error in failing to allow counsel to appear did not cause a miscarriage of justice. (2) The course the magistrate took in relation to the trial, including allegedly referring to the complainant as the ‘victim’, did not establish any substantial ground for a reasonable apprehension of bias. (3) The magistrate based his rejection of the mother’s evidence on the acceptance of the child’s evidence. Appeal allowed based on errors in assessing witness evidence as well as a failure to consider the defence of removing a trespasser.
BRK v Police [2020] SASC 116 (26 June 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Home detention’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Property damage’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; property damage x 1; resist police x 1; breach of intervention order x 2
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist.
Facts: The appellant man was sentenced to 5 months and 2 weeks imprisonment suspended after 2 months upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour bond for 2 years. At sentencing the appellant conceded incarceration was appropriate but argued it should either be wholly suspended under s 96 Sentencing Act 2017 (the ‘Act’) or served on home detention pursuant to s 71 of the Act.
The appellant and his daughter argued and she rang her mother (the victim and his former domestic partner) to ask her to collect her. The appellant was argumentative, aggressive and assaulted the victim by pushing her towards the wall. The appellant also damaged the victim’s vehicle. A mental health assessment deemed the appellant suicidal (he had a history of depression and bi-polar disorder). He resisted police when arrested 5 days later and breached an intervention order by failing to attend the Safe Relationships Abuse Prevention Program, and sending a SMS message to the victim asking for a character reference.
Grounds: That the Magistrate erred:
1.
By imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive in that an immediate custodial sentence was imposed and the sentence was not wholly suspended;
2.
In the alternative to ground 1, in declining to order that the custodial sentence be served on home detention under s 71;
3.
In erring in the approach taken to the ‘sentencing hierarchy’, in particular, the interpretation and application of ss 71 and 96.
4.
In the alternative to ground 3, in failing to provide adequate reasons for refusing to order that the appellant serve the custodial sentence on home detention.
Held:
1.
The Magistrate erred in failing to consider whether the sentence of imprisonment should be served on home detention. Section 71(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) does not prevent a sentencing court from considering home detention where partial suspension is in contemplation.
2.
The Magistrate erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for declining to order that the term of imprisonment be served on home detention.
3.
The parties will be heard on the factual basis on which the Court should exercise its discretion when considering whether to re-sentence the appellant.
It is a benefit of suspension under s 96 that a bond with a duration longer than the period of incarceration can be imposed with scope for supervision and directed counselling to facilitate ongoing rehabilitation [98]. Home detention cannot be ‘partially’ ordered under s 71, only ordered for the whole term of a sentence of imprisonment. If some period of imprisonment is considered necessary home detention must be rejected in favour of partial suspension [101]. In deciding whether to make a home detention order, the paramount consideration is community safety, whether that is the offender’s family in the case of domestic violence or the community generally [102]. Another important factor is whether a home detention order "would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice", in which case it must not be made. The sentencing court must consider the impact home detention is likely to have on the victim, spouse, domestic partner or any other person residing with the offender ([103]). The sentencing court must also reflect on whether home detention exposes the community and domestic violence victims to safety risks. The fact that the Magistrate was prepared to partially suspend the sentence suggested the appellant is not currently thought to represent an immediate threat. It also appeared that the appellant had been on bail without incident pending the outcome of this appeal [104].
As his Honour had little information about the steps taken to assist with the appellant’s rehabilitation, the availability of courses or counselling for his difficulties in managing violence and intimate relationships, and his current work and family circumstances, he proposed to stand the matter over for further submissions or evidence on the factual basis on which the Court should exercise its discretion when considering whether to re-sentence the appellant [106].
Note: On 17 July 2020 the appellant withdrew this appeal with the result that the appeal was dismissed and the matter did not proceed to resentencing.
Coleman v Police [2020] SASC 66 (30 April 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Withdrawal and restoration of plea’ – ‘Withdrawal of legal representation’
Offences: Assault x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issue: Whether the appellant’s lack of legal representation when he entered guilty pleas amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, assaulted his female ex-partner by punching her three or four times in the face and throwing a shoe at her. He had been represented by different solicitors from the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement in the Magistrates Court on at least four occasions with respect to the charge, but the matter had not been progressed. The appellant’s solicitor withdrew from the file after the appellant indicated in open court that he wanted to plead guilty and "get it over and done with" [6]. The Magistrate informed the appellant that she was "likely, potentially to impose a period of imprisonment as a penalty" [6]. She sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and imposed an intervention order prohibiting him from contacting the victim, except for telephone or text contact for the purpose of child access arrangements. The appellant appealed on the ground that he had not been represented and therefore the Magistrate should not have accepted his guilty plea, and that the Magistrate misled him about the consequences that would flow from the pleas and induced the appellant to plead at the hearing.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal, holding that there had been no miscarriage of justice due to lack of legal representation. The appellant understood the charges to which he was pleading, the Magistrate explained the seriousness of the offences and that the appellant was likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment, and the appellant volunteered his wish to plead [14]. The appellant had also been legally represented over the several months prior to the hearing and had accepted an opportunity to receive legal advice [20]. His Honour emphasised that the appellant was entitled to proceed unrepresented and that "the withdrawal of legal representation before the appellant entered his pleas is not, in isolation, a ground which can justify appellate interference" [20].
His Honour also held that there was no miscarriage of justice in respect of the appellant being induced to plea, because the appellant entered his pleas voluntarily, "free of any pressure or threat" [19].
Butler v The Queen [2020] SASC 74 (16 April 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic to bail application’ – ‘Weapon-protection order’
Offences: Aggravated assault x 2, contravention of intervention order
Proceedings: Application for review of bail
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist for the granting of bail.
Facts: The appellant man was charged with aggravated assault against his female former partner on two separate occasions and contravention of an intervention order. The appellant punched the back of the victim’s head, struck her with a water bottle, and punched and kicked her in the head on several occasions. A Magistrate refused bail but the appellant sought a review of this decision, contending that special circumstances existed for the granting of bail, pursuant to s 10A Bail Act 1985 (SA).
Judgment: Kourakis CJ dismissed the appellant’s application for review of the bail decision, holding that no combination of the appellant’s circumstances was sufficient to constitute special circumstances indicating that he, as someone charged with assaulting a domestic partner in breach of an intervention order, should be admitted to bail [5]. His Honour did note the systematic and endemic disadvantage of Indigenous people [7] (particularly where they are imprisoned [8]) and the burden of being imprisoned during the COVID-19 pandemic with its attendant restrictions [9]. However, His Honour ultimately held that the presumption against bail applies to all bail (even home detention bail) [14] and the appellant failed to establish special circumstances. Furthermore, the appellant had breached bail orders and intervention orders in past and the charged offences were serious in themselves [4]. His Honour highlighted that "the underlying problem is not [the appellant’s] relationship with the victim … but the alleged resort to violence in dealing with interpersonal conflict" [15]. His Honour did provide that a fresh review of the question of bail would arise, however, if it appeared in the future that a trial was a long way off or that the appellant’s mental health was deteriorating [17].
Peel v Police [2020] SASC 48 (7 April 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Breach of suspended sentence’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Protection order’
Offences: Contravening a term of an intervention order x2; aggravated assault x1; failing to comply with a bail agreement x1; and driving under disqualification or suspension x 1
Type of Appeal: Appeal against sentence following breach of suspended sentence of imprisonment
Ground: The Sentencing Magistrate erred in the exercise of his discretion pursuant to s 114(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 in that:
•
the learned Magistrate did not give adequate or appropriate consideration to the terms of the section and the meaning of "proper grounds" therein; and
•
gave undue weight to considerations personal to the Appellant including his criminal history, as opposed to the circumstances of the breach itself, such that the sentencing process miscarried.
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order, aggravated assault, failing to comply with a bail agreement and driving under disqualification or suspension on 2 September 2019. He was sentenced to four months and 15 days imprisonment to be suspended after one month upon entering into a 15 months good behaviour bond. With backdating the bond was entered into on 13 September 2019. Since 17 October 2016 the appellant had been the subject of an intervention order for three years. Condition 3 of the order read "the defendant must not be within 100 metres of the protected persons". The appellant breached this order by being found with the protected person (his female former partner) in the front yard of his family member on 23 October 2019. He was visiting family and while he was at their home the protected person attended. He did not know she would be there and nothing untoward happened between them. It was a chance encounter and by not leaving immediately, the appellant was found to have breached a good behaviour bond and convicted of contravening a term of the intervention order. The Magistrate sentencing him to three weeks imprisonment and at the same time revoked the suspended sentence bond and ordering that the appellant serve the remaining time in imprisonment [3]. An application was made before the sentencing Magistrate providing that the Magistrate "should find that there were proper grounds to say that the failure to comply with the conditions of the suspended sentence bond should be excused and that no further action should be taken in respect to that failure" [4].
Judgment: The appeal was allowed and the suspended sentence of three months and 15 days was revoked. David AJ stated that "[t]he question whether there are proper grounds for excusing the breach is to be confined to the nature of the breach itself without any consideration of matters personal to the offender. That principle has been clearly stated in Heritage" [15]. The sentencing Magistrate was found to have gone beyond this principle and was instead influenced by the previous offending [15]. In considering this, the sentencing Magistrate was found to have erred.
Healy v Police [2020] SASC 40 (19 March 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘General deterrence outweighed personal circumstances’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Property settlement’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault upon his wife (complainant), with whom he was now separated. There was some variance about the facts. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and complainant were experiencing domestic difficulties. The complainant came into their bedroom, looking for her mobile phone. On the prosecution case, the appellant pushed her to the dresser and moved her face in the direction of her phone. Such conduct was clearly against her will and involved force ([4]-[5]).
The sentencing Magistrate regarded the offending as ‘out of character’ and unlikely to be repeated but was concerned about general deterrence for this type of behaviour, which involved violence towards female partners. He placed less reliance on personal deterrence and considered that the recording of a conviction could potentially affect the appellant’s future employment. Nevertheless, he recorded a conviction on the basis of general deterrence ([7]), and sentenced the appellant to a $200 good behaviour bond for a period of 18 months.
Issue: The appellant appealed on the basis that the sentencing Magistrate erred in recording a conviction and did not consider the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his low risk of re-offending, the impact of a conviction on his employment and the background of the offending ([8]-[9]).
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s personal circumstances were noted at [6]. He had no criminal history, had already spent 9 hours in custody, and was employed as an electrician. The appellant and his wife no longer lived together and Family Court proceedings in relation to their property were finalised. Further, there had been no contact between the parties as a result of an intervention order.
The Court dismissed the appeal as no error could be demonstrated. The sentencing Magistrate considered all matters relevant to the appellant’s personal circumstances and was entitled to approach the matter by considering that general deterrence outweighed those matters. He was also entitled to be concerned about the prevalence and nature of domestic violence.
Miller v Police [2020] SASC 20 (13 February 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application made out of time’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Recording’
Charges: 1 x contravening a term of an intervention order
Case type: Application for permission to appeal out of time against an order for costs made by a Magistrate.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with contravening a term of an intervention order, the protected person was called at trial by the prosecution to give evidence. The evidence included the victim’s recording of an offending phone call, a copy of which was tendered. After she gave evidence, the prosecution closed its case and she was released. The Magistrate found a case to answer and the matter was adjourned. During the adjourned period, the victim was charged with property damage to the applicant’s vehicle. Consequently, the applicant applied for the witness to be recalled to cross-examine her further because of this behaviour. The Magistrate allowed the prosecution case to be reopened and reversed his ruling that there was a case to answer in order that the victim might be cross-examined. The victim could not be found as she had been released from giving further evidence. The Court issued a witness summons for her return, however, she was not served the summons. It was clear that she believed the matter was finished at least to the extent that her participation was concerned ([2]-[4]).
The applicant sought his costs. The Magistrate ordered that no costs should be allowed with respect to all appearances and work done up to and inclusive of the date of trial, but costs were granted for a number of hearing attendances after that date, albeit at an amount lower than that sought by the applicant ([9]).
A police officer who attended the scene gave evidence of two tranches of the appellant’s brother, Stephen’s, statements and conduct:
•
The first tranche was that Stephen ‘loudly told police to leave the property and shut the front door’.
•
The second was that when told the appellant was arrested for assaulting the complainant, Stephen stated ‘If she’s saying those things she needs to be dealt with. She needs to learn the Aboriginal way’.
Issue: The applicant sought permission to appeal the Magistrate’s orders as to costs. This application was made around 4 months out of time. The applicant submitted that he should be awarded appropriate costs up to the time the Magistrate found there was a case to answer, and that there should not have been a reduction to the costs awarded for work done after the trial date.
Held: The applicant submitted that he was successful in the matter as no conviction was recorded and no finding of guilt was made. As a result, he contended that costs should follow the event and that he should be awarded appropriate costs up to the time that the Magistrate found that there was a case to answer ([10]). The respondent submitted that the question of costs is discretionary, and noted s 189 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA).
In his reasons, the Magistrate indicated that in allowing the case to be reopened for further cross-examination of the victim, the matter had not been completed. It is uncertain how that cross-examination would have impacted his decision to find a case to answer. The alleged offending behaviour was presented by the victim’s evidence and by way of recording. It might go to the question of credit or her attitude towards the applicant, but it is difficult to determine a scenario where that would disturb the relatively low threshold of finding a case to answer. Additionally, the Magistrate had to consider that a permanent stay of proceedings is not necessarily a completion of the matter. In light of these difficulties, David AJ held that the Magistrate did not fall into error in exercising his discretion as to costs ([10]-[13]), and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
Rana v Police [2020] SASC 21 (13 February 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application for revocation of an intervention order’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protected person’ – ‘Revocation of an intervention order’ – ‘Women’
Case type: Application for permission to appeal against a Magistrate’s decision refusing an application for the revocation of an intervention order.
Facts: The appellant filed an application in the Magistrates Court for revocation of an intervention order that was issued against him in 2008. The appellant was absent at the application hearing. The intervention order involved allegations that ‘the appellant sent letters to the protected person (a female), presented at the protected person’s door on a number of occasions, caused the protected person to install additional security in her home and other matters’ ([3]). The protected person maintained that she regularly did not feel safe and believed that the appellant was capable of inflicting harm as he was not mentally stable ([4]). The Magistrate noted that the appellant had significant mental health problems in the past, and summarily dismissed the application pursuant to s 26(4) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ([8]. Under s 26(4), the Court may dismiss an application for revocation of a final intervention order without receiving submissions or evidence from the protected person if 1) it is satisfied the application is frivolous or vexatious; or 2) if not satisfied there has been a substantial change in the relevant circumstances since the order was issued or last varied ([9]).
Issue: The appellant sought permission to appeal against the Magistrate’s decision to refuse his application for the revocation of the intervention order on 3 grounds:
•
‘The Magistrate applied the wrong onus, as the burden of proof applied was proof beyond reasonable doubt rather than proof on the balance of probabilities;
•
There was an apprehension of bias as the matter was decided in his absence; and
•
A psychological report the appellant sought to tender on appeal stated he would benefit from release of the order.’
Held: David AJ refused permission to appeal and found that the Magistrate was open to summarily dismiss the appellant’s application for the revocation of the intervention order ([16]). In respect of the first appeal ground, David AJ held that although the Magistrate did apply the incorrect onus, this could have only been in the appellant’s favour. By applying the higher onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it was apparent that the Magistrate was satisfied on the balance of probabilities either that the application was frivolous or vexatious or he was not satisfied that there was a substantial change in the circumstances ([11]). In respect of the second appeal ground, his Honour found that the basis of the appellant’s submissions in his affidavit did not go to the question of whether there had been a change in the relevant circumstances. Instead, the submissions indicated a preoccupation with past events ([12]). In respect of the third appeal ground, David AJ held that the psychologist’s conclusion that the appellant ‘is a different person now tha[n] in the past and would benefit from release of the order’ fell short of there being a change in the relevant circumstances since the order was last issued. Consequently, there was no merit in the appeal ([13]-[15]).
Attorney-General (SA) v Pennington [2019] SASC 180 (25 October 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appreciable risk’ – ‘Childhood abuse’ – ‘Conditions’ – ‘Cultural obligations’ – ‘Extended supervision order’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Forensic evidence’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Traditional lands’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: 1 x aggravated recklessly causing serious harm
Case type: Application by the Attorney-General (SA) for an Extended Supervision Order (ESO) pursuant to s 7 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the HRO Act) in respect of the respondent for a 3-year term.
Facts: The male respondent was found guilty at trial of aggravated recklessly causing serious harm against his former domestic partner and was ultimately sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment ([5]). The respondent had a significant history of serious criminal offending, especially violent offending against women ([6]). His history included offences of non-consensual sexual penetration, armed robbery, aggravated unlawful wounding, possession of a weapon with intent to cause injury and fear, and unlawful assault causing bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation and breaching protective bail conditions. It was against this background and while subject to a suspended sentence, that the respondent was sentenced to the offending in question. The circumstances of that offending were that the respondent, while in an intoxicated state, stabbed the victim in the back and fled the house without rendering her assistance. The victim may have died within hours had she not been airlifted to Adelaide ([10]).
The applicant filed an application for an ESO under the terms of the HRO Act. An Interim Supervision Order was made pursuant to s 9 pending the determination of the application for an ESO, which was enlivened upon the respondent’s release from custody in September 2018. Further, a psychiatric report pursuant to s 7(3) of the HRO Act was provided ([11]-[13]).
Issue: The applicant sought an ESO in respect of the respondent for a period of 3 years on the basis that he is a high risk offender who would present an appreciable risk to the community’s safety if not supervised under such an order. The main issue for the Court, however, was the nature of the terms and conditions of the ESO, especially those relating to whether or not the respondent is restrained from leaving South Australia without permission ([3]).
The respondent accepted that he was a high risk offender pursuant to s 5 of the HRO Act, and did not oppose the making of an ESO provided that the order included the following conditions ([14]):
•
The respondent may depart from South Australia with the intention of living in another State, and if he chooses to do so, he will not be subject to the order unless he returns to South Australia during the period of the order.
•
The order will take effect if the respondent returns to South Australia.
The applicant submitted that the terms of the ESO as proposed by the respondent were beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, would render it impossible to effectively supervise him when he is absent from South Australia, and would not protect the community’s safety in an effective manner ([29]).
Held: The respondent was born in the dry community of Tjuntjuntjara in Western Australia ([15]), which is described as ‘relatively stable and safe’ and as ‘one of the remotest communities in Australia’ ([21]). The respondent’s daughter, grandson and elderly, ill father also lived in that community. His father’s family originally came from the A?angu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands in the remote north-west of South Australia. The respondent proposed that he would move between the Tjuntjuntjara community and Kurrawang, where he has other relatives. He also expressed an intention to live in Esperance ([15]-[16]).
The respondent submitted that given that Tjuntjuntjara is a dry community and he has family support and access to traditional healers, he could participate in men’s business and would therefore unlikely reoffend ([17]). In his opinion, an ESO in the terms proposed by the applicant would require him to stay in South Australia, rendering it difficult to visit the APY Lands ([18]). Further, it was submitted that if he was prevented from living on or near his traditional lands, both on the APY Lands and in Western Australia, this would negatively affect him and increase his likelihood to reoffend, as he would be deprived of the opportunity to play a meaningful role in his culture and lore ([19]). While it was undoubtedly in the respondent’s best interests that he be permitted to return to his homeland, Kelly J noted that the question was not ‘simple’, and required an analysis of the relevant provisions of the HRO Act ([26]-[28]).
Her Honour placed great reliance on the psychiatric report ([35]), which noted that the respondent was at high risk of further violent offending, due to his significant history of violent and sexual offending, his limited (and only very recent) insight into that behaviour, and his tendencies to minimise his behaviour and blame circumstances and victims for his past behaviour ([36]). It was also noted that the respondent was at a heightened risk of sexual offending due to his issues with childhood abuse and increased risk of violence ([37]). If the respondent returned to his traditional lands in South Australia, he would be at a greater risk of reoffending due to potential personal conflicts with other community members and the difficulties in accessing adequate supervision in remote communities. There would also be a real risk of the respondent resuming alcohol abuse without adequate supervision and therapy ([43]). Her Honour further considered therapies appropriate to the respondent’s personality type, and concluded that he would benefit from a combination of traditional western psychological therapy and support provided by traditional healers ([44]-[46]). The further the respondent travels from Adelaide, the more difficult it would be for him to access the necessary therapy ([47]).
The psychiatric report also raised the issue of the respondent’s desire to return to his traditional lands to fulfil his cultural obligations and identified some risk factors involved if he were to return ([48]). Importantly, the majority of the respondent’s offending occurred when he was living on his traditional lands and when he was under the influence of alcohol ([49]). Even though Tjuntjuntjara is a dry community, other communities in which the respondent had expressed a desire to visit are not ([50]). Under the terms of the order proposed by the respondent, there would be no practical way for the Court to satisfy itself that the community is protected should he choose to visit or reside in South Australia ([53]), as South Australian supervisory authorities have no practical way of determining if he was to re-enter the APY Lands ([52]).
Her Honour held that an ESO for a 12-month term would adequately protect the community and enable the respondent to continue with appropriate rehabilitation and therapy ([55]). Her Honour also found that the respondent was a high risk offender who posed an appreciable risk to the community’s safety if not supervised under the order, and that it would be outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to make an ESO in the terms requested by the respondent, and would render his effective supervision impossible when he is absent from South Australia ([33]).
Harwood v Police [2019] SASC 129 (26 July 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’
Charges: 3 x contravening a term of an intervention order contrary to s 31(2) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA)
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, was convicted of three counts of contravening a term of an intervention order, contrary to section 31(2) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The protected person under the intervention order was the appellant’s ex-partner, the victim ([1]). The agreed facts were that on 3 separate nights, the appellant attended the home of the victim’s father where the victim and their daughter were residing. The appellant left letters addressed to the victim’s father and old family photographs. Although he admitted to attending the premises, he argued that he genuinely believed that the victim and their daughter were residing at a different address ([2], [9]).
Under s 13B of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), the appellant was not allowed to cross-examine the victim at trial unless it was done so by counsel. The Magistrate failed to refer to the appellant’s rights under s 13B(b)(ii), which includes a reference to the Criminal Law (Legal Representation) Act 2001 (SA). Section 6(1a) of that Act provides that if a defendant who is not legally represented at trial applies to the Commission for legal assistance for the cross-examination of a s 13B witness in the trial, the Commission must, subject to qualifications, grant such assistance ([17]).
Although the Magistrate advised the appellant of his right to apply for legal aid ([14], [16]), he did not advise him that legal assistance must be granted to a defendant subject to certain qualifications (terms), and instead informed the appellant that he probably would not qualify for legal assistance ([18]). The trial was adjourned, and upon resumption, the appellant remained under the mistaken belief that he would not qualify for legal assistance and was not advised of s 6 of the Criminal Law (Legal Representation) Act 2001 (SA). The appellant was unable to test the victim’s evidence in any way. Consequently, the Magistrate accepted her evidence and convicted the appellant ([21]).
Issue: The appellant appealed on the ground that the trial court did not properly and fully advise him of his right to obtain a counsel’s assistance for the purpose of cross-examining the victim ([4]).
Held: Lovell J allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. Her Honour remitted the matter for retrial before a different Magistrate and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s appeal costs ([29]). Importantly, her Honour noted a trial judge’s obligation to ensure that an accused self-represented person understands their rights and has all the necessary information in order to receive fair trial and make informed choices about his or her case ([22]-[23]). In the present instance, the appellant was required to be aware of and fully understand his rights provided for by s 13B and, by extension, s 6(1a) in order to receive a fair trial ([23]). The Magistrate was obliged to ensure that he fully understood that cross-examination of the victim could only occur if he employed counsel to do so on his behalf, and that if he applied to the Commission for legal assistance, they were bound by law to provide it, subject to any conditions they saw fit ([24]). The trial miscarried because the Magistrate failed to properly and fully advise the appellant of his right to obtain counsel’s assistance for the purpose of cross-examination ([25]).
Siropoulos v Police [2019] SASC 127 (19 July 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Conditions’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of re-offending’ – ‘Step child in family’
Charges: 1 x assault causing harm
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted of assault causing harm after having repeatedly punched the victim in the face, in the presence of her twin daughters from a previous relationship ([14]). The appellant and victim had been in a relationship for approximately 9 years. The relationship was marred by allegations of infidelity made by the appellant, and ‘he felt betrayed and became very angry’ upon discovering that the victim had regularly contacted another man ([13]). The victim’s injuries were extensive ([16]), and she told the Court in her Victim Impact Statement that ‘she was upset that the offending occurred unprovoked in her and her children’s home’ ([18]).
The appellant was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to a prison term of 8 months and 2 weeks as a result of his early guilty plea. The sentence was partially suspended, allowing the appellant’s release after serving 4 months imprisonment upon him entering into a good behaviour bond for 2 years ([2]). The conditions of the bond are noted at [3], and included the requirements that he does not leave South Australia unless given permission by his Community Corrections Officer for specific purposes, and that he attend any programs and appointments as directed.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive and that it was manifestly unreasonable to not wholly suspend the prison sentence. He also appealed the condition of the partially suspended sentence bond requiring him not to leave South Australia without permission.
Held: Kourakis CJ noted the appellant’s personal circumstances at [19]-[27]. He was aged 47 at the time of the offending, worked in the fishing industry, suffered a lengthy period of depression after his father’s death, had numerous previous convictions of driving offences, and consumed an excessive amount of alcohol, particularly after his father’s death and to numb his emotions during hostile relationships. Although the appellant has not consumed alcohol in over 3 years, he reported weekly use of cannabis ([23]). His mother was dependant on him and he also had a brother who suffers from schizophrenia ([20]). The appellant experienced anxiety and low self-esteem, as well as health issues. His psychologist opined that he exhibited dysfunctional personality traits, and experienced self-doubt and feelings of inadequacy ([25]). According to a violence risk assessment, the appellant was identified as likely to pose a Moderate-High risk of re-offending ([26]).
Having regard to the relative importance of general deterrence, Kourakis CJ held that the length of the prison sentence was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had reoffended despite the leniency that had been previously shown to him, and the victim’s physical injuries were very serious. At [35], his Honour stated that ‘[p]ersonal and general deterrence must be given substantial relative weight in sentencing for assaults committed by men against women with whom they are, or have been, in a relationship, particularly when in a jealous rage’. The length of both the notional starting point and the actual prison term was well within the permissible range.
Kourakis CJ also found that the Magistrate’s decision to partially suspend the sentence fell within the proper exercise of the sentencing decision ([36]), and that the Magistrate considered all relevant matters ([38]). It was not unreasonable for the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant’s sentencing would be optimised by a combination of both punishment and deterrence effected by imprisonment for 4 months and rehabilitation over an 18-month period ([40]).
Kourakis CJ allowed the appeal only to the extent of removing the condition of the bond requiring the appellant to not leave South Australia unless given permission by his Community Corrections Officer, as such a condition was unreasonable. The appellant’s home was in Melbourne, where his dependent mother resided and his brother received treatment for his mental illness. His Honour found that ‘Australia is one nation and there is much movement between the south east corner of [South Australia] and Victoria’. His Honour also considered that there was ‘no real connection between the condition that he obtain treatment and counselling and the obligation to obtain permission.’ The appellant should be entitled to ‘come and go from his own home, to help his mother as and when he sees fit, and to fish in Victorian waters without first obtaining permission’ ([42]).
Lang v Police [2019] SASC 97 (7 June 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Community protection’ – ‘Condign punishment’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive--assault police’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step child in family - past domestic and family violence’
Charges: 2 x aggravated assault, 1 x contravening a term of an intervention order, 1 x property damage
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The offending occurred in the context of a domestic relationship which was in the process of ending ([5]). At the relevant time, the appellant was subject to an intervention order ([11]). The appellant was living with his former domestic partner and her daughter (the protected person under that order). One count of aggravated assault involved the appellant punching his former domestic partner with a clenched first to her left shoulder in the presence of her daughter ([8]). The police were called to the house. The second count of aggravated assault involved the appellant punching the attending Sergeant numerous times, one of which was described as ‘an unusual two-handed punch delivered in a jabbing manner’. The property damage occurred when the Sergeant’s glasses were broken as a result of the altercation between the appellant and himself ([10]). The Magistrate found that the appellant’s behaviour amounted to a breach of the intervention order, as he intimidated the daughter by assaulting her mother and the Sergeant in her presence, abusing her and conducting himself in a violent and abusive manner ([11]).
At trial, the Magistrate noted the appellant’s personal circumstances at [13], referring to his age, his previous marriage, and his employment history. His character references indicated that he was a hardworking, honest person who made a positive contribution to his community ([14]). The appellant had a prior conviction for assault of a police officer for which he was ordered to perform 200 hours of community service within 10 months ([15]). The Magistrate did not refer to the circumstances that led to the making of the intervention order ([17]). In his view, specific and general deterrence were significant sentencing principles ([18]). His Honour also ‘correctly observed’ that the law is required to protect police officers when performing their duties, as well as domestic partners ([19]). Consequently, the Magistrate imposed convictions on all counts and sentenced the appellant to 6 months’ imprisonment ([20]).
Issue: The appellant appealed against his sentence on 2 grounds, namely, 1) that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the appellant’s lack of antecedents, age, community work, good character and the interests of justice in sentencing the appellant; and 2) that the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Held: Hinton J allowed the appeal in part. His Honour considered each ground separately, and placed reliance on relevant case law and statistics from the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. His Honour noted that the first ground of appeal was essentially a contention that the appellant’s lack of antecedents, age, community work, and good character should have attracted a weight that resulted in a lesser sentence, or resulted in the sentence imposed being suspended in part or in whole ([21]). Referring to House v The King and R v Lutze, his Honour concluded that the submissions made in support of the first appeal ground should be treated as forming part of the submission in support of the second appeal ground ([24]).
As to the second appeal ground, his Honour found that the offending was ‘particularly serious’ and that the Magistrate correctly referred to the court’s duty to protect vulnerable people from domestic violence ([29]). His Honour cited R v Saunders for the proposition that intervention orders and bail conditions can prevent acts of domestic violence, and that the violation of such orders and conditions can have profound consequences for the victim’s sense of safety and security. Hinton J observed ‘the effectiveness of intervention orders as a means of protecting members of the community will be undermined if the courts do not respond appropriately to their breach’ ([33]).
Hinton J did not find the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment to be manifestly excessive per se. The appellant did not provide any explanation for his conduct or express remorse or contrition, and mitigating circumstances were absent. Although he is an intelligent person, his prior involvement with the courts and police should have been a clear reminder that such violent, abusive conduct towards his family and police is not tolerated ([40]). The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were good, as he generally lived a ‘good and productive life’ and would likely continue to do so upon his release ([41]).
His Honour, however, found the requirement that ‘he serve the entirety of the 6 month sentence so as to punish, to deter specifically and generally and to provide the protection’ to be manifestly excessive. The Magistrate’s approach was not reasonably open, having regard to the appellant’s personal circumstances and, in particular, his age, antecedents, previous good character, work history and prospects of rehabilitation ([43]-[44]). The Magistrate appeared to focus on condign punishment to the exclusion of rehabilitation, and overlooked the appellant’s likely response to supervision in the community for an extended period, which would have provided greater protection for the community ([44]).
In summary, the appeal was allowed, but to the limited extent of directing, pursuant to s 96(4) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), that the appellant serve 16 weeks of his 6-month sentence in prison and suspend the remainder of the sentence on condition that he 1) enter into a good behaviour bond for 18 months; 2) be subject to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer; and 3) attend any counselling, treatment and therapeutic programs that deal with anger management and/or domestic violence as directed and deemed appropriate by his Community Corrections Officer ([45]).
Wondimu v Police [2019] SASC 62 (18 April 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail conditions’ – ‘Breach’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Self-represented’
Charges: Stalking x 1; non-compliance with bail agreement x 3.
Case type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: On 2 November 2016, the appellant was arrested and charged with stalking his father-in-law. He was released on bail subject to conditions, one of which prohibited him contacting his then wife of 13 years, who was also the mother of his five children and the daughter of his father-in-law. On 10 November 2016, the appellant telephoned his wife, but did not leave a message. The appellant also sent 2 text messages on a separate occasion. As a result, he was arrested and charged with 3 counts of breaching the terms of his bail. The Magistrate found the appellant guilty, and imposed convictions in relation to each count and released him upon his entering into a 6 months’ good behaviour bond in the sum of $500. The appellant appealed against the conviction and sentence. His appeal against conviction was over 40 weeks out of time.
Issue: This is an appeal against a conviction and sentence, where the appeal against conviction was made out of time. The appellant submitted that the relevant bail condition was unreasonable or unlawful for including the prohibition against contact with his wife when she was not the complainant. He also argued that he had not been competently represented by counsel at his trial.
Held: Upon the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was unrepresented. Hinton J noted that one of the purposes of conditions of a bail agreement is to prevent further offending ([33]). Hinton J was not satisfied that the impugned condition was legally unreasonable, as the evidence suggested a domestic disturbance between the appellant and his wife, a repeat of which the police intended to prevent by prohibiting contact. Further, Hinton J found that the validity of a bail agreement does not depend on the prosecution’s success at trial of any charge to which the bail agreement relates. The fact that a person is charged is sufficient to subject him or her to bail ([36]).
Hinton J also found that it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt on Count 1 beyond reasonable doubt ([44]). His Honour noted that contact, in terms of communication, can be direct or indirect and that the evidence established that the call was made from the appellant’s phone. His Honour found that it is irrelevant whether a mental element attaches to the act, as the offence of breaching a bail agreement pursuant to section 17 of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) is one of strict liability. A bail agreement, in his view, not only seeks to ensure compliance but also requires the accused to take positive steps to ensure compliance. To hold that an offence is one that has a mental element attaching to the act would undermine the requirement that an accused granted bail take positive steps to avoid an inadvertent breach ([43]).
His Honour refused to grant the appellant an extension of time in which to appeal against his convictions, as no explanation was provided for the delay and the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success. His Honour held that the the appeal was, in effect, an effort to have the appellant’s case re-tried so that he could adopt a different approach ([45]). The appeal against sentence was also dismissed. The appellant was obliged to take steps to ensure compliance with the bail conditions, which he failed to do ([46]-[51]).
Mathew (SA) Nominees Pty Ltd v Belconnen Automotive Pty Ltd [2019] SASC 39 (21 March 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contract’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Misleading conduct’ – ‘Specific performance’
Civil proceedings: claim by plaintiff for specific performance of motor vehicle purchase contracts; counterclaim by defendant for misleading conduct, jurisdictional challenge; and security for costs application by defendant.
Appeal type: appeal against Magistrate’s reasons, security for costs order, and failure to make jurisdictional challenge order.
Facts: The plaintiff purchased three high performance Holden motor vehicles in the name of the plaintiff’s company. Only two are relevant to this matter. The purchases were negotiated by Mr Mazzacano and two others. Mr Mazzacano, as a former Holden employee, was entitled to an employee discount scheme. The plaintiff’s claims that he ordered the vehicles and was invoiced for each by the defendant ($42,927 and $44,467). He paid both the balance and deposit. The defendant contends that the plaintiff company was not entitled to access the discounts as the purchase was not for the benefit of Mr Mazzacano. The defendant did not deliver the vehicles but returned the purchase monies to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought specific performance of its contracts with the defendant on 19 July 2017 and filed an application for summary judgment. The defendant filed a defence stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to the EPSA discount. The defendant subsequently filed an amended defence and counterclaim, and included a counterclaim for misleading conduct and the defendant filed interrogatories seeking clarification on the nature of the business being operated by the plaintiff asking ‘what is the nature of the business that was being operated by the plaintiff during 2017’.
The defendants made a jurisdictional challenge and a security for costs application. The plaintiff appeals against orders granting security for costs and declining to order costs in relation to the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.
Issues:
1.
The Magistrate’s Reasons are inadequate in that they fail to address various issues raised by the plaintiff.
2.
The Magistrate erred in his decision to order security for costs in giving no weight, or insufficient wait to various matters.
3.
The Magistrate erred in ordering security for costs in an excessive amount, in particular having regard to the true quantum of the dispute, the inclusion of past the failure to make to make reductions for the costs of the counterclaim and the interruption caused by the failed jurisdiction application.
4.
The magistrate erred in failing to make an order (in respect of the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of that application).
Decision and reasoning:
Dismissing the appeal, Doyle J held:
There was no error in relation to the Magistrate’s exercise of his discretion to order security for costs per House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499.
The plaintiff did not establish that there was the potential for substantial injustice were permission to be refused and the orders for security left to stand.
Reasoning – appeal ground 1:
That a Magistrate attaches insufficient weight to a particular consideration is not, in itself, an allegation of error in the sense required by House v The King at [49]. That ‘Appellate intervention in interlocutory decision making’ should be ‘truly exceptional at [50]. In relation to the alleged inadequacy of reasons in relation to both security for costs and the costs of the failed jurisdiction application, his Honour, held at [53] that ‘in the case of interlocutory disputes, little by way of reasoning may be required’…’as long as the key planks in the judge’s reasoning process leading to the relevant decision are apparent, that will generally suffice’. The Magistrate in their reasons, ‘identified the plaintiff’s status as a trustee company’, the ‘defendant’s delay in bringing the application’ and ‘stated his conclusions in relation to the availability of security for past costs’ at [55].In the event that a plaintiff is a trustee, a defendant ‘should not be subjected to the potential complexity…expense and uncertainty, associated with having to resort to derivative rights in order to recover any costs’ at [64]. The plaintiff did not identify whether it holds the properties in its own right or as trustee, and as such the Magistrate was right to attach significance to the consideration [75]. In relation to the Magistrate not giving any weight to the defendants’ delay in bringing the application for security. While ‘it is a well-established that applications for security should be brought promptly’ [at 78], whether it is in the interests of justice to make an order for security is also a factor [at 82].
Other matters that were of some relevance to the discretion to order security was the absence of indication by the plaintiff that it would not be able to provide security, further there was no challenge to the bona fides or arguable merit of the plaintiff’s claim including that he had paid the for the cars prior to the order for security for costs. At [104] it was open for the Magistrate to make a reduction to the quantum of security upon the existence of the counterclaim, however the amount ordered was not ‘erroneously high’.
Conclusion as to security for costs:
•
The plaintiff did not suggest that it was unable to provide security.
•
The plaintiff having to meet its costs obligations flowing form the litigation constitutes an injustice or prejudice in this case.
Reasoning – appeal ground 2:
At [65] ‘while it is significant, the context of an application for security, that a plaintiff is suing as trustee, it does not follow automatically that it will be appropriate that there be an order for security’.
Shahin v El-Shafei; El-Shafei v Shahin [2018] SASC 167 (6 November 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Disclosure’ – ‘Domestic, family or apprehended violence or for personal safety’ – ‘Orders and convictions’ – ‘Orders to restrain’
Proceeding: Private application for final intervention order.
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s revocation of interim intervention order.
Facts: Mr Shahin is the owner of two adjacent properties, numbers 17 and 18. His family occupies number 17, while his sister occupies number 18. Dr El-Shafei owns number 19, which is adjacent to number 18. There have been ongoing disputes between the parties regarding a number of matters. Dr El-Shafei alleges he was assaulted by Mr Shahin, claiming a resulting wrist injury. Dr El-Shafei is charged with an offence relating to damage caused to the boundary fence. Following the dismissal of a police application for an intervention order, Dr El-Shafei filed a private application which proceeded ex parte withDr Cannon (then Deputy Magistrate) granting an interim order pursuant to s 21 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The application for a final intervention order was heard a week later by Magistrate Sheppard. The interim order was revoked and the matter referred back to Dr Cannon for further hearing. Dr Cannon declined to award costs of the intervention order application in favour of Mr Shahin. Mr Shahin filed a notice of appeal again Dr Cannon’s dismissal of his application for costs. Dr El-Shafei subsequently filed a notice of appeal against Magistrate Sheppard’s revocation of the interim intervention order on 29 June 2018. A second and third amended notice of appeal were filed by Dr El-Shafei on the 12 July and 5 September 2018. The second notice amended an incorrect identification of the parties. The third notice filed the day before the appeal hearing, was not served on Mr Shahin’s representatives until the morning of the hearing.
Issues:
•
Whether an applicant for an intervention order is required to make full and fair disclosure on the same basis as any other person seeking an ex parte order.
•
Whether s 76A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) was available to set aside an interim intervention order or whether the operation of s 76A is precluded by s 26(5) Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA)(‘IO Act’).
•
Whether Magistrate Sheppard erred in revoking the interim order or denied Dr El-Shafei procedural fairness by declining to adjourn proceedings until Dr El-Shafei arranged legal representation.
•
Whether Dr Cannon misdirected himself as a matter of law and fact by referring to his own conduct rather than by inquiring whether Dr El-Shafei had acted in bad faith or unreasonably pursuant to s 189C of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA).
Decision and reasoning:
Permission to appeal
As a criminal proceeding (per R 4.07 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), the jurisdiction conferred on by the IO Act is vested in the Criminal Division), any appeal relating to an intervention order is subject to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) at [41]. S 42(1a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) does not preclude an appeal against interlocutory judgment in these circumstances. Per Sulan J in Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93, the words “before commencement or completion of the trial” in s 42(1a)(c) have no operative effect unless there is a trial. Accordingly, ‘the Court has power to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal if … there are special reasons why that would be in the interests of the administration of justice’ at [45]. Granting permission, his Honour was satisfied special reasons existed due to the significant questions of law raised (ie the application of s 76A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) and validity of referring the matter for further hearing) at [48].
Dismissing Dr El-Shafei’s appeal, Parker J held
‘An applicant for an interim intervention order is not required to make full and fair disclosure in the same manner as an applicant for an ex parte order’ at [76]. ‘The relevant issue is not whether one party is more or less blameworthy than the other, but rather whether it is reasonable to suspect that an act of abuse may be committed’ (grounds for issuing an intervention order per s 6 IO Act) at [77]. S 23 IO Act provides the Defendant with an opportunity to respond before the Court concludes whether a final order is appropriate at [78]. ‘There is a real risk that the imposition of a full and fair disclosure obligation in such an environment is likely to frustrate or impede the object of providing prompt intervention to protect those at risk of abuse’ at [78]. Given the impracticality of subjecting the police to full and fair disclosure, private applications should be under no greater obligation at [81].
S 26 IO Act does not operate to preclude the Court from exercising its powers under s 76A where the operation of s 76A is considered necessary to remedy an injustice. The power conferred by s 76A was available to the Magistrate at [109], [112].
•
S 76A was not applied to frustrate the operation of a legislative scheme (the IO Act) but to rectify a situation considered unjust (Police v Clayton-Smith [2010] SASC 127 per Gray J).
•
The requirement to award persons with a relevant interest an opportunity to be heard before the revocation or variation of an order, as enacted by s 26(5)(a) IO Act, exists at common law and is therefore a relevant consideration in applying s 76A at [107], [109], [112].
•
Likewise, s 26(5)(b) does not extend the requirements of the common law as the same matters will be considered in making an order as in the varying or revoking that order at [110].
There was no process or outcome error in the decision of Magistrate Sheppard. Her Honour’s concern about the accuracy and timing of the information provided by Dr El-Shafei was a proper reason for revoking the interim order at [117]. As the ‘decisive issue was the reliability of the information put before the Court’ and as Dr El-Shafei was awarded ample opportunity to address those issues, he was not unfairly disadvantaged by a lack of legal representation at [129]. The orders of Magistrate Sheppard required a rehearing of the application for an interim order. A rehearing did not occur and the proceedings of 18 May 2018 before Dr Cannon therefore miscarried at [132]. If Dr El-Shafei pursues his application the matter should proceed to a hearing to determine whether a final order should be made (per s 23 IO Act) at [135].
Upholding Mr Shahin’s appeal against the dismissal of his costs application, Parker J held
There were not proper grounds to reject Dr El-Shafei’s application for costs as Dr Cannon ‘did not have sufficient information to decide whether or not Dr El-Shafei had acted in bad faith or unreasonably’ at [139]:
•
Given Justice Parker’s finding that an applicant for an ex parte intervention order is not required to provide full and fair disclosure, Dr El-Shafei’s failure to provide all relevant information did not warrant a cost order against him at [137]-[138]
•
While Dr El-Shafei may have caused the Court to be misled (a proper basis for setting aside the interim order), without a determination of the factual allegations made against him, Dr El-Shafei cannot be said to have acted in bad faith or unreasonably at [138]. That question should be determined if and when a final order is determined at [140].
Stone v Police [2018] SASC 147 (27 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contravention of an intervention order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravention of an intervention order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted after trial of two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order. After finding the evidence of the protected persons to be truthful and accurate, the Magistrate recorded convictions and imposed a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
Issues: The appellant appealed the convictions on a number of grounds including that the Magistrate erred in admitting evidence of past discreditable conduct, applied the wrong onus of proof in relation to the charges, placed undue reliance on the credibility of the protected person, impermissibly relied on evidence of a charge that was dismissed in finding the appellant guilty of the two charges, wrongly regulated the cross-examination of the appellant, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J dismissed the appeal on the following grounds:
•
The evidence of past discreditable conduct complained of was properly admitted.
•
The Magistrate applied the proper onus of proof in finding the charges proven.
•
The evidence was sufficient to satisfy the convictions.
•
The Magistrate made proper assessments of the witnesses at trial, as required, and was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the protected person as a witness following his assessment of that person’s evidence.
•
The Magistrate did not rely on evidence relating to the dismissed charge in finding the appellant guilty of the two counts on which he was convicted.
•
The cross-examination of the appellant at trial did not go beyond the bounds of fair and proper cross-examination.
White v Police [2018] SASC 124 (5 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Vulnerable people’
Appeal type: Appeal against decision of a magistrate to issue a final intervention order.
Facts: The police issued an interim intervention order against the appellant for the protection of Mr Larkins, his wife, his child and three other children in his care, all of whom lived in the same street as the appellant. The appellant and his wife (who had separated, but continued to live in the same house) had a poor relationship with Mr Larkins and his wife. Mr Larkins and his wife were Indigenous Australians. Mrs Larkins had been involved in Federal Court proceedings relating to unspecified issues with the appellant’s wife.
The Magistrate was required to determine whether or not the interim intervention order should be confirmed as a final intervention order or a final intervention order be made in substitution. The order was declared to address a domestic violence concern. The Magistrate made a final intervention order against the appellant in substitution for the interim order, finding that it was reasonable to suspect that the appellant would, without intervention, commit acts of abuse against the protected persons and that it was appropriate in the circumstances to issue a final order. The protected persons were unchanged but the terms of the final intervention order differed somewhat from those of the interim order.
Issues: Whether a final intervention order should be made; Whether the Magistrate erred with respect to evidentiary matters and in applying the statutory requirements for making a final intervention order.
Decision and reasoning: It was entirely open to the Magistrate to accept the evidence of Mr Larkins and his wife on critical issues in preference to that of the appellant and his wife. The transcript showed that the appellant appeared angry and malevolent towards Mr Larkins and his family, displaying significant animosity with racial overtones towards them. It was reasonable to find that the appellant would commit further acts of abuse in the absence of an intervention order. In all the circumstances, the Magistrate’s order was appropriate.
Dismissing the appeal, Nicholson J held that:
•
The order made by the Magistrate was interlocutory and special reasons must be established in order to obtain leave to appeal.
•
The features of a final intervention order, together with the fact that the appellant has no right to apply for a variation or revocation for at least 12 months, were sufficient to establish special reasons, at least where there is an arguable case on appeal.
•
Bearing in mind the usual advantages possessed by a trial judge when assessing oral evidence, it was open to the Magistrate to make the findings of fact he made on the evidence that was before him.
•
The Magistrate did not err with respect to the evidentiary matters complained of by the appellant.
•
The Magistrate did not err in applying the statutory requirements of s 6 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The findings made in satisfaction of these requirements were open on the evidence.
Hussey v Police [2018] SASC 122 (31 August 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Breach of bail x 1; Property damage x 2; Assault causing harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction for assault.
Facts: The appellant and complainant had been in a relationship for about eight weeks. Each had one daughter. The complainant was woken by her daughter vomiting. The next day, the complainant and appellant argued. When the complainant told the appellant to leave her home, he became very angry and violent. The complainant alleges that the appellant kicked, punched and shoved her. She ran to her neighbour’s house with her daughter and asked them to call the police. She could hear him ripping the flyscreens off her house. The Magistrate described the appellant and complainant as witnesses who ‘gave their evidence clearly and with some passion, both of them without major discrepancies’. He found the appellant guilty of assault but not guilty of the property damage charges.
Issues: Whether the verdict was open on the evidence; Whether the Magistrate adequately explained why the appellant’s evidence was rejected; Whether the magistrate’s reasons were adequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant appealed the guilty verdict on the grounds that (1) the Magistrate’s reasons were insufficient to explain his finding that ‘Nothing was sufficient to justify a movement of the foot sufficiently hard to damage the side of her face. He could have extracted his foot without kicking her to the cheek’; (2) that the Magistrate did not explain why his evidence was rejected beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence for the Magistrate to have rejected beyond reasonable doubt his version of events, which should have led to the Magistrate entertaining a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in relation to the assault charge.
Bampton J held that, having read the evidence in its entirety and in accordance with the requirements referred to in M v the Queen [1994] HCA 63, the finding of guilt was not supported by the evidence. The state of the evidence was such that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant intentionally applied force to the complainant causing ‘harm to the tongue and cheek’. Her Honour held that the Magistrate did not adequately explain his finding of guilt and did not explain how the elements of assault were satisfied. The Magistrate’s reasons were not underpinned by a reasoning process linking and justifying the findings made ([53]). There was reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. It was not open to the Magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the verdict of guilty was set aside and a verdict of not guilty was substituted.
R v Hayes [2018] SASC 114 (9 August 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Intentionally causing harm x 1; Contravening an intervention order x 1.
Proceeding type: Prosecution appeal against grant of bail.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was charged with intentionally causing harm and contravening an intervention order. The respondent assaulted his former partner (the complainant) during an access visit to their son. The circumstances of aggravation included that the complainant was his ex-partner and the respondent used a coffee mug, to inflict injuries to the head and face of the victim ([5]). The respondent also had a criminal history for offences of violence and dishonesty ([9]). The respondent was a prescribed applicant within the meaning of s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) such that bail may not be granted unless special circumstances are established. The DPP contended that bail should not be granted due to the risk of re-offending (given the respondent’s history of non-compliance with various court orders) and concerns for the complainant’s safety ([15]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Kelly J dismissed the appeal. Special circumstances justifying release on bail included that the complainant no longer resided in the Court’s jurisdiction ([17]), the likely trial date would not be for some time, and a recent report that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are highly over-represented in the remand population. According to the Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 133, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continue to be over-represented in the remand population by a factor of over 11. However, a finding of special circumstances does not mean that bail is automatically granted. At [12], her Honour stated –
‘Ordinarily, it may be expected that if special circumstances are established, then a grant of bail may follow but upon special circumstances being established, it will remain open to the bail authority to refuse bail if nonetheless, having regard in particular to the gravity of the offending, the likelihood that the prescribed applicant will re-offend, the likelihood that the prescribed applicant will interfere with a witness or evidence and the likelihood that he or she will abscond, the bail authority considers that bail should not be granted’.
Notwithstanding that the respondent was a prescribed applicant, her Honour held that there were special circumstances. It was therefore appropriate to grant the respondent bail on conditions of strict home detention ([18]).
Parish v Police [2018] SASC 18 (27 February 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Adequacy of reasons’ – ‘Magistrates court’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Assault causing harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant gave evidence that the appellant punched her from behind, pushed her to the floor, pushed her head into the floor and wall, and bit her on the cheek ([16]-[17]).
Issues: Whether the conviction was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for retrial before a different magistrate ([98]).
Lovell J described the case as an ‘oath on oath’ case ([10]). At [51]-[54], Lovell J provides a useful exposition of what is necessary for a Magistrate to include in a judgement to amount to adequate reasons. Simply summarising the evidence is not sufficient. The reasons must engage with conflicts in evidence and how those conflicts can be resolved.
Lovell J held that the Magistrate failed to provide adequate reasons in two areas. First, in accepting the evidence of a police officer and M’s treating doctor without explaining how the Magistrate reconciled the inconsistencies between their evidence and M’s evidence ([57]-[79]). Second, in dismissing the evidence of the appellant’s uncle without explaining why ([80]-[86]).
B, JL v Police [2017] SASC 9 (10 February 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Intermediate sanctions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a domestic relationship. They had a 7-month-old child and the complainant was pregnant with another child. The appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offences. An intervention order was in place requiring the appellant to not assault, harass, intimidate or threaten the complainant. The offence occurred when the appellant grabbed the complainant by the upper arms and squeezes them ([6]).
The Magistrate recorded a conviction and imposed a 12-month good behaviour bond.
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in recording a conviction.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The conviction was set aside, and again imposed the 12-month good behaviour bond ([24]).
The appellant submitted that the magistrate failed to have sufficient regard to the appellant’s youth and the purposes of the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA), in particular the policy that there should be no unnecessary interruption of employment ([12]).
Stanley J emphasised that the appellant had a history of domestic violence and highlighted the need for general deterrence at [19]:
Offences of violence by men against women are all too prevalent. All too often they result in harm but the deterrence of those offences will not be adequately achieved unless all offences of violence, whether they cause harm or not, are properly addressed.
Nonetheless, Stanley J held that the public interest in a conviction being recorded is diminished when the defendant is a youth ([18]). It was important that the appellant was now reconciled with the complainant and his ability to provide for her and their children would be diminished by recording a conviction ([22]).
R v Fox [2017] SASC 5 (3 February 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption against bail’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Protective function’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Appeal Type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The applicant and the female complainant had been in a relationship for 10 years. On 14 September 2016, the applicant was charged with using a dangerous article, aggravated assault with a weapon against his own child or spouse, and committing an assault aggravated by the use of an offensive weapon. These offences occurred in the context of the breakdown of the applicant and complainant’s relationship and were committed against the complainant and her new partner. On 14 September 2016, an interim intervention order was made against the applicant. The applicant breached this order on two occasions.
The applicant was charged with two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order pursuant to s 31 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) and one count of aggravated threat to cause harm. The applicant was a prescribed applicant pursuant to s 10A(2)(ba) of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) because he was charged with breaching an intervention order in circumstances involving violence. As such, there was a presumption against the grant of bail unless the applicant established the existence of special circumstances: s 10A(1). The magistrate refused to grant bail.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in failing to find there were special circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Hinton J noted generally that Parliament’s approach to an act of defiance to a protective order allegedly perpetrated in circumstances involving violence ‘only tolerates release into the community on bail if special circumstances can be established’ (see [16]). This is part of the community’s recognition of the ‘prevalence of domestic violence’ and the need to insist on strict compliance with intervention orders to ensure they fulfil their protective purpose (see [17]).
His Honour continued that, ‘special circumstances will only exist where the applicant can demonstrate that he or she does not pose the risk which Parliament had in contemplation in reversing the presumption and in relation to whom the denial of bail would result in consequences beyond the contemplation of Parliament’. The relevant risk here was ‘of further defiance of an order and violence threatened or perpetrated in doing so’ (see [19]).
The ability to fashion bail conditions which reduce the risk of offending and offer protection to the victim will not ordinarily amount to special circumstances (see [40]).
On the facts, Hinton J held that there were no special circumstances warranting the grant of bail. None of the sorts of special circumstances referred to in R v Buhlmann were present (see [20] of this case). The applicant had not pointed to any exceptional hardship that would result from his continued incarceration (see [42]).
Police v Martin [2016] SASC 194 (14 December 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Error of law’ – ‘Failure to provide inadequate reasons’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Power to issue intervention orders’ – ‘Protection orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the imposition of a final intervention order.
Facts: The male appellant was having an affair with a married woman, Ms P, who told him her marriage was over. The appellant was concerned that she was not telling the truth. On 8 October 2015, after an argument, the appellant went to Ms P’s home address at night. Being unable to see or raise her, he went to the backyard and called out to her. Ms P and her husband contacted the police. The appellant left without making any threat or committing any violence.
The next day, police approached the appellant and searched his vehicle. They found a can of OC spray (oleoresin capsicum spray), a hammer and a small knife, but it was agreed that he did not take these onto Ms P’s premises. The appellant was charged with being on premises without lawful excuse and for the items in his car. A police interim intervention order was issued against him with respect to Ms P, her husband and their children. On 19 August 2016, the appellant pleaded guilty. Relevant to this appeal, on the same day, the magistrate imposed an intervention order pursuant to s 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA).
Issue/s:
1.
The magistrate did not give any, or adequate, reasons for issuing the intervention order.
2.
The magistrate erred in the exercise of his discretion to issue the intervention order against the appellant pursuant to s 19A(1)Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Peek J held that s 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 did not create a freestanding power to issue final intervention orders. At [24], His Honour stated that:
‘Section 19A does no more than enable a court hearing substantive charges – in this case it happened to be a Magistrate – to issue an intervention order as if a complaint had been made under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009; the critical question of whether an order is to be made pursuant to such a complaint (or “as if a complaint had been made”) will depend on the substantive provisions of the Intervention Orders Act.’
Here, the sentencing magistrate made no reference to the requirements set out in the Intervention Orders Act. As such, it was impossible to assess whether the magistrate approached the matter incorrectly and failed to address the issues relevant to making a restraining order (see [33]-[34]). There was also an unacceptable risk that the magistrate took an incorrect approach to s 19A and failed to have sufficient regard to the requirements of the Intervention Orders Act (see [35]). Accordingly, the intervention order was quashed. The original police interim intervention order was declared to be continuing in force until it was withdrawn or a confirmation hearing convened.
Craill v Police [2016] SASC 168 (4 November 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breaching bail’ – ‘Contravention of an intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated contraventions of protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault x 1; contravention of an intervention order x 9, breaching bail x 5.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant attended the home of the female victim (his former partner). An argument ensued. While holding their eight-week-old child, the appellant pushed the victim against the bedroom door by holding her throat (aggravated assault). The appellant was also charged with nine counts of failing to comply with a term of an intervention order and the five counts of breaching bail. The applicant was sentenced to five months and two weeks imprisonment. This also involved revoking a suspended sentence imposed for an offence of driving while disqualified. The breaching offences were five of the counts of contravening an intervention order and one of the counts of breaching bail.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The magistrate erred in the application of s 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA);
2.
The magistrate erred in failing to find that there were no proper grounds to refrain from revoking a suspended sentence.
3.
The magistrate erred in failing to have regard or sufficient regard to the complainant’s attitude toward penalty;
4.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
First, the magistrate did not err in the application of s 18A. It was appropriate and convenient to go directly to the single sentence imposed for the course of conduct constituting the breach and contravention charges. The magistrate treated this offending separately from the offending on the charge of aggravated assault. Any descent into further detail would have created unnecessary elaboration – R v Major applied: see [18].
Second, there was no error in the approach of the magistrate. One of the key submissions rejected by Stanley J was that proper grounds existed to refrain from revoking a suspended sentence because there was a marked disproportion between the seriousness of the offence constituting the breach and the sentence of imprisonment that would be activated. In rejecting this, Stanley J held that the breaching offences shared the same characteristic as the earlier offending; they involved the appellant failing to comply with a term or condition imposed on him. However, more importantly, there was not a marked disproportion between the seriousness of the breaching offences and the sentence of imprisonment activated. The contraventions of an intervention order were ‘serious offending’. As per Stanley J at [28]:
‘In R v McMutrie this Court said that a breach of a restraining order is a matter of particular gravity. The object of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) is the prevention of domestic and non-domestic abuse, and the exposure of children to the effects of such abuse. The principal instrument for achieving this objective is the making of intervention orders. The protective objects of the Act can only be achieved if courts are scrupulous in doing what they can to ensure that persons who are subject to such orders comply with them. The repeated breaches of those orders by the appellant demonstrate a persistent, blatant and contumelious disregard for the orders and the authorities that impose them. Crimes of domestic violence are often occasions for the exercise, or attempted exercise, of power over the victim by the offender. Breaches of intervention orders can be occasions for the offender to intimidate the victim with an implied threat that such orders will not protect them. The courts must act to contradict this impression’.
Third, there was no error in the approach taken by the magistrate to the victim’s attitude towards penalty. Stanley J noted that ‘[w]hile the attitude of the victim to an offence is not an irrelevant factor in sentencing, that attitude cannot be determinative of what constitutes an appropriate sentence. Moreover, this principle must be applied with considerable caution in cases of domestic violence’ ([33]). His Honour continued at [36]:
‘The reason for such caution is obvious. In situations of domestic violence a victim’s motivation for advocating a particular penalty is often influenced by their ongoing relationship with the defendant and an unhealthy relationship of dependency between them. Their attitude is often influenced by apprehension about the consequences for them in the future given a continuing relationship with the defendant. This attitude frequently fails to reflect what is in their best interests and what the court might consider appropriate in all the circumstances. It would be contrary to sound sentencing practice to place victims of domestic violence in the position where they hold, or appear to hold, the keys to the offender’s release. To place victims in that position is to impose on them a burden they ought not be required to bear’.
Finally, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. This was in circumstances where the aggravated offence was towards the lower end of the scale for that offence but it was still a serious offence, exacerbated by the presence of a small child; the aggravated assault was not mitigated by the expressed attitude of the victim; the repeated breaches of the intervention order constituted serious offending; the appellant did not have a favourable criminal history; and considerations of general and specific deterrence were particularly important here: see [52]-[53].
Thakur v Police (2016) SASR 180; [2016] SASC 75 (3 June 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Court not to allow appeal against order confirmed by consent unless consent was not freely given’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Protection orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal to set aside an interim intervention order.
Facts: On 13 January 2015, a magistrate issued an interim intervention order against the appellant protecting his wife. The appellant was reported for five breaches of this order. On 7 May, the appellant was interviewed by police in relation to those alleged breaches. The appellant provided the police with his phone and its passcode. On the same day, the prosecutor contacted the appellant’s solicitor and offered to resolve the trial if the appellant consented to the confirmation of the intervention order. The prosecutor also offered not to proceed with the fresh charges in relation to the alleged breaches in those circumstances. The appellant’s solicitor said his client agreed to this. After being charged with subsequent breaches, the appellant sought to appeal the confirmation of the order.
Issue/s: The appellant consented to the confirmation of the interim intervention order in error or by mistake because he believed there was no other satisfactory alternative available to him to recover his mobile telephone from police and thereby protect the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.
Decision and Reasoning: To find ‘special reasons’ under s 42(1a)(c) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) to allow an appeal against an interlocutory order, only an ‘arguable’ case needs to be demonstrated. The appellant’s case was arguable (see [26]-[27]). Permission to appeal was granted.
However, the appeal was dismissed. At [38], Stanley J held that:
‘a court will allow an appeal from the confirmation of an intervention order made pursuant to s 23(3) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) in circumstances where the defendant’s consent was not freely given in the sense that the consent was not properly informed, was made inadvertently or was made by mistake or in error in the sense that the person giving the purported consent did not appreciate to what it was he or she was consenting’.
His Honour rejected the submission that ‘it is sufficient to set aside the order that a defendant only establishes that he or she consented to the confirmation of the order without due consideration to material matters, if that proposition is understood as requiring merely a failure on the part of the defendant to direct his or her mind to some relevant consideration in giving consent’ (see [39]).
Here, the appellant’s consent was freely given. Stanley J did not accept that the appellant had no satisfactory alternative but to consent to the confirmation of the intervention order. He could have been under no misapprehension as to what it was consenting to (see [40]-[41]).
Police v Hodder [2016] SASC 70 (24 May 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Costs order’ – ‘Investigations before applying for protection order’ – ‘Police domestic violence’ – ‘Police protection order’ – ‘Reasonableness of police actions’
Case type: appeal against costs order following a magistrate’s refusal to confirm an intervention order.
Facts: The respondent (Mr Hodder), his former wife (Ms Hodder) and her new partner (Mr Minchin) were police officers. Mr Minchin made an application for an intervention order against Mr Hodder alleging that Mr Hodder acted in a threatening and harassing manner towards him. The police obtained an interim intervention order on his behalf. After a trial, the magistrate found that Ms Hodder and Mr Minchin were not reliable witnesses. The magistrate found no basis for confirming the order and dismissed the application ([19]).
The magistrate ordered costs against the police for the whole of the proceedings, holding that they acted unreasonably in bringing and maintaining the proceedings ([20]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred by:
1.
ordering costs when the police had not acted in bad faith or unreasonably;
2.
awarding costs for the entirety of the proceedings; and
3.
fixing costs above the scale.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partly allowed.
On the first ground, Parker J held that the magistrate erred in finding that the police acted unreasonably. The prima facie position is that costs should not be awarded against a complainant in proceedings for a restraining order. The fact that the police could have investigated a matter further does not establish unreasonableness. Prosecutors should not prejudge the issue and should proceed where it is open to the court to accept the complainant as a credible witness ([37], [56]).
The second ground depended on whether it was reasonable for the police to continue the proceeding after the second day, when Mr Minchin’s credibility had been damaged. The matter was remitted to the same magistrate to decide whether the police acted unreasonably in continuing with the application after the second day of the trial ([78]).
On the third ground, Parker J held that it was within the magistrate’s discretion to award costs above the scale, having regard to the complexity of the evidence such as subpoenas and telephone recordings and the need to engage senior counsel ([88]).
Police v Kritcos [2016] SASC 28 (10 March 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a Magistrate’s decision to revoke an interim intervention order.
Facts: An interim intervention order was made against the respondent (the appellant’s former husband). A Magistrate dismissed an application to confirm the order and revoked the order. The alleged abuse consisted of three letters that the respondent sent to the appellant. One of the letters concerned renewal of their deceased pet dog’s council registration and the attached dog tag. She believed that the respondent was making a point of using her address when he knew she did not want it disclosed and that the letter was a ‘gratuitous and hurtful’ reminder of the dog’s death. During their marriage, they had intimidated the respondent’s former wife by driving past her house. She was worried she would suffer similar harassment. The respondent denied all knowledge of the other letters. The appellant gave evidence which alleged prior acts of abuse by the respondent, including threats to kill and physical abuse. The Magistrate largely rejected this evidence as not proven, taking into account the fact that the appellant admitted lying in an affidavit previously filed in the Family Court. The Magistrate also rejected the respondent’s explanation about sending the dog tag and found it was sent out of spite to upset the appellant.
Notwithstanding, while this conduct was spiteful, the Magistrate was not satisfied it resulted in emotional and psychological harm within the meaning of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act). The Magistrate concluded that it was reasonable to suspect that the conduct would cause ‘upset, annoyance and anger’ but not harm. While the Magistrate found it was reasonable to suspect that the conduct would continue without intervention because the respondent’s evidence ‘did not provide any direct reassurance that the conduct will not continue’ (See at [19]), he found that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances to confirm the order. He gave the respondent an opportunity to show he would not persist with the conduct. If the conduct persisted, the appellant could make an application for a further interim order. The Magistrate also noted the appellant was a personal trainer, coaches kick boxing and holds a black belt in martial arts.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in concluding that the letters did not amount to an act of abuse under the Act.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in concluding that it was not appropriate to make an order in the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the Magistrate erred by not having regard to the definition of emotional and psychological harm in the Act which includes ‘distress, anxiety or fear that is more than trivial’. Doyle J held that while the Magistrate should have expressly referred to this definition, the Magistrate’s finding was that, ‘the correspondence was reasonably expected to cause “upset, annoyance and anger” in contradistinction to non-trivial “distress, anxiety or fear”’ (see at [36]). The appellant also submitted that the Magistrate erred in ‘approaching the issue of harm on the basis that he needed to be satisfied that the defendant’s conduct was “intended to, and caused” harm. Doyle J concluded that the Magistrate had to consider three issues – ‘First, whether the letters might reasonably be expected to cause harm (s 8(4)(j)) and then whether they were intended to, and did in fact, result in harm (s 8(2))’ (see at [39]). His Honour concluded that the effect of the Magistrate’s finding was that, ‘the letters were neither intended to, nor did in fact, result in harm’ and ‘(the Magistrate) appropriately addressed both the respondent’s state of mind in engaging in the relevant conduct and the (subjective) impact of this conduct on the protected person’ (see at [39]). In relation to the exclusion of other evidence relating to the history of the relationship, Doyle J held that the appellant was given several opportunities to detail the effect of the letters upon her.
2.
The appellant submitted that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the principles set out in s 10 of the Act which are relevant to determining whether it is appropriate to make an order. In particular, the section makes clear that abuse can consist of isolated incidents. Doyle J stated at [44] – ‘his Honour did not suggest that isolated instances could not constitute abuse. His reasoning was merely that on the facts of this case the letters (neither individually nor cumulatively) were not sufficient to constitute abuse.’ In relation to the Magistrate’s references to the appellant being a personal trainer and having martial arts qualifications, his Honour stated that this was a ‘somewhat obscure’ reference, but it was, ‘probably best understood as being a reference to matters which might have given the protected person some level of personal confidence and physical prowess. While I consider these matters to have been of only marginal relevance, I do not think they are entirely irrelevant or that it was erroneous to take them into account’ (see at [45]). The Magistrate’s conclusion to give the respondent an opportunity to not persist with the relevant conduct is not a factor referred to in s 10(1) of the Act, but was nevertheless not irrelevant. It is a relevant consideration that the respondent is someone who might respond to an opportunity to change their behaviour. See finally at [48] –
‘Here there was no proven act of past abuse. While the Magistrate accepted there was a reasonable suspicion abuse would occur in the future without intervention, it might be inferred that the Magistrate did not consider there to be a high likelihood of this occurring. Indeed, the Magistrate’s judgment appears (from his reference to the contingency that his judgment might prove to be misplaced) to have been that the suspicion will probably not come to fruition. It is also relevant that while there was a suspicion of abuse in the broad sense contemplated by the Act (i.e. extending to emotional and psychological harm), the Magistrate made a positive finding that it was not reasonable to suspect that the defendant would cause physical harm to the protected person.
R v LI [2016] SASC 4 (4 February 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Proceeding: Application to exclude expert evidence.
Facts: The defendant was tried for murdering his mother. His counsel sought to adduce expert psychiatric evidence relating to his relationships with his family, his mother as well as his childhood. The Director of Public Prosecutions sought to have this evidence excluded.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence fell outside the area of human knowledge or experience, such that a jury would be able to form a judgment about it without expert assistance.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed and the evidence was excluded. It was not in dispute that the defendant caused his mother’s death – the issue at trial related to self-defence. The evidence detailed his traumatic upbringing where he witnessed episodes of domestic violence. It explored the dynamics of the relationship between the accused and his mother. It did not detail any recognised psychiatric illness or disability that the accused suffered which would affect his capacity to give evidence or recollect events. Indeed, the psychiatrist was in fact impressed with the accused’s ability to describe subtleties of his history in a way that convinced the psychiatrist that his account was accurate and that the relationship was abusive. The psychiatrist’s view was that the case was ‘unusual’. Blue J noted at [12] that the only ‘expert’ element of the report was the psychiatrist’s view that the accused was fit to stand trial and that the mental impairment defence was not available. His Honour then distinguished the case of R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen (1992) 56 SASR 114; [1991] SASC 2951 (28 June 1991), where the Court held that expert evidence regarding the ‘learned helplessness’ associated with ‘battered woman syndrome’ were contrary to ordinary expectations of human behaviour such that juries could be misled without the assistance of expert evidence. The recent Queensland Court of Appeal decision of R v Jones [2015] QCA 161 (1 September 2015) was analogous. In that case, the proposed expert psychiatric evidence was found to be a matter of common knowledge. The same approach was adopted in this case. Many of the matters in the evidence simply detailed the history of the relationship and issues relating to Chinese family culture. These were not issues that needed explanation from a psychiatrist. See at [22] – ‘The accused can give the evidence as he sees fit about the verbal or physical violence that he suffered at the hands of his mother. If that evidence is accepted by the jury it will be self-evident that the relationship between Mr Li and his mother was both complex and intense.’
Koay v Police [2015] SASC 158 (7 October 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘alleged prior violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant, a woman, and the complainant, a man, met in 2011 and married in 2012. The appellant was on a spousal visa. The complainant’s version of events involved the appellant coming into his bedroom at night when he was trying to sleep. He asked her to leave the room multiple times but she did not. He recorded some of the incident on his phone (and the recording was admitted in evidence). As they were grappling with a light switch, he claimed that the appellant punched and scratched him. He attempted to block the punches. He asked her to stop punching him. He suffered minor injuries. At trial, the appellant claimed that she acted in self-defence. She claimed that she was scared of him because he had previously been violent towards her, and that the reason for going into his bedroom was to discuss her visa.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred by rejecting her claim of self-defence without the proper analysis required by s 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant submitted that rather than restricting himself to the events on the night, the Magistrate should have considered the evidence of alleged prior violence by the complainant to place context around the incident. The Magistrate noted that the appellant’s claim that she was scared of the complainant lacked credibility, as she decided to enter his room in the middle of the night, notwithstanding his requests that she leave. The Magistrate found it difficult to accept her reason for going into the room (to discuss the visa) and also difficult to accept that the middle of the night was the most convenient time to do so. He described the appellant’s evidence of self-defence as vague. It did not explain how the conduct was reasonable for her own defence. Vanstone J accepted the Magistrate’s conclusions – the appellant made no attempt to directly address the elements required for self-defence in her evidence and she did not explain why, despite the complainant’s requests, she did not leave the room. Vanstone J also held that the Magistrate was correct not to rely on the evidence of alleged prior violence inflicted by the complainant because it was not ‘fleshed out in detail’ (see at [18]) and there was nothing in this evidence which was relevant to the incident on the night.
Police v Baker [2015] SASC 110 (30 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against acquittal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against acquittal.
Facts: The respondent allegedly slapped his female companion in the face. This was witnessed by a police officer, whose evidence formed the basis of the prosecution case. The companion did not give evidence and at the time of the incident was not distressed. She informed the police officer that it was ‘OK’. According to the officer, at the time of the incident, the companion did not want the respondent to be arrested. During the hearing, the Magistrate invited submissions as to whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to ground consent or ‘otherwise of having received force from the defendant’ (see at [3]). The respondent was acquitted of the charge, with the Magistrate concluding that the prosecution’s evidence was so lacking in weight or reliability that no reasonable tribunal of fact could safely convict (an R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; (1979) 2 A Crim R 45) direction). The Magistrate found a reasonable doubt about the ‘lack of consent’ element in the offence of assault. He noted that the prosecution’s case was ‘hampered’ by the victim’s failure to give evidence (See at [13]).
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in finding that the prosecution’s evidence lacked in weight or reliability and whether the Magistrate erred in finding a reasonable doubt as to the ‘lack of consent’ element.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court firstly noted the hesitance of appellate courts to interfere with Magistrates’ decision to acquit. The appeal was dismissed for this reason but Nicholson J accepted the appellant’s submissions relating to the trial process.
The Court accepted that there was a prima facie case to answer. The Magistrate gave no reasons regarding how he concluded that lack of consent could not be inferred beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant submitted that a reasonable tribunal of fact would not be able to ignore the inherent unlikelihood that a person would consent to being hit with the force as described by the police officer. Nicholson J accepted this submission, finding that the Prasad direction should not have been made and the case should have proceeded. The victim’s lack of complaint, lack of cooperation with the police and her request that the respondent not be charged were evidentiary matters which may assist in determining whether she had consented to the slap. In fact, they were consistent with a finding that the victim was prepared to submit to the conduct. Importantly, Nicholson J noted at [24] – ‘Submission and failure to complain are not the same as consent’ and at [27] – ‘Whilst each case will turn on its own facts, the mere fact that an alleged victim does not give evidence, will not necessarily mean that lack of consent cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt.’ However, while there were errors in the Magistrate’s approach, there were no ‘clear and compelling circumstances’ ([27]) to interfere with the acquittal in this case.
Groom v Police [2015] SASC 101 (14 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Construction of terms’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Electronic listening device’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Interpretation of intervention order’ – ‘Protected person’ – ‘Public interest’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An intervention order was in place between the appellant and his former partner. The breach arose from a conversation between the appellant and his former partner. The order prohibited discussions between the pair other than with respect to their child. In conversation, the appellant then brought up the appellant’s ongoing court proceedings relating to the intervention order itself. At trial, the Magistrate admitted into evidence an audio recording of this conversation secretly made by his former partner. His former partner claimed she was advised by police to record communications between her and the appellant. Conversations between her and the appellant were usually unwitnessed by anyone else, which made previous complaints that she had made to police a case of her word against his and thus difficult to prove in court.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the conversation was permitted by the intervention order.
2.
Whether the recording should have been excluded because it was unlawful pursuant to the Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (the Act). More specifically, whether the use of the device was in the public interest or for the protection of the former partner’s lawful interests under section 7 of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1. The Court rejected an argument that the conversation was permitted by the intervention order. The topic of the conversation, (the intervention order itself) was not related to their child which was the only topic that the intervention order allowed them to discuss. See further at [47]-[58].
2. Nicholson J held: the conversation was a private conversation within the meaning of the Act; the former partner intended to use the device to record the conversation and that there was no consent to the conversation being recorded. The Court then considered whether the use of the device was in the public interest or for the protection of the former partner’s lawful interests. While his Honour acknowledged that the breach was relatively minor, he noted that breaches of intervention orders are serious. In this case, the former partner had made many allegations of breaches but had encountered problems with proof. The Court accepted that the former partner held genuine concerns for her own safety. Nicholson J then made the following comments at [39]-[40] about how recording private conversations can be in a protected person’s ‘lawful interests’ – ‘… there is no way of knowing how seriously an intervention order might be breached until the fact of breach takes place. Breaches of intervention orders are capable of constituting serious crimes. Irrespective of whether or not a serious crime is in contemplation, a court should more readily accept that the recording of a “private conversation” has been carried out in pursuit of a person’s lawful interest in circumstances where that person has a genuine concern for their own safety. Domestic violence is a very serious problem in our community. It would appear that, at least, the recognition and reporting of domestic abuse, be it physical, psychological, or by threatening behaviour, is on the rise. An intervention order is a very important first step in protecting a person, usually a woman, who has been the subject of domestic abuse. Such an order gains much of its value in this respect according to the extent that it can be enforced. Respondents must be discouraged from infringing any such court order.’
The Court also accepted that the recording was in the public interest for two reasons. Firstly, that there is a public interest in, ‘allowing a protected person… the ongoing protection available through the recording and documenting of interactions that result in breaches’ (See at [44]). Secondly, that these recordings can assist the defence as well as the prosecution (see at [45]). It would also be possible for a defendant to make similar recordings to disprove a false allegation.
Murray v Police [2015] SASC 64 (22 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault’ – ‘Assaulting police’ – ‘Being unlawfully on premises’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Hindering or resisting police’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Unlawful damage’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Being unlawfully on premises, unlawful damage, assault (two counts), contravention of intervention order (three counts), hindering or resisting police (three counts), assault police (one count)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant was in an intermittent relationship with the victim. There were various incidents of verbal and physical violence over several years. This led the victim to apply for an intervention order which prohibited the defendant from approaching, contacting or communicating with the victim or her daughter. However, he returned to live with the victim on various occasions without the intervention order being changed. On the day in question, the defendant and the victim were arguing. The victim attempted to shut him out but he forced the door open, which knocked the victim onto the ground. He attempted to enter the victim’s daughter’s room multiple times to prevent her from calling the police. The daughter was pushing against it from the inside. He damaged various objects and threw a television across the room. He pushed the victim into a door frame and attempted to light a spray can while pointing it at the victim. He then pushed and attempted to punch two police officers, who had to use capsicum spray to subdue him. A psychiatrist diagnosed the defendant as suffering from an adjustment disorder with depressive features when he committed the offences. A single penalty for all offences of 14 months, 23 days’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 months was imposed. The defendant’s history included one like offence of violence committed against the same victim. He had had previous long term relationships which did not involve violence. The Magistrate concluded that the defendant had no insight into the offences he committed, and that his prospects of rehabilitation were minimal.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Blue J found that while the Magistrate was rightly appalled at the nature of the violence, insufficient weight was given to the defendant’s prospects of rehabilitation given the fact he had previous relationships that did not involve violence. The Magistrate also erred in not taking into account the lack of prior convictions for violence before his relationship with the victim and the psychiatric illness that he was suffering. He also had the support of a former long-term partner. As such, taking into account his pleas of guilty, he was resentenced to 11 months and 19 days’ imprisonment. This was suspended after the defendant served 5 months and five days upon entering into a good behaviour bond for 18 months.
Cook v Galloway [2015] SASC 36 (6 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against dismissal of an application for the confirmation of an interim intervention order.
Facts: The appellant and the respondent were in a de facto relationship and had separated. While proceedings in the Family Court were on foot, the appellant applied for an interim intervention order that was granted, but not confirmed. The factual basis for the intervention order was a series of incidents following the end of the relationship, where the appellant alleged his former de facto partner had, among other things, sexually assaulted him and punched him (See at [8]-[18]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the intervention order should have been confirmed.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred finding that the proceedings were brought unreasonably which led to an adverse costs order against the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of costs but otherwise dismissed.
1.
Nicholson J found that the role of a Court in confirming an intervention order involves considering whether it is reasonable to suspect that the defendant, without intervention, will commit an act of abuse, and secondly, that the order is appropriate in the circumstances. His Honour acknowledged that the Magistrate neglected to make several findings of fact, and as such did not wholly follow the approach of Kourakis CJ in Police v Giles [2013] SASC 11 (15 January 2013). However, the Court held that the Magistrate was correct to conclude that there was no reasonable suspicion that abuse would occur in the future. The respondent lived away from the appellant and they rarely saw each other. Furthermore, the relationship was over and there was no longer any aggressive behaviour.
2.
The Court held that the appellant’s concerns were genuine, and called for determination by a Magistrate. Nicholson J noted that just because the application failed, this did not mean that the proceedings were brought unreasonably. The Court cited previous authority and noted the public policy concerns of making adverse costs orders against applicants in intervention order applications, as they may deter people from bringing worthy applications.
Stone v Police [2015] SASC 28 (3 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of discreditable conduct’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order (two counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The protected persons in the order were the appellant’s neighbours, with whom the appellant had been in conflict for an extended period. There was a considerable amount of evidence admitted at trial regarding the history of the appellant’s behaviour towards the complainants.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred by admitting evidence of the appellant’s prior discreditable conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court found that the Magistrate did not give an adequate explanation of the purpose of the evidence of the appellant’s prior behaviour towards the complainants. Furthermore, the Magistrate made no reference to s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 which sets out rules regarding this type of evidence. The Court found that the evidence was ‘highly prejudicial’ to the appellant because it was similar to the offences which were the subject matter of the trial, and indicates that the accused has a propensity to commit offences of a similar nature. If it was to be used in that way, the Magistrate had to be satisfied that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect on the accused. Furthermore, no notice was given by the prosecution of their intention to adduce such evidence, and no direction was made by the Magistrate as to its use.
Fenton v Police [2014] SASC 167 (7 November 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Evidence of distress’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Uncooperative witness’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault – (Circumstance of aggravation: that the defendant committed the offence knowing the victim was his domestic partner.)
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant assaulted the victim by pushing her onto the floor with his knees in her back, twisting her arms and forcing her face into the floor. At trial, the defendant claimed he was acting in self-defence. Both the defendant and the victim were severely intoxicated.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred by not taking into account inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence.
2.
Whether the Magistrate should have left certain matters for expert evidence.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred by relying on evidence of the victim’s distress as observed by police.
Decision and Reasoning: Blue J dismissed all grounds of appeal.
1.
In relation to the inconsistencies in the victim’s account, his Honour at [22] stated that the Magistrate in fact did consider this in relation to the victim’s credibility as a witness, but it did not have a substantial impact on the case. The second ground of appeal, which was that the victim gave new information in cross-examination that she had not previously given in her witness statements was dismissed for similar reasons (See [26]). The third ground of appeal was that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the victim’s ‘guarded and defensive’ answers during cross-examination. This was rejected – the Magistrate had the benefit of seeing the victim give evidence. It was open to him to make a favourable assessment of her credibility.
2.
Blue J acknowledged that had the Magistrate gone further in making conclusions regarding the consistency of bruises to the victim’s back with the victim’s account and the potential effect of alcohol on self-control, this may have transgressed into the realms of expert evidence. However, the Magistrate only made limited use of his own common sense and experience when making conclusions with respect to the bruises on the victim’s back and the potential impact of alcohol. It is common knowledge that - alcohol can reduce inhibitions which can lead to a loss of self-control and if a person is disposed to be aggressive, alcohol can lead a person to act aggressively. The Magistrate was entitled to make limited use of these observations without needing expert evidence.
3.
On the defendant’s version of events, the victim’s distress was caused by embarrassment about, among other things, her own conduct of striking and slapping the defendant. Blue J held that it was not self-evident that a person in the victim’s position would have exhibited distress as a result of embarrassment as submitted by the defendant. The Magistrate was not obliged to expressly reject this possibility. He used the evidence of distress legitimately.
Police v Siaosi [2014] SASC 131 (5 September 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Certainty of terms’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Impact of breach on offender’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Validity of terms in intervention order’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An intervention order was made in favour of the appellant’s former wife. The fifth term of the order prohibited the appellant from entering or remaining ‘in the vicinity’ of the property at which his former wife lived. The appellant formed a friendship with another woman who, by coincidence, lived quite close to his former wife’s home. After visiting this property, the appellant realised that there was a direct line of sight between the backyard of his friend’s property and his former wife’s property. There was no direct route of access between the houses, and they were not addresses on the same street. The distance between the two houses was measured to be 26 metres. He was convicted of breaching the fifth term of the order.
Issue/s: Whether the fifth term which prohibited the appellant from being ‘in the vicinity of’ specified premises was void for uncertainty and whether it was a valid exercise of power under s 12(1) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The term was void for uncertainty and not a valid exercise of power under the Act. Peek J held that mandatory terms in intervention orders must be ‘clearly and specifically authorised by the words of s 12(1)’ (See at [18]). The terms of intervention orders can leave the affected person in no doubt as to the meaning and extent of the order. His Honour noted that the term ‘vicinity’ is inherently imprecise, which is in contrast to s 12(1) of the Act which requires that orders be specific and certain. Police do not have powers to insert ‘broad and vague terms’ (See at [28]) which gives them a right to use their individual opinions to determine in a particular case whether a contravention of the term has occurred.
Callow v Police [2014] SASC 8 (24 January 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Contravention of bail agreement’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (2 counts) – Circumstance of aggravation: that the applicant committed the offence knowing the victim was his wife, aggravated assault causing harm, driving while disqualified, contravention of bail agreement (5 counts), contravention of intervention order (5 counts), property damage.
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time to appeal against sentence.
Facts: See at [4] for a detailed factual summary of each offence. The assault offences involved the appellant kicking his wife while she was in bed and on a separate occasion punching her when she was on the couch recoiling from the applicant. The contravention of the intervention order counts all involved the applicant leaving voicemail messages for his wife. The applicant was sentenced to a single term of 1 month imprisonment for all offences. The remaining eight months were suspended with a good behaviour bond.
Issue/s: Whether the whole sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed. The applicant submitted that the Magistrate should have suspended the whole sentence based on the mitigating factors which led the Magistrate to suspend most of it. The Magistrate placed large weight on the mitigating factors, including that the applicant runs a successful business which he uses to help pay child support, as well as favourable character references. In fact, the Court described the sentence as ‘merciful’ given that the offending was repetitive, protracted and serious, and included ‘contumacious disregard’ of court orders (See at [10]). The Court also upheld previous authority that deterrence is an important factor in sentencing where there is a history of domestic violence, particularly breaches of intervention orders.
F, S v Police [2013] SASC 164 (1 November 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Standard of proof’
Appeal Type: Appeal against confirmation of intervention order.
Facts: The Magistrate confirmed an intervention order made in favour of the appellant’s ex-wife. Some of the alleged incidents of domestic violence included the appellant holding a screwdriver to his ex-wife’s throat, swearing and throwing clothes and shoes around in arguments. The Magistrate made findings of fact in relation to each alleged incident. On that basis he found a reasonable suspicion that the appellant would, without intervention, commit an act of abuse against his ex-wife and that such an act would cause distress, anxiety or fear which was not trivial.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate made proper findings of fact. Whether the Magistrate should have applied the higher standard of proof of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, rather than the ‘balance of probabilities’.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Magistrate set out the evidence very carefully, and in fact found that most of the alleged incidents were not sufficiently proven. The Court also found that the balance of probabilities is the correct standard, because the consequences of the imposition of an intervention order are ‘not so grave as to warrant such a heavier onus’ (at [18]). Finally, the Magistrate did not err by finding that the proven facts could amount to distress, anxiety or fear which is not trivial, because these considerations are somewhat subjective so the trier of fact has a distinct advantage.
Mullins v Police [2013] SASC 148 (20 September 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Resisting police’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (three counts), Contravention of intervention order (three counts), breach of bail (two counts), resisting police, damaging property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to all 10 offences which were on four Magistrates’ Court files. All of the offences were committed either against or in the presence of the appellant’s partner (the mother of his child) in the context of arguments. The contravention of the intervention order arose from conduct that would have made his partner feel threatened, as opposed to a positive intention to make her feel threatened or any physical contact. A single sentence was imposed for each file and the four sentences were made cumulative. None of the sentences were suspended.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in ordering a sentence of imprisonment for the resist police charge.
2.
Whether the sentence imposed on the appellant contravened the rule against double punishment.
3.
How the appellant should be re-sentenced.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
One sentence of three months’ imprisonment was imposed for the resist police and the first aggravated assault charge. The Magistrate made no reference to the facts of the resist police charge, which was in fact not particularly serious and only involved ‘childish and idiotic’ behaviour (see at [15]) and nothing more. Even though the aggravated assault charge required a sentence of imprisonment, this did not mean that the resist police charge also required a sentence of imprisonment. A similar conclusion was reached in relation to the second Magistrates’ Court file, where the appellant was sentenced to one term of one month imprisonment for the breach of bail and contravention of intervention order offence. He should not have been punished for the breach of bail offence because he believed he was not in breach of bail, which was acknowledged by the Magistrate.
2.
The facts that formed the basis of the contravention offence in the fourth file were the same facts that formed the basis of the aggravated assault charge. The facts that formed the basis of the second contravention offence relied on the same facts as the property damage charge. Therefore, Peek J found that there was both ‘double charging’ and ‘double punishment’. Convictions were recorded for four offences when they only should have been recorded for two and a penalty imposed for four offences when it only should have been imposed for two. It may have been possible to charge alternative offences, but once pleas of guilty were taken the other count should have been dismissed. Peek J did acknowledge the problem that where a breach is particularly serious, the maximum penalty for a contravention offence is two years, while the maximum penalty for offences such as aggravated assault is higher. In that case, his Honour stated that the best option would be to lay the more serious charge with the contravention offence laid as an alternative charge, to be withdrawn upon a guilty plea to the more serious charge. Furthermore, the fact that the offender knew that the assault was also a contravention of an intervention order would be an aggravating factor in sentencing the more serious charge.
3.
In resentencing, his Honour took into account the appellant’s youth, minimal criminal history and good rehabilitation prospects. He also took into account the victim impact statement, in which the complainant stated she wished to maintain a relationship with the appellant and stated that she is ‘not a victim’. His Honour described this as a ‘mature and balanced view of the relationship’. However, relevant also was the need to protect domestic partners, the repeated nature of the offending and the need to ensure intervention orders are obeyed. The appellant was re-sentenced to 50 weeks’ imprisonment, fully suspended.
Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93 (25 June 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Adjournment’ – ‘Consent to confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Interlocutory orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the order of a Magistrate.
Facts: With the appellant’s consent, a Magistrate confirmed an interim intervention order which had been put in place against him in favour of his domestic partner pursuant to s 23(3) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009. At the time of the hearing, the appellant was in custody and appeared unrepresented in the Magistrates’ Court. On the day of the hearing, he did not have documentation relating to his case including an affidavit sworn by the applicant, and his responses to this affidavit. This was because he had attempted to have the documents brought to him in prison by a friend but permission was refused. The prosecution had not provided him with the affidavit. The Magistrate granted an adjournment until the afternoon, but refused to grant a longer adjournment.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant’s consent to the intervention order was freely given and whether he could withdraw his consent and have the order set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Before deciding the main issue, the Court confirmed as a matter of procedure that the Magistrate’s confirmation order was interlocutory in nature as it was capable of variation or revocation. As such, permission to appeal was required (See at [29]- [32]). The Court then found (at [40]) that had the longer adjournment been granted, no prejudice to the protected person would have occurred because the interim intervention order would have remained in place. Sulan J drew an analogy between consent under s 23(3) and admissions made in civil proceedings. As such, the corresponding principles that govern whether such admissions can be withdrawn became relevant. The Court found that the appellant’s consent was given in circumstances, ‘in which he considered that he had no satisfactory alternative but to agree’, because of all the circumstances outlined above, the fact that he was partially unrepresented, as well as the fact that he was not aware that he could have applied for a further adjournment. As such, his consent was not freely given.
T, R v L, KC [2013] SASC 51 (15 April 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Intersection of legal systems’ – ‘Jurisdiction of family court of australia’ – ‘Jurisdiction of state courts’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s decision to dismiss application for intervention order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were separated and had two children. Orders were made in the Federal Magistrates Court in relation to custody, access and protection of their children ([4]). The orders provided that the children live with the appellant, that the respondent have limited access to the children, and preventing the respondent from bringing the children into contact with certain people ([5]-[6]).
The appellant sought an intervention order in the Magistrates Court restraining the respondent from contacting the children ([11]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that the Family Court was the proper forum for the appellant to pursue the relief he seeks.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Family Court had jurisdiction over the proceedings and could amend the parenting orders if it considered appropriate ([18]-[19]). An intervention order made by the Magistrates Court would be invalid to the extent of inconsistency with the Family Law Act ([16]).
Police v Giles [2013] SASC 11 (15 January 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence of prior abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reasonable suspicion’
Appeal Type: Police appeal against a Magistrate’s refusal to confirm an interim intervention order.
Facts: The Magistrate refused to confirm an interim intervention order which had previously been made ex parte against the respondent in favour of his former de facto partner. At trial, there were disputed facts regarding various prior incidents of physical and verbal abuse. The Magistrate made no findings of fact about these incidents.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate’s failure to make findings of fact about these incidents amounted to an error of law.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in finding that there was no reasonable suspicion that the respondent ‘would if unrestrained commit an act of abuse which was to result in more than trivial emotional harm’ (See at [4]). This appeal therefore concerned the meaning of ‘trivial’ distress, anxiety or fear and the degree of suspicion which is required.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
The Magistrate’s failure to make factual findings amounted to an error of law because: they were important to determining the nature of the relationship; they affected the degree of anxiety that the respondent’s former de facto partner may have felt about potential further acts of abuse and they were probative of further allegations made by his former de facto partner. Kourakis CJ noted at [29] that while proof of past acts of abuse is not a precondition to the making of an intervention order, the Act ‘appears to contemplate that the court will make findings of fact about past events and provides that it is to make those findings on the balance of probabilities’. As such, a reasonable suspicion (under s 6) that an act of abuse will be committed must be based on findings of fact made on the balance of probabilities.
2.
The Court found the Magistrate erred in finding that there was no reasonable suspicion in the circumstances. There is no requirement that the facts found by the Magistrate themselves constitute an act of abuse, that they be recent or that they occur before or after a relationship breakdown. An order could be made based on a statement of intention to commit an act of abuse, no matter who that statement was made to. While the timing of the acts is relevant, Kourakis CJ stated that depending on the circumstances, an event many years earlier could constitute a reasonable suspicion (See at [30]-[31]). A reasonable suspicion will include a suspicion that the ‘defendant will act in a certain way’ and a suspicion that those acts would have the prescribed effect on the protected person of something more than a trivial kind (See at [32]). In this case, the respondent’s former de facto partner had anxiety that the respondent may kill her. This was not trivial and the Magistrate had erred in finding it was.
Kourakis CJ then made several factual findings including that the appellant used a knife and verbally abused his former de facto partner and therefore found that the prescribed reasonable suspicion under the Act existed. His Honour then found that it would be appropriate in the circumstances to make the order.
RYSZ v Police [2011] SASC 167 (7 October 2011) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening to cause harm’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence restraining order, threatening to cause harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In 1999, a domestic violence restraining order was made against the appellant in favour of his wife. In 2010, he called his wife, verbally abused her and threatened her partner. This conduct amounted to a breach of the order which prohibited him from contacting her in any way. His criminal history was relevant and included offences of violence against his wife and daughter, as well as many prior breaches of the restraining order. He had an alcohol problem. At the time of the offending, he had ceased taking anti-depressant medication and had increased his alcohol consumption. He was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in not partially suspending the sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in respect of the partial suspension.
1.
The appellant submitted, inter alia that as over 7 years had elapsed since the last breach of the order, the current offence should be seen as an isolated lapse and that the latest breach was relatively minor. This submission was rejected. Given the applicant’s history of seven previous convictions for breach of the order, leniency was not warranted. White J then discussed the nature of breaches of restraining orders and noted that their purpose is to protect vulnerable family members. His Honour at [31] then drew an analogy between breaches of domestic violence restraining orders and driving while disqualified, in that, ‘both involve some defiance of a court order; both negate the protection of the community which they were intended to achieve; and considerations of general and personal deterrence are important in each case.’ Generally, the most appropriate penalty for driving while disqualified is imprisonment. His Honour (again at [31]) then drew some distinctions between the nature of the two offences. His Honour then concluded, notwithstanding the differences between the two types of offences, ‘I consider that, having regard to the important role of domestic violence restraining orders and of the necessity of courts promoting respect for their own orders, a sentence of imprisonment may be appropriate in those cases, like the present, in which the order has been repeatedly breached and the offender has not taken advantage of the lenience previously extended to him. In cases of contumacious breaches of order, considerations of both general and personal deterrence are especially important’ (see at [32]).
2.
The Court agreed with the appellant’s submission that the sentence should have been partially suspended. The appellant had complied with the order for a long period since 2003 and the latest offence did appear to be isolated. Furthermore, it was at the lower end of the scale of seriousness for offences of that type. The offence was also explained by the fact that the appellant was coming off anti-depressants’ and was intoxicated (see further at [41]-[45]).
Police v Dolan [2010] SASC 341 (9 December 2010) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: Common assault, trespass, breach of bail.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant had been in a relationship with the victim for nine months. The victim was 8 weeks’ pregnant at the time of the offending. The defendant was the father and aware of the pregnancy. While the defendant and the victim were having a conversation, the defendant became aggressive, at which point the defendant punched her in the left side of the head which caused her to fall to the ground. He then kicked her in the head while she lay on the ground, which caused her to pass out. While she suffered no permanent injury, she experienced extreme pain. After being arrested and placed on bail, the defendant breached this bail by trespassing because he wanted to see if his partner was with another man. He again breached bail by having a conversation with his partner. He pleaded guilty and was placed on an 18 month supervised good behaviour bond, which included conditions that he obey the directions of a Correctional Services Officer, particularly in relation to attending programs for mental health, anger management and domestic violence. The Magistrate stated that a term of imprisonment would have been appropriate but for the guilty plea.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Gray J held that the Magistrate erred by not paying sufficient regard to the fact that this was an act of domestic violence against a young pregnant woman, which was not justified by the fact that the defendant was angry. While the defendant was not charged with an aggravated assault based on a domestic relationship, this remained a relevant factor. The mere fact that the defendant pleaded guilty should not have resulted in a term of imprisonment not being imposed. Indeed, other factors, such as the fact that it was an offence of domestic violence required consideration. His Honour’s starting point for common assault was 6 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 4 months’ because of the guilty plea and remorse. His Honour then had regard to the lack of criminal history and evident remorse and suspended the sentence, upon the defendant entering into a three-year good behaviour bond to be supervised for 18 months. Conditions that he attend anger management, drug and alcohol abuse and domestic violence programs were included. The convictions for the other offences were confirmed but no further penalty was imposed.
Vonstanke v Police [2010] SASC 15 (4 February 2010) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Contravention of restraining order’ – ‘Evidence of prior abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (aggravating factor – that the offence was committed against the appellant’s domestic partner), contravention of restraining order (two counts), breach of bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s domestic partner believed the appellant was having an affair. She obtained documents from his computer. In attempting to get the documents back, the appellant pushed her backwards into a chair after grabbing her. The appellant prevented her from getting help by cutting the power to her telephone. She was fearful of the appellant. This conduct constituted the breach of the restraining order as well as the assault. After being arrested and released on bail with conditions that he not contact the victim, the appellant contacted the victim daily through the internet as well as by appearing at locations the victim drove to and sending her flowers. This conduct was in breach of bail and the restraining order. The offences were committed in the context of a background of domestic violence. The total effective sentence imposed was nine months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. While the victim suffered no physical injury, she was isolated, in considerable fear and subjected to physical force while the applicant prevented her from obtaining assistance. The fact that this incident was not unique was also relevant - the physical assaults she had suffered from the appellant in the past were an important consideration. See in particular the following comments by Duggan J at [16] – ‘Personal and general deterrence play an important role in offences involving domestic violence. This is particularly so in the case of a repeat offender. Furthermore, Parliament has acknowledged the importance of deterrence in such cases by declaring that an offence of violence against a domestic partner is an aggravated offence attracting an increase in the maximum penalty over and above that applicable in the case of an offence of common assault. The fact that the assault constituted a breach of a restraining order made by the Court is a further factor to take into account in considering the single sentence imposed in respect of the assault and breach of restraining order.’
Johnstone v Police [2008] SASC 357 (17 December 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Domestic discipline’ – ‘Offences against children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated Assault (aggravating factor – that the offence was committed knowing the victim of the offence was their child)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant plead guilty and was convicted for the aggravated assault of his son. The appellant inflicted a substantial blow on the child, which left bruising and finger marks on his leg. However, he did not require any hospital treatment. It occurred in the context of the appellant attempting to discipline his son. The appellant’s criminal history included a prior conviction for an assault in a domestic setting. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering into a good behaviour bond for two years with conditions that he be under the supervision of a Community Corrections Officer and that he undertake counselling for drug issues, anger management and domestic violence issues.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the sentence was reduced to three months’ imprisonment, fully suspended with the same bond conditions as fixed by the Magistrate. While acknowledging the appellant’s criminal history, Nyland J found that this was an isolated incident in the context of the appellant attempting to discipline his son, and was not intended to cause any injury. As such, while the sentence was excessive, the Court agreed with the Magistrate that a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate – ‘the court must make it clear, not only to the appellant but to others who might be like-minded, that violence of any kind to a child will not be tolerated’ (see at [28]).
R v Wilkinson [2008] SASC 172 (4 July 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated serious harm with intent’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated serious harm with intent, aggravated assault causing harm, aggravated harm with intent. (Aggravating factors – that the appellant knew the victim was his de facto spouse).
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was on bail for an unrelated charge at the time of the offending. The first incident arose when the complainant went to collect the appellant (her de facto partner) due to the appellant’s curfew as a condition of his bail. The appellant reacted angrily to this, which led to the assault. She was admitted to hospital for four days. The complainant’s injuries were extremely serious with lasting effects including permanent facial and dental damage, ongoing amnesia, psychological issues and disfigurement. The appellant was arrested and eventually released on bail with conditions that he not approach or communicate with the complainant in any way. In breach of this bail, the appellant seriously assaulted the complainant again by punching her in the face, choking her, pulling her by the hair and throwing her into a mirror. The complainant again sustained serious injuries and required hospital treatment. There was a long history of domestic violence in the relationship, and one of the past incidents involved an assault by the appellant. The complainant called police but was unable to explain what occurred. When police returned the call, the appellant held a gun to the complainant’s head. She told the police all was OK and hung up. At the time of the offending, the appellant was 27 and the complainant was 17. They had been in a relationship for some years and the police had been contacted about domestic violence three times in the 12 months prior. The appellant had relevant criminal history apart from the history of domestic violence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 7 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Gray J (with whom Sulan J and White J agreed) discussed the causes of domestic violence and the preferred response of the courts. See at [27]- [28] -
‘The causes of domestic violence are multiple. It has been recognised that relevant contributing factors include immaturity, mental illness, abnormal personality disorders, inhibition through drug abuse, poor anger management and lack of counselling and support. Courts have identified all of the above as common causative factors in modern times. Although imposing longer and longer terms of imprisonment does remove perpetrators from the community, domestic violence continues and its incidence increases. The imposing of sentences of imprisonment is a blunt instrument that does not adequately address the underlying causes of domestic violence in any real way.
The courts have long recognised that personal and general deterrence have a heightened significance when sentencing for the crimes of domestic violence. As King CJ observed in R v Banens (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, King CJ, Legoe and Von Doussa JJ, 18 November 1987) at 7-8:
“The sentence which is imposed by the court for a crime of domestic violence is aimed, in large part, at deterring other people who may be involved in like situations. I think that, in a serious case of domestic violence, it is necessary for this Court to make clear, by actual intervention, to the public that the sentences imposed for this type of crime are calculated to provide effective deterrence to those who might be tempted to commit similar crimes. Not only must the penalties imposed operate, as far as such penalties can, as an effective deterrent, but it must be made clear to the public that the courts are imposing sentences having that effect. It is a question not only of actual deterrence but assurance to the public that deterrent penalties are being imposed.”’
His Honour went onto comment on the vulnerability of victims at [29] – ‘Domestic violence is predominantly directed by men toward women. The community expects the law to protect women, to protect the weak from the strong, and to protect the vulnerable from the oppressor. These are factors that have led the courts to treat crimes involving domestic violence as grave crimes. Parliament has enacted laws designed to provide protection to those subjected to domestic violence. Parliament has recognised that crimes involving violence and assault may be aggravated by a domestic situation.’
This was particularly relevant on these facts as the victim/complainant was only 17. She had made multiple complaints to police but had received little protection, other than the no contact and no alcohol conditions of the appellant’s bail. The Court did not make use of the wide powers under s 11 of the Bail Act 1985. While the bail agreement indicated there was to be supervision by a Community Corrections Officer, there is no evidence that this occurred. Also, the appellant was not required to undertake counselling to address his violence, alcohol abuse and anger issues. As such, in this case, the no contact condition provided little protection and the complainant was left vulnerable and in danger. The Court concluded that the sentencing judge was correct to take a serious view of the appellant’s conduct. Over the preceding 12 months, the appellant had ‘bullied, victimised and brutalised his younger partner’ (See at [41]) and had continued this conduct notwithstanding the fact that the complainant sought protection from police and the bail conditions. Personal deterrence was important as the appellant had not been deterred by earlier warnings. General deterrence was also particularly important. See finally at [42] where Gray J referred to the fact that Parliament has made an assault in a de facto relationship an aggravating factor, which draws attention to the seriousness of this conduct. The Courts should pay due attention to this factor in sentencing.
R v Carr [2008] SASC 125 (13 May 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Antecedents’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening life’
Charge/s: Common assault (two counts), threatening life.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the appellant’s wife. There was a long history of physical and psychological abuse in the relationship. The assaults involved the appellant slapping and spitting on his wife. The threatening life offence involved the appellant holding a knife to his wife’s throat. He was sentenced to two years and five months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of twelve months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant was re-sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 months. The appellant submitted that the sentencing judge erred in not sufficiently taking into account the time he spent in custody and in home detention and his prospects of rehabilitation. The respondent submitted that there was no error in the sentencing judge’s approach, and that the charges had to be considered against the background of domestic violence that occurred over the period of a 17 year marriage. The respondent argued that this made general deterrence of paramount importance. Anderson J (Doyle CJ and Bleby J agreeing), agreed at [31] that general deterrence is a very important consideration in sentencing where there has been a history of domestic violence in the relationship. This was applied at [38], where Anderson J held that the history of domestic violence in the relationship and the importance of general deterrence could not justify suspending the sentence. However, the sentencing judge erred in assessing the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation as moderate. This was contradictory to the information that was before him, which included a lack of prior convictions and the fact the appellant no longer had a problem with alcohol abuse. The sentencing judge also erred by not specifying the extent to which he took the period of home detention into account.
R v Lennon [2003] SASC 337 (2 October 2003) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful and malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Unlawful and malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was intoxicated and engaged in an argument with his de facto wife. He lost his temper and struck her on the head with the blade of a shovel which caused very serious injuries. He then threatened to break her legs, struck her on the knees with the shovel handle and struck her on the arm, which was already broken and in plaster. He had a relevant criminal history including offences of violence. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Mitigating factors included the fact that the offence was committed on the spur of the moment while he was intoxicated and he was immediately remorseful (see at [9]). However, Doyle CJ (with whom Prior J and Vanstone J agreed) described the attack as ‘brutal’ and ‘cowardly’ (see at [10]). Doyle CJ then made the following comments at [12] –
‘The court has said consistently that it must do what it can to protect women from violence by men. This applies just as much to violence within a domestic relationship as it does to violence in other situations. In cases like this the community expects, and protection of women requires, that the court should impose a sentence that is likely to deter the individual offender and to deter other potential offenders. The fact that the violence occurs on the spur of the moment is a relevant factor, but this is often true in the case of domestic violence. The impulsive nature of such offences is often offset by the fact that, as here, there is a pattern of violence within the particular relationship, or on the part of the particular offender. Mr Lennon's record makes it clear that he has not yet learned that violence towards women cannot be accepted.’
As such, while there was no error in the primary judge’s reasoning, the sentence was too low. It was not justified by the mitigating factors in the context of the objective seriousness of the crime and the respondent’s criminal history. The respondent’s Aboriginality was acknowledged but no significance of that factor was identified. The Court held that the head sentence should have been twice what was imposed. There was a need for the Court to re-sentence because the original punishment was, ‘so inadequate as to shake confidence in the administration of justice’ (see at [18]). The appellant was then re-sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months. While Doyle CJ was of the view that a longer non-parole period was warranted, this was not appropriate because the original non-parole date fixed by the trial judge was to expire within two weeks of the decision being handed down. To increase the non-parole period so close to this date would have been particularly harsh on the respondent.
R v Parisi [2003] SASC 249 (14 August 2003) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily actual harm’ – ‘Contravention of restraining order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening life’
Charge/s: Damaging property (two counts), contravention of restraining order (two counts), threatening life, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty in the District Court to all of the above charges. The victim was the appellant’s estranged wife. Prior to the offences, there was domestic and family violence that led to the restraining order being obtained. The property damage offences involved the appellant damaging his wife’s car. The threatening life and assault offences involved the appellant attending a house at which his wife was staying and producing a knife. He was allowed to enter the house after he handed over the knife and stated that he would not harm his wife. He then entered the house, grabbed his wife in a headlock and punched her in the face multiple times while threatening to kill her. She suffered a broken nose and black eye. The appellant’s criminal history included various drug and assault offences. A psychiatrist concluded that the appellant had developed a depressive disorder associated with the deterioration of his relationship, which had caused him to act aggressively and violently towards his wife and children over some years. His condition had not stabilised. He was sentenced to three years and two months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that the primary judge did not adequately consider the appellant’s rehabilitation and had given undue weight to his criminal history and the comments of the psychiatrist. He submitted that the sentence should have been suspended. However, the appeal was not upheld for these reasons. Rather, the original sentence was set aside due to an error with calculating the maximum penalties for the property damage offences. In re-sentencing, Nyland J (with whom Gray J and Debelle J agreed) concluded that while the two property damage offences might not appear particularly serious, they should be treated as part of an escalating course of conduct which culminated in the assault, which caused serious injury and would have been a terrifying experience. Her Honour also noted that the fact the conduct was committed in breach of a domestic violence order was an aggravating factor. General deterrence was significant to ‘bring home to others who might be like-minded that the courts will not tolerate this type of behaviour’ (See at [21]).’ He was re-sentenced to two years and nine months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months. The reduced length of the sentence gave credit for the appellant’s guilty plea and time already served in custody and on home detention bail. The non-parole period was reduced to take account of the positive reports from the psychiatrist about the appellant’s rehabilitation, such that he was no longer a threat to his wife and personal deterrence was no longer necessary.
R v McMutrie [2002] SASC 253 (8 August 2002) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of a knife with intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, wounding with intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm, unlawful wounding, breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s relationship with his former de facto partner had recently ended. The appellant approached her at a club because he wanted her to come outside to witness him attempt to cut his own throat. As he attempted to force her to leave, a struggle ensued and she was wounded by his knife. They had been in a relationship for 20 years. The appellant had a history of domestic violence, mental health issues and various other illnesses. His criminal history involved alcohol and drug related offending and prior breaches of restraining orders. He was acquitted of attempted murder and wounding with intent but convicted of unlawful wounding and possessing a knife with intent. The trial judge indicated that the possession of the knife and unlawful wounding offences arose out of the same events. He pleaded guilty to breaching the restraining order. He was sentenced for all three offences to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the appellant was convicted twice for the same offending conduct, as the same facts were relied upon for the possess knife with intent charge and the unlawful wounding charge, such that the rule against double jeopardy was infringed.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was upheld and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
1.
The Crown conceded that there was a risk of a miscarriage of justice and acknowledged that the jury may have relied on the same factual circumstances for both convictions. As such, the appellant would have been entitled to the defence of ‘autrefois acquit’. The conviction for the possess knife offence was therefore set aside.
2.
In upholding the original sentence, Gray J (with whom Perry J and Williams J agreed) noted the lasting impacts of the history of domestic violence on the victim and their children. The Court held that an immediate custodial sentence was needed. See in particular these remarks at [15]-[18] –
‘Domestic violence is not just physical abuse but includes a range of violent and abusive behaviours perpetrated by one person against another. A high percentage of victims are women and children. Domestic violence has existed for centuries. However over the last 30 years its prevalence has been increasingly recognised. This has caused considerable community and governmental concern. More recently legislation has evolved in an effort to protect the vulnerable…The law seeks to protect the innocent and vulnerable. The legislative scheme is directed towards providing protection. This protection is primarily provided through the mechanism of restraining orders (Now known as intervention orders). Restraining orders are the principal legal response to domestic violence. They are can be (sic) obtained expeditiously from a magistrate's court. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Orders can be tailored to the particular conduct of the abuser and breaches are a criminal offence. In this case the victim had obtained a restraining order. She had done all she could to protect herself. The breach of that order is a matter of particular gravity. The use of the knife to engender fear and wound was an aggravating feature to the appellant's crime. The gravity of his conduct called for the imposition of an immediate custodial sentence’
See furtherat [23] – ‘A restraining order had been obtained to prevent the very conduct the subject of the wounding conviction. The need for personal deterrence is a significant factor in this case. The appellant needs to understand that court orders must be obeyed and that non compliance in circumstances of domestic violence will be viewed very seriously. General deterrence is also an important consideration in sentencing.’
District Court
R v Fraser [2020] SADC 127 (2 September 2020) – South Australian District Court
‘Actus reus’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Recklessness’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Choking, suffocating or strangling a person in a domestic setting x 1.
Proceedings: Application for ruling whether mens rea is an element of the offence.
Decision and reasoning: Mens rea is an element of the offence.
There is no Supreme Court authority that has considered the elements of this offence, and, in particular, whether mens rea is an element of the offence. The judge in this case agreed with the reasoning of the QCA in R v HBZ (2020) with respect to actus reas:
[17] In my view, the actus reus of choking, suffocating or strangling is the stopping, or significantly hindering or restricting of the complainant’s breathing, whether by application of force or by other means.
…
[20] Even where the actus reus does not involve the application of pressure or force, for example, the luring of the victim into an airless chamber, the placing of a plastic bag over the victim’s face, or the administration of a poison that causes an anaphylactic reaction, the resultant stopping or significantly hindering or restricting of the victim’s breathing is not a separate element of the offence but is the very evidence required to prove that the conduct (the luring, placing of the bag, the administration of the poison) was the act of choking, suffocation or strangling.
[21] For these reasons I conclude that, if mens rea is an element of the offence, the intention accompanying the conduct must be an intention to stop or significantly hinder or restrict the victim’s breathing.
[22] There is no express or implied exclusion of mens rea in s 20A. The offence in s 20A was created to avoid ‘relying on existing offences such as causing harm or serious harm, endangering life or attempted murder’. All of those offences require proof of mens rea. In enacting s 20A as a substitute for those offences and in dispensing with any requirement to prove injury or harm and yet providing a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment, Parliament cannot have intended to dispense with the element of mens rea. However, the offence does not require proof of harm or injury and thus does not require proof of a specific intent with respect to the consequence of the prohibited conduct.
[23] The very act the accused intends to perform must be to stop, significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s breathing. The intention to choke, suffocate or strangle will generally be inferred from the conduct itself but may also be established by additional evidence.
[24] Accordingly, I conclude that the presumption that mens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a grave criminal offence is not displaced in relation to s 20A of the CLCA. On a charge under that provision, the prosecution bears the onus of proving that the accused intended to choke, suffocate or strangle the complainant, that he, is intended to stop, significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s breathing.
…
[30] Accordingly, I consider it unlikely that Parliament would have intended to exclude recklessness as an alternative basis for liability …
[31] As there is no statutory definition of recklessness for the purposes of s 20A, and given the characterisation by Parliament of this offence as an indicator of escalation to domestic homicide, it is appropriate to apply the common law test for recklessness set out by the High Court in Crabbe.
[32] I rule that the elements of the offence under s 20A are:
•
At the time of the alleged offence the accused was or had been, in a relationship with the complainant.
•
The accused intentionally engaged in conduct which choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant; that is conduct that stopped or significantly hindered or restricted the complainant’s respiration. In the alternative, the accused engaged in the conduct which choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant foreseeing that it was probable that this conduct would stop or significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s respiration.
•
The complainant did not consent to being choked, suffocated or strangled.
•
The act of choking, suffocating or strangling the complainant was done without lawful justification.
R v Rogers [2020] SADC 72 (16 June 2020) – South Australian District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Credibility of complainant’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm x 1; damaging property x 1; assault x 1; rape x 2; assault causing harm x 1.
Case type: Judge only trial.
Facts: The accused man was charged with 6 offences alleged to have been committed against the complainant woman between 2016 and 2018 when they were in a ‘romantic relationship’ and were living together for periods of time. The offences included causing harm with intent to cause harm, damaging property, assault, rape, and assault causing harm. The alleged offences were committed in a domestic setting, at different addresses where the complainant resided with her 3 children, apart from periods on weekends or school holidays when they stayed with their respective fathers. The prosecution alleged that the relationship was characterised by the accused’s violence and aggression, and that the complainant was trapped in a destructive cycle of physical violence, abuse, threats and controlling behaviour, which usually occurred in the presence of her young children. According to the prosecution, the charges are specific examples of a general pattern of behaviour demonstrated by the accused in the course of the relationship.
In relation to Count 1, the accused was alleged to have choked the complainant. He also punched and slapped her in the face (Count 3). Further, the complainant allegedly woke to the sensation of her vagina being penetrated (Count 4), and the accused further penetrated her with his fingers (Count 5). The accused also allegedly threw the complainant and stood on her ankle with his body weight, causing extreme pain (Count 6).
Held: Tracey J held that the prosecution failed to exclude the defence case as a reasonable possibility on any of the charges, and found the accused not guilty on each count ([281]-[282]). Much of the complainant’s evidence was inconsistent and unreliable. Her Honour was troubled by the delay the complainant made in reporting Count 1 to police and the delay in providing the letter relied on by the prosecution as the accused’s acknowledgment of the violent acts that had occurred the previous night ([234]). Whilst the letter could be interpreted as referring to the event where he strangled the complainant as she alleged, it could also be viewed as an apology for calling her a bad mother, threatening suicide, punching the wall and grabbing her arms as the defence alleged ([236]).
Much of the defence case was focused on blaming the complainant for issues in the relationship, consistent with the threatening and intimidating abuse she allegedly experienced. Her Honour rejected the defence argument that she was often the perpetrator of violence. The evidence in relation to the complainant’s previous relationships did not demonstrate a propensity for violence or false reporting to police. It was clear that on some occasions, she had not been the instigator and/or was the victim. Tracey J also formed the impression that the accused exhibited manipulative behaviour ([272]). Moreover, behaviours, such as the complainant’s contacting police, making statements on some occasions and not others, withdrawing complaints, denying incidents occurred, allowing the accused back into her life and seeking variation to intervention orders, are common features in serious domestic violence cases. Abusive and violent relationships give rise to behaviours that may appear too odd or counterintuitive to be believed ([273]).
Tracey J did not doubt that some aspects of the complainant’s evidence were true or that she loved the accused. However, she did have difficulty assessing the complainant’s evidence overall. Whilst she sometimes appeared to be focused and doing her best to describe the events, she also appeared distant, non-committal and prone to exaggeration. She was open about her methamphetamine use and the fact that she had used drugs in her home, albeit not in front of her children ([274]). At times, the complainant’s manner seemed perplexing and her Honour had difficulty accepting her version of events as credible. The differences between her evidence and what she told police were troubling. Such inconsistencies could not be excused, even allowing for the passage of time, the frequent and repetitive nature of alleged abuse blurring a memory of an event, or the chaotic lifestyle that often accompanies drug use ([275]). It appeared much of her angst stemmed from the accused’s relationship with another woman. The complainant’s credibility was undermined by her initial refusal to accept the accuracy of texts she had sent to this woman and her denial that the relationship with the accused did not affect her, despite text messages to the contrary ([276]). Further, her Honour noted that although domestic violence victims may not seek attention for the injuries they sustain and may take extraordinary steps to conceal evidence of abuse, the complainant’s graphic descriptions of her injuries and episodes of violence were not borne out by other evidence. There was no evidence from the complainant’s consultations with doctors of any bruising or injury consistent with the allegations. Her daughter’s distress, apparently in response to questions about drugs, raised the question of whether there had been some discussion between her and the complainant before giving evidence ([279]). Tracey J observed that the police officers who gave evidence appeared to be careful and impressive witnesses who would have assessed and recorded any sign of injury ([280]).
R v Hanks [2019] SADC 139 (16 September 2019) – South Australian District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity reasoning’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: 4 x assault causing harm (Counts 1-4), 1 x rape (Count 5), 2 x aggravated assault causing harm (Counts 6-7), 1 x aggravated assault (Count 8), 1 x aggravated creating likelihood of harm (Count 9)
Case type: Criminal trial by judge alone
Facts: The accused was charged with 4 counts of assault causing harm, 1 count of rape, 2 counts of aggravated assault causing harm, 1 count of aggravated assault and 1 count of aggravated creating likelihood of harm. The complainant was his former de facto partner ([1]). The prosecution argued that the charged acts were committed during their de facto relationship ([3]). The defence case, however, was that the relationship was not a violent one and that the charged acts of violence and rape did not take place ([5]).
Held: The accused was found guilty of Counts 1-5 and 7-9. Judge Chapman did not find him guilty of Count 6, but guilty of the alternative offence of aggravated assault ([188]-[221]). The complainant gave evidence that the accused suffered from alcohol and drug abuse, and would get emotional about his past, resulting in rage ([19]-[20]). Judge Chapman emphasised that she avoided using the evidence in any prejudicial way against the accused, such as to reason that he was generally violent and therefore must have committed the charged acts ([187]). Her Honour noted that the fact the accused used drugs did not mean that he was a bad person or had the propensity to commit the charged offences. Rather, her Honour stated that the evidence of his alcohol and/or drug use may only partly explain his aggressive behaviour towards the complainant and his inability to control outbursts of rage ([21]). Evidence of various uncharged acts was further discussed at [23]-[52]. Judge Chapman was satisfied that all the uncharged acts occurred as described by the complainant and showed that the charged acts did not "come out of the blue" ([185]).
R v Schmidt [2017] SADC 98 (30 August 2017) – South Australian District Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence not accepted’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Judge-only trial’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uncharged acts of violence’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Indecent assault x 1; Assault x 1; Theft x 1.
Case type: Trial by a single judge.
Facts: The complainant alleged that the accused entered her house, strangled her, grabbed her in the vagina, punched her in the face and stole her mobile phone ([23]-[[26]). The accused denied all the allegations ([6]).
Issues: Whether the accused should be convicted.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Rice convicted the accused on counts 1, 2 and 4 ([56]). In relation to Count 3 (assault), Rice J found that it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused punched the complainant ([54]).
Evidence of uncharged acts of violence occurring earlier in the relationship was also admitted. The prosecution said that it showed that ‘the accused had a tendency to act in a violent and controlling manner’ towards the complainant ([12]). However, Judge Rice ignored the evidence on the basis that some of the complainant’s evidence was inconsistent, and was not supported by independent evidence ([20]).
Tasmania
Court of Criminal Appeal
Davey v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 11 (20 September 2024) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Burning victim’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Majority verdict’ – ‘Context evidence of controlling and abuse relationship’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘separation’-‘Admissibility” – ‘Competency of trial counsel’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Lack of credibility’
Charges: Attempted murder x1, persistent family violence contrary to s 170A of the Criminal Code x 1 (this latter charge was not appealed as the applicant had pleaded guilty)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: On the day of the attempted murder, the applicant went to the complainant’s house where the complainant told him their relationship was over. This caused an argument during which the applicant spat and threw a can of Coke at the complainant, and damaged her property. The complainant and her mother left the house and returned later that evening. As he had no other way of getting back to his house and was subject to a curfew, the complainant offered to drive the applicant to his house. Once there, they went into a shed where they had another argument which escalated into a physical fight. The complainant wanted to leave, but the applicant would not let her. He doused her with petrol. There was further arguing. When the complainant went to leave the shed, the applicant set her alight with a cigarette lighter. She suffered burns to 68% of her body, resulting in life threatening injuries.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon 21 grounds in applying for leave to appeal his conviction of attempted murder. For four of these grounds, he was represented by counsel; for the remainder, he was self-represented. The grounds are set out below, along with the Court’s decision and reasoning.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to appeal the conviction was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed.
1.
Majority verdict of guilty of attempted murder not lawful (represented). The applicant cited s 43 of the Juries Act 2003, under which the court is directed to take a majority verdict as the verdict of the jury in particular circumstances, except in trials “relating to treason or murder”. The applicant argued that trials “relating to… murder” included trials regarding attempted murder, and therefore the trial judge had erred by accepting a majority verdict. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that an accurate reading of s 43 meant that a court cannot take a majority verdict in a trial for murder, however, this did not extend to attempted murder or other crimes adjacent to murder [160]-[161].
2.
The admission of tendency evidence (represented). The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of previous violence in the applicant and complainant’s relationship to establish behavioural tendencies on the part of the applicant. The Court of Appeal found that the evidence strongly supported the asserted tendencies and was of significant probative value. The risk of the jury improperly using the evidence or giving it disproportionate weight was limited, and was ameliorated by the trial judge’s directions. The evidence was admitted properly [196].
3.
The admission of a letter written by the complainant (represented). The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of a letter written by the complainant prior to the offending. The letter was written by the complainant shortly before the applicant was released from prison, and expressed her fear of the applicant and her belief that he was capable of killing her. The Court rejected the applicant’s argument that the jury would give too much weight to the evidence on account of its predictive nature. Accordingly, the Court considered that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and the evidence was admitted properly [210]-[211].
4.
The verdict was unreasonable or incapable of being supported by the evidence (represented). The Court considered that the jury was entitled to reject the applicant’s evidence and to accept the complainant’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt [228].
5.
Category 1 of self-represented grounds: miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of the applicant’s trial counsel. The applicant argued that the cross-examination of the complainant had been inadequate; that his trial counsel had failed to object to the use of certain evidence; that his trial counsel had failed to adduce all relevant evidence; and that his trial counsel had failed to seek a direction. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s trial counsel had acted competently [314].
6.
Category 2 of self-represented grounds: errors on the part of the trial judge, which led to evidence being admitted erroneously and/or the jury not being discharged in circumstances where it was warranted. The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred by admitting certain evidence, and permitting the cross-examination of certain witnesses. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments. The Court found that other matters raised – the adequacy of the time allowed for jury deliberation, the permitting of the re-examination of a witness and the admission of prior inconsistent statements – similarly did not give rise to issues [347].
7.
Category 3 of self-represented grounds: miscarriage of justice due to the misconduct of the Crown prosecutor at trial. The applicant argued that the Crown prosecutor had been unfair in cross-examination by suggesting that the applicant had recently invented his evidence. The Court found that parts of the cross-examination should not have occurred, and should have been objected to. Even so, the Court found that the failure to object did not suggest that a miscarriage of justice had arisen, particularly in light of the trial judge’s directions to the jury. The prosecutor’s failure to call a certain witness was found to be an error of prosecutorial judgment, but resulted in no miscarriage of justice [417].
8.
Category 4 of self-represented grounds: contention that is fresh evidence which gives rise to the applicant’s conviction being a miscarriage of justice. The Court held that this fresh evidence was not credible, and could not be accepted [435].
Palmer v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 6 (5 July 2024) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
'strangulation' - 'assault - 'following, harassing, monitoring' - 'threat to animals
Charges: 2 x assault
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant had pleaded not guilty to two counts of assault but on the second day of the trial before Wood J, he changed his pleas to guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with 14 months suspended. Both counts relate to his then female partner. Their relationship had deteriorated, and he had become very jealous and paranoid, watching the victim's movements via cameras installed in the house via an app on his mobile phone [8]. The victim had left with their baby son, but he had threatened to kill the horses if she did not return. [9] The assaults were committed during one incident on the same day, 24 February 2020. The appellant slapped the victim to the face, pushed her onto a bed, put his hands around her throat and squeezed, and headbutted her to the head (assault × 1). He also wrapped a dressing gown cord around her neck and pulled it tightly, and headbutted her to the head (assault x 2).
Grounds of appeal: That the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal is dismissed.
Porter AJ (Blow CJ and Bret J agreeing with his conclusion and reasons concluded that the offences 'constitute quite appalling conduct. They were done in the context of an obsessive and possessive attitude on the part of the appellant. Those physical assaults, as is always the case with assaults in a domestic relationship, amount to breaches of trust. The second assault, involving strangulation by use of the dressing gown cord, is to be regarded in a particularly serious light...it is fortunate she was not more seriously injured.' [50] Error was not shown in the sentence and the sentence was not outside the permissible range
Gee v Tasmania [2022] TASCCA 1 (2 February 2022) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Admissibility of prison telephone call recordings’ – ‘Admissions of guilt’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Credibility of victim’ – ‘Lies of victim’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Post-offence conduct consistent with guilt’ – ‘Prison telephone calls’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of persistent family violence [8]. He appealed on the following grounds:
1.
The learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in ruling that the complainant’s evidence be taken at a special hearing.
2.
The learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in admitting into evidence the recorded content of phone calls made by the appellant to the complainant:
◦
‘…in finding that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant’;
◦
‘…in finding that it would not be unfair to admit the evidence having regard to its late disclosure’; and
◦
‘…in admitting the evidence conditional upon the State recalling the witness in circumstances where it had previously asserted in support of the application for special hearing that it would not do so under any circumstances’ [7].
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal is dismissed.
Ground 1: The Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling on the special hearing, dismissing the first ground of appeal [32]. The trial judge had found that when faced with the prospect of giving evidence in court in the presence of the accused, the complainant experienced symptoms of anxiety that ‘adversely affected’ her ability to comprehend and respond to questions ‘to a significant degree’. The trial judge noted that the complainant’s anxiety manifested ‘itself physically by her shaking and becoming effectively unresponsive’. Therefore, the trial judge was satisfied that by requiring the complainant to give evidence ‘in the usual way’ she would likely ‘suffer severe emotional trauma’ and ‘be so intimidated or distressed as to be unable to give evidence… satisfactorily’. The trial judge explained that this was due to the nature of the complainant’s ‘relationship with the accused and… the subject matter’ [16].
Ground 2: The court dismissed the second ground of appeal, stating that ‘the evidence was highly probative, involving admissions of guilt, post-offence conduct consistent with guilt and evidence highlighting the complainant's credibility’ [48]. The court held that the complainant’s admitted lies did not mean none of her evidence was to be believed.
Otto v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 15 (16 December 2021) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accessory after the fact’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction; Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the murder of her husband, the allegations being that she instigated her husband’s friend and her former lover Bradley Purkiss to commit the crime. The case against the applicant was solely circumstantial. The victim had been behaving erratically in the weeks leading up to the murder and the applicant and co-accused had spent a number of hours together on the afternoon before the murder. It was clear that the jury did not believe the applicant’s exculpatory statements in her police record of interview. The applicant and victim had been experiencing financial difficultied prior to the murder and she had reported to witnesses that her husband had mental and physical health issues which prevented him from working, and he was said to be an intimidating person. The applicant and Purkiss had a brief sexual relationship which ended prior to the murder, but they remained close. Text messages between Purkiss and the victim on the day of the murder were recovered from the victim’s phone, there was video evidence a man wearing a hood entered the applicant and victim’s home met after the murder and the CCV was disconnected after that person entered the home.
Grounds:
Application for leave to appeal – the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and cannot be supported with regards to the evidence (accepting a verdict of accessory after the fact should be substituted if successful).
Appeal against sentence – manifest inadequacy.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
Leave granted and appeal allowed.
2.
Verdict of guilty of murder set aside and verdict of being an accessory after the fact to murder substituted.
3.
Sentence for murder set aside.*
Porter J (Brett and Geason JJ concurring) held that the question for the court was whether it was open for the jury to have excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. On the evidence before the jury it was not possible to exclude the hypothesis put by the applicant in argument.
*Note: On 17 December 2021, for the crime of being an accessory after the fact to murder, the Court recorded a conviction and sentenced the appellant to six years' imprisonment to commence on 30 May 2017. The Court ordered that she not be eligible for parole until she had served one half of that sentence.
McCall v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 11 (12 November 2021) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accusations of infidelity’ – ‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Home invasion’ – ‘Manifestly excessive or inadequate’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People who are homeless’ – ‘People who are pregnant’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges:
Incident 1: Aggravated burglary x 1, assault x 1, associated summary offences;
Incident 2: evading police x 1, dangerous driving x 1, associated summary offences.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The accused man appealed the sentences imposed by Brett J for offending arising out of two separate incidents. The first incident was of violent offending including aggravated burglary and assault towards his then domestic partner (pregnant with a former partner’s child) and the violent invasion of the home of people with whom they were staying during a period of homelessness. The second incident related to the accused’s attempts to avoid arrest for the first incident by engaging in dangerous driving while under police pursuit. The accused had an extensive criminal history “which manifests in persistent and serious violent offending” and “a lengthy history of traffic offending, including a number of convictions for disqualified driving, and convictions for evading police and negligent driving”. Brett J noted that the only factors which could be taken into account in the accused’s favour were his pleas of guilty and the principles of totality. The appellant argued that the 18-month delay between his arrest and sentence should have been taken into account in mitigation.
Issue: Were the sentences imposed (7 years total term of imprisonments, eligible for parole after 5 years, together with a driving disqualification for an aggregate of 6 years from the date of release) manifestly excessive?
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Aggravating circumstances related to the first incident included:
•
The aggravated burglary took the form of a very frightening home invasion.
•
The victim of the assault was a pregnant woman.
•
It was a prolonged assault.
•
It amounted to domestic violence. [11]
Aggravating circumstances in relation to the dangerous driving included:
•
The crime occurred on a Monday afternoon, when it was likely that there would be motorists and pedestrians on the streets of Penguin.
•
A number of drivers had to swerve to avoid collisions.
•
A number of pedestrians, including an elderly woman, were crossing roads when the appellant drove towards them.
•
A number of police officers were involved in intercepting the appellant.
•
The appellant drove for about 7 kilometres when evading the police.
•
He ignored emergency lights and sirens.
•
He continued to drive after the vehicle's tyres were deflated.
•
He was a disqualified driver. [12]
The appellant was always likely to receive a term of imprisonment greater than the 18-month delay, negating any mitigation this factor might grant. [13]
Blow CJ, Jago J and Martin AJ observed:
….it cannot be said the impugned sentences, separately or in the aggregate, were out of proportion to the seriousness of the appellant's offending, particularly since provision was made for him to be eligible for parole two years before the expiration of the last sentence. [25]
Gordon v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 17 (2 December 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Traumatic childhood’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Wounding x 1; Common assault x 2.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant had a traumatic childhood, being sexually abused by her father and exposed to domestic and family violence. She had a history of mental illness (including depression, borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder), substance misuse (she had ceased drug use but was drinking heavily at the time of the offending), and a lengthy record of offending. The offences occurred during the course of an argument between the appellant and her mother, and related to feelings of love/betrayal the appellant felt towards her mother for her childhood. The appellant cut her mother’s fringe with a knife and forced her head back onto the couch. She put her mother in a headlock and cut across her neck. The appellant threatened to stab a neighbour while holding two knives. The appellant was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. The sentencing judge determined not to make an order that the appellant was eligible for parole. The appellant was made the subject of a community correction order for 12 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in fact and/or law in determining that an order for parole eligibility ought not be made.
Held: The appeal was allowed on ground 2 and the appellant re-sentenced.
Ground 1: There was sufficient evidence in the forensic psychiatrist’s report to establish a connection between the appellant’s impaired mental functioning and its contribution to the offending: 6 Verdins principles discussed at [27]-[33], [39]-[46] and [47]-[50]. Nevertheless, the 2 year head sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. It was not outside the range available to the sentencing judge. The appellant’s traumatic childhood, presence of mental disorders, and the relationship issue which lay at the heart of the offending were more appropriately taken into account in whether relief ought to be afforded in relation to the service of 2 years’ imprisonment (at [53]-[56]).
Ground 2: The appellant alleged that the sentencing judge misapplied certain material relevant to parole. However, the court declined to take the alleged factual errors further, instead allowing the appeal on other grounds (at [57]-[64]).
The failure to provide some relief from the full force of 2 years imprisonment was unreasonable and plainly unjust. The circumstances of the offences/offender called for some individualisation, these being: “the appellant's background of sexual abuse, her nature and extent of her illnesses, the underlying explanation for the attack on her mother, her remorse and the prospects of rehabilitation with sustained psychological therapy” (at [78]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, 8 months suspended on conditions including supervision of a probation officer in relation to drug/alcohol treatment, and undergoing medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment.
Tatnell v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 13 (7 August 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Prior inconsistent statements’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Trauma informed judicial practice’
Charges: Assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was charged with 3 counts of assault against his wife during the course an argument. A jury found the appellant guilty of the first count, which included strangling his wife and punching the wall above her head, but not guilty of the other counts. The trial judge imposed a wholly suspended sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and made a community correction order.
Grounds of appeal: Whether inconsistencies between the complainant’s description of the relevant events in evidence and that provided to police made the jury’s verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Held: Appeal was dismissed.
The jury was entitled to accept the complainant’s explanation of the inconsistencies. This was particularly so given the jury’s advantage of hearing the complainant give evidence and in the context of all the evidence (including objective evidence of strangulation). The jury’s acceptance of this evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilt on count 1.
Parker v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 9 (12 June 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Terminally ill victim’ – ‘Vulnerable victim’
Charges: Assault x 2
Case type: Second appeal against sentence
Facts: This is a second sentencing appeal by the appellant man in respect of 2 counts of assault on his female partner (see Parker v Tasmania [2019] TASCCA 16 (8 October 2019) . He plead guilty and his plea to one count was accepted in satisfaction of a charge of causing grievous bodily harm. The appellant was sentenced by Blow CJ to 4 years’ and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years, 9 months. He appealed on grounds the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge erred in determined the factual basis for sentence. Blow CJ resentenced him to 3 months longer than the original sentence with the same non-parole period. The offences were recorded as family violence offences.
The appellant struck the complainant, a terminally ill cancer patient, in the head with a teapot, and then pushed her, causing her to fall over. The fall caused the complainant’s hysterectomy wound to split open and her bowel to protrude. He had been drinking prior to the assaults. The appellant’s version of events differed from the complainant’s; the complainant’s sworn evidence was found to be more reliable.
The appellant’s lengthy criminal history included prior convictions for assault and for breaching family violence orders for violence towards an earlier partner and the current complainant. Factors in the appellant’s favour included the fact that he pleaded guilty, phoned the ambulance and did not flee from the scene, and admitted what he had done to the 000 operator and police. He left the complainant alone and bleeding to ask a neighbour for a cigarette. He recognised his violence was associated with his alcohol problem and sought treatment. The complainant was vulnerable and suffered terrible physical and mental health consequences as a result of the appellant’s actions ([11]). Aggravating features included that the assaults occurred in the context of a domestic relationship, the complainant suffered from a terminal illness and the appellant was her carer ([12]).
Ground: The second sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed, Estcourt, Pearce and Geason JJ concurring.
Estcourt J considered Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14, a case which considered comparative sentencing statistics. In considering the "yardstick" of the available statistical and comparable sentencing data, Estcourt J held that the sentence imposed on the appellant was "heavy", but not plainly unjust or unreasonable. The appellant was sentenced on the basis that he did not intend or foresee the serious harm to the complainant, but the consequences of the assault were nevertheless egregious ([29]). As the sentencing judge noted, the situation was worse than that of a drunken man assaulting a terminally ill partner, because the appellant knew that the complainant had an untreated abdominal hernia. This made the breach of trust even greater ([30]).
Pearce J did not characterise the sentence as "heavy". Whilst the appellant did not intend or foresee the terrible harm caused, the likelihood of such harm ought to have been obvious to any reasonable person with knowledge of the complainant’s vulnerability ([35]).
Geason J agreed with Estcourt J’s characterisation of the sentence as "heavy". His Honour noted that "this Court has on a number of occasions emphasised the importance of general deterrence in sentencing for offences involving the infliction of violence on the vulnerable", which frequently occur in a domestic or relationship setting, and that "[s]uch conduct requires a sentence that reflects the insidious nature of such offending, and the importance of protecting those vulnerable to such harm" ([41]).
Director of Public Prosecution v Johnson [2020] TASCCA 4 (8 April 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to interfere with witness’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous and obsessive behaviours’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking.’ – ‘Suffocation’ – ‘Use of family members’
Offences: Assault x 2; Stalking x 1; Attempt to interfere with a witness x 1; Breaching a family violence order x 15; Attempting to breach a family violence order x 23
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a relationship and had moved in together. The respondent was arrested for breaches of a protective order made for the benefit of the victim, sentenced and a 12-month family violence order was imposed consisting of full non-contact conditions. Nine days later, the respondent made contact with the victim in breach of the order, promising he had changed. The respondent called the victim telling her he had paid for a hotel for the two of them to meet. The victim agreed and when she arrived, they had consensual sexual intercourse. They then consumed a fair amount of alcohol. Later that evening, the victim received a text message from a male friend. The respondent became aggressive and claimed the victim had been cheating. He pushed her head onto the bed and struck her face four times, pulling a clump of hair out. The respondent went to the bathroom for a few minutes and when he returned, he pushed the victim’s face into a pillow and sat on her back so that she couldn’t move. The victim thought she was going to die. The respondent eventually let her go but grabbed her arm and told her she would never see her children again. The victim told the respondent that she had to use the bathroom; she went inside, locked the door and sat in the shower. The respondent banged on the door, but the victim came out when he stopped. She asked to be allowed to sleep; the respondent allowed her to while he was holding her arm.
The next morning, the victim called her sister to tell her what had happened, asking her to pick her up. The victim reported the matter to police. Over the next few days, the respondent sent torrents of text messages and made numerous calls to the victim, which ranged from threats to pleading. He later had his father pass two letters onto the victim, asking her to withdraw the charges and refuse to give evidence. The victim refused. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of twelve months.
Judgment: The court allowed the appeal, finding the sentence to be manifestly inadequate in that it "[fell] short of that required to adequately respond to the gravity of the offending" [41], and resentenced the respondent to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. The court held that "Apart from the fact that the offending occurred in breach of court orders intended to protect a vulnerable female, the respondent's conduct involved acts of significant persistent violence including suffocation, followed by persistent attempts to have her drop the charges or refuse to give evidence; and stalking" [31]. The court emphasised that "Offending occurring in the privacy of the home, unseen, and away from help must be met with a penalty that serves as a warning to others that detection and conviction will result in severe consequences" [31].
The court condemned suffocation, providing that "The fact that the respondent's conduct included suffocation has significance to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending. Suffocation should be treated with the same level of seriousness as is afforded strangulation or throttling. Such conduct is inherently dangerous, and capable of causing serious consequences within a very short period. It renders victims incapable of acting to protect themselves … it is a form of dominance and control which has the potential to cause grave psychological harm, serious injury and even death" [33]. The court held this to be an aggravating factor, along with the fact that the offending occurred just 12 days after the respondent was released and that the respondent attempted to interfere with prosecution of the case [34]-[35]. The court noted that "the objective seriousness of the offending was very high encompassing serious assaults in circumstances where help was not available, followed by a series of attempts to avoid prosecution. Because that sort of interference has a probability of success, to the detriment of the safety of the victim and the frustration of community attempts to protect the vulnerable, gaol should be the inevitable consequence of such conduct" [37].
The court concluded that:
"the prosecution of family violence matters is notoriously difficult due to the vulnerability of victims to interference and pressure from perpetrators, with whom they will often have been in a relationship … the circumstances of this case make it an appropriate vehicle through which to assert a general principle that conduct directed at interfering in the prosecution of family violence matters so significantly erodes the administration of justice that it should attract a heavy sentence of imprisonment. This is important to encourage community participation in reporting such violence, and to provide confidence in the processes which follow reporting. The importance of this principle prevails over the matters referred to by the respondent in respect of his rehabilitation and parole" [55]. And further, "Prosecutions are the cornerstone of the system for the protection of victims. They serve to expose the offending, protect the victim and afford an opportunity for intervention directed towards the rehabilitation of the offender" [54] and that "A message needs to be sent to violent men in the community that serious assaults on females and intimidatory and stalking behaviour, and behaviour designed to persuade a witness not to give evidence, will result in considerable periods of imprisonment" [74].
Hardwick v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 2 (20 March 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault of child’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Error in assessment and use of evidentiary material relevant to sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Parenting dispute’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Spousal assault risk assessment guide’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Trespass’
Charges: Aggravated burglary and assault x 1; Common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and assault, and to a summary offence of common assault. He was sentenced to 2 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment on various conditions. The crimes were committed in the context of a domestic relationship against his wife (the victim) and teenage son. The appellant and victim had separated after 22 years of marriage, and had 3 children. On the day of offending, the appellant attended the family home where the victim and children lived, having been denied contact with the youngest child, after having consumed a considerable amount of alcohol. He smashed into the home and choked and punched his wife and teenage child. The sentencing judge was satisfied that the appellant was not coping well with the dissolution of the marriage. The appellant had attempted suicide, and the family was concerned about his psychological state. He breached an agreement that he was not to attend the home without the victim’s consent, and was therefore a trespasser. The sentencing judge made a family violence order and directed that the crimes and summary offence be recorded on the appellant's criminal record as family violence offences.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. It was also contended that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment and use of evidentiary material relevant to sentence. Underlying much of this submission was the complaint that the sentencing judge should have relied on a pre-sentence report which concluded that the appellant presented ‘a low risk of future family violence’. The appellant also submitted that the sentencing judge misused or gave undue weight to statements in the Victim Impact Statements, in particular, the description of the effects of the act of choking.
Held: The learned judge’s sentencing considerations were discussed again on appeal ([20]-[27]). The appellant had not previously committed any criminal offences and had a "significant potential for employment". Whilst the offending was not premeditated, the medical evidence stated that he was suffering from an adjustment disorder at the time of the offending. As to the likelihood of future violence, a psychologist used a ‘structured professional judgment tool’ (SARA) designed to predict intimate partner violence recidivism. Based on the SARA, the appellant was assessed at being at moderate risk of further violence towards the victim. The combination of the SARA and other ‘red-flag’ risk factors led the psychologist to conclude that the appellant still posed a risk to the victim. Further, notwithstanding his guilty plea and cooperation in the proceedings, the appellant lacked insight and remorse and minimised the severity of his conduct. There was a need for personal deterrence as his personality traits, such as narcissism, predisposed him to having a ‘severe explosive reaction to the relationship separation’.
The appellant contended that the sentencing judge should have accepted the assessment of the probation officer in the pre-sentence report over the SARA. The Court held that the sentencing judge was not bound to accept the officer’s assessment or the reliability of the appellant’s statements to the officer ([36]). The officer was not provided with the SARA conducted by the psychologist, and took the appellant’s statements at face value ([37]). The officer’s assessment therefore provided a less reliable basis for findings relevant to sentence than the SARA ([39]-[40]).
Further, there was no basis for concern that the sentencing judge misused the Victim Impact Statements. In his sentencing remarks, he noted the victim's description of the terror she experienced while being choked and said it was "clear" that she perceived the choking as a "potentially lethal attack and felt powerless" to stop the appellant. He also described the violence as "unexpected, explosive, and unrestrained", and concluded that the assault was "brutal" with the potential to inflict serious injury ([50]). In relation to strangulation, the sentencing judge found:
"Attempted strangulation which does not result in death or physical injury, can still have long-term physical and psychological impact, and leave the victim susceptible to ongoing symptoms. In criminal assault such acts are generally used to subdue and force compliance by the victim without any real thought being given to the danger inherent in such conduct. Those dangers were clearly apparent in your actions in this case. Your rage and lack of restraint meant that you had no real capacity to judge or moderate your attack, and the complainant was therefore in real danger of serious injury or worse."
The Court of Appeal held that there was ample foundation in the evidence to support the sentencing judge’s remarks. His Honour correctly regarded the choking as a "particularly concerning aspect" of the assault, and appropriately considered the dangers attached to the appellant’s conduct as part of his overall assessment of the gravity of the offending ([52]-[53]). He also observed that the appellant’s conduct "constituted an extremely serious episode of family violence" ([63]). The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the choking of female victims by male offenders is understood by criminal courts as a "prevalent and dangerous feature of violence perpetrated in domestic circumstances" ([53]). Victims of domestic violence are vulnerable and the crimes are often committed in breach of the sanctity and safety of the family home ([64]). It referred to DPP v Foster and Gregson v Tasmania as support for the propositions that women in domestic circumstances are particularly vulnerable and violent behaviour by men towards women "must be condemned and discouraged" ([65]).
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. Notwithstanding the appellant’s prospects of successful rehabilitation, he engaged in dangerous and distressing conduct against his wife and child and remains an ongoing risk of future violence ([66]-[70]).
Parker v Tasmania [2019] TASCCA 16 (8 October 2019) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal (This decision was the subject of an unsuccessful appeal - Parker v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 9 (12 June 2020))
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’
Charge(s): Assualt; Causing grievous bodily harm
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Grounds:
•
1a. The sentencing judge erred by making factual findings inconsistent with the unchallenged assertions of fact by the defence;
•
1b. The findings of fact made were objectively more serious than those asserted by the defence and led to the imposition of a sentence that was manifestly excessive
•
2. The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: Appellant man pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against his then female domestic partner. The plea of one of the counts was accepted by the Crown in satisfaction of a charge of causing grievous bodily harm. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to four years and three months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
The appellant and complainant had been in a domestic relationship for about five years. The complainant was diagnosed with terminal ovarian cancer in May 2017, whilst the appellant was in prison for driving offences from April to August 2017. The complainant had treatment and on the appellant’s release he was her carer. She had a number of hospitalisations and had had a hysterectomy in July. On 27 September the appellant and complainant had a prolonged argument after he had been drinking all day. The appellant struck the complaint in the back of the head with a teapot during the course of an argument. He then pushed the complainant over, causing her to strike her head on a hard item of furniture. The fall caused her surgical wound to rupture and her bowel to protrude. The complainant required immediate surgical treatment and was later assessed that have suffered an evisceration of her small bowel, an abrasion to her nose, a laceration to the back of her head, grazes to her hands and left knee, and was developing bruises [8]. The appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the offence.
Judgment: The appellant’s sentence was quashed and the matter was remitted to the sentencing judge for resentencing.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that "there were a number of inconsistencies between the facts asserted to the sentencing judge by the Crown and the defence" [11]. Justice Pearce noted that the only difference that was of consequence was the immediate circumstances of the assaults as the circumstances would inform the objective gravity of the assaults and the appellant’s culpability. Reviewing the sentencing judge’s reasons, Pearce J found that "the sentencing judge either did not realise, or ignored, the inconsistencies" between the versions [15]. By ignoring these inconsistencies, the "exercise of the sentencing discretion miscarried" [22]. Given that the sentencing judge imposed sentence on the basis of disputed facts, the first ground of appeal succeeded [22]. Although the first ground succeeded, Pearce J provided that "[n]o assessment of the remaining grounds of appeal asserting that the sentence is manifestly excessive can be undertaken until the proper factual basis of sentence is determined" [23].
Director of Public Prosecutions v Foster [2019] TASCCA 15 (12 September 2019) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘Family violence order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 5 x assault; 1 x demanding property with menaces with intent to steal
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent pleaded not guilty to 5 counts of assault and 1 count of demanding property with menaces with intent to steal. The offences committed by the respondent occurred during the course of a domestic relationship. He was found not guilty of 3 counts of assault, but guilty of the remaining counts. The learned sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to 16 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of half of that term. His Honour also made a Family Violence Order.
The DPP appealed against the sentence on the sole ground that it was manifestly inadequate. The appellant submitted that the respondent committed 2 serious assaults, both of which were prolonged and involved strangulation. The crime of demanding property with menaces with intent to steal was arguably serious as it was committed during a prolonged attack and involved threats to kill the complainant and her children. It was also submitted that these matters were not isolated as they occurred in the context of a violent and abusive relationship ([13]).
Issue: The question for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate.
Held: The sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was found to be manifestly inadequate, having regard to the seriousness of the offending in the context of the domestic relationship ([42]). Estcourt J accepted that appellant’s submissions as ‘undoubtedly correct’ ([19]). Each incident involved ‘vicious and cowardly attacks by the respondent on a woman’. The respondent had convictions for violent offences, including ones of family violence. Citing an article by Heather Douglas and Robin Fitzgerald, his Honour observed that ‘strangulation is a form of power and control that can have devastating psychological long-term effects on its victims in addition to a potentially fatal outcome’ ([26]). It can cause loss of consciousness and lead to a sudden death ([27]). Further, the respondent’s prior convictions indicated that the present offences were not isolated or unusual. He did not plead guilty and did not show any remorse ([28]). His Honour allowed the appeal, set aside the sentencing order and imposed a new sentence of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with parole eligibility after serving half of that sentence. The Family Violence Order made by the learned sentencing judge was undisturbed ([36]-[37]). Brett J and Marshall AJ agreed with Estcourt J’s reasons.
Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14 (31 August 2018) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable grounds’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had violently attacked his vulnerable female partner with whom he was in a domestic relationship. The parties were arguing, mostly about the appellant’s intoxication and his lifestyle, characterised by his drug and alcohol abuse. The appellant delivered numerous forceful punches to the victim’s face, and shortly afterwards, returned and delivered more forceful blows to her head. She did not sustain any fractures, but the conduct was unprovoked and caused her to suffer nightmares. Estcourt J sentenced the appellant to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The appellant submitted that:
•
He was sentenced during ‘women’s month’ which may have influenced the sentencing judge’s decision.
•
The sentencing judge failed to take into account that immediately before the second assault, the appellant was ‘assaulted by the victim with a large serrated-edge kitchen knife’, and acted in ‘self-defence’.
•
He should have been sentenced in the Magistrates Court.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court agreed with the sentencing judge’s description of the offending as a ‘cowardly attack’ and his observation that ‘Vulnerable women such as the complainant are entitled to the protection of the law against brutal partners, and the community expectation is that such protection will be provided by the Courts’ ([29]). Although he did not use a weapon or kick the victim, the nature and strength used was not insignificant. The Court held that although the appellant should not be re-punished for his prior criminal conduct, he was not entitled to any leniency. The Court noted that the appellant had a history of violence towards women. The prevalence of this type of conduct impacts on the community at large. Women in domestic circumstances are particularly vulnerable to the abuse of power and breach of trust by violent male partners (Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6 [54]–[60]). Women who become victims in these circumstances, and other potential victims in the community, are entitled to such protection as the law can provide by the imposition of sentences that will act as both a personal and general deterrent ([37]). Whilst the sentence of two years’ imprisonment was towards the upper end of the appropriate range of the sentencing discretion, it was not manifestly excessive, harsh or unjust. Having regard to the appellant’s record of prior offending and disregard for court orders, the sentencing judge was found to be lenient in fixing a non-parole period, and the non-parole period of 18 months was within the range of sentencing discretion.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6 (20 April 2018) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’
Charges: Assault x 1; Assault on a pregnant woman x 3; Attempt to interfere with a witness x 5; Destroying property x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and complainant had been living together for 5 months with the complainant’s son ([6]). The complainant was 4 weeks pregnant at the time of the offences ([7]). The respondent threatened to leave the complainant, but the complainant asked him to stay ([9]-[10]). The respondent threatened to kill her and the baby. He headbutted the complainant and strangled her three times, causing her to lose consciousness twice ([13]-[16]).
The respondent was arrested and on remand. The respondent told a friend to tell the complainant that if she retracted her statement, he would ‘consider getting back with her’ ([22]). The complainant did so ([23]). The respondent was sentenced to 1 year and 10 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Geason J emphasised aggravating features of the case, such as the fact that the respondent had the opportunity to reflect on his conduct between each attack ([55]), that he did not seek help for the complainant ([51]), that the crimes were committed in the context of a domestic relationship ([54]), and that the complainant was unable to defend herself ([50]). Mitigating considerations included the fact that the respondent pleaded guilty early ([61]).
In relation to the charges of interfering with a witness, Geason J at [56] remarked on the importance of such charges in aiding the administration of justice in relation to domestic violence:
The respondent's attempts to frustrate his prosecution should also be seen as particularly serious matters. They were a cynical exercise in emotional blackmail … Domestic violence typically occurs behind closed doors, making detection inherently difficult. Relationship dynamics frequently militate against a prosecution. Conduct directed at interfering with the prosecutorial process undermines the system intended to afford protection to victims of violence, making an inherently difficult process more so … It should be accepted in cases of family violence that attempts to interfere with the due administration of justice by the means of emotional manipulation of a vulnerable victim is a serious matter the consequences of which will always be severe.
Geason J referred to R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, where the High Court stated at [21] that sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence may ‘depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. His Honour at [92] subsequently justified interfering with the sentence on the basis that:
Domestic violence is properly regarded as a most serious form of offending, frequently hidden from view, and thus difficult to detect. The court has a symbolic function. Censure for domestic violence should be communicated through the sentences which are imposed.
His Honour cautioned against giving weight to the complaint’s forgiveness of the respondent ([77]). His Honour questioned the sentencing judge’s generous characterisation of the respondent’s conduct during the assault ([83]-[86]).
Price v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 22 (6 December 2016) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Extraordinary case’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Public protection’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charge/s: Assault x 3; unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm x 1.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. The three assault counts occurred in August 2014 and April 2015 after the appellant had been drinking. The appellant punched the complainant in the face, choked her, and fractured her wrist. The final count occurred in June 2015 when, after an argument, the intoxicated appellant threw petrol on the complainant and ignited her. The complainant’s daughter heard the screams and rescued her mother. The appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Daley v State of Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 10 (22 August 2016) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of impact on children’
Charge/s: Murder x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 60 year old appellant murdered his former partner, 31 year old Meagan Wilton, and her new partner, 34 year old Benjamin Eyles, by shooting them with a shotgun. The appellant and Ms Wilton had a 21 month old son together, and Ms Wilton had two other girls, aged 12 and 9. Ms Wilton’s youngest daughter and the appellant’s son were in the house at the time of the murders. After leaving the premises, the appellant tried to commit suicide by shooting himself in the head. He suffered brain damage, lost the ability to walk, and required visual and hearing aids. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 45 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Estcourt J provided the lead judgment, with Blow CJ and Brett J agreeing but providing additional comments. Relevantly, Blow CJ stated that while the punishment here was significant and that there were a number of mitigating factors in the circumstances, these carried little weight in light of the aggravating factors of this case. As per His Honour: ‘[t]hese were deliberate killings. They were premeditated. They were motivated by vindictiveness towards a former partner’ (see [4]). Moreover, ‘[t]his was a case in which the impact of the killings on survivors [was] particularly significant’. The children who were present in the house could suffer long-term psychological or psychiatric consequences (see [5]). Further, the impact of the crime would be felt by family members raising the children, and police officers who worked on this case.
Devine v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 19 (26 August 2015) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’
Charges: Aggravated burglary, Unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm, Breach of family violence order, Motor vehicle stealing, Destroying property
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the protected person had been in a domestic relationship that ended towards the end of 2012. As a result of the appellant threatening to cut her throat and burn her house down, the protected person moved away from Hobart. Early in 2015, her house was burnt down, although no one was charged. The protected person then moved back to Hobart and entered into a new relationship. The appellant threatened her new partner, resulting in a family violence order restraining him from approaching the protected person.
On the day of offending, the appellant went to the protected person’s home, kicked the front door, smashed a window, drew a knife and threatened to kill her. The appellant then lunged towards the protected person who cut her hand as a result of trying to stop him. When the protected person’s partner came to assist, the appellant was holding the knife to the protected person’s throat and threatened ‘Why shouldn’t I kill him’. When her partner attempted to separate them, the appellant stabbed him in the stomach. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm, three breaches of a family violence order, one count of motor vehicle stealing, and one count of destroying property. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with no non-parole period.
The appellant had a long history of dishonest and violent offending commencing from childhood. When given the benefit of suspended sentences, bonds and parole in relation to these offences, the appellant breached them. A psychologist’s report noted the appellant had extremely low to borderline intellectual functioning and could be considered to have a mild intellectual disability. This was substantially the result of substance abuse in the view of the psychologist. The sentencing magistrate did not consider this as a mitigating factor, concluding there was a significant risk he would re-offend and therefore there was a need for specific deterrence.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive due to the magistrate failing to order a non-parole period.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Tennent J, with whom Porter and Pearce JJ agreed, held that the issue of whether or not to order a parole period is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge. His Honour took into account the relevant factors including the appellant’s offending history and disregard for orders in refusing to grant a non-parole order. The psychologist report did not suggest rehabilitation was likely. The sentencing judge therefore did not err in failing to order a non-parole period and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Connelly v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 15 (29 June 2015) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder (two counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant’s relationship with his wife deteriorated after she told him that she had a sexual relationship with another man. She moved out of the family home. The appellant attempted to kill his two sons by blowing up the family car when they were sitting in it with him. He was unsuccessful but he caused an explosion and a very fierce fire. His two sons suffered life-threatening burns. Their injuries are ongoing and they will have ‘functional and cosmetic problems for life’. They are at risk of ongoing psychological harm. The impact on their mother was devastating. The trial judge was satisfied that the appellant intended to kill the boys to ‘deprive his wife of them’ or to ‘spite his wife’ ([29]). He was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of the non-parole period. Estcourt J (with whom Tennent J agreed) held that the head sentence of 20 years was not excessive. The offending was serious and both victims were young children. However, Estcourt J noted that there was one act that impacted both victims. While the sentence encompassed the entirety of the appellant’s criminal behaviour, he should not be sentenced for his conduct twice.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the head sentence was not excessive, the non-parole period was excessive because of factors such as his lack of prior relevant offending, the unlikelihood of any re-offending ‘given the crime was directly related to his family circumstances’ and the fact that ‘it could not be said that the appellant’s “incorrigibility” justified the setting of the non-parole period at 75% of the head sentence’ ([38]). Estcourt J (Tennent J agreeing) accepted these submissions notwithstanding the appellant’s almost complete lack of remorse and reduced the non-parole period to 12 years.
Wood J agreed with Estcourt J’s reasoning with respect to the head sentence but dissented in regards to the non-parole period. At [7]-[21], her Honour engaged in general discussion about the applicable principles in determining the most appropriate non-parole period. Wood J then noted at [23] a number of considerations relevant to the nature of the crime. These included that it involved deliberate acts to kill two young children, the appellant’s ‘vindictive motive to inflict maximum anguish and emotional trauma upon his wife’, his son’s extensive injuries and degree of emotional suffering and physical pain, risks to their psychological well-being and the torment and harm suffered by his wife. It was appropriate for the sentencing judge to give effect to the aims of denunciation and retribution and, ‘the goal of assuaging informed moral outrage of the community, reasserting society's values and giving proper weight to the harm done to the victims’ ([24]).
Groenewege v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 7 (26 July 2013) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Course of conduct’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Arson, Assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant suffered from depression and became abusive and intimidating towards his wife. After she ended the relationship, the appellant became angry and upset. He cornered his wife in a shed, pushed her to the chest, grabbed her around the throat and squeezed for four seconds, causing her to become very fearful. The appellant asked to see his four children. His wife then walked with him to the car, got in and locked the doors before attempting to drive off and call the police. However, the appellant grabbed the vehicle and punched the window, which caused it to shatter. His wife then attended her children’s school. Meanwhile, the appellant poured methylated spirits onto the main bedroom of their house, set fire to the bed and left knowing the bed was on fire. The house was damaged beyond repair. An insurance claim was denied. The impact of the offending on the appellant’s wife and children was very significant. He was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
Issues:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred by placing too much weight on general deterrence given the appellant’s mental health condition.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 1.
1.
The appellant submitted that various mitigating factors existed ([39]) and that the sentence was outside the range of permissible sentences for arson. Further, the appellant submitted that the assault was brief and no physical harm was caused. The respondent conceded that the assault would not add to a sentence imposed for arson, but submitted that it was relevant as a course of conduct and to demonstrate the appellant’s attitude towards his wife ([44]). Porter J (with whom Wood J and Tennent J agreed) held that while the head sentence was very high, it was not outside the permissible range: ‘The appellant intentionally set fire to the house and intentionally caused its entire destruction. His motive for doing so was to exact some sort of vengeance on his estranged wife intending to destroy his wife's interest in the building and its availability as a home’…‘This was obsessive and possessive conduct, involving some violence, committed in the aftermath of a broken relationship. It is the type of conduct which simply cannot be tolerated’ ([52]-[53]).
Nevertheless, the non-parole period was found to be excessive. Porter J noted that in considering the length of a non-parole period, the issue is whether the period makes the sentence manifestly excessive, ‘"sentence" in this context, being used in a broader sense’ ([56]). The non-parole period amounted to a little over 60% of the head sentence. Given factors such as the appellant’s prior good character, his mental health condition and apparent remorse ([60]), the non-parole period made the overall sentence manifestly excessive and was therefore reduced to one half of the head sentence.
2.
The appellant submitted that his psychiatric condition affected his ability to properly consider the consequences of his actions, such that it was inappropriate for general deterrence to remain a large consideration in sentencing. Porter J (with whom Tennent J and Wood J agreed) held that notwithstanding the psychiatric condition, mood disorders are reasonably common in the community. As such, the sentencing judge was correct to conclude that the appellant was, ‘an appropriate vehicle by which to convey a message to the general community about the seriousness and likely consequences of this type of offending’.
Enniss v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 10 (2 October 2010) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Risk factor - weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Assault (five counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant lived intermittently with his partner (the complainant). The first count occurred when, during an argument, the appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat, forced her to the floor, punched her to the head multiple times and kicked her to the hip as she tried to stand up. The second assault occurred when the complainant was in her three-year-old child’s bed. The appellant pointed a knife at the complainant and threatened to stab her if she did not give him her phone (i.e. an assault by means of a threatening gesture). The child remained asleep throughout the incident. The next count occurred when the appellant kicked the complainant between the legs twice, which caused her to fall to the floor. The final count was again an assault by means of a threatening gesture and involved the appellant sharpening knives and threatening to kill or violently assault the complainant. The appellant was arrested but escaped on arrival at the police station and was not found until 10 days later. While the complainant did not suffer serious physical injuries, there were lasting psychological consequences for her and her daughter. The appellant had a significant criminal history. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years. Before being sentenced for these offences, he was sentenced to another 3 years’ imprisonment (with a two-year non-parole period) in respect of 50 unrelated offences. This resulted in an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment with a four-year non-parole period.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. ‘The ordeal that the appellant inflicted on his partner was horrific. He had many opportunities to desist from assaulting her, but did so over and over again, with their young daughter in the house. It was an unusually bad case of family violence. The only appropriate penalty was a significant cumulative sentence of imprisonment.’ ([20]).
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the fact the appellant was unlikely to be granted parole (even if eligible) should have been taken into account in his favour. The Court rejected this argument, holding that this is not an appropriate consideration in determining the sentence. However, the magistrate imposed the two-year non-parole period for the assault offences so as to not impose a crushing sentence. If the head sentence of three years was ‘crushing’, a non-parole period should not be regarded as changing that situation because parole may not be granted. Given the length of the sentence in combination with the fact that the complainant suffered no physical injuries, the head sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending and the aggregate term was also disproportionate. The appellant was re-sentenced for the assault offences to 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 (13 October 2011) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admission of guilt’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’
Charge: Arson
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was tried by jury and found guilty of arson purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It was alleged that he unlawfully set fire to the house of his former female partner. She gave evidence that the night before the fire the appellant slept over at her place. She and the appellant argued the next morning as she was leaving the property. He called her a ‘leg-opening slut’ and said that if she left he was going to burn the house down. She left and not long after received a phone call from the appellant who asked whether she was ‘warm enough’. She returned home to find the house on fire. Evidence was also given by a neighbour that he heard the appellant and his former partner arguing that morning for 10 minutes. He ignored the argument and did not claim to have seen the appellant on the morning of the fire.
Before trial, the appellant pleaded guilty to breaching a family violence order on the day of the fire by approaching his former partner and calling her a ‘leg-opening cunt’. The Crown alleged that this amounted to an admission of guilt. At trial, the appellant asserted that he did not realise the significance of this date and that he had used those words but not on the day of the fire. The appellant’s younger sister provided the appellant with an alibi. She said he was asleep at their mother’s place on the morning of the fire.
Issues: Some of the grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether the trial judge failed to correct the prosecution’s lack of adherence to the ‘rule’ in Browne v Dunn.
2.
Whether the trial judge failed to give an adequate warning in relation to the neighbour’s voice identification evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the conviction set aside.
1.
‘In the context of a criminal trial, the "rule" in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 requires defence counsel to put to a Crown witness in cross-examination the case upon which the accused proposes to rely, to the extent that it is proposed to contradict the evidence of the Crown witness. Similarly, if it is proposed, as part of the defence case, to lead evidence of a fact which, if true, would be within the knowledge of a Crown witness, it is usually expected, at least in this State, that defence counsel will put that part of the defence case to the Crown witness in cross-examination’ ([21]). Here, the Crown did not do this and sought to rely on such evidence in summing up. The trial judge did not correct this mistake in her directions to the jury and further she incorrectly directed the jury that they should be careful about the appellant’s sister’s evidence.
2.
The direction that the jury had ‘to clearly be careful’ about the identification evidence from the neighbour fell short of informing the jury that there was a ‘special need for caution.’ The trial judge said nothing about the reasons for that caution namely, the conviction of innocent persons as a result of mistaken identification by an apparently honest witness ([34]-[35]).
Legal Profession Board of Tasmania v W [2023] TASFC 1 (17 March 2023) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Legal practitioner’ – ‘Offer to settle dispute by withdrawal of complaints to police’ – ‘Professional misconduct’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unprofessional conduct’
Proceeding: Legal Profession Board appeal from finding of mere unprofessional conduct by a legal practitioner.
Grounds:
1.
The primary judge erred in holding that for a finding of professional misconduct both s 421(1)(a) and (c) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) had to be satisfied;
2.
The primary judge erred in failing to make a declaration of professional misconduct having found that the respondent’s conduct constituted a serious failure to reach a standard of competence and diligence.
Facts: A client of the respondent was charged with two counts of common assault against his former wife who had been granted a protection order against the client.
The lawyer wrote to the complainant on behalf of his client, offering to settle their matrimonial property dispute on terms which included that “all legal pursuits and accusations cease including Tas. Police. All matters are then resolved, finalised”. The client was charged with perversion of justice. Despite this, the respondent wrote to the ex-wife’s lawyer offering again to settle the matrimonial dispute upon the withdrawal of the complaints. Senior counsel for the respondent conceded ground 1.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Declaration of unprofessional conduct set aside.
3.
Declaration of guilt of professional misconduct made.
Estcourt J observed:
[1] I do not have the slightest doubt that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to offer to settle a client's dispute with another person on the condition that the other person withdraw a criminal complaint that person has made against the client and which is pending before a court.
Estcourt J found that the gravity of the respondent’s attempt to have pending charges withdrawn or undermined constituted a “substantial failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence” within the meaning of s421(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas). This was regardless of the client’s instructions or whether the offers amounted to a crime.
The court rejected the primary judge’s reasoning that the two paragraphs in s421 were to be read conjunctively. However, it was found that even if that were correct, the conduct would still amount to professional misconduct (per Porter AJ at [33].
PQR v Sundram [2020] TASFC 10 (4 December 2020) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Federal circuit court order’ – ‘Inconsistency’ – ‘Meaning of "parental responsibility"’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Breaches of police family violence order, breach condition of bail.
Proceedings: Appeal against breaches of police family violence order.
Facts: The appellant and his former wife had separated, and had two children. In 2014, the Federal Circuit Court made parenting orders which included provision for “equal shared parental responsibility”, and designated contact days. In 2018, police issued and served the appellant with a family violence order. This prohibited the appellant being within 50 m of the children (para 3), except in accordance with a court order (para 3(c)). It also prohibited the appellant being within 50 m of the children’s school where the children “may be present from time to time” (para 11). The appellant was charged with a number of breaches.
The Chief Justice dismissed charges relating to circumstances where the appellant was within 50 m of the children during contact periods allowed by the parenting orders and when the children were not present at the school. The Chief Justice found a charge proven, imposing a fine without recording a conviction, for an instance where the appellant attended the school on a non-contact day to speak to the principal while the child was there. The visit did not fall within the exception in para 3(c) of the family violence order, and breached para 11.
Grounds of appeal: The appellant's conduct in attending at the school on 24 July 2018 was permitted by the "Parenting Orders" made by the Federal Circuit Court which effectively restored the appellant his full rights as their father, including by having equal shared parental responsibility and a substantial and significant role in their lives, such that it cannot have been in breach of the police family violence order. There was inconsistency between the family violence orders and the parenting orders in the Federal Circuit Court and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court prevailed to the exclusion of the family violence order which underpinned the finding of guilt.
Held: The appeal was dismissed (Martin AJ, Pearce J agreeing). Martin AJ rejected the broad proposition that any constraint on the appellant’s ability to visit the school, at any time, necessarily created a relevant inconsistency between the parenting orders and the family violence order. Para 11 only applied when a child “may be present” and was not relevantly inconsistent with the appellant’s obligations (and rights) pursuant to the parenting order (at [47]-[49]).
In separate reasons and also agreeing with Martin AJ, Estcourt J also dismissed the appeal. While the family violence orders might “detract” from the appellant’s unqualified “parental responsibility” by limiting the means by which the appellant might communicate with teachers while the children were at school, those orders did not abrogate or nullify the appellant’s parental responsibilities. It could not be said that there was any relevant inconsistency between them and the parenting orders, or that the police family violence orders were incapable of operating “subject to” the Federal Circuit Court orders (at [15]-[17]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v J C N [2015] TASFC 13 (27 November 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’
Charges: Attempted aggravated assault, Breach of family violence order, Common assault, Damaging property
Appeal type: Appeal against order for bail
Facts: The respondent and the complainant had previously been in a relationship for more than two years. The complainant had two children. A family violence order was made against the respondent, restraining him from threatening, harassing or assaulting the complainant. On one occasion when the complainant went to the respondent’s house with her daughter and mother, the respondent seriously assaulted her and her mother. He was charged with two counts of assault and breaching the family violence order and was granted bail. Subsequently, the respondent breached the conditions of bail and the order when the complainant and her children stayed with him. After fighting the next morning, the respondent followed the complainant into shopping centre toilets, kicked in the door and punched her in the face twice. An interim family violence order was then made with a condition that he would not contact the complainant. In breach of that order, the respondent phoned the complainant seven times from prison. The respondent was sentenced for these offences to four months’ imprisonment and a new family violence order was made to protect the complainant and her children.
Just after a month after his release, the respondent seriously assaulted another female, his former partner, and was held in custody. While in custody, he phoned the complainant 19 times. He was then granted bail. After interviewing the complainant, the police discovered that the respondent had assaulted the complainant’s daughter by grabbing her bottom. He also threw a bar stool at the complainant and her son, striking him on the leg. The respondent then forced the complainant’s pants down and attempted to insert a plastic vibrator into her anus, witnessed by the two children. He then punched her five times in the face, bit her ear and pushed a hot cigarette butt into her forehead. The next morning the respondent emptied the complainant’s daughter’s school bag onto the floor and stomped on it, threatening ‘This is going to be your face’. He then grabbed her hair and pushed her against the wall. The respondent then threatened the complainant’s son that he would kill him, his sister and the complainant if the police were notified of the assaults.
In relation to this conduct, the respondent was charged with 35 counts of breaching the family violence order, one count of assault with indecent intent, five counts of common assault, three counts of damaging property, and one count of attempted aggravated assault. The respondent was granted bail, having satisfied the court that bail would not adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of an affected person or child under s 12 Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas).
Issue: Whether the order for bail should be set aside.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the order for bail was revoked.
In favour of granting bail was that the respondent’s mother and father were both ill. His mother was prepared to offer a surety of $4,000 to secure his attendance at court and compliance with bail conditions. The respondent agreed to comply with a curfew and reporting conditions. However, there was a significant risk he would continue to offend if bail was granted when considering his history of breaching court orders and violent offending. There was also a considerable amount of evidence to prove guilt once at trial.
Supreme Court
Smith v Boarder [2022] TASSC 30 (16 May 2022) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Costs of unsuccessful application to extend protection order’ – ‘Discretion to order costs s34 family violence act 2004 (tas)’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of objects of family violence act 2004 (tas) to costs order’ – ‘Separation’
Proceedings: Motion for costs for unsuccessful application to extend protection order pursuant to Family Violence Act 2004 (the Act), s 34.
Facts: On 19 February 2020 an interim protection order was granted to Ms Boarder. At the hearing of Ms Boarder’s application to extend the protection order for a further 3 years leave was refused, the interim order revoked and, following a further hearing on the issues, Mr Smith’s application for costs refused. The Magistrate held that the was no change in circumstances and the only contact between the parties during the term of the interim order was a letter delivered to Ms Boarder by Mr Smith, “which contained nothing which could reasonably be construed as abusive, threatening, intimidating or coercive”[8]. Both parties had been represented by counsel at the extension hearings.
Grounds of motion to review: The magistrate erred in dismissing the costs application in that:
(a) she took into account irrelevant matters, namely:
1. Ms Boarder 's subjective fear and psychological state; and
2. the objects of the Act as stated in s 3; and
(b) she acted on a wrong principle by misdirecting herself that "a holistic approach, rather than a compensatory approach, should be taken to the issue of whether costs should be ordered." [11]
Decision and Reasoning: Motion allowed; order of magistrate set aside; Ms Boarder is to pay Mr Smith's costs of the application for extension of a family violence order in the agreed sum.
The objects of the Act in s3 were relevant considerations but Ms Boarder’s demeanour while giving evidence, was, without more an irrelevant consideration. There was no finding that the fear Ms Boarder expressed related to any conduct of Mr Smith while the protection order was in force.
State of Tasmania v Levi Joseph David Hall (Sentence) [2021] TASSC unreported (27 September 2021) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
Comments on passing sentence Pearce J
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1; breaching a police family violence order x 5.
Proceedings: Comments on passing sentence.
Facts: The male defendant lived with the female victim and her children for 12-months. The defendant entered pleas of guilty. Throughout their relationship, the defendant used ‘violence, intimidation, threats and abuse’ towards the victim in the context of his ‘generally violent, abusive and controlling behaviour. The defendant monitored and controlled the victim’s phone use, controlled when she left the house, and subjected her to physical violence in the presence of her children. On one occasion, the defendant strangled and threatened to kill the victim. A family violence order made in May 2019, was immediately breached by finding the victim, taking her to his friend’s house, and holding her there while subjecting her to physical abuse.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 ½ years, with a non-parole period of 3 ½ years.
Pearce J viewed the defendant’s behaviour as a serious example of the crime of persistent family violence. His Honour highlighted that the offending included strangulation, which caused the victim to fear for her life and has had a ‘profound’ and lasting ‘psychological impact’. His Honour viewed the defendant’s repeated offending as discounting ‘any claim to… genuine remorse…’, and the fact that the offending was ‘committed in breach of a police family violence order’ as evidence of his ‘repeated refusal to comply with the law and… contempt of authority’. In sentencing, Pearce J considered the need for punishment and condemnation, and viewed the defendant’s ‘long and concerning record for violence… against women in particular’ as an ‘important factor in sentencing’. His Honour also considered the need to vindicate the victim and protect the community by imposing a sentence that achieved specific and general deterrence.
State of Tasmania v ARJ (Sentence) [2021] TASSC unreported (11 March 2021) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
Comments on passing sentence Pearce J
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Threat to cause abortion’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1, constituting 16 unlawful family violence offences: one rape, one assault of a pregnant woman and 14 assaults.
Proceedings: Comments on passing sentence.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty following jury trial. The 16 offences constituting the charge were committed over 9 occasions during the defendant’s two-and-a-half-month relationship with his pregnant younger female partner. The defendant’s conduct began soon after the relationship started, and ‘was characterised by ongoing domineering conduct, torment and the exercise of power, control and intimidation’. The assaults included striking with a hammer, baseball bat and power cord, burning with a cigarette, and threats to cut with glass in addition to assaults without weapons. The rape was constituted by the forcible penetration of the victim’s genitalia by striking with a baseball bat and the assault of a pregnant woman was the attempt to stomp on the victim’s stomach with the stated intent to cause an abortion. Some of the offending occurred in the presence of the victim’s children. The defendant had a history of family violence and drug abuse. The defendant was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years, and the court imposed a family violence order to remain in force for 7 years from the date of sentencing.
Issues: Sentencing.
Decision and reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years, and the court made a family violence order for 7 years from the date of sentencing.
Pearce J considered the offending in the context of the defendant’s criminal record, which included family violence offences, assaults, and breaches of family violence orders. His Honour considered the ongoing psychological impact of the offending on the victim, and the need for punishment, general and personal deterrence, vindication of the victim, and protection of the community’. ‘All of the offences were committed when you were subject to a family violence order… and while you were subject to electronic monitoring, thus displaying your contempt for the law and to court orders.’
Hopkinson v Wilkie [2020] TASSC 32 (3 July 2020) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault in a domestic setting’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Motion to review conviction’
Charges: Common assault.
Proceedings: Motion to review conviction by Magistrate.
Facts: The male applicant was found guilty of assaulting his female partner. The Magistrate found that the applicant hit the complainant in the head, pulled her hair and dragged her. The complainant kicked the defendant. The complainant gave evidence that she had a ‘mutual argument’ with the applicant and was not punched. Shelton (a witness to the incident) gave evidence that the applicant punched the complainant during a ‘verbal argument between them’. The magistrate accepted Shelton’s evidence and did not accept the complainant’s evidence or the applicant’s argument that there was consent, stating that a defence of consent ‘doesn’t apply to victims of domestic violence’.
Ground: The Magistrate erred in law in stating the defence of consent does not apply in the context of domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Motion to review dismissed.
As a matter of statutory construction, provisions relating to consensual violence as a defence do not include a ‘carve-out … for any category or class of cases such as domestic violence cases’ [34]. As a general statement of law, the defence of consent does not avail the applicant if ‘there either was no consent or if there was, the complainant did not consent to the degree of force involved in the assault’ [28]. Based on the magistrate’s findings of fact, the defence of consent was excluded.
Baker v Barratt [2019] TASSC 28 (4 July 2019) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Appeal and review’ – ‘Apprehended bias’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Motion to review’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Procedural error of magistrate in not playing record of interview in open court’ – ‘Procedure and evidence’ – ‘Visa threats’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man appealed against his conviction on a charge of common assault on the ground that the court erred in convicting him against "the preponderance of the evidence". The complainant, a Philippino woman who was applying for a visa, told the court that she had an argument with the applicant with whom she was in a relationship. During the course of the argument, she alleged that he slapped her in the face, twisted her arm and pushed her to the floor. He then allegedly tried to kick her. She also gave evidence that she rang a friend after the incident. The friend confirmed that this call was made and that the complainant had told him that she had been assaulted. He took photos of her for the purposes of recording the consequences of the assault. These were tendered along with the applicant’s record of interview. The applicant admitted in his video interview that he regularly threatened to withdraw support for the complainant’s Visa and controlled her access to a mobile telephone and the Magistrate identified this as evidence of the applicant’s controlling behaviour. The applicant denied the assault.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the Magistrate reasonably came to his conclusion on the evidence at trial.
Held: Geason J found that the applicant failed to establish that the Magistrate’s conclusion was not reasonably open to him. It was noted that the evidence was "of narrow compass" in that the applicant and complainant had engaged in a physical argument, evidenced by the bruising shown in the photographic evidence. Moreover, the Magistrate’s conclusions and reasons were found to be unimpeachable, and he was entitled to prefer the complainant’s evidence. This was because the complainant’s evidence was unshaken in cross-examination and corroborated in material respects by a third party ([13]-[15]).
A further issue on appeal was that of apprehended bias. Whilst the Magistrate had a familial relationship with the complainant’s employer, Geason J concluded that there was nothing in the conduct of the case or the reasons for the decision which gave the appearance of any pre-judgment based on that relationship ([21]).
Geason J also noted that the applicant’s record of interview was not played in court in its entirety, such that not all evidence was heard in open court prior to the court reaching its decision ([24]). The Magistrate elected to read the transcript of the interview rather than listen to it in full. His Honour was highly critical of this practice, emphasising that all evidence relied upon to prove a case should be heard in open court, and that the transcript itself was not evidence. The Magistrate ran the risk that something material to the case was not "seen" ([27]). Whilst this was considered to be an error, it did not give rise to any miscarriage of justice.
Irons v Moore [2019] TASSC 22 (22 May 2019) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Application of Weissensteiner’ – ‘Consent and disclosure’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Hostile witness’
Charges: Assault x 1; Breach of protection order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The facts of both charges were the same: the appellant grabbed and punched the complainant in front of her children ([3]).
While giving evidence, the complainant claimed that she could not remember what happened on the day. The prosecution successfully applied to treat her as a hostile witness ([3]). The evidence was limited to circumstantial evidence and hearsay evidence of witnesses who saw the complainant’s injuries immediately after the assault ([4]). The magistrate found the appellant guilty of both charges and imposed a fine.
Issues: The sole ground of review is that on no reasonable view of the evidence could the magistrate have been satisfied of the appeallant’s guilt.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
The principle in Weissensteiner v The Queen [1993] HCA 65 was considered, namely that a ‘hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused’ ([20]). In this case, while the complainant had given evidence, she could not remember what happened. Therefore, the only person who could have known how the injuries were inflicted was the defendant ([21]).
‘In the light of the evidence that force had been applied by the applicant to the complainant and in the absence of any contradictory or explanatory evidence from the applicant, I am satisfied that the application of force in lawful self-defence was not available to the magistrate as a reasonable possibility or hypothesis consistent with innocence.’ [24]
Cannell v G; G v Cannell [2018] TASSC 55 (1 November 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Meaning of harass’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victims and witnesses’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Trespass x 1; Making a false report to police x 1; Contravening an interim family violence order x 3.
Case type: Prosecution seeking review of dismissal of charges; defendant seeking review of charge proved.
Facts: The defendant and complainant were separated. The evidence in this case was contested by both parties.
The trespass charge occurred when the defendant entered the complainant’s house and did not leave when asked. The false report charge occurred when the defendant alleged that the complainant had struck him in the chest while she was telling him to leave. The first contravention charge occurred when the defendant approached the complainant in the Federal Circuit Court building. The complainant alleged that the defendant said ‘you’re all going down’. The magistrate was not satisfied that those words were spoken, but even if they were, they did not constitute a threat. The second contravention charge occurred when the defendant parked his car next to the complainant’s car during a handover of one of the children. The magistrate found that the defendant breached the order and that was no exception in the contact arrangement that would have allowed this ([39]). The third contravention charge occurred when the defendant approached the complainant on numerous occasions to serve her with an application for a restraining order ([43]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate’s decisions were reasonably open on the evidence and whether the Magistrate gave adequate reasons.
Decision and reasoning: Brett J affirmed all the magistrate’s decisions.
Note: in relation to the third contravention of the restraining order, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not proved the ‘mental element’ of the charge because he did not intend to harass the complainant but rather serve her with legal processes. Brett J discussed the statutory definition of the word harass, which includes following the person or keeping the person under surveillance ([48]). His Honour considered that “there is no requirement that the defendant intend or otherwise foresee the causation of [an effect on the person harassed, eg worry, fear or mental anguish]” ([60]).
‘The evidence overwhelmingly supported the magistrate's conclusion that the defendant had harassed the complainant by following her, and that following her was deliberate and intentional…. Whilst the service of documents on the complainant was a legitimate purpose, it did not justify conduct on the part of the defendant that was in breach of the order. It goes without saying that there were other ways of achieving that legitimate purpose which did not involve contravention of the family violence order.’ [63]
His Honour considered that this construction is consistent with the relevant legislation, that is, to protect likely victims of family violence from likely perpetrators of that violence ([61]).
Harrison v Moore [2018] TASSC 53 (19 October 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘oath on oath case’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Technology-facilitated domestic and family violence’ – ‘trivial breach’
Charges: Common assault x 2; Contravention of an interim family violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant and applicant had two young children. The assault charges occurred on one day where the complainant alleged that the applicant punched the complainant in the face and kicked her in the head ([5]-[6]). The breach of the interim family violence order occurred when the applicant sent the complainant 4 text messages asking about her and the children ([26]).
The applicant gave evidence at the Magistrates Court trial alleging that he was acting in self-defence. The magistrate accepted the complainant’s evidence over the applicant’s ([10]).
Issues: Whether the finding of guilt was not reasonably open to the magistrate as a matter of law; whether the magistrate should have applied the principle of ‘de minimis non curat lex’ (the law should not concern itself with trifles).
Decision and reasoning: All grounds of appeal was dismissed.
There were 3 grounds of appeal in relation to the assault charge. Ground 1 of the appeal was that the finding of guilt was not reasonably open to the magistrate as a matter of law because the magistrate said she substantially accepted the complainant’s version of events but accepted aspects of the applicant’s version as well. This ground was rejected because the magistrate was entitled to do so ([14]-[15]).
In relation to the breach of the interim family violence order, the ground of appeal was that the magistrate should have applied the principle of ‘de minimis non curat lex’. This was because the magistrate found that sending the messages constituted breaches that were ‘trivial at best’. However, Brett J stated that the principle of ‘de minimis’ is likely not applicable in criminal proceedings ([33]). In any event, it was not applicable in this case because the Magistrate’s reference to ‘trivial’ should be seen as an indication of the relative seriousness of the breaches compared to other examples of that offence, not that the direct contact with the complainant was a trivial matter ([34]).
Bonde v Maney [2018] TASSC 23 (17 May 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Dismissal of charges’ – ‘Evidence of respondent’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Case type: Application for review of Magistrate’s decision to dismiss charge.
Facts: The complainant alleged that the respondent tried to grab the complainant’s car keys from her, injuring her fingers in the process ([3]). The respondent denied assaulting the complainant and alleged that the complainant injured her fingers when she was trying to retrieve her keys ([4]). After the prosecution case closed, the Magistrate immediately moved to judgement without giving the respondent the opportunity to give evidence ([5]). The Magistrate dismissed the charge of assault on the basis that she was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent deliberately or recklessly caused the injury ([5]).
Issues: The complainant argued that the magistrate erred in law by:
•
first, stating that the respondent must have intended the injuries for the charge of assault to be made out;
•
second, failing to give sufficient reasons as to why she was not satisfied that the charge was proven; and
•
third, dismissing the complaint when on no reasonable view of the evidence could the learned magistrate have failed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground was upheld because the causation of injury is not an element of assault ([7]-[8]). The second ground was also upheld because it was not possible to discern from the Magistrate’s reasons the factual basis for the determination ([15]). Therefore, it was not necessary to consider the third ground ([16]).
The case was remitted to be determined by another Magistrate ([20]).
Moore v Rittman [2018] TASSC 5 (13 February 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Conviction not recorded’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault x 2; Breaching a police family violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and the aggrieved, his partner, were in a relationship and had 2 children. The assaults occurred on two occasions when the respondent choked his partner, causing her to lose breath and bruising ([4]). A police family violence order was made, requiring him to not return to the home where his partner and children were living ([5]). The police later found the respondent in the home [(6]). The respondent pleaded guilty to all charges ([7]). The respondent had no criminal history and had independently sought out participation in a men’s behavioural change program.
At the sentencing hearing, the magistrate did not ask the respondent to make submissions or to provide her with information as to his personal circumstances ([9]). The magistrate, pursuant to s 7(f) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), did not record a conviction and adjourned the proceedings on the condition that the respondent be of good behaviour and complete the Men’s Behaviour Change Program ([1]). The charges were recorded as family violence offences under s 13A of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) ([10]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Brett first addressed the fact that the magistrate did not allow the respondent to make submissions. His Honour at [11] noted that:
In the case of an unrepresented defendant, it is incumbent on the magistrate to ensure that, not only is such an opportunity provided, but that the defendant is aware of his or her right to address the court, and given some assistance with respect to the nature of the matters and information which should be the subject of the plea.
Nonetheless, this error was not directly in issue so was not determinative ([12]).
His Honour next addressed the sentence. The prosecution argued that the failure to record a conviction renders the sentence manifestly inadequate ([12]). His Honour emphasised the importance of therapeutic interventions for first-time family violence offenders at [24]:
While a punitive and protective response is essential in cases of serious and repeated family violence, it must also be consistent with the stated purpose of the legislation that consideration is given to therapeutic intervention with a view to achieving rehabilitation and behavioural change, when an offender presents before the court for the first time in respect of acts of spontaneous family violence. Prevention of future violence by use of effective strategies to modify behaviour in respect of offenders who have appropriate insight and desire for change is likely to promote the safety, psychological wellbeing and interests of people affected by family violence.
His Honour emphasised that the good behaviour bond and conditions attached were tailored to the respondent’s personal circumstances and was designed to rehabilitate the respondent and ensure that he did not reoffend ([20]). In all the circumstances, the sentence was not manifestly inadequate ([21]).
Barnes v Crossin [2017] TASSC 61 (12 October 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Arrest’ – ‘Reasonable suspicion’ – ‘Responses in criminal proceedings’
Charges: Resisting a police officer in the execution of their duty x 1.
Case type: Review of Magistrate’s decision to dismiss charge.
Facts: The police attended the respondent’s house in response to a call from the respondent’s son, who told the police that his father was ‘going off’ and had hit his mother. When they arrived, there were clothes strewn around the front yard. The police arrested the respondent. They gave the reason to ‘investigate family violence’ ([3]). The respondent struggled against the police, which gave rise to the resisting police officer charge. The Magistrate dismissed the charge on the basis that the arrest was unlawful in the first place ([4]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the charge.
Decision and Reasoning: The Magistrate did err in dismissing the charge.
The power to arrest is derived from the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas), which requires ‘a reasonable suspicion that the person concerned has committed family violence’ ([27]). This is distinct from a suspicion that the person committed a family violence offence ([33]). Brett J held that there was ample evidence to support the suspicion that there had been family violence, and he had adequately communicated that fact to the respondent ([46]).
Brett J remitted the matter to be decided by the same Magistrate ([53]).
Kirkwood v Thomas [2017] TASSC 56 (15 September 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Not manifestly excessive’ – ‘Text messages’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charges: Breach of family violence order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and the complainant were separated. The order prohibited him from threatening, abusing or assaulting the complainant, but not from going to her house. The first charge related to the defendant attending her house, ringing and knocking on the doors, and calling the complainant. The second charge related to the defendant sending the complainant 8 text messages also insulting the complainant and demanding money ([2]). The magistrate sentenced the appellant to two months’ imprisonment, cumulatively with a 5½ year sentence he was currently serving ([5]). That sentence related to a subsequent attack on the complainant, where the defendant broke into the complainant’s house and beat her with a baseball bat, leaving her with permanent disfiguring injuries and pain ([6]-[9]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate gave insufficient weight to the principle of totality, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive ([11]).
Decision and Reasoning: The judge had to decide first if the sentence of two months was manifestly excessive in order to conclude whether the principle of totality had been breached ([12]). It was relevant that the defendant could have been sentenced for longer than 5½ years for the attack with the baseball bat ([12]). There is usually a discount for subsequent sentences, especially because denunciation and personal deterrence may have been achieved by the first sentence ([13]). There was evidence that the appellant had undertaken some family violence and anger management programs in custody ([19]). However, in this case, a heavy sentence was warranted because there had been repeated breaches of the family violence order in the past, and family violence cases warrant tough sentences ([18]). Therefore, it was open to the magistrate to impose the cumulative sentence of two months ([22]).
Mayne v Tasmania [2017] TASSC 38 (29 June 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘General deterrence’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Smothering’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and complainant had a child together but were not living together. The complainant and defendant were arguing while the complainant was lying in bed. The defendant pushed a pillow onto her face, causing her to struggle for breath for two to five seconds ([3]). The complainant did not suffer any physical injuries. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment ([13]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence was not manifestly excessive. Wood J held that the Magistrate was right to highlight the aggravating factors of the offence, including that smothering is a dangerous act, the defendant did not stop of his own accord, and it would have been a terrifying experience for the complainant ([41]). While the sentence was high, it was appropriate to give prominence for general deterrence ([43]).
Wood J said at [43]:
… it is important that deterrent sentences be imposed not merely for crimes that cause grave physical or psychological harm to victims. There is a need to counter the perception that somehow violence of this kind in the home is less serious than the same kind of violence inflicted on a stranger in a public place. Also, acts of violence committed in a family or domestic context causing fear and distress to victims can have debilitating effects upon their well-being or the well-being of a family member witnessing such violence. It is not only violence resulting in visible injury that must be seen as unacceptable, and these victims, as vulnerable members of our society who have experienced fear and trauma, are entitled to the court's protection.
Parker v Hall [2015] TASSC 60 (10 December 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Breach of family violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and complainant had been in an on-again off-again relationship for two years. A police family violence order was made against the respondent, restraining him from contacting or approaching the complainant within 50 metres. The respondent contravened this order on four separate occasions by phoning the complainant, writing her a letter expressing his affection and remorse, going camping with her, and giving her a letter conveying his desire for reconciliation. An interim family violence order was then made. The conditions of the order were substantially the same as the police family violence order. The respondent then breached this order by meeting the complainant to talk on two separate occasions. The respondent was charged and found guilty of four breaches of a police family violence order and two breaches of an interim family violence order. The magistrate adjourned the charges without conviction for 12 months on the condition that the respondent enter into a good behaviour undertaking and not commit similar offences during the period.
The respondent had previously been found guilty of breaching a police family violence order and an interim family violence order, which were also sentenced without conviction. This offending occurred during the same time period as the six charges in question. The prosecution submitted a more severe sentence would have been imposed if all the charges had been sentenced together. The respondent had no other relevant prior convictions. His conduct did not involve any threats or violence and occurred with the complainant’s consent to varying degrees. Further, the respondent’s counsel submitted that as a legal practitioner, he suffered more than the average citizen as a consequence of the charges.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Despite the complainant’s compliance, the respondent knew that his conduct was in breach of the orders. Further, his repeated offending of eight separate breaches increased his culpability and pointed towards the need for specific deterrence. However, the respondent’s breaches, while not trivial, were not at the serious end of offending. The public interest did not favour a conviction being recorded. As a result of the media attention attracted by the matter, the respondent had already felt the consequences of his offending behaviour to a degree. If the charges were heard together with the previous two offences, the offending would not have necessarily demanded a heavier or more punitive response. Considering these factors together, Wood J concluded that there was sufficient justification for leniency extended to the respondent and the sentence was not manifestly inadequate.
Lacroix v Lacroix [2015] TASSC 42 (3 September 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Extension of family violence order’ – ‘Family violence order’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Proceeding: Review of family violence order
Facts: A family violence order was made against the applicant on 5 March 2015, in anticipation of the expiration of another 12-month family violence order made on 7 March 2014 (the first order). The applicant made no admissions in relation to the conduct resulting in the making of the first order. On 23 February 2015 the respondent, the applicant’s partner, made an application for an extension of the first order. The magistrate denied this extension but suggested the respondent lodge an application for a fresh order and said, ‘[The applicant] heard me say that, so he’s effectively on notice that that may well occur in the course of the morning and taking care of the service requirements [sic]’. Counsel for the respondent then lodged the application for a fresh order.
Issue: Whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness because he was not served with a sealed copy of the new application filed by the respondent.
Decision and reasoning: The motion to review the order was dismissed.
The magistrate was obliged to give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to be present at the hearing of the application, to obtain legal representation, and to make submissions and dispute allegations of fact at common law. The applicant was not denied these opportunities. He was present when the magistrate directed the respondent to lodge the fresh application that would be dealt with later that day. As a result, he had an opportunity to remain at court and instruct his counsel, who was also present at the time, to prepare submissions to defend the application on his behalf. The evidence relied on by the respondent for the fresh application was the same as for the extension of time. The common law rule of procedural fairness did not require the magistrate to proceed only if the applicant was served with a sealed copy of the fresh application.
The magistrate did not err in applying the statutory requirements. Section 106E Justice Act 1959 (Tas) does not apply to family violence orders, as submitted by the applicant’s counsel. Further, rule 54N(1)(a) Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) was complied with. The fresh application was served on the applicant on 11 March 2015. The rule does not require service before the family violence order is made, but as soon as practical after it is filed with the clerk.
However, the magistrate erred in making a final family violence order. He did not have authority to make such an order under s 31(7) Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas), as a sealed copy of the application had not been served on the applicant and no attempt had been made to carry out service. Despite this error, no substantial miscarriage of justice resulted. The applicant had notice of the application, when and where it would be made and the evidence to be relied upon. Further, the applicant was in court the morning of the application with a lawyer and merely needed to stay until the afternoon to defend the fresh application. Therefore, there was no procedural unfairness and no substantial miscarriage of justice.
Young v Wilson [2015] TASSC 16 (28 April 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Using carriage service’
Charges: Using a carriage service to harass, Breach of police family violence order (6 counts), Common assault
Appeal Type: Application for review of sentence
Facts: A police family violence order prohibited the applicant from approaching within 50 metres or contacting the complainant in any way. The breaches of this order involved the applicant phoning the complainant, sending her two text messages, threatening to kill her and punching her to the head and face. The punch also gave rise to the common assault charge. The carriage service offence involved the applicant phoning and sending eight menacing text messages to the complainant. The applicant had a substantial and relevant criminal history. A sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was imposed. This offending also activated previously imposed suspended sentences of imprisonment. This resulted in a total effective sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment with no parole eligibility.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed.
The eight-month sentence was not excessive. The applicant had previously shown a disregard for orders made in favour of the complainant. The assault offences were serious and the applicant did not appreciate this. A deterrent sentence was needed. It was not unjust to activate two of the previous suspended sentences resulting in six months’ imprisonment. However, a previous suspended term of imprisonment of 18 months for trespass, breaches of a family violence order and various traffic offences was substituted with a period of 12 months’ imprisonment. This was considered too harsh, given the other sentences of imprisonment to be served by the applicant and the fact the applicant has not reoffended with respect to the driving offences. Furthermore, there was no justification for not imposing a non-parole period. The applicant’s alcohol problem contributed to his ongoing offending behaviour: ‘The granting of parole may encourage reformation and increase the chances of rehabilitation under supervision through conditional freedom’ ([69]). He was resentenced to a total term of 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months.
(Note also at [17]-[27] where Wood J made some general comments on the correct procedure to be followed for breaches of suspended sentences in Magistrates’ Courts and at [37]-[53] which contains general consideration of totality, suspended sentences and non-parole periods).
Higgins v McCulloch [2013] TASSC 49 (11 September 2013) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault
Appeal Type: Motion to review conviction and penalty
Facts: The applicant was found guilty of one count of assaulting his wife by punching her in the face. The complainant had died by the time the matter came to trial. The parties were living together in unusual circumstances and the assault occurred in a bedroom of the family home in the presence of an adult daughter. The applicant had no prior convictions. A good behaviour bond was imposed and a conviction was recorded.
Issues:
1.
Whether the finding of guilt was reasonably open on the evidence.
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in recording a conviction.
Decision and Reasoning: The notice to review was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed based on the evidence before the magistrate: see paragraphs [5]-[27].
2.
At [33], Tennent J outlined the relevant issues to be considered when deciding whether to record a conviction. A court must consider the public interest, the need for an official record to be made of the commission of the offence and whether the victim might reasonably not feel vindicated by the failure to record a conviction. These factors are to be weighed against the benefits to the offender of a conviction not being recorded. This was a family violence offence. The applicant was not entitled to any discount for a guilty plea and did not display remorse. The applicant was suffering from mental health issues, which partly explained his ‘bizarre’ ([44]) behaviour that occurred in the background to the assault. There was nothing put before the magistrate indicating that recording a conviction would have an adverse impact on the applicant.
Tasmania v Finnegan (No 2) [2012] TASSC 1 (19 January 2012) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence - relationship’ – ‘Evidence - tendency’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge: Unlawful wounding
Proceeding: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence
Facts: The accused was charged with unlawfully wounding the complainant (his partner) by striking her to the face with a glass. He pleaded not guilty. The Crown sought to lead evidence from the complainant given on a voir dire about the accused’s conduct towards her on other occasions, both before and after the alleged wounding. The accused objected to the admission of some of the evidence ([6]).
Issues: Whether some of the evidence given by the complainant should be ruled inadmissible on at least one of the following bases:
1.
Irrelevance;
2.
Failure to satisfy the common law rule established in Pfennig v R whereby propensity or similar fact evidence is not admissible if, viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of that evidence that is consistent with innocence;
3.
The danger of unfair prejudice to the accused outweighing the probative value of the evidence: s 137 Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); or
4.
The probative value of the tendency evidence not substantially outweighing any prejudicial effect that it may have on the accused: s 101(2) Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The evidence led from the complainant as to the conduct of the accused was admissible. It was relevant on a number of bases: as ‘relationship evidence’, enabling the jury to assess the evidence as to what occurred at the time of the alleged wounding; as evidence of motive (jealousy); as evidence explaining why the complainant asserted she was injured because of a fall and why there was delay in her reporting what occurred; and as tendency evidence, showing that the accused had a tendency to be jealous of anyone who had a friendship/relationship with the complainant and to be generally violent towards her ([11]-[15]).
Further, the probative value of all the evidence under consideration substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect and danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. In this regard, Blow J noted at [30]-[31]:
‘In my view the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused is not great… [A] properly instructed jury, having heard all the evidence of jealousy and violence, is unlikely to be distracted from its duty of impartiality and its duty to give a true verdict in accordance with the evidence.
‘In my view the evidence of jealousy has substantial probative value. Without that evidence the jury might well take the view that the accused had not given any indication of jealousy on any other occasion. If the only evidence available for the jury as to violence on other occasions was the evidence of the three charged assaults, two of which shortly preceded the first report to the police of the accused wounding the complainant with the glass, that could result in the jury overestimating the likelihood of the complainant having fabricated the critical allegations. Having regard to that factor, and to the various bases on which the evidence of violence is relevant, I consider that all the evidence of violence also has substantial probative value’.
Here, there was nothing about the facts that made it one where s101(2) or s137 [Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)] required the Pfennig test to be applied (at [32]).
Note: this decision has been overtaken by legislative changes effective 12 December 2017. See section 13B Family Violence Act 2004.
James v Tasmania [2010] TASSC 50 (11 November 2010) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Breach of a family violence order, Common assault, Driving offences, Perverting the course of justice
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The magistrate imposed three terms of imprisonment. First, the applicant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 4 four months, for charges relating to driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and driving with alcohol in his body. Second, the applicant was sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment, cumulative on the first period of imprisonment, for perverting justice by providing a false name to a police officer. Third, the applicant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 3 months, for 3 charges. These were: breaching a family violence order by sending an abusive and threatening text message to a woman protected by the order; breaching the order by telling the woman he would punch her in the head if she did not pack his property; and committing common assault by placing both hands around her neck and squeezing, threatening to bash her head in if she did not give him a telephone, grabbing her by the back of the neck, and placing his arm around her neck. The magistrate merely expressed this sentence as being ‘cumulative.’ If the third period of imprisonment was cumulative on both sentences, the effective sentence was 10 months’ imprisonment. However, if it was cumulative only on the first sentence, the effective sentence was 7 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in failing to make the sentence clear and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The lack of clarity as to the cumulative nature of the third sentence amounted to a sentencing error and the applicant was re-sentenced. The first and second periods of imprisonment imposed were not manifestly excessive. However, the sentence for the assault and the breach of the family violence order was found to be manifestly excessive. A sentence of three months’ imprisonment wholly suspended was substituted. His Honour stated, ‘[t]he nature of the assault was not severe enough to warrant a greater punishment. His culpability for breaching the order was ameliorated by his belief, the claim to which was unchallenged, that the order no longer operated, and by the complainant reconciling and living with him since the order had been made’ ([22]).
Beechey v McDonald [2010] TASSC 47 (25 October 2010) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Guilty plea - unequivocal’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Breach of a family violence protection order (2 counts), Assault
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to two breaches of a family violence protection order and was sentenced to a wholly suspended sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment. The family violence order included an order that he not enter the premises of the complainant, his wife and mother of his 4 children. On one occasion, when returning the children to the premises, the applicant entered the residence and placed some of the children’s belongings inside (the first complaint – breach of a family violence protection order). The family violence order was later replaced with an order including a term that the applicant not directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault the complainant. The applicant and the complainant agreed to spend Christmas day together. On the day, a box the applicant was carrying came into contact with the complainant. She fell over and dislocated a shoulder (the second complaint – breach of a family violence protection order by assault).
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in accepting the applicant’s plea to one of the charges as he had made assertions that were inconsistent with his plea of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Sentencing submissions from counsel for the applicant evidenced that he denied applying force to the complainant intentionally. This was inconsistent with his plea of guilty on the second complaint. A plea of guilty must be unequivocal. The magistrate should have informed counsel for the applicant of this inconsistency ([9]-[12]).
Maingay v Seabourne [2009] TASSC 67 (19 August 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’
Charges: Breach of police family violence order (6 counts), Assault (2 counts), Breach of interim family violence order, Damaging property, Abuse of police
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence
Facts: The male respondent was sentenced by a magistrate in respect of numerous offences. The magistrate dealt with the offences in batches and the State sought review of a suspended sentence imposed in respect of two of these batches. The first batch of offences pertained largely to charges of stealing. More relevantly, the second batch of offences related to a number of breaches of police family violence orders. On 12 December 2005, a police family violence order was made for the protection of Cassandra Deering. The respondent breached this order by head-butting and punching Ms Deering. On 5 January 2007, a second police family violence order was made. The respondent breached this by approaching Ms Deering, damaging the car belonging to her new partner, and sending a threatening text message. A number of these breaches occurred while the respondent was on bail for earlier breaches.
On 2 October 2008, a police family violence order was made for the protection of Dana Smith. The respondent breached this order by kicking Ms Smith in the head. He also said she was lucky he did not slit her throat and that he should have snapped her neck. On 27 October 2008, an interim family violence order was made which required the respondent to immediately surrender firearms. The respondent also breached this order.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence imposed in respect of the batch of offences incorporating the family violence offences was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was a repeat offender. He showed a complete disregard for the orders made to restrict his behaviour and should have felt the full effect of a deterrent sentence, notwithstanding his age and lack of a prior history. If his offending had extended only to breach by approach (potentially instigated by the protected person) the outcome would have been different. However, the respondent’s offending went far beyond that; it extended to physical assaults against two separate female partners ([24]).
Her Honour noted that, ‘While it is accepted that, at the time the respondent was dealt with for all of this offending, he was still a young man with no relevant prior history, the legislation pursuant to which he had been charged was enacted to protect members of the community, and in particular to protect persons in close relationships with offenders. Deterrent sentences were required to give effect to that legislation … However, in practical terms, it is impossible in my view to argue that the deterrent effect of an actual term of imprisonment is the same as that of a suspended term of imprisonment’ ([23]).
The respondent was ordered to serve a period of four months’ imprisonment. Although it might have been unfair in all the circumstances to impose a custodial sentence several months after his release, if the error in the sentence was not corrected, the perception would remain that the sentence imposed lacked the requisite deterrent effect ([26]-[30]).
Bradshaw v Tasmania [2009] TASSC 22 (9 April 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charges: Unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm (2 counts), Aggravated burglary
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant had lived with the female complainant and her 7 year old daughter for over a year before the offending occurred. The relationship was violent and the complainant accordingly obtained a family violence order requiring the appellant not to threaten, harass or abuse the complainant, to keep the peace towards her, and not to damage any property at her home. The order was in place at the time of the offending. The appellant committed a series of offences against the complainant and they ceased cohabiting together. Following this, the appellant broke into the complainant’s house and stabbed her twice to her right side. He took a few steps away before turning back and stabbing her again twice to her left side. The complainant was holding her daughter at the time of the attacks. The appellant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with eligibility for parole after four years.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was rejected by all judges but with separate reasoning provided. Tennent J (with whom Porter J agreed) found that while there were mitigating factors (remorse, giving himself up, and pleading guilty), the applicant committed very deliberate acts of violence in the complainant’s own home when he had no right to be there and there was a need for both personal and general deterrence ([35]-[36]). The appellant was sentenced for two particularly serious crimes. The stabbings occurred very close together but constituted two crimes because the appellant walked away and made a conscious decision to return and stab the complainant again ([33]). Further, the appellant committed a number of other offences and showed a complete disregard for orders of the court. He caused significant, long-term physical and psychological damage to both the complainant and her daughter ([34]).
In a separate judgment, Evans J also held that the sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the totality of the appellant’s criminal conduct. The appellant’s criminal conduct was particularly serious. It was not impulsive. He went to the complainant’s home intending to inflict harm and acted in contravention of both a bail condition and a family violence order. One of the wounds he inflicted could have been fatal. The appellant also had prior convictions for violence and carrying weapons. His attack had a profound adverse impact on the complainant ([13]-[14]).
Allen v Kerr [2009] TASSC 10 (25 February 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Common assault
Appeal Type: Motion to review sentence
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the victim for three years and they had one child together. The victim also had a child from another relationship. Both of these children were present during the incident. The applicant was intoxicated and swore at the victim. An argument ensued and the victim spat in his face, which the applicant claimed led to his subsequent actions. The applicant took the victim’s house keys and told her to go inside before telling her to get in the car. He then smashed the car window, leaned inside and punched the victim twice to the face and four or five times to the back of the head and bit her multiple times. The police applied for a family violence order to operate for 12 months, which the applicant consented to. The applicant had a significant criminal history (though no convictions for assault) and was subject to a probation order and two suspended sentences. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment.
Issue: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The motion to review was dismissed.
Porter J found that the assault was not premeditated and arose from the applicant’s state of intoxication. The act of the victim spitting in the applicant’s face was a provocative act and an assault in itself. No weapon was used and the complainant suffered no lasting injury. On the other hand, the assault was serious particularly given the biting. Furthermore, the presence of the two children at the time of the attack was an aggravating factor, as recognised by s 13 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas): ‘Violence witnessed by children in the domestic environment not only is distressing (usually the victim is a parent or someone in the place of a parent), but it also serves to desensitise impressionable minds to violence, and to encourage the notion that resort to violence is acceptable’ ([13]).
The community has a general intolerance towards offences of violence. However, although immediate custodial sentences are appropriate for serious cases of assault, there is no prima facie position that assault offences should be punished by an immediate gaol term. The fact that the applicant was subject to the probation order and suspended prison sentences indicates that these measures did not deter the applicant from offending. ‘General deterrence in relation to offences of violence is a weighty factor’ ([27]). While the penalty was a relatively severe one, it did not demonstrate error having regard to the applicant’s circumstances.
Tasmania v R D P [2009] TASSC 72 (25 February 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Police family violence order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge: Rape
Proceeding: Application to adduce relationship evidence
Facts: The defendant was in a relationship with the complainant for about 14 months. The alleged offence occurred after the relationship ended. A police family violence order was in place against the defendant. The complainant arranged to attend the defendant’s house to collect her belongings with her 10-year-old son and her brother. She collected her belongings and then went to the bathroom with her son where she found the defendant. There was a knife on the hand basin. The complainant informed the defendant that she did not want to have sex, but he performed oral sex on her. She exposed her breasts on his demands because she thought he might hurt her if she did not. The complainant screamed for help and tried to defend herself by kicking the defendant. The defendant then threatened to rape her anally unless she uncrossed her legs. She then uncrossed her legs and the defendant vaginally raped her. This was done in front of their child.
Issue: Whether the relationship evidence should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence as to the nature of the relationship was admitted, with the exception of evidence of general physical and verbal abuse unconnected with sexual activity. The evidence included general physical abuse and physical violence used to coerce the complainant into sexual intercourse, one prior occasion of non-consensual vaginal intercourse and an act of anal intercourse. Porter J held that the evidence would allow the jury to more readily assess the actions of the complainant and defendant and ascribe meaning to things said by the defendant. In particular, evidence of prior sexual intercourse without consent might serve to explain why the complainant may have displayed some acquiescence to the oral sex and the vaginal penetration. Also, evidence of prior anal penetration was relevant to the jury’s assessment of why the complainant uncrossed her legs prior to vaginal penetration, given the high level of pain and discomfort the complainant suffered as a result of the earlier anal penetration. The probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudice.
Director of Public Prosecutions v P [2007] TASSC 51 (26 June 2007) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge: Rape
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent’s relationship with the complainant ended. The complainant attempted to maintain a friendship with the respondent but he could not accept that the relationship was over. He kept coming to her home and tried to kiss and cuddle her. She would sometimes relent to avoid an argument. She was pregnant with his child at the time. On the night of the offence, he arrived at the complainant’s home intoxicated. She asked him to leave but he refused. He stopped her from calling a friend. He then refused to allow her to go to the toilet, forcibly pinned her to their bed and raped her. She eventually stopped resisting and he stopped after about 5 minutes. The rape resulted in lasting psychological impacts on the complainant. The respondent had a long record of offending, including offences of violence and threatened violence. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Crawford J (with whom Slicer and Evans JJ agreed) held that a sentence of two years is low for the crime of rape, which is ‘a crime of violence, domination and degradation and it usually causes great psychological trauma to the victim. It requires a substantial sentence of imprisonment in most cases. Leniency may be extended in exceptional circumstances, but there were none in this case’ ([16]). His Honour was of the view that it is conceivable that a crime committed ‘during the currency of a sexual relationship’ might allow some leniency, but the fact of a prior sexual relationship is not a mitigating factor and the appellant’s disappointment about the relationship breakdown is not relevant to sentencing: ‘In no sense was his crime an act of unrequited love.’ ([16]). Evans J also noted that, ‘it is significant that the respondent's criminal conduct cannot be categorised as an impetuous response to the break-up of his relationship with the complainant and a manifestation of his love for her. His conduct over the period of in excess of an hour after she first asked him to leave bears all the hallmarks of an assertion of physical and sexual dominion over the complainant’ ([23]). The respondent was re-sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Lambie v State of Tasmania [2007] TASSC 10 (7 March 2007) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault (two counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was in an ‘up and down’ relationship with the complainant that was marked with arguments and assaults. On the day of the offence, the appellant attended the complainant’s home. An argument occurred and the complainant said she wanted to sort out the issues in the relationship. She stood in the doorway, preventing the appellant from leaving. The argument continued and the appellant grabbed the complainant and threw her backwards out of the way. The appellant then followed the complainant into their bedroom and shoved his motorcycle helmet into her chest, knelt on her chest and shouted in her face. The appellant later returned to the house and took her a glass of water. The assaults aggravated an existing unknown spinal condition and the complainant had to undergo surgery and suffered temporary and permanent disabilities. There were also lasting psychological impacts. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 months.
Issue: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on the basis of another ground of appeal (that the sentencing judge had taken extraneous or irrelevant material into account). In relation to the issue of manifest excess, Underwood CJ (with whom Blow J and Tennent J agreed) stated that the key consideration was ‘the extent of the appellant's criminal culpability for the consequences of his direct and intentional applications of force’ because the sentencing judge sentenced on the basis the appellant was ‘culpably liable’ for all the consequences of his criminality ([19]). However, there were no submissions on this issue from counsel so the Court was reluctant to make a determination. In any case, it was not necessary to do so because the consequences of the appellant’s criminal conduct were not reasonably foreseeable by him and the exceptional circumstances were such that the consequences should carry little weight in sentencing.
In re-sentencing the appellant, the Court held that the conduct was serious and that, ‘the nature of the criminal conduct was such that a sentence of imprisonment is called for to mark condemnation of this kind of domestic violence and to punish the appellant’ ([31]). However, the lack of relevant prior convictions made a 12-month sentence manifestly excessive. The appellant was re sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, fully suspended on the condition that the appellant be of good behaviour for two years after his release.
Remess v Rabe [2006] TASSC 105 (4 December 2006) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Ex parte proceedings’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Leave’
Appeal Type: Application for review of the making of interim family violence order
Facts: An interim family violence order (FVO) was applied for on behalf of the complainant by the manager of Victim Support Services within the Department of Justice. An interim order was made in the applicant’s absence and the order was to last for 60 days.
Issues:
1a. | Whether the magistrate erred in making the order when leave to make an application under the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (the Act) had neither been sought nor granted. |
|---|---|
1b. | Alternatively, whether the magistrate erred in granting leave to make the application when the material was insufficient for that purpose. |
2. | Whether the magistrate erred in making an interim order because the evidence contained in the application was entirely hearsay. |
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed.
1a. | The applicant submitted that the victim support officer was a person who was required to seek leave under s 15(2)(d) of the Act such that magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the application without leave being granted. Tennent J held that a grant of leave was not a pre-condition to jurisdiction, and that s 15 merely provides for the procedure of the classes of persons who may make an application for an FVO. |
|---|---|
1b. | Counsel for the applicant conceded that the application for the order was an interlocutory proceeding. Under s 75 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the hearsay rule does not apply as long as the party adducing the evidence also adduces evidence of its source. Counsel submitted that because the application did not disclose the sources of the information, the evidence was inadmissible. Therefore, there was nothing in the application upon which the magistrate could properly have considered the issue of leave. Tennent J held that in relation to leave the Court should consider ‘the position of the person seeking leave, their relationship to the affected person and whether they may have acquired knowledge of the matters the subject of the application’ ([15]). In this case, the magistrate recognised the person seeking leave and that the protected person was a client of hers. Her position and relationship with her client, of itself, would have identified her as being able to provide assistance to the protected person. It was appropriate in those circumstances for the magistrate to grant leave. While leave should have been expressly addressed, a grant of leave was implicit from the conduct of the proceedings. |
2. | The applicant submitted that while some of the material in the application came from police reports, it was not clear whether the officers referred to were reporting from personal contact with the protected person or relying on others. Tennent J held that the protected person clearly identified her sources as two police officers. Her Honour stated that s 75 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) is not limited to ‘first hand hearsay’. As such, the evidence was admissible. Her Honour then commented on the making of interim orders generally at [28]. Counsel for the applicant also raised the issue of the basis on which the magistrate made an order that extended to the children of the parties. The magistrate imposed the order so as to ‘err on the side of caution’ but was careful to not make an order preventing the applicant form approaching his children. Tennent J held this was appropriate: ‘It is well recognised that children in families where domestic violence is a factor can be affected by such violence whether or not they are directly subjected to it’. Even though there was limited material available to the magistrate, the interim nature of the order was reflected in its duration and an acknowledgment that the issue could be revisited. |
Oliver v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 95 (17 November 2006) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aggravated burglary (two counts), Unlawfully injuring property (two counts), Arson
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The offending related to the appellant’s former partner and father of her two children. The relationship had ended acrimoniously as the appellant found out that her former partner had an affair about the time their relationship ended that resulted in the birth of a child. She broke into his home on two separate occasions and damaged it. On the first occasion she broke nine windows, destroyed a collection of vinyl records and smashed a photo frame. On the second occasion she set fire to the home and damaged the complainant’s vehicle parked outside. The damage exceeded $50,000 and the contents lost had a value between $15,000 and $20,000. At the time of sentencing the appellant had three young children. She had relevant prior convictions. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that insufficient weight was given to the fact that the appellant was the mother of three children. However, nothing was put to the sentencing judge that suggested any particular hardship to the children arising from their mother’s imprisonment. Counsel also submitted that the penalty imposed for arson was the harshest in the preceding five years. Counsel for the respondent submitted that this was a deliberate action and resulted in substantial damage. Other dwellings could have been at risk. The offending was motivated by ‘significant ill will’. The appellant showed no remorse and attempted to place the blame elsewhere. The fire was lit late at night at a time when it would be expected that it would not be immediately detected. Tennent J (with whom Evans J agreed) held that the appellant’s conduct could only be described as ‘vindictive attacks in no way justified by what she presumably perceived as the wrongs done to her by him. The gravity of her behaviour escalated in that she went from simply smashing things to using fire, a much more dangerous tool’ ([44]).
Underwood CJ (with whom Evans J agreed) held that there was nothing to indicate that the trial judge did not give appropriate weight to the fact that the appellant was a mother of three children. His Honour held that family hardship is only relevant in the ‘most unusual case’ ([11]). In regards to the appellant’s ‘tariff submission’ that the sentence was the longest imposed for arson in the preceding five years, Underwood CJ noted that the appellant was sentenced for arson as well as other crimes. Further, the fact that the arson was intentional made it more serious. The appellant was neither youthful nor remorseful and this was ‘calculated’ conduct borne out of anger designed to cause maximum distress, such that the totality of the conduct called for a substantial sentence of imprisonment.
Re S [2005] TASSC 89 (19 September 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of innocence’ – ‘Risk assessment tool’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’
Proceeding: Application for bail
Facts: The applicant was arrested following a complaint that he assaulted his partner. She alleged that he had taken her car keys. When she asked for them back, he verbally abused her, grabbed her throat and pushed her backwards. The complainant stated that the applicant kept a gun on the property (though this was not untoward because it was a farming property with livestock) and that she lived in fear of her partner’s threats. The applicant denied the allegations and stated that he did not see the complainant on the day in question. He alleged that the complainant made threats against his safety and that she made the assault complaint maliciously in an attempt to force him to pay her money. Following his arrest, an application for a family violence order (FVO) was made. The applicant had no history of violence or prior convictions. The police officer completed a ‘Tasmania Police Family Violence Risk Assessment Screening Tool’. This involved a subjective assessment provided by the complainant and was part of a whole of government response to domestic and family violence instituted in Tasmania in 2004 ([18]). While the applicant was in the remand centre, the complainant called and asked to speak to the complainant. She indicated that she was willing to drop the assault charge if she was paid money that she was owed.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted. The Court held that various problems with duplication within the risk assessment, the mixture of protective legislation within the criminal law and the mandatory nature of the legislation meant that a court is inhibited in its assessment of future risk, especially in the case of an unrepresented defendant. There was evidence that the phone message from the complainant while the applicant was on remand could be construed, ‘as a form of pressure designed to enhance a financial outcome favourable to the maker’, which would be contrary to the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas). Section 12 of the Act creates a presumption against bail for a person charged with a family violence offence unless the court is satisfied that release, "would not be likely to adversely affect the safety … of an affected person". At [23], Slicer J made some general comments on the effectiveness of the statutory scheme, noting concerns that the public must have confidence in the administration of the scheme and that public confidence is diminished when an arbitrary approach is taken. By tasking the courts to assess the future risk of a person, reliable primary material must be put before the court to deal with issues such as deprivation of liberty and consequences to the family unit. Slicer J also noted the risk that, ‘deprivation of liberty is seen as a sanction imposed for unproven conduct.’
The Court held that it is not possible to determine the merits of the domestic violence complaint at first instance and that it remained an issue for trial. His Honour also noted tensions between the presumption of innocence and the need to protect victims. In applying this to the facts, his Honour granted bail on the provision of a surety and the imposition of residential, geographical and contact provisions.
Olsen v State of Tasmania [2005] TASSC 40 (13 May 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Proceedings: Bail application
Facts: The applicant was charged with aggravated assault against his former female partner. The Crown case was that the assault consisted of a threatening gesture or gestures with a replica pistol. The applicant vehemently denied these allegations. The Crown informed the court that they would not oppose bail if the applicant was able to produce a suitable surety. The applicant suffered from schizophrenia and would benefit from the supervision of a surety to ensure he did not breach any bail conditions. However, through no fault of his own, the applicant was unable to produce a surety.
Issue: Whether the application for bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for bail was refused. His Honour noted that, ‘Were I free of the restraints imposed by the Family Violence Act, s12, I would grant bail. I would do so because on the face of it, the assault is not a serious one, because the applicant has been in custody since 10 or 11 April, and because it will be some time before this applicant has his case heard.’ His Honour further noted that the applicant had no relevant prior convictions ([3]).
However, s 12 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) provided that the applicant not be granted bail unless his release on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, well being and interests of the complainant. The onus was on the unrepresented applicant to show this but he had no idea of where the complainant was living (so as to ascertain information about her safety). In light of this and in the absence of a surety to monitor the applicant’s behaviour, the application for bail was refused. His Honour concluded by stating that, ‘I want to say very strongly that this man needs legal assistance and he needs it urgently, otherwise he is likely to stay where he is for a considerable period of time’ ([10]).
S v White [2005] TASSC 27 (21 April 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factors’
Charges: Assault (3 counts), Destroying property, Application for a restraint order
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail
Facts: It was alleged that the appellant assaulted his former partner and two of her children, and that he destroyed the windscreen of her car. A police officer also applied for a restraint order as a result of this incident. The magistrate refused to grant the applicant bail.
Issue: Whether the release of the appellant on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of an affected person (the former partner).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and bail was granted with condition as to surety recognisance and a residential condition. There were a number of factors weighing against the appellant: the prosecution had a strong case; this was a case involving not only physical assault but a threat to kill; the appellant used weapons in the commission of the offence; the Family Violence Risk Assessment prepared by the complainant immediately following the incident noted alcohol problems, potential mental health issues, jealousy and possessiveness, threats to kill, violence in the relationship escalating and the relationship had only recently broken down; the proposed surety (the appellant’s mother) was not in good health and would be unable to stop the appellant harming his former partner ([14]-[18]).
However, in spite of this, Blow J was satisfied that the release of the appellant on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of his former partner and her children. The appellant had not assaulted his former partner or children prior to this incident. Despite allegations of mental illness, the appellant had not been diagnosed with such a disorder. The appellant’s demeanour in court was ‘ideal and exemplary,’ precautions had been taken to ensure the appellant did not know where his former partner was, and he had a previous good employment history ([19]-[23]).
Her Majesty's Attorney-General v O [2004] TASSC 53 (9 June 2004) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Assault, indecent assault
Appeal type: Attorney-General appeal against sentence
Facts: The responded pleaded guilty to assault and indecent assault against a woman with whom he cohabited for seven years. They had four children together. In March 2001, the respondent assaulted the complainant by raising his fist at her, waving a knife in her face and threatening to kill her. The relationship ceased some weeks prior to 30th May 2002. On 30th May 2002, the respondent trespassed into the complainant’s home and ejaculated over her legs while she was asleep. The complainant reported the incident to police soon after it occurred and, at the same time, reported the assault of March 2001. Considerable time was taken to obtain a DNA analysis of the semen on the complainant’s legs. As a result, police did not interview the respondent until a little more than a year after the indecent assault. The respondent was ordered to perform 80 hours of community service.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by Underwood and Slicer JJ but upheld by Blow J in dissent. The judges provided different reasoning.
Underwood J, in the majority, agreed with Blow J (in dissent) that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. However, he dismissed the appeal. The time in custody the respondent would have to serve would unlikely exceed 6 months and absent some point of principle, ‘it was unjust to take away the respondent's liberty and put him in prison because an undefined error, not caused or contributed to by him in any way, infected the sentencing discretion exercised with respect to crimes that occurred two and three years ago’ ([7]).
Slicer J, also in the majority, held that the sentence was not manifestly inadequate. His Honour quoted Parker v R [1994] TASSC 94 which in turn quoted from a Canadian case R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 242, 249 articulating principles for the sentencing of crimes of domestic violence: ‘When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterised as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape’.
However, His Honour nonetheless held that the circumstances of this case did not show manifest disparity or inconsistency with the sentencing standard (which was not to say that a more severe penalty would not have been appropriate). Here, the original assault (followed by the resumption of cohabitation) and the act of indecency were not charged for a further period of 12 months. There was no material advanced that suggested continuation of harassment or manifestation of aggression. The respondent had successfully completed the order of community service ([19]-[20]).
Slicer J also stated: ‘Resolution of the problem of violence within a domestic situation is complex and resumption of cohabitation, as in this case where the complainant had decided to give her partner another chance, makes any assessment of sanction difficult’ ([19]).
Blow J, in dissent, held that the nature of the indecent assault (ejaculating over a former partner’s legs) and the circumstances of aggravation in which it occurred made it a particularly serious example of that sort of crime such that a community service order was so inadequate a penalty that the appeal ought to be allowed ([30], [36]). The circumstances of aggravation were that the respondent entered the complainant’s house as a trespasser at night, the complainant was asleep, and it was committed in the immediate presence of the couple’s four young children which created a strong risk of them witnessing the incident ([26]). A sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 8 months, was appropriate.
His Honour disagreed with the comments of Slicer J as to delay insofar as they related to the indecent assault. He noted that, ‘Certainly fairness to an offender can require a judge imposing a sentence for a stale crime, long after it was committed, to extend what otherwise might be an undue degree of leniency: R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 at 519 - 520. There is also authority that a delay need not be inordinate before it deserves to be taken into account: Miceli v R [1997] VSC 22; (1997) 94 A Crim R 327 at 330. However the respondent was sentenced for the indecent assault some 20 months after committing it, and a delay of that order is now, regrettably, quite normal in this State. I therefore think that the delay in relation to that charge is of little significance’.
Waddington v R [2003] TASSC 21 (30 April 2003) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Murder
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and the female deceased lived together for 10 or 12 years. The appellant drank 10 cans of beer on the afternoon of the murder. While the appellant prepared dinner, the deceased telephoned a friend. According to counsel for the appellant, these telephone calls occurred on a regular basis meaning that the deceased would often eat dinner cold or not eat dinner at all. The appellant had become frustrated with these calls over the years. The appellant finished making dinner and told the deceased it was ready. She told him that she would eat it later. The friend on the other end of the phone then heard the appellant become enraged. He yelled, ‘Get off that fucking phone … I've been putting up with it for the last ten years … I'm sick to death of the fucking phone.’ The telephone connection was broken. In a rage, the appellant killed his partner. He held a pillow over her face for about three to four minutes, smothering her until she died. An hour later he went to the police and confessed.
Issues:
1.
Whether the sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the order fixing a non-parole period of 12 years was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2.
1.
A sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. Although the appellant expressed remorse, confessed to the crime quickly, and pleaded guilty, the appellant maintained his suffocation of the deceased for a prolonged period of time, the deceased did not provoke the appellant’s violence in any way, and the appellant had prior convictions ([25]-[27]).
2.
However, a non-parole period of 12 years was harsh, particularly when considered in light of orders for parole eligibility in other murder cases. Taking into account the appellant’s genuine and deep remorse and his full acceptance of responsibility, a non-parole period of 10 years was substituted ([30]).
Burton v R [2002] TASSC 64 (11 September 2002) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charges: Assault (2 counts), Aggravated burglary with intent to commit murder or assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant resided in a de facto relationship between May 2001 and 20 July 2001. The complainant had a six month old child. However, in July, the complainant informed the appellant she wanted to end the relationship. She went to live with her mother. On the morning of 29 July, the appellant smashed a window to enter the complainant’s mother’s flat, holding a large knife (count 1). He yelled, ‘where is the fucking slut’ and ‘where is she’. He entered the complainant’s bedroom, where she was sleeping with her child, shouting that he was going to kill her. The appellant dragged the complainant by her hair to the kitchen and started to cut her neck. She grabbed the blade of the knife and it snapped (count 2 and 3). The appellant dragged her outside the house (count 4) before calming down. The complainant sustained a superficial laceration to her neck and ongoing psychological injury.
The appellant was found guilty of assault at a first trial (count 4). At a second trial, he was found guilty of aggravated burglary (count 1) and assault (count 3). The assault subject of count 3 was framed as an alternative to counts alleging the commission of the crimes of attempted murder and committing an act intended to cause bodily harm (wounding). He was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment for the offences subject of the second trial. In respect of the assault, he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment cumulative on the first sentence.
Issue: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed by all judges but with separate reasoning provided. Crawford J (with whom Underwood J agreed) held that the sentence of three years and six months was manifestly excessive. The sentence was well outside the range of sentences typically imposed for these types of offences ([20]-[23]). In light of the need for consistency, the sentence was set aside and a sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Slicer J also found the sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. The circumstances of the offences warranted the sentence namely, this was a case of ‘home invasion’ and ‘domestic violence,’ the appellant had prior convictions, he was not entitled to the benefit of a guilty plea, there was no evidence of remorse, and the impact on the complainant was likely to be long standing ([46]-[50]). However, the problem was not with the sentence but with the verdict. It was strange that the jury found that the evidence supported that there had been a ‘cutting of the neck’ but returned a verdict of not guilty of wounding. Nevertheless, the sentence was constrained by the jury’s finding of assault, not wounding. On that basis alone, the sentence was manifestly excessive ([50]-[52]). His Honour agreed with Crawford J that a sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment was appropriate.
Rice v McDonald [2000] TASSC 70 (21 June 2000) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Compulsion’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stealing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charges: Stealing, Making a false report to police
Appeal Type: Notice to review conviction
Facts: The applicant and her partner were in a domestic relationship riddled with violence. For a summary of the history of the violence against her, see paragraphs [4]-[10]. The applicant was charged with stealing a television. She entered into an agreement to rent the television under instructions from her partner, who then arranged for the television to be sold to a friend. He instructed the applicant to tell the purchaser that the television came from her sister. After the applicant did not report that the television was stolen to the police, her partner became very angry. As a result of fearing what her partner would do if she defied him, the applicant then reported the television was stolen to the police and the rental company. After the police located the television in the possession of the purchaser, the applicant fully admitted to the crime and protected her partner by providing a false name.
At trial, the applicant gave evidence that she had acted out of fear that she would suffer grievous bodily harm if she did not follow her partner’s demands to commit the offences. She alleged that her partner threatened to kill her if she did not accept full responsibility for the crime and provide a false name to police. That is, she established an evidentiary basis for the court to consider compulsion under s 20 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) (the Code) and duress at common law. The magistrate found that neither of those defences applied.
Issues:
1.
Whether the magistrate erred by applying the provisions of the Code governing criminal responsibility to the charge of making a false report.
2.
Whether the magistrate made legal errors in applying the defences of duress and compulsion.
3.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to sufficiently consider the evidence of a psychologist with extensive experience in domestic violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues 2 and 3.
1.
The respondent conceded that this ground was made out. One difference between the common law defence of compulsion and the statutory defence is that it is not necessary for the person making the threat to be present at the time the offence is committed. The applicant was entitled to the benefit of the common law defence. However, this was not sufficient to overturn the conviction because the magistrate was satisfied that the prosecution proved that the applicant was not acting under duress.
2.
The magistrate concluded that the applicant’s contention that her partner would ‘bash the hell out of me’ contained a qualification and because of a slight hesitation in her response, she had not given credible evidence that she was threatened with serious violence. The Court disagreed, holding that given the history of violence, the words ‘bash the hell out of me’ amounted to a clear threat of serious harm.
In referring to the requirement of immediacy under s 20 of the Code, the magistrate concluded that her partner’s threat would not be carried out immediately because of the presence of the purchaser of the television. The Court disagreed, holding that immediacy does not mean that the threat will be carried out at the time of compliance or refusal, but that it is ‘proximate’ to the making of the threat. It requires that the person coerced ‘believes that such threats will be executed’ at the time when the person making the threats is able to carry them out. The magistrate also erred in concluding that the applicant could not have believed the threats could be carried out immediately. Given the history of violence, she was entitled to believe that the threats would be carried out immediately. In relation to seeking the protection of the purchaser, the Court held that this proposition ‘defies logic and experience’ ([25]). The magistrate did not sufficiently take into account the history of the relationship in determining the conduct said to give rise to compulsion. Her partner had complete domination over her and had assaulted her in a refuge. The false report was made at the direction of her partner in the face of explicit and implicit threats. While she theoretically could have made a complaint to the officer about her partner when she filed the report, the option of applying for a restraining order was not consistent with complying with the threats.
3.
The magistrate concluded that the psychologist’s evidence did not assist the defence in establishing duress and compulsion. This amounted to an error and the magistrate was required at least to consider the psychologist’s evidence and the history of violence in determining whether the applicant acted under duress or compulsion.
Magistrates' Court
Police v H [2021] TASMC 13 (22 December 2021) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Breach of police family violence order x 3.
Proceedings: Reasons for decision.
Issues: Whether text messages sent by the defendant fell within an exception to the non-contact condition of the police family violence order; the accused’s guilt.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married for 14 years and had two children. After the couple separated, the defendant was subject to a protection order that prohibited contact with the victim ‘except… for the purpose of discussing matters arising out of their relationship including related to their children by… electronic message’ [1]. The defendant was charged with breaching the order by sending three text messages to the victim. The messages invited the victim to the defendant’s house and made a statement about the parties’ relationship and children [28], [32], [36].
Decision and Reasoning: Two of the three messages constituted a breach of the order.
Magistrate Stanton outlined his approach to construing the order: ‘the construction of the clause should be what a reasonable person in the circumstances of the person bound by the order would understand the words to mean’, while ‘considering the context of the exception within the entire order’ [8]-[9]. His Honour found that the ‘intention of the order [was] to keep the parties physically separate and to prevent communication generally while allowing limited communication’ that was for the purpose of discussing matters arising out of their relationship [11], [18]. His Honour found that the text messages that invited the victim to the defendant’s house were invitations ‘to engage in an activity which would otherwise be prohibited by the order’, and ‘not solely a discussion about matters arising out of the relationship’ [31]. Therefore, these messages breached the order. His Honour found that the statement about the parties’ relationship and children, which read: ‘You may hate me but I know my kids love me’, was sent during a discussion between the parties about matters related to the children and arising out of the relationship [33]-[35]. Therefore, the message fell within the exception and did not breach the order.
Purton v Purton [2016] TASMC 9 (19 October 2016) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘Procedure’ – ‘Protection orders’
Case type: Directions in relation to application to revoke a Police Family Violence Order (‘PFVO’).
Facts: The applicant was served with a PFVO. It stated that the Sergeant was satisfied that the applicant had committed a family violence offence but did not explain why the order was made ([9]). The applicant applied to revoke the order ([10]).
Issues: The parties sought directions in relation to the nature of the application to revoke, the manner in which such an order should be made, and which party bears the onus of proof ([29]).
Decision and Reasoning: Magistrate McKee explained the procedure for challenging a PFVO. The application is not an appeal, nor an administrative review ([40]). It is an application for the court to exercise a discretion to revoke a PFVO ([41]).
The onus of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that it is appropriate to revoke the PFVO ([24]). Since the applicant is unaware of the basis upon which the order was made, the respondents (the police) would have to lead evidence to establish that the applicant committed the offence ([50]).
However, if the police applied to revoke or extend the PFVO, the onus of proof would lie on them ([56]).
McKenna v Smith [2014] TASMC 11 (27 March 2014) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’ – ‘Wilfully and unlawful destroying or damaging property’
Charges: Damaging property (3 counts), Breach of police family violence order (2 counts), Assault
Facts: At 2.30pm on 14 July 2013, the defendant smashed the windscreen of her former de facto partner’s car. Her former partner saw the incident occur and reported it to the police. A short time later, the defendant went to the police station and said she had smashed the windscreen of a car. At 5.45pm, a police officer who had attended the premises of the defendant’s former partner, made and served upon the defendant a police family violence order.
In breach of the police family violence order, at 8.00pm, the defendant again went to her former partner’s house. She began to abuse her former partner and his current partner. She threatened them both and at one point pushed the current partner of her ex-partner. Before leaving, she smashed the panels of her former partner’s car. The incident was reported immediately to police and the defendant was placed under arrest. She resisted arrest, kicking and screaming. This conduct continued at the police station.
The magistrate was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the acts.
Issues:
1.
Whether the police family violence order was not validly made because:
◦
it was not made by a police officer of the rank of sergeant or above; and/or
◦
the officer who made the order was not satisfied, or the evidence available to him was not sufficient to satisfy him, that the defendant had committed or was likely to commit a family violence offence.
2.
Whether the defendant was not criminally responsible for any of the acts charged having regard to her mental illness and the provisions of s 16 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas).
Decision and Reasoning: The magistrate rejected defence counsel’s submissions in relation to the first issue (the validity of the family violence protection order) but upheld submissions in relation to the second issue (insanity).
1.
The police family violence order was validly made because the police officer was acting in the rank of sergeant at the time the order was made. The magistrate also rejected counsel submissions in relation to the second limb of the argument. These submissions amounted to a collateral challenge to the validity of the police family violence order. A collateral challenge is a challenge to the validity of an order in proceedings where the existence of the order is an element of the offence (not in proceedings to review or set aside the order). The legislation did not permit collateral challenge at least on the basis alleged here i.e. whether the factual basis of the order was sufficient ([26]-[30]). However, even if collateral challenge were available, the ground would not succeed because there was sufficient evidence to support the making of a police family violence order ([19]-[21], [31]).
2.
The defendant was not criminally responsible for any of the acts contained in each charge. On the balance of probabilities the defendant was deprived of the capacity of knowing whether the acts that she performed in respect of each charge were ones that she ought not to do because of her mental illness, i.e. the Bipolar Disorder that resulted in her entering into a hypomanic or manic state. The defendant clearly knew what she was doing but was not able to rationally think about her actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure. This was because of the impact of her mental illness.
Howe v S [2013] TASMC 33 (29 July 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Charge particulars’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Guilty plea - withdrawal’ – ‘Protection order’
Charge: Breach of a police family violence order (3 counts)
Proceeding: Application for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty in respect of each charge and substitute a plea of not guilty
Facts: On 4 May 2012, a police family violence order was made against the male defendant that included the following order: ‘you must not directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault J’. It was alleged that the defendant contravened this order by harassing the female protected person (‘J’). The defendant demanded that the protected person spend the night with him. The defendant threatened to take her child away if she refused to do so. In relation to pending family law court proceedings, the defendant also stated, ‘if you take this to court, things will get vicious and you know what happens when things get vicious. So it’s up to you. Either come and meet me tonight at the house or we will be enemies’ (count 1). This conduct also amounted to a breach of s 9 (emotional abuse or intimidation) of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (count 3). The police family violence order included an order that, ‘you must not approach (J) directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault; by telephone, email, facsimile or letter’ [sic]. It was alleged that the defendant contravened this order by approaching the protected person on numerous times by text messages (count 2).
The defendant pleaded guilty because of advice from his lawyer. He obtained new legal representation and they advised him to lodge an application for leave to withdraw the guilty pleas. His counsel submitted that leave ought to be granted because the particulars alleged of the complaint were insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the allegation contained in each charge. It would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the guilty pleas to stand.
Issue: Whether leave should be granted to withdraw the pleas of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to withdraw the guilty plea was allowed in respect of counts 2 and 3 but refused in respect of count 1. In relation to count 2, a miscarriage of justice would result if the guilty plea was allowed to stand. The particulars of the charge alleged the defendant approached the complainant on numerous undefined occasions by use of text messages. This breached the requirements of the Justices Act because the prosecution failed to set out each matter of complaint in separate numbered paragraphs and because the prosecution failed to provide particulars by which to identify the text messages said to constitute breach. The ‘rolling up’ of charges meant that the defendant had no real understanding as to what approach and which text message/s constituted the offence. It was impossible to determine what exactly he admitted to in the plea of guilty ([17]-[18]).
Leave was also granted in respect of count 3. The magistrate held that ‘the mental element required to amount to a breach of s 9 is that the defendant knew or ought to know that the course of conduct in which he was engaging is “likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating, or causing mental harm, apprehension or fear in his spouse or partner”. This is not what has been alleged. That he knew or should have known that his conduct was “likely to have the effect of abusing or intimidating” his partner, is a different mental element from that referred to in the section’ ([23]).
However, the guilty plea was held to stand in relation to count 1. Counsel for the defence submitted that a person could not be ‘harassed’, as a matter of law, by one act alone. The magistrate concluded that, ‘Whilst I accept that the term “harass” as used in the general community could well include an element of persistence or repetition, I see no reason why a person cannot be harassed within the context of a Family Violence Order, by one act alone. This view is in fact consistent with the definition in s.4 of the Family Violence Act of the word “harassing” … The reference in the definition to “any one or more of the following actions” suggests that a single act might be sufficient. Furthermore, it is appropriate, in my view, to interpret the term having regard to the context in which it is used in the order. The reference to “threaten, harass, abuse or assault” suggests that the order is to be understood as providing protection to a person from contact with the respondent which is unwelcome, and might be in various forms or have variable effect’ ([12]-[16]).
Kerr v Brown [2013] TASMC 30 (8 July 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’
Charge: Breach of family violence order (FVO)
Facts: A family violence order (FVO) was made in favour of the protected person that prohibited the defendant from approaching the protected person directly or indirectly. After the order was made, she phoned the defendant and caught a bus to Hobart where he was residing and commenced residing at his property.
The defendant submitted that he never approached the protected person, notwithstanding the fact that when she approached him, he allowed her to remain living at his home. The prosecutor submitted that the order should be interpreted to mean that the defendant was not permitted to allow the protected person to come into his presence, and that if she did, he must immediately leave her presence.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the offence charged.
Decision and Reasoning: The charge was dismissed. ‘Clearly the intention of the order is to prevent the respondent from coming near or initiating communication with the person to be protected. However, my impression is that police, and perhaps courts, view the condition as a primary mechanism for keeping persons apart in cases where family violence has been alleged or perpetrated, and may well consider the order to have the more extensive effect contended for by the prosecution in this case.’ ([5]). The ordinary meaning of ‘approach’ in the context of the FVO is that a person should not intentionally contact or bring themselves into the presence of the protected person. The order should be interpreted in a way that it would be understood by persons in the position of the defendant without legal training and of limited education: ‘The defendant cannot, in my view, be said to have approached (the protected person) by simply allowing her into the house, even for an extended stay, once she was there. To hold otherwise would be to give the word an extended meaning which is beyond its ordinary common meaning.’
Lusted v MRB [2013] TASMC 9 (19 February 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uncooperative witness’
Charge: Assault (6 counts)
Facts: The alleged assaults involved the defendant grabbing, pushing, striking, punching and pinching the complainant. One count involved the defendant grabbing her throat and pinning her against a table. Another involved pushing hot chicken into her face, grabbing hold of her by the chest and pouring cold water over her head ([17]-[28]). The complainant’s relationship with the defendant started when she was 15 and lasted for about 6 years. The prosecution’s evidence indicated that the defendant was controlling and violent towards the complainant throughout their relationship. The complainant was socially isolated and the defendant prevented her from contacting friends. He demanded that she wait on him and would strangle and abuse her if she did not comply with his demands. On one occasion, he threw a bottle at her. For further detail of the ‘uncharged acts’, see paragraphs [8]-[16]. There was one child of the relationship. The infant daughter witnessed two of the assaults.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the charged offences.
Decision and Reasoning: The charges were dismissed.
The prosecution adduced various circumstantial evidence from other witnesses ([29]-[42]). This included evidence of witnesses who noticed that the complainant had various physical injuries. The prosecution also sought to adduce evidence of the defendant’s tendency to engage in violent conduct against the complainant. Magistrate Pearse admitted this evidence on the basis that it had substantial probative value because it could be inferred that the relationship involved violent and controlling behaviour. The danger of unfair prejudice posed by the evidence was low, particularly in circumstances where no jury was involved. The prosecution also sought to adduce relationship evidence relating to uncharged conduct. This evidence was also admitted on the basis that it removed the implausibility of the assault being isolated. It also supported the assertion that the defendant exercised dominance and control and that the complainant feared the defendant.
This case involved serious and prolonged domestic violence. However, the complainant had not been entirely truthful about the relationship and her evidence was inconsistent with her parents’. She had discussed the possibility of ending the relationship with her parents and decided to leave him at the urgings of her mother once her father returned to town. However, on the day she decided to leave the defendant, she decided to return to him because he seemed remorseful and he offered to buy her dinner. As such, given the gravity of the conduct that was the subject of the complaint, the magistrate found it difficult to believe that the fear of what might happen in her father’s absence was a plausible explanation for her not leaving him. While the magistrate acknowledged that other explanations such as the fact that she may have become conditioned to such behaviour could be relevant, her account was doubted. There were no photographs, medical reports, phone records or other corroborating evidence. As such, the complaints were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The magistrate nonetheless emphasised the widespread scale and seriousness of family violence. ‘It is a significant social problem, of concern to the community and the justice system. The parliament saw fit to enact legislation, the Family Violence Act 2004, expressly to “provide for an integrated criminal justice response to family violence which promotes the safety of people affected by family violence”. The nature of family violence is that it is difficult to detect and prosecute. It is frequently the case that offences are committed in private and with little or no independent corroborative evidence. Moreover, family violence offences are often characterised by reluctance on the part of the victim to assist in the prosecution of offences. That is so for a range of factors including fear and a wish to preserve relationships, even dysfunctional ones, for the sake of loyalty, affection, companionship, economic and domestic support and in the perceived interest of children. Sometimes those motivations are misguided but persist nevertheless. As a consequence of such factors victims sometimes act in a way that seems to an outside observer to be incongruous and difficult to understand, including by failing to complain about, or hiding or lying about violence directed at them. Even if victims are willing to give evidence then the success of prosecutions depends principally on credibility of the uncorroborated account of the victim, a factor often taken advantage of by perpetrators and further adding to the reluctance of victims to complain.’ ([68]).
K v K [2012] TASMC 3 (25 January 2012) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - suicide threat’
Proceeding: Application for revocation of an interim family violence order (IFVO)
Facts: A police family violence order was made against the applicant, which prohibited him from threatening, assaulting or approaching his wife. The order was made on the basis that the police officer was satisfied that family violence was likely to be committed. The applicant and his wife had separated. An argument occurred about the contents of their house but the applicant claimed he was not aggressive and did not threaten or abuse the complainant or threaten to harm himself. He claimed that when he was wheeling a motorbike out of the house, she stepped in front of it to prevent him from taking it and the bike struck her legs which caused her to fall. The complainant claimed that when the applicant attended her home to collect belongings, he was volatile and aggressive and threatened to shoot himself with guns kept on their property. She did not specify what words amounted to these threats or abuse. She claimed he pushed the motorbike against her.
Issue: Whether the order should be revoked.
Decisions and Reasoning: The order was revoked.
A police family violence order cannot be issued only on the basis that the officer believes family violence has been committed. Rather, the officer must be satisfied that a family violence offence has been or is likely to be committed. This is because the definition of family violence includes acts that may not amount to a family violence offence within the meaning of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas).
The protected person’s evidence was not corroborated. Family breakdowns can be traumatic so each party tends to perceive events influenced by their own interests. The only way an order could be made would be by proving that the applicant engaged in threats, intimidation, verbal abuse or a course of conduct that amounted to emotional abuse and intimidation. Alternatively, an order could have been made if an assault by pushing the motorbike was proven. Such conduct was not proven: ‘It is difficult to characterise or define what words may amount to threats, intimidation or abuse. The same words may in some circumstances amount to a threat or abuse when in other circumstances they may not. Much depends on the background and the context. In some circumstances even the most seemingly innocent words may be highly intimidatory. The court should consider whether one of the parties is in a position of disadvantage, either physically, emotionally, intellectually, socially or economically’ ([29]). The applicant was more credible as a witness than the complainant and the complainant would not be in a position of disadvantage in an exchange with her husband. She demonstrated throughout the course of the hearing that she was capable of protecting her own interests and it was unlikely that she would have felt threatened, coerced or intimidated. She also likely prevailed in the arguments about property and she likely overstated her evidence to paint the applicant in the worst light.
Buxton v Brinckman [2011] TASMC (21 July 2011) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail – interim family violence order’ – ‘Breach of temporary protection order’ – ‘Inconsistency’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of interim family violence order
Proceeding: Reasons for decision
Facts: An interim family violence order (IFVO) was made against the defendant that prohibited him from entering the premises of the protected persons. The defendant was living with his parents. The agreed facts established that one of the protected persons started living at his parents’ address as well. In breach of the order, the defendant continued to live in his parents’ house. However, at the relevant time the defendant was on bail. One of the conditions of the bail order was that he was to reside at his parents’ house.
The magistrate found that the elements of the offence were proven. The defendant submitted that given that he was obliged to reside at his parents’ house by the bail conditions, this relieved him of criminal responsibility for the breach of the IFVO. That is, because the failure to live at his parents’ premises would amount to a breach of bail, this should excuse the breach of the IFVO.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the offence charged.
Decision and Reasoning: While there may be some circumstances where a person might claim a defence of breaching a statutory obligation on the basis that some other law compels the breach, this was not the situation in this case. Section 6 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (the Act) provides that the Act prevails to the extent of any inconsistency with another act. The Court acknowledged that the defendant’s parents made it impossible for him to comply with the bail condition without breaching the IFVO. However, the defendant could have applied for a variation of bail. In the interim period before bringing that matter before the court, the breach of bail may have been excused on the grounds of ‘reasonable cause’. As such, he was not relieved of criminal responsibility for breaching the IFVO.
Victoria
Court of Appeal
Qayyum v The King [2025] VSCA 14 (20 February 2025) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘attempting to pervert the course of justice’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Charge: Attempt to pervert the course of justice (committed in a family violence context) (x1).
Facts: The applicant, Jawad Qayyum, pleaded guilty to attempting to pervert the course of justice and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year.
The subject offending arose in the context of a series of family violence charges brought against the applicant by his wife, HB. While on remand for those charges in February 2021, Qayyum made multiple monitored telephone calls from Ravenhall Detention Centre to his brother Bilal. In these calls, the applicant instructed Bilal to pressure FM, a close friend of HB, to provide a false statement to police regarding the applicant’s relationship with his wife and her mental state. The applicant specifically directed Bilal to tell FM not to mention any “arguments” between himself and HB and to avoid any reference to beatings or her observations of physical violence. Over a three-week period in February 2021, Bilal, in accordance with these instructions, contacted FM by phone and text message, urging her to provide a statement favourable to the applicant. FM ultimately made a statement to police in March 2021, in which she described both her knowledge of the relationship between the applicant and HB, including regular arguments and repeated violence and Bilal’s attempts to pressure her into altering her account.
The applicant’s conduct was part of a broader pattern of family violence and manipulative behaviour. In April 2016, the applicant had previously been charged with recklessly causing injury and unlawful assault of HB, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour undertaking and fined $1,000. In August 2020, HB reported to police that the applicant had assaulted their daughter Z, resulting in a family violence safety notice and a Family Violence Intervention Order naming both HB and Z as protected persons. HB subsequently suffered a mental health episode and was diagnosed with PTSD, disclosing to treating doctors a longstanding history of weekly physical beatings, mental abuse, threats of violence and coercion by the applicant, including efforts to create a false record of her mental illness. Between September and November 2020, the applicant repeatedly contravened the terms of the intervention order by covertly attempting to influence Z during supervised contact, whispering instructions to her about what to say to authorities and asking her about her disclosures to child protection. He was ultimately arrested and charged with further offences including assault, intentionally causing injury, persistent contravention of the intervention order and committing an indictable offence whilst on bail. After his bail was revoked, he was remanded in custody pending trial. During this remand period, the applicant made the monitored phone calls that formed the basis for the present offence.
On 19 May 2021, the applicant pleaded guilty to the family violence offences and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and a 12-month Community Correction Order, including requirements to participate in behaviour change and anger management programs. Upon his release from prison in August 2021, the applicant was immediately placed in immigration detention and was released in December 2021. In March 2022, he was charged with the present offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, to which he ultimately pleaded guilty after his trial had commenced and the jury was discharged.
Grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: the judge amended the factual basis of the plea beyond the terms of the plea indictment and the prosecution opening (procedural fairness).
Ground 2: the sentencing judge overstated the objective gravity of the applicant’s offending (objective gravity).
Decision: The Court of Appeal (Emerton P and J Forrest AJA) refused leave to appeal the sentence on both grounds.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The applicant argued that the judge sentenced him on an aggravated factual basis, specifically FM’s observations of marks consistent with violence and the applicant’s admissions to FM about beatings, when these matters were not referred to in the indictment or prosecution opening [69-70]. He claimed that he was not notified that he would be sentenced on this basis and that this amounted to a denial of procedural fairness [72].
The Court rejected this submission. Referring to R v Lowe [72], the Court explained there is no rigid rule requiring a sentencing judge to confine themselves strictly to the facts in the indictment or prosecution opening [74]. Instead, the test is whether, in all the circumstances, fairness dictates that disclosure of any additional material be made before sentencing. The authorities emphasise the importance of context in determining whether a judge may rely on certain material [76]. For example, as noted in R v Healey and R v Mielicki, procedural fairness may require the judge to alert counsel if they intend to rely on disputed or aggravating facts not previously disclosed [76]. Further, as set out in R v Formosa [77], the Crown opening and depositions typically provide the factual basis for sentence, and any additional matters must be raised by the parties and proved by admissible evidence. Critically, a sentencing judge cannot take adverse facts into account unless they are established beyond reasonable doubt [77].
In this case, FM’s statement (part of the depositions) clearly included both the applicant’s admissions and FM’s observations of violence [80], and the amended prosecution opening expressly referred to the applicant instructing Bilal that FM should not mention beatings [81]. The applicant and his counsel were provided with all relevant materials, including FM’s statement and the call transcripts and could have been under no illusion as to the scope of the case. The exchange during the plea hearing further confirmed that both “arguments” and “beatings” were at issue, and no objection was raised at the time [82]. The Court was satisfied that the applicant and his counsel must have been aware that sentencing would proceed on the basis of FM’s evidence about violence [83–86]. There was, accordingly, no denial of procedural fairness [87]. This ground failed [88].
Grounds 2: The applicant submitted that whilst the judge did not explicitly state the level of objective gravity of the applicant’s offending, her reasons nevertheless enabled a conclusion that she regarded the objective gravity of the offending as ‘relatively high’ [89].
He contended that the absence of threats or direct violence and the fact that the conduct was directed at a witness (FM) rather than the victim herself, placed the offending towards the lower end [90]. The applicant relied on various authorities involving attempts to pervert the course of justice in family violence contexts, arguing such cases are more serious when the pressure is exerted on the primary victim, not a witness [91].
The Court accepted that the judge did not make an explicit finding as to the level of seriousness but found that her Honour’s reasons overall conveyed the impression that the offending was treated as serious [93-94]. However, the Court rejected the submission that the absence of threats or the fact that FM was a witness diminished the seriousness [95]. The Court held that the judge was entitled to regard the offending as grave, having regard to a range of relevant factors, including the inherent seriousness of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the family violence context, the attempt to undermine HB and Z’s protection under the law, the emotional pressure and fear imposed on FM and the calculated, persistent and manipulative nature of the conduct [95].
The Court reiterated established authority that an attempt to pervert the course of justice in a family violence context is “always a grave matter” [96]. None of the authorities relied on by the applicant supported a lower assessment of gravity [97]. The absence of threats of physical violence or the fact the conduct was directed towards a close personal friend of the victim and not the victim herself, does not ameliorate the objective seriousness of the conduct; sentencing must be based on what actually occurred, not what might have aggravated the offending further [98-99]. Even though the conduct was not directed at the primary victim, the effect on FM and the indirect retraumatisation of HB, supported the judge’s approach [100].
The Court concluded there was no error in the judge’s assessment of seriousness. This ground of appeal failed [101].
Fusca v The King [2024] VSCA 297 (3 December 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘systems abuse’ – ‘influencing a witness’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charge:
Charge 1: intentionally causing injury (x1)
Charge 2: theft (x1)
Charge 3: attempt to pervert the course of justice (x1)
Charge 4: persistent contravention of family violence intervention order (x1)
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in an intimate relationship for approximately four months and lived together at the time of the offending. On the evening of 30 June 2023, the applicant and the complainant were at home with Mr Malloy (the owner of the unit they were living in). After drinking heavily and arguing throughout the evening, the applicant left the unit with the complainant’s phone. The complainant used Mr Malloy’s phone to call a friend for help. When the applicant returned, he checked the call log on Mr Malloy’s phone and believed the complainant had called her ex-partner. He then assaulted the complainant, smacking her face, dragging her back inside by the hair as she tried to escape, throwing her onto a bed, yelling abuse, inserting his fingers into her throat and blocking her airway and hitting her until she lost consciousness. The assault caused significant injuries, including facial bruising, jaw swelling, a lacerated uvula, a dislocated jaw and floating bone requiring surgery.
The next morning, the complainant discovered $400 had been transferred to the applicant using her mobile phone at 3:00 am, described as “rent.” She did not have access to her phone overnight and was not awake at the time. Later that day, she reported the assault to police and was hospitalised. The applicant was arrested on 1 July 2023 and remanded in custody, an interim family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) was made prohibiting contact with the complainant.
Between 14 and 19 July 2023, the applicant called Mr Malloy from prison six times, asking him to alter or withdraw his statement, offering inducements and suggesting what to say. Mr Malloy, fearing harm, reported the calls to police. Between 10 July and 7 August 2023, the applicant also used associates to contact the complainant, breaching the FVIO, with messages expressing affection and intent to return. He admitted arranging at least one of these contacts. The applicant pleaded guilty to all charges in November 2023, before the second committal case conference.
Grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: The sentence and order for cumulation on charge 3 of attempting to pervert the course of justice is manifestly excessive.
Ground 2: The sentence and order for cumulation on charge [2] of theft is manifestly excessive.
Decision: The Court (Walker and T Forrest JJA) refused leave to appeal on both grounds.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: Ground 1 was that the sentence imposed for attempting to pervert the course of justice and the cumulation for that offence, were manifestly excessive [42]. The Court noted the test for manifest excessiveness was stringent and found it was not satisfied [42]. Attempting to pervert the course of justice is objectively serious, carrying a maximum of 25 years, and the judge had correctly referenced R v Oksuz [2015] VSCA 316, where a 6-month sentence was found manifestly inadequate [43]. The judge had also observed that he seriousness of the underlying offence the applicant sought to avoid was relevant, and that sentences of between 2 and 4 years have regularly been imposed for such offending [44]. On appeal, the Court stated that little benefit is to be gained from arguments pointing to the absence of aggravating features. Instead, sentencing judges are required to assess the objective gravity and moral culpability based on what actually occurred and the absence of aggravating factors does not reduce that gravity [45].
The Court rejected the applicant’s submission that the offending lacked aggravating features, accepting that the offending was persistent over a relatively extended period of five days and was calculated, involving repeated attempts to persuade Mr Malloy to alter his statement, including suggestions as to what to say and offering inducements [46-48]. Although the offending may have been unsophisticated, it was nonetheless serious and involved high moral culpability [49]. The judge took into account all mitigating and personal factors, but none was of such significance as to compel the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive [50].
In relation to comparable cases, the Court found the sentence imposed to be consistent with current sentencing practice [51]. The Court also found that the cumulation was not manifestly excessive, as the offending involved separate criminality from the intentionally causing injury charge [54]. The offending had important effects on the administration of justice, and general deterrence required a substantial sentence [55]. The Court concluded that more than a minimal degree of cumulation was warranted and that the cumulation of eight months was within range [56]. Leave to appeal on ground 1 was refused [57].
Grounds 2: The Court considered that the sentence imposed for theft was within the range open to the judge in the circumstances [62]. It was necessary and appropriate to consider the full context of the offending, not just the amount stolen or the method used [62]. The victim was vulnerable, having recently been subjected to a serious assault by the applicant in a context of family violence [62]. The applicant took advantage of her unconscious state to transfer money from her account using her phone. The judge was correct to conclude this was a “not insignificant” example of theft [62]. The applicant also had a relevant prior criminal history for theft and at the time of the offending, was subject to a community correction order for related offences. He was in breach of that order by committing further offences, including those before the Court [63]. The judge was entitled to regard the applicant’s failure to comply with the order as significant for specific deterrence and in assessing rehabilitation prospects [64]. The cumulation of one month was moderate and not outside the range, as the offending involved distinct criminality and warranted a distinct sentence [65]. For these reasons, leave to appeal on ground 2 was refused [66].
Payne v The King [2024] VSCA 273 (20 November 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Admissibility of VARE and special hearing evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Unfair prejudice’ – ‘Substantial miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Prosecution submissions to jury’ – ‘Intellectual disability’ – ‘victims as alleged perpetrators’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence to appeal against conviction.
Charge: Murder x 1.
Facts: The applicant and Noel Payne were married, and were living in their family home with Alice, a woman with an intellectual disability and an acquired brain injury, whom Noel had moved into the home. Both the applicant and Alice were subject to serious and prolonged abuse by Noel. One day, the applicant made biscuits. She crushed temazepam tablets (which had been prescribed to her for insomnia) into the icing of one of the biscuits, which she then gave to Noel. Later that day, Noel fell into unconsciousness. On the applicant’s account, she found Noel slumped at his computer and, unable to detect a pulse, concluded he had died. She wrapped Noel’s body in a blanket and moved him outside into an unused freezer. After asking her neighbour to store the freezer on the neighbour’s property, the neighbour’s son discovered the body.
Grounds of appeal: In respect of the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the applicant relied on two grounds. The first was that the evidence of Alice should not have been admitted at trial, and that its admission had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. The second was that a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred because of submissions made during the prosecutor’s closing address. In respect of the application for leave to appeal against sentence, the ground relied upon was that the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The application for leave to appeal against conviction was dismissed; the application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.
In respect of the first ground relied upon in the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the Court observed that the trial judge’s task had been to determine whether Alice’s evidence was relevant. The Court accepted that some evidence could be so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous such that it could not be accepted by a rational jury, and that the trial judge would be expected to withhold such evidence on the basis of irrelevance [53]. Alice’s account of what had happened on the night in question had changed over time. At first, she gave a detailed account of the applicant and deceased’s activities on the night in question, but at a later hearing, she attributed her earlier evidence to guesswork and claimed to have witnessed little of the night [40]. The Court held that it was for the jury to decide whether to accept the truth of the evidence, and the weight to be given to it. The Court further found that Alice had confirmed the truth of her initial VARE evidence at a special hearing, and that her evidence was corroborated by other evidence, meaning that this was not a case where the evidence could not be rationally accepted [55]. The Court ruled the evidence relevant, and therefore admissible.
In respect of the second ground relied upon in the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the Court found for the respondent on all of the seven criticisms of the prosecution case the applicant had made. In brief, the Court’s findings were that:
•
the prosecution had not inappropriately enlarged the Crown case [72];
•
the prosecution was entitled to suggest to the jury reasons for the inconsistencies in Alice’s evidence and propose how they should resolve these [76];
•
the prosecution was entitled to offer their own possible quantification of the dose of temazepam that was consistent with the expert evidence given at trial [83];
•
the prosecution was entitled to say that it was a matter of speculation whether Noel Payne had died as a result of positional asphyxia while sitting at his computer [90];
•
the prosecution did not reverse the onus of proof when the prosecutor said to the jury that the applicant was “asking you to accept” her account [95];
•
the prosecution was entitled to submit on the issue of family violence – while the prosecutor should have refrained from using the language of personal opinion, his submissions did not unfairly diminish the significance of the violence [102]; and
•
the prosecution was within bounds to pose a hypothetical situation of self-defence [106].
In respect of the appeal against sentence, the Court noted that the standard sentence for murder is 25 years. The sentence that had been given in this case was 16 years’ imprisonment (NB non-parole period is not specified). The Court explained that the case was one that called for mercy given the applicant had suffered over 10 years of serious abuse [137]. The Court cautioned, however, that these exceptional circumstances had to be balanced against the need to denounce and deter the deliberate taking of human life [122].
The Court noted that the applicant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter when she was arraigned at the commencement of trial, and that this showed her taking some responsibility for causing the death of the deceased [134]. Ultimately, the Court agreed that the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive, and substituted a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 years [138].
Clayton (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 203 (16 September 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘use of context evidence
Case type: Appeal of conviction.
Charges: The applicant faced multiple indictments across three trials:
Trial 1: common assault (x3); rape (x1), acquitted.
Trial 2: common assault (x3); rape (x1), guilty of common assault (x2) and rape (x1)
Trial 3: common assault (x3), make threat to kill (x2), intentionally cause injury (x1), alternative charge of recklessly cause injury (x1), applicant was acquitted of the charge of intentionally cause injury but found guilty of the remaining charges.
Further indictment: possession of a drug of dependence (x2) contravening bail conditions (x1) possessing a controlled weapon (x1) and possessing cartridge ammunition (x1), plead guilty to all.
Facts: The applicant, Robert Clayton (a pseudonym), was convicted at two County Court trials of offences arising from alleged acts of physical and sexual violence against his former partner, with whom he had an intimate relationship from late 2017 until November 2019. The complainant lived with the applicant at his mother’s property in regional Victoria for most of their relationship. In October 2019, she provided a statement to police alleging multiple incidents of family violence. She later gave birth to the applicant’s child in 2020.
Before the first trial, the prosecution sought to adduce both tendency and context evidence. The trial judge excluded the tendency evidence but ruled that the context evidence was admissible to explain the nature of the relationship and the complainant’s behaviour. This evidence included four alleged incidents of uncharged violence (the paddock, goose, pokies, and car-purchase occasions) and two sets of injury photographs, the right eye photos and the selfie black left eye photo. The applicant was acquitted of all charges at the first trial.
At the second trial, the complainant gave evidence of a 2018 incident in which the applicant allegedly pushed her into a wall, choked her, restrained her with cable ties, and raped her, causing injury and scarring. The prosecution again relied on the previously admitted context evidence. The complainant described the relationship as violent and controlling. The defence denied all allegations, asserting that any injuries were the result of consensual rough sex or drug use, and argued the complainant had fabricated the claims to obtain crisis accommodation.
At the third trial, the prosecution alleged that, in September 2019, following a dispute over missing money, the applicant punched the complainant, poured alcohol on her, trashed the room, threatened to kill her, stomped on her neck, and used a sharp object to cut her knee. Again, the prosecution relied on the same contextual material. The complainant reiterated that she remained in the relationship due to fear, dependence and emotional isolation. The defence contended that the relationship was not violent and highlighted inconsistencies in the complainant’s account and conduct.
On appeal, the applicant challenged the admission and use of context evidence at the second and third trials. He submitted that the complainant’s evidence went beyond the limits of the trial judge’s ruling and was unfairly prejudicial, particularly because the photographs were not linked to specific events. He further argued that the prosecution’s closing address improperly used the context material to suggest that uncharged acts corroborated the complainant’s credibility in relation to the charged offences.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his convictions sustained at the second and third trials.
1.
Excessive detail in context evidence: the trial judge erred by allowing the prosecution to lead context evidence in excessive detail, resulting in a miscarriage of justice across the course of the three trials.
2.
Improper use of context evidence to bolster credibility: the trial judge erred by allowing evidence admitted for context purposes to bolster the credibility of the complainant in the third trial.
Decision: The Court of Appeal (Boyce, Orr and T Forrest JJA) dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the applicant’s convictions of the second and third trials.
Reasoning:
Ground 1 (Excessive Detail in Context Evidence):
The applicant did not dispute the admissibility of the context evidence but argued that the detail with which it was presented made the trial unfair. This argument was rejected [130].
The Court found that the failure to seek edits to the complainant’s pre-recorded evidence was not due to any tacit approval from the judge but was instead a forensic decision made by defence counsel [130]. Given the acquittals at the first trial and the inconsistencies revealed within the context evidence, the defence appeared to have made a deliberate and reasonable strategic choice to attack the complainant’s credibility on the basis of her detailed testimony [131].
The Court emphasised the significance of the context evidence in providing a rational explanation for the complainant’s otherwise counter-intuitive behaviour, such as remaining in the relationship, expressing affection, and seeking to vary the intervention order [134]. Her claim that she had been “Stockholm’d” by the applicant required a proper evidential foundation. The prosecution largely succeeded in keeping the evidence appropriately confined, and further narrowing it would have risked making the explanation seem artificial or glib [134].
As for the photographic evidence, the right eye photos and the selfie black left eye photo, although the defence consistently sought exclusion, the Court accepted that it had legitimate forensic value, particularly in light of the complainant’s cross-examination [136]-[137]. The photos did not materially increase the level of detail but instead supported the existing narrative. Any marginal increase in detail was not sufficient to justify exclusion [138]. Finally, the Court emphasised the significance of the trial judge’s directions, which instructed the jury that the context evidence, including the photos, could only be used to assess the nature of the relationship and the complainant’s credibility, and not as proof of the charged offences. These directions substantially mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice [140].
Ground 2 (Improper use of context evidence to bolster credibility):
The applicant contended that the prosecutor’s closing addresses at the second and third trials engaged in an impermissible form of ‘bootstraps’ reasoning, that is, inviting the jury to accept the complainant’s account of the charged offences because her uncharged context evidence was corroborated [142]. While the written submissions focused on the third trial and oral argument emphasised the second, the Court assumed the same issue was raised in both [143].
The Court rejected this ground. It held that context evidence, if accepted, may legitimately enhance a complainant’s credibility. On reviewing the prosecutor’s closing addresses in full, the Court found that the submissions did not overstep. The prosecutor did not suggest that the complainant’s evidence of the charged offences should be accepted merely because her context evidence was independently supported [144]-[145]. Rather, the addresses pointed to points of support for both kinds of evidence, consistent with the structure of the trial and the judge’s directions.
The trial judge gave careful and repeated directions at both trials, instructing the jury that only independent evidence directly referable to the charged acts, such as the photograph of the scar in the second trial, could be used to support the complainant’s account of those acts [146]–[147]. Other supporting material, including photos or witness observations relating only to past uncharged conduct, could not be used to support proof of the charged offences. The judge expressly warned the jury against reasoning that truthfulness in context meant truthfulness in relation to the charges. As he stated in the third trial, “It is not a matter of saying look, she told the truth about that [context], therefore we accept her evidence about this [charged event].” [148].
The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s submissions stayed within legitimate bounds, the Judge’s directions were clear and comprehensive, and there was no real risk of jury confusion or misuse of the context evidence in the manner alleged [149]-[150].
Sturt (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 102 (20 May 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Separation ’ – ‘Evidence ’ – ‘Admission’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Jury directions’
Charges: Rape x 2; sexual assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male appellant was found guilty and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months’ imprisonment for the offences of rape and sexual assault. The complainant was the appellant’s wife.
At trial, the prosecution led evidence from the complainant that, following the second incident of rape, the appellant stated, “I shouldn’t have done that”. [5] Neither party made any request pursuant to the Jury Directions Act 2015 for a jury direction concerning the relevance or use of this statement.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant proposed five grounds of appeal, the second of which concerned the prosecution’s use of the appellant’s statement:
•
The learned Judge erred in failing to direct the jury not to engage in impermissible reasoning relating to the statement “I shouldn’t have done that” resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The Court (Macauley, Kaye and T Forrest JJA) held that it was mandatory for the trial judge to give the jury the direction required under s 21 of the Jury Directions Act 2015, irrespective of whether either party requested or failed to request it. [33] This is because the statement was ‘capable of being construed as an implied admission’, the prosecution sought to use the evidence to establish that the appellant ‘had no reasonable belief in the complainant’s consent’, and the jury’s acceptance of the admission on one occasion had the capacity to influence the jury’s view about the appellant’s belief about consent in all instances [30]–[32].
The omission of a jury direction was material: ‘Evidence as to the state of mind of the appellant was, apart from the impugned statement, entirely a matter of inference from the circumstances of and surrounding the events, in the context of the nature of the relationship between the parties’ [35]
Accordingly, the judge’s failure to direct the jury ‘deprived the appellant of a most significant mandatory safeguard in the context of the trial’ [37]
Dragovic v The King [2024] VSCA 95 (16 May 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Attempt to pervert court of justice ’ – ‘Damaging property ’ – ‘threats’
Charges: criminal damage x 1; common assault x 6; persistent contravention of protection order x 1; attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 28 November 2023, the male applicant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to all charged offences. The primary complainant was the applicant’s ‘on and off’ again intimate female partner. The applicant physically assaulted the complainant on several occasions (e.g., punching, kicking, and throwing her on multiple occasions).
The applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. The complainant sought a protection order against the applicant, prohibiting the applicant from contacting her. Two months later, the complainant sought to withdraw her complaint of assault(s) against the applicant, stating that the applicant had contacted her from prison and threatening her to ‘get rid’ of the case. [10]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on a single proposed ground:
•
The sentencing Judge erred in imposing a sentence in respect of charges 2–7 (common assault) and making orders for cumulation in respect of the remaining offences, that was manifestly excessive having regard to all relevant circumstances.[3]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (Kennedy and T Forrest JJA) held the aggregated sentence of 16 months’ for the common assault charges was not manifestly excessive. The Court emphasised the inherent difficulty in establishing tis particular ground, and the aggravating fact of the assaults being committed against the applicant’s partner.
Any ground of manifest excess is difficult to establish. An applicant must demonstrate that the sentence or sentences imposed are ‘wholly outside the range of sentencing options available’ in the reasonable exercise of sentencing discretion [29]
[T]he applicant involved himself in serious violence against his intimate partner. Violence towards an intimate partner can never be justified but in this case, there seems little if any reason for this sustained course of violence. The applicant’s apparent grievance seems to be that the complainant, having cared for him during his illness, called an ambulance against his wishes. She then had the temerity to leave his presence for a few hours [31]
Those (mostly) men who elect to engage in violent activity within the home can expect little sympathy from sentencing courts [33]
Gardner (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 83 (30 April 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People with disability and impairment ’
Charges: false imprisonment x 1; rape x 4.
Proceedings: Application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male applicant was found guilty of one count of false imprisonment and four counts of rape. The victim was the male applicant’s long-term female partner of 18 years (although the par separated for a period of three years). [2]; [8] The offences occurred in one instance. The prosecution case was that the applicant restrained the complainant to the bed and penetrated her four times, all without consent. [2]
The primary evidence was given by the complainant, who was opined by a clinical neuropsychologist to have a tendency to ‘exaggerate and embellish’: a tendency exacerbated by the removal of a large tumour from the complainant’s brain in 2001. [4]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on two grounds:
•
The guilty verdicts were unreasonable or could not be supported by the available evidence; and
•
The guilty verdict pertaining to the charge of penile penetration was unreasonable, as the complainant’s evidence indicated uncertainty as to whether the applicant had in fact penetrated her anus [6]
Decision and Reasoning: Application dismissed. The Court (Emerton P, McLeish and Macaulay JA) held the complainant to be an ‘unreliable witness’ in many respects. [75]
The complainant was clearly ‘prone to embellishment’ and gave ‘conflicting evidence’ on the nature and extent of digital penetrations, such that an unreliable evidence direction under s 32 of the Jury Directions Act was appropriate. [76]
Despite these matters, the jury accepted the complainant’s evidence as ‘credible and reliable’. [79] Accordingly, the question is ‘whether the jury ought, acting rationally, to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of the applicant’s guilt, whether by reason of inconsistencies, discrepancies or other inadequacy[ies] in the complainant’s evidence’. [85]
The evidence of the clinical neuropsychologist might have suggested that the jury ought rationally to have doubted the applicant’s guilt. However, the Court did not accept that the jury have must have done so. [93] The jury did not have to accept the applicant’s account of consensual activity. Further, the evidence of the complainant was corroborated by medical evidence, concerning the nature of her injuries. [94]
Russo (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 40 (22 March 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Threat to kill ’ – ‘ Economic and financial abuse ’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence ’ – ‘ separation ’ – ‘ threats’
Charges: common assault x 9; causing injury intentionally x 3; conduct endangering persons x 1; threat to kill x 2; persistent contravention of protection order x 3.
Proceedings: Application to leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty in the County Court to several offences committed against his former wife. [1] The applicant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Over the course of their relationship (2012–2017), the applicant was physically violent to the complainant, and her son from a previous relationship. [5]–[6]
This violence persisted after the complainant sought a protection order against the complainant in 2014. The applicant assaulted the complainant after she communicated her decision to terminate the relationship and her pregnancy due to the ‘violent nature of the relationship’ and choked her on another occasion when she re-attempted to end the relationship. [7]–[8]. Further, while serving time in prison, the applicant contacted the complainant 281 times, with 100 calls involving ‘economic, electronic, financial and psychological and emotional abuse’. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on three grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in their approach to the issue of totality by failing to impose appropriate individual sentences;
•
The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to recognise that the applicant’s guilty plea was worthy of additional credit; and
•
The individual charges, total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
With respect to ground one, the Court (Niall and Boyce JJA) recognised a ‘broad brush’ approach by the sentencing judge in not drawing any ‘fine distinctions … to the imposition of individual sentences on each of the respective charges of common assault, intentionally causing injury and threat to kill’. [35]
Leaving aside whether distinctions in ‘months’ or ‘years’ were in fact made between the separate charges of intentionally causing injury, on the one hand, and the instances of make threat to kill on the other, in circumstances where there were only two instances each of these particular charges, it is difficult to conclude that the circumstances of those charges alone permitted … utilisation of the so-called broad-brush approach [41]
Accordingly, the Court held that a broad-brush approach was inappropriate in this case, with the applicant entitled to have ‘the sentencing discretion brought to bear properly upon each individual charge in the conventional manner’. [45]
With respect to ground two, the Court noted the applicant’s plea was late, indicated on the first morning of the trial after the Crown withdrew a charge of rape. [54] In this capacity, the plea had ‘all the hallmarks of a pragmatic decision taken by the applicant upon the Crown’s decision to withdraw’. [64] Accordingly, the Court dismissed ground two.
Lastly, with respect to ground three, the Court held that there was ‘no reasonable prospect’ that this Court would impose a lesser total effective sentence. [71] This view is informed by the fact that the case concerns family violence. [70]
Dhal v The King [2023] VSCA 289 (29 November 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Manifesttly excessive’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury ’ – ‘ Recklessly cause serious injury ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ Jealousy ’ – ‘ History of domestic and family violence ’ – ‘ separation’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; recklessly causing injury x 1; commit indictable offence whilst on bail x 1; possess a controlled weapon without lawful excuse x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to several offences perpetrated against his former female partner (‘Ms Malith’) and friend. In the days following the end of the relationship, the applicant assaulted Ms Malith and a friend in the gaming room of a hotel, swiping and stabbing both with a knife ([13]–[19]). The applicant received a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the offending was premeditated;
2.
The sentencing judge afforded insufficient weight to the applicant’s ‘deprived’ childhood; and
3.
The sentences imposed on the charges of intentionally causing serious injury, recklessly causing serious injury and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive [3]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Osborn and Whelan JJA) denied the applicant leave to appeal.
First, the Court upheld the trial judge’s assessment of the CCTV footage as making clear the applicant’s determination ‘to attack Ms Malith with knife as he entered the gaming room’ [43].
Second, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s application of the Bugmy principles. Childhood deprivation may reduce moral culpability, but it may also ‘bear upon the weight of other sentencing principles’, including the need for community protection [56]:
[T]his is a case where consideration of the applicant’s deprived background, and the effects of that background on his psychological make-up, particularly insofar as current and former intimate partners are concerned, significantly increases the need for community protection [58]
Lastly, the Court observed the original sentence as appropriate in light of the applicant’s limited prospects of rehabilitation, heightened risk of reoffending and history of violence towards intimate partners:
The evidence reveals he represents a significant risk of violence to intimate partners and former partners in the future. The applicant’s criminal history is more concerning than that in either Packard or Lukudu, particularly in relation to intimate partners and former partners, and he has repeatedly disobeyed intervention orders [66]
The fact that the victim was the former partner of the applicant, and the fact that the applicant has prior convictions for assaults on a partner or former partner, were significant. As this Court said in Smith v The Queen, male violence against women is a ‘scourge of our society’, and those who engage in it ‘should be in no doubt that offending of this kind will attract very heavy sentences’ [67]
The offending in this case visited horrific injuries on a 21-year-old former partner. The applicant was motivated by jealousy and revenge. He used a boning knife. As a result of his work as a butcher, he was familiar with the effect of the use of such a knife [68]
Harlen (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 269 (09 November 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal ’ – ‘ Rape’ – ‘Rendency evidence’ – ‘Stalking ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ control ’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the County Court concerning the admissibility of tendency evidence.
Facts: The applicant was charged with several offences, including stalking and rape, arising from ‘the breakdown’ of his relationship with the complainant ([9]–[19]). At pre-trial, the judge allowed the prosecution’s application to adduce tendency evidence to demonstrate the applicant’s willingness to engage in — or to actually engage in — verbal violence and physical violence towards the complainant (and another previous intimate partner) as a ‘means of control’ over them ([2]; [12]–[17]).
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant’s appeal was advanced on the ground that the judge erred in ruling the tendency evidence as disclosed in the ‘Tendency Notice’ was admissible [40]. In particular:
1.
The evidence did support the alleged tendency that the applicant’s alleged conduct was engaged in as ‘a means of control’ ([44]–[45])
2.
The evidence concerning a previous intimate partner was ‘irrelevant’ to the present proceedings ([43]); and
3.
The evidence was ‘not significantly probative’, and if it were, it did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect ([46]–[49])
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (McLeish, Niall and Kennedy JJA) emphasised that a consideration of the admissibility of tendency evidence (as governed by the principles of House v The King) is “fact specific” [69].
The conduct the subject of each charge involves verbal or physical violence undertaken in an effort to control Ms Abbott at the end of her relationship with the applicant during October 2020. We do not consider the concept of “control” lacks substance in this context where ethe conduct evinced a tendency to become threatening or violent so as to regain control during a relationship breakdown.
The evidence was not just relevant … but had a significant value in making more likely the facts making up the other charged offences [73]
The applicant’s tendency to engage in verbal and physical violence as to exercise control (in the non-rape charges) was clearly relevant to whether he might have also sought to manifest physical control, as alleged by the rape charges. His willingness to engage in such verbal and physical violence in the past was also highly relevant to whether he reasonably believed there was consent on the part of Ms Abbott [74]
The Court also upheld the trial judge’s admission of the evidence concerning the former intimate partner:
Although it is not a condition of admission that the tendency evidence have similarities with the conduct in issue, similarities can still have significance provided they are addressed in the manner Hughes requires. In this case, those similarities include that: both women were in an intimate relationship with the applicant which was breaking down; the applicant used aggressive behaviour in an effort to control each women; and threats were made to each woman and/or her family [79]
Headland v The King [2023] VSCA 269 (03 October 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Interlocutory Appeal ’ – ‘ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Admissions ’ – ‘ Victims as (alleged) perpetrators ’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal interlocutory decision.
Facts: The Applicant was allegedly complicit in an aggravated burglary committed by her former partner and his accomplice ([6]–[7]). In her record of interview with police, the applicant admitted that she drove her partner (and his accomplice) to the victim’s home and did not protest her involvement in the plan ‘because she still loved’ her former partner [14].
Prior to the empanelment of a jury, the applicant sought the exclusion of admissions contained in the record of interview [2]. The applicant submitted that the truth of any admission made was ‘adversely affected’ by her illicit substance abuse and intoxication in the lead up to, and at the time of, the interview, her cognitive disfunction, Aboriginality and experience of domestic violence [24]. The judge refused this application.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appeals the decision via one ground:
1.
When exercising discretion under sections 85 and 90 of the Evidence Act, the judge failed to take into account the applicant’s status as an ‘Aboriginal woman who has been a victim of domestic abuse’ ([4]; [29]–[30])
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (Emerton P, Priest and Kennedy JJA) affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that the truth of the admissions was not adversely affected by the circumstances in which the admissions were made [57].
In our opinion, there was nothing in the evidence in this case which would have justified a finding that the applicant was at a disadvantage or was vulnerable by reason of a lack of comprehension of English or for cultural reasons. English was her primary language, and there was nothing in the evidence which might have founded an inference that the applicant might have answered questions “in the way in which they think the questioner wants” [63]
Indeed, having viewed the record of interview ourselves, it is far from obvious to us that the applicant’s cognition is impaired, whether through alcohol consumption, drug use or fatigue (or a combination of factors)’ [71]
Skeates (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 226 (19 September 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence ’ – ‘ Threats’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Beach of protection order ’ – ‘ History of family violence offending ’ – ‘ Manifest excess ’ – ‘ Gravity of offending ’ – ‘ Miscarriage ’ – ‘ Coercive control ’
Charges: Common assault x 5; intentionally cause injury x 5; recklessly cause injury x 1; threat to inflict serious injury x 1; rape x 1; persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to 15 charges across two indictments. The charges concerned threats, various assault offences, rape and breaches of family violence intervention orders committed against four previous intimate partners between July 2016 and September 2019 ([8]–[41]). The applicant received a total effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on the ground that the individual sentences imposed on the charges, and the orders for cumulation between charges and indictments, were manifestly excessive [3].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal dismissed. The Court (Emerton P, Niall and Taylor JJA) rejected the applicant’s submission that the gravity of his offending ought to be understood by separately measuring the ‘relatively limited physical consequences’ of his assaults [77].
It is incorrect to deconstruct the whole in an attempt to divorce each individual offence from its context. While the degree of physical injury sustained in each assault is relevant, the applicant’s offending must be understood in the context of his persistent perpetration of family violence. His behaviour towards each of the victims was degrading. He exhibited an alarming attitude of ownership and control. He created domestic environments in which there was an ongoing latent threat of physical violence if he was displeased. He was prepared to engage in physical and verbal violence in front of his children. He minimised the harm he caused to his partners. The learned sentencing judge’s characterisation of him as a “serial woman basher” and “a classic example of a perpetrator” was apt [77]
In doing so, the Court affirmed the sentencing judge’s emphasis on general and specific deterrence, along with community protection, ‘as being of primary significance’ in the sentencing determination:
The sentence imposed needed to carry heavy opprobrium of the applicant’s conduct, to both punish him adequately for it and deter him from such conduct in the future, as well as to signal to other family violence perpetrators that such behaviour will not be lightly regarded. Community protection is also a very important consideration, given the applicant’s apparent inability to learn — despite the intervention of the justice system on a number of occasions — that violent, controlling behaviour towards domestic partners will not be tolerated by the community [79]
The Court has “made it clear that acts of violence in a domestic setting, and in particular by men towards women, are utterly abhorrent and unacceptable”. The strength of the language used in these statements is not accidental. Family violence is contemptible. It warrants both condemnation and appropriate punishment. [59]
The Court also specified that the gravity of family violence offending is aggravated if ‘it breaches an extant FVIO [ie, prevention order] or is committed in front of children’ [59]. Further, the Court emphasised the multifarious nature of family violence, as constituting more than physical injury:
[T]he seriousness of family violence and the harm it inflicts is not to be simply equated with physical injury. Family violence is now understood — and defined in law — to encompass behaviour that is physically, sexually, emotionally, psychologically and economically abusive or threatening or coercive, even if such behaviour does not constitute a criminal offence. That kind of behaviour produces situations where people disproportionately women, live in “real and justified fear of men who are, or were, their intimate partners”. It produces a domestic atmosphere steeped in dread. It robs victims of capacity and agency and also engenders shame. [61]
DPP v Cormick [2023] VSCA 186 (15 August 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal on a question of law ’ – ‘ Beach of protection order ’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘ Protection order ’ – ‘ Mens rea ’
Charges: Persistent contravention of family violence intervention order x 1; contravention of a family violence intervention order x 4.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal on a question of Law.
Facts: The male respondent was subject to an interim protection order on 12 May 2021. The protected person was the respondent’s female former partner, with whom he shared a daughter. On 2 September 2021, the respondent was charged with several contraventions of the order. The alleged contraventions involved committing family violence against the protected person in the form of telephone calls and text messages which amounted to emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviour.
A Magistrate rejected the prosecution’s argument that the contraventions were strict liability offences and determined that the prosecution had been unable to prove the respondent’s intention to breach the order. The DPP unsuccessfully appealed the Magistrate’s decision.
Grounds of Appeal: An appeal was brought by the DPP on the following question of law:
1.
What is the correct relationship between the physical element and the fault element under section 123 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (‘the Act’), and in particular, what is the correct relationship where the form of ‘family violence’ is the type described in section 5(1)(a)(ii) and section 7 of the Act?
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed.
The majority accepted the DPP’s submission that the language of sections 5 and 7 of the Act separate the act (of family violence) from its consequences [70]. Accordingly, behaviour is abusive ‘because of its effect’ and not because it is intended to be so [70].
The majority (Emerton P and Osborn JA) held that there was nothing in the text of the relevant provisions, construed in the context of the Act as a whole and having regard to its purpose to support the implication of a specific intent to section 123. [77]
As a matter of fact, emotional or psychological abuse can occur without the perpetrator intending to intimidate, harass or offend. [82]
The Act seeks to address a pervasive social problem, the victims of which are vulnerable people caught in dysfunctional domestic arrangements. It therefore seeks to capture forms of abuse that, while subtle, are nonetheless pernicious. Tearing the buds off a rose bush at the family home might be regarded a trivial, but in the context of a family relationship that has broken down and a pronounced power imbalance (which might be based on physical strength or financial control or both), that act might well be perceived as menacing or “offensive”. It is notorious that those who are alleged to have committed family violence offer other reasons for their conduct. In many cases, it will be difficult to ascribe a particular or specific intention to an act which results in emotional or psychological abuse. [96]
The majority granted leave to appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal for two reasons:
1.
The prosecution should not be permitted to ‘rerun’ its case before the magistrate on a different basis from that which it contended at first instance (ie, that section 123(2) is a strict liability offence) [101]; and
2.
The order served on the respondent did not explain the extent of the order with respect to emotional and psychological abuse nor that it prohibited the ‘giving of offence whether intentionally or unintentionally’ [102] Justice Forrest agreed with the conclusions of the majority but favoured a construction of section 123(2) that incorporated an element of specific intent. His Honour considered the majority’s preferred construction to encourage ‘criminal prosecution for actions that by any sensible measure are harmless or benign’. [112]
Perry v King [2023] VSCA 218 (12 September 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence ’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ Attempted rape ’ – ‘ Common assault ’
Charges: Attempted rape x 1; common assault x 2; sexual assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The male applicant received a sentence of 3 years and 9 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years, after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against his former female partner. The conduct constituting the charges included forcibly attempting vaginal penetration, punching the complainant in the face, non-consensually touching the complainant’s breasts and biting her arm ([6]–[9]).
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on the ground that the sentences imposed, the orders for cumulation, the non-parole period and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive [18].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. The Court (Beach and Walker JJA) held that the sentences imposed on the charges concerning common assault and sexual assault were manifestly excessive.
The punch to the face, though ‘violent’, was outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge, bearing in mind the applicant’s ‘good prospects of rehabilitation, and his relative youthfulness’ [35]. Similarly, the act of touching the complainant’s breast was without force and concluded when the complainant articulated her lack of consent [37]. In this capacity, the applicant’s conduct was ‘at the low end of the spectrum’ of sexual assault offending [37]. Further, the act of biting the complainant’s arm was observed to be ‘minor in nature’ [38].
The Court, however, upheld the original sentence imposed on the offence of attempted rape:
The offence of attempted rape is an objectively serious offence … Sexual violence within an intimate partner relationship is a particularly insidious and degrading form of domestic violence. Denunciation of such behaviour plays an important role in sentencing for this offending. In that regard, we agree with the trial judge’s remarks to the effect that the sentence imposed for such offending must send a signal that all sexual exchanges must be consensual [28]
The total effective sentence was re-formulated to be 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months [44].
Morey (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 153 (23 June 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Open to jury to convict’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Significant probative value’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Whether convictions were unreasonable and unsupported by evidence’ – ‘Whether probative value of tendency evidence substantially outweighed prejudicial effect’
Charges: Rape x 3; Common assault x 1; Theft of motor vehicle x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.
Facts: Following conviction at trial the male applicant was sentenced to 12 years and 4 months, with a non-parole period of 8 years. The trial judge allowed the prosecution’s pre-trial application to adduce tendency evidence to demonstrate the applicant to engaged in a pattern of threats of violence to compel the complainant’s compliance. The prosecution’s pre-trial tendency notice (s97(1)(a) Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)) noted their intention to rely on the tendency of the applicant to:
•
Act in a particular way, namely:
(a)
To threaten to assault, or cause harm to [the complainant], if she did not comply with his demands.
(b)
To threaten to kill [the complainant], or members of her family, if she did not comply with his demands.
(c)
To assault [the complainant] in order to compel her to comply with his demands. [26]
•
Have a particular state of mind, namely:
(a)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he threatened to assault, or cause harm, to her.
(b)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he threatened to kill her or members of her family.
(c)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he assaulted, or caused harm to her. [27]
It was asserted that the ‘demands’ referred to included that the complainant not report his behaviour to police. [28]
Grounds:
Conviction
(1) The convictions are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence; and (3) the judge erred in ruling the tendency evidence admissible, particularised as follows:
(a)
The judge erred in finding that the tendency evidence showed the applicant acted in a particular way that was significantly probative of the sexual offences on indictment.
(b)
The judge erred in finding that the tendency evidence showed the applicant had a particular state of mind that was significantly probative of the sexual offences on indictment.
(c)
The judge erred in finding that the 2017 threats of dumping the complainant in a shit dam was significantly probative of the offences of rape.
(d)
The judge erred in finding that the 2018 SMS messages of threats made by the applicant in the context of frustration regarding a friend’s marriage breakup were significantly probative of the offences of rape.
(e)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats as not unfairly prejudicial.
(f)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats was not a generalised assertion of general bad character.
(g)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats was probative of committing the rapes with the requisite intent.
Sentence
1.
The judge erred in characterising of the objective gravity of his offending as ‘serious’;
2.
the judge erred in applying the standard sentencing regime;
3.
the judge erred in finding that offending in 2018 was a relevant sentencing consideration in respect of the rape charges; and
4.
the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Leave to appeal granted, appeal was allowed on conviction ground 2 and the applicant’s conviction and sentences on charges 5 to 8 will be set aside, retrial ordered.
Beach JA, Forrest JA and Kaye JA refused leave to appeal on conviction ground 1.
Conviction ground 1: Nothing in the evidence relied upon by the applicant required the jury to have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the applicant on charges 5, 6, 7 and 8 [24].
Conviction ground 3: The court held the prosecution tendency evidence ‘barely established the asserted tendency’ [47]. The court also identified that charges 5 to 8 did not involve any threat by the applicant [48]. It was held the tendency evidence had no probative value and had a prejudicial effect. It was therefore deemed inadmissible [50].
Sentencing: Due to the court’s decision on conviction ground 2, it was not necessary for the court to consider sentencing grounds 1-3. However, the court held that 18 months was for the theft of the complainant’s vehicle was manifestly excessive [54]. The sentence was reduced to 1 month of imprisonment [55].
Giudice v The King [2023] VSCA 105 (8 May 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Adverse effect of imprisonment on mental health’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences for victims’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Damaging property x 2; Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male offender entered his female former partner’s bedroom and repeatedly punched her in the face, stomach and head before strangling her until she could not breathe [3]-[5]. The offender then went to the victim’s parent’s home and damaged the complainant’s car. The offender pleaded guilty to charges of damaging property, intentionally causing serious injury and contravention of protection orders [10].
The offender had an extensive criminal history, commencing in 2011, including offences of violence against other women he had shared relationships with. The seriousness of offending had escalated, and the offender had persistently breached previous community correction orders.
The offender had suffered significant trauma throughout his life and had a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder [21].
In the County Court, Dean J held that the offender’s borderline personality disorder did not moderate his moral culpability, as he had not taken any steps to address his mental health despite numerous acts of serious violence since 2011 [18]. The offender was sentenced to 8 years, with a non-parole period of 5 years 6 months [10].
Grounds: The sentencing judge failed to give appropriate weight to the adverse effect of an excessive term of imprisonment on the applicant’s mental health, particularly given the offender’s history of self-harming in prison.
Decision and reasoning: Ferguson CJ, Emerton P and Osborn JA refused the application for leave to appeal.
A psychological report stated the offender required ongoing treatment, which he was receiving in prison. The report confirmed that the offender’s mental health was not being exacerbated in prison. The offender was free from stressors, such as alcohol, and was not self-harming [34]-[35].
It was held that Dean J appropriately balanced the requirement to protect the community from the offender per s 6D of the Sentencing Act 1991 and the adverse effects of imprisonment on the applicant’s mental health during sentencing [37].
Rowan (a pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236 (28 October 2022) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Battered wife syndrome’ – ‘Bestiality’ – ‘Common law duress’ – ‘Continuing or ever-present threats sufficient’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Defence of duress’ – ‘Duress of circumstances’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Incest’ – ‘Indecent act with child under 16’ – ‘Inferred threat’ – ‘People with an intellectual disability’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Specific, overt threat’ – ‘Threat by implication’ – ‘Threat of physical and sexual abuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Note: a Crown special leave application to appeal to the High Court of Australia was granted on 16 June 2023 and the matter has been listed for hearing in October 2023. The Crown argues that the Court of Appeal “committed an error in principle by extending the law of duress as it applies to both common law and by operation of statute, to cover what is known as duress of circumstances”.
Charges: Incest x 11; indecent act with a child under 16 x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted following trial of 11 counts of incest (s 44(1) and one count of indecent act with a child under 16 (s 47(1)) contrary to the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Her partner, JR, was the father of the two complainant daughters and had previously been convicted of sexual offences against them. At the applicant’s trial it was argued that JR had directed the applicant to commit the offences, and she had complied due to an ever-present threat of physical and sexual violence by JR if she did not do what he demanded of her. It was submitted that this constituted duress. The judge, however, ruled that this did not constitute duress, as duress required there to have been a specific or overt threat, not just an ever-present threat. Consequently, duress was not left to the jury and the applicant was convicted of the offences on the basis that she was present and encouraged the daughters to comply with his abuse.
The applicant and JR’s relationship commenced when the appellant was 18 years old. They lived on a rural property owned by JR’s father and had 4 children. The applicant had a mild intellectual disability and was financially and socially dependent on JR. There was evidence that JR was physically, emotionally and sexually violent to the applicant, he isolated her on the farm, was highly controlling of her movements and had a bad temper. The prosecution accepted that JR’s violence towards the applicant was ‘severe’ [57]. It was reported that the applicant had tried to leave in the past but had returned because she ‘would struggle with the kids’ and that she had not reported the violence to the police because ‘noone would believe her because she was nothing.’ [107] A psychologist gave evidence that the applicant suffered from learned helplessness and low self-esteem characteristic of ‘battered women’s syndrome’, a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder. The applicant’s counsel submitted that ‘JR’s conduct created and maintained a serious, standing threat of significant, ongoing harm, namely, angry subjection to the domineering, violent, rape-embracing regime of life imposed by a brute upon a traumatised, vulnerable person. Under that regime, refusal was said to always have its consequences and this had the effect of overbearing the applicant’s will so that she always submitted to the will of JR.’ [132]
Grounds: The trial judge erred in ruling that the defence of duress was not open on the evidence and thereby caused a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted; appeal against conviction upheld; new trial ordered; unnecessary to consider appeal against sentence.
Kyrou & McLeish JJA:
Their Honours found there was ‘considerable overlap’ in the elements of each form of the defence [188].
They made the following remarks regarding element (i) of common law duress in the context of the case:
[155] We accept that no previous case has expressly accepted the proposition that a continuing or ever present threat — whether overt or tacit — as distinct from a specific, overt threat, is sufficient. However, no case has expressly considered that proposition and rejected it. …. Further, the analysis of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Runjanjic [(1992) 56 SASR 114] is consistent with the proposition that a continuing or ever present threat may be sufficient.
[156] In our opinion, a continuing or ever present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out. We cannot think of any reason in principle or policy that requires exclusion of a continuing or ever present threat where, due to the threat, the accused has lost his or her freedom to choose to refrain from committing the charged offence. In this context, it is relevant to note the additional limiting factors identified in element (iii) [common law duress above] which requires that the threat be present and continuing, imminent and impending at the time each offence is committed.
[169] Having regard to the above features of the relationship between JR and the applicant … it would have been open to the jury to conclude that it was reasonably possible that the applicant understood that there was a continuing or ever present threat of physical and sexual violence (including rape) by JR if she did not do what he demanded of her. If the jury reached this conclusion, it would have been open to them to find that it was reasonably possible that, when JR requested the applicant to be involved in each of the sexual offences against the complainants, she understood that, if she did not comply, he would physically and sexually harm her, including by raping her.
[174] We are also of the opinion that it is not fatal in this case that there is no direct evidence that JR told the applicant shortly prior to each offence that, unless she performed the acts that constitute each of the charged offences, he would physically and sexually abuse her. That is because it would be open to the jury to infer that this was a reasonable possibility based upon the history of the relationship between JR and the applicant as set out in the …[evidence].
Their Honours made the following remarks regarding element (ii) of common law duress in the context of the case:
[180] A person of ‘ordinary firmness of mind’ in the present case would be a female domestic partner of JR who was of the applicant’s age and who has lived with JR in the same circumstances as the applicant and has endured the physical and sexual abuse that she has experienced. That person would also have the same isolated lifestyle as the applicant and possess her knowledge of JR’s personality and behaviour. However, that person would not have the applicant’s history of sexual abuse as an adolescent or her mild intellectual disability.
There was evidence that the AR suffered ‘battered woman syndrome’:
[181] In our opinion, upon the basis of the [evidence], it would have been open to the jury to conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that a person of ordinary firmness of mind having the characteristics described… above would have been likely to:
(a)
develop a battered woman syndrome with the consequence of learned helplessness, and yield to JR’s continuing or ever present threat in the way the applicant did; and
(b)
not seek to escape the situation.
Their Honours then briefly considered elements (iv), (v), (vii) and (viii) of Common Law duress in turn but did not consider element (vi) because the accused was not charged with murder, or any other crime excepted from common law duress:
[184] In relation to element (iv), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out based upon JR’s history of punishing her if she sought to disobey him.
[185] In relation to element (v), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant was induced by the continuing or ever present threat to commit the charged offences based upon our previous analysis regarding her will being overborne by that threat.
[186] In relation to element (vii), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant did not, by fault on her part when free from the duress, expose herself to its application. That is because the threat was a continuing or ever present threat and the jury could conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant was not free of the threat at any time during the period of the offending.
[187] In relation to element (viii), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant did not have the means, with safety to herself, of preventing the execution of the threat. That is because the jury could conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant’s battered woman syndrome rendered her incapable of escaping from her abusive relationship with JR.
McLeish JA agreed with the reasons given by Kyrou and Niall JJA in respect of elements of the defence of duress’ both under common law and under 32O.’ [228] McLeish JA also observed:
[208] It is not necessary that the threat which underpins a defence of duress be the subject of direct evidence of the accused. There is no reason in principle why the requisite threat might not be found by a process of inference from other evidence. That inference may, in principle, be drawn from evidence about an ongoing course of conduct. The threat may also be conveyed to the accused by implication rather than express words. Naturally, the defence may very well be weaker in the absence of direct evidence from the accused; but that is not the only way it may be raised.
Shiryar v The Queen [2022] VSCA 96 (25 May 2022) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert course of justice’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Persistent contravention of protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Use of third party’
Charges: 1 x attempting to pervert the course of justice; 1 x persistently contravening a family violence intervention order.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice and one charge of persistently contravening a family violence intervention order. These offences were committed whilst the applicant was on remand for separate charges (to which he also pleaded guilty): two charges of criminal damage, one charge of stalking, one charge of making a threat to kill, and two charges of committing an indictable offence while on bail. The charge of stalking related to the applicant’s former partner, ES. The charge of making a threat to kill related to her father.
The applicant’s relationship with ES ended shortly before the offending. An interim family violence intervention order was made against the applicant. Whilst on remand for the initial offending, the applicant instructed someone to phone ES to ask that she and her father drop the charges against him, and to tell her that if the charges were dropped, he would give her a car that had been the subject of a dispute between him and her family. The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive?
Held: The Court refused leave to appeal. The applicant had an extensive criminal history, which predominately involved contravening family violence intervention orders and breaching bail. The sentencing judge viewed the applicant’s convictions on the initial offending as relevant to the present offending, because the present offending occurred shortly after the applicant was remanded in custody and informed the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation ([19]). The sentencing judge took into account, inter alia, the applicant’s early guilty plea, mental health difficulties, apparent insight into the offending and support from his family. The offending was described as “premeditated, repeated and persistent, involved enlisting others, and employed veiled threats and inducements” ([25]).
The Court of Appeal found that any attempt to pervert the course of justice is to be denounced, and that, within a family violence context, it is a very serious matter ([38]).
Frecker v The Queen [2021] VSCA 331 (2 December 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing appeal’
Charges: Common law assault x 2, intentionally damage property x 1, intentionally cause serious injury x 1, persistent contravention of family violence intervention order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 23-year-old appellant received a sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 8 months, and a 2-year alcohol exclusion order after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against two of his former female partners. The appellant repeatedly punched and pushed each victim on several occasions, often after consuming alcohol [7]-[11]. On one occasion, the appellant repeatedly punched the second victim’s face and neck, which fractured her jaw and seriously injured her left eye [12]-[26]. The appellant persistently contravened a protection order by repeatedly contacting the second victim while she was in hospital, and parking near her house ([28-35]). The appellant had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety and alcohol use disorder, had no prior criminal history, was employed and supported by his family [42]-[45].
Grounds:
The sentencing judge erred in failing to consider:
1.
As a form of additional punishment, the alcohol exclusion order imposed upon the appellant.
2.
The appellant’s youth at the time of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Kyrou and T Forrest JJA dismissed both grounds of appeal. ‘[T]he judge did not err by failing to explain in his sentencing remarks how any punitive elements of the AEO informed the exercise of his sentencing discretion… because defence counsel did not submit that the AEO had an additional punitive impact upon the appellant which warranted discrete moderation in his sentence’ [76]. Furthermore, the j sentencing judge remarked on the applicant’s youthfulness as a relevant sentencing consideration, especially in relation to his ‘very positive’ prospects of rehabilitation [92]while noting the appellant was at the ‘upper end of youthfulness’, and his offending was of a ‘particularly egregious nature’ such that the judge appropriately gave more weight to the sentencing considerations of community protection, denunciation, specific deterrence and just punishment [94]).
Dunford v The Queen [2021] VSCA 304 (9 November 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to control using extended family’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Covid 19 pandemic’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of drug and alcohol abuse’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Step-child’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: intentionally cause injury x 1; false imprisonment x 2; make threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges and received a total effective sentence of 4 years and 9 months ([1]). The sentencing judge reduced the applicant’s sentence by 9 months due to his guilty plea because it showed remorse and saved the Court’s time ([19]-[20]).
The female victim and male applicant did not reside together. In January 2020, the applicant assaulted the victim in the presence of her nine-year old daughter The applicant punched, kicked and strangled the victim, threatening to kill her or her daughter whenever they attempted to leave, for approximately 2.5 hours ([3]-[6]). While in custody, the applicant told family members to persuade the victim not to cooperate with police and to accuse her of ‘just keeping him away from the kids’ ([12]). The applicant suffered from a mental health condition and had a history of alcohol abuse ([16]-[17]) and family violence offending([15]).
Grounds: The individual sentences, orders for cumulation, total effective sentence and non-parole period were each manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Beach JA dismissed the appeal ([45]). His Honour affirmed her Honour’s description of the applicant’s behaviour as ‘a protracted ordeal of violence… threats and control… that did not cease upon the applicant being remanded into custody’ ([25]). His Honour accepted that the applicant’s plea of guilty during the COVID-19 pandemic entitled him to a ‘more pronounced amelioration of sentence’ as in Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169 (18 June 2021) ([43]). Honour found that the individual sentences could only be described as ‘modest’ ([38]), and the non-parole period as ‘very moderate’ ([39]), due to the objective seriousness of each offence. In his Honour’s view, ‘[t]he imprisoning of the victim and her daughter, resulting in the victim’s daughter witnessing the acts of violence perpetrated by the applicant against her mother, was undoubtedly very serious offending. Any submission to the contrary is not reasonably arguable.’ ([38]).
Newton v The Queen [2021] VSCA 207 (29 July 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing appeal’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Persistent contravention of a family violence safety notice, aggravated burglary, intentionally causing injury x 2, making threat to kill, damage property, making threat to inflict serious injury.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds:
1.
The orders for cumulation breached the principle of totality and produced a total effective sentence that was manifestly excessive.
2.
The learned sentencing judge was wrong not to find that:
(a)
The Appellant’s anti-social personality disorder and clinical depression meant his sentence of imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him compared to a person in normal health; and
(b)
Imprisonment would have a significant adverse effect on the Appellant’s mental health [5].
Facts: The 35-year-old male appellant received a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 4 months, after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against his 28-year-old former female partner. The couple had been in a ‘volatile’ relationship for three years, and shared a 2-year-old son [6]. The appellant made threats to kill or injure the victim via text for several days before forcing entry into her home. Armed with a kitchen knife, the appellant made several ‘chilling’ threats to kill the victim, before punching, strangling, and eventually pushing her head through a plaster wall. The appellant’s conduct constituted persistent breaches of a family violence safety notice and occurred in the presence of a child [6]. The applicant had a ‘significant criminal record’, and had been diagnosed with a substance abuse disorder, depression, anxiety, and mild psychosis [9],[12]. The appellant identified as Aboriginal [11].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed, appellant resentenced to 6 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The appellant’s psychological assessment stated that R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 ‘may’ apply [43] and on this basis, the appellant’s legal counsel had not raised Verdins at the plea hearing. Niall JJA (Priest JA concurring) found that this reasoning, which was incorrect, had led the sentencing Judge into a specific error that vitiated the sentence [46]. His Honour stated that ‘whether any of the Verdins principles’ apply ‘to mitigate sentence’ is ‘a matter for the judge to determine on the basis of the evidence’ [44].
In resentencing, Their Honours found that psychological evidence of the appellant’s ‘impaired mental functioning and his deprived and violent upbringing’ reduced his moral culpability and required consideration of whether incarceration would be more onerous [31]. The appellant’s substance abuse severely compromised his judgment and capacity to control his behaviour [27] and was caused by ‘childhood trauma’, which had also impacted on his ‘development of empathy and distinction between right and wrong’ [28], and had arisen ‘through no fault of his own’ [61]. Their Honour’s noted that the appellant’s conduct had ‘escalated over a number of days, giving him an opportunity to desist which he failed to take’. However, it was accepted that the appellant’s ability to regulate his behaviour was significantly impaired [60].
Baker (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 158 (9 June 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the court of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Intellectual impairment’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People affected by drugs or alcohol’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with illness or impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat of image abuse’ – ‘Threat of suicide’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 14 charges arising out of abuse of his female domestic partner over a period of 18 months. He sought leave to appeal in relation to charges 5, causing injury recklessly, and 8, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Charge 5 related to causing injury by pushing the victim’s face into a pot of boiling water, following which he did not call an ambulance and instructed the victim to conceal his role in her injuries and return home the same day, not remaining in hospital for treatment. There was dispute as to whether permanent injury was caused. The offending was in breach of a protection order, occurred after earlier offending against the same victim and when the applicant had only just been released from prison. Charge 8 related to sending a large number of text messages to the victim demanding the withdrawal of charges against him, threatening variously to keep their stillborn child’s ashes and urn from her, distribute intimate images of her and commit suicide stating it would be her fault if he did so.
The applicant had a history of prior violent offending (having only just been released from jail) including against the victim, had intellectual impairment, a traumatic upbringing and was abusing methylamphetamine at the time of the offending. It took place in the context of a history of violence, manipulation and coercion against the victim and sought to exploit her emotional and psychological vulnerability by threatening her ability to access the ashes of her stillborn child and also threatening her dignity and right to privacy with the exposure of intimate images.
Grounds:
Ground 1: The sentence imposed on indictment charge 5 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Ground 2: The sentence imposed on indictment charge 8 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Ground 3: The cumulation order fixed in respect of charge 8 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Held: leave to appeal refused.
Ground 1: The court held that notwithstanding the mitigating factors raised by the applicant which ought to be taken into account, this was horrific violence inflicted on a woman by her domestic partner in her own home. The offending was at the upper end of the range with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, and 3 years was within the appropriate range:
In all the circumstances, the infliction of such horrific violence against a woman at the hands of her domestic partner in their own home called for denunciation, just punishment and general deterrence, especially in the context of persistent defiance of a family violence intervention order and bearing in mind the applicant’s criminal history. In that context, specific deterrence also remained a relevant consideration. We accept that the mitigating features to which the applicant referred were matters of weight that fell to be taken into account, as we have discussed. However, even when that is done, we are unable to conclude that the sentence was outside the range available to the sentencing judge. To the contrary, bearing in mind that this was an offence at the upper end of the range, punishable by a maximum term of 5 years’ imprisonment, a sentence of 3 years on a guilty plea was well open. [32]
Ground 2: While at the lower end of the scale for attempting to pervert the course of justice, any attempt to pervert the course of justice is serious and should be denounced. The offending occurred in the context of violence, manipulation and coercion of the victim, with “especially unpleasant features of seeking to exploit Ms Anderson’s emotional and psychological vulnerability by threatening her ability to access the ashes of her stillborn child and also threatening her dignity and right to privacy with the exposure of intimate images.” [36]
Ground 3: The applicant’s submission that accumulation of 12 months of the charge 8 sentence on the balance of the sentences failed to accord with the principles of totality and was therefore manifestly excessive was dismissed:
An attempt by a perpetrator of family violence to prevent a victim from seeking the full protection of the law and their physical and emotional safety is a very serious matter which calls for general deterrence and denunciation…[37]
Charge 8 involved repeated attempts by the applicant to conceal his wrongdoing over the previous 18 months, by means of emotional and physical threats directed at Ms Anderson. It was distinct offending that called for significant additional punishment. [40]
Mercer (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 132 (14 May 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘False imprisonment’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (FVIO) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with 5 offences against his de facto female partner (the complainant). The applicant instructed her to drop the charges over telephone calls while remanded in custody. At trial, she gave evidence unfavourable to the prosecution case, recanting statements previously made to police, and giving evidence that the applicant had neither imprisoned nor assaulted her. The judge gave the prosecution leave to cross-examine the complainant about prior inconsistent statements she had made and in relation to her evidence on charges 1-4. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge should not have given any direction on incriminating conduct as: (a) The prosecutor did not rely on the relevant phone calls as incriminating conduct in his final address; and (b) Using phone calls as evidence of incriminating conduct involved the jury engaging in impermissible ‘bootstraps’ reasoning.
2.
The sentence imposed on the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed.
Re conviction:
Re Ground 1(a), it was difficult to see how there was any miscarriage of justice in the judge giving a direction under s 21. If defence counsel had raised the prosecutor’s failure to address the incriminating conduct, the judge would have granted the prosecutor leave to address the jury further and given the same direction.
Re Ground 1(b), it was well open to the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was attempting to persuade the complainant to lie in the relevant phone conversations. There was no issue that the applicant told the complainant:
•
she should tell the police that she was not in her right state of mind when she made the allegations and that she wished to drop the charges;
•
he would pay for a lawyer to make a statutory declaration for her, in which she would state that she was not in her right mind when she made her statement and could not remember making the allegations against him; and
•
she should not talk on the phone about him assaulting her, as the calls between them were being recorded.
These words were not neutral as to the applicant’s guilt or otherwise of the offending. Nothing he said suggested that the complainant’s allegations were false or that the alleged events had not taken place. On the contrary, it was open to the jury to view the statements as demonstrating his belief that he was guilty.
Re sentence:
The court made the following observations relevant to coercive control at [65]:
In our view, the applicant’s persistent and cynical assertion of control over the complainant, and his exploitation of her known vulnerabilities, made this case just as serious as if there had been explicit threats or actual violence. The transcripts of the calls make plain his exertion of coercive psychological pressure on her, encouraging her to think that they can ‘work things out’ between them and asking questions like ‘Do you want me to get out or not?’ The fact that the conduct about which he was asking her to lie involved his own criminal violence against her was a further aggravating feature. In our view, the applicant’s moral culpability for this offence was high.
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive including in light of: the applicant’s high moral culpability, not guilty plea, seriousness of the offending, significant prior criminal history, and the importance of general and specific deterrence.
Re delay:
The lack of an adequate explanation for months of delay was unsatisfactory. It provided further basis upon which to refuse the extension of time applications.
Hardwick (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 67 (19 March 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to offences committed against his wife following their separation. The appellant waited until she returned home, restrained her (including using cable ties), prevented her from escaping, and threatened to kill her. The wife managed to escape. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a 3 year non-parole period. He had also breached an order protecting his wife on numerous previous occasions.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal was dismissed but noting that the sentence was “very stern” and “at the uppermost extremity of the appropriate range.”
The sentence for the aggravated burglary charge was not manifestly excessive. Previous decisions reinforced “the seriousness with which the courts view aggravated burglaries” and identify typical matters that might aggravate a particular instance of the offence. While the offending was not “an act of extreme domestic violence,” as characterised by the sentencing judge, overall the offending was serious. The sentencing judge was entitled to have significant reservations regarding the appellant’s remorse and insight which underpinned the importance of specific deterrence. General deterrence was also important in the context of family violence.
The sentences for false imprisonment and threat to kill were also not manifestly excessive. In particular, “[t]he false imprisonment extended over a period of time and involved physical restraint. The imprisonment in her own home, in the context of family violence would have been extremely distressing to the victim. It deserves powerful denunciation. Equally, the threat to kill was serious. The threat was made in circumstances where the appellant told his victim that he was concealing things ‘that you don’t want to see’. The whole incident did not have an obvious end point and the appellant’s behaviour would have instilled a substantial sense of dread and fear.” The degree of cumulation was also not manifestly excessive.
Packard (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 56 (15 March 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Forgiveness of victim’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Lack of history of domestic violence’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Mercy’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to stabbing his wife 5 times. There was no prior history of domestic and family violence. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account the victim’s full recovery.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in treating the victim’s forgiveness with extreme caution, and having regard to it only insofar as it boded well for the applicant’s rehabilitation, rather than also taking it into account in assessing the impact upon the victim and in considering the application of the principle of mercy. In particular:
(a)
Her Honour took into account irrelevant considerations namely forgiveness of a victim is often attributable to a pattern of behaviour on the part of perpetrators of family violence and her family had “persuaded” her to forgive the applicant.
(b)
Her Honour failed to take into account relevant considerations which indicated that the victim’s forgiveness was genuine/informed.
(c)
Her Honour’s conclusion was not reasonable open.
(d)
The applicant was denied procedural fairness.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of all the relevant matters, including that the applicant called emergency services, his confessions, his very early guilty plea, his lack of relevant prior convictions, his lack of history of violence, and the fact that he was of no risk of reoffending.
Held: Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: It was fortunate that the victim had made a good physical and emotional recovery but this did not negate that this was a serious example of the offence causing serious injury. The applicant’s moral culpability was also high.
Ground 2: Counsel for the applicant was plainly on notice that the judge was minded to apply the principles regarding victims’ forgiveness stated by Neave JA in R v Hester at [27]. It was not open to argue he was denied procedural fairness.
It could not be reasonably maintained that the judge erred in failing to extend “mercy” to the applicant. This was a serious instance of intentionally causing serious injury, noting “[i]t would be most difficult to comprehend how mercy can be properly extended in a case in which a man has overpowered his wife in her home, and proceeded to violently stab her five times with a knife, thereby penetrating her vital organs and putting her life at risk” at [45].
While it seemed the sentencing judge incorrectly inferred that the victim had been persuaded by male family members to express forgiveness (with reference to Hester), that observation “could not materially have affected the question whether her Honour should have extended mercy to the applicant.” Further, the judge correctly took into account the relevance of the victim’s forgiveness to motivating the applicant’s rehabilitation.
Ground 3: Without the compelling mitigating circumstances present in this case, the sentence would have been properly characterised as lenient. Accordingly, the sentence appropriately reflected the mitigating factors referred to by the applicant. In light of the gravity of the offending, and the importance of general deterrence and denunciation, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive: [53]-[57].
Edwards v The Queen [2020] VSCA 339 (23 December 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Dysfunctional upbringing’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant woman stabbed the male victim, her partner for just over 12 months, in the neck and he died of the injuries inflicted. The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months: R v Edwards [2019] VSC 234 (12 April 2019).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that her moral culpability was not lessened in any way by the violence perpetrated upon her.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that her moral culpability was high notwithstanding her severely disadvantaged background.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The appeal was refused.
Ground 1: The sentencing judge’s finding of moral culpability was open on the evidence for the reasons she gave. This included evidence that the applicant and victim had been violent towards each other, but with the applicant as most often the aggressor; the offending took place in the context of heavy methamphetamine use; and the applicant had a traumatic childhood, and a history of controlling and abusive relationships. Had there been evidence of a causal link between the applicant’s stabbing of the victim and his acts of violence towards her, the sentencing considerations may have been quite different (at [15]-[23]).
Ground 2: It was well open to the sentencing judge to find that notwithstanding the applicant’s severely disadvantaged background her moral culpability remained high. The applicant’s offending was heavily influenced by her drug use at the relevant time (at [24]-[27]). It was also not open for the applicant to contend that her moral culpability was lessened as her offending was causally linked to her drug use. She had expressly disavowed such a causal link on the plea and the submission was not supported by the authorities (which instead related to instances where a person commits an offence to satisfy a drug addiction, relevant to moral culpability and rehabilitation) ([28]-[32]).
Ground 3: The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge gave proper consideration to all relevant features of the offending and the offender. After finding that high moral culpability was established, it was not reasonably arguable that the sentence was outside the range open to the sentencing judge given the objective seriousness of the offending (“planned and deliberate”), the maximum penalty for manslaughter, and the weight to be given to the sentencing purposes identified by the sentencing judge (particularly “just punishment, denunciation…and general deterrence”) ([33]-[39]).
Shau v The Queen [2020] VSCA 252 (25 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘No history of domestic violence’ – ‘People who are pregnant’
Charges: Recklessly causing injury x 1; Reckless conduct endangering life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant man punched, kicked and stomped on his pregnant wife. The attack started in a car, which his wife was driving, and ended up at a service station.
[18] Footage captured on CCTV at the service station depicts the appellant grabbing and dragging Lee by the hair on at least two occasions; punching and striking her with his hands and fists, mostly in the region of her head, on at least seven occasions; and kicking and stomping her to the head, neck, shoulder and torso region on at least 19 occasions. Lee curled up into a ball to protect her unborn child and raised her hands to protect her face.
The wife suffered extensive injuries. The appellant then drove his car at speed into the service station where his wife had sought shelter, smashing through the wall and wedging the vehicle inside the store. That conduct endangered the life of the service station attendant who had locked the doors of the shop to prevent the appellant from coming in after his wife. The victim gave evidence that there had been ‘no earlier instances of domestic violence’ and that the appellant was ‘drunk at the time of the offending’.
Issues: (1) Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Aggravating factors considered by the sentencing judge included that:
[32] … the offending occurred in the context of domestic violence …
[the victim] was five months’ pregnant at the time …
It was a lengthy, repetitive and violent bashing of a woman who was considerably smaller and of much lesser strength than you …
You must have been aware of the likelihood of injury to her …
You must have been aware that she would be terrified as a consequence of your attack upon her and terrified of the serious risk of injury to her and to her unborn child.
Priest JA referred to his own comments in granting the application for leave to appeal observing that the seriousness of the offence in this case ‘is not only to be gauged by the injuries caused, but also the manner of their infliction (in this case a protracted and very violent assault on a vulnerable victim)’.
Niall JA observed:
[46] Compounding, to a significant degree, the seriousness of the offence is the fact that it occurred within the context of a family relationship. That fact had two relevant consequences. First, it meant that the offending arose in a relationship of trust. Lee was five months’ pregnant and ought to have enjoyed protection and care from her husband. The breach of trust necessarily made the offending more serious.
[47] Next, the courts must respond to the blight of family violence by imposing punishment that denounces the conduct and adequately addresses general deterrence. Unlike in many cases, there was no basis in the evidence to suggest that there had been earlier incidents of violence. In her evidence, Lee said that the appellant had never assaulted her before. For that reason, the conduct was, on the evidence, an aberration. Lee expressed support for her husband on the plea. However, there remains a very high public interest in punishing family violence, both for its denunciatory and deterrent effect, even where the victim seeks leniency and incarceration would place great pressure on the domestic relationship.
…
[50] Accommodating all of the relevant factors, both aggravating and moderating the sentence, may result in a sentence that represents a high proportion of the maximum, even on a plea of guilty.
Hardwick (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 227 (7 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Making threats to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man, who was subject to a protection order, entered the marital home and repositioned the CCTV cameras away from the house. When his female former partner (the victim) came home, he grabbed and restrained her, putting her in a headlock, then pinning her to the ground. The applicant tried to tape the victim’s mouth with duct tape and bound her hands with cable ties before forcing her inside the house. The applicant locked the door and bound the victim’s feet with cable ties. The applicant threatened to kill her. When one of the children arrived at the house, the victim was able to escape from the house. A neighbour called the police.
Grounds: (3) Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted for Ground 3.
[55] Coincidentally, on the very day that this application was argued before me, this Court delivered judgment in Hill v The Queen. That case concerned a home invasion by a woman who had been left by her former partner. She armed herself with a knife, forced her way into the house, and stabbed both her former partner and his new girlfriend. She faced charges not only of aggravated burglary, but also two counts of intentionally causing injury. The offending seemed to have been premeditated, and was described by the judge as ‘grievance driven’ and ‘purposeful’. The total effective sentence is 6 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. In effect, the motive for the applicant’s conduct in was anger at abandonment, and animosity towards her husband’s new partner.
…
[57] It is noteworthy that the offender in Hill received a non-parole period which was only 6 months greater than that fixed for the applicant. That minimal disparity, of itself, raises a question in my mind as to whether he was treated in accordance with current sentencing practice. It is of some interest to note that the sentencing judge in Hill was the same judge who sentenced the applicant in the present matter. I recognise, of course, that this Court described the sentences imposed in Hill as ‘moderate’, as indeed they were. Be that as it may, I regard the offending in Hill as far more serious than that in the present case.
Hill v The Queen [2020] VSCA 220 (3 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Causing injury intentionally’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Home invasion’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Threat to kill x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Causing injury intentionally x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and her husband separated seven months earlier, when the husband formed a relationship with his new partner. The applicant regularly accused her former partner of infidelity and made disparaging comments about his new partner. The applicant occasionally made threats about killing her former partner and his new partner to the applicant’s daughter, but the daughter did not take these seriously. On 19 October 2017, the applicant assaulted her daughter. The applicant was charged with assault and a protection order was taken out against her to protect her daughter. On the same day, the applicant threatened to kill her former husband, his new partner and his next-door neighbour. Later that day, the applicant carried out the violent home invasion.
The female applicant armed herself with weapons (a length of pipe and a knife) and smashed a window to enter the home of her ex-husband and his new partner. The applicant attacked her ex-husband and his new partner, stabbing them both.
Grounds: The sentencing judge erred in (a) failing to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant had experienced protracted family violence; and (b) finding that the offending was ‘purposeful and grievance-driven’.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
[4] In seeking leave to appeal, the applicant disputed the judge’s characterisation of the offending as ‘purposeful and grievance-driven’. According to the submission, the true explanation for the applicant’s conduct lay in the history of violence inflicted on her by [former partner] during the marriage. Instead of aligning the case with those involving male-to-female violence following a relationship breakdown, it was said, the judge should have viewed the applicant’s conduct as reflecting the ‘very different psychological pathway’ which results from protracted domestic violence.
That submission was rejected as there was no objective evidence to establish a link between the offending and violence experienced by the applicant during the marriage. All of the evidence before the sentencing judge supported the conclusion that “what drove this very serious offending was the applicant’s distress at having been ‘abandoned’ by her former partner and anger towards [his new partner] for ‘taking’ her husband”.
[37] … in Filiz [v The Queen (2014)], the Court said:
Senior counsel for the applicant rightly conceded that general deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in this case, not only in relation to aggravated burglary generally, but most particularly in relation to violent offending against a former domestic partner. … Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to the breakdown of a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear that such offending will attract serious consequences …
[38] In the present case, the offending was perpetrated by a female against her former male partner (and his new partner). But, in our respectful view, the judge was quite correct to view it as falling into the same category of post-separation, anger-driven violence.
[39] In our view, no other conclusion was reasonably open on the material before the Court but that it was that anger — directed both at [her former partner and his new partner] — which was the driving force behind this offending. This was well illustrated by the applicant’s having said to [the victim] that she would ‘never stop’ stabbing her. It may be accepted that the applicant was not making ‘an assertion of possession and control’. But that seems to us to be immaterial. What matters is that, seemingly unable to accept the fact of the separation, the applicant gave vent to her anger and distress by this appallingly violent invasion of [her former husband’s] home.
[40] The position would have been entirely different had there been any evidence before the sentencing judge that prior violence (or threats of violence) by [her former partner] towards the applicant had so affected her as to provide an explanation for the offending. The profound and long-lasting psychological effects of domestic violence are well-established and, where a proper evidentiary basis is established, can have a very significant impact on the court’s view of the culpability of an offender and may even preclude criminal responsibility.
[41] But that was not this case. As defence counsel properly conceded on the plea, there was no such evidence. There was no suggestion, for example, that the applicant had been driven to act in this way by things done to her during the marriage. On the contrary, all the evidence showed that what prompted this attack was the ending of the marriage and [her former partner’s] commencement of a relationship with another woman.
Freeburn v The Queen [2020] VSCA 155 (17 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, possessive behaviour’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction
Facts: The applicant man was convicted of the murder of his female intimate partner and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 years. The victim was mildly intellectually disabled and had been the victim of domestic violence in a prior relationship. The applicant acted in a jealous and possessive manner towards her, which sometimes included acts of violence. After the assault which resulted in the victim’s death the applicant left the victim alive, but in a debilitated state and failed to seek assistance. He admitted to having "lost control" and seriously injuring the victim. An autopsy showed the victim suffered around 43 injuries, mostly soft tissue injuries caused by moderate blunt force trauma. Toxicology testing revealed the presence of GHB in her body. Expert witnesses disagreed as to whether the assault caused the victim’s death: one forensic pathologist believed the victim died as a consequence of soft tissue injuries sustained in an assault in the context of her using GHB; another said that the cause of death could not be determined.
Grounds:
1.
The jury’s verdict of guilt was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. Particulars:
(a)
The evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had caused the death of the deceased.
(b)
The evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had intended to cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased.
2.
The trial miscarried due to the admission of prejudicial evidence that a closed circuit television system had been deactivated prior to the death of the deceased.
Held: Ground 1 was allowed, the murder conviction was set aside, and the Court substituted a verdict of manslaughter. Ground 2 was dismissed.
The Court found that whilst it was open for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s actions, in assaulting the victim, were the substantial and operative cause of her death, it was not reasonably open to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause her really serious injury ([106]). Taken at its highest, the admission the applicant made to Witness A was that as a result of causing her death, he had enjoyed or experienced a significant rush of adrenalin ([93]). Further, the Court accepted that a jury could not reasonably conclude that Witness A’s evidence was either truthful or reliable ([94]). Whilst the assessment and credibility of a particular witness is essentially a matter for the jury, that proposition does not preclude the assessment by an appellate court of the evidence given by that witness (Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12 (7 April 2020)) ([95]).
The verdict of manslaughter was substituted because the applicant caused the victim’s death by an unlawful and dangerous act and it was inevitable that the jury would conclude that a reasonable person in the applicant’s position would have realised they were exposing the victim to an appreciable risk of serious injury [104]. Leaving the victim in a severely debilitated state and refraining from obtaining medical or other assistance constituted criminal negligence for the purpose of the offence of manslaughter. The evidence was that the applicant was well-aware that the victim required assistance and treatment. It was inevitable that the jury would have been satisfied the applicant’s actions fell so far short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances, and involved such a high risk of death or really serious bodily injury, as to merit criminal punishment ([105]).
Ground 2 failed because the prosecution did not put to the jury that the evidence could or should be used as evidence of incriminating conduct by the applicant ([120]) and the judge gave a clear and specific direction to the jury that it should not rely on the evidence, and explained why it was of no probative value ([121]).
Note: The applicant was subsequently resentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years: Freeburn v The Queen (No 2) [2020] VSCA 176 (1 July 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal.
Carter v The Queen [2020] VSCA 156 (15 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Recklessly cause injury x 1; intentionally damage property x 1; possess a firearm while a prohibited person x 1; attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; persistently contravene a family violence intervention order x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to recklessly causing injury (grabbing her by the throat causing bruising and breathing difficulty), intentionally damaging property, possessing a firearm while a prohibited person, attempting to pervert the course of justice (a number of phone calls demanding the victim retract her statement), and persistently contravening a family violence intervention order. He also pleaded guilty to a series of related summary charges, including failing to store a firearm in a secure manner, possessing cartridge ammunition while unlicensed, and committing an indictable offence while on bail. The offending occurred in the context of family violence within a domestic relationship. The applicant was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years.
At the time of the offending, the applicant lived with his former partner (the victim). They had been in a ‘turbulent "on again, off again"’ relationship for around 16 years. The applicant had been subject to 3 intervention orders and a family violence safety notice prior to the present offending. The relationship came to an end, however, the victim and their daughters had continued to visit the applicant in custody until the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
In relation to the most serious charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the sentencing judge noted the fear that the victim must have experienced as a result of the applicant’s threats over the phone ([20]). The offences involving the possession of the firearm were linked to, and committed "because of [the applicant’s] mental state with the intention of self-harm" ([22]). With regard to the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his Honour accepted that the offending occurred "in the context of a daily methamphetamine habit". The applicant had a long history of addiction to drugs, and his prospects of rehabilitation were considered guarded ([25]). The applicant’s guilty pleas, however, entitled him to a reduction in sentence ([26]). His criminal history related mainly to driving or drink-driving offences ([27]). With regard to the applicant’s Indigenous background, the judge took into account the fact that he came from a disadvantaged background, experienced deprivation and poverty, suffered from learning difficulties, and had been exposed to substance abuse and mental health issues ([28]).
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
The applicant had suffered double punishment in that the base sentence of 2 years imposed on charge 4 (attempt to pervert the course of justice), and the sentence of 6 months imposed on charge 5 (persistent breach of intervention order), had resulted in 3 months cumulation.
•
The totality principle was offended in cumulation of sentencing.
•
Insufficient weight was given to prospects for rehabilitation based on the applicant’s limited history of prior offending, his not having served a previous term of imprisonment, Aboriginal background, difficulties faced while in prison and efforts made to participate in programs while on remand.
Held: The Court of Appeal held that the sentence imposed on the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice was not manifestly excessive. The applicant’s conduct was persistent and involved repeated threats of violence to the victim ([69]). "An attempt to pervert the course of justice is a substantive, and not an inchoate offence", and "any conduct that meets [its] description must be viewed seriously and denounced appropriately" ([70]). The submission in relation to double punishment was rejected as the elements of charges 4 and 5 were separate and distinct: "The criminality involved in attempting to persuade [the victim] to withdraw her complaint against the applicant, through the use of threats, harassment, and a form of emotional blackmail, was conceptually, and practically, separate from the deliberate and persistent contraventions of the family violence intervention order". The judge was therefore entitled to order some degree of cumulation between them ([72]). Ground 4 also failed as the judge considered all relevant matters, and it was open, on the evidence, to conclude that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were guarded ([73]). As there was no error by the sentencing judge, the Court refused leave to appeal.
Stapleton v The Queen [2020] VSCA 147 (4 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Gambling’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Theft’
Charge(s): Aggravated burglary x 1; intentionally causing injury x 1; intentionally damaging property x 1; theft x 1; unlawful assault x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds: The sentence was manifestly excessive, in particular:
1.
the sentences imposed on the charges of aggravated burglary, intentionally causing injury and unlawful assault were manifestly excessive;
2.
the learned sentencing judge placed excessive weight on a finding of a lack of remorse, and insufficient weight on compelling mitigating factors (such as his guilty plea, prior good character and the absence of prior convictions); and
3.
the orders for cumulation infringed the totality principle and produced a manifestly excessive total effective sentence and non-parole period.
Facts: In 2018, the applicant man pleaded guilty to a series of offences committed against his wife of 20 years (the victim). The offending occurred in the context of the breakdown of their domestic relationship, in the early hours of the morning at the victim’s home. He broke into the house, pushed the victim against the wall, and assaulted her boyfriend. When the victim sought to intervene, the applicant verbally abused her and threw her against the bedroom wall, causing her head to go through the plaster. The applicant continued to punch the victim’s boyfriend, and after another attempted intervention by the victim, he threw her across the room. He also damaged her boyfriend’s car. The applicant left the premises but returned about half an hour later. Once again, he barged through the front door, entered the bedroom, grabbed the victim’s hair and threw her against the wall, and continued to physically abuse her boyfriend. He also punched the victim in the face. While she was attempting to contact her friend, the applicant snatched her phone and left the house with it. The applicant was arrested later the same morning.
At sentence, the judge noted that the applicant had been drinking heavily and told police that there had been a slow build-up of emotion. His account to police was also seen as an attempt to minimise his conduct ([23]-[25]). Further, the sentencing judge stated that "offending of this nature is all too often perpetrated by men who respond to difficulties in a relationship, with possessive, violent rage" ([27]). Mention was also made to the victim impact statements which detailed the applicant’s history of domestic violence towards the victim, specifically in the form of mental abuse ([28]-[29]). The applicant had a lengthy history of heavy drinking and extensive difficulties with gambling, which resulted in the sale of the family home in order to pay his debts ([32]). The judge characterised the motive for the applicant’s offending as a desire to exact revenge for the victim’s having interfered in his relationship with another woman, and observed that his return to the house on the second occasion demonstrated a degree of premeditation. The applicant had no prior convictions ([33]). His guilty plea was not made at the earliest opportunity, and in his record of interview, he sought to downplay the gravity of the offending, blamed the victim for his behaviour, and falsely denied having punched her boyfriend ([34]). In these circumstances, her Honour was not persuaded that the applicant "deeply regretted his wrongdoing and desired to atone for it". While there was some level of remorse, this was not given much weight ([36]). Her Honour also explained that a combination sentence was inappropriate as the offending was too serious ([38]). He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 3 years’ and 7 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Held: The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. It stated that "aggravated burglary, where the offender’s intent is to assault and injure a former domestic partner, must always be regarded as an offence of a serious nature" ([60]). The appeal ground of manifest excessiveness was difficult to maintain in light of the aggravated burglary and serious assaults committed on that second occasion ([62]). The Court held that the sentencing judge took into account and gave weight to all relevant mitigating factors. The applicant did not succeed in his submission that the judge erred in her finding that little weight should be given to his remorse, as she "took great pains to explain why, putting to one side the remorse associated with the plea of guilty, she could give little weight to what the applicant had told various third parties about how he felt" ([64]-[65]).
Johns v The Queen [2020] VSCA 135 (29 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mental element’ – ‘Obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unsafe and unsatisfactory verdict’
Offences: Recklessly cause serious injury in circumstances of gross violence; Intentionally destroy property
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction; Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds (conviction):
1.
The jury verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory, where there was a marked disparity between the size and weight of the appellant’s car and the victim’s truck and trailer such that it was not open to the jury to find that by consciously voluntarily and deliberately colliding with the truck and trailer she:
(a)
Foresaw the likelihood that the collision would cause serious injury, or
(b)
When planning her conduct, either intended, was reckless that or foresaw it was more likely than not that her conduct would cause serious injury to the victim.
2.
The judge incorrectly directed the jury that the Intentionally destroy property charge could be established by an intent to damage or destroy the truck, when the indictment alleged that the appellant intended to destroy the truck, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
Grounds (sentence):
1.
The judge erred by applying the wrong test under s 10A(2)(e) Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) when considering whether "special reasons" existed to justify imposing a non-parole period of less than four years.
2.
The judge should have imposed a large, if not complete, degree of concurrency in relation to the sentences for the two charges.
3.
The head sentence imposed was outside the permissible range, the non-parole period was excessive, and the judge failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant’s previous good character and prospects of rehabilitation.
Facts: The female applicant was driving a Toyota Camry car when it collided with a truck and tanker trailer which was driven by the male victim. The vehicles were travelling in opposite directions on an open stretch of highway; the applicant’s car crossing the centre line and colliding with the front right-hand side of the truck. The truck rolled, causing the victim serious injury (a severe laceration to his scalp and two fractured vertebrae in his neck) and extensive damage ($900,000 worth) to the truck and trailer (which were later written-off). The applicant sustained minor injuries.
The applicant and victim had been in a sexual relationship for some time and had a daughter together, although they disagreed as to the nature of the relationship (the victim believed it to be only sexual/physical while the applicant was "besotted" with the victim). When the victim was driving his truck, the appellant would often follow him in her car and turn up at his home. On the day of the offending, the victim had stopped for a break at a parking bay and was approached by the applicant who threw the remote control to the victim’s garage at him, told him she was pregnant and yelled "I’ll kill you" before driving off. The applicant had stated on numerous occasions that "if she couldn’t have [the victim], nobody would" and that she should "take him out" by "driving straight into him".
The applicant was convicted of recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence and intentionally destroying property, and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years.
Judgment: The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against conviction. The court rejected Ground 1, finding that it was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant knew the collision would probably cause serious injury to the victim because of the nature of the collision (high speed, head-on, on an open road) and the threats made by the applicant [40]. The court noted that "The issue for the jury was not which of the two drivers bore the greatest risk of injury but whether the applicant knew the truck driver would probably be seriously injured" [39]. The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the applicant did not seek to make a distinction between damage and destruction at trial [48] and in any event, any disconformity between the indictment and the way the case was run at trial could have been resolved by amending the indictment [49].
The court also dismissed the appeal against sentence. The court rejected Ground 1, finding that while the judge incorrectly approached s 10(1) as if it called for an assessment of a non-parole period for the s 15B offence alone, the answer the judge gave to that assessment demonstrated that "there was never any possibility of a non-parole period for the whole of the offending of less than four years" and that there was no basis to consider that the judge could have found substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a non-parole period of less than four years [94]. The court further held that, "When regard is had to the additional criminality of the conduct underpinning [the Intentionally destroy property charge], we are satisfied that any error in applying the ‘special reasons’ provisions could not have played any role in the sentence imposed on the individual charges or in setting the non-parole period" [94].
The court also rejected Ground 2, holding that the two charges were very serious, and separate, offences and the extent to which the sentences were to be made concurrent was the discretion of the sentencing judge [99]. The court further rejected Ground 3, holding that neither the sentence nor its constituent parts were wholly outside the permissible range [100]. The court noted that the offending was grave and "exceptionally dangerous conduct" that had "very serious consequences" for which the conduct needed to be denounced and punished [103]. The appellant did not have the utilitarian benefit of a plea and there was no evidence of remorse [103].
Laa v The Queen [2020] VSCA 136 (28 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Offences: Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence; Aggravated burglary; Common assault; Making a threat to kill.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The findings by the judge concerning the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects for rehabilitation, were not supported by the evidence.
Facts: The male applicant commenced a relationship with the female victim in 2006 and the couple had two children together. Their relationship involved periods of separation and reconciliation. During the periods of separation, the applicant would stay at the victim’s house overnight on the days he would see the children. However, the overnight stays and the regular visits to see the children ceased after several arguments between the applicant and the victim. One night, the applicant sent the victim 14 text messages, threatening to come after her and kill her. The next morning, the applicant went to the victim’s house and banged on the front door repeatedly. The victim told the applicant to leave and that she had called police. The applicant tried to break open a sliding door with an outdoor chair but failed, so smashed two front windows and entered the house through the unlocked front door. The victim secured herself and the children in her bedroom by placing a wedge under the door but the applicant forced the door open. The victim was on the phone to 000, so the applicant took the phone, terminated the call and hit the victim repeatedly on the head, face and neck with the phone. The children were crying as this occurred.
The victim fled outside but the applicant followed her and dragged her indoors where he forced her to the ground, choked her and told her he would kill her and her family. The applicant took the children and placed them in the car, then returned and punched the victim in the face, knocking her to the ground. He drove off (during which time the victim called 000) but returned and started banging on the front door again. The victim let him in because she did not want to antagonise him. The applicant locked the front door and punched her in the face a number of times, telling her that he would kill her whole family. Police arrived and arrested the applicant who denied the assaults and the threats to kill. He was convicted on all charges and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and two months.
At trial, the court accepted that the applicant was a refugee from South Sudan [20] and that he began drinking excessive quantities of alcohol due to his financial struggles and it was in this context that the offending occurred [23].
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal. In rejecting Ground 1, the court held that the offending was particularly serious and the applicant’s moral culpability was high [53], despite the mitigating factors being "quite substantial" [55]. The court noted that "confrontational aggravated burglaries, in the setting of an underlying domestic dispute, are all too prevalent in our society. They are calculated to cause lasting and serious physical and emotional harm to the victim. By their nature, such offences have the potential to escalate into incidents that result in serious harm and, on occasion, human tragedy" [50]. As a result, general deterrence is of significance in such cases [50], as is condemnation by the courts of such conduct [51]. The court further noted that "The courts have made it clear that acts of violence in a domestic setting, and in particular by men towards women, are utterly abhorrent and unacceptable" and the fact that the assaults occurred in the presence of the couple’s children was a serious aggravating factor, a "serious breach of [the applicant’s] duty as a parent towards his own children" and an "appalling example" of behaviour for the children, particularly the son [52].
The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the delay between the date of offending and the date the applicant entered a guilty plea (22 months) was a sufficient basis for the judge to entertain genuine reservations about the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects of rehabilitation [42], despite a plea of guilty often being an indicator of genuine remorse [45].
Ballantyne v The Queen [2020] VSCA 115 (11 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Early plea’ – ‘Loaded firearm’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Offences: Carrying a loaded firearm in a place with reckless disregard for the safety of another x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1; Possessing drug of dependence x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order x 2; Failing to store a category A/B long arm correctly x 1; Failing to store category A/B long arm ammunition correctly x 1; Possessing a prohibited weapon x 1
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The appellant man and female victim had been in a relationship for 14 years and were married at the time of the offending. The appellant threatened to kill himself in front of the victim, leaving the house and returning with a shotgun. He swung the shotgun in front of the victim like a baseball bat, then touched the barrel to her forehead before pushing it into her eye socket and threatening to kill her "slowly" [25]. The appellant fired a shot into the TV then pointed the gun back at the victim’s head and threatened to shoot her again [25]. The victim was held like this for around three hours. The appellant plead guilty and was sentenced to four years and three months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years and six months. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant alleged that he did not remember the incident. Medical evidence was also tendered showing that the appellant had a history of depression and alcohol abuse, but that he had committed to make improvements and had ceased alcohol and prescription medication [17].
The appellant appealed against this sentence on the following grounds:
1.
The individual sentences on charges 1 and 2 and the total effective sentence are manifestly excessive.
2.
The non-parole period is manifestly excessive and in particular:
1.
The ratio of 17.65% of the head sentence is manifestly low having regard to the fact that the applicant had no relevant prior convictions and his prospects for rehabilitation were relatively good;
2.
The purported reason for this ratio that ‘… there is potently no remorse …’ … was not a good reason for denying the applicant a greater period of parole; and
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding that in the circumstances there was ‘… potently no remorse …’ ….
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding that there was a complete absence of remorse, and as a result the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
Held: The court refused to uphold ground 1 as the sentences were not manifestly excessive. The conduct founding the Making a threat to kill charge "constituted a very serious example of the offence" [25] and that, balancing the seriousness of the offending with the mitigating factors (see [24]), the sentence was proportionate [26] and punished the appellant to an extent just in all the circumstances [28]. Even though the sentence imposed was more lengthy than the general trend for the offence of threat to kill in recent cases, "[s]entences in comparable cases … are not precedents which must be applied", but each case must turn on its own facts [28].
However, the court upheld ground 2, providing that the finding by the sentencing judge that the appellant was not remorseful did not justify the imposition of a relatively high non-parole period [32]. The purpose of fixing a non-parole period is to "provide for mitigation of the punishment of the prisoner in favour of his rehabilitation through conditional freedom, when appropriate" (Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623 at 629). The court substituted a non-parole period of two years and six months [33].
Furthermore, the court partially upheld ground 3, finding that the trial judge erred in finding that there was a complete absence of remorse. The court provided that it considered "that there was some evidence of remorse to be drawn from the early pleas of guilty and from the applicant’s insight and incipient commitment to reform" [19]. The court referred to its reasons for finding against the remainder of ground 3 (namely, whether the sentences and non-parole period were manifestly excessive).
Zakkour v The Queen [2020] VSCA 72 (26 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order possession of weapon’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Criminal damage x 1; attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; possess prohibited weapon x 1; contravene family violence intervention order x 1
Case Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence for possess prohibited weapon
Facts: In 2019, the applicant went to his former partner’s property and caused damage. He was arrested the next day, and police searched his vehicle and found a home-made laser pointer. While in custody, he made telephone calls whereby he attempted to have people call his former partner and ask her to withdraw her police statement. The applicant pleaded guilty to criminal damage, and attempting to pervert the course of justice. He also pleaded guilty to 2 summary offences, carrying a prohibited weapon and contravening a family violence intervention order. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months. The individual sentence imposed on the weapon offence was 2 months’ imprisonment to be served cumulatively on the sentences for the other offending.
Ground: The sentence and the order for cumulation on this charge was manifestly excessive because, inter alia, the offending was not aggravated in any material way and the accused pleaded guilty to the offence at the earliest available opportunity.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence on the weapon offence, and ordered that the applicant be convicted and discharged on that charge. The applicant’s counsel submitted that the laser pointer had not been used as a weapon, and that it was not used in connection with any of the other offending. Despite the fact that the applicant had prior convictions for possessing controlled and prohibited weapons, it was clear that the sentence for the weapon offence was "egregiously excessive", given the intrinsic nature of the weapon, the lack of material as to whether the applicant had or would have used it, and the complete absence of evidence supporting the sentencing judge’s findings that it was potentially dangerous and could cause injury ([18]). As a consequence, the total effective sentence was amended to 22 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 months.
Tedford v The Queen [2020] VSCA 71 (26 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Motor vehicle’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide attempt’
Charges: Attempted murder x1; Reckless conduct endangering persons of serious injury x1.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Ground: The individual sentence on Charge 2, order for cumulation, total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive, having regard to the five-year maximum penalty for the offence, the fact that it was committed in the context of a suicide attempt, and the significant factors in mitigation, including the applicant’s early pleas of guilty, advanced age and ill health, and prior good character.
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on the charge of attempted murder of his wife and two years and six months’ imprisonment on the charge of reckless conduct endangering persons of serious injury for driving his vehicle into a train. On year of the sentence or chare 2 was cumulative on the sentence for charge 1, resulting in a total effective sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.
The applicant 77 year old man and female victim were married but had separated at the time of offending, the wife moving out of the family home into a bungalow at the back of the property. On the day of offending, the applicant and victim had consumed a large amount of alcohol together and the applicant became argumentative [5]. The victim suggested the applicant see a psychologist. That evening, the applicant told a friend that he felt depressed, he needed his wife to look after him to survive and that "if anything were to happen to him, [the friend] should make sure he claimed a Holden Kingswood motor car presently garaged at the applicant’s home" [5]. Two hours later, the applicant entered the wife’s bungalow and deadlocked the door behind him before saying "I’ve got something for you" and producing a large knife [6]. He proceeded to stab the victim 13 times, including defensive injuries, mostly to the chest and arms. The applicant stated that he was going to kill both himself and the victim during the attack. The victim also suffered blunt force trauma and other lacerations before managing to escape the offender when he fell over and struck his head.
The applicant then drove away from the property. "A dash camera recorded him in a confused, angry and emotional state of mind. He expressed disbelief that he had not killed his wife [and] then discussed with himself how he could kill himself" [8]. The applicant then proceeded the drive his car into a train. "The train struck the driver’s side of the applicant’s car, pushing it for a considerable distance. No one on the train was injured" [8] and the applicant did not sustain substantial injuries.
Judgment: Leave to appeal against sentence was refused [41]. To demonstrate manifest excess "an applicant must demonstrate that the impugned sentence is ‘wholly outside the range’ of sentences available for that particular offence in the relevant circumstances" [29]. Likewise "arguments for excessive cumulation must fail unless an applicant can demonstrate that the order for cumulation is manifestly excessive" [30]. The sentence for the reckless conduct charge was not manifestly excessive: "[w]hilst a sentence of 50 per cent of the maximum available upon a plea of guilty to a man in the applicant’s circumstances can reasonably be viewed as ‘stern’, we are not persuaded that it is beyond the range of sentences reasonably available to his Honour."[36] The cumulation of one year upon the base sentence for attempted murder was also not manifestly excessive. The sentence for attempted murder "represents less than a third of the maximum penalty available for what was an appalling example of domestic violence, committed with homicidal intent. Whilst old age, ill health and an almost pristine criminal history all counted in the applicant’s favour, in the face of his conduct towards his wife, it could not count for a great deal" [38]. The sentence was moderate in all the circumstances. In considering the appropriate degree of cumulation the sentencing judge appropriately considered "the temporal and circumstantial relationship between the offences" and specifically considered the sentencing factors such as overall criminality, general deterrence and the principle of totality.
The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the delay between the date of offending and the date the applicant entered a guilty plea (22 months) was a sufficient basis for the judge to entertain genuine reservations about the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects of rehabilitation [42], despite a plea of guilty often being an indicator of genuine remorse [45].
Guirguis v The Queen [2020] VSCA 48 (13 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Community correction order’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Uncharged act’
Charges: Sexual assault x 1; Make threat to kill x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man and the female victim were in a relationship for 11 years and had 2 children. The relationship terminated in 2016. Before the relationship ended the applicant allegedly forced the victim to engage in oral sex (Charge 1) and, months later, told the victim that he would ‘slit her throat’ if she ever left with the children (Charge 2). The applicant also said he would ‘take [the children] out too’ which constituted an uncharged act. In 2016, an interim protection order was granted in favour of the victim and the children, and in 2017 a final intervention order was made for an indefinite period. Relevantly, the applicant had been sentenced at the Magistrate’s Court in early-2017 to 91 days’ imprisonment, combined with an 18 month Community Correction Order for other offending against the victim that occurred on the same date on which the offending giving rise to Charge 2 in the present matter occurred ([3]-[14]).
In sentencing the applicant, the judge recognised that the victim suffered profound trauma as a result of the applicant’s degrading, cruel and humiliating treatment of her. These adverse effects continuously and significantly affected her. Given the seriousness of the offending, there was a need for stern punishment to achieve general and specific deterrence and denunciation ([22]). The applicant, on pleas of guilty, was sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment in combination with a 3-year Community Correction Order (CCO). The sentence imposed in early-2017 and time that the applicant had spent in a residential drug rehabilitation clinic were relevant to totality.
Issue: The applicant completed the term of 23 months’ imprisonment in February 2019 and sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the sentence of imprisonment followed by a 3-year CCO is manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court refused leave to appeal ([38]). The two offences constituted serious acts of family violence and the offending was not isolated ([33]). Further, a CCO was necessarily and properly punitive, and was structured towards advancing the applicant’s rehabilitation and community protection ([34]). It could not be said that the decision to attach a CCO to the term of 23 months’ imprisonment was clearly or wholly outside the range open to the sentencing judge, and there was no error of principle ([36]). The offending was ‘grave’ as the applicant’s conduct towards the victim was ‘cruel and degrading’, ‘designed to be humiliating and hurtful’, and resulted in substantial trauma ([37]). The sexual assault was described as a ‘humiliating and degrading act’. Further, the threat to kill was ‘chilling and menacing, and had a traumatic and ongoing effect’ on the victim ([33]). The conduct resulted in profound trauma.
Vu v The Queen [2020] VSCA 59 (23 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Totality principle’
Offences: manslaughter x1; attempted murder x1and recklessly causing serious injury x1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man and the female victim lived together in a domestic relationship for many years and had two children together. In 2013 the applicant was charged with drug-related offences and imprisoned for three years. During this time, the female and male victims commenced a relationship and were married. Shortly before the applicant was released, the male victim moved out of the female’s house and into a nearby residence. They continued their relationship in secret after the applicant was released and resumed living with the female victim.
The applicant was later informed of the victims’ relationship and confronted them about it. The victims’ stated they were just friends, but the applicant refused to accept their denials. The applicant then grabbed a hunting knife he had previously hidden and stabbed both victims in the chest. The male victim died at the scene and the female was seriously injured, though there was no evidence of any permanent or ongoing impairment as a result of the injury.
Applicant was charged with murder of the male victim and attempted murder of the female victim and in the alternative either intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury. Prior to trial the applicant offered in writing to plead guilty to manslaughter. No offer was made in respect to the charges relating to the female victim’s injuries. Following trial he was convicted of the manslaughter of the male victim and recklessly causing serious injury to the female victim. He was given a total effective sentence of 15 year’s imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years.
Grounds of appeal:
•
The order for cumulation was excessive and thereby infringed the totality principle.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by granting the applicant only a modest benefit for the utilitarian value of his plea offer.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by granting the applicant no benefit for his plea offer other than for its utilitarian value.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by not treating the applicant’s post-offence conduct as mitigatory.
•
The individual sentences imposed for both offences, the order for cumulation and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive, particularly in light of:
◦
The totality principle (see ground 1 above);
◦
The finding that the recklessly causing serious injury was mid-range example of the offence;
◦
The applicant’s offer to plead guilty (see grounds 2 and 3 above);
◦
The mitigatory effect of the applicant’s conduct immediately after the offending (see ground 4 above);
◦
There being, it is argued, some evidence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice;
◦
The finding that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation are ‘quite good’;
◦
The finding that specific deterrence ‘does not loom large’ in this case.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal on against sentence on grounds 1 and 5 (in part), limited to the order for cumulation only. The order for cumulation was quashed and ordered a total effective sentence of 13 years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years.
In regard to Grounds 2 and 3, the Court held the sentencing judge was entitled to consider the utilitarian value of the applicant’s offer to plead guilty as ‘relatively modest’ given the overall circumstances of the case and rejected the second ground. While the offender offered to plead guilty, this is not necessarily a sign of remorse and agreed with the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the offer was most likely motivated by pragmatic considerations [40], thus also rejecting the third ground. In light of the Court’s rejection of an inference of remorse, they noted that the sentencing judge’s reasoning "embraced a consideration of the entirety of [the] post-offence conduct, favourable and unfavourable to the applicant" and rejected the fourth ground [44].
Turning to Grounds 1 and 5, the Court noted that while the individual sentences were each particularly stern but not wholly outside the range of sentencing discretion [48], this was not the case for the order for cumulation. "Given the very significant overlap in time, context and conduct, and particularly, the high sentences imposed on both charges, [the Court] consider[s] that the principles of totality and proportionality ought to have operated to moderate the order for cumulation to a considerably greater extent" [54]
Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 26 (20 February 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Credibility’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Lack of disclosure’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Retrial’
Charges: Charges 1 and 2 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury – acquitted following trial); Charges 3 and 4 (intentionally causing injury – acquitted - and alternatively recklessly causing injury - convicted); Charge 5 (common law assault - acquitted)
Case Type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction on charge 4
Facts: The charges related to two occasions on which the applicant man was alleged to have assaulted the complainant woman, with whom he was then in a de facto relationship. Charges 1 and 2 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury) concerned an allegation that the applicant threw the complainant, causing her to hit her head. Charges 3 and 4 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury) related to an allegation that the applicant, on a different day, grabbed the complainant’s arms and held her down, causing bruising to her arms and back. It was alleged that immediately after that incident, the applicant also pushed her, constituting the basis of Charge 5 (common law assault). The applicant was found guilty of Charge 4, acquitted on the other charges and, following a plea, was convicted and fined $4,000 ([1]-[4]).
After verdict, the prosecution served a victim impact statement from the complainant, to which a document called ‘Initial report - Recommendation for more than five hours of counselling’ was attached. The report noted that the complainant consulted a psychologist and recounted events the subject of Charges 3 and 4. The appellant submitted that this was the first occasion, known to him, that the complainant had given a different account in which it was suggested that he had thrown her across the room against the wall ([9]-[10]). Applying the principles in R v Nguyen and Tran to the relevant evidence, the appellant submitted that although the report existed at the time of trial, he exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining relevant records and this had failed to result in the production of the report. It was argued that his legal representatives sought disclosure of various documents which would have included the report; that he sought production of the victim impact statement during committal proceedings and the complainant refused to provide it at that time; and that he obtained a subpoena to compel the complainant to produce the victim impact statement. The appellant contended that as he was acquitted on Charges 1, 2 and 5 and given the case largely turned on the complainant’s evidence, the existence of a different version of events as evidenced in the report potentially further undermined the complainant’s credibility ([12]-[13]).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The prosecution failed to disclose relevant information in its possession; and
2.
fresh evidence that is now available since the time of conviction would have led the jury to hold a reasonable doubt as to the applicant’s guilt or would have given rise to a significant possibility that the jury would have held such doubt.
The respondent conceded Ground 2, and in light of this, the applicant did not press Ground 1 ([5]-[6])
Held: Having decided Ground 2 was established, the Court was required to determine whether to order a new trial or enter a judgment of acquittal. The report met the threshold for fresh evidence and, had the evidence been before the jury, there was a significant possibility that the appellant would have been acquitted on Charge 4 ([18]).
In determining whether to order a new trial, the Court considered that the appellant would be compromised in his ability to test the complainant’s evidence on Charge 4 by reference to the inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of events which underpinned Charges 1, 2 and 5. Any disadvantage to the appellant would be particularly acute in relation to Charge 5 which was so closely tied in time and context to Charge 4 ([35]). The Court drew an analogy with R v Bartlett ([37]), and held that a retrial of Charge 4 alone would be ‘unfair’. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction on Charge 4 and entered judgment of acquittal on that charge ([39]).
The Court emphasised the public interest in seeing allegations of domestic violence, where there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, being prosecuted in accordance with the law ([25]). The gravity of domestic violence is not solely measured by the extent of the physical injury. Women and children ‘who suffer the brunt of domestic violence’ are entitled to feel safe and secure in their own homes. Other ‘very important factors’ the Court will consider in assessing the severity of a particular offence include the breach of trust reposed in a domestic partner and the compromising of the security of the home ([26]).
Director of Public Prosecutions v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287 (06 December 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Remorse’
Offence: Manslaughter
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether sentence was manifestly inadequate;
Whether sentence was manifestly inadequate;
(a)
failed to fix a sentence commensurate with the circumstances of the offending, giving too much weight to the lack of information about the unlawful and dangerous act;
(b)
failed to have sufficient regard to significant aggravating features when determining the nature and the objective gravity of the offending (cf the circumstances of the killing), particularly in the context of family violence and the breach of trust;
(c)
failed to have sufficient regard to the impact of the Respondent’s offending on the victims;
(d)
failed to give sufficient weight to the principles of general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and just punishment;
(e)
failed to have sufficient regard to the maximum penalty for the offence; and
(f)
placed too much weight on the matters in mitigation, particularly in light of the lack of remorse, including the Respondent’s plea of guilty and prospects of rehabilitation.
Facts: The exact events surrounding the offence are unclear. What is known is that the respondent husband "killed [the victim (his wife) by unlawful and dangerous act(s); put her body into the body of her car; and disposed of [and concealed] her body in a remote location" [4]. When later questioned about his wife, the offender lied to relatives and police by claiming that she "had left the family home after they had an argument saying that she was going to clear her head" but never returned [5].
There was no evidence of earlier domestic violence in the relationship. He was convicted on his plea of guilty to manslaugter following a contested committal where the charge was murder.
Held: The offender was resentenced by majority to 13 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 10 years.
The sentence was held to be manifestly inadequate, with Priest JA stating the "sentence imposed on the respondent was far too low to reflect the needs of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment". The disposal of the wife’s body was treated as a significant aggravating factor and "emblematic of [the offender’s] complete lack of remorse" [73]. The domestic setting of the offence was also an aggravating circumstance, with Ferguson CJ and Whelan JA providing that while "there was a time when the seriousness of such domestic violence offences was not properly recognised. That is no longer the case…[The wife] should have been able to live without any fear in her own home. It should have been a safe place for her" [10]. General deterrence and denunciation were particularly significant. These factors were not sufficiently outweighed by the offender’s previous good character, prospects of rehabilitation or the utilitarian value of his guilty plea.
DPP v Smith [2019] VSCA 266 (21 November 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Intervention order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 3 x causing injury intentionally; 1 x false imprisonment; 1 x rape; 1 x make a threat to kill; 2 x contravention of Final Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending involved intentionally causing physical injury, threatening to kill, false imprisonment, rape and breaching FVIOs. The respondent and complainant were in an intermittent de facto relationship for a few years prior to the offending. The respondent was sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly inadequate, and that the learned sentencing judge failed to:
•
Properly consider the objective gravity of the offending;
•
Give sufficient weight to the sentencing principles of just punishment, denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence and community protection;
•
Give sufficient weight to the maximum penalties for the offences; and
•
Give sufficient weight to the impact of the offending on the victim.
Held: Manifest inadequacy is difficult to establish ([28]). Nevertheless, the respondent was re-sentenced to 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years. Notwithstanding the factors relied upon in mitigation ([21]), several of the individual sentences imposed and the orders for cumulation were found to be inadequate, and therefore produced a total effective sentence that was below the range of sentences available to the sentencing judge so as to reveal an error of principle ([28]). Personal factors included: history of drug and alcohol abuse; criminal history which included a number of dishonesty and drug matters, assault and robbery, intentionally and recklessly causing injury, and failure to comply with court orders; a disadvantaged and dysfunctional upbringing; and low cognitive functioning. However, in the Court’s view, there was a need for both specific and general deterrence, given the respondent’s long history of violence, especially towards the complainant ([34]-[35]). The offending in question was ‘brutish, cowardly…and calculated to humiliate and degrade a powerless, diminutive woman’ ([32]). The Court also noted that ‘people considering similar brutal, degrading abuse of a domestic partner must understand that the courts have a duty to protect vulnerable members of [the] community and will not hesitate to impose stern punishment upon wrongdoers’ ([35]).
DPP v Evans [2019] VSCA 239 (25 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attack on former partner's new partner’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Causing serious injury intentionally x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty following a self-serving confession 4 years after the assault having previously denied all involvement several times. The DPP appealed the sentence and non-parole period. The complainant, who had been involved in a domestic relationship with the respondent’s estranged wife, sustained life-altering and life-threatening injuries as a result of being struck with a metal bar. The original sentence was 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the individual sentence and non-parole period are each manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed and resentenced to 7 years and 6 months with non-parole period of 4 years 6 months. The discount given for the respondent’s confession was too great, as the respondent’s admissions did not go so far as to warrant a full discount.
The court also considered that the seriousness of offending called for a stern response and strong denunciation, as this was a case of extraordinary violence which had a devastating impact on the victim ([83]).
"[84] There is a further important consideration, that of general deterrence. This was a violent act of reprisal following the breakup of the respondent’s marriage, expressing his animosity and anger towards the person who had been his wife’s partner. Although there are differences between a case like this and a direct attack against a former partner, they are closely related. Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. It is never justified. The sentences imposed must convey that message strongly.
[85] For similar reasons, nothing should be said in sentencing reasons to suggest that statements by such an offender to the effect of ‘I just snapped’ or ‘I’d had enough’ in any way mitigate the seriousness of the offending or reduce the offender’s moral culpability. Such self-justifying statements are, regrettably, all too common in cases of family violence. Marital breakdown is stressful and upsetting for all concerned. But a resort to violence can never be condoned.
Tan v The Queen [2019] VSCA 226 (14 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical harm and violence -separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to 5 years 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months. The applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive given that the offending was not at the median of offending for the type of offence.
The victim of the incident was the applicant’s de facto partner. Around the time of offending, the applicant sent the victim a series of text messages asking for money, which the victim refused. The applicant was angered by the refusal and when he returned to the couple’s home, he started verbally abusing her. He pushed her off the bed, injuring the victim’s knee, before pulling back on to the bed with his hand around her throat. Threatening to kill the victim, the applicant obtained a knife from the kitchen and pushed it against the victim’s throat while she was still on the bed. This caused a superficial laceration. The owner of the apartment became aware of the altercation and called the police. While the owner was on the phone the victim tried to push the applicant off her, causing him to slash her on the left arm with the knife.
The applicant pleaded guilty prior to the committal hearing despite previously denying he was the aggressor. The judge "accepted this plea as being ‘indicative of some remorse’" [19].
Issue: Whether sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision and reasoning: The sentence was manifestly excessive. A sentence of 4 years 3 months was substituted.
There was no finding that the wound to the victim’s arm was deliberately inflicted, unlike the laceration to her neck. When compared to more serious cases (Marrah, Nolan [63]) of the same offence this was significantly less serious. Ashley and Weinberg JJA state that ‘it is the fact that, despite the limited utility of raw sentencing statistics, the sentence imposed in this case was not far short of twice the median length of imprisonment for the offence over the 2016/2017 year, and that over the five-year period ending 2017 only a very small number of those imprisoned for this particular offence were subject to a sentence exceeding five years. Underlining the severity of the sentence imposed here, by no means did all persons sentenced for this offence in the five year period receive a custodial disposition.’[65]
Nevertheless, the court also pointed out that despite the sentence being manifestly excessive, this conclusion "does not gainsay the need for sentences for this offence, committed in a domestic setting, to reflect the need for general deterrence, specific deterrence … and protection of the community as pertinent sentencing considerations" and noted that "sentences for this offence, committed in a domestic setting, have increased in recent years." ([63]).
Ivanov (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 219 (8 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Perpetrator self-reported to police’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Victim testified in favour of perpetrator’
Offences: Rape x 2
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been partners for 22 years and had three children together. The appellant found out that the victim had been having an affair for the last five years. He lost self-control and raped the victim, verbally abusing her during the assault while she just lay there. Afterwards, the appellant felt terrible and apologised. Two days later, the appellant discovered more details of the affair and lost control and raped the victim again. The couple cried together afterwards and the appellant apologised many times. The day after this, the appellant became concerned that the victim would try to harm herself and the appellant felt guilty about what he had done, so he reported his actions to a mental health clinician. The clinician alerted police and arrested the appellant who plead guilty immediately. The victim never intended to report the offending and saw police involvement in their marriage as ridiculous.
At the sentencing hearing, the victim gave evidence in support of the appellant and told the court that this was a private matter for the appellant and the victim to work out together. She testified that she wanted the appellant to be released as soon as possible so that the couple could start repairing what had happened, but that this had not been allowed to occur because of the imposition of an Intervention Order. Despite this, the judge sentenced the appellant to nine and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to synthesise properly the sworn and mostly unchallenged evidence of the victim. Specifically, the sentencing judge made findings on the impact of the offending that:
(a)
were not open to the judge or not properly founded on the victim’s evidence, and
(b)
failed, in the circumstances, to accord the appellant procedural fairness.
2.
The sentencing judge’s discretion miscarried as a result of the judge’s findings regarding remorse and the circumstances of the appellant’s own reporting of his crime. Specifically, the judge erred by:
3.
The individual sentences, the total effective sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
(a)
departing from the agreed statement of facts, and
(b)
denying the appellant, in the circumstances, procedural fairness.
Judgment: The court allowed all grounds of appeal, holding that the sentences were manifestly excessive and resentencing the appellant to four years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years. The court held that while the appellant’s behaviour was reprehensible [2] and involved a "grave breach of trust and violation of … bodily integrity" [153], "the prison sentences in this case must be much shorter than would ordinarily be required" [10]. This was because of two exceptional factors: 1) the appellant’s self-reporting and confession (without which he never would have been prosecuted), and 2) the victim’s "remarkable and powerful evidence" [10]. The court stressed that this was "an exceptional case" [1] and "these are wholly extraordinary circumstances calling for an equally extraordinary response" [10]. However, the court noted that denunciation and just punishment were relevant sentences factors in this case [153].
The court noted that a twelve-month Intervention Order was previously taken out against the appellant on behalf of the victim for smashing food into the victim’s face. However, the couple remained living together and their sexual relationship continued [17]. The court noted that the couple got divorced (because the appellant was frustrated that the victim worked so much), but continued to live together as if nothing had changed [20]. They did not tell the children of the divorce. The victim testified that she was the "Alpha female" and "glory parent" and would only see the children two or three times a week, and that the appellant was the sole carer of the children, the one who did all the hard work [21].
Regarding Ground 1, the court accepted that the sentencing judge erroneously found that the impact on the victim (who would now have to arrange for care of the children and explain the appellant’s absence to them) was an aggravating factor, as opposed to a mitigating factor [84]. The court also accepted that it was not open to the judge to have qualified the mitigation resulting from the reduced psychological and emotional impact of the offending on the victim in the way the judge did [95] and that the judge erred in qualifying the mitigatory effect of the victim’s evidence by being "mindful of the complex nature of the potential damage resulting from sexual offences committed in the context of family violence, which may not be readily apparent" [102]. While the court accepted the sentencing judge’s comments regarding the nature of sexual violence in a family setting and held that it was "therefore appropriate for sentencing judges to be cautious when confronted with evidence of forgiveness by victims of violence, whether sexual or otherwise" [103], the court held that each case turns on its own facts. In this case, there was no evidence that the relationship was afflicted by family violence or that the victim was persuaded to reconcile by the appellant [106]. The court noted that "There is not the slightest suggestion that [the victim] gave this evidence as woman ground down by years of ill-treatment and ensnared in a relationship from which she found it impossible to escape" [5].
The court also upheld Ground 2, finding that the fact that the appellant could not remember certain things was "not inconsistent with a high level of remorse" in part because the appellant consistently make extensive admissions about his conduct to police but also consistently told police that there were parts he could not remember [123]. The court accepted that there was overwhelming positive evidence of remorse [124]. The court considered that it was not open to qualify the level of the appellant’s remorse on the basis that his reporting of the offending was about the victim, not the appellant’s crimes [125].
The court further upheld Ground 3, holding that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive because they failed to reflect all relevant considerations (including the appellant’s early pleas, remorse, previous good character, hardship involved in his imprisonment, and strong prospects of rehabilitation) and the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the two exceptional factors outlined above [139].
The court noted that the resentenced non-parole period was shorter than what otherwise might be imposed, but that this would still adequately reflect all of the sentencing purposes mentioned [166].
Degney v The Queen [2019] VSCA 183 (19 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed for the offence of attempted aggravated burglary (3 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment) on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. The applicant and victim lived together at the time of the offending, and were in a relationship ‘on and off’ for around 6 years.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to the objective gravity of the offending, the applicant’s limited criminal history and youth, the early plea of guilty and current sentencing practices.
Held: The applicant submitted that his criminal history was ‘limited and relatively minor’ ([32]). He had previously been sentenced, without conviction, to a community correction order (‘CCO’) for offences, including a charge of unlawful assault, charges of possession and use of cannabis and descending onto a railway track ([26]). He did not complete the CCO and was subsequently fined ([27]). The applicant contended that the offending was not towards the ‘serious end of the spectrum’ as it was brief, was not committed in company, and there was limited evidence of planning. He argued that there was only an intention to assault, not an intention to inflict actual physical harm ([31]).
The Court held that the seriousness of the offending was increased by factors, such as the fact that it involved ‘an attempted forced intrusion into a residence’ during the night, while possessing a ‘menacing weapon … with an intention to assault a terrified and vulnerable domestic partner’ by creating fear ([45]). His efforts to enter the premises were persistent and threatening ([46]), and his conduct could not be described as brief or short-lived as had been submitted by the applicant ([48]). His conduct was viewed within the context of his earlier abusive behaviour towards the victim ([47]). The absence of an intention to physically harm the victim and of a history of family violence was found not to diminish the inherent gravity of the offending ([49], [53]). Significantly, the offending was committed in circumstances of family violence, which aggravated the offending ([50]). His conduct was motivated by a sense of entitlement, which reflected on his moral culpability and exemplified ‘the very worst of male attitudes towards women’ ([51]). As a result, general deterrence was an important sentencing purpose ([52]).
Mitigating factors included the applicant’s early guilty plea, relative youth, limited prior history and remorse ([62]); however, when balanced against the objective gravity of the offending, these factors did not persuade the Court that the sentence was wholly outside the range of sentences reasonably available to the sentencing judge ([62]). The Court also noted the dearth of sentencing decisions involving attempted aggravated burglary ([58-[59]). Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the appeal against the sentence.
Lim v The Queen [2019] VSCA 182 (16 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Contravening a family violence order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Offences: Aggravated burglary; intentionally causing injury x2; threat to kill x2; persistently breaching a family violence intervention order; summary assault x1; summary offence of using a drug of dependence; and unlawful assault.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
•
Whether sentence on summary assault exceeded maximum penalty;
•
Whether the individual sentences and orders for cumulation, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive;
•
Whether the sentencing judge paid insufficient regard to the principle of totality; and
•
Whether the sentencing judge erred in treating the applicant’s prior convictions as relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the applicant’s offending.
While drunk and drug-affected, the applicant forced his way into the home of his female ex-partner, the protected person in a FVIO to which he was the respondent. Upon entering, he grabbed KC’s father, threatened to kill him and chocked him in a sleeper hold to the point of unconsciousness. He followed KC as she fled the home and similarly choked and threatened her in the presence of her young daughter, continuing the choke hold until a police officer struck him with a torch and placed him in a headlock, having failed to subdue him with pepper spray. An elderly neighbour tried to comfort those at the scene but was also threatened by the applicant. When police arrived, they were only able to subdue the applicant with force.
The applicant persistently breached a family violence intervention order during the month leading up to the offence and had previously committed violent offences against KC and her father. He entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years and seven months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years. The sentencing judge described the offending as "very grave", "sustained and dangerous", "gratuitous" and "cruel and chilling". Sentencing considerations were general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and protection of the community. Weight was placed on the applicant’s significant criminal history and "selfish and cowardly" approach to relationships. Significant mitigating factors were raised on his behalf including his early pleas of guilty, remorse, medical conditions causing particular hardship in custody, and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.
Held: The first ground was conceded by the Crown. In respect to the second and third grounds, it was held that the sentence for aggravated burglary, cumulation, base sentence and resulting total effective sentence were all manifestly excessive and in breach of totality, providing that it is "likely that the judge placed too much weight on Mr Lim’s prior criminal history, was overwhelmed by the gravity of the offending or gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors, or that some combination of these factors was operative" [122]. The sentence for unlawful assault was also held to be manifestly excessive.
The Court rejected the fourth ground of appeal as they considered using the offender’s prior convictions to inform an ‘assessment of the gravity of his crimes [was] not the same "as speaking of an assessment of the objective gravity of a crime" [53].
Nicholson (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 177 (14 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 1 x stalking; 1 x damage property; 1 x intentionally causing injury; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x commit indictable offence on bail; 3 x contravention of Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and victim were in a relationship for about 3 years, and had married. They separated in 2016 due to infidelity and domestic violence issues. The charges to which the appellant pleaded guilty were contained in 2 separate indictments. 2 summary charges were brought against him. The appellant was subject to a Final FVIO in 2016 which he breached by attending the victim’s address, damaging her car, and coming within 5 metres of her on two occasions. He also stalked the victim by contacting her in breach of the Intervention Order ([9]-[17]), damaged her car ([21]), pinned her to the ground, and choked and sexually assaulted her by kissing her on the lips ([25]-[26]). The appellant also wrote the victim letters and emails over a period of several months that were threatening in nature. At the time of committing the offences, the appellant was on bail for other matters ([29]). The victim was injured as a result of the attack ([30]).
The sentencing judge concluded that the offending was serious, ‘protracted, violent and terrifying’, and sentenced the appellant to 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence and orders for cumulation were manifestly excessive, given the mitigating factors of the applicant’s health issues and the characterisation of offences.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal as the total effective sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was not manifestly excessive and did not fail to adequately reflect the principle of totality ([75]-[81]). The offences were committed over a period of many months within the context of family violence. The damage caused to the victim’s property was found to be significant, planned and executed to cause harm ([56]). At [62], the Court noted that the sentencing judge correctly emphasised the seriousness of the offence of intentionally causing injury. The victim was frightened and threatened with words, such as ‘You are going to get it’ and ‘Just die’ ([61]). Further, the context of the sexual assault was considered to be ‘significant and inextricable’, as it occurred during a ‘frightening physical attack’, and was motivated by hatred and contempt ([66]). As for the 2 charges of contravention of the FVIO on the separate indictment, the Court did not consider the individual sentences to be manifestly excessive and that despite the applicant having no ability to carry out the threat as he was in custody, the fact that they contained death threats and were sent by someone who had previously employed threats of death made it very serious offending ([69]-[74]). As each offence was committed over an extended period of time, directed at the one person within the context of family violence, and escalated and continued even in custody, the overall criminality meant that the orders for cumulation was not manifestly excessive ([79]-[80]).
Kiril (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 133 (14 June 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Elder abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Offences: Reckless conduct endangering life
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, in particular that the Learned Sentencing Judge gave insufficient weight to the delay in these proceedings being finalised.
Facts: The male appellant and his wife severely neglected the 83-year-old victim, the appellant’s mother, who relied entirely upon them for care. The victim previously lived in a supported residential service where she was very healthy and active, and would routinely visit the doctor. However, her visits to the doctor (which included filling her prescriptions) declined and ceased altogether when she returned to live with the appellant. The victim was found dead in her bed in squalid conditions. She died as a result of bronchopneumonia in a setting of cerebral infarction, weighing only 34kg and covered in bruises and abrasions. The appellant plead guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 months. The appellant appealed this sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive because the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the delay in the proceedings being finalised.
Judgment: The court refused to allow the appeal, holding that the sentence was not manifestly excessive but could even be regarded as "lenient" [49], [54]. The court noted that "the proper approach for this Court to adopt is to consider the circumstances of the offence and those of the applicant, instinctively synthesising the aggravating features and those going in mitigation – including the considerable delay – to determine whether the sentence imposed by the judge is wholly outside the range open in the sound exercise of discretion" [41]. While the delay had been considerable (five years from the offending to sentencing) and the court held that "ordinarily, a delay of that order would constitute a very powerful mitigating factor" [43], in this case, the appellant did not have a lengthy period of rehabilitation (the court accepting that he had developed no insight into his offending and did not have good prospects of rehabilitation) nor did he suffer stress or anxiety as a result of the delay [43]-[45]. Beyond the delay, the court emphasised, there was little that mitigated the offence [46].
The court noted the seriousness of the offending, holding that the victim was in such poor condition "because of the applicant’s callous disregard for her welfare" [48]. It further accepted that the appellant’s treatment of his mother was "cruel, heartless and inhumane" [48]. Forrest JA held that the appellant "admitted he foresaw that his conduct placed [the victim] at an appreciable risk of death, and yet he continued to neglect her … I consider that conduct to be truly reprehensible" [53].
Milosev v The Queen [2019] VSCA 121 (3 June 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breaches of community correction order’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Drug dependency’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; theft x 1; recklessly causing serious injury x 1; conspiracy to commit theft x 1; breach of community correction order (CCO) x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated burglary, theft, recklessly causing serious injury and conspiracy to commit theft. She was ordered to serve a community correction order (CCO), but was later charged with breaching that order and the mandatory terms contained in it. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective term of 15 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 months.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on two grounds. The first ground was that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. It was also contended that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to 1) the impact of family violence suffered by the applicant, which compromised her ability to comply with the CCO; and 2) the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation. The second ground was that the sentencing judge erred by not deferring sentencing before making a finding that the applicant was ‘unwilling and unable’ to comply with a further CCO.
Held: The application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused. The applicant’s counsel contended that the applicant’s capacity to fully comply with the terms of the CCO was affected by the domestic violence perpetrated on her by her partner ([20]). It was argued that the applicant was the ‘captive of her partner throughout the term of the [CCO]’, and found it difficult to leave him and the drug infected environment in which she was then living ([25]). Although the Court recognised that the applicant was clearly subjected to domestic violence by her ex-partner, their Honours noted that the materials placed before the sentencing judge did not sufficiently explain her substantial and repeated failures to comply with the conditions of her CCO ([48]). While it was understandable that the applicant, under the pressure of the domestic circumstances in which she was living, relapsed into drug use, it appeared that she sometimes managed to remove herself from the abuse. Taking those matters into account, and giving full weight to the impact of her partner’s conduct towards her, their Honours did not accept that the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the applicant was either unwilling or unable to comply with a further CCO ([49], [56]). No sufficient circumstances were put to the sentencing judge which would require him to defer sentencing ([56]).
Neil v R [2019] VSCA 64 (25 March 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: For about four months leading up to the victim’s death, the applicant and the victim were in an intimate relationship. In the period leading up to the incident, the applicant, Marmo (the applicant’s co-accused) and the victim were heavy ice users. On the day of the incident, the applicant was angry with the victim because she made a family violence complaint against him to police. The victim was savagely beaten by the applicant for ‘snitching and dobbing’ ([9]). Marmo and two other people were present. The applicant’s attack on the victim escalated, and involved kicking her to the head and body with extreme force. The victim later died and the applicant and Marmo agreed that Marmo should ‘dispose of her’, by dumping her body down a mineshaft and then burning it using petrol ([12]). The trial judge sentenced the applicant to a term of 26 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 22 years. Marmo was sentenced to a term of 24 years’ imprisonment ([3]).
Issues: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his sentence on the following grounds:
•
The judge erred in applying the parity principle, for example, in that she imposed a greater sentence on the applicant than Marmo, even though the applicant pleaded guilty and Marmo pleaded not guilty, and where the applicant offered to give evidence against Marmo.
•
The non-parole period is manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The Court refused the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the sentence. In determining the first ground of the appeal, the Court found nothing wrong with the trial judge’s conclusions about the respective roles of the applicant and Marmo. It was the conduct of the applicant that was ‘at the heart’ of the horrific offending and but for his anger with, and treatment of, the victim, her death would not have occurred ([42]). The Court was also unpersuaded that the applicant’s late plea of guilty required the trial judge to impose a lesser sentence than the sentence she imposed on Marmo ([43]). Overall, her Honour correctly differentiated the cases of the applicant and Marmo, and the Court therefore rejected the first ground of appeal ([44]).
The Court found that there was no substance in the applicant’s second ground of appeal, that the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The fact that the non-parole period was almost 85% of the head sentence did not indicate any error. The higher the head sentence, the higher the percentage of the head sentence the non-parole period will likely be, and often it will exceed 80% ([46]). The non-parole period was not manifestly excessive in light of the circumstances of the applicant’s offending. The Court also held that the trial judge’s conclusions that a lower non-parole period need not be fixed on the basis that the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation ‘appear reasonable’.
DPP v Elfata [2019] VSCA 63 (21 March 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: Rape x 1; reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1 (acquitted); common law assault x 1 (acquitted); stalking (intent to cause physical harm) x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of rape and stalking with intent to cause physical harm. He was acquitted of reckless conduct endangering serious injury and common law assault. The respondent and the complainant had been in a relationship for two years before the offending conduct. In relation to the charge of rape, it was alleged that the respondent placed his fingers inside the complainant’s vagina, so as to constitute digital, rather than penile, penetration ([5]).
The respondent was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year. The Crown appealed on the ground that the individual sentence imposed for the rape charge (two years), the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly inadequate, and that the sentences imposed failed to:
•
Have sufficient regard to the maximum penalty for the prescribed offences;
•
Properly reflect the objective gravity of the offending;
•
Have sufficient regard to the impact of the offending on the victim;
•
Give sufficient weight to principles of community protection, general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and the need for just punishment; and
•
Give weight to mitigating factors that was not excessive ([28]).
Issues: Whether the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The Court (Priest AP, Beach and Forrest JA) noted the difficulty in establishing a ground of manifest inadequacy as it requires the Crown to show that it was not reasonably open to the sentencing judge to come to the sentencing conclusion reached, and that the sentence imposed was ‘wholly outside the range of the sentencing options available’ ([35]). The appeal was dismissed because the objective gravity of the offending was lower than is often seen for rape offences. The Court distinguished Shrestha v The Queen [2017] VSCA 364 as the respondent did not display the same degree of criminality as the offender in that case ([36]). The Court agreed with the sentencing judge’s findings that the incident was a single, impulsive act, which did not appear to be premeditated. Excessive violence was not involved and the duration of the incident was relatively brief. Further, as the rape involved digital, rather than penile, penetration, ‘the offence could properly be described as a breach of an agreement as to the limits of intimacy, in the context of a longstanding relationship in which intimacy occurred throughout.’ ([37])
Moreover, the Court, agreeing with the sentencing judge, held that the fact the respondent exhibited little remorse and ran a trial was an important mitigating factor ([38]). Their Honours also did not disagree with the sentencing judge’s finding that the respondent had ‘relatively good’ prospects for rehabilitation ([27]). Although the sentence imposed was lenient, the Court held that is was within the range of available sentencing options.
DPP v Weaver (a Pseudonym) [2019] VSCA 26 (21 February 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pretext call’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Rape x 2; common assault x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: At the time of the offending, the respondent and the complainant were in a relationship. Their relationship was characterised by physical and emotional abuse. On two separate instances, the respondent raped the complainant ([2]-[3]). He also assaulted her by punching her in the face ([4]). In the past, the respondent had generally acted in a possessive and aggressive manner towards the complainant ([8]). He had previously made threats to commit suicide if she left him and had insisted on having sex with her on many occasions ([6]-[7]). An important piece of evidence in this application was a pretext call between the respondent and complainant. In the pretext call, the respondent made an admission to one or more of the allegations made by the complainant. Before the empanelment of the jury, the trial judge made a ruling excluding the admission into evidence of the contents of the pretext call.
Issues: Whether leave to appeal should be granted. Whether the exclusion of the evidence would eliminate or substantially weaken the prosecution’s case.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that the trial judge did not err in considering that the jury could not reasonably conclude that the complainant specifically referred to either of the incidents subject to the two rape charges in the pretext call ([45]). Further, it was held that the trial judge correctly accepted that the jury could conclude that the respondent did make an admission of sexual misconduct in the pretext call. However, this admission was of limited probative value in the context of the case. The trial judge did not err in concluding that the probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect ([54]). Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicant should not be granted leave to appeal the decision of the trial judge to exclude the contents of the pretext call from evidence ([55]).
DPP v Missen [2019] VSCA 32 (4 February 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Murder of parent’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of his father (the victim). The offence took place at the offender’s house that he occupied with the victim and his then girlfriend. The offender had an argument with the victim which erupted into a violent altercation, leading him to physically assault the victim until he was dead. Following the murder, the offender and his then girlfriend approached two men to help remove the body from the house and take it to a disused mineshaft for disposal. The offender’s relationship with his father at the time of the offending was ‘intensely troubled’; however despite the difficulties, they had a close and co-dependant bond. Further, he suffered from a range of emotional and psychological problems and was prone to drug abuse ([9], [57]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Dixon J sentenced the offender to 21 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years. The offender had a limited criminal history which included contravening a family violence safety notice and offences against police ([74]). Further, he pleaded guilty late and therefore was not entitled to the same degree of mitigation as if he had pleaded guilty at the earliest possible stage. There was also delay in the finalisation of proceedings which was due to factors beyond the offender’s control. For example, his then girlfriend changed legal representation more than once, and he was also diagnosed and treated for testicular cancer. As a result of these matters, the offender had been on remand since March 2016 ([75]-[78]). Her Honour noted that he had used this time productively, having enrolled in several programs open to remand prisoners, and received training in drug education ([79]). The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were found to be reasonable, particularly if he remained on stabilising medication and avoided illicit drugs upon release ([82]-[83]).
The objective gravity of the crime was aggravated by the way the offender continued to assault the victim when he was already severely incapacitated. It was further increased by the nature of the physical violence, together with his efforts to dispose of the body and involve other people in that conduct. The concealment of the offence meant that the victim’s relatives did not learn of his death for some time after it occurred. Regardless of the pressures that the offender may have endured, her Honour found him to be solely responsible for the victim’s death ‘in an episode of appalling brutality’ ([84]-[85]).
The offending was not premeditated but arose in circumstances of sudden rage in the context of a highly dysfunctional household. Her Honour accepted that the offender was contrite but noted that expression of sincere remorse gave way to self-interest in the aftermath of the murder. She gave weight to denunciation, just punishment, general and specific deterrence, and the need for rehabilitation. However, specific deterrence was somewhat diminished as a factor given his limited criminal history and conduct on remand ([86]-[90]).
The parties only referred to a small number of cases involving the murder of a parent, none of which were comparable to the present case. A notable feature of this case was that despite the history of conflict between the offender and the victim, he ‘accepted responsibility for murdering the person [he] had come to depend on most’ ([91]-[93]).
Forbes (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 341 (18 December 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Multiple counts of assault and rape.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was charged with 12 counts of assault and rape. The first five charges involved intentionally causing injury and rape against his former domestic partner. The remaining seven charges concerned offences of assault, rape, making a threat to kill and intentionally causing injury against the same domestic partner, however, the parties had separated at the time these particular offences were alleged to have been committed. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the offences. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 10 years 10 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years and three months.
Issues: The applicant sought leave to appeal because the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in that:
•
The individual sentence imposed for one of the counts of rape (count 11) was excessive; and
•
The sentencing judge incorrectly characterised each offence as a serious example of that kind of offence; and
•
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation.
Decision and reasoning: The Court emphasised that the ground of manifest excess will only succeed if it can be proven that the sentence imposed fell wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the sentencing judge. Their Honours considered the applicant’s limited criminal history to be relevant, but given his lack of remorse, denial of the offending and the circumstances of the offending, the sentencing judge was open to conclude that his prospects of rehabilitation were ‘guarded’ ([39]). The offending was found to be very serious, and the context of domestic violence significant ([42]). The applicant’s personal circumstances were also considered, including his previous experiences as a victim of sexual abuse, and his medical and psychological history (including brain damage and bipolar disorder). Ultimately, the Court refused the appeal as the total effective sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was not outside the range of sentencing options available to him.
The Court observed that the context of domestic violence is also very important. The Court quoted from Pasinis [2014] VSCA 97:
Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
The Court noted the importance of general deterrence in this context.
Hayden Samuels (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 251 (1 October 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Cumulative sentence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Rape x 2; make a threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence. Determined ‘on the papers’.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s wife of many years. The applicant and the victim married in 1996 and have 2 children. The family emigrated from Egypt in 2009, and practise the Coptic Christian Orthodox faith. The rape offences involved penile-anal penetration, contrary to the Coptic religious faith (charges 3 and 4). The applicant also threatened to kill the victim, telling her that if she saw a counsellor he would kill her and tell everyone that she was mentally unstable and had committed suicide (charge 5). The victim suffered an anal injury as a result of the rape the subject of charge 4. The applicant was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 years and 9 months. For the charge of making a threat to kill, the individual sentence was 2 years, and for the two rape charges, the individual sentences were 8 years each. The applicant was also sentenced as a serious sexual offender in respect of charge 5.
Issue: The applicant sought to appeal against the sentence. One ground of appeal was that the sentences imposed on each of the individual counts, and the order for cumulation of the sentence imposed on charge 4, were excessive.
Held: Tate JA refused leave to appeal as she was not persuaded that it was reasonably arguable that the sentences imposed against the applicant went beyond a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion ([48]). The sentences imposed against the applicant in relation to the rape charges were ‘very stern’. However, the offending was ‘extremely serious’ and, as the sentencing judge acknowledged, there has been a recent shift towards sterner sentencing for rape and other sexual offences. This has been a conscious decision of the courts to reflect the seriousness of domestic violence and sexual crimes committed against women in Victoria ([39]).
Her Honour noted the extreme seriousness of the offending and the absence of remorse. Therefore, there was a need for specific and general deterrence in the context of protecting the community from a serious sex offender in respect of charge 5 ([43]). Having regard to the facts, circumstances and available data regarding current sentencing practices, the sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment in respect of charge 5 was not manifestly excessive nor was the relatively modest cumulation of 6 months ([46]). Further, the order for cumulation with respect to charge 3 was found to be necessary to reflect the fact that the 2 rape offences occurred as ‘distinct and separate episodes’ ([47]).
McLean v The Queen [2018] VSCA 209 (24 August 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; Criminal damage x 1; Resisting an emergency worker on duty x 1.
Appeal type: Applicant for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant and his ex-partner argued by text message, culminating in the applicant’s text: ‘Addie won’t had no mother from today’ and ‘I’ll have the last laugh I promise you that’. Addie was their six-month old daughter. On the same day, the applicant broke into his ex-partner’s home, causing damage and turning on the gas before leaving. The applicant was charged with aggravated burglary, in that he entered as a trespasser, intending to destroy property with reckless disregard as to the presence of another person. He was also charged with causing criminal damage and resisting an emergency worker. He was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years.
Issues: The applicant sought leave to appeal on the basis that (1) the sentencing judge erred by imposing a manifestly excessive non-parole period of 80% of the total effective sentence; and (2) his Honour did not explain the necessity for the imposition of the relatively high non-parole period.
Decision and reasoning: The high ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence was such that leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed ([27]). Given the nature of the offending and the applicant’s criminal history, the sentences imposed (leaving to one side the non-parole period) were very modest and not excessive. The Court found that the explanation for the moderate sentence was largely the significance placed by the judge on the prospect of deportation. As the sentence exceeded two years’ imprisonment, the sentencing judge was required by s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)to fix a non-parole period, unless he considered it inappropriate to do so, having regard to the nature of the offence or the offender’s past history. Clearly, his Honour considered it appropriate to fix a non-parole period. s 11(3) required that period to be at least six-months less than the term of the sentence. Here, the non-parole period fixed was, in a sense, the ‘maximum’ period that could be fixed. In determining the non-parole period, the judge was required to take into account the purpose of parole, namely, to provide for mitigation of punishment in favour of rehabilitation after the offender had served the non-parole period (see Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26). The seriousness of the offending was such that justice required a non-parole period of at least two years. Therefore, the high ratio between the head sentence and the non-parole period was explicable by the very modest sentences imposed (and cumulation ordered) for the offences. There was no error in his Honour fixing the non-parole period.
Sawyer-Thompson v The Queen [2018] VSCA 161 (22 June 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Defensive homicide x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The female appellant had been in an abusive and violent relationship with her male partner for 12 months prior to her offending. Her partner threatened to kill her family unless she killed the victim. Acting under the fear of this threat, she killed the victim. The appellant pleaded guilty to defensive homicide.
Issues: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Maxwell ACJ and Tate JA held that the sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years was manifestly excessive. The appellant was re-sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of five years.
The sentencing judge accepted that the killing took place at the direction of the appellant’s violent and abusive partner who had threatened to kill her family unless she killed the victim. She had been subjected to ‘repeated acts of violence, degradation and humiliation at the hands of her partner, who was… a highly dangerous person’. The fact that she proceeded to kill the victim rather than attempting to flee, and that she used excessive violence, ‘could only be understood through the lens of the sustained family violence she had experienced’ ([7]).
Maxwell ACJ and Tate JA held that the sentence imposed reflected a mischaracterisation of the gravity of the offending and of the appellant’s culpability. Insufficient weight was also given to the mitigating factors of cooperation with authority and youth ([65]).
The appellant’s undertaking to assist, and the provision of her statement, reflected remorse and a genuine desire to bring a person to justice ([55]). As a result, discount for cooperation was necessary because ‘there [was] some personal risk’ to the applicant, as a result of which she had already spent some time in protective custody.
Beach JA held that whilst the sentence was stern, it was not manifestly excessive ([133]).
Lewis (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 40 (27 February 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay rule’ – ‘Interlocutory appeal’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; Intentionally cause injury x 2; Recklessly cause injury x 2; Intentionally damage property x 1; Extortion with a threat to kill x 1; False imprisonment x 1; Making threat to kill x 1; Contravening family violence intervention order x 1; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against interlocutory decisions.
Facts: The charges related to an incident of violence committed by the applicant against the aggrieved, his partner. The aggrieved was to be the central witness for the prosecution ([5]-[7]). The aggrieved invoked s 18 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), which provides that a person can avoid giving evidence against their partner if there is a sufficient likelihood that harm would be caused to the person ([9]-[11]). The prosecution then gave notice under s 65 Evidence Act 2008 that they would rely on statements that the aggrieved had made to the police as tendency evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule ([16]).
Issues: The applicant appealed against 3 main interlocutory decisions made by the judge. First, admitting the statements the aggrieved made to the police. Second, refusing to certify the appeal, which is a precondition to appeal against an interlocutory decision under s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). Third, refusing to sever the proceedings for each of the applicant’s charges.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court dismissed all grounds of the appeal. On the first ground, it was reasonably open for the judge to admit the evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The applicant argued that admitting the evidence might lead to prejudice because the aggrieved could not be cross-examined (since she had invoked the protection against giving evidence against a de facto partner) ([58]). The Court held that there were sufficient protections available to ensure a fair trial, including directions against giving too much weight to untested statements ([59]). Accordingly, in relation to the second ground, it was reasonably open for the judge to refuse to certify ([64]). On the third ground, the Court held that many charges stemmed from the same factual basis, so there was no basis to sever the charges ([68]).
The Court observed that the applicant did not seek to challenge the judge’s ruling that the tendency evidence satisfies the requirements of ss 97 and 101, ‘presumably’ because ‘he regards a submission of that kind as foredoomed to fail, based upon the recent decision of the High Court in Hughes v The Queen’ [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017). [72] The Court stated at [73] that:
It is, however, worthy of note that the general evidence of the history of domestic violence, which forms the basis of the tendency notice, may not have quite the probative force in relation to the allegation of the threat to kill and extortion, as it does in relation to the other charges brought against the applicant.
The Court concluded by cautioning trial judges about the use of tendency evidence: ‘[if the tendency] evidence were led, the judge would have to give a careful direction as to how it could be used and, more importantly, how it could not be used’ ([75]).
Saxton v R [2017] VSCA 357 (5 December 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Recklessly cause injury x 4; Common law assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and victim were married and had two children. The applicant worked as a solicitor and the wife, the victim, as a librarian. The applicant had an epileptic seizure, which caused him to stop work and his mental health to decline. The applicant became increasingly controlling of the victim, forcing her to relinquish her financial independence and remain at home with him rather than going to work. The ‘recklessly cause injury’ charges occurred when the applicant punched and hit the victim at home and in their bed. The common assault charge occurred when the applicant twisted her arm so violently that her arm broke. The applicant threatened suicide, and the victim went to the police (see [5], the remarks of the sentencing judge).
The applicant was sentenced to 7 months and 14 days’ imprisonment and a 2-year community correction order ([1]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed (see [28]). The applicant argued that the injuries sustained were at the lower end of the scale, and the broken arms was not intended ([21]). The Court did not accept that submission. Justices Santamaria and Coghlan JJA stated that the offending was ‘serious’ and stemmed from an ‘abusive relationship between the applicant and the victim, who was vulnerable and frightened of the applicant’ ([29]). The Court quotes Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223, discussing the scourge of domestic violence:
The trial courts of this State are imposing sentences for family violence offences with increasing frequency. This Court has repeatedly emphasised the need to condemn family violence, in line with community expectations. In Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 [23], the Court acknowledged the ‘shameful truth’ that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44.
The Court concluded that the principles of general deterrence and denunciation loomed large in the present case, and the sentence was, if anything, merciful ([31]).
DPP v Lade (a pseudonym) [2017] VSCA 264 (21 September 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Breach of family violence intervention order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Intimate photos’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Suicide threats’ – ‘Technology and abuse’
Charges: Sexual assault x 1; Stalking x 2; Attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) x 1; Making threats to kill x 1; threatening to distribute intimate images of another person x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the defendant’s ex-wife. The offences occurred over an 18-month period after they had separated ([7]). The offences included: the defendant forcing the victim onto her bed and ejaculating on her; threatening to distribute intimate photos to the victim’s father and employer if she did not agree to his terms for their property settlement; entering her house and leaving videos of himself; and sending mail to her house ([7]-[22]); threatening to kill himself if the victim did not drop the charges (attempting to pervert the course of justice). The defendant was originally sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment (see table at [2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
The Court (Priest, Hansen and Coghlan JJA) re-sentenced the defendant to 2 years and 11 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years. The primary judge treated the offences as ‘situational in the sense that it was based within a relationship, not that that condones it in any way, shape or form’ [34]. But the Court of Appeal placed more emphasis on the fact that the domestic context, breach of FVIO and offending while in jail were all aggravating factors [49].
The Court appeared to endorse the DPP’s description of the sexual assault as ‘particularly serious … being violent, non-consensual and humiliating for C who was treated as though a marital chattel’ [40].
Nolan v The Queen [2017] VSCA 240 (6 September 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Causing serious injury’ – ‘Gratuitous violence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Not manifestly excessive’ – ‘Presence of children’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Youth’
Charges: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1; False imprisonment x 1; Making threat to kill x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a de facto relationship with two children. Over one afternoon, the appellant inflicted the following actions on the complainant in the presence of the children: throwing a pot of boiling water over her; punching and kicking her; whipping her with a kettle cord; hitting her with a broom; rubbing salt and curry powder into her wounds; and threatening to kill her (see [3]-[11]). The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. The applicant had previously been refused leave to appeal against sentence, but renewed the application to the full Court.
Issues: First, whether the sentencing judge erred in not applying principles relevant to young offenders; and second, whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
The Court (Beach, Ferguson and Coghlan JJA) dismissed the first ground on the basis that the judge took into account the applicant’s age, but also took into account the seriousness of the offences, the fact that the offences took place in a domestic relationship and in the presence of the applicant’s and victim’s children, and the serious injuries inflicted on the victim ([30]-[31]).
The Court dismissed the second ground on the basis that the sentencing judge took into account the applicant’s disadvantaged upbringing, lack of relevant antecedents, plea of guilty and remorse, and no comparable case established that the sentence fell outside the reasonable range ([38]). The Court appeared to endorse the sentencing judge’s comments that this was an unusual case with many aggravating factors ([24]), and that the use of weapons, boiling water and salt as ‘gratuitous and sickening behaviour’ ([22]).
Kalala v R [2017] VSCA 223 (30 August 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Approaching “worst category of case”’ – ‘Current sentencing practices’ – ‘Incitement to murder’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Incitement to murder x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim were in a de facto relationship ([4]). While the victim was visiting relatives in Burundi, the applicant became suspicious that she was seeing another man ([7]). The applicant arranged and paid for the victim to be killed ([8]). While speaking with the victim on the phone, the applicant told her to go outside ([9]). Upon walking outside, the victim was forced into a vehicle, held captive for 2 days and told that she would be killed. However, the kidnappers did not kill her because she was a woman ([10]). The victim returned to Australia. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years ([1]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The main argument advanced by the applicant was that the sentence was the highest yet imposed for the offence, and the circumstances of the offending were not more serious than previous offences ([3]).
President Maxwell and Redlich JA (‘the joint judgement’) made some general conclusions ([3]), including:
•
previous sentences do not impose an upper limit on a sentencing judge (see [51]-[54]);
•
the circumstances of the offending were more serious than previous sentences (see [44]-[50];
•
inciting the murder of a partner is an extreme form of family violence; and
•
previous sentences for incitement to murder have not reflected the objective gravity of the crime, and must be increased (see [66]-[70]).
The joint judgement remarked that the case had many aggravating factors, including the fact that the applicant played an active role in initiating the plan and delivering her into the hands of the kidnappers ([24], [46]). Since it was not suggested that the case warranted the maximum penalty, it was inappropriate to classify the case was a ‘worst category’ case (citing R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48) ([28]). However, the sentence was reasonably open to the sentencing judge ([54]).
The joint judgement stated at [62]:
The applicant’s motivation — to have NR killed as punishment for perceived infidelity — is expressive of the very worst of male attitudes towards women … It follows that this offending must be viewed as involving moral culpability at the highest level.
Justice Osborn agreed with the joint judgement, but was reluctant to express a global view on the adequacy of current sentences for incitement to murder ([92]).
Fitzpatrick v The Queen [2016] VSCA 63 (6 April 2016) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Common assault’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated breach of protection orders’ – ‘Risk factors’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order, common assault, threat to kill, theft x 2, criminal damage.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The principal victim of the offending was the applicant’s former female domestic partner. After the relationship broke down, the victim obtained a family violence intervention order, which the applicant repeatedly breached. One night, the applicant broke into the victim’s house and wrapped a telephone cord tightly around her neck. He threatened to kill her and cut off 40cm from her hair, saying he wanted to disfigure her to the point that no-one else would find her attractive. He then took the victim’s phone, house and car keys and drove away. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years and nine months with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The objective gravity of the offending warranted severe punishment, certainly extending to a sentence of the overall length here. In that regard, Beach JA noted that the persistent contravening of a family violence intervention order was itself extremely serious and was ‘no mere breach of an intervention order of the kind so frequently seen’. The conduct on the night of 29 October 2014 was also extremely serious because it must have been terrifying for the victim, the applicant knew there were children in the house, and the assault was not spontaneous. This was not an act brought about by a temporary loss of self-control, resulting from something said or done by the victim. His Honour stated that instead, ‘it was an act of wanton cruelty intended to humiliate and terrify a defenceless woman in her own home’ (See [37]-[41]).
Byrnes v The Queen [2015] VSCA 341 (10 December 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Contravening a family violence intervention order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, threat to kill, contravening a family violence intervention order, assault with a weapon, assault police, resist police.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim were in a relationship and the victim was 17 weeks pregnant with their child. The applicant wanted the victim to terminate the pregnancy and had made numerous threats against the victim and the baby. A family violence intervention order was made. On the day of offence, the applicant locked the victim inside the house, held a knife against her, and threatened to kill her if she screamed or called the police. He then tried to force the victim into the bath, saying that he was going to abort the baby. He continued to threaten the victim and the baby until he became tearful. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and nine months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In light of the applicant’s mitigating circumstances (his mental condition, his lack of prior convictions and his steps towards rehabilitation), the sentences imposed were high. However, the circumstances of the offence were particularly serious and required the imposition of a sentence that was sufficient to reflect the gravity of offending and to serve the purposes of sentencing including general deterrence and denunciation (See [24]). In particular, at [22]-[23], Kaye JA held:
‘The applicant’s offending had a number of very serious characteristics. As the respondent has pointed out, it was premeditated, and the applicant had clearly prepared for it. The victim was vulnerable. She was carrying the applicant’s baby. The applicant took advantage of his greater strength, and the fact that he had a weapon, to overwhelm her. The threat to abort the baby was, as the judge correctly said, a ‘most ugly’ aspect of the false imprisonment. The whole experience, to which the applicant subjected her, must have been extraordinarily terrifying. She was justifiably in grave fear for her own life and that of her baby. While the imprisonment did not extend for hours or days, it lasted for over one hour, during the whole of which the applicant terrorised his victim.
In those circumstances, the offending by the applicant, comprising charge 1, called for a stern sentence. In such a case, involving wanton domestic violence, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and denunciation were important considerations: Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212at [21] and Mercer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 257at [54]. While the judge accepted that the applicant’s psychological condition moderated the weight to be given to those considerations, nevertheless, they rightly remained important factors in the determination of the applicant’s sentence: R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376, 381’.
DPP v O’Neill [2015] VSCA 325 (2 December 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Male victim’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘People with mental impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Principles in R v Verdins’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charge/s: Murder, arson.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent and the male deceased were in a relationship. The trial judge accepted that the deceased had a dominant and controlling personality while the victim was submissive and often demeaned and belittled by the deceased in public. On the morning of offence, the respondent rejected the deceased’s sexual approach and the deceased called him a ‘frigid bitch’. The respondent tried to apologise but the deceased repeated his abuse. The respondent snapped. He hit the deceased over the head with a steel pan and strangled him with a dog lead. The respondent acted if the deceased was alive for several days before setting fire to their home with the deceased’s body inside. He acted as if the deceased had died accidently until he was arrested.
At sentence, Dr Barth, a psychologist, provided evidence of the respondent’s psychological condition. He diagnosed the respondent as having a maladaptive personality adjustment and as suffering from pervasive feelings of worthlessness, inadequacy and insecurity. The sentencing judge accepted that the respondent’s personality disorder played some role in his offending, and therefore operated to reduce his moral culpability and to moderate to some extent the need for general and specific deterrence. A total effective sentence of 18 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 13 years, was imposed.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
In setting out the background to the matter the Court observed:
The deceased was the dominant partner in the relationship, with the respondent by and large acquiescing to the deceased’s directions. Over the term of the relationship there was regular verbal conflict which intensified with time. The respondent told his psychologist how he was abused and humiliated in front of others by the deceased. Sometimes the conflicts involved verbal abuse and sometimes pushing and shoving. He also told the psychologist that the deceased was sexually demanding of him and if he declined the deceased’s approaches he would call him a ‘frigid bitch’. The respondent said he felt as if the deceased treated him as his own property. Despite all this, the deceased was regarded by the respondent as being loving and affectionate towards him. [7]
The Court also quoted from the earlier sentencing judgment of the Supreme Court, for example:
27 The personalities of both the deceased and the respondent were considered by the judge. Her Honour said this:
Mr Rattle was strong, confident and successful. He also had a dominant, controlling personality; everything had to be done his way, both personally and professionally. No doubt that was part of the key to his professional success. And, because of your own psychological make-up, you felt inadequate; it suited you to be with someone who took control and made all the decisions. But many of your mutual friends have described how Mr Rattle used to demean and belittle you in public. He frequently complained to them that you were not satisfying him sexually. In front of others, he would call you lazy, a parasite; he would threaten to send you back to where you came from. He was critical of your lack of business acumen. There were financial and business pressures on the relationship. In the work context, he treated you like the office boy, not his partner.
The Court provided extensive consideration of the six circumstances identified in R v Verdins in which impaired mental functioning is considered relevant to the appropriate sentence to be passed on an offender (See [66]-[84] in particular). The Court rejected a purely mechanistic approach and they emphasised that careful consideration must be given to whether the evidence establishes that mental capacity has been impaired and which of the circumstances in Verdins are engaged. This requires rigorous evaluation of the evidence (See [68]). Here, the respondent did not establish on the balance of probabilities that he suffered from a mental impairment. As the principles in Verdins do not extend to personality disorders such as those relied upon, the relevant principles (in particular, the moderation of the need for general and specific deterrence, and the reduction of moral culpability) were not engaged (See [85]).
Nevertheless, the respondent’s mental condition was still of some relevance to sentence, it just did not attract the level of mitigation of sentence that must be allowed where Verdins principles are applicable. First, the sentencing judge did not err in accepting that the respondent’s personality disorder operated to moderate, to some extent, the need for general and specific deterrence. Second, the Court also held that on the evidence it was open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the murder of the deceased was not premeditated, vindictive or gratuitous but rather the result of a very complex and conflicted personality structure. In that way, the sentencing judge was correct in taking the respondent’s disorder into account in making an assessment of the moral culpability of the respondent (See [99]-[100]).
The appeal court noted that the sentence was mid-range in light of the trial judge’s rejection of the Crown’s characterisation of the crime as premeditated; the trial judge had noted that while the controlling and belittling behaviour that had characterised Rattle’s relationship with O’Neill did not justify killing him, it did mean that the sentence to be imposed for murder should be towards the lower end of the range for that offence.
DPP v Barnes & Barnes [2015] VSCA 293 (12 November 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, intentionally cause serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: Trevor Barnes (‘the first respondent’) and his younger brother (‘the second respondent’) entered into the premises of the first respondent’s estranged wife, without her consent. Three days prior to the home invasion, the first respondent had been released from prison for offences including assaulting his wife and multiple breaches of an intervention order she had in place against him. The first respondent saw his wife and her new partner in the shower together and smashed the door of the shower. He struck his wife’s new partner and his wife with a jemmy bar before pulling out a Stanley knife. He only stopped when his wife said she loved him. The first respondent was sentenced to six years imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence imposed on the first respondent was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, in relation to the charge of aggravated burglary, Redlich JA noted that this was a very serious offence of ‘intimate relationship aggravated burglary’. The first respondent entered into the house, uninvited and in company, carrying a jemmy bar, with the intention to assault his estranged wife, whom he knew was frightened of him because of his past instances of violence. He had just been released from prison and committed these offences in breach of an intervention order and a partly suspended sentence. As Redlich JA stated at [48]-[49]:
‘General deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are important purposes in sentencing for such an offence … Specific deterrence and protection of the community are also important in this case, given that Trevor had not long since been released from prison for offences that included assaulting Ms Bethune and breaching an intervention order in her favour’.
However, the sentence here failed to adequately reflect these purposes.
Second, in relation to the charges of intentionally causing serious injury, in sentencing the first respondent for these offences, the sentencing judge stated: (See [68])
‘I make it plain that I consider that you are the main offender in this criminal enterprise and the whole appalling saga was dictated by your immaturity and inability to control your anger in the context of your possessive and controlling behaviour of Ms Bethune, whom you had subjected to domestic violence on earlier occasions. In sentencing you, the court must denounce your conduct, give emphasis to general deterrence, and impose just punishment. A strong message needs to be sent to males in the community who are inclined to be violent towards their female partners. You do not own them. You have no right … menacingly [to] control them. If you lay a hand on them in anger, the law will not spare you punishment. Men who are bullies towards women usually have some psychological inadequacy. They need to look long and hard at themselves to try to understand why they are inclined to behave with anger and brutality, and seek professional help to overcome such inclinations.
In your case, emphasis must also be placed upon specific deterrence because of your prior history of violence towards Ms Bethune. As I have indicated, your history of offending whilst on a suspended sentence, and breaching an intervention order, do not inspire optimism’.
Redlich JA noted that while the sentencing judge was clearly alive to the need to place considerable weight on the need for general deterrence, denunciation, just punishment, specific deterrence and protection of the community, the sentences imposed did not adequately reflect these purposes (See [69]).
Uzun v The Queen [2015] VSCA 292 (27 October 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community education’ – ‘Contravening a family violence intervention order’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Making threat to kill’ – ‘Persistent breach’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering a person’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, making a threat to kill x 3, common assault, contravening a family violence intervention order, reckless conduct endangering a person x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and his wife were married and had three children together but separated in 2007. A family violence intervention order was later made against the applicant. In 2013, the applicant went to his wife’s home and committed a number of offences including aggravated burglary, breach of a family violence intervention order, threatening to kill and common assault. At trial, evidence was adduced of three previous incidents where the applicant had been physically and verbally abusive towards his wife and their children. It was adduced as tendency of the applicant to act in a particular way namely, to make threats to kill family members, to assault family members, to falsely imprison family members, and to contravene family violence orders. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of eight years.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge erred in admitting tendency evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive or ‘crushing’.
Decision and Reasoning: Priest JA (Maxwell P and Beale AJA agreeing) dismissed the appeal against conviction. The principles governing the admissibility of tendency reasoning were formulated in Velkoski v The Queen where it was said that:
‘The features relied upon must in combination possess significant probative value which requires far more than ‘mere relevance’. In order to determine whether the features of the acts relied upon permit tendency reasoning, it remains apposite and desirable to assess whether those features reveal ‘underlying unity’, a ‘pattern of conduct’, ‘modus operandi’, or such similarity as logically and cogently implies that the particular features of those previous acts renders the occurrence of the act to be proved more likely. It is the degree of similarity of the operative features that gives the tendency evidence its relative strength’.
Here, consistent with the principles in Velkoski, ’the evidence impugned by the applicant met the necessary high threshold of admissibility. Indeed, the conduct revealed by the tendency evidence was, as I have mentioned, conceded to be strikingly similar to the charged conduct. Given that the live issue for the jury was whether the charged conduct occurred, the evidence introduced as tendency evidence had the potential to shed considerable light on that issue, in circumstances where it could hardly be realistically contended that the probative value of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect’ (See [27]).
Priest JA (Maxwell P and Beale AJA agreeing) also dismissed the appeal against sentence. The total effective sentence and non-parole period could not be said to be excessive in light of the applicant’s extensive and persistent history of criminal offending, the need for general and specific deterrence, his lack of remorse and rehabilitation, and the need for denunciation of his conduct. In particular, Priest JA stated that: ‘general deterrence is important in cases such as this of violence against domestic partners, so as to deter other like-minded individuals from similar offending’ (See [32]-[40]).
Maxwell P (Beale AJA agreeing) made some additional observations at [48]-[50]:
‘Priest JA has referred to the importance of general deterrence and this Court’s repeated statements that sentences imposed for family violence should be set at a level which will send a message to those — predominantly men — who might offend violently against domestic partners or former partners or family members.
Plainly enough, the sentences which the courts impose will not serve that purpose unless the sentences and the reasons for them are properly publicised. As the Court said last year in DPP v Russell(in relation to sentences for random street violence) at [5] and [6]:
‘Obviously enough, … a prison sentence can only have that wider deterrent effect if it is publicised across the community, especially amongst those … who are at risk of offending in this way. Courts have neither the expertise nor the resources to engage in the kind of sustained community education which is necessary if general deterrence is to be a reality. That is a task for government.
After all, it is the responsibility of government to ensure public safety. And government must therefore take responsibility for communicating the deterrent message to those who need to hear it. That requires sustained effort and the commitment of substantial resources. Without that, the community simply will not derive the benefit — in greater public safety — which should flow from the painstaking work of sentencing judges and magistrates in this State. Self-evidently, if the message is not getting through no change in sentencing law can make the difference’.
In view of the community concern about domestic violence and the importance of deterring it, those considerations are particularly pertinent in this area. A copy of the Court's decision in this matter will be forwarded to the Royal Commission on Family Violence for its consideration’.
Mercer (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 257 (17 September 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences’ – ‘Threatening to inflict serious injury’
Charge/s: Assault x 5, intentionally causing injury, threatening to inflict serious injury, false imprisonment.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim was the male applicant’s domestic partner. The applicant accused the victim of concealing drugs, becoming increasingly angry and aggressive. He slapped her, punched her to the side of the face, threw her to the floor, and whipped her with a coat hanger. The applicant then accused the victim of having a relationship with another man. He banged her head against a wall, punched her and threatened to physically harm her. The victim managed to escape but only after she had been confined for several hours. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and six months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. This was a serious example of serious offending. As per Maxwell P and Beach JA at [54]:
‘This Court has said on many occasions that domestic violence will not be tolerated, and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition which must be, and must be seen to be, condemned by the courts: R v Gojanovic [2002] VSC 467, [31]; R v Robertson [2005] VSCA 190, [13]; DPP v Smeaton [2007] VSCA 256, [21]–[22]; R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298, [19]. To borrow from what this Court said recently in Filiz v The Queen, offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to conflict with a partner is one of violent rage. Such a response is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear, and will continue to make it plain, that offending of this kind will attract serious consequences’.
The sentence imposed could not be regarded as manifestly excessive. Indeed, in light of the objective seriousness of the applicant’s conduct and giving full effect to considerations of totality, the sentence imposed by the judge was entirely appropriate (See [55]).
Portelli v The Queen [2015] VSCA 159 (22 June 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating features’ – ‘Assault police officer’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Effects of family violence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally cause serious injury, assault police officer x 3.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was in a de facto relationship with the female victim. A week prior to the offending, the applicant became enraged and, fearful of violence, the victim obtained an interim intervention order. Despite the intervention order, the victim let the applicant stay at her place. On the day of the offence, the applicant cut the complainant’s throat with a razor blade. He then tried to suffocate the complainant with a pillow before producing a serrated knife and trying to cut her throat again. After some time, the applicant stopped attacking the complainant and she asked him to cuddle her because she did not want to die alone. Police arrived and the applicant attacked them with knives in both hands. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 11 years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years and three months.
Issue/s: The sentencing judge erred in making adverse findings about the seriousness of the applicant’s offending namely,
1.
that because of the applicant’s prior experience with drugs, he was aware when he ingested drugs at the time of offending that he was more likely to behave in an abusive, violent manner;
2.
and that there had been an element of planning in the attack on the victim.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Neither finding had been sought by the prosecutor on the plea and the applicant’s counsel were not given notice that the sentencing judge was considering making such findings. Further, there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had the relevant foreknowledge of the effect the drugs would have on him (See [4]). The court also made a number of observations about family violence at [29]-[30]:
‘The sentencing judge described the attack on C as ‘extremely vicious and intolerably abhorrent’. It was clear, His Honour said, that C was terrified:
You made her believe she was going to die. To ask you, her attacker, to comfort her after your attack because she thought she was going to die reveals how frightening the experience must have been for her. Yet she was in her home in the presence of an intimate partner and entitled to feel safe and secure. She was doing no more than going about her ordinary life. I do not think that she trusted you; rather, she was in fear of your confrontations when denied what you wanted. Undoubtedly, your vicious attack will be an ongoing nightmare for her. It is clear that the community is intolerant of violent behaviour in such circumstances and expects the courts to send a strong message that behaviour of this kind is totally unacceptable. Women in domestic situations are entitled to feel safe from the violently abusive behaviour of their ex-partners. This circumstance is a significant aggravating feature.
We respectfully agree. What his Honour said accords with recent statements of this Court on the subject of violent attacks by men on their current or former domestic partners. In Filiz v The Queen, the Court said:
It is a shameful truth that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44. It is also sadly true that there are a great number of women who live in real and justified fear of the men who are, or were, their intimate partners.
In Pasinis v The Queen, the Court said:
Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence. The victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities. The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm.
Most recently, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Meyers, the Court said:
Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. The statistics about the incidence of women being killed or seriously injured by vengeful former partners are truly shocking’. See also DPP v Portelli [2013] VSC 588.
Hopkins v The Queen [2015] VSCA 174 (19 June 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of offending’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following a plea of guilty, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30 years for the murder of his de facto partner. Both the applicant and the victim were heavy users of illicit drugs and the relationship was characterised by violence committed by the applicant against the victim. On the day of the offence, the applicant poured petrol over the victim at a petrol station and set her alight. The victim was conscious and screaming the entire time while the applicant taunted her. He actively prevented bystanders from helping the victim by threatening them with a knife. In sentencing the applicant, the judge concluded that the applicant’s behaviour was an example of ‘the worst kind of viciousness and sadistic behaviour that a court is likely to ever see’.
Issue/s: The head sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive. In particular, the sentencing judge erred in placing this murder in the worst category of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. While the applicant’s conduct arose out of a drug-fuelled rage, it was very clear the applicant understood what he was doing. In this context, his drug consumption did not reduce his moral culpability in any way (See [42]). Further, significant aggravating circumstances were present which explained why the objective gravity of the offence was elevated namely, the circumstances of the death, the applicant’s conduct at the time of offence, and the fact that others were exposed to this horrific event (See [45]). The applicant’s guilty plea and criminal history were given adequate weight.
DPP v Maxfield [2015] VSCA 95 (12 May 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Community correction order’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female respondent stabbed her male partner four times: twice in the shoulder, once in the lower back and once in the chest. The respondent suffered from a mild intellectual disability and PTSD. She was sentenced to a Community Correction Order (CCO) for 12 months, with conditions including mental health treatment, compliance with a justice plan and the supervision of a community corrections officer.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. In light of the respondent’s intellectual disability and mental illness, her moral culpability was reduced, as was the significance of general and specific deterrence. However, even allowing for the respondent’s reduced moral culpability, the sentence imposed was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of just punishment and denunciation, given the objective gravity of the offence (See [36]-[38]).
In re-sentencing the respondent, the Court had regard to the Court’s guideline judgment in Boulton v The Queen. The Court praised the trial judge for imposing a CCO, which was appropriate in an unusual case such as this. The objective of community protection was more likely to be achieved – through the reduction of the risk of reoffending – by making such an order with appropriate conditions attached, rather than imposing a prison sentence (See [34]-[35]). However, the length of the CCO was increased to three years and greater conditions imposed.
Marocchini v The Queen [2015] VSCA 29 (25 February 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Alternative sentencing orders’ – ‘Assault police’ – ‘Community correction order’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering serious injury’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Criminal damage x 2, reckless conduct endangering serious injury, recklessly causing serious injury, threat to kill, assaulting police, various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and one of the victims were married. The applicant suspected his wife was having an affair with their neighbour. Accordingly, he placed a tracking device on his wife’s car, located her, drove dangerously, threatened to kill her and damaged her vehicle. The total effective sentence was 3 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Court considered whether the imposition of a ‘Community Correction Order’ (CCO) would have been more appropriate than imprisonment. Beach JA quoted extensively from Boulton v The Queen, an important guideline judgment about CCO’s. In Boulton, it was noted that imprisonment should always be the last resort, and that a CCO is an alternative punitive option, even for ‘relatively serious offences which might previously have attracted a term of imprisonment’ (See at [23] – [26]).
While Beach JA acknowledged that this was a serious offence, with a number of aggravating features, a CCO should have been ordered here. The offending occurred over a relatively short time, the appellant was married with four children, had no criminal history and he had the support of his wife who was the principal victim. The sentence was set aside and substituted for a sentence of four months’ imprisonment and a CCO of three years’ duration with conditions including 300 hours of unpaid community work (See at [30]). This case confirms that where such mitigating factors exist (particularly a lack of criminal history), the sentencing objectives can be achieved by combining a short term of imprisonment with a CCO. However, Beach JA noted that this would not have applied if the appellant had a criminal history.
The relevant passage in Boulton that his Honour referred to is – ‘The availability of the combination sentence option adds to the flexibility of the CCO regime. It means that, even in cases of objectively grave criminal conduct, the court may conclude that all of the purposes of the sentence can be served by a short term of imprisonment coupled with a CCO of lengthy duration, with conditions tailored to the offender’s circumstances and the causes of the offending’.
DPP v Meyers [2014] VSCA 314 (4 December 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Seriousness’
Charge/s: Damaging property, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment, intentionally causing injury, possessing an unregistered firearm.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim was the male respondent’s ex-partner. On the day of the offence, the respondent drove to the victim’s premises with a double-barrelled shotgun, a power nail gun, a crow bar, cable ties and rolls of gorilla tape, various knives and cutting tools, and a plastic drop sheet. He smashed his way into the house and attempted to restrain the victim with cable ties. The victim struggled and the applicant struck her with the shotgun and started strangling her. He eventually managed to restrain the victim. After three and a half hours, police attended the premises and the applicant let the victim go. The respondent was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. For the fourth time in six months, the Court here was concerned with sentencing for an offence of aggravated burglary committed by a male offender against his former domestic partner, ‘intimate relationship aggravated burglary’ (See [3]-[4]). At [5]-[6] the Court said:
‘On this appeal, as in each of the previous appeals, the offender submitted that what was said by the Court in Hogarth— about the need to increase sentences [for confrontational aggravated burglary] — had little or no application to aggravated burglary where the victim was a former domestic partner. That submission failed on each previous occasion, and we likewise reject it.
As these reasons demonstrate, the task of applying Hogarth does not require the classification of offences into categories. Put simply, Hogarth established that current sentencing practices (‘CSP’) for serious forms of aggravated burglary needed to change, as they did not reflect the objective seriousness of such offending. Aggravated burglaries which involve confrontation and violence, or threats of violence, should be viewed very seriously, whether the target of the attack is a former domestic partner or a person against whom some other grievance is held’.
In reaching this decision, the Court made some observations about domestic violence offending. At [45]-[46] they stated:
‘We would wish to endorse the remarks in Filizat [21]-[23] about the particular seriousness of offending involving former domestic partners. Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. The statistics about the incidence of women being killed or seriously injured by vengeful former partners are truly shocking. Although the cases under consideration do not fall into that worst category, they are symptomatic of what can fairly be described as an epidemic of domestic violence.
General deterrence is, accordingly, a sentencing principle of great importance in cases such as these. Those who might, in a mood of anger or frustration or bitterness, contemplate this kind of violent entry into the home of a former spouse or partner must realise that, if they do so, they will almost certainly spend a long time in prison’.
Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 (11 September 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Contravention of family violence intervention order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship to sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary with intention to assault, intentionally causing serious injury x 2, theft, contravening a Family Violence Intervention Order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant had been in a relationship with the female complainant for ten years and they had three children together. A Family Violence Intervention Order was made against the applicant in relation to the complainant and their children. On the night of the offence, the complainant was lying in bed with her new partner. The applicant kicked open her bedroom door and started striking the complainant and her partner with a curtain rod. The complainant telephoned the police and the applicant fled. Another intervention order was obtained which prohibited the applicant from contacting the complainant. He breached this order on two occasions. The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and ten months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Redlich JA’s comments at [21]-[23] have often been cited in subsequent cases:
‘Senior counsel for the applicant rightly conceded that general deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in this case, not only in relation to aggravated burglary generally, but most particularly in relation to violent offending against a former domestic partner: Felicite v The Queenat [20]; DPP v Pasinisat [53]. Of particular significance is the fact that the applicant was already subject to a Family Violence Intervention Order. Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to the breakdown of a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear that such offending will attract serious consequences and even harsher penalties where it involves the breach of an order which exists for the victim’s protection: Cotham v The Queenat [14]; DPP v Johnsonat [38]-[49].
At the oral hearing it was said that the complainant’s fear would have been greater if her home had been invaded by strangers seeking to steal personal property. It was suggested that the context of the offending affected its seriousness. We do not accept that these matters affect the objective gravity of the offences. The level of fear engendered by the applicant, in kicking in the locked bedroom door and proceeding to beat the victims with an iron rod, did not have to be evaluated according to such niceties. The attack the applicant launched upon his ex-partner was strongly suggestive of a desire to do her and her partner serious harm, and anybody in their position would have feared that such harm would occur. The complainant’s victim impact statement makes clear that the physical and emotional effects will be lasting.
It is a shameful truth that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44. It is also sadly true that there are a great number of women who live in real and justified fear of the men who are, or were, their intimate partners. In such circumstances, the submission that the complainant’s level of fear when being attacked by her ex-partner was less than it might have been if she had been attacked by a stranger should be rejected’.
Although there were a number of relevant factors in mitigation – that is, the applicant’s relatively early plea (but absent any remorse), his previous good character, his rehabilitation, both actual and prospective, work history and solid family support, and the difficulties he would suffer in prison when separated from his children, these had to be balanced against the aggravating factors of the offending and the need for general deterrence discussed above, as well as the need for specific deterrence, just punishment and denunciation. In light of this, it could not be said that the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [29]).
Curypko v The Queen [2014] VSCA 192 (29 August 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Context evidence’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant was the male applicant’s de facto partner. The applicant repeatedly and brutally assaulted the complainant over a four year period. The charged offence occurred in 1989 and concerned a ten hour assault by the applicant which included striking the complainant multiple times and breaking her jaw, hitting her with various objects, heating up a knife and dragging this across her neck, and stabbing her with a syringe. The applicant was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. There was a substantial delay between the offending and the applicant being charged – some 24 years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the maximum penalty, the long delay and the applicant’s rehabilitation during that period, the guilty plea, the applicant’s youth when he offended, and sentencing practice at the time of offence.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in concluding that the gravity of the offending required the applicant’s youth at the time of offending, the delay and his rehabilitation in the interim must ‘give way’.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in departing from the agreed statement of facts and in relying on the Victim Impact Statement as evidence of uncharged offending providing context for the charged offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Ashley JA acknowledged that the delay was substantial and as such merited substantial consideration as a matter of fairness to the accused. During that period, the applicant had ‘reformed’ (at [65]), was in a stable relationship, had a child, and was able to demonstrate rehabilitation. Notwithstanding this, the sentence imposed at trial, though harsh, was within the discretion of the primary judge.
Second, the sentencing judge did not fall into error by concluding that mitigating factors including delay, rehabilitation and the applicant’s youth, ‘had to take a back seat to circumstances which favoured a greater sentence’ (at [41]). The seriousness of the offending as an example of severe domestic violence meant that just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence took prime consideration. An argument that the delay in bringing the proceedings reduced the need for general deterrence was dismissed. The delay here was connected to the complainant’s fear and trauma and then further delay was caused by change in investigators (See [53]-[56]).
Third, the sentencing judge did not err in referring to statements made by the victim to the police, in supplementing the general description of the assaults relied upon for contextual purposes by recourse to statements made by the complainant, and by referring to the victim impact statement. In particular, the circumstances of earlier assaults were, as the judge repeatedly stated, admitted for contextual purposes only (See [34]-[39]).
Marrah v The Queen [2014] VSCA 119 (18 June 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Contravening an intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury, rape, threat to kill.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: There numerous family violence incidents between the male applicant and the female respondent during their relationship. A family violence intervention order was active at the time of offending. On the day of offence, the applicant and the complainant were arguing after the applicant accused her of having sexual relations with other men. The applicant punched the complainant, picked her up by her hair and threw her to the floor, kicked her several times, and banged her head on the floor. He also grabbed her around the neck such that she could not breathe and the applicant repeatedly shoved his fingers in the complainant’s vagina. He retrieved two knives and said he would kill her and her dog. The applicant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of ten years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The gravity of the applicant’s conduct was aggravated by the fact the applicant was subject to a family violence intervention order. As Tate JA said at [25]:
‘The gravity of the offending was aggravated by the fact that the applicant was at the time the subject of an intervention order, which he flagrantly disregarded. Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to difficulties in a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. The sentences must convey the unmistakeable message that male partners have no right to subject their female partners to threats or violence. The sentences must be of such an order as to strongly denounce violence within a domestic relationship’.
However, the orders for cumulation did not produce an aggregate sentence that was commensurate with the gravity of the whole of the offending (See [21]-[22], [27]-[28]).
Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 (22 May 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Effects of family violence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences for victims’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury (ICSI) x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant were in a de facto relationship. On the day of the first offence, the applicant began punching the complainant and went to kick her in the face. The complainant put up her left arm to protect herself and the applicant’s kick broke her arm. After some delay, the applicant took her to the hospital. Three months later, the applicant started hitting the complainant and again the complainant put her arm up to defend herself and the applicant broke her right arm. Despite her excruciating pain, the applicant did not take the complainant to the doctor until the following day.
When the incidents were first charged, the applicant and the complainant had resumed their relationship and concocted a false version of events to exonerate the applicant. The relationship subsequently ended and the complainant went to the police. They were both charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. The applicant was also charged with two counts of ICSI and sentenced to eight years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive and the sentencing judge failed to give appropriate consideration to the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence imposed could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Further, the totality principle was appropriately applied. Kyrou AJA made a number of observations about family violence that have been cited in a number of subsequent judgments. The Court considered the serious consequences of violent domestic assaults and emphasised the importance of general deterrence in cases involving offences committed in the context of family violence. As at [53]-[54]:
‘Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
The effects of family violence are now well documented. They are not confined to physical injury. Victims often feel responsible for the violence and ashamed that they were not able to prevent the perpetrator from offending. As occurred in this case, it is common for victims to deny or conceal that their partners have assaulted them until the violence becomes unbearable… Victims who have been dominated, controlled and beaten by their partners over a significant period experience serious and longlasting psychological trauma. As in the present case, the physical effects of the violence and its erosion of the victim’s confidence can also affect their ability to participate in paid work and have other serious financial effects’.
His Honour reiterated at [57]:
‘General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence. The victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities. The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm’.
Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51 (28 March 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant had been in a relationship for 13 years. The complainant alleged that in April 2011 the appellant hit her after she refused to have sex with him. She described this as the ‘last straw’ and told the appellant she was leaving him. They remained living in the same house. One month later, the intoxicated appellant forced her into bed and penetrated her with his penis. Their son saw the incident and called the police.
At trial, the Crown sought to admit evidence of physical assaults by the appellant against the complainant that occurred between 1999 and 2003 (none of these assaults happened after the complainant refused to have intercourse with the appellant). The Crown argued that this evidence explained the context in which the alleged rape occurred, and was relevant to whether the complainant had freely agreed to have intercourse with the appellant and whether the appellant was aware that the complainant was not consenting or might not be consenting on the night of the alleged offence. The trial judge took account of the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence but considered that it was both relevant to and probative of the facts in issue and should be admitted for the limited purpose described in her ruling (see [19]-[23]).
Issue/s: The trial judge erred in admitting evidence of past conduct by the appellant because the evidence was not relevant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Neave JA held (Bongiorno and Coghlan JJA agreeing) that the evidence was inadmissible. Bongiorno and Coghlan JJA also held that there was a miscarriage of justice (Neave JA in dissent). Neave JA first considered whether the ‘relationship evidence’ (evidence of physical assaults) was relevant. Her Honour stated generally at [29]:
‘Evidence of the relationship between an accused and the alleged victim of an offence may be relevant and admissible for the purpose of placing the event which is the subject matter of the offence in context, where such evidence may assist the jury to evaluate the conduct of the complainant and the applicant on the occasion which gave rise to the charge. Where the evidence is of criminal or other disreputable acts committed by the accused, so that there is a danger that the jury will treat it as evidence that the accused has a propensity to commit acts of the kind charged, the judge must warn the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence can be used. In particular the jury must be told that the relationship evidence cannot be regarded as a substitute for the evidence that the accused committed the charged acts, or for the purpose of showing that the accused is ‘the kind of person’ likely to have committed that offence (R v Grech (1997) 2 VR 609)’.
Neave JA went on to consider the circumstances in which relationship evidence may be relevant. At [31], Her Honour noted that relationship evidence of prior violence by the accused towards the complainant may be admissible in sexual offence cases ‘because it assists the jury to evaluate whether the complainant had freely agreed to sexual activity on the occasion to which the charge relates, or whether the accused knew that the complainant had not consented or might not have consented to having sex on that occasion’: see, for example, R v Loguancio [2000] VSCA 33; (2000) 1 VR 235, 23 (Callaway JA).
At [33], Her Honour noted that relationship evidence of prior acts of violence by the accused ‘may also be admissible where a person is charged with homicide or an offence arising out of the infliction of injury on a victim, because such evidence is relevant in evaluating the accused person’s claim that he or she had an amicable relationship with the victim, or that he or she acted in self-defence’: see, for example, Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334 and R v Mala (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Brooking, Ormiston, Batt JJA, 27 November 1997).
In this case, the appellant correctly conceded that evidence of the April 2011 assault when she refused to have sexual intercourse with him only a month before the alleged rape was relevant in assessing the likelihood that she had in fact voluntarily agreed to have intercourse with him or he believed that she had done so (see [35]). However, Neave JA held at [36]-[37] that:
‘[D]espite the appalling nature of the earlier assaults, I consider that the evidence of those assaults was not sufficiently relevant to the nature of the relationship which existed at the time of the alleged rape to the admission of that evidence. There was a lengthy time lapse between the earlier assaults and the alleged rape. Of itself, that time lapse might not have made the evidence irrelevant…’
‘However in this case there was not only a significant time delay between the alleged rape and the earlier assaults, but the complainant remained with the applicant despite the assaults and bore him children after those assaults had occurred. It may be that she did not leave him earlier because she was afraid of him, but there was no evidence that he had assaulted her because she refused to have sex with him, prior to April 2011’.
Bongiorno and Neave JJA agreed with the reasons set out by Neave JA as to why the evidence was inadmissible. However, they also held that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice as a conviction in this case was not inevitable: see Baini v The Queen [2012] HCA 59; (2012) 246 CLR 469. Neave JA in dissent at [52]-[61].
Freeman v The Queen [2011] VSCA 349 (9 November 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Desire to inflict emotional harm on another parent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had recently divorced from Ms Barnes, the mother of his four year old daughter (the victim). Consent orders were made in the Family Court which reduced the applicant’s share of custody. The applicant was distressed by this outcome. A few days later, he was driving with his three children and had a telephone conversation with Ms Barnes, telling her that she would never see her children again. He pulled the car over and threw his four year old daughter off a bridge.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There were a number of aggravating circumstances on the facts including that the applicant killed an innocent child, the circumstances of the killing were horrendous and the child’s death would have been painful and protracted, the applicant’s conduct was a fundamental breach of trust, the killing was in the presence of his two sons, the applicant killed his daughter in an attempt to hurt his former wife as much as possible, the crime was committed in a public place, the applicant offended the public conscience, and the applicant threatened his ex-wife in the presence of their children (see [15]). The most heinous nature and gravity of the applicant’s offending, his lack of remorse and poor prospects for rehabilitation, meant that a non-parole period of 32 years was not manifestly excessive.
DPP v Johnson [2011] VSCA 288 (23 September 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Breach involving a child’ – ‘Contravening/breaching a family intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, assault, contravening a family intervention order.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent entered the house of his former female partner, the complainant, with two knives and with the intention of killing himself in front of her. The complainant awoke and started screaming. This woke their daughter and the respondent left the premises (aggravated burglary and assault). The applicant was also charged with breach of a family violence intervention order which included conduct of a home invasion four days prior to the aggravated burglary, telephoning the complainant and threatening her and her family, and by coming within 200 metres of the complainant’s house on the night of the offence.
He was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for aggravated burglary, six months imprisonment for assault, and six months imprisonment for contravening a family intervention order. The sentencing judge took the view that the circumstances surrounding the burglary and assault were ‘almost identical’ to those surrounding the breach and ordered the sentence for breach to be made wholly concurrent with these sentences. After cumulation, a head sentence of one year and nine months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of ten months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with Redlich, Neave and Bongiorno JA providing separate reasoning. The judges gave detailed consideration to matters relevant to sentencing for breach of an intervention order.
Neave JA (Bongiorno JA agreeing) agreed with Redlich JA in part but held that the sentence imposed for the breach of the intervention order was manifestly inadequate. Her Honour stated that the frequency with which intervention orders are breached – and the potentially tragic consequences of this – warrants strong judicial condemnation of the contravention of such offences. As per Her Honour at [4]-[5]:
‘All Australian states have enacted legislation which is intended to protect potential victims of family violence from physical injury and from being placed in fear by harassment or threats. Family violence is a serious problem in Australia. In 2004, it was reported that family violence is ‘the leading contributor of death, disability and illness in women in Victoria aged 15 to 44 years’. Breach of intervention orders is relatively common. In its Report on Breaching Intervention Orders, the Sentencing Advisory Council said that, between July 2004 and June 2007, the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria and the County Court of Victoria imposed on average approximately 14,000 intervention orders per year. Over a quarter of all intervention orders imposed were breached.
Further, offenders who breach orders and continue to threaten and assault their partners may go on to seriously injure or even kill them. As was recognised during parliamentary debates on the Family Violence Protection Bill 2008, intervention orders can only protect victims of threatened violence if they are effectively enforced and if breach of an order attracts an appropriate sentence. The Victorian Law Reform Commission, in its report which ‘underpin[ned]’ many of the changes in the Bill, observed:
The response to a breach of an intervention order is crucial to ensuring the intervention order system is effective in protecting family violence victims. If police or the courts do not respond adequately to breaches of intervention orders, they will be perceived as ineffectual – ‘not worth the paper they are written on’ – by victims and perpetrators alike’.
Here, the respondent’s conduct that formed the basis of the breach was conceptually distinguishable from the other offences, including the aggravated burglary. The respondent also had a significant history of breaching these orders and displayed contempt for such orders. Accordingly, the sentence imposed for breach an intervention order was manifestly inadequate.
Redlich JA (with whom Neave JA and Bongiorno JA agreed in part) held that the sentence imposed for the aggravated burglary was manifestly inadequate. In dissent, His Honour held that the sentence for the breach of the intervention was not manifestly inadequate. However, upon re-sentencing the respondent, the sentence imposed for breach of an intervention order was lenient and thus a substantially higher sentence was warranted in the circumstances.
Redlich JA concluded that the sentencing judge erred by having regard to the respondent’s claims that his previous breaches were ‘innocuous or insignificant’ (at [49]). In reaching this conclusion, His Honour noted that it was an aggravating feature of the offending that the respondent had repeatedly contravened intervention orders. Accordingly, the principles of general and specific deterrence had to assume particular importance here (See [42]-[43]). As per the Court in R v Cotham at [14]:
‘Intervention orders must be strictly adhered to, and it is very much in the interests of the community that those against whom such orders are made be under no misapprehension that the courts will punish severely those who breach such orders. The applicant’s actions suggest that he believed he could breach the intervention order with impunity. Only by appropriately severe penalties can the courts make clear to the applicant and the broader community that such conduct will not be tolerated’.
It was also an aggravating feature that the breach involved a child who was protected by the order because such orders are granted pursuant to a legislative regime that places ‘particular emphasis on the protection of children from family violence’ (See [45]).
Redlich JA also concluded that the sentencing judge erred in ordering the sentence for the breach to be wholly concurrent. The offence of breach was not part of a single episode of offending (See [52]-[53]). As per the comments in R v Maher at [16] relating to cumulation and concurrency:
‘I turn to the relationship between, on the one hand, the stalking counts and the burglary and aggravated burglary, and, on the other hand, the breaches of the intervention order. It appears to me that the distinct criminality of the offending means that there should be some cumulation between the sentences imposed. Breaches of the intervention order, were in terms, disobedience of a court order. It would be inappropriate if that was not reflected in the breaches having real impact upon sentence. But, to meet the totality point, some amelioration of the individual sentences for the breaches and on the other counts is, in my view, required’.
Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274 (9 September 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The relationship between the male applicant and his wife, the victim, was characterised by the applicant’s ‘inability to control his anger’ (at [2]). The victim met another man and said she was ending her relationship with the applicant. A few days later, during the course of an argument, the applicant stabbed the victim repeatedly in the neck and throat. At least part of the attack was witnessed by their four year old son. He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Redlich JA at [20]:
‘The taking of a domestic partner’s life undermines the foundations of personal relationships and family trust upon which our society rests. The sentence must reflect both the sanctity of human life and societies’ abhorrence of violence towards vulnerable and trusting partners who could legitimately have expected the offender to be the protector, not the perpetrator of violent abuse. An outburst of homicidal rage in such contexts is totally unacceptable. The community expectation is that the punishment assigned to such conduct must be condign so as to denounce in the strongest terms the abhorrent nature of domestic murder and to deter others from taking a similar course. Accordingly the principles of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment will ordinarily be given primacy in sentencing for the murder of a partner in a domestic setting even where there are present, circumstances of provocation or great emotional stress’.
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. It appropriately reflected the considerable weight given to the principles of general deterrence and just punishment arising from the spousal relationship between the applicant and the victim (See [36]).
El Tahir v The Queen [2011] VSCA 46 (4 March 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury, breach of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the applicant’s estranged wife. The complainant obtained an intervention order against the applicant. In the presence of their two children, the applicant stabbed the complainant in the back, slashed her fingers, punched her, kicked her and pulled some of her hair out.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held at [23] that ‘the sentence was not manifestly excessive and, indeed, properly reflected the gravity of the offence after taking into account all mitigatory factors including the plea of guilty. The Court rightly treated with the utmost seriousness the appellant’s knife attack on his defenceless wife in the presence of their children and in circumstances which included the invasion of her home in breach of a court order. Further, the relative brevity of the non-parole period might be thought to properly and adequately take into account the personal circumstances of the appellant’.
Kane v R [2010] VSCA 213 (23 August 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury, intentionally causing injury, common assault, criminal damage, breach of an intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending was spread over two indictments. The male applicant and Rachel Delaney were in a de facto relationship. She was married to, but separated from, Daniel Smyth. During the applicant’s relationship with Ms Delaney, there were repeated incidents of tension and conflict between him and Mr Smyth. After Ms Delaney informed the applicant that their relationship was over, he broke into her house and attacked Mr Smyth (who was also present). He bit of a large part of Mr Smyth’s nose and held Ms Delaney by the throat. The applicant was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Nettle JA cited with approval the sentencing judge’s remarks that, ‘it is incumbent on a sentencing judge to impose condign punishment in a case like this in order to send a clear message to likeminded people that a civilised society does not condone people using physical violence to take the law in their own hands to settle disputes and deal with domestic partners in a violent way. Her Honour also observed, correctly, that inasmuch as these attacks were cowardly, unprovoked and unexpected attacks, there was a particular need for specific deterrence’.
However, as the Crown conceded here, the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [24]-[25]). Nettle JA further noted that, although this was not the case in which to do so, there was a need to revisit sentencing practices in relation to offences of intentionally causing injury (See [25], [29]-[30]).
Smith v The Queen [2010] VSCA 192 (29 July 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Need to condemn family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship. They were arguing and the applicant started punching and striking the complainant. The applicant was sentenced to three years and three months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in failing to have any regard or sufficient regard to the attitude of the victim.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There was an assertion from counsel for the applicant that the complainant did not want these charges to be pursued (but no evidence from the complainant to substantiate these assertions). Beach AJA held that the sentencing judge was not bound to give any weight to the unsupported assertions made about the complainant’s attitude to the prosecution. His Honour referred to Neave JA in R v Hester at [27] and held that, ‘even in cases where there is evidence of forgiveness of the victim of domestic violence, this evidence should be treated with extreme caution’ (See [8]).
Further, notwithstanding the applicant’s attempts to deal with his drug and violence problems since being remanded in custody, the sentence imposed was well open and could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge properly took into account the personal circumstances of the appellant, the appellant’s bad criminal record, principles of general deterrence, specific deterrence and denunciation. As per Beach AJA, ‘this Court has said on many occasions that domestic violence will not be tolerated and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition which must be, and must be seen to be, condemned by the courts’. In the circumstances, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive (See [11]).
Kanakaris v The Queen [2010] VSCA 120 (28 May 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Common assault x 4, intentionally causing injury x 3, threat to kill x 2, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 13 offences, involving appalling physical violence, humiliation and abuse committed against his female de facto partner, sister, mother and four year old daughter. The total effective sentence was nine years and three months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s plea of guilty.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in fixing the non-parole period.
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground of appeal was dismissed but the second ground of appeal allowed. The applicant’s contention that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his plea of guilty was dismissed. The offending here was extremely serious. The conduct involved constituted breach of an intervention order, it was well planned and involved the use of an accomplice, the applicant was armed and threatened his partner, he took away her children, and she was unable to escape for six hours. His Honour also noted the that maximum penalties for aggravated burglary and intentionally causing serious injury as 25 years and 20 years respectively (See [70]-[72]). It was clear that the trial judge incorporated the discount for the plea of guilty in her orders of accumulation, which were only 12 months on the base sentence.
However, the appeal was allowed on the basis of the non-parole period. It was noted that a seven year non-parole period is ‘very substantial’. Coghlan JA concluded that the primary judge must have imposed such a substantial non-parole period because of a ‘guarded view taken of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation’ (at [83]). However, the applicant had no criminal history and had pleaded guilty. As such, His Honour concluded that the primary judge erred in imposing such a long non-parole period on the basis of her conclusion on rehabilitation alone. The non-parole period was reduced to six years.
Neave JA agreed with Coghlan AJA but made some brief remarks about the complaint of manifestly excess. She noted at [4]:
‘Notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances to which the learned sentencing judge referred, the shocking violence which the offender inflicted on those he professed to love required strong denunciation and considerable emphasis on both general and specific deterrence’.
R v Bastan; DPP v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157 (4 August 2009) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence; Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant gave evidence that her marriage to the applicant was arranged by her parents. After the applicant was aggressive, she fled to a women’s refuge. They were divorced and the complainant obtained a family violence intervention order. The applicant began sending text messages to the complainant, masquerading as another man. The complainant invited this man to her house but told the applicant to leave when he arrived. He then dragged her to the bedroom, forced her onto the bed and penetrated her vagina with his penis. The applicant was found guilty after a trial and sentenced to four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Crown appeal against sentence was allowed. In upholding the appeal, Buchanan JA said at [36]:
‘I consider that the sentence would generally be regarded as inadequate if imposed upon an offender who tricked his way into the house of a stranger and raped her. The fact that the applicant and the complainant, in the past, had shared a consensual sexual relationship may have played a part in producing this sentence. In my opinion it should have played no part save insofar as those who have been in a relationship should be deterred from asserting any right or power in a like fashion against their former partners. This rape constituted an act of dominion by the applicant over the complainant’s body, which is not to be tolerated. In my opinion, the sentence, and in particular the non-parole period, was manifestly inadequate and represents an error that warrants interference by this Court’.
Earl v The Queen [2008] VSCA 162 (25 August 2008) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Offences at home’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of an argument, the applicant punched his wife, the complainant, six times in the head. The complainant did not seek medical attention for two days. She was admitted to hospital and found to have a large sub-arachnoid haemorrhage. She was also discovered to have carotid aneurysms. As a result of the carotid aneurysms, the complainant suffered permanent changes to her life and could no longer live independently. It was acknowledged by the sentencing judge that, on the basis of medical evidence, it was not possible to know for certain whether there was a causal link between the applicant’s attack and the serious medical events that followed. The applicant was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment suspended after 10 months for a period of 12 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence could not be said to be beyond the range of sound sentencing discretion. Despite the limited nature and extent of the attack, and the injuries which it was shown to have caused, the offence was still serious. The complainant was a person with limited cognitive impairment and, to that extent, she was vulnerable and in need of care and support. The complainant was entitled to the applicant’s love and protection as his wife but was instead assaulted by the applicant in their own home. Nettle JA said at [23]:
‘As such, the offence involved a gross breach of trust in the place where the victim was most entitled to feel safe. General deterrence is of real importance in cases of domestic violence, especially in cases where victims are particularly vulnerable. And because of the applicant's prior convictions, aged as they were, it was apparent that there was a need for some measure of specific deterrence’.
R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298 (29 November 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Difficulty of leaving’ – ‘Evidence of forgiveness’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Need to condemn’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim impact statements’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing injury, intentionally causing serious injury, false imprisonment.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant were in an intimate relationship. On two occasions the applicant physically assaulted the complainant while intoxicated. On the second incident of assault, he also detained the complainant for 45 minutes and refused to let her seek medical attention. At sentence, a victim impact statement was tendered in which the complainant said she was partly to blame for the second incident and that she wanted to resume a relationship with the applicant. The applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in ignoring the victim impact statement for sentencing purposes.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing judge did not err in not taking into account the part of the victim impact statement in which the complainant assumed blame for the second offending. There was also no substance in the claim that the sentencing judge failed to have regard to have proper regard to the complainant’s attitude to her relationship with the applicant (see [13]). Second, the sentences imposed were balanced, if not lenient, in all the circumstances. The offending was very serious – it was a savage, brutal and cowardly act on a victim who was physically much weaker than the attacker. Chernov JA also noted that the Courts have stated on a number of occasions that ‘such domestic violence will not be tolerated and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition’ (see [19]-[20]).
Neave JA agreed with Chernov JA and added at [27]:
‘It is a common pattern of behaviour for perpetrators of domestic violence to express penitence and persuade their victims to reconcile. For a number of complex reasons which have been discussed in the social science literature dealing with this issue, many victims are assaulted on several occasions before they summon the courage to leave an abusive relationship. Often they require considerable support in order to do so. In my view, these are matters which should be given considerable weight by a judge who is considering the weight that should be given to a victim impact statement made by a person who has been the victim of domestic violence. I therefore agree with the comments of Simpson JA in R v Glen at 4 that evidence of forgiveness of the victim of domestic violence should be treated with extreme caution’.
DPP v Smeaton [2007] VSCA 256 (15 November 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Blaming the victim’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent saw the victim, his ex-girlfriend, at a Shopping Centre and became abusive and aggressive after she refused to help him ‘score’ heroin. He punched her and kicked her repeatedly in the head when she fell to the ground. The respondent was sentenced to three years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. It was possible to infer that after being refused heroin, the respondent ‘snapped’ and his moral culpability was therefore less than it otherwise might have been. However, having said that, ‘this was a vicious, cruel and unprovoked attack on a small and virtually defenceless woman. To kick anyone in the head is grossly dangerous. To do it more than once, deliberately, is courting the worst kind of disaster. Fortunately, that did not occur. But her injuries were serious, and they are to some extent likely to be permanent’. The offence was aggravated by the fact that it was committed in a busy shopping centre and it represented a gross breach of trust the victim reposed in the respondent. Accordingly, the respondent’s moral culpability was high (See [13]). Given the nature and gravity of the offending and the extent of the respondent’s criminal history, Nettle JA held the sentence was manifestly inadequate (See [16]).
Dodds-Streeton JA added further comments regarding some particularly troubling features of this offending. At [21], Her Honour stated:
‘Violence, and in particular violence by men against women as a means of control in current relationships or in relationships which have ended, is a prevalent and even critical social evil. As in the present case, the perpetrator not uncommonly expresses remorse immediately after a violent assault, but nevertheless seeks to blame the victim for causing the attack. Although the respondent did appear to regret the assault, as the sentencing judge observed, his letter to the court denigrated the victim's character and effectively sought to blame her for his backsliding into drug use and for provoking the attack. In the police interview, he denied the crime, at one point apparently claiming that the victim had assaulted him, and called her a lying dog’.
R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (14 August 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female deceased entered into a de facto relationship with the applicant. The relationship deteriorated, in part due to the deceased’s gambling habit. The relationship ended and the deceased moved into separate premises. The applicant started stalking her, largely to monitor her treatment of his son. The applicant followed her home one evening, clubbed her on the head a number of times with a rubber mallet and strangled her with cord. The applicant was found guilty by a jury of murder and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge was justified in concluding that the applicant was not remorseful for killing the victim. The evidence before the judge was of a vicious, determined and brutal attack by a person with a significant advantage in size and weight over his victim. The sentencing judge was further entitled and correct to regard general deterrence as a significant factor in such a case in the exercise of his sentencing discretion. As per the Court at [140]:
‘[O]ur courts have stated on more than one occasion that in cases of killings of the type which occurred here in a “domestic” setting, the concept of general deterrence is an important and weighty sentencing consideration. The sentence, in such cases, must be such as to provide a strong message that outbursts of homicidal rage, in contexts such as this case are totally unacceptable and will be dealt with by stern sentences of the type imposed upon the applicant’.
The Court continued at [141]:
‘As (the sentencing judge) correctly observed many individuals have to confront circumstances of difficulty in the course of the breakdown of relationships. The Court must send a clear message to estranged parents that custody and other such disputes are to be resolved by proper processes and not by horrendous violence such as that imposed on the deceased in this case. In all the circumstances it cannot be said that the sentence imposed in this case is manifestly excessive’. See also R v Gojanovic [2005] VSC 97 (27 January 2005).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Gojanovic v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 66).
R v Duncan [2007] VSCA 137 (22 June 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Breach of intervention orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Damaging property, intentionally causing injury, breach of an intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant engaged in protracted stalking of the female complainant for a number of years, in an attempt to initiate a relationship. The complainant obtained an intervention order against the applicant. In breach of this order, the applicant attended the complainant’s workplace, smashed her car’s windscreen and caused injury.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were that –
1.
The sentencing judge failed to have sufficient regard to the need to avoid double punishment and thus the sentences imposed were excessive. This was based on the principle of double jeopardy i.e. where two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements, it is wrong to punish the offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common (Pearce v The Queen).
2.
The trial judge failed to have sufficient regard to the principle of totality.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Vincent JA remarked at [37] that:
‘I would add that the sentencing judge was clearly correct in attributing a high level of seriousness to the appellant's conduct and reflecting that in the sentences imposed. Not only did the appellant’s conduct involve a savage and sustained attack upon his unfortunate victim but, it must not be forgotten she had sought the protection of the law against his continued and frightening criminal harassment. He responded to her endeavours, and to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment upon him, by seeking to punish her and damage her property. Obviously the community cannot accept that those who avail themselves of its protection may be subject to revenge or retribution if its structures and that protection are to possess credibility and operate to deter potential offenders’.
R v Elias [2007] VSCA 125 (19 June 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Verdins principles’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Theft x 19.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending took place between 2000 and 2004 when the female applicant was employed as an accountant at a firm. She diverted funds paid by bankrupt estates for creditors to her own accounts. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 20 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 months. The sentencing judge accepted evidence that the applicant’s offending behaviour was symptomatic of ‘battered woman syndrome’. There was a history of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of the applicant’s husband.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing judge erred:
(a)
In failing to sufficiently reduce the weight to be accorded to specific deterrence and moral culpability on account of the applicant’s psychological condition; and
(b)
In failing to sufficiently reduce the weight to be accorded to general deterrence on account of the applicant’s psychological condition.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence imposed did not suggest that the sentencing judge failed to give any or sufficient weight to the impact of the applicant’s mental state upon the significance of general deterrence, specific deterrence or moral culpability. His Honour’s sentence, reflecting moderation in individual sentences, and a small extent of cumulation, was in fact merciful (See [16]-[28]).
In obiter, Ashley JA observed that the Verdins principles had not as of yet been applied in respect of offences of this kind, where the offender asserts battered woman syndrome, as the relevant mental impairment, reduced moral culpability and the weight to be accorded to specific and general deterrence in sentencing. The battered woman/learned helplessness situation had typically been raised in homicide cases in relation to the question – why the offender did not leave their abusive partner? His Honour left open the possibility of the Verdins principles applying in a case where learned helplessness is given as the explanation for the commission of, for example, property offences. But this case was not an appropriate vehicle for making such a determination because there was insufficient evidence of the impairment to the applicant’s functioning arising from the history of abuse (See [12]-[14]).
R v Roach [2005] VSCA 162 (8 June 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Conduct endangering persons’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Negligently causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Burglary, theft, conduct endangering persons, negligently causing serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant and Mr O’Neill, her partner and co-offender, broke into a milk bar and stole goods and cash. The applicant drove off from the store with Mr O’Neill as her passenger. They were chased by police, with Mr O’Neill threatening to kill her if she slowed down. The applicant crashed the car into another vehicle driven by Mr Hahn. The impact caused both vehicles to be engulfed in flames, trapping Mr Hahn inside his vehicle. He suffered extensive burns to his body. Mr O’Neill also suffered injuries as a result of the crash. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the applicant’s moral culpability by giving insufficient weight to the threats made to her by her partner.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Callaway JA at [15]:
‘the judge did accept that O'Neill's threats motivated the appellant to drive as she did and that she took those threats seriously because of the history of violence directed towards her. There was an element of "battered woman" syndrome. Nevertheless, His Honour said, the police were present and protection would have been immediately available to her. I appreciate that she would have feared what O'Neill might do subsequently, but it is one thing to engage in shop-lifting or the like under a threat of violence; it is another thing altogether to engage in conduct so dangerous that it results in the kind of injuries sustained by Mr Hahn. General deterrence is not excluded by threats. On the contrary, general deterrence may provide a counter-threat. The judge was not in error in saying that general deterrence must be the paramount sentencing consideration for offences of the kind the subject of counts 3 to 5 and that a substantial period of imprisonment was required to deter others minded to act in a similar way. I do not consider that his Honour undervalued the threats from O'Neill, particularly when the sentences he imposed on counts 3 to 5 are taken into account’.
R v Pham [2005] VSCA 57 (7 March 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was in a relationship with the female victim and lived with her and her son, the other victim, for a few months. The relationship ended but they maintained an association. The applicant married the victim’s sister but started to harass both the victim and her sister. The victim obtained an intervention order protecting her and her children. In breach of the intervention order, the applicant entered into the victim’s house. He stabbed her with a knife to the face, mouth, chest and neck approximately eight times (count 3). The victim’s son tried to intervene but the applicant struck him with the knife twice times, almost severing the child’s hand (count 4). The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: The sentencing discretion miscarried as the judge was required to sentence the applicant on the basis that the verdict on count 4 rested not upon a finding by the jury of the deliberate infliction of serious injury to the victim but upon their application of the instructions of the trial judge concerning the concept of transferred malice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There was no error on the part of the sentencing judge. His Honour did not impose a sentence on the basis that the applicant deliberately stabbed the victim (See [14]-[19]). Vincent JA further noted that the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion in this case required an order that effectively cumulated part of the sentence imposed on count 4 upon the sentence imposed on count 3. This was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the two separate offences and the particular aggravating features attaching to each, some of which were common and other not. In this context, it was particularly serious that the applicant act in flagrant violation of an intervention order the female victim had obtained to protect herself and her children. This is because the intervention order is:
‘… designed by parliament to provide the protection of the law to vulnerable individuals, usually, as in this case, women and children, who legitimately fear for their safety. Offenders who disregard such orders and occasion injury to persons whose personal security is intended to be guaranteed through this means must anticipate that an extremely stern view will be adopted by the courts of their conduct and, save in the most unusual circumstances, will be subject to condign punishment’ (See [21]-[22]).
DPP v Muliaina [2005] VSCA 13 (2 February 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Causing serious injury recklessly’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Need for denunciation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Presentment 1 – false imprisonment; Presentment 2 – causing injury recklessly, indecent assault x 2, rape; Presentment 3 – aggravated burglary, common assault, false imprisonment, making a threat to kill, causing injury recklessly.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The primary victim was the male respondent’s former de facto partner and mother of their child. The circumstances of the first presentment were that the victim said she wanted to end their relationship. The respondent dragged her to his house and tied her to a chair. The false imprisonment ended when she was able to convince the respondent to call her mother because their daughter needed feeding. The second presentment related to the respondent’s offending after he had resumed living with the victim. He slapped the victim and hit her with a leather strap. He then tried to force the victim to perform oral sex on him and engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with her without her consent. The victim obtained an intervention order against the respondent. The offences that were the subject of the third presentment occurred when they had ceased co-habitation and the respondent forced his way into her parent’s home. He assaulted the victim’s friend who was there at the time, threatened to kill the victim, and punched and hit her. The respondent was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, The sentence imposed did not equate with the gravity of the crimes. As per Chernov JA at [21]:
‘It seems plain enough that the respondent's offending conduct had the aggravating features for which the Director contended. It was brutal and cowardly and was, in the relevant sense, ongoing. It involved, in the main, ferocious physical attacks by the respondent on a much weaker victim whom the respondent claimed to love. On those occasions he treated her as if she were his slave who had to do his bidding or be severely punished if she refused. Such conduct is clearly unacceptable to this community and must be denounced by the courts. That the respondent experienced the brutal upbringing for which he contended does not make his behaviour, even though it may have been a manifestation of his uncontrolled anger, any more acceptable’.
R v Sa [2004] VSCA 182 (7 October 2004) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Cautious approach to victim forgiveness’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Role of apology’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim, his cousin, were born in Western Samoa. They had a heated argument over the phone, in which the applicant said he would ‘chop [the victim’s] head off’. The applicant armed himself with a machete and went to the victim’s home. The applicant entered through an unlocked door and struck the victim twice with the machete to the back of the head and neck, in front of two small children. After the offence, a cultural ceremony of apology and reconciliation was performed. At sentence, the victim expressed his desire that the applicant not be imprisoned, his forgiveness of the applicant and that they now had a very good relationship. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included that the sentencing judge erred in that he failed to take into account the attitude of the victim and the remorse of the offender.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Eames JA at [38]-[40]:
‘The statement of his Honour that the attitude of the victim could not ‘govern’ the sentencing approach was consistent with the principles stated in Skura. In the present case, however, there was good reason why the judge would be cautious in evaluating the weight to be given to the evidence of the victim. In the first place, he was not the only victim of the appellant’s crime; the two children also witnessed what must have been a horrifying incident, although there was no evidence of any long lasting adverse effects on the children. Crimes of violence frequently create alarm and distress to people other than the immediate victims, and in assessing the need for general deterrence a sentencing judge must have regard to the impact of crime more broadly than merely upon the immediate victim.
An additional reason for being cautious about the weight to be given to the evidence of the victim related to the nature of [the victim’s] evidence. One reason why courts do not allow the wishes of the victim to determine the sentence to be imposed is that the victim might not always be able to assess what is in his or her own best interest. For example, when considering what weight to give to factors of general and specific deterrence in a case of a woman assaulted by her partner a sentencing judge would be minded to have regard to the imperatives which might motivate a battered wife to plead for leniency towards her attacker. In such circumstances the sentencing judge might be cautious about giving undue weight to such a plea for leniency.
In the present case, the victim was himself in a difficult position among other members of the Samoan community, and his acceptance of the apology might have been motivated by a range of considerations’.
The sentencing judge accepted that the ceremony was of great cultural significance and that it represented a traditional apology of the most humble and sincere kind. He further accepted that the applicant had expressed genuine contrition and remorse. These statements reflected that the sentencing judge did in fact give weight to the performance of the cultural ceremony and to the factors of remorse and forgiveness (See [43]). Eames JA was not persuaded that the weight given to these factors displayed error in the sentencing judge’s approach. On the contrary, having regard to the seriousness of the offences, the sentences imposed were merciful (See [44]).
R v Skura [2004] VSCA 53 (7 April 2004) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Incitement to murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Incitement to murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant pleaded guilty to a single charge that she incited Jason Dorrian, an undercover police officer, to murder her husband, the complainant. She was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. At trial, her husband submitted a victim impact statement that stated his forgiveness of the applicant, his desire that she return to live with the family and his willingness to offer her support to enable her to re-enter society. The sentencing judge stated that the relevance of the victim’s attitude was doubtful.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the way the sentencing judge dealt with evidence of a number of factors including the victim impact statement of her husband.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with the judges providing separate reasoning. Smith AJA stated at [48] that:
‘So far as the attitude of the victim to the degree of sentence is concerned, that is generally irrelevant. But evidence that the victim has forgiven the offender may indicate that the effects of the offence had not been long-lasting. It may mean that ‘psychological and mental suffering must be very much less in the circumstances. Accordingly, some mitigation must be seen in that one factor’: R v Hutchinson (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 134, 137. Where the offence occurs in a domestic situation, the attitude of the victim may also be relevant to the question of rehabilitation’.
Here, the sentencing judge considered one aspect of the victim impact statement – the attitude of the victim and whether it could affect the sentence. His Honour did not appear to consider the impact of the crime on the victim or the relevance of the victim impact statement, and the attitude shown in it, to the question of rehabilitation. However, ‘the evidence revealed by the victim impact statement was in fact significant and, in particular, showed that there was no adverse impact on the victim’. Further, the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were enhanced because of the willingness of the victim and the daughter to help the applicant deal with her serious personality disorders. Accordingly, the sentencing judge erred in failing to have regard to this relevance of the victim impact statement (See [50]).
Eames JA also held that the sentencing judge did not give sufficient weight to the victim impact statement of the applicant’s husband (See [13]). His Honour stated at [12]:
‘This Court has often acknowledged that the introduction of victim impact statements has served an important purpose of ensuring that sentencing judges have a full appreciation of the consequences of criminal conduct to the victims of the crimes, thereby ensuring that judges properly weigh the factors relevant to victims which must be considered by virtue of s.5 of the Sentencing Act 1991. The courts have also warned that the victim impact statements should not be misused so as to produce a sentence which is unfair, and that an articulate or emotional victim impact statement could not justify a sentence being imposed which was not just in all the circumstances’.
However, while judges must ensure the contents of victim impact statements do not unbalance the sentencing process so as to cause a miscarriage of the sentencing discretion, Eames JA held that there may be many instances where the victim impact statement may have the effect of producing a more severe sentence. Likewise:
‘If a victim impact statement can have that effect in encouraging a view of the case which would justify a more severe sentence, then in my view sentencing judges ought to give equally appropriate weight to a victim impact statement where the victim positively expresses support for the accused and argues for a more lenient sentence’ (See [13]).
R v MFP [2001] VSCA 96 (15 June 2001) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Domestic context as an aggravating factor’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Risk factors’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was married to the victim and they had three children together. The applicant forcibly dragged his wife out of the house and into the shed, where he had set up a noose. There was a struggle and he placed a noose so tightly around her neck that she passed out. The applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in finding that the offence was aggravated because it occurred in a domestic context.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge in fact stated that the legislature and the community regarded the offence of recklessly causing serious injury as serious, an attitude that was correct particularly in a domestic context. Ormiston JA held that the sentencing judge was entirely justified as seeing this as a factor to be born in mind (See [19]). His Honour further stated that:
‘ I think [the domestic context] can be seen to be aggravating both as to its potential consequences and also inasmuch as a husband (or a wife) is in a privileged position in relation to a spouse. They each know the everyday movements, the habits, the likes and dislikes, the fears and pleasures of their spouse, which might enable them not only to effect an attack more easily on their victim but also to devise the kinds of attack which could more seriously affect their spouse, not merely physically, but so as to cause mental anguish. Now it was not suggested that there were special advantages which the applicant had in the present case, but he was certainly able to know whether the children would be up or asleep and where they would be, and where to take his wife to gain privacy for this cruelly devised attack. The matter need not be examined any further, for in truth the advantages that he had, including that of surprise, justified the judge in holding that it was proper to view more seriously this attack occurring in the domestic context of this family. The consequences for both his wife and children were manifest, as fairly could have been expected’ (See [20]).
R v Mason [2001] VSCA 62 (2 May 2001) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Common assault’ – ‘Digital rape’ – ‘Existence of prior relationship not mitigating’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault, common assault, digital rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offences were committed by the applicant against his estranged wife, the complainant, with whom he had two children. During the course of an argument, the applicant grabbed the complainant by the crotch and lifted her up, slamming her into the bed on a number of occasions. Three days later, the applicant broke into the complainant’s house and started to choke and slap her. She struggled against him and he pushed her to the floor and penetrated her vagina with his finger. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and four months, with a non-parole period of 14 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to a number of factors including the pre-existing relationship between the applicant and his wife.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Winneke P addressed the submission that where the rape occurs against the background of a previous settled sexual relationship, it should generally be regarded by a sentencing court as less serious than a rape by a total stranger. Winneke P considered the authorities led in support of this submission and at [7] and [8] expressed the following conclusions:
‘I do not regard them as laying down a sentencing principle of inflexible or universal application. A rape committed in the context, and against the background, of a previous settled relationship may in certain circumstances be a factor which a court can take into account in mitigation where it can be seen that the impact upon the victim has, for that reason, been less traumatic than otherwise it might have been. But, equally, it is not difficult to imagine a rape, committed by a man who has been in a previous relationship with his victim, which would be every bit as frightening as a rape committed by a stranger. The one thing which the authorities to which this Court has been referred demonstrate is that the crime of rape, whatever the circumstances, and upon whomsoever committed, is regarded by the courts as a grave insult to its victim and a crime which can rarely give rise to a non-custodial sentence.
It should not be forgotten that the crime of rape is an intensely personal crime which, for sentencing purposes, cannot be divorced from its effects on the victim. But the effects include not only those which flow from the physical invasion of the victim's person and security, but also those which flow from the violation of the more intangible intellectual properties of the victim's rights and freedoms. In a society in which there is an increasing number of couples becoming estranged, the courts have a heightened obligation to deter those who have previously lived in a stable relationship with a wife or partner from regarding such wife or partner as akin to a chattel devoid of rights or freedoms, and as an object readily available for their sexual gratification’.
R v Boaza [1999] VSCA 126 (5 August 1999) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic homicide’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant formed a relationship, which the complainant subsequently ended. One evening, the applicant tailgated the complainant, forcing her to stop her vehicle. He dragged her out of the car and threw her down an embankment. Stating that he was going to kill her, the applicant punched the complainant and stabbed her multiple times before he was restrained by passers-by. Despite losing massive amounts of blood, the complainant survived. The applicant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s plea of guilty and other matters put in mitigation on his behalf.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed, with separate reasoning provided by Chernov JA and Winneke P but each concurring with the final orders. Chernov JA found that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive in the circumstances. The offence was in the upper range of the scale of seriousness for the crime of attempted murder – it was a brutal, cowardly and unprovoked attack induced because the complainant had left their relationship. The applicant showed no remorse and repeatedly lied to police. A sentence reflecting the principles of denunciation and general and specific deterrence was warranted in the circumstances. Further, without the intervention of others the applicant would have killed the victim. Finally, it was clear the sentencing judge took into account all relevant mitigating factors (See [27]-[31]).
Winneke P similarly held that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. His Honour said at [50]:
‘[T]his was truly a case where the court’s sentence must mark the community’s condemnation of the applicant’s conduct and must be such as to deter others like-minded from resorting to such conduct as a means of resolving emotional disputes. The type of conduct engaged in by the applicant, reflecting as it does a lack of self-discipline and self-centred lack of respect for the freedom of choice of his victim, was rightly viewed by his Honour, I think, as a serious example of this crime’.
R v Harris [1998] 4 VR 21 (3 December 1997) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Existence of a prior relationship’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, recklessly causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of raping and recklessly causing serious injury to his estranged wife. During the assault, which lasted one and a half hours, the respondent punched the complainant over 200 times, predominately to the face. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of one year. The sentencing judge relied on four matters in deciding to impose a sentence at the lower end of the scale: (a) the offender was unlikely to reoffend, (b) the confusion in his mind as to where his relationship with the complainant was going, (c) the offender’s previous good record (which indicated the actions were out of character), and (d) the fact that, since the complainant was his wife, she would not have suffered the long-term traumatisation endured by other rape victims.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Charles JA (Phillips JA agreeing) held that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate. None of the first three factors (a), (b) or (c) identified by counsel justified the low penalty for the rape of the complainant. Charles JA did not accept the Crown’s submission that factor (d) disclosed a significant error of principle. The sentencing judge’s statement as to traumatisation was no more than a finding of fact in the circumstances of this particular case, and not purely premised on the fact that the complainant was his former wife. Notwithstanding this, a substantially heavier sentence was warranted in the circumstances.
Charles JA further held that the imposition of such a lenient sentence here undervalued two important sentencing considerations. First, general deterrence plays an extremely important role in warning the community that rape, within or outside of marriage, will not be tolerated and will attract condign punishment. Second, the considerations which influenced the sentencing judge to impose a lower sentence suggested that His Honour gave little weight to specific deterrence. In light of the respondent’s lack of remorse for his actions, specific deterrence ought to have played a significant role in the construction of an appropriate sentence. Error was also shown in the sentencing judge’s decision not to direct any cumulation of sentence for the serious physical violence inflicted upon the complainant (See 27).
Tadgell JA also agreed with Charles JA but provided some additional observations. In particular, at 28-29, His Honour stated:
‘In particular, it cannot be said that [the sentencing judge] purported to apply any principle to the effect that rape by a man of his wife or former wife or of a person with whom he is or has been in a close relationship is to be treated more leniently than a rape by a stranger. The authorities do not appear to support any such principle. The most that can be said, in my opinion, is that the penalty to be imposed for the crime of rape cannot be regarded as necessarily conditioned by the relationship of the parties to it. Any relationship or lack of it between them will no doubt usually fall to be considered as one of the circumstances to be taken into account in a determination of the appropriate penalty. In some circumstances a prior relationship may serve as a factor of mitigation, but it need not, and it may indeed serve to aggravate the offence’.
There was no error of that kind here but the sentence was still manifestly inadequate for the reasons articulated by Charles JA.
R v Cotham [1998] VSCA 111 (17 November 1998) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Repeated and contemptuous breaches of intervention orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, theft x 3, breach of intervention order x 5, unlicensed driving.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were divorced and the complainant had obtained multiple intervention orders against the applicant over a period of time. The applicant broke into the complainant’s home, threatened the complainant with a knife and tapped the complainant’s mouth and legs and tied her to the bed. He then took the complainant’s credit cards and left the premises in the complainant’s car. Some days later, the applicant again broke into the complainant’s house. The complainant fled the premises and the applicant took credit cards and various other items. On a final occasion, the applicant telephoned the complainant at work, trying to persuade her to drop the charges against him. All these incidents were in breach of an intervention order. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of two years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Charles JA held that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The applicant committed serious crimes which adversely affected the victim and her children quite significantly. The applicant was contemptuous of the intervention order, disregarding it and its terms as and when he pleased. And he had been in court on two previous occasions for breaching the same order (See [16]). As per Charles JA at [14]:
‘Intervention orders must be strictly adhered to, and it is very much in the interests of the community that those against whom such orders are made be under no misapprehension that the courts will punish severely those who breach such orders. The applicant's actions suggest that he believed he could breach the intervention order with impunity. Only by appropriately severe penalties can the courts make clear to the applicant and the broader community that such conduct will not be tolerated’.
R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376 (9 October 1997) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Background of emotional and physical abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of the attempted murder by stabbing his wife. He attacked her in a frenzy in public in front of their children. At the time of the incident, the respondent was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Batt JA stated that ‘general deterrence is not eliminated but still operates, sensibly moderated, in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or severe intellectual handicap’ at 381 (See also R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo [2007] VSCA 102 (23 May 2007) and R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 (28 November 1995)). His Honour held that the sentence failed manifestly to meet the gravity of the respondent’s crime. The fact the offence occurred in a domestic situation did not decrease its heinousness. The crime warranted a sentence reflective of the considerations of general and specific deterrence, the community’s expectation of proper punishment and the possibility of rehabilitation (See 381).
Winneke P agreed with Batt JA but added his own observations. His Honour agreed at 382 that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and stated:
‘[T]his was a very serious example of the crime of attempted murder. It was premeditated and vicious and carried out upon a defenceless woman, in a public place, in the presence of the terrified children of both the respondent and the victim. I agree with the learned sentencing judge that the crime is not to be regarded as any the less heinous because it was committed against the background of an emotional domestic dispute. That is merely an explanation and not an excuse for the crime.
Winneke P also held at 383 that ‘whether in the particular case a psychiatric condition should reduce or eliminate general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of punishment will depend upon the nature and severity of its symptoms and its effect upon the mental capacity of the accused’.
R v Towns [1992] VCCA (unrep, 21 September 1992) – Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Seriousness’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s wife. Throughout the marriage, there were episodes where the applicant drank to excess and subjected the victim to mental and physical abuse. The victim obtained an intervention order against the applicant. The applicant stabbed the victim in the throat on a train. The applicant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence imposed on the applicant was outside the range of sentences imposed for comparable offences. In re-sentencing the applicant, Phillips CJ stated at 7:
‘[T]here appears to be an implication in counsel’s submissions on behalf of the applicant that, in some way, cases involving a murder arising out of a relationship, or arising out of a domestic situation are less heinous as a class than other types. There is no doubt in my mind that the court must set its face against such an implication’.
Supreme Court
Re JP [2024] VSC 691 – Supreme Court of Victoria
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaging property ’ – ‘Protection Order ’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ ’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ ’ – ‘People with children’ ’ – ‘Separation’ ’ – ‘Stalking’ ’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ ’ – ‘Bail’
Case Type: Bail Application
Charges:
Charges dated 12 June 2024
Use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (x3); assault (x1); making a threat to kill (x2); stalking (x1).
Charges dated 30 August 2024
Persistent contravention of a family violence safety notice or family violence intervention order (x1); stalking (x1); use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (x1); contravening a family violence intervention order (x21); threatening to inflict serious injury (x1); making a threat to kill (x2); contravening a family violence intervention order intending to cause harm or fear for safety (x2).
Facts: JP and his former partner were in a relationship from 2016 to 2020 and have three young children. Following their separation, they maintained an "on again, off again" relationship between 2021 and April 2024. In late May 2024, an interim family violence intervention order was made against JP, listing his former partner and their children as protected persons. This was replaced by a final order served on 8 July 2024, prohibiting JP from contacting his former partner except for negotiating child custody through written communication.
12 June 2024 charges: On 13 May 2024, JP allegedly strangled his former partner, pinning her face down on the bed for 30 seconds. On 23 May 2024, JP allegedly let himself in her home, demanded her car keys, when she refused, JP threatened to kill her. She challenged JP and asked if he would kill the mother of his children, he allegedly responded by stating he would “put a hit on her and her family,” and then followed up stating, “fuck it, I’ll do it myself”. His former partner then hid in a closet. JP left to collect their children and police were contacted by the sister of his former partner, who had been on a loudspeaker call in the background.
30 August 2024 charges: Between 29 July and 27 August 2024, JP allegedly made 98 prohibited calls to his former partner. On 26 August 2024, he allegedly threatened to put a gun to her head in a fast-food carpark in an attempt to take possession of his former partners car. On 29 August 2024, he allegedly followed her to her workplace and screamed, “I’m going to fucking kill you” while holding a shifter spanner.
JP is subject to an interim family violence intervention order made on 16 September 2024. Of significance to the following judgement. JP has a limited criminal history, including two theft convictions and a single bail breach in 2023.
Decision: The Supreme Court of Victoria (Elliott J) refused JP’s bail application, finding that exceptional circumstances justifying bail were not established. Even if exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated, JP posed an unacceptable risk to the safety and welfare of his former partner and others if released on bail [84].
Reasoning: The court found that the alleged offending was extremely serious, this was supported by significant evidence, including telephone records and CCTV footage. This evidence significantly undermined JP’s suggestion that the prosecution's case was weak [65]. While it was accepted that JP’s criminal history is limited and of little relevance to the charges he presently faces, in the circumstances of this case, the absence of a relevant criminal record is not exceptional. That is, in cases involving family violence in connection with the breakdown of an intimate relationship, it is not unusual for offenders to have no or only a limited criminal record [67]. The availability of psychological treatment and stable accommodation, while relevant, did not meet the high threshold required for exceptional circumstances. The proposed treatment plan involved only weekly sessions and did not adequately address the significant ongoing risks associated with JP’s history of anger, substance abuse, and financial instability [69]–[75]. The offer of a $100,000 bail guarantee, although significant, was insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the alleged conduct and the high risk of reoffending, given JP’s repeated disregard for court orders and intervention conditions [78]. Lastly, the court also found that JP’s previous breaches of bail and intervention orders, including repeated contact with his former partner despite explicit prohibitions, indicated a substantial risk of further breaches if released, even with strict bail conditions [80]–[82].
DPP v Lindemann [2024] VSC 220 (22 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic violence’ – ‘No genuine remorse’
Charges: Murder x1; Recklessly causing injury x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant pleaded guilty to the murder of his female partner and to recklessly causing injury to their young daughter.
The relationship was strained, owing in part to the defendant’s insecurity and jealousy, and dislike of the victim’s parenting style. [5]–[6]. The victim had developed a relationship with another individual and attempted to end the relationship with the defendant. [13]–[15] The defendant had trouble accepting the termination of the relationship, ‘exploding in a violent, jealous rage’, stabbing, kicking and strangling the victim in her bedroom. [29] Their daughter witnessed this entire incident and attempted to intervene. The victim’s mother also attempted to intervene (she resided in the home and suffered from Parkinson’s disease). The daughter suffered several knife injuries to her hands, elbow and shoulder. [28]–[36] The defendant stabbed the victim 17 times with multiple knives. [49]
The defendant then completed an internal transfer of $71,000 from his accounts before stabbing himself multiple times. [38]
Decision and reasoning: 31 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Justice Hollingworth found the defendant’s conduct to be ‘very serious examples of each offence’, motivated by ‘jealously, rage and a sense of entitlement’. [85] Her Honour held each offence to be ‘well above the mid-range’. [120]
The defendant has no prior criminal history and positive prospects of rehabilitation. [93] However, these prospects are tempered due to the defendant’s ‘limited insight’ into the impact of his conduct and victim-blaming mentality [93]
Accordingly, the defendant’s moral culpability was very high, [83] with the defendant possessing a ‘range of problematic gender-based beliefs’ [81].
DPP v Griffiths [2024] VSC 263 (22 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Ruling’ – ‘Psychological support for jurors during a trial’ – ‘Vicarious trauma’ – ‘Audiovisual evidence’ – ‘Evidence from child witnesses’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder x1; Recklessly causing serious injury x 1.
Proceedings: Ruling on the provision of support for jurors during a trial.
Facts: The accused is charged with the murder of his wife, and recklessly causing serious injury to his step-daughter. The accused has pleaded not guilty to these charges. Upon empanelment, the jury were notified that the trial would involve confronting audio-visual evidence: namely, body-worn camera footage of the scene of the crime, and the injured victim. In the presence of his two step-children, the accused poured petrol on his wife and lit the petrol using a cigarette lighter. The victim suffered burns to 90% of her body, dying four days later in hospital. The accused’s step-daughter suffered serious burns in the incident.
Members of the jury, experiencing vicarious trauma, notified the court and queried if counselling would be made available during the trial.
Issue: Whether counselling or other psychological support can and should be provided to a jury during a trial.
Decision and reasoning: Psychological support for jurors should be provided during trials.
When read as a whole, the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) does not prevent ‘a jury from being provided assistance during the trial if it becomes necessary’. [29]
Accordingly, there is ‘no impediment’ a court providing jurors psychological support should, like the present, ‘graphic or confronting evidence’ be played and members of the jury indicate the need for such support. [38] The nature of this support may vary, but typically may involve an information session on vicarious trauma, [49] or ‘a group information session which all jurors attend, or private counselling sessions between individual jurors and a psychologist’. [40]
Re Harris [2024] VSC 226 (09 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Bail application’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Charges: Common law assault x 1; Assault x 2; Resist x 2; Assault an emergency worker x2; Threat x 1;
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The male applicant strangled and threw his wife against a wall in their house. One of their children witnessed the incident, and immediately contacted the grandfather and 000. The applicant threw a lit candle at his father (upon his arrival) and pinned him to the ground. The applicant resisted police, punching two officers. The applicant was taken to the hospital, following his father’s concern that he had consumed an illicit substance. Therein he threatened to kill ‘them all’ and punched a security guard several times. [3]
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail approved with conditions
Justice Champion was satisfied that the applicant’s sustained violent behaviour occurred after ‘he had taken an overdose of tablets’. [24] The applicant has no prior criminal history and may spend longer on remand that on any sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed for the charged offences. [22] Accordingly, HH accepted the bail application on the condition the applicant receive residential treatment at a health clinic.
Re Mahat [2024] VSC 140 (01 February 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Bail application’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Threats of violence ’ – ‘Damaging property ’
Charges: Attempted armed robbery x1; robbery x1; Reckless conduct endangering life x1; Intentionally causing injury x2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Making threats to kill x1; Assault with a weapon x3; Using a prohibited weapon without approval x1; Committing an indictable offence whilst on bail x1; Contravening certain bail conduct conditions x1; Contravention of protection order, intending to cause harm or fear x4; Contravening an interim protection order x 10; Unlawful assault with a weapon x1; Unlawful assault x3; Intentionally damaging property x1; Driving whilst suspended x1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female complainant is the male applicant’s former partner. [15] The present charges cover various incidents of actual and threatened physical harm, emotional/psychological abuse, and withholding and damaging personal property[17]–[39]
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail denied.
Justice Champion held the allegations to be ‘serious examples of family violence’. [96] The incidents escalated in severity and involved weapons: ‘the alleged use of a knife and a taser is highly concerning’. [96] Further, certain incidents involved strangulation, ‘which are commonly accepted to be an indicator of, or risk factor for, homicide’, and the most violent involved the assistance of a third party. [97]–[98]
Lastly, each of these incidents were committed in disregard of protection orders, indicating that the applicant has no ‘insight into the relationship or the seriousness of’ protection orders. [99]
DPP v Malovski [2023] VSC 748 (13 December 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘significant criminal history ’ – ‘Family violence intervention order ’ – ‘Coercive control ’ – ‘Jealousy ’ – ‘Separation ’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1; Being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The defendant confronted, pursued and repeatedly shot a friend of his ex-wife while he assisted her in a flower stall in 2022. The defendant shot no fewer than five shots at the victim, one of which rendered him an incomplete paraplegic. The defendant’s 10-year-old son witnessed the event. The defendant was motivated by anger at the victim for supplanting him in the life of his family and a desire to maintain control over his ex-wife ([6]). The defendant was on a family violence intervention order at the time, issued in 2021 [8]. The defendant was found guilty of attempted murder and pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.
Decision and reasoning: 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. In handing down the sentence, Tinney J noted:
For reasons of anger, resentment, jealousy and probably also a desire to maintain control over your former wife, you carried out a shocking and senseless public attack upon an entirely innocent man in full view of your former wife, your 10 year old son and many others. The very idea of an angry and embittered man chasing his quarry around in circles in a public reserve bordering a busy main road in a suburb of Melbourne and firing a large number of shots from a pistol intending to kill him is quite appalling. You failed to achieve your aim, but not for want of trying. You have left Mr Grant with terrible injuries which will blight his life forever and reduce the quality of that life. This was a terrible crime, as your counsel fairly conceded, and is deserving of condign punishment [79]
Turning to general deterrence, male violence towards former intimate partners, or towards new friends of former intimate partners, is a depressingly frequent occurrence in our society, and is to be deplored and discouraged. The sentence I pass on you must be such as to clearly bring it home to any male, or any person, who would seek to wreak violent retribution against another person motivated by a refusal to accept or deal with the end of a relationship, that such conduct will be met with very strong punishment’ [81]
DPP v Charlton (No 2) [2023] VSC 707 (29 November 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Cold Case’ – ‘16-year gap between offense and laying of charge ’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Active steps to conceal involvement ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of the murder of Joanne Howell in 2007.
The defendant and Howell were in a relationship, living together for approximately five months prior to Howell’s death. During this period, the defendant and Ms Howel were experiencing ‘relationship difficulties’ [4]. On the morning of Ms Howell’s death, Ms Howell demanded the defendant move out, giving him 30 days to do so. That evening, after having taken the dog for a walk, the defendant called emergency services, reporting the discovery of Ms Howell unconscious at the bottom of the stairs in their home.
No charges were initially laid in 2007. A coronial inquest into Ms Howell’s death was conducted in 2011 and in 2020, the investigation was revived, and charges of murder laid against the defendant [16]–[18]. Based on the whole evidence, the jury concluded that the defendant struck the back of Ms Howell’s skull, strangled her with a ligature with an intention to kill [13].
Decision and reasoning: 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 19 years. In passing sentencing, Elliot J noted:
Murder is a gravely serious offence. You brutally murdered Ms Howell in her home where she was entitled to feel safe. It is a significant aggravating factor that your offending was an extreme act of domestic violence [42].
The delay between the date of your offending and you being charged is significant. … That being so, the delay cannot simply be characterised as undue and nothing more in circumstances where you took active steps to conceal your involvement in Ms Howell’s murder [48].
DPP v Basham [2023] VSC 655 (14 November 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Application for forfeiture of property’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Tainted property ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for forfeiture of property connected to offence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of the murder of his estranged wife. The murder took place in the victim’s home (‘the home’). The respondent drove his motorcycle to and from here. The DPP applied for forfeiture of the home and motorcycle under s 32 of the Confiscation Act 1997, which empowers the DPP to apply for a forfeiture order of property ‘used in or in connection with certain criminal offences’. [3]
Decision and reasoning: Application for forfeiture granted. Both the home and motorcycle were judicially determined to be ‘tainted property’; each was instrumental to the offence, and the respondent obtained an interest in them by survivorship following the victim’s death. [50];
In outlining the relevant considerations attached to a grant of an order of forfeiture, Taylor JA emphasised the gravity and nature of the offender’s crime as both relevant. [16] The application of these considerations further reinforced the grant:
The objective gravity of Basham’s offending and his moral culpability for it are of the highest order. It was a premeditated murder that occurred against a background of family violence and seven days before Ms Fraser was to give evidence in the committal hearing of rape allegations she made against Basham. The offending itself consisted of Ms Fraser being subjected to a savage beating in which she sustained 41 separate blunt force injuries before being hanged. The forfeiture of [the home] is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the offending, being a ‘worst case’ murder. [53]
Forfeiture also advances deterrence in relation to serious crimes. Deterrence is of particular note when offending occurs in the context of family violence. [53]
DPP v Pandilovski [2023] VSC 514 (30 August 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Concealment ’ – ‘History of family violence ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife. In the morning of 14 July 2020, the accused strangled his wife, before moving her body into a storage room. The accused took photos of the victim’s body using the victim’s mobile phone. [5] Not long after leaving the victim’s home, the accused attempted to commit suicide by veering into the path of oncoming traffic. [6] No one was killed. When taken to the Royal Melbourne Hospital, the accused threatened to harm himself. [6] Police discovered the victim’s body in the evening.
Decision and reasoning: 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years. [48]–[49]
Justice Beale considered the victim impact statements of the victim’s family, which referred to the ‘great suffering’ caused by the accused’s actions. [13] His Honour considered the objective gravity of the accused’s offending to be in the ‘upper-mid range example of murder’: it was a ‘domestic murder, carried out in [the victim’s] own home against the backdrop of past violence’ committed by the accused towards her. [16]
His Honour accepted the accused’s plea of guilty, remorse and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation as circumstances of mitigation. [40]
DPP v Tan [2023] VSC 416 (21 July 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Late confession ’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring ’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was found guilty of the murder of his former female partner. In the month leading to the victim’s death, the victim’s interest in the accused waned. The accused, however, maintained strong possessive feelings for the victim and soon began monitoring the victim, accessing her phone and reading her private messages. One night, following a heated argument concerning the victim’s waning interest, the accused stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest in her home. [9] The victim’s son was in the house. The accused proceed to dispose of the victim’s body in a wheelie bin. [15]
Decision and reasoning: 28 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 23 years. [60]
Justice Fox considered the victim impact statements of the victim’s family and friends, including the victim’s son who has been ‘left traumatised’ by the accused’s actions. [31]
Justice Fox noted that it was only after hearing the victim impact statements that the accused accepted the jury’s verdict and admitted to murdering the victim. [41] A confession ‘after a verdict attracts none of the benefits which attach to a guilty plea’. [42]
The accused had no prior convictions or history of family violence. [45] However, it remained a troubling aspect of the accused’s character that ‘after a relationship of only on month, [he] became so jealous and proprietorial that, when faced with rejection, [he was] capable of murder’. [45]
DPP v McDonough [2023] VSC 352 (23 June 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘High moral culpability’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Homicide’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter of his female partner. In the course of assaulting the victim, the offender punched the victim in the face, causing her to fall over and hit her head. The fall caused bleeding to the brain, resulting in the victim’s eventual death.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Reasoning and decision: Fox J sentenced the offender to 11 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months.
In assessing the offender’s personal circumstances, Fox J acknowledged the offender’s drug abuse led to an unstable lifestyle and significantly contributed to his offending behaviour [27]. Fox J also recognised the offender had a very lengthy and relevant criminal history, dating back to 2001. The offender breached good behaviour bonds, suspended sentences and community correction orders imposed by the courts [29]. The offender was on bail for other matters when he committed manslaughter, aggravating his offending [29].
Mental illness diagnoses were not consistent, but experts discussed schizophrenia, substance use disorder, depression, personality disorder, and a mild acquired brain injury [30]-[34]. However, Fox J held Verdins has no application as there was no evidence prison would be a burden on the offender’s mental health [35].
Fox J provided a sentencing discount for the early-stage guilty plea [36] and accepted prison COVID-19 restrictions as a mitigating factor [38]. The judge also regarded the offender’s post-offence conduct as relevant; he called an ambulance, expressed he knew what he did was seriously wrong, and handed himself into police the same day [41].
However, Fox J considered the offender’s remorse limited [40]. The judge also held the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were poor, as he had declined to engage in prison-based services and had a long-history of breaching court orders [43]. Fox J held that neither the offender’s drug use nor mental health issues mitigate his offending. His moral culpability for the crime was high [45].
Fox J stated when sentencing violence against female partners, ‘the courts must send a message to other would-be offenders that if you commit such crimes, you should expect to receive a substantial term of imprisonment’ [48].
Re Thompson [2023] VSC 274 (17 May 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Compelling reason’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘No prior criminal history’ – ‘Past defence service’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Serious alleged offending’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Suicide threat by perpetrator’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: rape x 7; rape by compelling sexual penetration; attempted rape x 2; assault x 6; sexual assault x 3; assault with intention to commit sexual offence x 2; recklessly causing injury; false imprisonment x 6; criminal damage x 4; stalking; installation use and maintenance of optical surveillance devices; threatening to distribute intimate image; theft. (Also unrelated charges of driving under the influence of alcohol x 3).
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant man and complainant woman had been in a relationship since 2015. Following unsuccessful IVF treatment their relationship deteriorated and it is alleged the applicant’s violence towards the complainant commenced. The relationship ended in 2021 but despite this, the couple continued a sexual relationship, while agreeing to also see other people, which the complainant commenced to do. They agreed the complainant could keep storing belonging’s in the shed of the home and stay in the shed when visiting Bendigo (he had moved to Melbourne). It was during this period that the offending occurred.
The applicant allegedly broke into the complainant’s house on multiple occasions, including while she was sleeping with another man, and on one occasion secretly filmed her having sexual intercourse with someone else and threatened to distribute the resulting film. The applicant also came to the complainant’s house and tampered with and damaged her car, came into her bedroom while she slept, monitored her phone and sent her images of a cut on his arm, insinuating that he would kill himself.
After the complainant told the applicant she needed space apart from him, he became aggressive, verbally and physically, grabbing the complainant and ripping a door off its hinges. On another occasion, the complainant came home to find the applicant hiding under her bed and there were multiple instances of rape. While the complainant left her house for a period and changed the locks, the applicant later confronted her at her home again and attempted to rape her again, chasing her out onto the street and physically assaulting her.
The applicant admitted to stalking but denied the sexual offences and was initially denied bail. A ten-year protection order was made with a full no-contact condition. The applicant relied heavily on evidence from his psychologist (Cummins) to demonstrate his lack of risk. Cummins opined that the offending was ‘situationally motivated,’ having arisen in the context of a relationship breakdown in which the agreement to see other partners was ‘very provocative’ and difficult for the applicant [82], [87]. Cummins undertook a risk assessment using the ‘Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol’ guidelines (and not the Static-99R), concluding that the applicant displayed none of the markers of re-offending. He was not able to complete a full assessment of the applicant’s risk profile for violence, as he felt limited by the need to distinguish allegation from established fact. The prosecution challenged Cummins’ characterisation of the offending and finding of low risk, which they saw as being largely based on his focus on the applicant’s lack of criminal history and lack of completion of the risk-assessment tests.
Reasoning and decision: Bail refused.
There was no contention that the offender had compelling reasons for bail and Champion J accepted this based on his stable accommodation, possible future employment, substantial surety, ongoing treatment opportunities and lack of criminal history.
Champion J found that the applicant demonstrated an unacceptable level of risk given the degree and protracted, premeditated nature of the offending, his disturbing surveillance of the complainant and his willingness to travel significant distances for the offending, consistent with the prosecution’s rejection of the offending as ‘situationally motivated.’ The complainant had an entitlement to live in peace and privacy which would be undermined by his bail.
While there was no mental health diagnosis, Champion J noted Cummins’ lack of access to historical records, refusal to draw connection between the offending and the applicant’s military history, and limited ability to commit a full sexual offending risk-assessment. Given the arrangement for the committal hearing in a few weeks, the judge concluded that the prosecution case and thus his bail could more realistically be assessed at that time. The applicant relied heavily on evidence from his psychologist (Cummins) to demonstrate his lack of risk. Cummins opined that the offending was ‘situationally motivated,’ having arisen in the context of a relationship breakdown in which the agreement to see other partners was ‘very provocative’ and difficult for the applicant [82], [87]. Cummins undertook a risk assessment using the ‘Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol’ guidelines (and not the Static-99R), concluding that the applicant displayed none of the markers of re-offending. He was not able to complete a full assessment of the applicant’s risk profile for violence, as he felt limited by the need to distinguish allegation from established fact. The prosecution challenged Cummins’ characterisation of the offending and finding of low risk, which the court saw as being largely based on Cummin’s focus on the applicant’s lack of criminal history and lack of completion of the risk-assessment tests.
DPP v Tan (Ruling No 1) [2023] VSC 296 (2 May 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Application to lead hearsay evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of accused accessing text messages of victim’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Short relationship’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Prosecution pre-trial application to lead hearsay evidence.
Facts: The accused objected to the admissibility of two statements in the Crown’s noticer of hearsay evidence filed pursuant to s67 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (‘the Act’). The deceased woman was in a relationship with the accused which commenced on 1 January 2021. She was killed on 1 February 2021, after the accused became aware that she was friendly with another man.
The prosecution submit the hearsay representations for part of the evidence detailing the relationship evidence, and relevant and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to s65(2)(b) and/or s65(2)(c) of the Act.
Issue: The admissibility of the disputed evidence, two hearsay statements of the deceased to the deceased’s friend Ms Chi, namely:
1.
‘That the accused deliberately ejaculated in her vagina without her permission, and that she was angry as a result’ (the parties agree ‘deliberately’ and ‘without her permission’ should be deleted); and
2.
‘The accused had been accessing her mobile phone and reading her messages’.
Objections: The defence objects to the admission of the statements on the following bases:
1.
The first statement is not relevant, does not come within a recognised exception to the hearsay rule, and in any event should be excluded pursuant to s 137 of the Act.
2.
The second statement does not come within a recognised hearsay exception.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
The first statement is not relevant pursuant to s 55 and therefore not admissible pursuant to s 56(2):
In my view, the evidence that the deceased told Ms Chi that the accused ‘came inside my vagina’, and she was very angry and yelled at him about it, could not rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of whether the accused killed the deceased, and if so, whether he killed her with murderous intent. The evidence does not provide a motive or reason for the killing. It does not assist a jury to determine whether the accused in fact killedthe deceased. It does not provide necessary context or background. It is not relevant and therefore not admissible. [53]
2.
The second representation is hearsay and admissible pursuant to s 65(2(c):
Turning to s 65(2)(c). The phrase, ‘made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable’ creates a stringent test. It may be contrasted with the language employed in s 65(d)(ii), which provides that the representation must be ‘made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable’. Clearly, s 65(d)(ii) sets a lower bar than s 65(2)(c).[59]
There are a number of relevant circumstances which bear upon the question of whether it is ‘highly probable’ that the representation is reliable. The deceased and Ms Chi were close friends, and the evidence shows the deceased shared intimate and personal information with Ms Chi. The deceased told Ms Chi a number of things about her relationship with the accused, and not only things that portrayed the deceased positively and the accused negatively. For example, the deceased told Ms Chi that she was not in love with the accused, but liked his money and that he cleaned her house. She said she did not really want to have sex with him, but did it so he would keep paying for things. These disclosures suggest Ms Chi and the deceased had an honest and frank relationship. [60]
The deceased had no reason to lie or embellish, or mislead her friend Ms Chi. She was not drug or alcohol affected. She did not suffer from any physical or mental illness or other issues that would have impacted her reliability. The event about which she spoke had occurred recently, in circumstances where she was still seeing the accused. This was a simple, uncomplicated narrative, made to a close friend who she communicated with multiple times a day. [61]
R v Basham (Sentence) [2023] VSC 79 (27 February 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous or obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Tracking’
Proceedings: Sentencing hearing for a conviction of murder (Category 1 offence).
Issue: Was the murder in the ‘worst category’ of offending such as to justify the imposition of a life sentence?
Facts: The male defendant and female deceased separated after 10 years of a marriage in which the defendant subjected the deceased to physical and emotional abuse.
The victim lived in ‘abject fear’ of the defendant, who monitored her movements and communications and made threats to destroy her. The victim obtained a protection order following the separation, installed security in her home and made two allegations of rape against the defendant, who was charged.
One week before the committal hearing for the rape offences, the defendant hid himself outside the victim’s house while she took her children to school. When she returned into the garage, he brutally beat her (inflicting 41 separate blunt force injuries) and hanged her, attempting to stage the scene as a suicide.
Reasoning and decision: Taylor JA imposed a life-sentence with a non-parole period of minimum 30 years describing the offence as an instance of the ‘worst case’ of murder.
Taylor JA considered both the objective seriousness of the crime itself and the personal circumstances of the criminal (R v Kilic). The premeditated and vicious nature of the attack, the defendant’s motivations of rage, jealousy and preventing the victim giving evidence at his rape trial, and the background of sustained family violence supported the conclusion that the offence was in the most serious category of murders.
Taylor JA was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the murder was a ‘long held, sustained goal,’ apparent in the defendant’s attempts to conceal his presence in the area, stalking of her house and the immediate nature of the attack. Taylor JA rejected the defence suggestion that the attack was a result of a momentary loss of temper, as the victim’s fear of the defendant meant she would not voluntarily have remained in his presence.
Taylor JA was further satisfied that a large part of the defendant’s motive was to prevent the victim from giving evidence in the rape proceedings against him, as well as his rage and jealously at no longer being in control of her.
The defence argued that the defendant’s good character, lack of prior conviction and good prospects for rehabilitation made specific deterrence and community protection of limited relevance. However, Taylor JA refused to accept that equal weight should be given to the criminal’s personal circumstances and the ‘objectively heinous’ nature of the crime. Importantly, Taylor JA drew attention to the fact that domestic violence is pernicious due to its invisibility and frequent perpetration by men with otherwise good reputations.
The defendant was also found to lack remorse – continuing to deny responsibility and remaining impassive during the victim impact statements – and have no ameliorating personal circumstances.
The defendant’s moral culpability was at ‘the highest end’ and the sentence must reflect ‘the abhorrence with which society regards violence towards domestic partners.’ The principles of general deterrence, denunciation, community protection and just punishment guided the decision:
“such violence is pernicious largely due to the fact that it is often invisible in public life, committed disproportionately by men who might otherwise enjoy a reputation for being good fathers, hard-working providers, reliable friends or community minded citizens” [94]
DPP v Cormick [2022] VSC 786 (16 December 2022) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Appeal on a question of law pursuant to s272 criminal procedure act 2009’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Appeal on a question of Law pursuant to s272 Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
Facts: The male respondent was subject to an interim protection order in which the protected person was the respondent’s female former partner made on 12 May 2021. On 2 September 2021 charged with 1 x persistently contravening a protection order section 125A Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) and 4x contravening a protection order s 123 Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) (the factual basis of charge 1 was the contraventions alleged in charges 2-5).
The alleged contraventions involved committing family violence against the protected person in the form of telephone calls and text messages that amounted to emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviour.
The magistrate found that the messages were emotionally and psychologically abusive, making the protected person feel unsafe and threatened. However, the magistrate rejected the prosecution’s argument that contraventions were strict liability offences and determined that the prosecution had been unable to prove the respondent’s intention to breach.
Issue: An appeal was brought by the DPP on two grounds, the first of which was withdrawn.
1.
Contraventions of protection orders are strict liability offences
2.
The learned magistrate erred when construing the relationship between the physical element and the fault element under s 123.
At issue was whether the offence created by s 123 was concerned only with prohibited conduct and not whether the result of that conduct was intended.
Reason and decision: Appeal dismissed. The Magistrate properly directed themselves as to whether the order had been breached.
Niall JA premised the construction of the nature of the mens rea under s 123 on the general principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient and considered authorities that distinguished between specific and general intent offences.
In relation to the offence of contravening a protection order (s 123(2)) by engaging in family violence in the form of emotional or psychological abuse (ss5, 7), it was observed that divorcing the physical act from its impact was impossible and excluding consequences from the mental element would ‘substantially alter the nature of the offence’ [54].
It was concluded that a ‘person must intend to commit an act that has the physical or emotional consequences which form part of the offending conduct’ [61]. In this case, the prosecution was required to prove the accused sent the messages ‘with the intent to torment, intimidate, harass or be offensive to the recipient’ [62]. Niall JA observed that this construction would not undermine the statute’s protective purpose or be unduly burdensome, as intent ‘will be proved inferentially’.[58]
The Queen v Surtees [2022] VSC 124 (11 March 22) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Burning’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Dousing’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Immolation threat’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: manslaughter by unlawful dangerous act x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband. The offender and her husband had been in a relationship for 10 years and had two daughters, aged six and four. The offender’s 11-year-old son from a previous relationship also lived with the couple. The couple would often argue, at times have screaming matches and sometimes hit each other.
In 2016 Victorian Child Protection Services received a report of children being exposed to violence, but an investigation was not pursued [7]. In 2017 the victim pleaded guilty to unlawful assault against the offender [8].
On the night of the offence the victim had been drinking and yelling at people at a party they attended. After returning home he continued to yell at the offender. After the victim had calmed down and was sitting on the couch the offender, angry about the victim’s behaviour through the day, doused the victim in petrol and threatened him with a lighter by igniting it near him. He ‘burst into flames’ leading to serious injuries which resulted in his death [15]. The three children all witnessed their father in flames.
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Decision and Reasoning: 12 years imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 8 years [132].
Justice Tinney noted that 17 victim impact statements were filed, and all detailed the kind and decent nature of the victim. His Honour specifically noted the ongoing financial and emotional impact on the victim’s brother and his wife, who took in the children [111].
The offence was a serious example of manslaughter and the objective gravity of the offence as very high [85], [125]. There was a very high and obvious level of dangerousness inherent in the offender’s actions [90], aggravated due to it occurring in such proximity to her young children [92].
His Honour significance of family violence and provocation [71], however it was not a relationship “marked by frequent violence and controlling behaviour” [81]. The offence was not a long-considered crime; however, it involved several deliberate steps and was not unpremeditated [83]. There was no evidence that justified any contention the victim was physically abusive the day or night of the offence [72] and the offender’s actions were a “very extreme overreaction” [82].
Justice Tinney considered the offender’s PTSD diagnosis as cumulative from childhood sexual abuse, and violence in previous relationships but found no realistic or causal connection between the PTSD and the offence [61]. The victim deliberately attempted to shift a degree of blame onto the victim by giving conflicting accounts [67].
DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858 (21 December 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Impact of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No criminal history’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The 65-year-old male accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his female de-facto partner of three years. The accused stabbed the victim with a kitchen knife 11 times in the chest and neck following an argument about the accused’s divorce settlement, during which victim had attempted to end the relationship.
Decision and Reasoning: 23 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years and 3 months).
Lasry J considered victim impact statements of the victim’s family, which referred to the ‘lifelong’ and ‘severe’ impact of the accused’s actions (20). His Honour explained that while the accused intended to cause really serious injury, and was being sentenced on that basis, his moral culpability would be ‘determined by the nature of the killing… rather than the… intent’ behind the conduct (55). The accused’s moral culpability was high (56). The 5th and 6th limb of R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 applied due to the accused’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and likelihood of internalising ‘the punitive aspects of sentencing’, age, and ‘demographic divergence from… other prisoners’ (43). His Honour stated that general deterrence is an important sentencing principle in the context of domestic violence (60), noting the accused’s explanation for the crime “carries the implication “Look what you made me do”[58]:
People are entitled to leave relationships and, men in particular, who are told their relationships are finished do not have any form of licence, rationale or excuse to then inflict fatal violence as a reaction in order to quell their feelings of rejection [59].
The accused had no prior criminal convictions, was of an ‘advancing age’ and had previously been ‘of good character’ (62) and the utilitarian value of his guilty plea was ‘very high’ due to the Covid-19 pandemic (34), (62).
Re Strachan [2021] VSC 538 (31 August 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) x 1, contravening a FVIO x 7, committing an indictable offence whilst on bail x 1, contravening a conduct condition of bail x 7.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether the applicant posed an unacceptable risk.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were married for 10 years and shared four children. They separated in March 2021. The victim reported to police that throughout the relationship the applicant was frequently verbally abusive, intimidating towards the children, and physically abusive two to three times per year, strangling her on one occasion. The applicant was charged with various offences and bailed on those offences. An interim protection order and then a final protection order was made. The applicant allegedly breached these orders on numerous occasions by contacting the victim via phone and being near his daughter’s school. On one occasion the applicant visited his daughter at school and asked her to leave with him. The applicant suffered from severe mental health issues, including depression and anxiety, and a pain condition. He was charged in relation to the breaches of bail and protection orders and sought further bail.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail refused.
Lasry J found that the applicant had not established exceptional circumstances. His Honour found that the applicant could receive treatment for his mental health issues while in custody and that his pain condition, while serious, had not prevented him from engaging in community sports. Therefore, ‘special vulnerability’ had not been established. Furthermore, it had not been established that without bail the applicant’s time in custody would be ‘far in excess’ of any likely sentence.
Re Windley [2021] VSC 432 (20 July 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Homeless applicant’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Sexual assault x 2; unlawful assault x 2; persistent contravention of a family violence order; contravention of family violence orders x 9.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of bail
2.
Whether the applicant posed an unacceptable risk
Facts: The applicant was charged with persistently breaching a Family Violence Intervention Order (‘FVIO’) by refusing to move out of his female former partner’s house [1], harassing the victim via phone [25], and perpetrating sexual and unlawful assaults against the victim [3]. The applicant had an extensive criminal record and a history of contravening bail conditions and community corrections orders.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail granted.
Coghlan J found that there were exceptional circumstances, and that by the imposition of appropriate conditions, the risk represented by the applicant was not unacceptable [24]. His Honour acknowledged that conditions of imprisonment had become more difficult due to quarantine requirements [18], and noted that if released the applicant would reside with his aunt, Ms Terri Brown, at a location ‘significantly removed from… the complainant’ and with very few means of transport [21]. Ms Brown had agreed to report any breaches of the applicant’s bail conditions. His Honour highlighted that the applicant had complied with court orders and requirements while previously residing with Ms Brown, and that ‘it was in part due’ to the applicant being homeless ‘that he continued to impose upon the complainant’ [7-8]. The conditions of bail included that the applicant reside with Ms Brown and not leave the house unless accompanied by her and produce his phone to police for inspection [29].
R v Margolis [2021] VSC 341 (15 June 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charge: Murder.
Facts: The male offender killed the female victim, his domestic partner of one week, by applying force to her neck by holding her in a chokehold. A jury convicted him of murder following a trial in which the issues were whether the victim was killed by a conscious, voluntary and deliberate act and, if so, whether the offender had murderous intent. The offender was diagnosed with long-term Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and alternately borderline or severe personality disorder by psychiatric experts. There was evidence he had mental health issues dating from his teens. He argued he killed the victim in the course of a flashback provoked by the behaviour of the victim, in pushing and haranguing him in the course of an argument which extended over a number of hours. Following the murder, the offender sent text messages to the victim’s family purporting to be from the victim. The offender had no prior history of violent offending and alleged he had been a victim of abuse as a child.
Held: Sentenced to 23 years imprisonment with a minimum term of 17 years. It was noted that this was less than the standard 25 year head sentence to take into account the offender’s prior good character and Verdins principles.
Re Charlton [2021] VSC 342 (11 June 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘14 year gap between alleged offence and laying of charge’ – ‘Alleged murder of partner’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘No relevant criminal history’ – ‘No unacceptable risk posed by applicant’ – ‘Poor mental and physical health of the applicant’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant is alleged to have killed his female domestic partner in 2007, approximately 6 months after they had commenced residing together in her unit. He was arrested but released the day after his partner’s death. A coroner found the applicant likely contributed to the death of the deceased in 2011 but the applicant was not re-arrested until 6 January 2021 and has been in custody since then. There is some evidence of a history of violence by the applicant towards the deceased, including an incident where he drove dangerously with the deceased in a vehicle in the days prior to her death which allegedly was a source of arguments between them. There is evidence the deceased asked the applicant to move out of her apartment the day of her death.
Issues: Unacceptable risk and exceptional circumstances.
Held: Bail granted. The fact the applicant remained in the jurisdiction for the many years before he was charged, including while being dealt with for earlier historic offending, and failed to reoffend went a long way to establish that there was no unacceptable risk posed by a grant of bail. The applicant’s counsel’s assertion the prosecution case was weak was rejected, but exceptional circumstances were established by the passage of years and the good behaviour of the applicant during the delay, his lack of relevant prior offending or breach of bail, his serious physical and mental health issues and the effect of incarceration thereon, the conditions he would likely spend remand in, the likely future delay in reaching trial, his stable relationship and accommodation, and the availability of substantial surety.
R v Dellamarta [2021] VSC 220 (4 May 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Impact of covid 19 pandemic’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender, who had an intellectual disability, pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her male partner. She stabbed her partner once to the upper chest during the course of an argument. She admitted to stabbing the deceased but was unable to say why she had done so. She said that she had never been scared that he would physically hurt her, but that he had called her abusive and hurtful names.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A sentence of 7 years and 6 months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 5 years.
The following factors were relevant to objective seriousness: First, the offender deliberately stabbed the deceased with a large kitchen knife. Second, the deceased was her partner, and the offence took place in her home. Third, she grossly overreacted to whatever feelings of hurt and anger she was experiencing in the face of the deceased’s aggression. Fourth, she immediately attempted to revive the deceased, called for help and assisted police.
The offender’s moral culpability for the offending, and the relevance of general deterrence, were somewhat reduced by her intellectual disability and depressive disorder (notwithstanding the lack of a causal link established by expert evidence). Specific deterrence was also modified by her personal factors (genuine remorse, ability to manage the limitations of her intellectual disability and fair prospects for rehabilitation). The guilty plea was also taken into account.
Finally, the court recognised the burden of prison on her at [45]:
“I accept that your deficits mean that your will find prison more burdensome than a person without your disability. Mr Newton described you as a vulnerable prisoner at risk of victimisation and other negative attention in the custodial environment. It seems that this risk has, in fact, materialised. Mr Newton further stated that there is some risk that the intensity of your depressive symptoms will increase as a result of your incarceration. I accept these opinions. I also accept that your experience of custody to date has been difficult given the lack of physical visits between March and December 2020 consequent upon the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Re Dinatale [2021] VSC 104 (9 March 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Impact of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Numerous family violence charges and protection order breaches.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant was charged with numerous family violence offences and intervention order breaches over multiple years, but principally in 2019 and 2020, in respect of his wife (the complainant) and their 2 young children. The alleged offending involved physical violence (including use of weapons and strangulation), exposing the children to family violence, animal abuse, threats to kill (including if the complainant failed to revoke a protection order), and repeated breaches of intervention orders. Due to the delays brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a real prospect that the applicant’s trial would not proceed until 2023.
Issues:
1.
Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether there was an unacceptable risk.
3.
Whether there would be a risk that the applicant would commit family violence if released on bail, and whether such risk might be mitigated.
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail was allowed on strict conditions.
At the outset, counsel for the respondent informed the court that “the children of the applicant are apparently petrified of him, and that Child Protection have indicated an intention of stepping in should the applicant make any attempt to have contact with them. She pointed out that the two children are eye witnesses to some of the offending, and that the risk of interference with them as well as with the complainant herself is a live concern.
Further, counsel for the respondent emphasised that the applicant’s conduct while incarcerated “showed his malevolence towards his wife and aggression towards some other individuals which would itself raise concerns about the safety of his family and others.” The charges were serious, “notwithstanding that no serious injuries had been caused. This was more by good luck than good management, and there was still the risk of psychological harm and ongoing consequences for the children. The seriousness of the offending was amplified by the constant undertone of family violence, encompassing control and actual violence.”
Exceptional circumstances existed. In particular, the possible period of remand due to the COVID-19 delay (2-3 years) would highly likely exceed any term of imprisonment. The obvious risk of the applicant endangering the safety and welfare of any person or committing an offence while on bail could be mitigated by stringent bail conditions so as not to be an unacceptable risk noting: “Any attempt to contact in any way, much less, harm, his wife or children, would have the inevitable consequence that he would be taken again into custody, with little hope of release until the resolution of the charges he faces.”
Re Application for Bail by Wilson [2021] VSC 22 (29 January 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Mild traumatic brain injury’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No unacceptable risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Support services’
Charge: Murder.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female applicant killed her male domestic partner by stabbing him in the back during the course of a domestic dispute. At trial, the applicant intended to argue that she acted in self-defence and that she did not intend to cause death or really serious injury. The applicant had a history of drug addiction, mental illness, and had been in a car accident a few weeks prior to the offending, potentially resulting in a mild traumatic brain injury.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant was granted bail.
There were sufficient matters to establish exceptional circumstances. The two central issues that would arise at trial (self-defence and intent) were “live” and needed to be finely judged, in combination with the delay in the matter (which in itself would not be sufficient) and the circumstances of detention due to COVID-19 (unable to receive visits with her mother or daughter) ([45]-[48]).
The respondent had not demonstrated that the applicant was an unacceptable risk of endangering the community, offending whilst on bail or failing to answer bail. The applicant had a criminal record but this included relatively minor offences and the more serious conviction had no particular resonance in relation to the present offending. There was evidence that she would receive support with accommodation, and in relation to any ongoing problems of drug addiction and mental health from Women’s Housing Ltd. The applicant had further motivation in restoring her relationship with her mother and re-engaging with her young daughter, supported by the Department of Health and Human Services ([50]-[56]).
Re Chambers [2020] VSC 758 (17 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Compelling reason’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Stringent bail conditions’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Reckless conduct endangering life x 2; Aggravated assault of a female x 6; Contravening a family violence intervention order (FVIO) x 1; Recklessly causing injury x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant man and complainant woman were in a domestic relationship, and she was 3 months pregnant with their child. The applicant was subject to two FVIOs, one involving his ex-wife and child, and one involving the complainant. The charged offending involved the application of pressure to the complainant’s neck until she lost consciousness on the first occasion, and until she sustained a fractured larynx on the second occasion. The applicant owned his own business, had no criminal history (but been the subject of a number of reports of family violence), and had a history of depression/anxiety and substance abuse issues.
Issues:
1.
Whether the applicant had demonstrated a “compelling reason” to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether the respondent had demonstrated that there was an “unacceptable risk”.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant was granted bail.
First, on “compelling reason”, the offending alleged was very serious. It involved a man in the context of an ongoing intimate relationship applying pressure on 2 occasions to the neck of his pregnant partner rendering her unconscious and fracturing her larynx. The case against the applicant was of reasonable strength in view of the objective evidence ([50]-[51]).
Nevertheless, his Honour was satisfied that a compelling reason existed to justify the grant of bail ([53]). The applicant had no prior convictions or adverse bail history, stable employment and accommodation, and the situation of the offending had ended. There was no evidence to suggest he would further attack the complainant, with a traumatic period in custody being a strong disincentive to do so. The applicant was seeking treatment for his drug problem. He also stood to spend significant time in custody in difficult circumstances in the absence of bail ([52]).
Second, the court was not satisfied that the risk posed by the applicant (that he would contact and possibly harm the complainant) was unacceptable. This was in light of the very stringent bail conditions imposed to mitigate the risk including a curfew, requirement to comply with a full FVIO that had been put in place concerning the complainant, prohibition on drug use (including testing), requirement to undergo drug treatment, and a broad geographical exclusion to further protect the complainant ([54]).
Application for bail by LP [2020] VSC 764 (16 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Attempts to dissuade victim’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Perverting the course of justice’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Four groups of charges, including alternative charges. Group 1: Reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1; Unlawful assault x 1. Group 2: Intentionally causing injury x 2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Unlawful assault x 2. Group 3: False imprisonment x 1; Intentionally causing injury x 2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Theft x 1; Unlawful assault x 2; Unlawful assault with a weapon x 1. Group 4: Common law assault x 1; Common law charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant man was charged with a number of family violence offences against the female complainant. The charges related to a series of incidents in November 2017 and subsequent text messages aimed at dissuading her from pursuing the complaints. At the time of the bail application, there were three Family Violence Intervention orders (FVIOs) in force (protecting the complainant, another former intimate partner, and the applicant’s further former partner/children). The applicant had expressed a desire to change submitting evidence of, inter-alia, the support of his sister and rehabilitative programmes undertaken in custody.
Issues:
1.
Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether there was an unacceptable risk.
3.
Whether, if the applicant were released on bail, he would pose a risk of committing family violence and whether that risk could be mitigated by the imposition of bail conditions or the making of a FVIO.
Decision and reasoning: Bail refused.
While the matter was finely balanced, the applicant met the threshold of exceptional circumstances through a combination of factors namely, the death of his mother whilst in custody and deferral of her funeral until his release, the likely delays in the matter proceeding to trial, the legitimate criticism levelled at aspects of the prosecution case, and the overall delays in the matter being prosecuted which were not attributable to the applicant (at [78]-[80]).
Nevertheless, there was an unacceptable risk that that the applicant would endanger the safety or welfare of a person, commit offences on bail, interfere with a witness (the complainant), or fail to answer bail. The applicant’s most recent conduct on bail showed that despite awaiting court for family violence charges (including those alleged by the complainant) he was prepared to engage in very similar conduct towards another partner (at [81]-[84], [88]).
Further, the risks the applicant posed not only of committing further family violence but also of trying to dissuade the complainant from proceeding with her complaint could not be mitigated by FVIOs or additional bail conditions. The court noted: “Preventing family violence in the community can be difficult because victims are often reluctant to come forward and/or may be easily dissuaded from pursuing complaints” (at [86]). Risks could not be ameliorated with bail conditions given the applicant’s poor history of compliance with previous bail orders, CCOs, and other court orders, his family violence history committed against different partners and his persistent drug use and offending (at [87]).
OP v XY [2020] VSC 754 (16 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘18-year period for protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse (cald) people’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unborn child added to protection order’ – ‘Whether child in utero at the time of offending is a child who has been 'subjected to family violence'’
Proceedings: Application for judicial review.
Facts: In protection order proceedings in the County Court, XY (female partner) claimed that her husband OP (male partner) had committed numerous instances of family violence during their relationship. This ranged from physical violence and unwanted sex to psychological manipulation and humiliation.
[28] XY alleged that, over the course of the marriage, OP emotionally controlled her, isolated her (from others), and continually abused her — for example, by writing on a whiteboard numerous ways in which she was a bad wife and stepmother. She claimed that OP made her sleep on the floor, limited her food intake and gave her no money. XY said that she felt pressured to have sex and that she could not say no as OP would say that she was a bad wife. She said she made numerous attempts to leave the relationship, but that OP would contact her and manipulate her to return. XY alleged that OP physically assaulted her on several occasions. He also ejected her from the home numerous times, including without shoes. He abused her for being selfish and using money on herself instead of the children. [Also see paragraphs [47]-[51] and [57]].
While OP denied these claims, and made his own against XY, he ultimately consented (without admissions) to a protection order. OP’s claims against XY included ‘falsified and exaggerated claims of being assaulted by her’ [29], also see [79]-[80]. The magistrate made mutual protection orders against OP and XY for a period of two years. OP filed a notice of appeal against the protection order made against him. XY did not appeal the order made against her. On appeal, her Honour extended the length of the DFV protection order against OP from a two-year term to one of 18 years’ duration. Her Honour also added XY’s child to the order on the basis that the child had been subjected to family violence in utero. OP now applies to this court for judicial review of the judge’s decisions and orders.
Decision and reasoning: Application for judicial review dismissed.
The County Court judge’s reasons for extending the DFV protection order to 18 years’ duration and including the child in the order are set out at [221]. The applicant (self-represented) made submissions with respect to, but was unable to demonstrate, actual or apprehended bias, a denial of procedural fairness, inadequacy of the judge’s reasons, Wednesbury unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality in the judge’s decision, and a failure to apply the Briginshaw test to the serious claims of DFV made against him [373].
[17] The difficulty for OP, however, is that this application is not an appeal of the kind in which I am entitled or required to substitute my views on the evidence for those of the County Court judge. Instead, this Court’s jurisdiction on an application for judicial review is merely supervisory, not appellate, and is strictly confined in consequence. In exercising this jurisdiction, I am not to assess the merits of the decision, but must consider only whether the court below exceeded its jurisdiction and whether it observed the law in reaching the relevant decisions. Perhaps counter-intuitively, as I have already intimated, even if the judge below erred, but did so within jurisdiction, still there would be no relief by way of judicial review.
[18] In my opinion, while aspects of the judge’s decision are very close to being afflicted with Wednesbury unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality, in the end, those high hurdles for relief are not cleared. Nor am I satisfied that OP’s claims of actual or apprehended bias are established, whether examined with or without the fresh evidence. Instead, I am persuaded by [counsel for the complainant] that the asserted errors (except perhaps one) are not established or are otherwise within jurisdiction. While it is, I think, plain that the judge exceeded her jurisdiction by including the child in the order by reliance on a power that was not available on the evidence, that order is supported by another power which turns upon OP’s lack of opposition, and the consent XY implicitly gave, at the hearing.
…
[449] I do not accept that, for the purposes of the first limb of s 77(2) (or its later equivalent), it can be said that the child [in utero] “has been subjected to family violence”. While, as I have said, strictly, I need not decide whether there ever could be a case in which a child-to-be in utero may come within the provision, I very much doubt it. Indeed, given that a “child” is “a person who is under the age of 18 years” and that the words “has been subjected to family violence” connote the present tense, I think it is extremely unlikely that the definition of family violence in s 5(1)(b) could extend to behaviour directed at or experienced solely by the mother when the child-to-be is in utero.
Re Busari [2020] VSC 572 (7 September 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Child’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Reckless conduct endangering life x 1; Reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1; Aggravated assault x 1; Common law assault x 1; Unlawful assault x 1.
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The complainant is the male applicant’s female partner. It is alleged that the present charges occurred against a background of long-term, largely unreported domestic violence by the applicant against the complainant. In March 2018, the applicant is alleged to have threatened to burn down the family home resulting in the issuing of a protection order (the applicant is alleged to have breached the DFV protection order on numerous occasions, but these breaches were not reported at the time). In June 2020, the applicant is alleged to have been aggressive and verbally abusive. In July 2020, the applicant is alleged to have verbally abused the complainant. Later, he is alleged to have become increasingly aggressive and assaulted the complainant in front of their child, including pulling chunks of her hair out before allegedly strangling her. After a ‘prolonged period of strangulation’, the complainant managed to free herself and escape. The applicant is alleged to have been intoxicated during the various offences. Bail was previously refused on the basis that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of committing an offence while on bail.
Issues: Whether risk can be mitigated by imposition of condition.
Decision and reasoning: Bail granted.
[56] There is no question that the applicant does pose a risk of contacting the complainant, and interfering with her as a witness and exposing her to danger. The question is whether there are conditions of bail which could be imposed so as to mitigate that risk so that it is not unacceptable.
…
[60] Taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk of any of the matters prescribed in s 4E of the Act. He does certainly pose a risk but I believe that the risk can be ameliorated to an acceptable level by the imposition of the stringent conditions [including residential requirements, curfew, prohibition against drugs or alcohol, mental health care plan, no-contact order for the protection of the complainant and their daughter and compliance with an interim DFV protection order].
R v Sturt [2020] VSC 317 (10 June 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘- people affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Cannabis-induced psychosis’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of sexual violence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mitigating and aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Personality disorders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Murder x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The accused murdered his long-term intimate partner by suffocating and strangling her while he was in a cannabis-induced psychosis. He surrendered himself to police the same day as the killing, made a full confession and pleaded guilty to murder at the first available opportunity. The offence was not an isolated instance of domestic violence, as the accused had been physically and sexually violent towards the deceased in the past. He had also been previously admitted to a psychiatric unit, on which occasions the deceased reported that his mental state had deteriorated in the context of substance abuse, and that he had tried to strangle her in her sleep. He also assaulted the deceased in 2010.
Issue: Whether the voluntary drug taking was an aggravating circumstance; whether his Schizotypal Personality Disorder was a mitigating circumstance.
Held: After an assessment, a forensic psychiatrist made several observations about the accused, including that he used various coercive behaviours, such as violence and threats of violence and suicide, to mitigate the persistent likelihood of the deceased abandoning him. It appeared that the fatal attack was motivated by delusional beliefs. The psychiatrist also found that notwithstanding his prior history of domestic violence, the killing would not have occurred in the absence of the psychotic episode ([26]). In the police interview, the accused described his childhood as "troubled". His stepfather physically and emotionally abused his mother, and the accused used cannabis for many years, and has "dabbled" with other drugs ([52]-[58]).
The Court did not accept the prosecution’s submission that the accused’s cannabis use was an aggravating feature, as it could not be established beyond reasonable doubt that he knew that he was likely to become violently psychotic from the cannabis use during the relevant period ([27]-[30]). Further, his moral culpability was not reduced by his psychosis at the time of the offending, because he had voluntarily taken the cannabis in the knowledge that it might make him violently psychotic ([32]). His forensic psychiatrist considered that his Schizotypal Personality Disorder indirectly contributed to his offending because (1) his problems with social anxiety and depression predisposed him to the heavy use of cannabis, and (2) it lowered the threshold for developing psychosis following ingestion of psychotogenic substances ([37]). The defence counsel’s submission that his personality disorder was a mitigating circumstance was also rejected by the Court ([40]). Cannabis was not the only way to deal with his anxiety. The accused should have undertaken a drug rehabilitation program instead, particularly since he was aware that cannabis might cause him to become violently psychotic ([39]).
Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the deceased was the accused’s long-term intimate partner, she was murdered in her own home, and the offence was not a "one-off instance of domestic violence". The fatal conduct, however, was not motivated by the same considerations which led to the earlier domestic violence instances, and was not planned ([45]-[50]). Mitigating circumstances included the accused’s cooperation with authorities, remorse, and his reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, given his excellent insight into his psychological issues and his positive response to medication while in custody ([65]-[71]). Consequently, he was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years.
R v Cameron [2020] VSC 334 (5 June 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Drug misuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suicide threats by perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship for three months and lived together. The couple argued in the days leading up to the offending and the victim appeared nervous and scared to those she met. She told several friends that she could not leave, even though the offender had choked her. On the night prior to the offending, the victim visited her friend after a fight with the offender. The victim received text messages from the offender saying that he would kill himself if the victim did not come back. The offender went to the friend’s house and spoke to the victim, but the victim said she was not ready to come back home now but would come soon. The offender left the house and travelled to the house of a friend. On the way, he slashed his right forearm repeatedly; the friend wrapped the offender’s arm in a tea towel. In the meantime, the victim returned home but did not find the offender there, so she texted her friend, indicating that she thought she would be okay. A text message exchange then occurred between the offender and the victim in which the offender asked the victim if he could come home and told her that he loved her, but the victim said she did not want to talk and that "If you love someone you would not harm them and control them". The victim exchanged text messages with other people but these ceased abruptly around 4:55am.
At this time, the offender returned home and stabbed the victim numerous times to the face, scalp, neck and arms with a kitchen knife while she was on her bed. She died quickly after this attack. The offender tried to clean the scene with bleach and hid the body and bloody sheets under the bed. He then tried to burn down the house by lighting a fire in a cabinet next to the bed, but this only smouldered as the cabinet was closed and the fire was starved of oxygen. The offender went to his friend’s place and told him that he had killed the victim, but only because she had attacked him in his sleep. He repeated this account of events to police, claiming that the victim had attacked him when he refused to get her more ice.
Judgment: The judge sentenced the offender to 29 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 23 years. His Honour noted that the offender’s "crime of murder is a very serious example of that always serious crime" [118]. In addressing the offender, his Honour emphasised the aggravating features of the offending: "In the context of an ongoing domestic relationship which left your partner strongly fearing you, at least in the days leading up to her death, for reasons which have not in any honest way been explained by you, you took to her with a dangerous knife while she was in the sanctuary of her own bed in her own home … You ignored her futile and desperate attempts to ward off your blows. Having killed her, you showed your lack of regard for her by hiding her under her bed, conducting a cursory clean-up, then setting the fire in the cabinet intent on burning the crime scene. Then you left her, dead on the floor, covered in blood" [118]. And further, "Yours was a sustained and outrageously violent attack upon a helpless woman," such that his Honour held that the lack of planning or premeditation "said nothing about its seriousness" [121]. His Honour further stated that "You were in a position of trust where she was concerned. She should have been able to look to you for love and protection. You chose, however, to kill her by extravagant, protracted and shocking acts of violence. Each single act of stabbing her entailed serious danger to the welfare of your helpless victim. You carried out many such individual acts" [123] and that "Your breach of trust and lack of normal human decency are simply stunning" [140].
His Honour held that rehabilitation would have little part to play in the sentence, because the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were "exceedingly dim," given he had not honestly acknowledged his crime nor dealt with his drug and other issues [131]. Instead, just punishment, denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence and protection of the community were important to the sentence [141]. His Honour noted that "The sentence of this Court must make it perfectly clear that the Court deplores violent crimes of this sort, especially against a domestic partner" and that "the sentence I pass must bring it clearly home to any person who might be minded to inflict extreme violence upon a domestic partner, for whatever reason, that such conduct will be met with strong punishment" [141]. His Honour was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the physical altercation did not commence as the offender claimed and that his account was a complete fabrication; that is, it did not begin with the victim attacking the offender because the victim was evidently very scared of the offender and "would have known that to [attack the offender] would only serve to inflame [the offender] and might trigger a violent reaction from a person of whom she was in fear" [50], [51], [55]. In rejecting the offender’s claim, his Honour held that there was no explanation for the shocking crime [56].
His Honour rejected that the plea of guilty was made at a reasonably early stage, having been made 16 months after the offending [59], but noted that there was still a significant utilitarian benefit to the plea, which would constitute a mitigating factor [61]. His Honour also rejected that the offender was remorseful [64], taking into account his conduct after the offending (in attempting to clean the scene and hide the body), his false assertions of the victim attacking the offender first, and his obvious sorrow for his own position, not the death of the victim. His Honour accepted that the offender had a substantial history of methylamphetamine use, and that the offender was using that drug at the time of offending [80]. However, his Honour also noted that the offender had an extensive criminal history for matters of violence, dishonesty, weapons and driving, and that he had been imprisoned numerous times and received numerous community-based dispositions which were frequently breached [83]. His Honour was not convinced that the offender actually suffered from PTSD and noted that even if he did, this would not result in any term of imprisonment weighing more heavily on the offender than a person in normal health [102]. His Honour therefore held that the principle enunciated in the fifth limb of R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 did not have any application in this case [103].
Re Brzezowski [2020] VSC 294 (28 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Compelling reasons’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Offences: Common assault x 2; Unlawful assault x 2; Sexual assault x 2; Criminal damage; Threaten to commit a sexual offence; False imprisonment; Contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO) x 4; Persistent contravention of a FVIO; Committing an indictable offence whilst on bail; Contravening condition of bail.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Whether compelling reasons exist justifying the grant of bail.
Facts: The applicant and complainant commenced a ‘romantic’ relationship in August 2019. The applicant moved into the complainant’s home which she shared with her 23-year-old daughter. On the day of the offending, the complainant came home from work and found the applicant intoxicated. They argued before the applicant told the complainant to join him in the shower. The complainant initially refused but eventually agreed to appease the applicant who appeared angry. The applicant suggested they have sexual intercourse but the complainant refused. The applicant became violent towards her, pushing her into the shower door. The complainant tried to leave the shower but the applicant pushed her onto the bed, held her wrists above her head and thrust his knee into her thigh. The complainant kicked the applicant in the genitals. The applicant then punched the complainant in the abdomen about ten times. The applicant left the house but came back shortly later, yelling "Right, time for round two". The complainant attempted to leave in her car but was initially blocked in by the applicant’s car. She managed to leave but returned to the house to collect her dogs as she was fearful the applicant would harm them.
The complainant went to the toilet when she arrived but found the applicant in there. The applicant rubbed faeces over the complainant’s face and hair, then pushed her up against a wall using his forearm under her chin. She broke free and called 000, while the applicant began hitting things in the house. The applicant grabbed the complainant, threw her onto the bed, pushed his forearm to her throat and punched her in the abdomen, stating he was going to give her anal with his clenched fist. The applicant got off the complainant when she grabbed his genitalia with her fingernails. She cancelled the police request but asked her sister to come and help her. The complainant’s sister and daughter arrived, followed by police.
A full and final non-contact FVIO was granted after this incident which the applicant breached by texting and calling the complainant. On one occasion though, the complainant visited the applicant at a motel room for about five minutes.
Judgment: The judge granted bail on the applicant’s own undertaking with strict conditions (including he: provide a $3000 surety, reside at his parent’s residence, abide by a curfew, comply with the FVIO, not contact any prosecution witness, not enter the suburb the complainant lives in, not consume alcohol or drugs), finding that the applicant had established that a compelling reason exists to justify the granting of bail, despite the offending being "serious and distasteful" [65]. The applicant argued that the following were compelling reasons to justify bail: the applicant’s limited criminal history (he has only come before court twice); his first time in custody; weakness of the prosecution case (the complainant’s credibility is likely to be successfully challenged); delay (one year on remand); implications of the COVID-19 pandemic (lockdowns and the possibility the virus could enter prisons); availability of stable accommodation with the applicant’s parents; his ties to the jurisdiction, including his parents and children; $3000 surety from his mother; other conditions to reduce the magnitude of risk (for example, imposition of a curfew) [32].
His Honour noted that the applicant conceded that the offending was serious, finding that "the offending alleges multiple acts of family violence committed by a more powerful male upon a relatively vulnerable female who would have been entitled to look to him for protection, rather than physical violence and threatening conduct" [49] and that the applicant "flagrantly breached requirements" of the FVIO [50]. While his Honour did accept that the complainant’s credit "will be subject to strong and justifiable attack", he found that the prosecution case could not be described as weak due to other things supporting the complainant’s account [52]-[53].
His Honour further found that the applicant’s criminal history included a finding of guilt for an assault upon a previous domestic partner and that the applicant had "deliberate and flagrant disregard" for previous grants of bail. As such, his Honour held that there was a "real concern as to [the applicant’s] willingness to abide by conditions of bail" that might be imposed in the future [57]. Furthermore, his Honour noted the existence of the FVIO and that the complainant was very frightened of the applicant and dreaded his release on bail [60].
His Honour accepted that a full year on remand would be a significant period of time for a case which would remain in the summary stream [61] and that such a period would be particularly significant in light of the onerous conditions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic [62]. Additionally, his Honour held that the applicant was likely to receive a sentence lower than the period of time he would spend on remand if not bailed [63]. In considering the "unacceptable risk" test, his Honour noted that there was a legitimate concern that the applicant would try to contact the complainant again, but that, since his arrest, the applicant had not attempted to contact the complainant and had not been violent towards her. His Honour considered that the risk posed by the applicant could be ameliorated with imposition of strict bail conditions.
Re Ilpola [2020] VSC 578 (21 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Allegations of family violence’ – ‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of orders’ – ‘Charges of schedule 2 offences while subject to community corrections order for schedule 2 offences’ – ‘Community corrections order for schedule 2 offences’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Bail application.
Charges: attempted rape, sexual assault, persistent contravention of FVIO, making a threat to inflict serious injury x 3, false imprisonment, intentionally causing injury, common law assault.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been married and had one daughter together but were separated at the time of the offending. A protection order was in place prohibiting the applicant from contacting the complainant or their daughter, or coming within 100m of them or 200m of their home.
The offences predominantly arose on one day. It was alleged the applicant first telephoned the complainant while she was at home with her son and threatened them, following which they left the house. When the complainant returned home later that day, the applicant was inside her house and grabbed her, punching her head and face, and later attempting to anally penetrate her. The following day he returned to her house and was further verbally abusive. The complainant reported the incident to the police.
The applicant denied all the allegations apart from having attended the complainant’s residence on three occasions. At the time of the offending he was subject to a 12-month CCO following convictions for recklessly causing injury, contravening an FVIO, intentionally damaging property and failing to answer in relation to the same complainant.
Reasoning and decision: Lasry J had regard to the serious nature of the attempted rape offence, his view that the strength of the prosecution case was not compromised by his dependence on the complainant’s evidence, the accused’s criminal history and existence of the CCO at the time of the offending, the lack of evidence of the availability of treatment opportunities and his view that if bail were refused the applicant would not be likely to spend more time in custody than the likely sentence.
Exceptional circumstances were found to exist in the substantial delay of the trial of two and a half to three years, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Lasry J found that there was an unacceptable risk of reoffending and that this risk would not be sufficiently mitigated by imposing bail conditions. Given that the applicant had been subject to a CCO for similar offences at the time of the incident and a protection order had already been put in place seeking to protect the complainant, it was concluded that bail was not acceptable.
Re Mazzitelli [2020] VSC 288 (21 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Weapons’
Offences: Intentionally cause injury x 3; Common assault x 8; Making a threat to inflict serious injury x 2; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2; Being a prohibited person in possession of an imitation firearm x 2
Proceedings: Bail application
Issues: Whether exceptional circumstances exist justifying the granting of bail; Whether there is an unacceptable risk that the applicant would reoffend or endanger the community if released.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship from November 2017 until September 2018, during which there were a number of separations and reconciliations. From February 2018, there were numerous instances of violence by the applicant towards the complainant. These included: using a chain like a whip to hit the complainant; pushing her out of the car; splashing hot wax on her hair, face and arms; tasering her; hitting her on the back of the head; throwing drinking glasses at her; kicking her hard in the stomach when she was pregnant; burning her on her back with a blow torch; and hitting her with a metal pole. The applicant also made several threats towards the complainant, including: a threat to cut her hands off; threatening to kill her (while holding a gun); threatening to shoot different limbs; threatening her so that she would recant her testimony to police. The applicant’s sister told the complainant that she had to tell police that she made up the allegations, and the complainant later made a statutory declaration to this effect. However, she maintained the allegations at the committal hearing and explained why she made the statutory declaration.
Judgment: The judge refused the bail application, holding that the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances existed that justified the granting of bail and even if this had been established, the risk posed by the applicant of reoffending or endangering the community if released would be unacceptable. The applicant relied on the following matters as proof of exceptional circumstances: delay (about two years from arrest until trial), onerous nature of remand due to the COVID-19 pandemic, weakness of the prosecution case, absence of any contact with the complainant while on bail, availability of support through CROP (a drug intervention program), family support and stable accommodation, modest criminal history (no convictions for violence), first time in custody, no pending matters other than the trial, and the applicant’s medical condition [43]-[44].
His Honour found that the applicant did not challenge the proposition that the offending was serious, noting that "Whilst not anywhere near the higher end of the range of seriousness of offences of family violence, the alleged attacks by the applicant upon his then partner were repeated, nasty, and had some disturbing elements to them, including the use of weapons and the infliction of a kick to the abdomen of a pregnant woman" [58]. His Honour considered that the complainant was scared of the applicant and a FVIO was in place with her as a protected person [71].
His Honour also found that the prosecution case was not weak, the applicant’s criminal history "reveal[ed] some signs of a lack of respect by the applicant for the orders of the court", and the applicant had already been imprisoned in the past for failing to answer bail. His Honour noted that the applicant’s conduct in respect of bail "paint[ed] a picture of a person who is entirely unwilling to comply with the requirements of bail when they do not suit him" and that this was an important consideration when assessing exceptional circumstances [67].
While his Honour accepted that the applicant had an extensive history of illicit drug use as a form of pain relief for an accident the applicant suffered eight years ago, his Honour held that it was completely unacceptable for the applicant to do this, particularly where the applicant knew this would breach his bail conditions [69]. Furthermore, his Honour held that the provision of family support was "not an important matter in the overall mix of circumstances in this case" where the applicant had family support in the past but still offended [70]. His Honour noted that the applicant was likely to spend 17 months on remand before trial, but that this "is not, on its own, or in combination with other factors, exceptional" [72]. In any event, any sentence imposed was likely to exceed this period anyway [73].
Re Sepehrnia [2020] VSC 247 (6 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 to bail application’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Step-children in home’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Rape x 2; Infliction of injury; Threats; Damaging property.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Do exceptional circumstances exist justifying the grant of bail; does the applicant pass the unacceptable risk test.
Facts: The male applicant threatened to kill and physically harm his female ex-partner, MZ, on multiple occasions, including by pointing a firearm at her and threatening to throw acid in her face. Following an argument between the couple, the applicant punched MZ in the face and kicked her in the middle of her back, before pushing her on the bed, covering her face with a pillow and stating that he was going to rape her. He removed the pillow and grabbed MZ around the throat before raping her. The assault lasted several minutes before the applicant left MZ alone at his house. MZ reported the assault (but not the rape). When the applicant learnt of this, he threatened to kill MZ’s family. A Family Violence Intervention Order (‘FVIO’) was issued to protect MZ.
The applicant also threatened to kill and physically harm another female ex-partner, SB, and her children, and frequently damaged her property. On a number of occasions, the applicant slapped, spat on, choked, scratched, pulled SB’s hair and threw her to the ground. He also physically assaulted SB’s 16-year-old daughter and one of SB’s friends, and detained SB in her home on one occasion. SB ended the relationship, but the applicant continued to abuse her until he was remanded for other matters. After his release, the applicant attended SB’s house, forced her onto her bed, threatened to kill her if she was ever with another guy, and raped her.
The applicant applied for bail twice in relation to the charges arising out of these events, but both applications were refused as the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances and there was an unacceptable risk of further offending.
Held: The judge refused to grant bail as the applicant failed to establish that exceptional circumstances existed justifying bail and if the applicant were released, there was a high risk that he would endanger the safety of the public, commit offences while on bail, interfere with witnesses and/or fail to answer bail. The applicant contended that various matters, when considered together, constituted exceptional circumstances. These included: delay (his trial was unlikely to occur until next year because of the COVID-19 pandemic and he already spent 252 days in custody); the onerous circumstances of his custody (he has been held in protection due to physical attacks upon him and receives no visitors due to COVID-19 restrictions); lack of strength of the prosecution case; his criminal history occurred in the context of drug use; he has used his time in custody well (by completing courses and maturing); the availability of stable residence, employment and family supports; and the availability of a surety of $500,000 [33].
His Honour held that the offending was very serious [47], the cases against the applicant were not weak [48], his criminal history (violence, dishonesty and weapons offences, breaches of FVIOs, failing to answer bail) rose questions as to his character and ability to abide by any court orders [49], he had previously been convicted for failing to answer bail [50], at the time of offending he was already subject to bail and CCOs [51], he was very unlikely to be willing and able to comply with any bail conditions [52], there were already several FVIOs against the applicant [53], the proposed living arrangements if he were to be released were unsatisfactory as the applicant has committed family violence against his mother and sister in the past (with whom it was proposed he should live) [54], there was no evidence he had taken major steps towards dealing with his drug issues [55], both victims were frightened of the applicant [56], and he would receive a much longer term of imprisonment if convicted for even one rape offence than he would on remand [57].
His Honour also noted the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, but approved Re Tong [2020] VSC 141 in which the court held that the pandemic is "simply part of the surrounding circumstances required to be taken into account in a consideration" of steps in the bail process. His Honour therefore was "far from satisfied that the applicant … discharged the onus resting on him to establish the existence of exceptional circumstances" [59].
Even if the applicant had established exceptional circumstances, His Honour concluded that the risk of the applicant harming the victims and/or their families was so high that His Honour would have refused bail in any event [62].
Re Bertucci [2020] VSC 88 (2 March 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Children present’ – ‘Contravention of protection orders’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘No exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: Various offences, including contraventions of FVIO, recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault, failing to answer bail and committing an indictable offence on bail
Case type: Application for bail
Facts: On 19 April 2019, the applicant man was charged with contravention of a FVIO and persistent contravention of a FVIO (‘the informant Sidorovska matter’). He was released on bail, however, after failing to appear in the Sunshine Magistrates’ Court, an order was made forfeiting his bail and a further bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On 2 October 2019, the applicant was charged with recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault (x 2), contravention of a FVIO, failing to answer bail and committing an indictable offence on bail (‘the informant McKay matter’). The applicant had been refused bail twice in the Sunshine Magistrates’ Court in relation to both sets of charges.
The applicant and complainant woman were in a relationship and have 3 children together. At the time of the relevant alleged offending in the informant Sidorovska matter, the applicant and complainant were separated and a final no-contact FVIO was in place against the applicant, listing the complainant and the children as the affected family members. In relation to the informant McKay matter, the applicant allegedly assaulted the complainant woman by striking her to the leg with an implement, as well as to the head. This occurred in contravention of a FVIO and in close proximity to the children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify bail and whether the previous history of family violence towards the complainant not resulting in findings of guilt should be taken into account.
Held: The Court refused bail as the applicant failed to discharge the onus to prove the existence of exceptional circumstances to justify his release on bail ([64]). In considering the submissions for a finding of exceptional circumstances, the Court found that:
•
the decision on bail would not interfere long-term with the prospects of the family being reunited ([49]);
•
allowing the applicant to live with the complainant and children would do nothing to mitigate the risk of reoffending as such a living environment was ‘far-from stable’ ([50]);
•
the applicant’s two-months of part-time employment leading up to the date of the contested hearing was relatively insignificant ([51]);
•
the prosecution’s case in respect of the two sets of charges was not weak ([52]);
•
the multiple breaches of the intervention order indicated a deliberate disregard and lack of respect for the court order imposed to protect his partner and children from him ([53]); and
•
striking a female with an implement cannot be described as trivial offending ([54]).
Although the applicant’s criminal history was not lengthy, it was deemed highly significant. For example, he had previous convictions for persistent contravention of a FVIO, and had previously acted with violence towards another female partner, both of which resulted in imprisonment ([57]). This indicated that he had not been adequately deterred and showed a lack of regard for court-imposed sanctions and for the importance of bail ([63]). There had also been a number of alleged incidents of family violence towards the complainant, which did not result in findings of guilt. The Court considered these matters as relevant to whether the applicant posed a risk of future endangerment to the complainant and her children ([58]-[59]).
R v Eckersley [2020] VSC 22 (30 January 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children exposed’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Domestic homicide’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Misuse of drugs and alcohol’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Moral culpability significantly reduced by psychosis’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a domestic relationship from 2001 until the victim was killed in July 2018. They had three children together. There was a history of controlling behaviour by the offender towards the victim. The offender’s mental health had deteriorated in the lead up to the offence, with his GP recording that the offender was "struggling with depression due to a loss of income and employment, and that [he] had been self-medicating with alcohol and cannabis but had stopped consuming these substances" [9]. The GP did not observe any homicidal ideations or psychosis symptoms at the time.
The morning of the offence, the neighbours heard a large argument ensuing within the offender’s home. The offender threw food and cleaning products into the rubbish and damaged items in the kitchen with a hammer before suddenly attacking the victim by punching her in the face. The victim fell to the ground and was kicked by the offender before he grabbed a knife and stabbed her in the head, neck, chest and upper body. The attack was witnessed by two of their children, one of whom unsuccessfully tried to stop the attack. The offender then proceeded to set fire to a near-by fabric couch and applied the lighter flame to the older daughter’s shoulder. He then forced the children and family dog into a car and drove away. Police later found the offender and children unharmed.
The offender suffered from ‘severe, acute and transient’ drug-induced psychosis at the time of offending [62]. The offender’s psychosis meant that his degree of moral culpability was of significant dispute.
Held: Eckersley was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
The judge provided that ordinarily, "a drug-induced psychosis does not commonly result in the application of the Verdins principles and a mitigatory outcome" [88]. However, as the offender was prescribed the drug by his GP and was not aware that they could cause psychotic symptoms, the judge was satisfied of the offender’s low moral culpability [92]. This lower culpability lessened denunciation and deterrence as sentencing factors, however the judge noted that this did not "take away from the fact that the killing of an intimate partner is an inherently terrible act" [108]. The judge also noted that while the murder did not occur in the context of a history of family violence, "the killing of an intimate partner is a most serious form of offending which must again be tragically emphasised by the Court" [112].
In sentencing Eckersley, Justice Champion considered the children witnessing the offence, the offender’s destruction of the victim’s body and fleeing the scene as aggravating factors. The unreasonable delay in sentencing was also accounted for.
Re Rodgers [No 2] [2019] VSC 760 (20 November 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 33 offences, including strangulation
Case type: Bail application
Facts: The applicant was charged with 33 offences, 32 of which arose out of incidents alleged to have occurred over 3 days. The other charge involved the contravention of an undertaking given to the Magistrates’ Court. The primary complainant was the applicant’s wife, however, the alleged offending also involved the complainant’s children. It was alleged, among other things, that the applicant grabbed the complainant’s throat and pushed her head through a wall, while threatening her that he would ‘drain’ their bank account and take their daughters to the United States ([6]).
The applicant was refused bail in August 2019, and applied for bail again ([3]-[4]). The applicant contended that a compelling reason to justify a grant of bail could be established based on his personal and financial circumstances, the strength of the charges against him, the likely delay until determination of the charges, and the lawful sentencing range open to the sentencing court. He also submitted that, without being granted bail, he was likely to spend a significantly longer period of time on remand ([11]-[12]). On the issue of unacceptable risk, the respondent pointed to the applicant’s ‘history of contravention of court orders’ and his addiction to illicit substances which appeared ‘to be linked to his offending and violence against the complainant and [her] children’ ([17]-[21]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine whether a ‘compelling reason’ existed in favour of bail.
Held: The applicant was admitted to bail on strict conditions. In the Court’s view, bail conditions, such as daily reporting to police, prohibition from approaching the vicinity of the complainant’s residence and curfews, would sufficiently mitigate any risk posed by the applicant ([33]). The applicant was 33 years of age, and had a limited prior criminal history and no prior criminal history involving violence. He had no prior convictions for breaching court orders, however, he previously admitted to breaching a family violence order ([26]-[27]). The applicant ran a trucking business, which would likely suffer financially if he was not granted bail. Factors militating against the applicant included the seriousness of the allegations of strangulation and the fact that the complainant was afraid of him. Nevertheless, the Court found that the applicant had established a compelling reason to justify the grant of bail, given his lack of a negative bail history, the modesty of his criminal history, his personal and financial circumstances, the time already spent in custody, the period of any likely sentence and the material and recommendations in the CISP Remand Outreach Program (CROP) report ([30]).
The Queen v Karatzas [2019] VSC 658 (26 September 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Depression’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused and victim were married. After an argument with the victim, the accused strangled her with an electrical extension cord until she collapsed and fled the scene. Expert evidence that the accused was suffering from a major depressive episode at the time of the offence ‘which may have clouded [his] thought processes and [his] appreciation of the consequences of [his] actions’ [24] was accepted at trial along with evidence that the accused loved his wife and had been violent to her before.
Issues: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 11 years.
The court accepted that the fact the accused was suffering from a major depressive episode significantly reduced the accused’s moral culpability [24]. Beale J said ‘[d]omestic violence murders are often upper range examples of the offence of murder, particularly where there has been a history of domestic violence. This is not your case. The fact that you killed your wife of nearly 50 years was a gross breach of trust which elevates the seriousness of your offending but, having regard to all circumstances, and particularly your mental illness, I find that yours is a mid-range example of the offence of murder’ [25]. The other mitigating factors considered by his Honour include the accused’s: remorse; previous good character; excellent prospects of rehabilitation; age; and ‘the punishment [the accused will] continue to experience knowing you killed your beloved wife’ as other mitigating circumstances [54].
The Queen v Bufton [2019] VSC 621 (13 September 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Controlling, possessive, jealous behaviour’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’
Charge: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The female offender was found guilty following trial of the murder of her male domestic partner, her various offers of a guilty plea to negligent manslaughter, then dangerous driving causing death (following the death of the sole living witness to the offence), and then again negligent manslaughter having been rejected. The pleas offered appeared to relate to the Crown’s perceived prospects of proving their case with the evidential difficulties occasioned by the death of the witness.
The offender and victim had a turbulent relationship involving many arguments and periods of separation from January 2016 until his death in October 2017. The victim was attempting to remove his caravan from the offender’s property when the offender became verbally abusive and refused to let the victim move it. The victim walked away to call police for assistance but was followed by the victim in her car and struck by the vehicle. The call to 000 remain connected during the accident and picked up the ensuing conversation between the offender and a witness in which the offender claimed that the victim jumped in front of her car and she was unable to avoid him. This false story was later repeated to police.
The offender was 68 years of age and had no prior criminal convictions. She had been diagnosed with cancer. She was subject to an intervention order prohibiting the commission of family violence against the victim at the time of offending.
Held: Bufton was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
The Court treated this protection order as an aggravating feature along with the use of a dangerous weapon and noted that the ‘crime occurred in the context of [Bufton] having been in a domestic relationship with [the victim], and of [Bufton] having acted out of anger and frustration at the state of the relationship [36]. Her persistence in the false account of events and the fluctuating pleas were considered to be indicative of a lack of contrition or remorse[46-52]. Assistance rendered by the offender to the accused was conduct which could be explained by the crime being carried out in full view of the witness[53]. The judge said at [52]:
"For completeness, I make it clear that you are not to be punished for your refusal to admit what you had actually done, or for pleading not guilty to murder. Rather, these facts point to the absence of a possible mitigating feature of your crime which would have existed were you to have been willing to accept the true criminality of your conduct."
Just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence were treated as the most important sentencing purposes, with the significance of specific deterrence being reduced in light of Bufton’s age and cancer diagnosis.
Re Rodgers [2019] VSC 553 (20 August 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Multiple charges of causing injury intentionally and recklessly, a charge of recklessly causing serious injury, charges of reckless conduct endangering life and endangering person, a charge of making a threat to kill, drugs charges, a charge of criminal damage, and numerous breaches of Family Violence Intervention Orders (FVIO)
Case type: Bail application
Facts: The applicant applied for bail on a number of charges, which arose out of family violence related incidents. The complainants include his former wife and children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine whether a ‘compelling reason’ existed in favour of bail.
Held: The Court refused the bail application as there would be an unacceptable risk that the applicant would endanger the safety and welfare of the complainant and her children, or commit further offences while on bail ([65]). The nature and seriousness of the offending was considered to be the most important matter for the Court. Tinney J described the offending as ‘quite disturbing, with a significant and worrying risk of causing serious injury or death’ ([51]). Some of the alleged violence occurred in the presence of one or more of the children, and occurred in the family home ([54]). Although the applicant’s criminal history was limited, he had been found guilty of assaulting the complainant in the past. Further, he was on an adjourned bond for that assault ([56]), and was also subject to a FVIO at the time of the alleged offending ([57]).
There were many personal circumstances favourable to the applicant. For example, he had a supportive family and was the operator of a company which, in his absence, struggled financially ([58]). According to Tinney J, the applicant’s prolonged drug use had a significant impact on the alleged offending, and would increase the risk of failure to comply with his bail conditions ([59]). The complainant’s attitude to bail was also a relevant consideration. She was afraid of the applicant and did not want him to be released on bail ([60]). His Honour concluded that there were sufficiently compelling reasons to deny the applicant a grant of bail ([63]).
Additional matters of concern included ([64]):
•
The applicant allegedly repeatedly and violently assaulted his wife;
•
The offending allegedly occurred in the context of ongoing drug use by both the applicant and the complainant;
•
The offending occurred despite there being an intervention order in place and the fact that he was subject to an adjourned bond for a previous assault on the complainant; and
•
If bail was granted, the conditions imposed on the applicant would not have sufficiently reduced the risks to a level where they would be acceptable.
Note: An appeal against this decision to refuse bail was rejected by the Victorian Court of Appeal - Rodgers v The Queen [2019] VSCA 214 (26 September 2019)
The Queen v Solmaz [2019] VSC 530 (12 August 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: 1 x murder
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty (shortly before the trial was due to commence) to the murder of his former wife, with whom he entered into an arranged marriage when he was 18 years of age. They had 2 children. The murder occurred in the context of an unhappy relationship which had subsisted for many years leading up to her death. The offender claimed that the deceased attacked him with a broken leg of a table and that he took the piece of wood from her and hit her repeatedly. He then used an extension lead to strangle her ([10]). In the aftermath, the offender left the deceased dead on the floor and went to his step-sister’s home where he confessed to the killing. He then fled Melbourne, and was intercepted by Queensland police two days after the killing.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The Court sentenced the offender to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years. The offender was 60 years of age and was born in Bulgaria. He had one prior conviction of unlawful assault, but this had limited significance to his case ([33]). Medical evidence indicated that he was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder, and was likely depressed at the time of the deceased’s death. One expert considered that his Adjustment Disorder contributed to his offending by diminishing his ability to reason and make sound judgment ([45]). The Court, however, noted several deficiencies in this expert’s evidence, such as the fact that he heavily relied on the truthfulness of the offender’s account to him about his relationship with the deceased and that it conflicted with other expert evidence ([86]-[94]). Consequently, the Court did not accept this expert evidence and rejected the defence’s submissions in respect of the Verdins principles to reduce the sentence, other than for the purpose of the hardship of imprisonment ([95], [99]). According to the Court, the offender’s conduct could not be connected to any defect in his reasoning abilities or be characterised as an impulsive crime. He inflicted multiple, forceful blows to the deceased. The ‘shocking and protracted nature of the crime’ indicated that any impairment to mental functioning was not causally connected to the offending, and that he intended to kill her ([96]-[97]). The crime was described as one of ‘extravagant and drawn-out violence committed against a physically weaker person whom [the offender] apparently detested and who had offered some provocation to [him] by striking [him] with the leg of the table’ ([97]).
While the offending was not premeditated, the Court considered it to be at the high end of the range of seriousness. The crime was an extreme overreaction to modest provocation by the deceased and the challenges of their ‘sad and troubled relationship’ ([102]). The Court also found that the offender had not exhibited true remorse ([111]). His prospects of rehabilitation, however, were found to be good ([117]).
Relevant sentencing principles included just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence. The Court found it necessary to make ‘perfectly clear’ that it deplores violent crimes of this nature, particularly those committed against domestic partners. The deceased’s life was ‘precious’, and was brutally and deliberately taken away by the offender as a result of his anger, resentment and frustration. He had full knowledge of the severity and criminality of his actions ([121]-[122]).
R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male victim and female offender (Stone) had been married for 22-years and had five children together. Evidence tendered during trial was that the male victim had reported an incident of the offender chasing him from the house with a knife. Neighbours also reported sounds of arguing and physical violence coming from the home prior to the incident that lead to the victim’s death. There was evidence that the victim told members of his extended family that he intended to leave the relationship the day of the incident that lead to his death.
The Crown case was that Stone doused the victim with highly flammable enamel thinner and set him on fire. While none of the children saw the victim committing the offence, one of the daughters saw their father engulfed in flames and heard him say that he was going to die. Another daughter saw the trail of debris left by the victim as he ran to the bathroom after being set alight.
The victim was found conscious by paramedics despite sustaining burns to 95% of his body, including his airways. He was placed on life-support and interviewed but did not recover. Both the victim and Stone gave false versions of the events, claiming that the victim had been attacked by three men. Stone provided the names of the alleged offenders but failed to identify them during police interviews and was subsequently arrested herself.
Held: The accused was sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years. The Court provided that murder is "the ultimate act of family violence", with the offender’s ‘vicious and barbarous’ conduct constituting a "a violation of the security of the sanctity of the home and a massive breach of trust" [32]. With the offender’s conduct being ‘a most serious example of murder’, the Court found the objective gravity of the offence and offender’s moral culpability to be ‘extremely high’. As such, denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing considerations along with protection of the community [42].
Note: Subsequent applications for leave to appeal against conviction (on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding the applicant’s alleged lies were reasonably capable of amounting to ‘incriminating conduct’; (2) the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; and (3) a substantial miscarriage of justice occurred because of the failure of the prosecution to disclose telephone records); and sentence on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive were dismissed: Stone v The Queen [2021] VSCA 186 (24 June 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal.
See also R v Stone (Ruling No 1) [2018] VSC 625 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court and R v Stone (Ruling No 2) [2018] VSC 626 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court.
R v Willis [2019] VSC 398 (20 June 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘History of family violence’ – ‘Murder of parent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verdins’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of his mother. The case raises important community issues and the connection between drugs, mental health and family violence. The evidence showed that the offender and his mother had significant mental health issues, which strained their relationship and ultimately led him to stab her to death ([2]). The offender admitted to killing his mother to police, and made further admissions to his father and former partner. Lasry J described the murder as ‘grave and tragic’. The victim was vulnerable and defenceless in the face of the attack, and her death was the culmination of a lengthy history of hostility and family violence between them ([17]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Lasry J noted the offender’s personal circumstances at [21]-[25], and the issue of mental health and substance abuse at [26]-[33]. He started using drugs as a teenager, however remained drug free for several years. His deteriorating mental health and increasing drug use led to the breakdown of his relationship with his former partner and the loss of his job. The offender had also been diagnosed with Delusional Disorder and subject to various treatment orders. A forensic psychiatrist gave evidence of the offender’s long history of major mental disorder and substance misuse, but noted that he had no history of being violent or anti-social other than when he was psychotic or affected by drugs. The offender also suffered from paranoid schizophrenia which was likely precipitated by his cannabis use and aggravated by his methamphetamine use.
The offender pleaded guilty at a relatively early stage of the proceedings. An element of remorse was identified in his post-offence conduct; however his Honour noted that the offender’s hostility towards his mother had not completely abated ([41]-[43]).
Further, the offender had no criminal history and made efforts to improve himself while in custody through education and work opportunities. Lasry J was satisfied that there was some evidence that he was capable of leading a law-abiding and productive life, and that his prospects of rehabilitation depended on his compliance with treatment for his mental health and substance misuse ([44]-[45]).
Lasry J was satisfied that the principles arising from Verdins meant that the offender’s moral culpability was significantly reduced. Community protection was not a significant sentencing consideration provided that his serious mental health issues were properly managed ([53]). The offender was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.
R v Considine & Anor [2019] VSC 386 (31 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to murdering the victim. The offender’s partner of around 9 years, Hogan, pleaded guilty to assisting him. The relationship between the offenders involved homelessness, drug use and domestic violence. In 2015, while the offender, Considine, was serving a term of imprisonment, Hogan and the victim met on Facebook and commenced an intimate relationship. When the offender was released from prison, Hogan and the victim ended their relationship, but resumed social media communication in 2017. The offender, Considine, became aware of this relationship. Considine and Hogan arranged a threesome with the victim. The offender became jealous of the sexual activity between Ms Hogan and the victim, and strangled the victim to death. Ms Hogan assisted the offender to dispose of the body.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: The offender, Considine, began consuming alcohol and taking drugs as a teenager. A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed the offender with Borderline Personality Disorder and believed that he likely had an acquired brain injury (ABI). He therefore concluded that it was likely the offender was experiencing severely impaired impulse control at the time of the offending due to his intoxication with multiple substances and Borderline Personality Disorder and probable ABI ([49]). Champion J accepted this opinion at [71]. The offender also had an extensive criminal history, however very few of his convictions involved violence ([52]). The offender’s moral culpability was reduced by various factors, including his intellectual impairment and personality disorder ([71]). The offender’s guilty plea showed a willingness to accept responsibility for the victim’s death and spared the victim’s family and friends from the traumatic effects of a contested trial ([73]). His Honour also accepted that the offender was remorseful for having killed the victim, even though this took some time to develop ([76]). The offender was sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years ([115]).
Ms Hogan also commenced using drugs at an early age and had a minor criminal history ([56]-[57]). It was submitted that her role in the offending could not be separated from the nature of her relationship with the offender which was ‘marred by domestic violence, control and drug use’. It was also submitted that these circumstances reduced her culpability ([86]). Champion J considered that her experience of domestic violence was a factor relevant to the establishment of her state of mind, and mitigated the circumstances of her offending to some extent ([90]). She also decided to cooperate with the police and offered to plead guilty at an early stage ([94]). His Honour accepted that she was genuinely remorseful for the victim’s death ([96]). Ms Hogan was sentenced to one year and 10 months’ imprisonment ([118]).
R v Davsanoglu [2019] VSC 332 (24 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suicide pact’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The accused ‘[inflicted] his will on a woman [the deceased] by the use of fatal violence in her home’. They had maintained a relationship over several years, which ended as a result of her family’s disapproval. The deceased later remarried and had a child. The accused and the deceased later re-established their relationship, but it was ‘marked by periods of instability’ [8]. In 2017, the deceased became engaged to another man. On 13 July 2017, the accused visited the deceased’s residence, where they ‘apparently had a sexual encounter’ while her child was asleep [10]. The accused killed the deceased by holding her underwater in a bath. The accused then removed her body from the bath, partially dressed her in clothes, and placed the body in his car. He drove the deceased’s body from Melbourne to South Australia, as he intended to deposit it in the ocean. He also purchased 2 knives and inflicted superficial incisions to his wrist. The accused decided to return to Melbourne where he deposited the body in the garage of an unoccupied property that he had previously leased. He confessed to killing the deceased to his friends and family, but said that she had told him to kill her and that he had tried to kill himself. At the police station, the accused gave conflicting evidence on his feelings about the deceased’s relationships with other men.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Lasry J inferred that the appellant’s self-inflicted injuries were not a genuine attempt to suicide, but a means of explaining his involvement in the killing by reference to a ‘suicide pact’ ([14]). By reference to Ron Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274, his Honour noted that the seriousness of the offending required the imposition of significant punishment ([27]). It represented the accused’s endeavour, through the use of fatal violence, to control the deceased, and to overpower her rejection of their relationship ([23]). Relevant sentencing principles included general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment. His Honour also noted aggravating circumstances, including the fact that the killing occurred in the deceased’s home while her child was asleep in the nearby room, and that he abandoned the child when he drove off with the deceased’s body ([26]).
Lasry J also considered the peculiarity of the accused’s guilty plea. It was given in circumstances which made it difficult for his Honour to determine whether it was a sign of genuine remorse over the deceased’s death. The accused would have derived a greater benefit had he pleaded guilty at an earlier time ([31]-[34]). Personal circumstances of the accused were also considered. He was born in Turkey, raised in an environment of domestic violence, lived in foster homes, did not receive any formal education in Australia, maintained employment since the age of 18, and had no prior convictions for violence ([35]-[37]). The accused’s steady employment throughout his adulthood and lack of prior criminal convictions indicated positive rehabilitation prospects ([38]). The sentence was also determined in light of victim impact statements ([28]-[30]).
His Honour sentenced the accused to 23 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years ([42]). He allowed some discount for the accused’s guilty plea. As his Honour was not satisfied that the accused’s guilty plea reflected significant remorse or acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, only a small discount was made ([44]).
DPP v Jensen [2019] VSC 327 (17 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Binge drinking’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2; intentionally causing serious injury x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender had maintained an incestuous relationship with his sister since he was 17 years old, and they have a child together. While they were still living together, but after their relationship ended, his sister began an intimate relationship with the first victim. The offender, while intoxicated, entered the first victim’s house which he shared with his mother. The offender found the first victim and his sister asleep in bed together, and stabbed them both repeatedly and also stabbed the first victim’s mother who intervened. The offender pleaded guilty to 3 offences: the attempted murder of the first victim (charge 1) and his own sister (charge 2), and intentionally causing serious injury to the first victim’s mother (charge 3).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held: Beale J sentenced the offender to 19 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 14 years. The offender was sentenced as a Serious Violent Offender on charges 2 and 3 pursuant to the Sentencing Act 1991.
Notwithstanding the offender’s relative youth, good work history, limited prior convictions and guilty plea, his Honour could not accept the submission that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation. The violence was extreme and sustained, and the offender had a history of binge drinking. Even though his intimate relationship with his sister had ended, his ability to cope with any future relationship difficulties and to control his drinking was uncertain ([48]).
The offender’s personal history is discussed at [29]-[41]. He was born in the Cook Islands and raised by his grandparents after his parents abandoned him as an infant. He moved to Australia in 2009 with his parents and his sister. Beale J noted the possibility that he would be deported from Australia at the end of his sentence. This was a relevant factor in determining the sentence ([52]).
The mitigating factors of the case were summarised at [56]-[64]. The offender had a difficult childhood which partly caused him to develop an incestuous relationship with his sister. A lack of parental supervision when they were teenagers was also found to be a contributing factor. The offender pleaded guilty at a relatively early stage, showed remorse, is relatively young, and has a limited criminal history and no violent antecedents.
Aggravating circumstances, noted at [65]-[70], were that the offending involved a ‘terrifying’ home invasion; the attack with knives was not momentary, but sustained; the offending against his sister was an instance of domestic violence given their long-term incestuous relationship; the injuries inflicted on his sister and the first victim were life-threatening; and the offender had a prior conviction for incest, which clearly did not lead him to end his intimate relationship with his sister.
A useful table of summaries of various sentencing cases in respect of attempted murder is also annexed to the judgment. In addition to these cases, his Honour also had regard to the Judicial College of Victoria Sentencing Manual’s attempted murder case collection and the Court of Appeal overview regarding intentionally causing serious injury ([54]).
DPP v Gibson [2019] VSC 328 (16 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Dementia’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Life expectancy’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with mental illness’
Charges: 1 x murder
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife to whom he had been married for 44 years. The accused was 65 years old and had retired. He had four children with the victim, as well as grandchildren. The accused regarded his relationship with the victim as having ‘broken down’. He shot her twice in the head and then attempted to kill himself. The accused’s sister and their grandson were present at the time of the offending.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: To determine the appropriate sentence, Coghlan JA took into account the accused’s personal circumstances. He suffered from depression and anxiety since he was a teenager ([27]). He had stopped working a few years prior to the offending, and experienced financial difficulties ([28]). He was resentful of the amount of time his wife was spending with her parents ([6]), and over time, he started to scrutinise her spending habits, including the cost of caring for their grandchildren and her parents ([29]). Further, the accused and victim had made significant contributions to their local community ([30]-[31]).
The accused’s mental health was a major consideration for the Court. There was medical evidence indicating that he suffered recurrent depressive disorder of moderate severity ([38]), and that aspects of his processing speed, working memory, complex new learning skills, executive and language skills, and impulse control had deteriorated ([40]). There were suggestions by medical professionals that he might have suffered from either frontotemporal dementia or Alzheimer’s related dementia. Another expert suggested that his frontal lobe might have been damaged as a result of his attempted suicide ([43]). It was important to determine the precise cause of the brain damage as his life expectancy differed depending on his diagnosis ([45]). His Honour sentenced the accused on the basis that he had been diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia, which had a life expectancy of 8 years ([51]). This diagnosis affected the weight to be attributed to sentencing principles, such as just punishment, denunciation and deterrence ([52]). As a result of the accused’s ‘complex medical condition’, there was a significant delay in sentencing ([2]), which was also taken into account ([3]).
Coghlan JA was satisfied that the accused’s mental condition would render his prison sentence more onerous than it would for a prisoner without his condition ([54]), and that his moral culpability and the need for denunciation, general and specific deterrence were reduced ([53]). The accused pleaded guilty, had no prior convictions and was found to have led a ‘worthwhile and…blameless life’ ([56]). Taking into account all relevant matters, the accused was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years.
R v Eustace [2019] VSC 189 (26 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim met while visiting Australia from India, and eventually married. Three months later, the offender killed the victim in a knife attack in their shared home ([3]). On the night of the murder, the offender and victim argued, which ultimately resulted in the offender obtaining a knife and stabbing the victim ([9]-[14]). She suffered 12 wounds to her chest, abdomen, arm and leg. The offender’s actions were described as ‘sustained, purposeful and ruthlessly determined’. Even after the offender was restrained in a head lock and dragged from the bedroom by a man with whom they lived, he returned to the room to resume the attack ([15]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence of murder in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Taylor J took into account the offender’s personal circumstances at [26]-[31]. He was 43 at the time of the offending and his work history showed him to be ‘a man of industry’ ([29]). However, his father was an aggressive alcoholic ([28]). Prior to meeting the victim, he had been in two significant relationships, one of which was an arranged marriage ([31]).
The offending was found to be ‘self-evidently extremely serious’, as the killing of a domestic partner violates a fundamental principle underpinning society, namely, that all persons have the right to safety, respect and trust in intimate relationships. Whether or not the marriage was one of convenience, his Honour noted that the offender had voluntarily entered into a relationship in which he owed the victim kindness and safety. Rather, the offender betrayed her trust and the expectation that, even where issues in family relationships arise, violence is not tolerated. Even if the offender was fearful, angry, intoxicated or frustrated, he should have just walked away ([33]). Women should not fear or suffer physical harm because their partner loses their temper. The offender’s actions were found to be at the extreme end of the scale of ‘abominable acts’ ([34]). Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the victim was his wife, that she was murdered in their home, that a knife was used, and that despite the number of wounds already inflicted, the offender continued his attack, even after being physically restrained by another person ([35]-[36]). The public has an interest in matters involving family violence. Principles of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are relevant to sentencing ([35]). The objective gravity of the offending and the moral culpability of the offender was also found to be very high ([38]).
The offender pleaded guilty after the committal hearing, demonstrating a willingness to facilitate the course of justice ([39]). He also surrendered himself to the police station and admitted the killing. His remorse was further expressed in a letter of apology to the victim’s family ([40]).
Taylor J sentenced the offender to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years ([46]). After the expiry of his sentence, it was noted that the offender would be deported to India. Knowledge of this deportation was said to make imprisonment more burdensome ([41]). Taylor J also noted that the offender would be isolated in custody ([42]). The offender’s prospects for rehabilitation were found to be good, as a result of some positive references indicating his good character and hardworking nature ([43]).
DPP v Ristevski (Ruling No 1) [2019] VSC 165 (15 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Ruling as to evidence.
Facts: The prosecution alleged that the accused killed the deceased at their home on the morning of 29 June 2016, put her body in the boot of her car and drove it to Macedon Regional Park where he concealed it between 2 logs in a forest. It was discovered approximately 8 months later. The accused and deceased had been married for over 20 years and had a daughter. There was no prior history of physical violence on the part of the accused. However, he admitted to pushing the deceased on occasions if she ‘got in his face’ during arguments ([34]). The prosecution conceded that the evidence at most supported an inference that their financial difficulty was significant and may have fuelled an argument between them ([24]).
Issue: Whether the prosecution was entitled to rely on evidence of post-offence conduct to prove not only an unlawful killing but also murderous intent.
Held: Beale J noted some similarities with R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35. However his Honour found that the differences between the two cases were ‘more striking’. At [37], his Honour stated -
‘First, there was compelling evidence of a motive for Baden-Clay to kill his wife – a desire to be rid of her so he could be with his lover. Second, the post-offence conduct in that case included lies and other conduct directed at concealing his ongoing extra-marital affair. In other words, the post-offence conduct was intertwined with his motive to kill and thus it is easy to see how the High Court, viewing the post-offence conduct on the basis of the evidence as a whole, reached the conclusion that it did.’
In the present case, the prosecution submitted that the accused’s post-offence conduct was inconsistent with his having unintentionally killed the deceased, as one would expect him to report the incident, and not bundle her body into the boot of a car, drive to a remote location, conceal the body and lie about the circumstances of her disappearance to family, friends and investigators ([35]). Counsel for the accused submitted that he could well have feared that the unlawful killing of the deceased would attract a substantial prison term and cause permanent damage to his relationship with his daughter ([36]). Beale J found that those submissions made it difficult to see how a jury could properly find that the only reasonable explanation for the post-offence conduct was that the accused was conscious of having killed his wife with murderous intent ([36]).
Beale J held that while the evidence of post-offence conduct referred to in the prosecution’s amended Notice of Incriminating Conduct could be relied on as evidence that the accused killed his wife, it could not be relied on to prove that the accused did so with murderous intent ([31]–[39]).
R v Robertson [2019] VSC 145 (6 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant pleaded guilty to murder of his partner (the deceased) with whom he fathered a daughter. After their daughter’s birth, their relationship became strained. The defendant resented the deceased’s change of employment and her being around other men. He became jealous and constantly concerned about possible infidelity. The deceased’s behaviour became more obsessive and paranoid. He even set up a fake Facebook and Instagram account to contact the deceased’s work colleagues under the fake name to establish if anything was happening between the deceased and her male colleagues ([3]-[11]). After a heated argument in which the deceased expressed her desire to end the relationship, the defendant picked up a dumbbell bar and hit her multiple times to her face and head. The blows, forceful and vicious, killed her immediately. After committing the offence, the deceased rang his mother and admitted to his actions. His mother rang the police ([12]-[19]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence of murder in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Champion J sentenced the defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment, taking into account general and specific deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation and protection of the community. His Honour considered the defendant’s personal circumstances at [39]-43]. The defendant grew up in a close, supportive and loving family. Through his job he was able to buy a home for himself, thus demonstrating his independence and self-sufficiency. Friends and family observed that he became agitated and alienated after his daughter was born.
Champion J did not accept a complete lack of premeditation even though the defendant committed the offence in a highly emotional state. The ‘savagery’ of the assault affected the sentencing. The act in question was terrible and grossly violent. It was not fleeting and involved multiple deliberate blows to the face and head. His Honour noted the defendant’s intention to kill. An aggravating feature was the fact that she was his intimate partner ([65]-[66]). Champion J therefore concluded that his offending was a grave example of murder and above the middle range of seriousness ([67]). However, it was noted that the extreme violence was out of character as there was no evidence of previous domestic violence incidents ([90]).
Champion J discussed his culpability and degree of responsibility at [68]-[73]. The offending occurred in the context of the defendant being extremely jealous, possessive and controlling. At [73] Champion J stated: ‘I note that these features of jealousy, the need to possess, and uncontrollable rage associated with extreme violence emerge too frequently in cases of the murder of an intimate female partner.’ The attack was described as grievously inappropriate and a wildly disproportionate response to the situation. Therefore, his culpability and degree of responsibility was within the higher range. A mitigating factor was the fact that the defendant admitted to killing the deceased very soon after the act, and thus his Honour found that it he should receive the full benefit of that early plea as it facilitated the course of justice and relieved the deceased’s family and friends from having to give evidence and endure the trauma of a trial ([76]). With these factors in mind, his Honour accepted that the defendant has positive prospects of rehabilitation.
The Queen v Samaras [2019] VSC 120 (1 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Firearm’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: Before moving to Australia from America, the victim sent four packages containing firearms to the accused’s parents’ address in Australia. Three of these packages were intercepted by the Australian Border Force. ‘The [female] victim and [male] accused were charged with the importation and possession of firearms and were bailed’ [10]. They decided to ‘go on the run’, packing their belongings and purchasing a caravan to escape in. Arrest warrants were issued after the pair failed to appear in court, but they managed to evade the police [11].
The couple lived in the caravan for a couple of weeks prior to the incident. On the night of the shooting, both the accused and the victim were intoxicated and were arguing. The accused physically assaulted the victim during the argument while the victim was in possession of the loaded firearm. The two struggled for the weapon, with the accused eventually gaining possession and deliberately pulling the trigger. The accused did not aim the weapon or deliberately shoot the victim, although ‘there is no suggestion the firearm was defective in anyway’ [17].
The accused later pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 8 years. Relevantly, the sentencing judge observed at [48]:
The sentence I pass must make it perfectly clear that the Court deplores the use of firearms, all the more so against women in a setting of domestic violence…… The sentence of this Court should bring it clearly home to any person in our community who might be minded to inflict violence of any sort against a domestic partner, particularly with the use of a weapon, that such conduct will be met with strong punishment.
DPP v Freeburn [2018] VSC 616 (14 December 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Murder x 1
Facts: The offender met the deceased, a 29 year old woman with a mild intellectual disability, on an internet dating site. The deceased was particularly vulnerable as she was guarded about her relationships and sometimes did not inform her family as to her whereabouts. Her parents obtained a guardianship order at VCAT because of their concern that she was unable to protect her own interests. The deceased had told her family and friends of the offender’s violent behaviour towards her. The offender often exhibited jealousy, anger and verbal aggression when the deceased interacted with other men. The deceased’s body was found in the offender’s room three days after she was reported missing, with restraint marks on her wrists, bruising to her face and upper body, and a ‘tram track’ mark on her back. She also sustained brain injuries, indicating multiple blows to the head. Her wrists were bound and her neck and face were wrapped in tape. An autopsy revealed that she consumed the drug GHB prior to her death. It was entirely plausible that the deceased was alive, albeit unconscious, when the offender left the premises.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years. The jury rejected the offender’s defence that the deceased’s death was caused solely by her consumption of GHB. At the time of the incident, the offender regularly abused drugs, and suffered from personalty disorder and long-term anger management problems which may have affected his judgment and ability to make calm and rational decisions ([24]). The deceased was also in a particularly vulnerable position due to her intellectual disability. His Honour considered the offender’s personal circumstances which included his parent’s separation, his upbringing which was characterised by substance abuse and family violence, his experience in several foster placements in which he exhibited violent behaviour, and his diagnoses of ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder. His involvement in the criminal justice system began when he was a minor, and his violent offending included numerous convictions of assault. Given his history of mental health problems and violent prison incidents, his Honour accepted that he should remain in conditions more restrictive than those of other prisoners.
Re Mongan [2018] VSC 638 (24 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Charges including false imprisonment, recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault, aggravated burglary, theft and threat to kill.
Proceeding type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant and complainant were married for 13 years and have three children. The complainant claimed that the marriage ended because of the applicant’s controlling and intimidating behaviour. From the time of the separation, a series of interim and final Family Violence Intervention Orders (FVIOs) were in place restraining the applicant from contacting the complainant. The applicant breached many of the FVIOs. It was alleged that the applicant, armed with items intended to incapacitate the complainant, unlawfully entered her premises, interfered with a CCTV camera which might have recorded his subsequent conduct, and then waited for her. He grabbed her from behind, forced her to the ground, sought to bind her wrists and gag her, pushed her into her own home, and again forced her to the ground, binding her ankles. He threatened her in a graphically and frightening manner whilst she was bound and helpless. The children returned home from school and heard the complainant screaming. The complainant eventually escaped ([46]). The applicant submitted that a combination of a number of matters demonstrated a compelling reason that justified a grant of bail (see [34]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted; Whether there was a compelling reason why the applicant’s detention in custody was not justified; Whether the applicant presented an unacceptable risk of committing further offences, endangering the safety or welfare of the complainant and interfering with witnesses.
Decision and reasoning: Section 4AA of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) sets out circumstances in which a two-step test applies to the consideration of a grant of bail. Step 1 requires the existence of exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons. Step 2 mandates that the Court must apply the unacceptance risk test. In considering whether or not the applicant established compelling reasons that justified the grant of bail, the Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances (see s 4C and s 3AAA of the Act). The Court was required to assess ‘the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending, including whether it is a serious example of the offence’ (see s 3AAA(1)(a)).
There was no question that the offending alleged was serious. It was pre-meditated and involved the use of equipment to incapacitate the complainant. Only the escape of the complainant prevented a continuation of the offending. The Court found that the applicant’s lawyer’s reliance of an ‘arguable defence’ was ‘somewhat optimistic’ ([48]). The Court also considered the applicant’s criminal history and the extent of compliance with conditions of earlier grants of bail. Although his criminal history was limited and there was nothing to indicate previous breaches of bail, the Court noted two factors, namely, that the applicant failed to accept the breakdown of his marriage, and that he refused to respect the orders of the Magistrate Court in relation to the complainant. A significant matter was the fact that, at the time of the alleged offending, the applicant was approximately six weeks into a six month adjourned bond which he received for his multiple breaches of the FVIOs. Matters pursuant to s 3AAA(1)(g), (j), (k), (l) were also considered.
At [57], his Honour noted that the risk of further violence or intimidation by the applicant towards the complainant was significant and entirely unacceptable (see s 4E of the Act). The application for bail was therefore refused as the applicant failed to establish a compelling reason that would justify the grant of bail. The circumstances suggested that the applicant should be held in custody pending trial.
R v Stone (Ruling No 2) [2018] VSC 626 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Incriminating conduct’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: The accused allegedly murdered the victim by dousing him with fuel thinner and setting fire to him. Their relationship spanned approximately 25 years. The accused claimed that a Mr Baxter murdered the victim. The question before the Court was whether the accused was the murderer. The Prosecution filed a Notice, pursuant to s 19 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), of its intention to adduce evidence of incriminating conduct, namely, the lies told by the accused in describing the circumstances of the deceased’s death, and the accused’s authorship of a letter purporting to be under the hand of Amanda Thatcher and which implicated Mr Baxter in the death of the deceased.
Issues: Whether the evidence of the conduct is reasonably capable of being viewed by the jury as evidence of incriminating conduct.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could be satisfied that the accused’s multi-faceted statement as to how the incident took place was deliberately false. The conduct relied on by the prosecution was much more than a bare denial of guilt, and amounted to a detailed account of the deceased’s death. Therefore, the jury could conclude that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence was that the accused believed that she committed the offence. Accordingly, the prosecution was allowed to rely on the conduct specified in its notice, namely the lies told by the accused describing the circumstances of the deceased’s death, as evidence of incriminating conduct ([24]-[27]).
Note: The accused was convicted and sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years: R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court.
R v Stone (Ruling No 1) [2018] VSC 625 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: The accused allegedly murdered the victim (her defacto partner) by dousing him with fuel thinner and setting fire to him. Their relationship spanned approximately 25 years. The accused claimed that a Mr Baxter murdered the victim. The question before the Court was whether the accused was the murderer. The prosecution sought to lead evidence from the deceased’s mother as to the nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased. That evidence included 1) that the mother observed instances of verbal and physical abuse between the deceased and accused over a number of years; 2) that in 2010, the mother observed a particular argument between the deceased and the accused in which the accused physically assaulted the deceased before the deceased’s brother intervened; and 3) that in November 2016, the mother received a phone call from the deceased, claiming that he was fearful for his own life. The prosecution filed a Hearsay Notice with respect to the ‘November 2016 incident’. Sections 65(2)(b) and 66A of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) were relied upon as the path to admissibility.
Issues: Whether the deceased’s mother’s observations of instances of verbal and physical abuse between the accused and the deceased were admissible; Whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused; Whether the representations made by the deceased to his mother concerning an earlier incident with the accused are admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The prosecution argued that the deceased’s mother’s evidence was admissible as relationship and context evidence in that evidence of the poor relationship between the accused and the deceased could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the question in issue, namely whether the accused killed the deceased. The accused argued that the relationship evidence was not relevant and that the evidence of the November 2016 incident failed to satisfy the tests specified in s 65(2)(b) and s 66A of the Act ([7]).
On an analysis of the particular evidence, Taylor J made the following observations:
•
Evidence of the general poor relationship between the accused and the deceased was relevant to the probability of the existence of the question in issue. However, owing to the vagueness of the general relationship evidence, its probative value was low and was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. Therefore, such evidence was excluded under s 137 of the Act.
•
The evidence of the 2010 incident was irrelevant and was therefore excluded by the operation of s 56(2) of the Act. The lack of relevance was a result of the fact that the accused was claimed to have threatened the deceased’s brother with a knife, rather than the deceased herself.
•
The evidence regarding the November 2016 incident, although hearsay, was admissible pursuant to s 65(2)(b). It was sufficiently proximate to the alleged incident and revealed the state of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, as well as the deceased’s fear of the accused in the months preceding her death. It was ‘extremely unlikely that the representation was a fabrication’ ([31]). The evidence was also admissible pursuant to s 66A of the Act.
Note: The accused was convicted and sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years: R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court.
Re application for bail by Roberts [2018] VSC 554 (21 September 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Charges include rape, unlawful assault, contravention a Family Violence Intervention Order, persistent contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order, attempt to commit an indictable offence, property damage and use a carriage service for child pornography material
Proceeding type: Application for bail
Facts: The complainant was the former partner of the applicant. They have three children. The applicant was charged with 64 offences including rape, unlawful assault, contravention a Family Violence Intervention Order, persistent contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order, attempt to commit an indictable offence, property damage and use a carriage service for child pornography material.
Issues: Whether bail should be ordered; Whether the applicant discharged his onus of showing compelling reasons why his continued detention is not justified.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant’s application for bail was refused as he failed to show compelling reasons why his continued detention was not justified. Taylor J noted that if he had been satisfied that a compelling reason existed justifying the grant of bail, he must apply the unacceptable risk test. In considering s 5AAAA(2)(a) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic), Taylor J considered that there was a risk that, if released on bail, the applicant would commit family violence. His blatant disregard of the court orders and the effect of his behaviour on the complainant, was exemplified by the 1200 text messages he had sent to the complainant between September 2017 and March 2018. His preparedness on two occasions to continue a sexual offence notwithstanding his knowledge that his actions were being audio-recorded further indicated a complete indifference to the complainant, as well as a sense of entitlement ([57]). His prior convictions for matters of family violence demonstrated continuous disregard for the authority of the court and the complainant’s safety and wellbeing. If released on bail, the risk of family violence would not be able to be sufficiently mitigated by the imposition of a bail condition requiring compliance with existing FVIOs ([59]).
Smith v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 475 (27 August 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Duty of care owed by police’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Negligence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Negligence claims.
Case type: Application for summary dismissal.
Facts: The plaintiffs, a woman and her three children (who identify as Aboriginal), were the victims of family violence by the children’s father. They alleged that police officers and senior officers owed duties of care to them as victims of family violence, and that they suffered psychological harm as a result of breaches of those duties. The plaintiffs also asserted that the officers acted in breach of the plaintiffs’ human rights and obligations as public authorities under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ([40]). The defendant submitted that the alleged duties cannot arise at law and that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed ([41]). Alternatively, the defendant sought a strike out of the allegations of a common law duty of care pleaded in certain paragraphs of the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim on the basis that no cause of action had been disclosed ([3]). The plaintiffs contended that the current law in Australia regarding the application of duties of care to police officers is ‘in a state of development’ and that, as a result, the court ought not summarily dismiss the proceedings ([87]).
Issue: The State of Victoria sought either a summary dismissal of the case or that the Court strike out the claims alleging that a common law duty of care was owed.
Held: Dixon J dismissed the application, stating that the defendant’s contention that the proposed duties of care have no real prospect of succeeding had not been established ([174]). Dixon J held that a summary dismissal is an ‘extreme measure’ and would ‘forever shut out’ the plaintiffs from seeking to prove their claim at trial ([169]). Although the case was ‘fact rich and fact intensive’, the defendant did not persuade his Honour that no duty of care could arise ([171]).
Duty of care
Dixon J stated at [170]:
‘Australian common law has not affirmatively recognised that a police officer can never owe a duty of care… In no case has a court determined that no duty of care was owed in circumstances that demonstrate the degree of proximity between the plaintiffs and the police that is likely to be demonstrated on the evidence in this case at trial and in the legislative and policy framework that prevail in respect of domestic violence at the relevant time.’
As outlined in Kuhl v Zurich Finance Services Australia Ltd [2010] HCA 11, the existence of a duty of care is determined by considering reasonable foreseeability and the salient features of the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant ([168]). The plaintiffs argued that the police officers owed them a duty of care to prevent breaches of several Intervention Orders (IVOs) by the father due to the existence of a relationship of proximity between the police officers and the plaintiffs, arising from various salient features, including that:
•
It was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiffs required protection from breaches of the extant IVOs by the father;
•
The police officers had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms of the extant IVOs;
•
The police officers exercised control with respect to the compliance by the father with the terms of the extant IVOs;
•
The Victorian police represented, through the terms of its family violence policies, that police officers would protect women and children from family violence. As a result of these representations, the plaintiffs relied on the police officers to enforce compliance by the father with the extant IVOs; and
•
There were no countervailing policy reasons that negated the imposition of a duty of care on the police officers to prevent breaches of IVOs ([49]).
The defendant argued that some of the pleadings in the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim were too broad. The submission was that these duties were that, ‘every’ police officer owed a duty to ‘every’ affected family member named in any and ‘every’ extant IVO ([53]). In response, the plaintiffs argued that the duties were ‘owed by police officers at stations local to the plaintiffs’ homes, by reason of their status as family violence victims’ or, alternatively, as ‘victims of a recidivist family violence offender known to police’ ([58]). Dixon J accepted the plaintiffs’ submission that the duty was not pleaded in unnecessarily broad terms ([59]).
Salient Features
Dixon J noted that as the existence of a novel duty of care was alleged, the court must apply the salient features approach in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee[1999] HCA 59 ([90]). A determination of the existence of a duty of care requires ‘[a] close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by reference to the salient features or facts affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury’ ([91]).
The plaintiffs submitted that the salient features of foreseeability, knowledge, control and responsibility applied ([129]). They challenged the defendant’s reliance on Hill’s Case [1989]AC 53, emphasising that the salient features of proximity, knowledge and control were absent in Hill’s Case. Dixon J held that Hill’s Case was distinguishable, even if it was good law in Australia ([94]-[95]). The plaintiffs also emphasised the dissenting judgment in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, which viewed proximity as the determinative factor ([102]). The plaintiffs submitted that NSW v Spearpoint [2009] NSWCA 233 was analogous, and that it was persuasive authority for their submission that the proceedings could not be summarily dismissed ([114]-[115]).
In relation to the factor of control, Dixon J accepted that the relevant focus was on control of the risk not the offender, and that the issue of control is ‘fact sensitive and a matter for evidence’ ([135]). The plaintiffs suggested that the police officers exercised control by having the father in a police vehicle and dropping him within the zone identified in one of the IVOs ([137]).
R v Jones [2018] VSC 415 (31 July 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter based on an unlawful and dangerous act x 1
Proceeding type: Sentence to be imposed
Facts: The female offender was in a relationship with the male victim, with a history of illicit drug use and domestic violence. In April 2015, the victim grabbed the offender around the throat and threatened to harm and kill her. In October 2015, the victim pushed the offender. She armed herself with a knife and returned to the bedroom to confront him. He grabbed her by the throat, and verbally and physically assaulted her. She was pregnant at the time with his child. In December 2016, there had been a heated verbal argument between the parties. She stabbed him in the chest with a kitchen knife. The offender pleaded guilty.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Taylor J took into account victim impact statements ([20]-[21]), and the offender’s prior criminal history ([22]-[26]) and personal history ([27]-[41]). The offender had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a charge of recklessly causing injury by punching and stabbing a former partner. She had experienced trauma at an early age as she was raped by two of her brother’s friends. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and excoriation disorder. Her psychological condition did not warrant the application of the principles in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102. Her Honour accepted that there had been a history of domestic violence at the hands of the victim and that, on the balance of probabilities, physical violence had occurred the morning of the victim’s death. The gravity of her offending was to be assessed in the context of her history of family violence and her perception of a physical threat. At [48], her Honour stated –
‘Family violence is insidious. It need not find expression in physical violence to be described as grave or create a mindset in its victims of fear and helplessness. That mindset arises from all forms of violence experienced by victims and is not triggered only at the time of a physical assault…’
Her Honour accepted that her plea of guilty was an expression of genuine remorse, and that her time in custody would be more burdensome due to the separation from her children, as well as her diagnosed psychiatric illnesses. Specific deterrence was considered a significant sentencing factor, as well as general deterrence and denunciation. At [58], her Honour acknowledged that ‘This Court must pass a sentence that denounces your behaviour and deters others from resorting to the use of knives or other sharp objects during conflicts.’ The offender was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
The Queen v Donker [2018] VSC 210 (11 May 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by drug misuse’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Manslaughter.
Matter: Sentence.
Facts: Ms Donker and Mr Powell were in a violent, volatile and toxic relationship [5]. Mr Powell’s violence was fuelled by ice use, he would become violent in the course of arguments, was controlling and suspicious of Ms Donker, and, even during Ms Donker’s first pregnancy, would grab her around the throat and push her around.
Ms Donker lied to protect Mr Powell whenever the police were called. Ms Donker was also violent towards Mr Powell in retaliation, which would make Mr Powell more angry and more violent. Mr Powell’s violence had caused their children to be removed from Ms Donker’s care and them both to be evicted.
In January 2017 Mr Powell woke Ms Donker when she was asleep in her car in a kindergarten carpark by him dragging her from the car by her hair. She had parked there for the night as it was close to where her children were living with Mr Powell’s extended family. In response to Mr Powell’s assault she repeatedly manoeuvred her car so as to threaten and taunt Mr Powell. She did not intend to physically hurt him. However, on the fourth instance of reversing away from and driving towards Mr Powell, she struck a pole which bent and fell so as to strike Mr Powell’s head, killing him instantly.
Decision and reasoning: Five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
Croucher J accepted that:
[23] ….after years of Mr Powell’s violence; after numerous unsuccessful attempts at defending herself; after losing her recently hard-won gains – including her home, her job and, most importantly, the care of her children; after being forced to live in a car; after being choked and having her eyebrow split by him again the night before; after being viciously dragged out of her car by the hair as she tried to sleep…
Ms Donker ‘could take no more and finally snapped’.
Having outlined a history of controlling and violent behaviour by the deceased towards the accused at [5]-[9] and the physical violence to which the accused was subjected immediately prior to the instant offending Croucher J noted:
[72] While the law in this State does not excuse anyone – whether of uncommonly sturdy or brittle disposition – from criminal liability for otherwise unlawful actions based on provocation alone, the same law does not demand that victims of abuse of the kind and extent to which Ms Donker was subjected be super-resilient before provocation can operate in mitigation of sentence. Rather, the law attempts to strike a balance that recognizes human frailty in the face of extremely difficult circumstances, and allows that moral culpability may be reduced in such cases. This is such a case. As I say, I think it is very likely that any ordinary person, facing the circumstances which confronted Ms Donker and fixed with her history of exposure to family violence by Mr Powell, would lose self-control and act in a violent manner towards him.
Re Kele [2018] VSC 159 (10 April 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Show cause’
Charges: Contravention of family violence intervention order x 1; Intending to cause harm or fear x 1; Unlawful assault x 2; Home invasion x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Theft x 2.
Case type: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant was arrested for a family violence incident and an unrelated home invasion ([1]). The family violence incident occurred between the applicant and the victim, who were in a relationship for 4 years and had a 22-month-old son ([7]). The applicant accused the victim of changing his Centrelink account details and cheating on him. He grabbed the victim by her arms, pushed her to the ground, and hit her face, head and hands. The victim left the house and called for help with a payphone ([8]-[9]). The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of assault and one charge of breaching a family violence intervention order.
Issues: Whether bail should be granted. Because the home invasion charge involved the use of an offensive weapon, the applicant was required to show cause why his detention in custody is not justified, pursuant to s 4(4)(c) of the Bail Act 1977 ([23]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted.
Champion J considered the following factors in favour of the applicant:
•
the applicant’s youth, being 21 years old ([44]);
•
the applicant’s relative lack of criminal history ([45]);
•
limited instances of domestic violence ([46]);
•
the defence submitted that the likely penalty for the family violence incident would be higher than the time the applicant has already spent in custody ([48]);
•
the likely of up to 12 months delay in having the matter heard in the County Court ([50]);
•
the victim had moved to a secret location ([54]); and
•
if the applicant was remanded in custody, he would not be able to access a men’s behaviour change program ([54]).
Champion J considered the following factors against the applicant:
•
the prosecution submitted that the penalty for the breach of domestic violence order would include imprisonment, because it was a serious breach and occurred in front of their child ([56]); and
•
the applicant did not have accommodation ([61]).
Champion J considered that the applicant has shown cause why his detention in custody is not justified ([62]). His Honour remarked that while the level of violence towards the victim was unacceptable, it did not involve the use of a weapon, threats to kill or the infliction of significant physical injury ([64]).
DPP v Lo (Ruling No 3) [2018] VSC 149 (29 March 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Ruling on relevancy of evidence.
Facts: The female accused Lo was charged with murder and perjury. It is alleged that AB shot the deceased and that the accused Lo assisted, encouraged and directed AB in those actions. The accused was a Chinese national living with the deceased prior to the murder.
The central issue of this trial was whether the evidence provided by a marriage celebrant was relevant. The marriage celebrant provided evidence that he visited the deceased’s home in relation to proposed plans for him and the accused to marry. The Defence submitted that this confused the jury, and that it was counter-intuitive to the Crown’s case. It was also submitted that if the evidence was put before the jury, there would be a risk that the jury would be misled into thinking that the deceased wanted to marry the accused because he loved and cared for her. This would require the Defence to adduce evidence to show an alternative scenario that the deceased had been actively seeking to marry a young Asian woman and had told others of his willingness to facilitate such a person getting an Australian visa through such an arrangement ([3]-[6]). The Defence submitted that consideration of this issue would be time-consuming and distracting for the jury, and the evidence of the marriage celebrant was not sufficiently relevant to allegations of the accused’s complicity in the murder ([7]).
Issues: The Court was required to determine whether the evidence of the marriage celebrant was relevant.
Decision and reasoning: Under the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), evidence is prima facie admissible if it is relevant. In order to exclude the evidence, the defendant bears the onus of showing that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value. Dixon J held that the marriage celebrant’s evidence was relevant and admissible as context and relationship evidence ([22]), and that the Defence should be entitled to adduce evidence supporting a counter-narrative that the deceased had been interested in marriages with other women prior to the murder ([27]). Her Honour was of the view that evidence as to the events in the house the night before the murder, and evidence of the complex nature of the accused’s and deceased’s relationship was relevant. Any unfair prejudice arising from the jury learning about a planned marriage of convenience between the accused and deceased did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence ([25]). The marriage celebrant’s evidence was found to have significant relevance to the issues in the trial ([27]), and to be admissible relationship evidence.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Walker [2018] VSC 83 (28 March 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator a battered woman’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and deceased were in a relationship for 2 years. There was a history of arguments, physical violence and cannabis and methylamphetamine use ([2]-[7]). On the day of the offence, the defendant and deceased argued for 3 hours, during which the defendant tried to leave the house, and the deceased dragged her back inside ([9]). The defendant stated in later interviews that the deceased would not let the defendant leave and goaded her into stabbing him ([25]). By the time the police attended, the defendant had stabbed the deceased ([11]-[12]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Hollingworth J imposed a head sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years ([50]).
Her Honour had regard to the fact that the defendant had a limited criminal history and displayed some evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder ([40]). Her Honour also reduced the sentence for the defendant’s early guilty plea: the defendant was charged with murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter a month before her trial was due to begin ([43], [50]). The defendant displayed remorse for her actions ([45]) and had begun counselling in custody ([46]).
Re Williams [2018] VSC 76 (23 February 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Challenge to complainant's evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Show cause’ – ‘Word-on-word case’
Charges: Intentionally causing injury x 3; Recklessly causing injury x 5; Unlawful assault x 3; Contravening family violence intervention order x 3.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 10 years and had 2 children ([2]). The complainant alleged three events forming the basis of the charges. First, the applicant kicked and punched her, drove her to the hospital, dragged her from the car and left her at the entrance. Second, the applicant chased her in his car, dragged her out of her car, and punched her. Third, the applicant forced his way into her house, urinated on her, and punched her ([14]-[22]).
Issues: The applicant was required to ‘show cause why his detention was not justified’, under s 4(4)(ba)(i) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was refused.
The applicant argued that he was entitled to bail because he had stable accommodation, was willing to comply with strict bail conditions, and that the prosecution case was not strong because it relied mostly upon the complainant’s evidence. The applicant intended to challenge the credibility of the complainant ([24]). The prosecution argued that the applicant had a lengthy criminal history including violence, has shown disregard for previous family violence intervention orders, and has committed offences while on bail ([47]-[48]).
Justice Champion at [57]-[59] discussed the applicant’s contention that the prosecution case is weak because it relies on the complainant’s evidence:
… the prosecution points out that cases involving family violence frequently involve ‘word on word’ evidence and that this is often the very nature of these types of cases. The prosecution submits that this circumstance does not of itself warrant the prosecution case as being regarded as weak, or without merit.
It is clear enough that the case will be strongly defended, and that there are arguable issues to be decided. That said, it was not submitted to me that the case should be regarded as inherently weak.
From what I have been able to glean in this application I cannot conclude that the prosecution case is weak.
DPP v Paulino (Sentence) [2017] VSC 794 (21 December 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Current sentencing practices’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victorian systemic review into family violence deaths unit’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Appeal type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and victim were estranged. The defendant made open threats to kill the deceased, sought to commit a character assassination of her by alleging that she was promiscuous and by making spurious allegations about her involvement in pornography, nuisance-calling her at work, and following her and her new boyfriend. The deceased took out a protection order against the defendant. Shortly before a Family Court hearing, she was stabbed by the defendant, and was found dead by her sons ([7]). At a pre-trial hearing, relationship evidence was admitted (see DPP (Victoria) v Paulino (Ruling No 1) [2017] VSC 343 (17 June 2017)). After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty.
Justice Bell referred the case to the Victorian Systemic Review into Family Violence Deaths unit at the Coroners Court. The function of the unit includes identifying risks associated with deaths resulting from family violence. His Honour highlighted features of this case, including that:
•
the murder was preceded by threats to kill, assassination and blaming directed towards the deceased that were open and persistent;
•
there was an intervention order on foot, which was not a sufficient deterrent;
•
Family Court proceedings, initiated by the deceased, had reached a critical stage;
•
the parties had separated; and
•
the deceased had expressed a fear that her husband would kill her.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to a period of 30 years with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Justice Bell placed importance on the fact that current sentencing practices being more condemnatory of men murdering women ([25]), the circumstances of stalking and breaches of intervention orders leading up to the murder ([27]), and the murder was premeditated ([29]).
The accused’s acts in relation to the victim — namely the character assassination and other harassment — were found not to be ‘random measures’. Instead, Bell J found that they represented a ‘pattern of coercive control’. Her right to ‘personal dignity and autonomy’ was violated by the accused, whose conduct led to a situation in which she no longer had a life to live. This, Bell J explains, ‘was the culmination of a pattern of behaviour aimed at preventing her from living the life she chose’. [27]
Re Kumar [2017] VSC 742 (6 December 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail conditions not sufficient’ – ‘Bail refused’ – ‘Immigration detention’ – ‘Past breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Show cause’
Charges: Contravention of a family violence safety notice intending to cause harm or fear for safety x 1; Destroying or damaging property x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Attempted murder x 1; Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; and Recklessly causing serious injury x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant attended the house of his former partner and her new partner (the victim), and forced his way in by breaking the window ([7]-[8]). The applicant stabbed the victim’s head and hands with a piece of broken glass, leaving him with permanent injuries ([9]).
Issues: The applicant was required to ‘show cause why his detention was not justified’, under various sub-sections of s 4(4) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic). For example, the appellant was charged with contravening a family safety notice in which he was alleged to have used violence and, in the previous 10 years, had been found guilty of the same charge (s 4(4)(ba)(i)) ([12]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was refused.
The applicant had argued that because he has been given notice that he is an unlawful non-citizen, he would be put straight into immigration detention and therefore would not pose a risk of committing another offence ([14]).
Priest JA held that there was an unacceptable risk that the applicant would commit further offences against his former partners. Most importantly, the applicant had a history of breaching family violence orders ([20]). Therefore, the risk of the applicant committing further violence could not be mitigated by strict bail conditions ([21]). Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the applicant would be put straight into immigration detention ([17], [20]).
Re Easson [2017] VSC 565 (20 September 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Bail’ – ‘Firearms’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Show cause’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Strict conditions’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Intentionally causing injury x 1; Recklessly causing injury x 1; Unlawful imprisonment x 1; Unlawful assault x 3; Unlawful assault using an instrument x 2; Unlawful assault by kicking x 1; Threatening to inflict serious injury x 1; Unlawful assault with a weapon (a steak knife) x 1; Making a threat to kill x 2; Kidnapping x 1; Common law assault x 2; Reckless conduct placing a person in danger of death x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: All charges related to one 12-hour period, where the applicant allegedly assaulted his wife by: banging her head on the floor and striking her with an iron; punching, kicking and strangling her with a lamp cord; and threatening to take her somewhere to be raped, and threatening to kill her while holding a steak knife ([6]).
Issues: Since the applicant was charged with an indictable offence involving the use of a weapon, the issue was whether he could ‘show cause’ why his detention was not justified (s 4(4)(c) Bail Act 1977 (Vic)) ([3]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted, with strict conditions. Significant factors against granting the applicant bail included: the charges are serious; and it could not be said granting bail would pose no risk to the complainant ([14]). On the other hand, significant factors in favour of granting bail to the applicant were: he had no criminal history; and the risk to the complainant could be ameliorated by strict conditions such as requiring him to reside with his mother, engage in drug treatment, and removing his access to firearms ([14], set out in full at [17]). Justice Beach stated: ‘There is considerable merit (and potential benefit for both the applicant and the wider community) in addressing the applicant’s drug, and any mental health, issues now rather than later’ ([15]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) v Turner [2017] VSC 358 (23 June 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Respect of women’ – ‘Role of sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1; Breach of domestic violence order x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and deceased had been in a relationship. After consuming alcohol and methamphetamines, the defendant beat the deceased in their home with punches, kicks, and hit the soles of her feet with a hammer ([5]). The deceased was discharged from hospital, but died of internal bleeding the next day ([8]-[9]). The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Bell J imposed a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years. His Honour considered that the contravention of a domestic violence order made it a serious example of manslaughter ([32]).
Bell J at [33]:
“Denunciation and specific and general deterrence are sentencing principles through which the law gives effect to the fundamental purpose of protecting individuals and the community from crime. Ms Cay and all other women have an inviolable human right to life, to equality – not just the appearance of equality but to real equality, to physical and emotional integrity, to respect for their dignity and personal autonomy, to loving relationships with children and others, and to freedom from fear of physical or mental harm. They look to the law for protection from men who would perpetrate crimes of assault or homicide upon them in a domestic setting by reason of failing to control their anger, aggression and rage. While the police cannot be present in every home on every occasion of risk, the values and standards of human behaviour that the criminal law demands are omnipresent. The courts must respond appropriately through the sentencing process when those standards are severely or seriously breached, as they have been in this case, for this vindicates the individual interests of victims in seeing that perpetrators are brought to justice, as well as the general interests of the community in seeing that justice is so done, and also performs the important educative function of positively influencing how the community, and especially men, value, respect and treat women.”
His Honour thought that the defendant had good prospects of rehabilitation, but the defendant’s efforts to stop drinking was not a mitigating factor ([27-[28]).
DPP (Victoria) v Paulino (Ruling No 1) [2017] VSC 343 (17 June 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Pre-trial hearing.
Facts: The defendant and deceased had been in a relationship, and had two children ([3]). They separated acrimoniously in 2010 ([3]). The defendant was accused of murdering the deceased. The prosecution wished to lead evidence relating to the relationship between the accused and deceased ([4]) in order to establish that the accused’s enmity and hatred towards the deceased was the motive for the murder ([5]). The evidence included: threats made by the defendant; relationship evidence; the fact that the accused had an intervention order taken out against him by the deceased; and the accused’s actions in relation to a pornographic video allegedly depicting the deceased.
Issues: Whether the ‘relationship evidence’ should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Bell set out the relevant principles in relation to the Court’s mandatory duty to exclude evidence where the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused (see [33]-[36]). In this context, evidence of a poor relationship between the accused and deceased has been admitted where that evidence may be relevant to whether the accused killed the deceased and whether the accused had a motive to do so ([37]).
Threats
The deceased’s statements about her fear of the accused (for example, that if something happened to her, it would be because of the accused) were not admissible. In deciding the admissibility of a victim’s fear of the accused perpetrator, the issue is ‘whether the evidence of the deceased’s fear of the accused was relevant to the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, usually whether the accused had a motive for killing, and actually did kill, the deceased’ ([57]). However, the statements were merely evidence of her subjective state of mind, not the accused’s ([70]). Further, the content and volume of evidence would be highly prejudicial to the accused ([71]).
By contrast, evidence of threats made by the accused to kill the deceased and her family were admissible, because it was relevant to the accused’s state of mind towards the deceased ([76]).
Relationship evidence
Evidence of the defendant’s feelings of hatred and enmity towards the deceased was admissible ([42]-[43]). However, most the evidence of the state of their marriage before 2010 was not relevant ([41], [51]). Bell J held that the jury should be told generally that the marriage was unhappy ([85]-[87]), but not the precise details of the aggressive behaviour of the accused ([88]).
Intervention order
Evidence of the intervention order was admissible as a feature of the relationship leading up to the death of the deceased ([91]). There was a danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, but that could be mitigated by proper instruction ([92]).
Pornographic video
The accused had alleged that the deceased had participated in a pornographic video, and had shown his colleagues and the deceased’s family ([94]). Evidence of the video and the accused’s actions were admissible to demonstrate the extremely negative attitude of the accused towards the deceased ([96]).
DPP v McDermott (Rulings Nos 10 & 11) [2016] VSC 822 (27 April 2016) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Anti-tendency warning’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Prejudicial evidence’ – ‘Propensity evidence jury discharge’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Application to discharge jury.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for stabbing his former partner. His son gave evidence that the defendant usually carried a knife. Defence counsel applied to discharge the jury on the ground that the ‘propensity evidence’ was highly inflammatory and could not be cured by a direction ([2]). The next day, a newspaper article was published about the son’s evidence ([35]-[36]).
Issues: Whether the jury should be discharged.
Decision and Reasoning: Jane Dixon J declined to discharge the jury ([31], [45]). Her Honour considered that any prejudice to the accused could be cured by a direction to the jury ([31]). Her Honour gave two anti-tendency warnings ([35], [43]), and intended to give another curative direction in her Honour’s final address ([44]).
The Queen v Cook [2015] VSC 406 (19 August 2015) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence.
Facts: The victim was the male offender’s de facto wife. After drinking 15 beers at their house party, the offender started punching and pushing the victim. A friend tried to intervene but was pushed away. He then picked up a steel-framed chair and hit the victim with such force that that one of the legs went through her skin and bone and penetrated her brain.
Decision and Reasoning: Elliot J sentenced the offender to 21 years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years and six months. In passing this sentence, His Honour made some general observations on domestic violence at [28]-[30]:
‘The courts clearly recognise that they must forcefully condemn domestic violence (See, e.g., R v Earl [2008] VSCA 162, [23]). When domestic violence manifests in murderous conduct, that conduct must be denounced in the strongest terms (Felicite v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 329, [20]; Portelli v The Queen [2015] VSCA 159, [30]).
Moreover, general and specific deterrence have special significance in cases involving domestic violence. In such circumstances, general deterrence is more important as “[t]he victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities” (Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97, [57]).
Also, specific deterrence is often more important, as it is in this case, because “women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously”’ (Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97, [53]).
DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304 (27 June 2014) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Defensive homicide’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert evidence - academic’ – ‘History of violence’ – ‘Lack of disclosure of family violence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Defensive Homicide.
Hearing: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant was charged with murdering her de facto partner but was found guilty of defensive homicide. She struck the deceased to the head 16 times with an axe. She buried the deceased’s body in the backyard and lied about his whereabouts to family and friends for more than four years, claiming that he had gone interstate. The defendant gave an account of a violent fight which led to the deceased’s death which included the deceased taunting and goading the defendant. She attested to a long history of family violence by the deceased.
Issue/s: The appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years. In finding the defendant guilty of defensive homicide, the jury had to be satisfied that the killing took place in the context of a serious history of family violence. Hollingworth J noted at [20] that, while there was no evidence that the defendant or her children had ever complained about family violence, this is not uncommon.
The deceased was the dominant person in the relationship. He had a long history of violence and drank heavily. His behaviour towards the defendant ‘over many years, was abusive, belittling and controlling, and involved both physical and psychological abuse’ ([26]). Her Honour noted, ‘The final act or acts of the deceased may well be relatively minor, if looked at in isolation; but what happens in such cases is that the victim of family violence finally reaches a point of explosive violence, in response to yet another episode of being attacked. In such a case, it is not uncommon for the accused to inflict violence that is completely disproportionate to the immediate harm or threatened harm from the deceased’ ([32]).
The Court heard (largely unchallenged) expert evidence from Professor Patricia Easteal regarding the complex dynamics of family violence, the reasons why women often do not leave violent partners and the use of weapons by female victims of family violence against male partners ([33]-[34]). Given this evidence, Her Honour noted that while ordinarily, striking 16 blows with an axe in response to a minor physical and verbal attack by an unarmed attacker would seem disproportionate, this may not be the correct conclusion in family violence cases involving a female offender ([36]). However, aggravating factors included the defendant’s deceit and a lack of remorse. Her offending had a large impact on the deceased’s family.
DPP v Bracken [2014] VSC 94 (12 February 2014) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Social framework evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Proceeding: Pre-trial hearing.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for the murder of his de facto partner. He argued that he shot his de facto partner in self-defence. He alleged that his partner perpetrated psychological and physical violence against him over the course of the relationship. He successfully argued that the killing was in self-defence and was thus acquitted.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether evidence of family violence or ‘social framework’ evidence within the meaning of the then s 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) was admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The evidence was admitted. Maxwell P held that family violence was alleged as required by the section. As such, evidence such as ‘the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a family member of (family) violence’ was relevant in determining whether self-defence was made out. Significantly, his Honour held that, ‘There will be no basis for an objection on grounds of relevance…’, though there could be other available grounds of objection (see at [16]).
DPP v Neve [2013] VSC 488 (13 September 2013) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Make threat to kill’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering life’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Criminal damage, make threat to kill x 2, reckless conduct endangering life, intentionally causing injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and the complainant were married. After an argument, the offender fatally shot the complainant’s dog. He then reloaded the rifle and began chasing the complainant as she ran towards the road yelling, ‘I’m going to fucking kill you…You’re fucked’. The complainant stopped running and tried to negotiate with the offender. She managed to grab hold of the gun and forced the applicant to fire both of the shots from the rifle. The offender then pushed her over and started punching her repeatedly in the head and chest, trying to reach other cartridges he had in his pocket. The complainant managed to get up and flag the attention of a passerby.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. In passing sentence, Bell J noted at [67]:
‘Denunciation of your crimes and general deterrence are powerful sentencing considerations in your case, leading to an immediate sentence of imprisonment. Ms Fuller was your wife. You are guilty of committing appalling domestic violence towards her. Many of your actions were not only violent but calculated to belittle and demean her and place her in abject fear. The double barrel shotgun was a common feature of all five charges and it was loaded when the first four offences were committed. This criminal conduct deserves the strongest condemnation of the court. Others must be made to appreciate the consequences of committing crimes of this nature’.
DPP v Huynh [2010] VSC 37 (19 February 2010) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Violation of trust between husband and wife’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and the victim, his wife, came to Australia from Vietnam on tourist visas. After the offender became suspicious the victim was seeing another man, he stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest and abdomen.
Decision and Reasoning: In sentencing the offender, Curtain J took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, his lack of prior criminal history, the fact that the offender would be separated from his children for a number of years, and that the offender was remorseful and distressed by his conduct. Her Honour also accepted that the offender’s prospects for rehabilitation were favourable. However, in opposition to these factors, Curtain J held at [42]-[43]:
‘Against these matters stand the nature and gravity of the offence here committed. This is a serious example of a serious offence. It involves the infliction of serious violence upon your wife which is a gross breach of the trust which reposes between husband and wife. I take into account also the need to pass a sentence which will act in denunciation of your conduct and serve to punish you and also give due weight to special and general deterrence.
Although such considerations are to be sensibly moderated, nonetheless, the sentence imposed must signal to the community that acts of violence, including domestic violence, are not tolerated and warrant condign punishment’.
In the circumstances, a sentence of seven years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years was appropriate.
R v Gojanovic [2005] VSC 97 (27 January 2005) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: After being in an ‘on and off relationship’ for some years, the male offender and the female victim separated. One evening, the offender entered the victim’s home and battered her repeatedly on the head with a rubber headed mallet. He then took a dressing gown cord and strangled her to death.
Decision and Reasoning: Osborn J noted that while the killing was not premeditated and it occurred in a state of high emotion arising out of the disintegration of the offender’s relationship with the victim, there were nevertheless five seriously aggravating circumstances associated with this crime. First, the killing was brutal, protracted and vicious. Second, the killing was selfishly callous. The offender knew he was not only taking the life of another individual but also taking away the mother of four innocent children. Third, the killing took place in what should have been the safety of the deceased’s own home. Four, a substantial penalty was warranted in light of the need for general deterrence. As per His Honour at [31]:
‘The Court and the community which it represents cannot tolerate resort to violence, let alone homicidal violence, in circumstances of this kind. The Court must send a clear message to estranged parents that they cannot act as you did and expect to receive other than a penalty which affirms the sanctity of individual human life and condemns in the strongest terms the deliberate taking of another life even in circumstances of strong emotion’.
Finally, the offender displayed a total lack of remorse for his conduct. The offender was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
See also R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (14 August 2007).
R v Kibble [2002] VSC 52 (1 March 2002) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship’ – ‘Right to leave a relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally cause serious injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The female victim ended her relationship with the male offender and gave him money to fly back to London, where he was from. Upon returning to England, the offender felt humiliated and angry and decided to return to Australia to punish the victim. He purchased a rubber mallet to break into the victim’s house and a roll of duct tape. When the victim arrived home, the offender started stabbing her with a knife. She managed to fight him off and called the police.
Decision and Reasoning: This offence was serious. As per Gillard J at [57]:
‘A person in a relationship with another has every right to terminate the relationship and walk away without fear of reprisal. Too often, upon the termination of a relationship, the physically stronger person pursues a course of conduct of harassment and violence towards the other person. That is what has happened here. Your conduct was serious and has had a long-lasting, emotional effect upon the victim. The Legislature views any offence under s16 as serious. The circumstances surrounding the commission of this offence supports that conclusion and you are guilty of a high level of criminality’.
There were a number of factors that aggravated the offending namely that the conduct was premeditated, the offender waited for the victim in her home, his conduct caused the victim terror and fear, and the conduct had a long-lasting emotional effect on the victim. His Honour was satisfied that specific deterrence was not warranted on the facts but that general deterrence was important i.e. the sentence had to send a message to those who are like-minded to use their superior physical strength to punish a partner in a relationship after it has terminated.
His Honour also took into account a number of mitigating factors namely, the offender frankly admitted his involved, he pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, there was no criminal history, the physical injuries were at the lower end of the scale, the sentence would be onerous because the offender was English, the offence was out of character, it was unlikely he would reoffend, and his prospects for rehabilitation were good. The offender was sentenced to six years imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years.
DPP v Williamson [2000] VSC 115 (31 March 2000) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘Parents who kill children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and a young woman, Ms Park, had been in a relationship and had a child together, the victim. This relationship was characterised by the offender’s jealousy and possessiveness towards Ms Park and the victim. Eight months after the victim was born, Ms Park left the relationship. The offender resented his obligation to financially support the child and began to deeply resent Ms Park. Four months before the victim’s death, the offender began telling people he was going to kill himself and his son, to take him away from Ms Park. One night, the offender took the child to a hotel and smothered him. He then wrote a letter to Ms Park telling her he had killed the victim.
Decision and Reasoning: In sentencing, Cummins J took into account, as mitigating factors, the offender’s poor family situation, the burdensome quality of imprisonment to the offender, his age, his lack of prior convictions and the rehabilitative courses he undertook while in custody. However, His Honour stated at [25]:
‘Of all the rights of the child, the most fundamental right of all is the right to life. It is necessary that parents and others in charge of children unmistakably understand that child abuse will be met by the full force of the law. The intentional killing of a child by a person without psychiatric illness or other significantly mitigating factor will ordinarily be met with life imprisonment of the offender’.
Cummins J also noted the significant importance of condemnation, punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence. The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 24 years.
County Court
DPP v Walker [2024] VCC 374 (26 March 2024) – Victorian County Court
‘social abuse’ – ‘contravening a protection order’ – ‘kidnapping’ – ‘threats’ – ‘deportation’ – ‘perpetrator programs’
Charges: 1 x kidnapping; 2 x common law assault; 1 x contravening a family violence order; 4 x summary offences.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: On 20 December 2021 a final family violence intervention order was made. Its duration was three years. It contained only two conditions, including a condition prohibiting the respondent /offender from committing family violence against his wife (the protected person). At incident one the victim and offender were living together. The offenders used abusive language towards the victim and dragged her out of the house when she decided to smoke (2 x summary offences- assault and contravening the intervention order). The police attended an a further condition was included in the intervention order – that the respondent/offender remain at least 200 m away from the victim/protected person’s home. Incident 2 involved the offender going to the victim’s house, dragging her out of bed, removed the charger from her phone, strapped her into the car, and hit her. The offender told the victim he would take her where no one would find her (1 x kidnapping; 1 x common assault; 1 x summary offence). The offender was later arrested regarding drink driving matters (summary offences).
Decision and reasoning: The sentencing judge considered a range of factors including the plea of guilty, the issue of possible deportation (the offender was from New Zealand) and the fact that the offender had completed programs while in custody. The total effective sentence ordered was 61 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 40 months' imprisonment. Judge Lauritsen discusses research about the effectiveness of domestic violence perpetrator programs observing that some research ‘shows the effectiveness of such programmes in changing behaviour’ [79] –[80].
Judge Lauritsen observes: ‘The kidnapping is a particularly nasty aspect of those events, accompanied as it was with distinct assaults upon her. Rendering her phone unworkable and your statement which was reasonably interpreted by your wife as threatening to kill her.’ [54]
DPP v Lee [2023] VCC 2008 (02 November 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘text messages’ – ‘contravening a protection order’ – ‘bail’
Charges: 11 x persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order, 3 x common law assault; 1 x criminal damage; 2 x committing an offence on bail; 1 x trespass.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to all offences. There were two victims. The offender had previously been in a defacto relationship with the primary victim and had a child with her. The offender was the respondent to a final intervention order with the primary victim the protected person. The secondary victim was the primary victim’s current partner. Around 2am on day of offending the offender went to the primary victim’s home and broke a glass window (criminal damage) and climbed through (trespass). The offender headbutted the secondary victim (assault). The primary victim called police and they attended and arrested the offender. A search of the offender’s mobile phone revealed that he had sent the victim 2,110 text messages on one occasion; 435 text messages on another and made 59 calls to her in breach of the intervention order. Further interviews with the primary victim revealed his attendances at the primary victim’s home (persistent contraventions of a family violence intervention order).
Decision and reasoning: Blair J took into account the offender’s pleas of guilty and his remorse, the gravity of the offending and the family violence context in which the offending occurred, the offender’s mental impairments, and the offender’s own history of abuse. Blair J placed the offender on a Community Correction Order for a period of 16 months with various conditions.
[The primary victim and those she] ‘chose to have at her home, were entitled to feel safe and secure. Your offending occurred late at night, where you were not welcome at the address. Further, you assaulted … and frightened [the primary and secondary victims] … and no doubt your daughter … also.’
Although your breaches of intervention order were persistent, protracted and occurred over the better part of a year, I consider them to have occurred in the context of the breakdown and attempted reconciliation with your former partner…. Further, I accept that at the time of the offending … you were at a particularly low ebb in your life having attempted suicide approximately one month prior.’
DPP v Chirnside [2023] VCC 1221 (29 June 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘text messages’ – ‘emotionnal and psychological abuse’ – ‘bail ’ – ‘contravene protection order’
Charges: 2 x attempt to pervert the course of justice; 1 x threat to kill; 1 x common assault; 2 x contravene a family violence intervention order intending to cause harm or fear for safety; 2 x persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order
AND
3 x unlawful assault; 2 x contravention of a family violence intervention order which has a two year maximum penalty; 4 x commit an indictable offence on bail; 1 x contravening a condition of bail
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The charges arise out of a nine-month relationship the offender had with the victim. On various occasions the offender verbally abused and threw things at the victim and assaulted her. The victim obtained an intervention order. The offender sent text messages to the victim telling her to ‘tell them to drop the order’ and to lie to her lawyer [22]- [24]. He subjected her to a ‘barrage of obscene and derogatory verbal abuse and abusive conduct in person and via text’ [29]
Decision and reasoning:
Judge Hassan considered early plea total effective sentence: 18 months’ imprisonment in combination with a two year community correction order [99]. (The sentences are set out from [93]). The judge commented:
‘You subjected [the victim] to behaviour which was relentless, oppressive, degrading, threatening and at times involved physical violence. Your conduct must have worn her down and left her feeling helpless and frightened. You paid scant regard for orders and on two occasions manipulated [the victim] in an attempt to get her to withdraw complaints to police against you… While I accept the submission made by your counsel that this is not a case of family violence involving a high level of violence, and the attempt to pervert the course of justice charges do not involve threats or acts of overt intimidation, nevertheless your abuse of [the victim] is objectively serious offending and your moral culpability is high.’ [84]-[86]
DPP v Forrest (a pseudonym) [2023] VCC 2172 (22 November 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘coercive control’ – ‘strangulation’ – ‘economic and financial abuse ’ – ‘following, harassing and monitoring’
Charges: 10 x common law assault; 1 x threat to kill; 1 x stalking
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim began living together in an intimate relationship in 2008. Initially the offender gave many gifts to the victim but then began to control and manipulate her, behaving aggressively and ultimately isolating her from her friends and family. From 2011 the offender began pulling the victim’s hair, ripping some out. The offender and victim had a baby in 2012 and a second child in 2017. The victim began to run a business, but the offender took over, the offender made threats about the business and made the victim write out lines saying she was an idiot and needed to behave [10]. In 20212 the offender and victim married. The offender made the victim sleep in the laundry locking her out of the house. Specific assaults the subject of the offences are explained at [16] –[24] but involved hitting, kicking and punching her, dragging her by the hair, various threats, grabbing her around the neck [25] and numerous calls. She obtained an intervention order. After separating the offender monitored the activities of the victim and accessed her bank statements.
Decision and reasoning:
Individual sentences set out at a [186]; total effective sentence of 5 years and 2 months' imprisonment, and to serve 2 years 10 months before becoming eligible for parole. [188]
Judge Cannon observed: ‘your offending is serious and deserves a punishment which is just in all of the relevant circumstances. Your conduct must be firmly denounced. Your behaviour towards the complainant was monstrous and repugnant. You assaulted her on 10 separate occasions over a prolonged period of time in the context of a controlling and abusive relationship where you appear to have behaved in any way you wished at a whim. In saying this, I make it clear that you are only to be sentenced for the offences on the indictment rather than in relation to the contextual information, but that contextual information is relevant.’ [93]
Judge Cannon quotes from the victim impact statement: ‘She said that by the time she had fled you, she felt like she had no identity at all, and she continued to struggle in finding out who she was. She spoke of you devaluing her as a person and that the effects on her broken confidence and self-belief continued to permeate her daily life and interactions with others. She said that she would never know whether you would be Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde from one day to the next, and that she felt she had to behave in a way that would protect herself from your violence. She continued to be hypervigilant because of this. She said that your actions had left lifelong scars on her mental and emotional wellbeing, stripping her of her confidence and ability to function on a day-to-day basis, questioning all that she said and did because she never felt she was worthy as a person …She spoke of her sense of isolation because of your offending and control over her….’ [114]-[118]
DPP v Buck [2021] VCC 759 (11 June 2021) – Victorian County Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Criminal damage; Common assault; Conduct endangering serious injury; Intentionally cause injury; Threat to kill; Trespass; Indictment offence on bail; Persistent Breach of Family Violence Intervention Order.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship for approximately four months. The offender ripped her clothes off and hit the back of her head with a hair dryer multiple times. He punched her five or six times to the face, and stomped on her head and chest several times. He strangledher, threatening to kill her, and she felt unable to breathe. At one point, the offender chased the victim into the street and threatened to kill her while brandishing a knife. He also caused property damage and assaulted the victim’s housemate (who tried to intervene). The victim’s children were present at the time of the offending. The victim sustained many injuries, including exposing her bone and skull. A Family Violence Intervention Order was imposed and, despite the order, the offender telephoned the victim from custody on 12 occasions, but desisted once the victim told him to stop.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A sentence of 3 years 5 months imprisonment with a non-parole period 2 years was imposed.
Assessed in the context of an intimate relationship, this was a reasonably serious example of causing intentional injury for the following reasons:
•
It was an assault on the offender’s partner who was entitled to his care.
•
The offending occurred in the victim’s home, where she should have felt safe.
•
The offender used a household item as a weapon, hitting the victim to her head repeatedly to a point where she was feeling dizzy. The victim said she felt unable to stand up, had blood in her eyes and her head was throbbing. The physical injury to her head was a result of those repeated strikes. The offender continued to assault her, despite her state and her pleading with him to stop.
•
The assault was protracted, moving between various rooms in the house, out onto the street and back into the house.
•
The acts of violence against the offender’s partner “were not only physically violent, resulting in her injuries, but they were degrading, including stripping her naked. One neighbour refers to her running naked in the street, bloodied and bruised.”
•
As part of the episode, the offender choked her. The victim described feeling unable to breathe and wondering whether she would be able to do so again. There were marks around her neck from that part of this event. During that event, he made the threat to kill her which must have been terrifying given the context of that threat. He later made a threat when brandishing a knife.
•
The offender continued to attack the victim, despite the intervention of the victim’s housemate.
•
The acts occurred in the presence and hearing of the victim’s children, which was most disturbing. As his Honour noted: “The fact that a 12 year old had to call police because you were violently assaulting her mother is reprehensible. [The victim’s] daughter was extremely courageous and showed wisdom beyond her years in doing what she could to try and get police to the scene.”
•
The offender’s assault on the victim’s housemate demonstrated the offender’s level of aggression.
•
“Despite the fact I have not received a victim impact statement, I can well anticipate that Ms Brewer suffered distress, humiliation and fear during this offending, and that she is likely to have experienced some ongoing trauma as a result. Those matters would only be exacerbated in my view, by the presence of her two daughters and her feelings of concern for them.”
The principles from Bugmy v The Queen were applicable in this case (disadvantage and events during his formative years) and somewhat reduced the offender’s moral culpability. He pleaded guilty. There was an intervention order protecting the victim and the offender had shown no desire to try and contact her now.
DPP v Vickers (a pseudonym) [2021] VCC 445 (16 April 2021) – Victorian County Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Detention for a sexual purpose’ – ‘Low cognitive functioning’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Offender in relationship with victim from under the age of 16’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Rape (rolled up charge, 3 separate incidents) x 1; Detention for a sexual purpose x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was 23 years old at the time of the offending and the female victim, his partner, was 32 years old. The offender had been groomed by the victim since he was a child, with sexual and then de facto marital relationship commencing when he was a child.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A total effective sentence of 6 years and 9 months was imposed, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months.
The court noted the seriousness of rape as an offence. The objective gravity of the offender’s offending (as rolled-up charges) was high.
The court noted at [41] that: “This case is an example of controlling and violent conduct borne out of an inability to accept and negotiate the end of the relationship – culminating in the heinous and devastating offence of rape. It is reprehensible conduct of the highest order and must be deterred and denounced.” And at [42]: “The impact upon the victim also needs to be given proper weight in the exercise of my sentencing discretion. Your victim states that she has had suicidal thoughts, has been diagnosed with anxiety, depression and PTSD, and is having counselling. The offending has also impacted the children, who are anxious and withdrawn.”
Age disparity between the offender and victim alone would have had limited impact in assessing the circumstances of the offending and offender’s moral culpability. But, in combination with the following factors, the circumstances of the relationship were more significant:
•
The offender was diagnosed with ADHD in Grade 3;
•
He had difficulties at school and is dyslexic;
•
He suffers hearing impairment, requiring hearing aids;
•
He has low intellectual functioning;
•
He became a father when he was a child and by 20 was working to support a house of three children;
•
To some degree, the offender was subject to some manipulation/control in the form of managing his medication and access to hearing aids, particularly leading up to the offending;
•
The relationship was his first sexual relationship. It was his “only experience of a relationship and your attitudes and strategies for dealing with conflict have been shaped within a relationship that commenced when you were a child.”
The offender required specific deterrence, treatment and programs to ensure he did not repeat this offending. Denunciation and general deterrence were also important sentencing considerations: “All potential perpetrators who may feel aggrieved within a domestic relationship and who lack the skills, intelligence, maturity and emotional control to relate to a partner or ex-partner in anything other than a violent and controlling way – must be deterred” at [55].
DPP v Senior (a pseudonym) [2020] VCC 1380 (2 September 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Contravention of a DFV protection order x 1; Arson x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male perpetrator plead guilty to breach of a protection order by threatening to kill his female former partner and arson. After an argument the offender called his former partner and threatened to ‘come to her house and blow her and her family up’. He entered her home, and despite his father’s atempts to calm him, threw thinner over the couch and lounge room floor, stating he would burn the house down with his former partner in it. Some of the thinner (accidentally) caught fire on the gas heater causing an explosion. The offender and his father escaped the fire; however, the house was destroyed.
Issues: Sentencing.
Decision and reasoning: Sentenced to time served, followed by a community corrections order for 12 months with conditions designed to continue rehabilitation by way of supervision, mental health and programs to reduce reoffending.
[16] You are fortunate that your vile threats of harm did not cause further injury or damage to your son and his mother. Arson is a very serious offence. In the circumstances of this case, you allowed your rage and anger to get the better of you in a situation in which you recklessly used an accelerant which you well knew and believed would probably result in damage or destruction to property. It is important in your case, as the learned prosecutor made clear very fairly during the course of the plea, that two factors need to be recognised.
[17] The first is that this was not a case in which you burnt down a property either to damage it intentionally or to prevent or deny another its enjoyment or ownership, and that having properly classified and understood the modus in which the fire started in a seemingly accidental way which nevertheless carries the inference of intention, and secondly, that your intention at the time was to hurt yourself by fire, even endangering your own father; intent which should be also noted you put into effect, not by arming yourself with an accelerant fuel but because your work made it available to you through a thinner which you already had available to you.
[18] The circumstances significantly reduce in my view the gravity of the offending and your moral culpability. You have, by your plea, accepted responsibility legally and I accept you are remorseful for your actions.
DPP v Jenkins [2020] VCC 749 (4 June 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Guilty plea at commencement of trial’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Lengthy procedural history’ – ‘Obsessive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent offending’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sex offender registration’ – ‘Significant criminal history’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: 11 charges, including rape x 2; destroying or damaging property x 1; causing injury intentionally or recklessly x 1; threats to kill x 3; assault x 3; stalking x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The majority of offending was committed against Ms Burgess (the victim), with whom the male accused was in an intimate relationship ([12]). Their relationship was marred by excessive drug and alcohol consumption, physical and sexual violence and stalking. The accused regularly argued with the victim about his paranoid suspicions concerning her infidelity ([13]). The controlling and obsessive behaviour became more severe over time. On one occasion, the victim threatened to stab him before self-harming, demonstrating the level of stress she was suffering at the time ([17]). The accused’s controlling behaviour continued. He checked her emails and social media accounts, accessed her phone without permission and tracked her location. He also broke her phone after she refused to give it to him ([18]-[20]).
On 5 October 2017, he raped ([23]-[24]) and physically abused the victim ([25], [27]) and threatened to cut her throat ([26]). A week later, he pushed the victim to the ground after she had told him that their relationship was over and demanded him to leave the premises ([29]). After this incident, the accused was arrested, and released on bail with conditions prohibiting contact with the victim ([30]). Despite this order, he continued to text and ring the victim, track her location and loiter near her home. One evening, the victim allowed the accused to enter her house, where he accused her of sleeping with other people, physically assaulted her and grabbed her phone ([34]-[40]). The accused continued to contact the victim, causing further distress and fear, and later threatened to cut the victim’s and a police officer’s throat ([41]-[43]).
There was a significant delay in resolving the matter, and the accused was unrepresented for most of the proceeding, including the plea hearing. His guilty pleas were entered at the commencement of trial ([51]-[52]). The Court held that "the fairest and most appropriate course" was to ensure that he was not punished for adopting a "somewhat uncooperative approach" ([56]), and that his guilty pleas still entitled him to a sizeable reduction in sentence ([57]).
Held: The accused’s personal circumstances and criminal history are discussed at paragraphs [58] to [75]. He abused alcohol and drugs from an early age, and had previously seen doctors for drug dependency, depression, drug psychosis and attempted suicides. Although he had suffered numerous head injuries, a neuropsychologist concluded that he did not have an acquired brain injury ([64]-[65]). He also has a significant criminal history, including past convictions for recklessly causing injury, indecent assault, contravening a family violence intervention order, and making threats to kill ([69]-[70]). He has also been convicted of a number of offences against former intimate partners and has breached a family violence safety notice on several occasions ([71]-[73]).
The Court found that the accused’s conduct was "absolutely appalling". He had "gained [the victim’s] trust and formed an intimate relationship with her only to go on to degrade and demean her at the whim of [his] paranoid obsessions". The rape, assaults and threats to kill demonstrated the kind of behaviour to which she was subject for the duration of their relationship ([85]). The rape was particularly serious, because it was committed in the context of an initially trusting and intimate relationship, and involved the use of force and violence ([86]). The charge of stalking was also serious as the accused went to great lengths to control and abuse the victim in a "pathologically unfeeling" manner. He also knowingly disregarded court orders intended to protect the victim from his conduct ([87]). The Court assessed his moral culpability for the offending as "very high", and accepted the prosecutor’s submission that the physical and sexual violence he inflicted on his partner requires just punishment and strong denunciation ([88]). Further, the accused had prior convictions, indicating a tendency to treat intimate partners violently ([89]). The accused appeared to have some "incipient insight" into his conduct and the necessary steps to address his drug problem and attitude towards women ([92]). Whilst he apologised for his behaviour, the Court did not place a great deal of weight on that assertion as there was no evidence that indicated that he was genuinely remorseful for the harm caused to the victim. The Court was also not confident of his prospects for rehabilitation, but took into account that any sentence imposed must not be crushing ([93]).
Consequently, the Court granted the Crown’s application to have the accused report under the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 for the "rest of [his] life" as he poses a real risk to the sexual safety of women ([95]-[101]). He was convicted of all charges (except one count of rape), and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years ([115]).
Director of Public Prosecutions v Linton [2020] VCC 515 (28 April 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History as victim of family and domestic violence as child’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Substance misuse’ – ‘Verdins principles’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1; Possessing drug of dependence x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The female offender and male victim had been in a relationship that ended six months prior to the offending, but had started spending time together one to two months before the offending. One night, the offender picked up the victim from a pub and they visited the victim’s cousin’s house where they played pool and used drugs. The offender and the victim left around 2am and returned to the offender’s bungalow where an argument broke out. The offender stabbed the victim on the left side of his chest with a pair of scissors. The victim left the bungalow and called emergency services. The offender sent text messages to the victim asking him if he was alright, but the focus of the messages was very much on the offender’s own needs. The victim suffered a left haemopneumothorax, haemopericardium, a punctured lung and fluid overload, and was admitted to the ICU. The victim initially attempted to protect the offender by not telling police she was the one who caused the injuries, and the offender feigned ignorance when questioned by police, but later the victim told police what had really happened.
Judgment: The sentencing judge ordered that the offender be placed on a community corrections order for three years during which the offender was to complete 300 hours of community work and participate in rehabilitation programs for drug use and mental health issues. The judge also ordered that the offender be subject to judicial monitoring. Her Honour held that "a community corrections order can be punitive, achieve deterrence, and may be suitable even in cases of relatively serious offences such as this, which might have previously attracted a medium term of imprisonment" [72].
Her Honour held that the offender "committed a serious criminal offence with serious consequences" for the victim by inflicting an injury when the victim "had little, if any, chance to know what was happening", using a hidden weapon [19]. However, her Honour accepted that the act was impulsive, without premeditation, and that the actual consequences of the attack were "probably unintended" [20].
Her Honour emphasised the need to give significant weight to general deterrence, as the offence was committed in a domestic violence setting [21]. However, she noted several factors that impacted on the weight to be given to general deterrence in this case. Specifically, the offender’s young age, the offender suffered physical and emotional abuse from her former stepfather (and witnessed her mother being subjected to this too) and older brother, the offender abused drugs, the offender had an unstable and volatile upbringing, and the offender had a long history of mental health issues. Her Honour accepted that the offender had committed to positive change and had engaged in a variety of alcohol and drug treatment programs. She also accepted that the offender had personality difficulties which, when combined with her use of ice and other drugs, resulted in difficulty thinking clearly and rationally and impaired her judgment at the time of the offence [43]. Her Honour accepted that there was therefore a basis for limited reduction to moral culpability for the offences [44].
Her Honour somewhat applied limbs 5 and 6 of the decision in R v Verdins & Ors [2007] QSCA 102. Limb 5 refers to the existence of a condition at the date of sentencing which may mean that a given sentence would weigh more heavily on an offender than a person in normal health. Limb 6 refers to a serious risk of the imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on mental health. The judge noted the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the offender if she were to be imprisoned, particularly in light of her mental health issues and her strong family support base (which she would be unable to access if imprisoned).
Her Honour held that less weight needed to be given to specific deterrence and protecting the community from the offender because of her lack of criminal history. A discount was given to recognise the utilitarian benefit of the offender’s early guilty plea.
Magistrates' Court
DPP v Cope (a pseudonym) [2021] VMC 014 (17 September 2021) – Magistrates’ Court of Victoria
‘Honest and reasonable mistake of fact’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charges: Contravention of family violence intervention order x 1.
Proceedings: Judgement.
Issues: Whether section 123(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (‘the Act’) was a strict liability offence.
Facts: The accused was charged with beaching a family violence intervention order, an offence pursuant to s 123(2) (‘the offence’) of the Act, by being within 200m of the victim’s workplace. Magistrate Foster accepted that the address was unknown to the accused and not specified by the order. However, the prosecution argued that proof of mens rea was not required, because s 123(2) was an offence of strict liability. The prosecution also argued that the accused had not made out the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact.
Decision and Reasoning: The charges were dismissed.
Applying He Kaw Teh v The Queen [1985] HCA 43; (1985) 157 CLR 523, Magistrate Foster found that the presumption of mens rea had not been displaced. The aggravated versions of the offence explicitly required proof of a mens rea element ([45]). Therefore, it would be inconsistent with the structure and operation of the act for the offence to be one of strict liability. All three offences carried considerable terms of imprisonment. His Honour highlighted that ‘a strong presumption exists that proof of mens rea is necessary where an offence carries serious sanctions’ [57]. ‘The serious nature of… family violence and… serious consequences for all three… offences strongly suggests that the presumption of mens rea has not been displaced’ [48]. Furthermore, the absence of a mens rea element would not assist with the enforcement of the offence (see [59]). It would be counter intuitive and ‘contrary… to the spirit of the act’ [71] to require the accused to take steps to remain aware of the details of victim’s workplace, which was not specified by the order. His Honour found that it was not necessary to address whether the accused had proven the defence of mistaken fact, but explained that the defence would have been established due to evidence that the accused had no reason to believe that the victim worked within 200ms of the café (see [82]-[84] and [97]).
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
ZHC v Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal (Review and Regulation) (Corrected) [2022] VCAT 333 (30 March 2022) – Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative review’ – ‘Application for assistance’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Decision not to pursue charges’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Pregnant victim’ – ‘Reasonable assistance’ – ‘Reasonable time’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victims of crime assistance act 1996’
Proceedings: Review of decision to strike out the victim’s application for assistance pursuant to section 52 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (‘the VOCA Act’).
Issue: Was the act of violence reported within a reasonable time?
Facts: Under Section 52 of the VOCA Act, an award of assistance must be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that an act of violence was not reported to police within a reasonable time, or that the applicant failed to provide reasonable assistance to investigators. The section does not apply if the Tribunal considers a delay in reporting, or lack of assistance, to be the result of the applicant’s ‘special circumstances’ [3]. In May 2021, the victim’s application was refused on the basis that she had failed to report acts of violence by her former partner within a reasonable time. While the victim had reported a protection order breach in December 2020, materials provided to the Tribunal alleged a history of family violence commencing in 2016 [4].
Decision and reasoning: The Tribunal was not satisfied that the victim’s application ought to be refused under section 52 of the VOCA Act. The Tribunal found that the acts of violence were reported to police within a reasonable time. The Tribunal highlighted paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of section 53 of the VOCA Act, which provide that in considering whether an act of violence was reported within a reasonable time, the Tribunal may consider:
(c) ‘whether the person who… is alleged to have committed, the act of violence was in a position of power, influence or trust in relation to the victim’
(d) whether the victim was threatened or intimidated by the person who… is alleged to have committed, the act of violence’
(e) ‘the nature of the injury alleged to have been suffered by the victim’ [12]-[14].
Considering paragraph (c), the Tribunal noted that the victim’s former partner exerted power and influence her through acts of physical violence, which escalated during her pregnancy, and by controlling her finances. Considering paragraph (d), the victim felt intimidated and threatened by her former partner. This was evidenced by a protection order application, and evidence that the victim’s former partner had made threats to harm or kill the victim or their child if she left the relationship. Considering paragraph (e), the victim sustained serious physical injuries due to her former partner’s assaults, including cuts, broken teeth, and post-traumatic stress disorder [15]-[19].
The Tribunal was not required to consider whether the victim had provided ‘reasonable assistance’, or whether ‘special circumstances’ existed. However, the Tribunal explained that a decision not to pursue charges or provide a statement to assist police to arrest, investigate or prosecute does not amount to a failure to provide reasonable assistance [30]-[31].
Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the facts exemplified ‘special circumstances’ [43]. Due to the nature of the violence perpetrated against the victim, the fact that the couple lived together, and the applicant’s repeated contravention of protection orders, the victim was unlikely to make immediate reports to police [44]. Rather, the victim prioritised ‘more effective mechanisms that would keep her safe’, such as a protection order [45]-[48].
Western Australia
Court of Appeal
Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 8 (15 January 2025) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Guilty pleas’ – ‘ Relevance of forensic prejudice’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate discounts’ – ‘ Aggregate sentence reflecting overall criminality’
Proceedings: appeal against sentence.
Charges: Persistently engage in family violence (x1), aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm in a family relationship (x2), act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety (x3), be armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear (x1).
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a relationship from 2014 to 2020. During their relationship, the complainant and her children lived between the appellant’s farm and a house in Geraldton.
In relation to count 1 (persistently engage in family violence), the appellant committed six incidents of family violence against the complainant between 26 March 2015 and 1 November 2020. The violence involved punching, pushing, dragging, hitting the complainant with an implement (spatula), and grabbing her by the throat.
In relation to counts 2 and 3 (aggravated assaults occasioning actual bodily harm), count 2 involved the appellant pressing a working drill spindle into the complainant’s back, causing a burn. Count 3 involved the appellant elbowing the complainant to the face, causing a swollen, bruised eye.
In relation to count 4 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety), the appellant pushed the complainant to the chest, causing her to fall to the ground. He then jumped onto her, straddled her chest and used both hands to squeeze her throat. The complainant struggled to breathe and lost consciousness.
In relation to count 5 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety), the appellant threw a glass tumbler at the complainant’s face, causing numerous cuts. The complainant suffered swelling and severe pain, which continued afterwards when trying to eat.
In relation to count 6 (act of being armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear), the appellant and the complainant had been arguing. During the argument, the appellant picked up a shotgun and cocked it. The appellant then dry-fired the gun while pointing it away from the complainant.
In relation to count 7 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, health, life or safety), the complainant was walking to the kitchen when the appellant pushed her to the floor. She landed face down. The appellant at on her back, straddling her. He then grabbed her hair and used it to slam her head onto the ground. She managed to escape and ran to her car.
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on three grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant’s pleas to counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 were not entered at the first reasonable opportunity, by failing to take into account the existence of relevant forensic prejudice to the appellant had he pleaded guilty or indicated a plea of guilty any earlier.
2.
The discount afforded by the sentencing judge under s 9AA(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) to each of counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 76 was manifestly inadequate.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing an aggregate sentence that did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant’s conduct having regard to all relevant circumstances including those referable to the appellant personally.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1 was dismissed on the basis that an offender will not act reasonably (within the concept of “first reasonable opportunity” to plead guilty in s 9AA) in delaying the entry or indication of a plea of guilty to a charged offence if the object/effect of the delay is to secure a forensic advantage/to avoid a forensic disadvantage in relation to other charged offences [81]. Leave to appeal on ground 1 was dismissed.
Ground 2 was also dismissed. While the Court acknowledged that there were utilitarian benefits to the state, the complainant and other witnesses [93]. The appellant had initially pleaded not guilty with the case being listed for a 5-day trial. It was on the first day of the trial that the appellant pleaded guilty. At that point, witnesses had been summonsed, and some had already travelled to Geraldton to give evidence. The complainant had suffered anxiety and uncertainty preparing to give evidence [95]. The primary judge gave rational and coherent reasons for the discounts he allowed for the guilty pleas in relation to counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. Leave to appeal on ground 2 was refused [97].
Ground 3 was also dismissed. The Court noted that the legal principles applicable to a claim that an aggregate sentence breaches the totality principle are well known and are summarised in Kabambi v Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 at [21], [192]. The Court found that having regard to the maximum penalties, the circumstances of the offences, the appellant’s personal circumstances and the limited assistance provided by comparable cases, it was not reasonably arguable that the total effective sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust [206].
Purmah v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 88 (31 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Image-based abuse’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Online relationship’ – ‘ sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘ coercive control’
Case type: appeal against sentence
Charges: making a threat with intent to compel the complainant to do an act that she was lawfully entitled to abstain from doing (x3)
Facts: In 2017, the appellant was a 27-year-old Mauritian citizen studying in Perth on a student visa. The complainant was a 22-year-old woman residing in Mauritius. In May 2016, the pair commenced an online relationship.
At the appellant's request, the complainant provided nude photographs of herself. When the relationship broke down, the appellant threatened to send the photographs to her family and friends and publish them more broadly unless she complied with his demands. Those demands included that she completes his university assignments, that she gives him money when she did any work and that she not bring any legal proceedings against him.
Threats were made on three occasions via WhatsApp and email between May and June 2018. He also sent messages urging the complainant to commit suicide and falsely made it appear the images had been posted online. He was arrested in 2019, denied knowing the complainant and pleaded not guilty at trial. He was convicted after trial and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on each count (concurrent), with eligibility for parole.
Ground of appeal
1.
The individual sentences (on each count) were manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offense and the personal circumstances of the appellant.
2.
The Judge overlooked or made a mistake about the appellant’s personal circumstances
3.
Other sentences were reasonably open such as a suspended sentence.
Decision: The Court (Miocevich DCJ) refused the application to extend time, refused leave to appeal on all grounds and dismissed the appeal.
Reasoning:
Ground 2 (Error regarding remorse and hardship): The Court held that it is plainly not the case that the sentencing judge overlooked the appellant's letter or the contents of the pre‑sentence report. His Honour referred to both of those documents in some detail. There was no failure on the part of the sentencing judge to understand the purport of those documents. Nor is there any reason to think that he failed to take them into account and give them such weight as he considered appropriate [40]. It was plainly open to the sentencing judge to come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the appellant's expressions of remorse in the letter, he was not genuinely remorseful [41]. While the appellant expressed regret, the judge found his remorse was not genuine due to ongoing victim-blaming and contradictory claims [41]. The judge also did not overlook the reference to potential hardship in custody but correctly concluded it did not warrant a different sentence [43]. The Court held there was no merit in ground 2 [44].
Ground 1 (Manifestly excessive sentence):
The Court held there was no merit in the claim that the sentence was manifestly excessive [58]. The offending in this case was serious because it involved the making of threats to effectively destroy the reputation of the complainant if she did not do things that the appellant wanted her to do [47]. Although the images were not distributed, the appellant falsely suggested they had been, and he urged the complainant to commit suicide, causing significant psychological harm [48]. The offending was not isolated but part of a pattern of abuse within a coercive relationship [49].
The appellant provided no comparable cases, and although Singh v The Queen was cited, it was distinguished as it involved a different offence with a lesser maximum penalty (5 years cf 7 years), a guilty plea and actual distribution of images [53]–[56]. Given the maximum penalty, seriousness of the offending, and lack of mitigating factors, the 18-month sentence was well within range and not plainly unjust or unreasonable [57].
Ground 3 (Suspended sentence not considered):
The Court rejected the claim that the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a suspended sentence [62]. Per the sentencing principles set out in div 1 of pt 2 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), a sentencing judge must be positively satisfied that immediate imprisonment is appropriate, having considered all relevant sentencing principles [59]. While different sentencing outcomes may be open in borderline cases, the discretion to refuse suspension is not limited to rehabilitation. it can be based on the objective seriousness of the offence [59]. Here, the seriousness of the offences, the repeated nature of the threats and the lack of any real mitigating factors, justified that conclusion that a suspended sentence was inappropriate [61]. The Court confirmed that the judge’s discretion was properly exercised and the sentence was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust.
Clinch v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 92 (31 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Family violence restraining order’ – ‘ Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘ Whether sentencing judge had erred in characterising offending as ‘prolonged’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Jealousy’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Charges: Aggravated home burglary x1
Facts: The applicant arrived at the home of the complainant, his former partner, who had previously had a family violence restraining order against him. He was angry and yelling because he believed that the complainant was seeing another man. The complainant locked the front door, but the applicant entered the house forcibly by kicking in another door. He demanded that the complainant produce the man he believed was there. He then assaulted the complainant by grabbing her around the jaw and squeezing hard, pushing her against a door, punching her on her arm, torso and shoulder, throwing his car keys at her, and hitting her on the shoulder. The complainant called the police, but the applicant left before they arrived [1].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon two grounds of appeal [32]. The first ground alleged that the sentencing judge had made an error of fact in finding that the applicant had committed a prolonged and persistent series of assaults. The second ground alleged that the sentence of 4 years imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused, and the appeal was dismissed [50].
Regarding the first ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted that on a fair reading of the sentencing judge’s remarks, her Honour characterised the applicant’s violence against the complainant as ‘prolonged’ [38]. In doing so, the sentencing judge had compared the violence to a ‘one-off momentary slap’ [37]. The Court did not find that the sentencing judge made the alleged error (characterising the violence as ‘prolonged’ when it had not been), but even if she had, the Court would not grant the appeal, as it was not reasonably arguable that the Court should impose a different sentence if it were to re-exercise the sentencing discretion [39].
Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Court found that having regard to the maximum penalty for the offence (20 years’ imprisonment), the seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances of the applicant and sentences imposed in comparable cases (of which the Court cited many), it was not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment was plainly unreasonable or unjust [49].
The State of Western Australia v Winch [2024] WASCA 79 (3 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Protection order’ – ‘ Persistently engaging in domestic violence’
Case type: State appeal against sentence.
Charges: Persistently engaging in family violence (x1).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: Over an eight-year period (2011-2019), the respondent repeatedly assaulted and threatened his wife in the context of a long-term marriage. The violence occurred regularly, especially when the respondent was intoxicated. Generally, the respondent would apologise to the victim the next day and he would tell her it would never happen again. The abuse included physical assaults, verbal abuse, threats to kill, property damage and controlling behaviour.
The offending included:
•
Common assault (2012): Threw a meat pie in the victim’s face.
•
Threat to kill (2013): Held a kitchen knife to the victim’s throat, stating she no longer had a choice whether she lived.
•
Threat to harm & property damage (2013): Spat at the victim, smashed photos and her phone, locked the door and paced while holding an axe.
•
Threat to kill with speargun (2014): Pointed a speargun at the victim, said he would kill her and then himself.
•
Previously charged offending (2015): Punched the victim while she was recovering from surgery and swung a coffee table at her.
•
Assault occasioning bodily harm (‘AOBH’) (2017): Forcefully grabbed the victim’s arm, causing bruising.
•
Act likely to endanger and common assault (2019): Told the victim there would be “murders” if she left him, then strangled her and said he would slit her throat and smear her blood on the wall.
•
Common assault and act likely to endanger (2019): Struck the victim with a sandal and berated her.
Police were called on multiple occasions. The respondent was subject to violence restraining orders, which were repeatedly breached. Despite some reconciliations, the abuse persisted until the final separation in late 2019.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
Error of fact: Sentencing judge wrongly found that custody would be more onerous due to alcohol detoxification.
2.
Manifestly inadequate sentence: Disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence, personal circumstances, and deterrence purposes.
Decision: The Court (Mitchell, Hall and Vandongen JJA) allowed the appeal and set the sentence aside. The respondent was resentenced to 5 years and 8 months' imprisonment, backdated to 31 January 2024, with parole eligibility.
Reasoning:
Ground 2 (Manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that the sentence of 2 years and 3 months was manifestly inadequate, given the seriousness of the offence and the limited mitigation [116]–[117].
Section 300 of the Criminal Code (WA) reflects Parliament’s serious view of persistent family violence, with a maximum penalty of 14 years [95]; [116]. The offending spanned eight years, involved verbal and physical abuse, strangulation, and threats with weapons including a knife, axe and speargun [98]–[101].
The abuse followed a cyclical pattern, with episodes of violence followed by apologies and reconciliation [99]. Some of the acts of family violence that were specifically relied on by the State were extremely serious [100]. Although it is true that the victim did not suffer from any very serious physical injuries, this is to be expected given the limited range of acts of family violence that can constitute an offence contrary to s 300. Nevertheless, the victim experienced significant psychological harm [104]–[105]. The offending amounted to a gross breach of trust and the respondent did not change his ways even after earlier convictions and a restraining order [106]. The nature of many of the respondent’s acts of persistent family violence were such as to be likely to make it very difficult for the victim to leave the relationship. They appear to have been designed to make the victim terrified of the potential consequences of attempting to leave the respondent [107]. The only substantive mitigating factor was a 12% guilty plea discount, entered on the morning of trial [108]–[109]. The judge’s finding that detox in custody would be “more onerous” (than being in community) was noted, but even accepting that, the sentence remained manifestly inadequate [110]–[111]. The Court emphasised the need for general and specific deterrence in domestic violence sentencing [114]–[115].
The Court concluded the sentence failed to reflect the gravity of the offending and the limited mitigation. A significantly higher sentence should have been imposed. Ground 2 upheld [116]-[117].
Ground 1 (Error of fact):
The Court declined to determine Ground 1, as the appeal was allowed on Ground 2 and the Court proceeded to resentence the respondent independently of the alleged error [118].
MYB v State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 53 (13 May 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Charges: strangulation x 1; intent to cause bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant strangled the female complainant, his de factor partner of three years, in the presence of their 9 month old child. [12] This incident was followed by an onslaught of physical abuse, and threats to kill made towards the complainant, which was all committed in the presence of their child. [13]–[17] The male appellant pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. [5]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The sentence of five years’ imprisonment on count 2 (intent to cause bodily harm) was manifestly excessive individual sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
2.
The sentence on count 2 infringed the totality principle [7]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal dismissed. The Court (Mazza, MItchell and Vandongen JJA) dismissed ground one, holding the appellant’s submission to ‘substantially downplay the seriousness’ of their actions which involved ‘sustained and persistent violence’. [67] In reaching this conclusion, the Court’s emphasised the following aggravating features of the appellant’s actions: the acts were committed in the presence of the appellant’s child, the acts have and will continue to have severe psychological consequences on the complainant (and the child), and the acts included the particularly serious offence of strangulation:
Strangulation, which is commonly reported by women who have experienced domestic violence, can be distinguished from other forms of family and domestic violence on the basis that it often leaves very few marks or signs; even in cases where the strangulation was life-threatening. The fact that this type of offending is more likely to go undetected makes strangulation a particularly dangerous form of domestic violence, and recent studies have consistently shown that it is both a predictive risk factor for future severe domestic violence and a relatively common cause of domestic violence-related homicide [64]
The Court also dismissed ground two, finding the ground to have no merit. [94] The sentencing judge’s findings that the appellant ‘had not fully accepted responsibility for his conduct’ indicated a significant need for personal deterrence and denunciation. [95]
State of WA v Riley [2024] WASCA 11 (2 February 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘ Totality principle’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Breach of protection order’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ History of domestic and family violence’
Charges: Aggravated threat to kill x 1; aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; aggravated deprivation of liberty x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 24-year-old male respondent had a ‘lengthy history of violent offending’ against the female complainant, his former partner and mother to his three children [7]. In 2021, the respondent was declared a ‘serial family violence offender’ as a consequence of this offending. In May 2022, the respondent was released from prison, after serving 10 months for breaching a protection order in which the complainant was a protected person [8].
Upon release, the respondent knowingly breached this order by attending the complainant’s home and demanding that she and the children come to his family home. When she refused, the respondent branded a knife, threatened to ‘kill’ the complainant and hit her (without rupturing her skin) ([12]–[14]). Their children were present during this exchange ([16]). The complainant complied with the demand and got into the car with her children. While parked at a petrol station to purchase alcohol, the respondent was arrested by police for breaching the prevention order ([19]–[20]). The respondent was sentenced to 2 years and 2 months’ immediate imprisonment [3].
Grounds of Appeal: The State appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
Each individual sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
2.
The total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle (ie, sentences be proportionate to the gravity of the offence).
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The Court (Buss P, Mazza and Hall JJA) resentenced the respondent to a total effective sentence of four years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
In relation to ground one, the Court held that original sentence did not properly reflect the numerous aggravating factors of the offending: the offending constituted breaches of a restraining order and was committed in ‘the presence of young children’ and in ‘the context of a family relationship’ [53]. Further, the respondent was ‘intoxicated, agitated and armed with a knife’ and ‘clearly intended to intimidate and terrify’ the complainant by threatening to kill her in the same manner as her father did her mother [54]–[55].
This case clearly required that significant weight be given to personal deterrence. The respondent has a deplorable history of offending against AB. He has shown disregard, if not frank contempt, for court orders put in place to protect AB. He is driven by a misplaced sense of entitlement that puts the continued safety of AB at real risk. That risk was confirmed by the assessment in the presentence report [66]
General deterrence also looms large in cases of this type. Domestic violence is a scourge on society. Awareness of this type of offending and concern to prevent it have grown markedly in recent years. Persistent violence and intimidation in the context of family relationships must be strongly discouraged by appropriate sentences [67]
Domestic violence can include physical injury, psychological injury and emotional trauma. It affects mainly women and children. In the present case, the respondent physically, psychologically and emotionally abused AB. The abuse occurred in the context of an obvious imbalance of power. The respondent's offending included behaviour that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control AB. Denunciation of the respondent's criminal conduct, in addition to personal and general deterrence, was an importance sentencing consideration [68]
With respect to ground two, the Court held that the original sentences were manifestly inadequate. Public interest in ‘maintaining appropriate sentencing standards’ for serious offending of the type committed by the respondent weighed strongly against the Court’s exercise of residual discretion (ie, discretion to not interfere with a primary judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion) ([76]; [79]).
State of WA v LSM [2023] WASCA 132 (1 September 2023) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘ Strangulation’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘ Coercive control’ – ‘ Attempting to pervert the course of justice’
Charges: Deprivation of liberty x 1; threat to kill x2; aggressive sexual penetration without consent x 2; attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In October 2020, the male respondent subjected the female complainant, his wife, to ‘a prolonged episode of physical and sexual violence that demonstrated a complete disregard for her humanity’ [1]. During the complainant’s birthday celebrations, the respondent became jealous and accused the complainant of being unfaithful. The respondent forced the complainant into their car, drove dangerously and threatened to crash the car and kill them both [2]. The complainant escaped the car on two occasions and managed to contact emergency services before being forcibly pulled back in ([2]; [95]–[96]). Over the course of two hours at their apartment, the respondent deprived the complainant of her liberty, repeatedly raped and strangled her [3].
In November 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty to seven offences and sentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment [7].
Grounds of Appeal: The State appealed the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in reducing the head sentence by 25% for the respondent’s pleas of guilty, which were not offered at the first reasonable opportunity;
2.
The individual sentences for the four offences of aggravated sexual penetration without consent were manifestly inadequate; and
3.
The total effective sentence failed to adequately reflect the overall criminality of the offenses [8]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The discount for the respondent’s pleas of guilty was reduced to 15% [31], and the total effective sentence increased to 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment [33].
In relation to ground one, Quinlan CJ, Buss P and Mazza JA observed that the respondent conceded that his pleas of guilty ‘were not made at the first reasonable opportunity’ ([10]; [52]; [127]).
In relation to ground two, Quinlan CJ held that ‘none’ of the individual sentences reflected the objective seriousness of the offences, nor the ‘actual violence’ of the respondent and his intention to ‘violate, hurt, demean and humiliate’ the complaint ([15]–[16]):
First, each offence was committed in circumstances of aggravation, being the familial relationship between the respondent and the victim … The circumstance of aggravation in this case reflects the recognition by the Parliament and the courts of the seriousness of the offences involving family violence, including by reason of the significant breach of trust and exploitation of vulnerability involved in such offending. These matters make clear the importance of general deterrence in sentencing for offences involving violence by men on vulnerable victims (mostly women) with whom they are in domestic relationships [14]
[T]he offences were accompanied by actual violence (beyond the violence inherent in the act of sexually penetrating a person without their consent), including the forceful nature of the penetration … and the respondent squeezing the victim’s neck and throat. As to the latter, the particular dangers associated with offences involving non-fatal strangulation and the role they play in cases of intimate and family violence are well recognised [16]
Finally, the offences were committed in the victim’s own home. Not only was the victim with a ‘person’ with whom she should have been safe (her husband), she was in a ‘place’ in which she was entitled to feel safe. The respondent betrayed her on both fronts [17]
President Buss similarly characterised the nature and quality of the respondent’s ‘violence’ as particularly ‘serious’:
Domestic and sexual violence can involve physical injury, sexual assault, psychological injury and emotional trauma. Domestic and sexual violence is a major concern in Australia. It affects mainly women and children. In the present case, the respondent physically, sexually, psychologically and emotionally abused F. The abuse occurred in the context of a patent imbalance of power. The respondent's offending included behaviour that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control F. Denunciation of the respondent's criminal conduct and personal and general deterrence were important sentencing considerations [59]
In relation to ground three, Quinlan CJ held that all of the offences ‘involved the coercive control by the respondent of his wife’, demonstrating a degree of criminality not captured by the original sentence [23].
This ‘pattern of abuse’ was also identified by Buss P as being inadequately reflected in the overall criminality of the respondent’s offences [71]. For Buss P, the respondent’s attempt to ‘manipulate’ the complainant into withdrawing her complaints was a ‘continuation of his abusive conduct’, as too ‘the physical abuse … the infliction of emotional trauma’ [70]–[71]:
All of those counts manifested behaviour by the respondent that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control [the complainant] [71]
Justice of Appeal Mazza emphasised the domestic context in which the offending took place as particularly warranting a heavier sentence:
It cannot be overlooked that the entire offending occurred in the context of a domestic setting. The respondent, grossly in this case, abused the trust his wife placed in him, using his greater physical strength to overcome any resistance and to dominate, terrify and humiliate [the complainant]. [The complainant] was a highly vulnerable victim who could not readily extricate herself from the position into which the respondent forced her. It is the duty of courts to impose a proper sentence that is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending in order to, as far as courts can, protect victims of domestic violence and to denounce such conduct [146]
Gomboc v State of WA [2023] WASCA 115 (24 July 2023) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Aggravated assault’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘ Totality principle’ – ‘ People with mental illness’ – ‘ Strangulation’ – ‘ People affected by substance misuse’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 2; threat to harm x 7; doing an act endangering life, safety or health with intent x 1; threat to kill x 6; aggravated unlawful wounding x 1; wilful damage to property x 1; being armed likely to cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant began a domestic relationship in 2014 that lasted till 2018. Throughout ‘almost the entirety of the relationship’, the appellant subjected the complainant to ‘regular physical and verbal abuse’ (eg, strangulation, kicking, punching, and making threats to kill) ([2]; [19]; [24]–[110]). The complainant consequently suffered severe anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder [2]. In July 2022, the male appellant was convicted of 19 offences and sentenced to 11 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant advanced an appeal against the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The total effective sentence failed to ‘bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of his conduct’;
2.
The trial judge erred in failing to find that imprisonment would weigh more heavily on the appellant due to his mental health condition; and
3.
The trial judge erred in not making a positive finding as the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation [5]
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground one. The total effective sentence was reformulated to 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
The Court (Quinlan CJ, Mazza and Hall JJA) identified the appellant’s pleas of guilty, mental health issues, character references and prospects of rehabilitation as factors militating towards the conclusion that the original sentence was high ([9]; [199]; [202]; [220]).
In our view, this is truly one of those cases when the metaphor of taking one ‘last look at the total, just to see whether it looks wrong’ is apt. And when we take a last look at the sentence of almost 12 years, in light of the appellant’s pleas of guilty and such potential for rehabilitation … the sentence looks wrong [220]
It was observed that the appellant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder and poly-substance misuse disorder (cannabis and alcohol) arising from the appellant’s time in military service with the Australian Army. [120]
However, the Court maintained the need to strongly denounce this type of offending:
The appellant’s steps to begin addressing his perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards domestic and family violence are encouraging. Nevertheless … the persistent, callous and menacing nature of his offending required a long term of imprisonment. Offending of this kind must be denounced by severe penalties [223]
The Court dismissed the second ground of appeal, finding insufficient evidence before the sentencing judge to support the conclusion that imprisonment would weigh more heavily on the appellant due to his mental health condition ([6]; [164]).
The Court also dismissed the third ground of appeal, observing the appellant’s insufficient insight into his behaviour and the ‘entrenched’ nature of his violent attitude in the domestic setting ([7]; [172]–[181]).
State of WA v Williams [2022] WASCA 105 (11 August 2022) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against refusal to make declaration offender is a serial domestic family violence offender’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Family violence legislation reform act 2020 (wa)’ – ‘Whether declaration can be made following conviction for family violence offence committed prior to commencement of legislation’ – ‘Whether legislation operates retrospectively’
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to make a declaration that offender is a serial domestic family violence offender.
Facts: The Family Violence Legislative Reform Act 2020 (WA) by s 29 inserted s 124E into the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). The amendment commenced on 1 January 2021. It provides that where an offender has been convicted of at least three prescribed offences, with at least three of them having been committed on different days, a judge may declare the offender to be a serial family violence offender, consequences of which include a presumption against the grant of bail, and specific sentencing options.
In September 2021 the offender was convicted of three offences, including one prescribed offence, committed on 14 November 2020. He had a prior record of 11 prescribed offences committed against Ms C. The trial judge did not declare him to be a serial family violence offender on the basis that to do so would infringe the presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes. The State appealed the decision not to declare Williams a serial family violence offender.
Grounds: The primary judge erroneously concluded that s 124E(l) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) did not apply to the 'family violence offences' for which the respondent had been convicted because those offences occurred prior to the commencement of that statutory provision, and that to hold otherwise would infringe the presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes. The discretionary power in s 124E should have been exercised to declare the respondent to be a serial family violence offender.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal granted; appeal allowed; matter remitted to consider whether to make declaration.
The Court held that s124E could apply to offences committed before its commencement. First, the section conferred a discretion on a court to make such a declaration [45]. The ‘trigger’ for the discretion is the ‘convicting’ of an offender by the court, which ‘speaks prospectively, that is, it only applies to a ‘conviction’ occurring after the commencement of the section’ [46]. Secondly, while the statutory preconditions required to enliven the discretion might include events that occurred before the section commenced, ‘that does not give the section a retrospective operation’ [47]. Thirdly, where a court makes a declaration, the consequences only affect an offender’s rights in the future [48]. Finally, even the disqualification from being authorized to use firearms or explosives is ‘prospective only; it does not make any such licence, permit, approval or authorisation invalid at any time in the past’ [52].
CEG v Wright [2022] WASCA 42 (1 April 2022) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Audio recording evidence’ – ‘Child protection’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Use of extended family’ – ‘Victim credibility’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issues: Whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.
Facts: The female complainant and male appellant were married for 10 years and had 4 children.
The couple’s fourth child died in May 2019, approximately 6 weeks after being born prematurely. In July 2019, the couple’s remaining children were removed from their care. During an argument about child custody proceedings, the appellant slapped and attempted to suffocate the complainant. An audio recording of the incident was captured by a listening device. The appellant was found guilty following jury trial and appealed on the ground that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence. The appellant argued that the complainant lacked credibility by making submissions about inconsistencies in her evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court rejected the appellant’s submissions and affirmed the findings of the primary judge. The Court stated that ‘the recordings provided irrefutable, independent evidence that strongly supported the prosecution case’ and the complainant’s oral evidence. The Court stated that the audio recording contained ‘sounds… consistent with the impact of a hand to the face or head’, and a record of the complainant crying, complaining of being hit, and ‘pleading with the appellant not to hit her again’ [21]. Furthermore, the recording contained ‘muffled sounds consistent with the complainant being forced down into pillows or bedding’, a record of the appellant threatening to kill the complainant several times, and the complainant saying ‘get off me’ [23]. The Court found that any inconsistencies or omissions in the complainant’s evidence were minor and did not ‘justify a conclusion that the complainant was a generally untruthful or unreliable witness’. Moreover, the Court stated that complainant’s poor memory of the incident did not detract from her evidence, which ‘was strongly supported by the audio recording’ of the argument, and an audio recording in which the appellant made references to having hit the complainant [76]. Furthermore, the Court considered the fact that English was the complainant’s second language and found that a statutory declaration signed by the complainant, which stated that the appellant had not physically harmed her, had been signed ‘at the behest of her father-in-law without’ the complainant having understood them.
Turner v State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 158 (3 September 2021) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Defense of insanity’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Reasonable doubt’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Unsound mind’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant killed the female victim, his former partner with a kitchen knife at the conclusion of a pre-trial conference held at the Joondalup Courthouse in relation to legal proceedings the appellant had brought in the Magistrates Court claiming a debt from the victim. The parties had been in a relationship for 6 years and had two primary school aged children and were engaged in child custody and property settlement disputes. The circumstances and cause of the victim’s death were uncontested [1]-[15]. At trial, the appellant unsuccessfully raised the defence of unsound mind on the basis that he had suffered from a dissociative seizure when he stabbed the victim [23]. The appellant was found guilty of murder.
Grounds: The appellant appealed on the ground ‘that there was a miscarriage of justice when the learned trial Judge failed to direct or adequately direct the jury that evidence going to insanity, but not establishing it, was relevant and admissible on the issue of specific intent’ [20], [53]. This evidence ‘should have caused the jury to doubt that the appellant was capable of forming’ an ‘intent to cause death’ or ‘intent to cause bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger, or to be likely to endanger, the life of the person killed’ [51]. The evidence related to the nature of the stab wounds, the knife used, the location of the incident, and aspects of appellant’s account that were consistent with expert evidence on dissociative seizures [52].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justices Buss, Mitchell and Morrison stated that:
…the directions were adequate. Taken as a whole, the trial Judge's direction conveyed to the jury that they were to have regard to the whole of the evidence, including the evidence referred to [in the appellant’s submissions] in deciding whether the State had proven the requisite intention beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the trial Judge's direction had not done so, it would not have given rise to any miscarriage of justice… because the evidence… considered in light of other evidence led at trial, was not capable of giving rise to any reasonable doubt as to the appellant's capacity to form the requisite intent, or as to whether he did form the requisite intent [52]-[55].
Their Honours continued:
…[i]n our view, the only reasonable inference open on the whole of the evidence, considered in light of the presumption of sanity, was that the appellant was acting purposefully, with a requisite intention for murder, and he could not have killed Ms Thomas while in a dissociative seizure. No miscarriage of justice could arise from any failure of the trial Judge to give a more specific direction about the jury having regard to evidence when considering the issue of intent, when the relevant evidence was not capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant intended to kill Ms Thomas, or inflict an objectively life-threatening injury upon her [108].
Noi v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 84 (18 May 2021) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unlawful damage’
Charges: Aggravated home burglary x 1; Unlawful damage x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim were former de facto partners, and have 2 children. They had been separated for approximately 8 years. Shortly after a three-day order protecting the victim expired, the appellant attended the victim’s residence to show the victim and their son “who was the boss”. He kicked in the front door, and wilfully destroyed the television. He said: “you can get a restraining order that lasts for two years, it’s not going to make any difference”, and smashed the victim’s phone as she tried to call 000. The appellant was arrested and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 2 years immediate imprisonment, with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
A miscarriage of justice occurred when the sentencing judge “adopted the matters set out in the pre-sentence report” and found the offences indicated that the appellant “harboured feelings of entitlement consistent with being a domestic violence perpetrator”.
2.
Sentences of immediate imprisonment were manifestly excessive as to type and the sentencing judge should have imposed conditionally suspended sentences.
3.
2 years’ immediate imprisonment for the aggravated home burglary offence was manifestly excessive as to length.
Held: Application for leave to appeal on ground 1 was dismissed. Leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 was also refused and the appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: No reasonable prospect of success.
The finding the offending was “a form of domestic violence” was based on the sentencing judge’s own assessment of the circumstances, rather than the impugned pre-sentence report/feelings of entitlement.
“[45]… the sentencing judge was plainly correct to characterise the offending as a form of domestic violence. The victim was the appellant’s former de facto partner and the mother of his two children (the children being co-parented by the appellant and the victim). The appellant violently forced entry into the victim’s home, when he knew she was present, by kicking in the front door. This occurred shortly after the expiry of a police order protecting the victim. The appellant wilfully damaged her property, including a mobile phone which was a means of seeking help, while threatening that the victim obtaining a 2 year restraining order would make no difference. He was clearly using violence to intimidate his former partner with whom he shared the care of their two children. The pre-sentence report was not required to conclude that the offending was a form of domestic violence. Additionally, the report was not actually relied upon by the sentencing judge for the purposes of reaching that conclusion. Even if the pre-sentence report had been relied upon for that purpose, there would be no miscarriage of justice as, in our view, it could not reasonably be contended that the offending in this case did not constitute a form of domestic violence.”
Finding that the appellant intended to intimidate the victim was inevitable, given the admitted conduct constituting the offence.
Grounds 2 and 3: The sentences were not arguably unreasonable or plainly unjust. The offending was serious, as the sentencing judge observed:
“As I’ve explained, the offending here is serious and included forced entry and the offending being carried out with an intent to intimidate and to assert control over your ex-partner. The offending also instilled fear in her, which it was intended to do.”
JLD v The State of WA [2020] WASCA 156 (18 September 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against refusal to grant bail’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’
Charges: Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1; Common assault in circumstances of aggravation x 1; Threats to injure, endanger or harm any person x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant were married in 2015. The complainant first reported domestic violence to relevant services in October 2019. The complainant reported that the appellant was emotionally abusive, jealous and controlling, including requiring the complainant to disclose her Facebook password to him, ‘monitor[ing] and question[ing] her on every expenditure on their bank statement’ and telling the complainant there was a ‘hidden camera in the house’ [22]-[23].
In February 2020, during an argument, the appellant made threats against the complainant including: ‘[y]ou and your daughter deserved to be burned alive like the Queensland family’ and accused the complainant of infidelity.
In March 2020, the complainant was recovering from surgery at home. The appellant demanded that the complainant have sex with him. When she refused, he forced her legs open and slapped her in the face saying ‘I’m still your husband and you’re bound to do it’ before raping her. A DFV protection order was made against the appellant to protect the complainant and her daughter.
Grounds: The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant posed a significant risk of interfering with the complainant such that there were no conditions that could be imposed on bail that could sufficiently protect the complainant.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
The primary judge was entitled to receive and take into account the information in the bail risk assessment report (prepared by a family violence worker).
[69] The risk assessment report, and the information on which the report was based, raised issues of serious concern in relation to the appellant’s psychological or psychiatric state and the safety and welfare of the complainant and her daughter if the appellant were to be granted bail. There were reasonable grounds, based on that information, for apprehending that the appellant may have engaged in an escalating process of serious family violence of a sexual character, including threats of greater violence, and may attempt to interfere with the complainant as a witness.
The primary judge was correct to reject the appellant’s submission that the nature of the complainant’s employment indicated that she had support in the community and was not vulnerable:
[26(c)] Her Honour rejected the appellant’s submission that the nature of the complainant’s employment indicated that she had support in the community and was not vulnerable. Her Honour said that offences of domestic violence are not confined to offences against unemployed women at home and that serious domestic violence against women occurs at all levels of society and affects all occupations (ts 4 - 5).
…
[80] Her Honour was obliged to have regard to matters favourable to the appellant’s application, including the presumption of innocence, the absence of a prior criminal record, the fact that the appellant had not actually interfered with the complainant (or any other person) as a witness, his stable and well-paid employment, his need to work to obtain revenue to meet his expenses including the cost of legal representation for his trial, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the time that would elapse before his trial could be listed for hearing.
We are satisfied that her Honour had regard to all matters which militated in favour of a grant of bail.
However, the nature and extent of the relevant risk justified her Honour’s decision to refuse bail.
The State of Western Australia v Clark [2020] WASCA 103 (25 June 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Home burglary’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-harm’ – ‘State appeal against sentence’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Unlawful assault whilst in the place of another person without that person’s consent x 1; attempted murder committed in the course of an aggravated home burglary x 1
Case type: State appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent was convicted after trial and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on the count of attempted murder in the course of an aggravated home burglary and to 3 years’ 6 months' imprisonment for unlawful assault, to be served concurrently such that the total effective sentence was 15 years.
The respondent man and his female ex-partner had been in a relationship for approximately 10 years and had 4 children. They separated in 2017. The respondent had difficulty accepting the end of the relationship, particularly the prospect of his ex-partner dating other men. On the night before the offending the respondent fabricated an incident by texting himself purporting to be from a man who recently had sex with her. The next morning, the respondent broke in to her house and asked her to reconcile. She declined and told him that another man was in her bed (the victim). The respondent took a knife from the kitchen and threw it across the room then left.
Later than morning he returned armed with a knife, assaulted the victim and slashed him across the face causing life-threatening injuries. He also attacked the victim with a screwdriver. The respondent left the house with the knives and began to cut his own wrist with one of them.
The trial judge made the following findings of fact: (1) the respondent did not act in self-defence, but attacked the victim with dangerous weapons; (2) the respondent entered the bedroom with the intention of killing the victim, and this intention was not only momentary; (3) the attack on the victim was premeditated - after leaving the house on the first occasion, he returned with a weapon and entered the house without consent and with an intention to attack the victim; (4) the attack was persistent and violent; (5) the attack resulted in a very serious injury to the victim’s face and was likely to have endangered his life without medical treatment. The victim now has permanent facial disfigurement; (6) the respondent fled the scene and rendered no assistance to the victim; (7) the offending likely traumatised his ex-partner; (8) the respondent did not accept responsibility for his offending and sought to blame the victim; and (9) the respondent displayed limited remorse and victim empathy ([34]).
The respondent had a prior criminal record, including a conviction for domestic violence in relation to his ex-partner so was not a person of previous good character ([36]). He had used drugs since he was 18 years old, experienced marked issues with emotional arousal and regulation, and was diagnosed with ADD as a child. Further, longstanding issues with trust, impulsivity, a sense of betrayal, being made a fool of, perceived injustices and poorly developed decision making and coping skills were relevant factors in his offending. The trial judge did not accept that the respondent's health issues, including ADD and epilepsy, reduced his moral culpability for the offending or reduced the necessity for general deterrence.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence and appealed his conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence. He also submitted that the evidence against him was unreliable, inconsistent and not capable of supporting a verdict of guilty on Count 3, and that there was no corroborative evidence in relation to the complainant’s allegations as to how the strangulation occurred. The Crown argued that whilst there were weaknesses in the complainant’s evidence in terms of her reliability, those factors were fairly outlined by the trial judge in the summing up, and that the complainant’s evidence was able to be supported by other evidence.
Ground: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal, and imposed a total effective sentence was 17 years’ imprisonment ([86]). The Court considered the maximum penalty, the statutory minimum penalty, the facts, circumstances and seriousness of the offending (including the victim’s vulnerability and circumstances), the importance of appropriate punishment and personal and general deterrence as sentencing considerations, and all aggravating and mitigating factors. It held that the sentence of 15 years' imprisonment was not commensurate with the seriousness of the respondent's offending, and was substantially less than the sentencing outcome that was properly open to the trial judge ([77]).
S 283(2) Criminal Code was introduced "to ensure that burglars who commit numerous home invasions, which can involve serious violent offences, are incarcerated for longer periods; to deter such offenders; to ensure that such offenders are kept out of circulation longer; and to reflect community abhorrence of such offending" ([56]). Section 6(1) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that a sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence ([59]). The respondent’s offending was a serious example of offending of this type. The attack was premeditated, persistent, and was carried out with weapons. The respondent’s intention to kill the victim was not held only momentarily, but was present while he was inflicting the injuries. After attacking the victim, he fled the scene and rendered no assistance to him ([70]). Although his prior criminal record did not aggravate the seriousness of the offending, it indicated that he was not entitled to leniency on the ground that he was of previous good character ([72]). He did not take responsibility for his actions and denied criminal responsibility ([74]). Mitigating circumstances were limited: he had a difficult and problematic childhood, made appropriate concessions at trial which facilitated the administration of justice, showed some remorse and victim empathy, and completed a number of courses and had positively responded to his incarceration ([76]).
The State of Western Australia v Radovic 2020 WASCA 46 (8 April 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Possessing an offensive weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear to other persons x1; Attempted murder x1;
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence
Grounds: The sentence for the charge of attempted murder was manifestly inadequate having regard to:
•
The maximum penalty for the offence;
◦
The person the respondent intended to kill was a police officer;
◦
The respondent knew the victim was a police officer before he struck;
◦
The respondent came to the premises armed with a sword which he knew was sharp and which he was adept at using;
◦
The respondent used the sword to strike to victim in an vulnerable area which was likely to result in fatal injury;
◦
The offence was committed in front of witnesses; and
◦
The offence was committed in breach of the respondent’s VRO and community based order;
•
The serious nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed, including:
•
The serious impact of the offence on the victim and his family;
•
The personal circumstances of the respondent;
•
The importance of personal deterrence considering the respondent’s criminal history; and
•
The importance of general deterrence and punishment for offences of this nature.
Facts: The respondent man pleaded guilty to the charge of possessing an offensive weapon and was convicted following trial of the charge of attempted murder. He was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment for possession of an offensive weapon and 9 year’s imprisonment for attempted murder. The sentences were backdated to the day of offending and ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment. The ground of appeal relates to the sentence imposed on the charge of attempted murder.
At the time of offending the respondent was the subject of a violence restraining order (‘VRO’) which prevented the respondent from contact or communicating with his former wife (Radovic) or any of their three children. The day before the offending, the respondent made an application seeking to vary the terms of the VRO. The former wife was opposed to the changes and the matter was adjourned. The next day, the respondent attended the workplace of Radovic’s brother armed with a samurai sword. Radovic’s brother was not there at the time. Later that day, the respondent went to the unit Radovic’s brother and sister shared, banged on the door and shouted threats to kill them. The Respondent did not know that Radovic and her children lived in the unit adjacent to her siblings’. Some of the children witnessed the display and police were called to the scene. The officers arrived in a marked vehicle and attended Radovic’s unit to take the children’s statements. Radovic arrived shortly after.
The Respondent returned to the unit while police were still there with the samurai sword and began to brandish his sword in a manner that caused fear to those present, constituting the first charge, while threatening to kill them. A witnesses alerted the police and the officers left the unit and approached the respondent. The respondent rushed towards one of the officers with the sword raised, prompting the officer to discharge his taser at the respondent, to no effect. The respondent then swung the sword and forcefully struck the officer’s head. This action formed the basis of the attempted murder charge and caused two lacerations. The respondent was eventually subdued and arrested.
Judgment: The sentence for attempted murder was manifestly inadequate and the respondent was re-sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment.
None of the previous cases concerned truly comparable offending [60]. There is no tariff or usual sentencing range for a charge of attempted murder, sentences are variable and while all offences are very serious each case will turn on its own facts [61]. This was a very serious example of offending [62]. The Court found the fact that the fact that the victim was a police officer executing his duties was a "profoundly aggravating feature" [64]. They noted that "[p]olice officers are often required to place their safety at risk in carrying out their duty to protect the public. It is vital that the courts impose significant custodial sentences upon offenders who intentionally cause serious injury to police officers acting in the course of their duties" [63]. Personal and general deterrence were thought to have particular importance especially in light of the respondent’s criminal history [66]. In light of the limited mitigation available to the respondent, it was found that the sentence was "substantially less than the sentence open on a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion" [72] because of the seriousness of the offence and aggravating features.
Larsen v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 181 (15 November 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to adduce additional evidence’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction following guilty pleas’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Mandatory minimum sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Being armed in a way that may cause fear x 1; aggravated home burglary x 1; act intended to cause grievous bodily harm or prevent arrest committed in the course of an aggravated home burglary x 1.
Case type: Applications for leave to adduce additional evidence, application for leave to appeal against conviction following guilty pleas
Grounds:
1.
The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice in relation to Count 3 because he pleaded guilty to the charge without understanding its nature.
2.
There was an abuse of process by reason of the amendment of the indictment on the morning of the appellant's sentencing.
3.
The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice by failing to apply for an adjournment of the proceedings in respect of Counts 2 and 3 following the amendment of the indictment.
Facts: The appellant was convicted on his guilty pleas of being armed with a dangerous instrument, namely a knife, in circumstances likely to cause fear to any person (Count 1), aggravated home burglary (Count 2), and unlawful wounding with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do some grievous bodily harm in the course of the aggravated home burglary, contrary to s 294(1) and (2) Criminal Code (Count 3). On Count 3, the appellant was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, and received concurrent terms of imprisonment with respect to the other offences. Count 3 on the indictment was amended on the day of the appellant's sentencing. The appellant claimed that he had not been advised of the nature of the amended charge or that the amended charge carried a mandatory 15 year sentence of imprisonment.
The circumstances of the offending are as follows. In 2016, the appellant and victim met through an online website, and commenced an intimate relationship. Their relationship eventually broke down, and a violence restraining order protecting the victim was served on the appellant in late-2016. In 2017, the appellant breached the restraining order by attempting to communicate with the victim via mobile. He called the victim 243 times in an attempt to contact her. The appellant continued to breach the order by following the victim to her sister’s unit. Once inside the unit, he slashed and stabbed the victim with a knife in a frenzied and concerted attempt to seriously injure her. The victim feared that she was going to die. Family, neighbours and other members of the public intervened in the appellant’s assault, and he was eventually restrained.
Held: Applications for leave to adduce additional evidence granted; application for leave to appeal on ground 1 granted, appeal dismissed; applications for leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 dismissed. It is difficult to set aside a conviction based on a guilty plea, because there is a strong public interest in the finality of proceedings. There are 3 well-recognised circumstances in which courts may set aside guilty pleas: (1) the appellant did not understand the nature of the charge or intend to admit guilt; (2) upon the admitted facts, the appellant could not, in law, have been guilty of the offence; or (3) the guilty plea was obtained by improper inducement, fraud or intimidation ([44]-[46]). The appellant alleged that he suffered a miscarriage of justice because had he been informed that he would be liable to be sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment, he would have pleaded not guilty ([50]).
Mazza and Beech JJA rejected the submissions that the appellant did not understand the element of intent in Count 3 ([88]) and the fact that if he pleaded guilty to Count 3, he would be liable to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment ([89]-[106]). The appellant understood the advice which he was given ([97]). Their Honours also dismissed the alleged abuse of process for two reasons: first, there was no abuse in the making of an application to amend the indictment, and second, the amendment was unnecessary and did not prejudice the appellant because he was liable to the minimum term stipulated in s 294(2) regardless of whether the indictment stated that the offence was committed in the course of a home burglary ([111]). After analysing the authorities, their Honours determined that the State was not required to plead that fact in order to make the offender liable to the mandatory minimum penalty in s 294(2) ([123]). Ground 3 was found to have no reasonable prospects of success, as the appellant did not suffer a miscarriage of justice as a result of his counsel failing to seek an adjournment of the sentencing principles ([128]-[129]).
Allanson J agreed with the orders and reasons of Mazza and Beech JJA, but believed that it was not necessary to decide whether the State was required to plead that the offence in Count 3 was committed in the course of conduct that constituted an aggravated home burglary in order to make the appellant liable to the mandatory minimum penalty in s 294(2) of the Code. That the appellant failed to show that he did not understand the indictment, as amended, or the advice given to him, was sufficient reason to refuse leave to appeal on Ground 2 ([133]).
The State of Western Australia v TLP [2019] WASCA 66 (24 April 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Aggravated grievous bodily harm x 1; Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 6; Attempted aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attended his grandparents’ house. He attacked his grandmother and his half-sister. He punched his grandmother and threw her to the ground. He then attempted and committed acts of sexual penetration on his half-sister including inserting his finger and penis into her vagina and anus performing cunnilingus on her ([34]-[56]).
A circumstance of aggravation was that his relationship with both victims was a family and domestic relationship. In relation to his half-sister, another aggravating circumstance was that he threatened to kill her. In relation to his grandmother, another aggravating circumstance was that she was over the age of 60 ([27]).
The respondent pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years 6 months’ imprisonment ([1]-[2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate; whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle by not reflecting the overall criminality.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. All three Justices agreed that the respondent should be resentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment but differed on the appropriate individual sentences.
Mazza and Beech JJA identified the mitigating factors identified by the trial judge (including his pleas of guilty, remorse, prior good record, relatively young age, negative familial experiences and previous bullying) entitled the respondent to some mitigation of his sentence ([93]). However, the individual sentences for each offence were judged to be manifestly inadequate having regard to the maximum sentences and the seriousness of the conduct. Their Honours would have imposed a total sentence of 15 years, but after having a ‘last look’ to ensure that the total sentence measures the respondent’s overall criminality, determined that a sentence of 12 years was appropriate ([115]-[116]).
Buss P would have imposed a total effective sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment without requiring a ‘last look’. His Honour imposed slightly different sentences for each individual count compared to Mazza and Beech JJA ([20]-[21]).
The State of Western Australia v Yamalulu [2019] WASCA 6 (14 January 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In 2017, the respondent, a Walmajarri man, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation. The respondent was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim and the offending occurred when he was in breach of a violence restraining order which prohibited him from contacting or being within 50 metres of the victim. The respondent and the victim had been in a relationship for approximately three or four years, and had one child aged three at the time of the offence. The relationship had ended due to various incidents of domestic violence. On the night of the offence, the respondent was heavily intoxicated. He found the victim engaging in sex with his brother and subsequently violently assaulted her by throwing her to the ground and jumping on her chest, legs and head. He made attempts to hide from the police and initially gave the police a false name. The victim sustained numerous serious injuries resulting in quadriplegia. The primary judge imposed a sentence of three years and 8 months’ immediate imprisonment.
Issues: It was submitted that the sentencing judge fell into error because the sentence was manifestly inadequate on the following grounds:
•
The maximum penalty for the offence;
•
The exceptionally serious nature of the injuries;
•
The serious nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed;
•
The need for the sentence to reflect specific and general deterrence;
•
The respondent’s personal circumstances; and
•
The requirement that sentencing be consistent with the standards of sentencing set for offending of this nature.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge and re-sentenced the respondent. The Court found that the respondent committed ‘a frenzied, savage and relentless attack upon a vulnerable, unarmed and defenceless woman’ ([68]). He inflicted serious injuries despite the victim’s repeated pleas for him to stop attacking her. Their Honours also highlighted that the victim was left permanently disabled with limited prospects of improvement. The respondent had a significant prior criminal history including previous convictions for violent offending against the victim. This history of violence indicated that he should not be afforded any leniency on the ground that he was of good character. Mitigating factors included the respondent’s plea of guilty, his remorse and acceptance of responsibility and the adverse effects of his troubled upbringing ([72]). Although the ongoing effects of his childhood deprivation may have diminished his moral culpability, the consequences of his behaviour rendered him a serious threat to women with whom he is or has been in a relationship. Their Honours therefore held that the initial sentence was not merely ‘lenient’ or ‘at the lower end of the available range’, but was unreasonable and plainly unjust. A sentence of seven years six months’ imprisonment was imposed.
NPA v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 131 (2 August 2018) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social and psychological abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 5; Attempted aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1; Threat to harm x 1.
Appeal type: Defendant appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in an ‘on again, off again’ relationship. The appellant was controlling, manipulative, and required the complainant to change her mobile phone number so that her family and friends could not contact her. There were two main occasions of sexual offending. On the first occasion, at a time where they had broken up, the appellant was invited to the complainant’s house. He held the complainant down and inserted his penis into her vagina ([11]). On the second occasion, the appellant entered the house uninvited. Over the next 8 to 9 hours, the appellant repeatedly raped the complainant, choked her, and smashed a TV remote over her head ([17]-[26]).
The appellant was convicted of the charges and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 12 years’ 6 months imprisonment ([1]).
Issues: Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle by not reflecting the overall criminality.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that the sentence did reflect the overall criminality. The Court referred to serious and aggravating factors including the maximum sentences, the repeated nature of the offences, the prolonged nature of the second occasion, the appellant using degrading and insulting threats towards the complainant and the appellant’s refusal to accept the complainant’s ending of the relationship ([52]).
Salkilld v State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 168 (15 September 2017) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Remorse’
Charges: Making a threat unlawfully to kill x 1; Stealing x 1; Breach of protective bail conditions x 7; Breach of bail x 1; Breach of violence restraining order (VRO) x 8; Possession of property reasonably suspected to be stolen x 1; Fraud x 1; Breach of police order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship for about 3 weeks ([4]). The appellant had come home to find the complainant having sex with another man, which sparked a confrontation. The police issued the appellant with a police order preventing the appellant from approaching the property and complainant ([5]). The appellant returned to the property the same day and tried to force his way in ([6]). The complainant obtained a violence restraining order (VRO) against the appellant ([7]). Over a period of two days, the appellant called the complainant many times and sent text messages of a frightening nature, including threats to kill her ([15]-[19]). This conduct constituted a breach of the VRO subject of the appeal. The following day, the complainant repeatedly rode his motorcycle past the house while the complainant was inside ([21]). This conduct constituted a breach of the protective bail conditions subject of the appeal.
The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment ([45]).
Issues: There were 4 grounds of appeal:
1.
the sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment for the breach of VRO was manifestly excessive;
2.
the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment for the breach of protective bail conditions was manifestly excessive;
3.
the head sentence infringed the principle of totality; and
4.
the judge erred in finding that the appellant was not remorseful
Decision and Reasoning: All four grounds were dismissed for the following reasons.
For ground 4, the appellant bore the burden of proof in establishing remorse on the balance of probabilities ([58]). While the appellant had expressed some level of responsibility for his actions, he displayed minimal victim empathy ([59]). It was open to the sentencing judge to find that the appellant demonstrated no remorse for the impact of his offending on the victim ([57]).
For ground 1, the breach was a sustained course of conduct and the messages were intended to terrify the complainant ([63]).
For ground 2, the breach was not an isolated breach and was intended to intimidate the complainant ([72]).
For ground 3, the sentence was well within the acceptable range ([87]).
Liyanage v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112 (22 June 2017) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Social context evidence’ – ‘Social worker’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the deceased were married. The appellant killed the deceased by striking him with a mallet [1]. The appellant gave evidence that the deceased was violent and controlling, and regularly sexually assaulted her [2]. She had no memory of the night on which she killed the deceased [47]. At trial, she was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter [4]. She was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment [5].
Issues: The appellant appealed on several grounds including that the trial judge should not have excluded evidence from a social worker about domestic violence [7].
Decision and Reasoning:
All grounds of appeal were dismissed.
Social worker’s risk assessment evidence
The social worker’s risk assessment evidence was in relation to the psychological impact of prolonged exposure to domestic violence (popularly known as ‘battered women’s syndrome’). The evidence was based on a risk assessment which used actuarial risk assessment tools and clinical guides, including the ‘Power and Control Wheel’ (see Chapter 4 Context Statement) ([108]). The Court held that: the evidence did not explain the appellant’s state of mind ([123]-[129]); that the evidence did not quantify the extent of the risk, and did not specifically address the question of the risk of homicide ([130]-[148]); and the actuarial tools had not ‘been accepted by the relevant scientific community’ as defining the risk of homicide ([149]-[154]).
Social context evidence
The Court remarked that there is a body of academic literature that is supportive of ‘social context evidence’ in family violence cases ([160]). This may include evidence about the history of the parties’ relationship, the defendant’s culture, the non-psychological impediments to leaving a violent relationship ([160]-[165]). However, the Court emphasised that in order for contextual evidence to be admitted, counsel must ‘explain precisely and specifically how it is relevant to the issues which the jury are required to decide’ ([166]).
The social worker gave evidence in relation to the dangers of leaving a domestic violence relationship ([169]-[177]) and the exercise of power and control which characterises domestic and family violence ([178]-[183]). The Court held that the evidence was too general, and would not assist the jury beyond the knowledge and inferences able to be drawn by a reasonable person ([177],[183]).
McCoombe v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 227 (20 December 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Blaming the victim’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Public protection’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 4.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant, an Indigenous man, and the female partner (‘D’) had been in a domestic relationship. Counts 1-3 involved the appellant, who was jealous of the victim, punching her, strangling her, striking her with a chair in the back of the head, and striking her several times with a crate. Count 4 occurred when the appellant again became jealous of the victim. He verbally abused her and poured a kettle full of boiling water down her back, causing second and third degree burns. He then punched and kicked her. The appellant prevented the victim seeking medical treatment for several days. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on count 4, 1 year and 2 months imprisonment on counts 1 and 3, and 1 year imprisonment on count 2. The sentences on counts 1 and 4 were to be served cumulatively.
Issue/s: The sentence imposed on count 4 was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Newnes and Mazza JJA noted the circumstances in which count 4 was committed at [33]:
‘The pouring of a kettle of boiling water on D was a particularly cruel and senseless act which was plainly capable of causing very serious injuries. In the spectrum of physical injuries constituting bodily harm sustained by D, they were severe. The offence entailed an abuse of the relationship of trust which existed between the appellant and D. D was in a vulnerable position by reason of the greater physical strength of the appellant and the degree to which he had intimidated her by his past acts of violence: as to which we respectfully adopt Mitchell J's statement in Bropho v Hall [2015] WASC 50[16], which was approved by this court in Gillespie v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 216[48]’.
Their Honours referred to the fact that this was ‘part of a pattern of serious and ongoing domestic violence against D’. The appellant had no insight into his offending and sought to justify what he did by blaming the victim. His criminal history was poor and showed that he posed a high risk of further serious violent offending against domestic partners. Retribution, deterrence and public protection were important factors on sentence here (see [34]-[35]).
While acknowledging the severity of the sentence imposed on count 4, Newnes and Mazza JJA concluded that, in light of all the relevant circumstances noted above (including the appellant’s plea of guilty and his criminal history), count 4 was an offence of the ‘utmost gravity of its kind’. The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive (see [36]).
The State of Western Australia v Smith [2016] WASCA 153 (31 August 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Cruelty to animal’ – ‘Defensive injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Aggravated grievous bodily harm, aggravated unlawful wounding, assaulting a public officer, cruelty to animal.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The State appealed against a total effective sentence of 2 years and 2 months imprisonment imposed on the respondent in respect of a number of offences. The most significant offences occurred on 5 August 2015 while the respondent was subject to a suspended imprisonment order. The respondent attacked his former female de facto partner and a police officer using a claw hammer. He pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding and causing grievous bodily harm. He also pleaded guilty to assaulting a public officer and cruelty to the officer’s police dog.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence imposed for grievous bodily harm and unlawful wounding was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Buss J (Mazza JA agreeing) held that the sentence of six months imprisonment imposed for the unlawful wounding offence was manifestly inadequate. This was in light of a number of factors including: the maximum penalty (7 years imprisonment); the seriousness of the offending (including the vulnerability of the victim – his former de facto partner); the general pattern of sentencing for offences of this kind; the importance of appropriate punishment and personal and general deterrence; the respondent’s unfavourable personal circumstances and antecedents (including a prior history of family violence offences); and all mitigating factors (see [27]-[32]).
Buss J also held that 18 months imprisonment for grievous bodily harm was also manifestly inadequate in light of the seriousness of the offending (especially the injuries the victim sustained in trying to defend herself and the fact that the respondent was significantly larger and more powerful than the victim) and all other relevant factors (see [39]-[40]).
In a minority judgment, Mitchell JA also upheld the appeal. This was in light of a number of factors including that His Honour found that the respondent’s offending was a serious example of grievous bodily harm. It was particularly significant that the injury sustained by the victim was a defensive wound, the level of violence was high, the victim did not provoke the attack and she was no threat to the respondent. Mitchell JA also noted that it was a significant aggravating factor that the offence occurred in a family and domestic relationship (see [95]-[96]).
Conomy v Maden [2016] WASCA 30 (18 February 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim violence restraining order’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge/s: Stalking.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal from Supreme Court’s decision to refuse leave to appeal.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant went on six dates. The complainant made it clear she did not want to see the appellant again. The appellant repeatedly sent her emails, letters and text messages. She took steps to discourage further communication including obtaining an interim violence restraining order which prohibited contact. But the appellant persisted. The appellant was charged with a stalking offence and fined $3000. Leave to appeal against sentence and conviction was refused in the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in finding that none of the grounds of appeal against conviction had any reasonable prospect of success.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. None of the many and detailed grounds of appeal that the appellant advanced had any reasonable prospect of success. Some of the reasons for this finding included that the magistrate was correct in treating the existence and breach of the interim violence restraining order as relevant to the complainant’s subjective fear and apprehension and assessing whether the communication could reasonably be expected to cause fear or apprehension in the complainant (See ‘Primary Ground 5B/Appeal Ground 6’ [96]).
Additionally, the appellant argued that the objective element of the stalking offence was not satisfied because he could not reasonably have expected his actions to have intimidated a normal person. However, the question was not what the appellant could reasonably have expected but rather whether the manner of his communication with complainant could reasonably be expected to cause her fear or apprehension. Further, the magistrate did not give inordinate weight to the evidence of the complainant because the complainant’s evidence was central to questions of whether the communications occurred, and whether the manner of these communications subjectively caused her fear and apprehension (See ‘Primary Grounds 9A and 9B/Appeal Grounds 9 and 10’ [109] - [110]).
Finally, the magistrate did not err in assessing the complainant to be a reliable witness and did not err in refusing to permit the appellant to ask certain questions. The appellant, an unrepresented litigant, had a ‘tendency to become distracted by, and fixated on, issues not significant to the question of his guilt of the charged offence’. The appellant was entitled to ask questions of the complainant relevant to matters in issue at trial. However, the magistrate had a responsibility to ensure the appellant did not abuse this right by the manner and length of his cross-examination of the complainant (See ‘Primary Ground 16/Appeal Ground 12’ [115]-[118]).
‘The paramount responsibility which a judicial officer presiding over a criminal trial owes to the community is ensuring that the accused person receives a fair trial. However, the judicial officer also owes other concurrent responsibilities to the community. In a case such as the present they include a responsibility to see that the accused does not utilise the proceedings as a vehicle for harassment of the alleged victim. The exercise of that responsibility will require vigilance in confining an accused person to asking questions which are relevant to the issues raised for the court's determination’ (See ‘Primary Ground 16/Appeal Ground 12’ [117]).
Conomy v Western Australian Police [2016] WASCA 31 (18 February 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal from Supreme Court’s decision to refuse leave to appeal.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of breaching a violence restraining order by sending three text messages to the complainant. He was arrested and participated in a video-recorded interview. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against conviction and sentence was refused.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in refusing to grant leave to appeal against conviction. The appellant was self-represented. The grounds were interpreted as raising issues including that:
1.
The DVDs of the recorded police interview should not have been admitted in circumstances where the discs served to the appellant were labelled differently and were blank.
2.
The magistrate erred by basing his decision on the evidence of the recorded interview which was ‘not worthy of any significant weight’.
3.
The evidence was not capable of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the interim violence restraining order was still in force, and had not been amended, at the time of breach.
4.
The primary judge’s reasons were inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In relation to ground 1 above, there was no substance to the appellant’s allegations. The labelling of the DVDs was immaterial and even if the discs were blank, the appellant made it clear at trial that he was aware of their contents. There was no issue about the authenticity of the recording, and no challenge as to its fairness (See [8]). Second, the magistrate based his decision on all the evidence before him and indicated that, even without reference to the recorded interview, there was a compelling case the appellant breached the order (See [9]). Third, it was open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the interim order was still in force at the time of breach. It was implicit in the complainant’s evidence that the interim order was still in force. The appellant made no suggestion to any witness in cross-examination that the interim order was not still in force. Statements in the recorded interview reflected the appellant’s understanding that the order was still in force. Nothing in the evidence suggested the order had been cancelled or amended (See [12]). Finally, the primary judge’s reasons clearly explained why he concluded that none of the grounds had any reasonable prospects of success (See [13]).
The State of Western Australia v Stoeski [2016] WASCA 16 (19 January 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder (two counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The first victim was the respondent’s long term partner. He had an unfounded and delusional belief in her infidelity. He killed her by asphyxiation in their bedroom. After killing her he bound her head and neck with multiple layers of duct tape and wrote derogatory remarks across her forehead. The second victim was the respondent’s long-term male friend and associate. He had an unfounded and delusional belief that his friend was spreading rumours about him. He stabbed him three times and struck him repeatedly to the head with a chrome vehicle component. The respondent had a history of mental illness and had ingested a substantial amount of illicit drugs in the period leading up to the offences. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 21 years for each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole periods were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
The Court held that these murders were at the upper end of the scale of seriousness. The killings were unprovoked and the first victim was extremely vulnerable as she was smaller in stature than the respondent and isolated in her bedroom. The respondent treated the first victim in a degrading manner and he made no attempt to seek medical assistance. The killing has deprived their children of their parents (see further at [153]). Mitigating factors included his plea of guilty, genuine remorse and good prospects of rehabilitation. However, these mitigating factors were outweighed by the brutal and sustained nature of the attack and the respondent’s entrenched drug abuse. The appellant’s rehabilitation prospects had to be understood in the context of the drug abuse and the difficulty of predicting rehabilitation progress for offenders of that kind. As such, the main sentencing considerations were just punishment and personal and general deterrence. The non-parole period on each count was increased to 27 years.
The State of Western Australia v Churchill [2015] WASCA 257 (23 December 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Male victims’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence.
Facts: The deceased was in a domestic relationship with the respondent. The day prior to the murder, the respondent approached the deceased with a broken bottle and threatened to kill him. The deceased told the respondent he wanted to leave her. The next day the respondent threw bottles at the deceased, threatened to kill him, and chased him wielding a bottle. Later, the respondent and the deceased drank alcohol together. An argument broke out in which the both the respondent and the deceased threatened to kill each other. At some time between that night and the next morning, both the respondent (who was intoxicated) and the deceased returned home. The respondent stabbed the deceased with two knives and assaulted him with an electric frypan, causing his death. In total, there were 14 stab injuries and 26 incised injuries. The respondent cleaned up the premises, changed out of her clothes, and went to a neighbour’s place saying she had found the deceased injured. ‘[The deceased] had been the victim of sustained physical abuse at the hands of the respondent, who the sentencing judge described as bigger and stronger than the 'weak and vulnerable' [deceased]. This case confirms the experience of those who work in the criminal justice system in this State that, particularly in alcohol and/or other drug fuelled dysfunctional relationships and communities, it is not uncommon for a male to be a victim of domestic violence’ (See [15]). The respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years.
Issue/s: The non-parole period was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent resentenced to a non-parole period of 21 years. The nature and extent of the respondent’s very significant prior record of violent offending underscored the need to give significant weight to the sentencing objectives of punishment, protection of the public and personal deterrence (See [35]). The circumstances of the respondent’s offence placed it at the high end of the scale of seriousness of the offence of murder – she intended to kill the deceased, engaged in a ‘sustained, prolonged, frenzied attack’, used multiple weapons, and went to considerable lengths to cover up the murder. Her long standing alcoholism contributed to the crime. However, of greater significance, was ‘her inability to control her volcanic eruptions of anger, and the regularity and normalisation of her use of violence’ (See [37]). The only mitigating factor was the respondent’s disadvantaged and dysfunctional upbringing.
Rimington v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 102 (29 May 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Criminal damage by fire’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Criminal damage by fire (4 counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had recently separated from his wife and had commenced discussion relating to the distribution of assets. The appellant lit three fires. Count 1 related to the destruction by fire of the contents of business premises effectively owned and controlled by the appellant and his former wife. Count 2 related to damage caused by the same fire to a neighbouring unit and common property. Count 3 concerned a separate fire causing extensive damage to an investment property owned by the appellant's former wife. Count 4 related to a third fire causing extensive damage to the former family home and a car.’ The total damage was worth approximately $1.5 million. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment, taking into account various orders of concurrency and cumulation.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the sentencing judge sufficiently took into account the appellant’s depression as a mitigating factor.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge placed excessive weight on general deterrence.
3.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, as it infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
A psychiatrist’s report expressed the view that the appellant’s acute depression and adjustment problems relating to his separation mitigated against the seriousness of his actions and affected his capacity for sound judgment and self-control. The appellant’s intoxication was also relevant (see at [30]). While the sentencing judge made a factual error by concluding that the appellant was taking anti-depressants, this error was not material. The sentencing judge expressly referred to the psychiatric report, and more specifically, the error did not affect the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s good prospects of rehabilitation.
2.
The sentencing judge observed that general deterrence was the dominant sentencing factor in arson cases. The appellant submitted that this statement was in error because ‘no one purpose of sentencing can be said to have the dominant role’ as sentencing requires a ‘sensitive approach’ which involves weighing the purposes of punishment and all the relevant circumstances of each case (see at [41]). Beech J (with whom Buss JA and Mazza JA agreed) rejected this argument and confirmed that there is a consistent line of authority that general deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration in cases of arson.
3.
The Court found that this was a serious example of arson because the appellant lit three fires over 1 hour, the offending involved a degree of preparation and the offending was founded on the appellant’s anger towards his former wife. The offences were founded on the appellant's anger towards his ex-wife and his intention was to destroy the properties so as to defeat her claim to them. That context aggravated the offending. The sentencing judge did take into account various mitigating factors including the appellant’s remorse, good character, good rehabilitation prospects, low risk of re-offending and the fact he was suffering from depression when he committed the offences. Furthermore, the sentencing judge did consider issues of totality by ordering the sentences on counts 1 and 2 to be concurrent because they related to the same fire and ordered that the sentences on counts 3 and 4 be partially concurrent. As such, the Court found that the sentence imposed did bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offending.
X v Y [2015] WASCA 70 (13 April 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Expert witness’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Social worker’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The appellant father and respondent mother were in a de facto relationship. They separated when the appellant attacked the respondent’s father. The Family Court of Western Australia made parenting orders granting the appellant no time with the children. The appeal centred upon the report of a ‘single expert witness’, a social worker. The expert’s report stated that the children did not wish to spend time with the father due to his violence towards their grandfather and his verbal abuse towards the children themselves ([25]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to take into account relevant matters and finding that the single expert witness was qualified as a witness.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court summarised the principles applicable to Family Court appeals at [61]-[64]. In relation to the evidence of the social worker, the Court held that it was open to the magistrate to admit the evidence: “[although] he was not a clinical psychologist, the nature of his expertise was known to the parties when the court ordered, by consent, that he be the single expert witness in the proceedings” [126].
Oxenham v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 30 (18 February 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent, aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (aggravating factor – the appellant was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a de facto relationship for 8 years. After they separated, his former partner commenced a new relationship with a work colleague and the appellant reacted poorly. The appellant attended his former partner’s home and pleaded to recommence the relationship. The appellant went with his former partner to their children’s bedroom. In the presence of their children, he demanded to see her phone. He read through her text massages, threatened to kill her and repeatedly kicked her in the shins. He then used his former partner’s phone to lure her new partner to the house. When her new partner arrived, the appellant attacked him by punching him in the face and continued to kick and punch him while he lay on the ground, again in the presence of their child. He dragged her new partner outside. He taunted his former partner and children to look at the injuries that he was inflicting. The appellant forced his former partner to kiss her new partner while he was unresponsive on the ground and used substantial force to do this. He photographed her new partner’s injuries and sent it to her friend. The injuries sustained by his former partner were relatively superficial, but her new partner sustained extremely serious injuries. The appellant had favourable antecedents with no relevant criminal history and was regarded generally as a person of good character. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for both offences (six years’ imprisonment for the GBH offence committed against the new partner and 18 months’ imprisonment for the assault offence committed against his former partner).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the offence imposed for GBH was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The attack against his former partner’s new partner was extremely serious and left permanent injuries. There were elements of premeditation and deception. The attack was not provoked and committed in the presence of children. The offending was at the upper end of the scale of criminality for offences of a similar character. See in particular at [34] where Martin CJ (Buss JA and Mazza JA agreeing) noted at [34], ‘The breakdown of personal relationships is an inevitable aspect of contemporary society, and often causes anger, frustration and jealousy. (The appellant) responded to those emotions with particular brutality…The community rightly expects the courts to denounce conduct of this kind in the clearest of terms, and to impose a sentence which reflects the community's abhorrence of serious offences of domestic violence of this character.’
2.
The appellant submitted that the total effective sentence of 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment did not bear a proper relationship to the criminality involved in the two offences. Martin CJ (Buss JA and Mazza JA agreeing) held that while both offences were related and stemmed from the same motive, they were separate and required distinct punishments. In those circumstances, and also considering the various mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Court held that the sentence was not disproportionate to the overall criminality involved.
Hill v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 17 (22 January 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Accident’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and the deceased knew each other for 25 years prior to her death. At one stage, the relationship broke down (at which point the deceased obtained a restraining order against the appellant) but it later improved to the extent that the appellant began to live in a bus on land nearby the deceased’s property. Following a series of escalating arguments (involving the appellant doing things such as throwing objects at the deceased and threatening to kill her), a neighbour found the deceased’s body.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge’s directions to the jury with respect to the defence of accident (under section 23B of the Criminal Code (WA)) were adequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Hall J (with whom McLure P and Mazza JA agreed) held that the trial judge made sufficient reference to the evidence of a medical expert. He adequately explained that the jury must have regard to that evidence in considering the severity of the injuries to determine whether the death was foreseeable for the purposes of the defence of accident. In considering that defence, the jury was also obliged to consider the whole of the evidence including that the appellant knew the deceased was vulnerable and the previous history of violence and threats of violence (see at [62]).
Hansen v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 229 (11 December 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault causing bodily harm, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for an extension of time to appeal and appeal against sentence.
Facts: One of the victims, Ms Lee, was in a family and domestic relationship with the appellant, an Indigenous man. She had previously been in a relationship with the other victim, Mr Hill, and they had 2 children together. Count 1 related to an occasion where Ms Lee, Mr Hill and their children were out walking. The appellant, who had followed them, struck Mr Hill with a stick out of anger and jealousy. Mr Hill suffered bruising to his elbow, a fracture to the ulna bone, bruising to the back and loin, and a laceration and bleeding in and around the kidney. Count 3 occurred when the appellant and Ms Lee were in Ms Lee’s bedroom and he asked her for sex. She refused and the appellant punched her seven to ten times to her face with a closed fist. Ms Lee underwent surgery to repair a fractured eye socket and sustained ongoing psychological trauma. In sentencing, to accommodate the totality principle, His Honour reduced the individual sentence he would have imposed on each offence by six months. The total effective sentence was 6 years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: The total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle namely, ‘the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally’ (See [22]).
Decision and Reasoning: The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed. The total effective sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment properly reflected the appellant’s overall criminality having regard to all the circumstances of the case (See [27]). These offences were serious examples of their type. The offences were ‘brutal, sustained and completely without justification’. The victims were defenceless and the injuries they sustained were significant. In count 1, the appellant used a weapon capable of causing serious harm. In count 3, the appellant beat his domestic partner who was in bed and therefore vulnerable. The sentencing judge was correct to emphasise the need for general deterrence. There was very little that could be said by way of mitigation (See [24]).
McCardle v McCardle [2014] WASCA 129 (15 July 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appellant a legal practitioner’ – ‘Application for violence restraining order’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Family law matters’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’
Appeal type: Extension of time within which to commence the appeal, appeal against decision dismissing application for violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant originally obtained a restraining order against the respondent in Adelaide in March 2010 which expired in March 2012. The appellant then obtained an ex parte interim violence restraining order (VRO) in Western Australia on 11 July 2012. This was obtained on the basis that the appellant had received telephone calls from the respondent on at least 33 occasions in mid-2012. Prior to final orders being given in relation to the ex parte VRO, the respondent made an application to strike out proceedings on the basis that they were an abuse of process in light of the determination of family law matters in the Federal Magistrates Court. The Magistrate made orders cancelling the July 2012 order in March 2013.
In June 2013, the appellant appealed to the District Court. The respondent brought an interlocutory application seeking orders to have the appeal struck out. The respondent’s application was allowed. His Honour noted, amongst other things, that the appellant (herself a legal practitioner) had chosen not to seek a fresh restraining order on the basis of any actions since July 2012. There was no suggestion that the respondent had telephoned the appellant since July 2012. It was accepted that the original grounds of the 2012 interim VRO were ‘stale’ and ‘sufficiently minor’ so as to not justify the costs of the appeal.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant should be given an extension of time within which to commence the appeal against the decision of the District Court?
Decision and Reasoning: The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was dismissed. In terms of prospects of success, it was arguable that the judge erred by ‘understating the degree of domestic and family violence' evidenced by the 'blocked number' telephone calls, the alleged verbal abuse of the appellant from the respondent in the call she answered, and the failure to take into account incidents which allegedly occurred after July 2012’ (See [34]). However, it was nevertheless not in the interests of justice to grant the extension of time. The Court of Appeal was unable to make orders for the application for a VRO to be heard by a magistrate. Instead the matter would have to be returned to the District Court for a rehearing of that appeal (See [39]-[40]). The length of delay that would result was not minimal. The appellant’s stated reasons for not filing an appeal notice on time were unsatisfactory for a legal practitioner (See [37]). Further, there was no impediment to the appellant seeking a fresh violence restraining order, particularly in relation to any events since July 2012 (See [41]).
Baron v Walsh [2014] WASCA 124 (18 June 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Act of abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence not previously adduced’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Legally available procedures’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Appeal Type: Appeal from the District Court which upheld the respondent’s appeal against the imposition of a violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship for six months. The respondent sent offensive text messages which led the appellant to apply for an interim violence restraining order (VRO). This was made a final order. The respondent successfully appealed to the District Court against the imposition of the order. The District Court judge held that the text messages from the respondent to the appellant did not contain any threats, and, more specifically, ‘threats to take, and/or the pursuit of, “legally available procedures” were incapable of constituting acts of abuse’ (under s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997) (see at [46]). The only messages capable of constituting acts of abuse were four offensive text messages, which were not repeated and the appellant apologised for them.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the respondent’s use of ‘legally available procedures’ is capable of amounting to an act of abuse within the meaning of s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997.
2.
Whether the District Court judge erred by admitting affidavit evidence that was not adduced or admitted at the final restraining order hearing in the Magistrates’ Court.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
The respondent’s use of ‘legally available procedures’ included making complaints to the appellant’s employer’s regulator (she was employed as a nurse) regarding her professionalism, commencing minor claim proceedings, making multiple interlocutory applications in the VRO application and making a perjury complaint to police. McLure P, (with whom Mazza JA and Chaney J agreed), noted that the use of legally available procedures, of itself, will not normally amount to an ‘act of abuse’. However, if legally available procedures are used or threatened with an improper intent or purpose, this could amount to a tort (such as malicious prosecution or abuse of process) or a criminal offence. Her Honour gave the following examples at [63] –
‘a threat made with intent to cause or compel a person to settle an action is a criminal offence under s 338A of the Code: Tracey v The Queen [1999] WASCA 77[11] - [16]. See also The Queen v Jessen [1996] QCA 449; (1996) 89 A Crim R 335. Further, the commencement or maintenance of legal proceedings for an improper collateral purpose is a tort: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34;(1992) 174 CLR 509; Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 773; (1999) 163 ALR 744. A knowingly frivolous and vexatious claim is also an abuse of process.’ Her Honour went on at [65] – ‘To threaten and/or take detrimental action against a person to achieve a collateral outcome is improper (at least) and is to behave in a manner that is intimidating, even if the action involves a person availing himself of legally available procedures. I do not intend to suggest that this is an exhaustive statement of behaviour that is intimidating.’
The Court held that the Magistrate was correct in finding that the respondent’s behaviour of using legally available procedures was intimidating and noted that the excuses given by the District Court judge for the respondent’s behaviour ‘underscore the failure to recognise the impropriety of the respondent’s conduct’ (See at [68]). The respondent’s conduct therefore amounted to an ‘act of abuse’.
2.
This ground was also upheld. The relevant evidence concerned the relationship of the parties and what the appellant could have reasonably expected from the break up. Its use led the District Court judge to conclude that the purpose of the Act is not to ‘protect a person from the fallout of a failed relationship’. This was incorrect, the purpose of the Act is, ‘to protect people from acts of abuse in appropriate circumstances whether or not they occur in the fallout of a failed relationship’ (see at [78]). This evidence was used notwithstanding that it was not adduced at the final hearing in the Magistrates’ Court and it was not substantially litigated by the parties at the hearing. The judge was in error in using this evidence.
Cramphorn v Bailey [2014] WASCA 60 (21 March 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: Assault, breach of police order.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The prosecution case was that the appellant and her de facto partner, the complainant, were travelling in a vehicle when the appellant punched the complainant in the mouth. The appellant stopped the vehicle in the middle of the road and a further altercation occurred between them in which the appellant clawed at the complainant’s face. Police issued the appellant with a 24-hour police order which the appellant breached by sending the complainant two abusive text messages. The appellant was convicted after trial in the Magistrates Court of unlawful assault, and breaching a police order. At trial, the appellant was entitled to the protection of a previously imposed violence restraining order issued against the complainant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court but the appeal was dismissed. At every stage of proceedings, the appellant represented herself.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the trial in the Magistrates Court was unfair to the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. Although the proceedings before the magistrate were not in respect of the violence restraining order issued against the complainant, the existence of the order was relevant to the proceedings because there was likely to be considerable antipathy between the appellant and the complainant, and there was a risk that the presence might intimidate the unrepresented appellant (See [88]). The trial posed difficulties for the unrepresented appellant, particularly with respect to her having to directly cross-examine the complainant (See [90]). However, having regard to the whole of the trial record, the trial was conducted fairly. The magistrate explained the trial process to the appellant. He controlled the complainant and the appellant, intervening when required during cross-examination and when the complainant interrupted the appellant’s evidence (See [91]). Despite arguing to the contrary, the appellant was permitted by the magistrate to cross-examine the complainant about the history of the domestic violence relationship. She declined to do so (See [92]). Further, the appellant was not entitled to use an intermediary for cross-examination. These provisions are only for the benefit of the person being cross-examined (See [104]-[106]).
Beins v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 54 (12 March 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Parity’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant had been in an off and on relationship with the male complainant. Prior to this, the appellant had been in a relationship with her co-offender. The appellant and the complainant had been arguing and the argument became violent. The appellant contacted her co-offender and they formed a plan to assault the complainant. They went to the complainant’s premises and the appellant’s co-offender struck the complainant with a pole approximately 15 times. Amongst other findings, the sentencing judge found that the appellant was not the victim of entrenched domestic violence and could not claim any degree of diminished responsibility. Her co-offender had a history of severe domestic violence against him, his brother and their mother. The appellant was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months’ immediate imprisonment. Her co-offender was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the sentence breached the parity principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. McLure P held that the totality of sentencing considerations could not justify the imposition of different types of sentence. The offenders were broadly comparable in terms of their personal circumstances, involvement with the police, and remorse and rehabilitation. McLure P noted that the sentencing judge cast the appellant as a ‘siren’ who manipulated and knowingly misused her ‘childlike’ co-offender and found that this was not justified by the evidence. The sentencing judge incorrectly concluded that the co-offender’s rehabilitation required the incarceration of the appellant (See [48]). Pullin JA also upheld the appeal but for different reasons. His Honour found that the existence of extraordinary disparity in sentences breached the parity principle (See [82]). Mazza JA also provided his own reasons. Mazza JA noted that the disparity in sentences could not be rationally explained by differences in the circumstances of offending or of the offenders. The offences were not markedly different, their personal circumstances were similar, and both were amenable to programmatic intervention for their therapeutic needs (See [113]-[116]).
Rosewood v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 21 (29 January 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a domestic relationship with the deceased for 12 months prior to the offence and had a 3-month old child. On the day of the offence, the appellant and deceased were drinking alcohol and an argument occurred. The appellant then stabbed the deceased in the chest. The deceased turned away and the appellant stabbed her twice in the back. The appellant witnessed ‘chronic and acute’ (see at [7]) domestic violence in his childhood. He had several prior domestic violence convictions against the deceased and other partners. The appellant was convicted on a plea of guilty. The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant was a high risk of violence in respect of intimate partners and a moderate risk in respect of other people. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. McLure P (with whom Newnes JA and Mazza JA agreed) held that this was a serious example of offending of this kind. The deceased was unarmed. While the attack was impulsive and not premediated, this meant that the deceased and other people in the house had limited ability to defend her. The offence was committed in front of the deceased’s family including young children. In relation to intoxication, her Honour noted at [15] – ‘The fact that the appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time is not mitigatory. The sentencing objectives of personal and general deterrence weigh heavily in relation to acts of domestic violence that are committed when drunk or sober.’
Tunney v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 286 (17 December 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Trespass’ – ‘Wilfully and unlawful destroying or damaging property’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm, wilfully and unlawfully destroying or damaging property, aggravated burglary, breach of a police order, trespass, breach of bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in an ‘on and off’ domestic relationship with the victim for about three years. The aggravated assault charge involved the appellant standing over the victim who was on the floor of their living room. The appellant kicked her in the groin, which caused her to cry out and curl up into the foetal position in agony. The damaging property offence occurred the next day. While driving, the victim noticed the appellant was following her in his truck. He called her and sent her text messages as she drove to a shopping centre. She entered the shopping centre. When she returned to her car she found that two tyres had been deflated.
Some months later, the victim arrived home to find the appellant inside. He began shouting at her. She fled and the appellant took a bag containing her passport and other belongings. He was issued with a 72-hour police order. He then breached that order the next day by making numerous phone calls to the victim at her work. The trespass charge involved the appellant entering the victim’s home using a set of keys that he had cut without the victim’s knowledge. The aggravated burglary charge occurred when the victim arrived home, again finding the appellant in the house. He attempted to kiss her and refused to leave. At one point, the appellant threw her onto a bed, ripped a necklace from her neck, struck her to the face and hit her on the head with his knees. Later the appellant entered into a bail undertaking in relation to these matters, which he breached by contacting the victim and asked her to look after him because he was sick. He insisted that she take him back to her home, where he remained until he was taken into custody. The total effective sentence imposed was 3 years 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence infringed the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court found that notwithstanding the appellant’s ‘favourable’ antecedents, he was not truly remorseful, and considerations of personal and general deterrence remain important. The offending was sustained and designed to intimidate the victim physically and psychologically. He was not deterred from further offending notwithstanding the imposition of police orders and bail conditions. As such, the Court held that the total effective sentence did bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved, having regard to all the relevant circumstances. A substantial period of imprisonment was required.
Silva v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 278 (4 December 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage to the deceased was marred by ongoing arguments. There had been prior minor assaults. The appellant then discovered the deceased was having an affair. The appellant became obsessed about the deceased’s fidelity, was jealous of her friendships with work colleagues and he demanded that she resign from her employment, which she refused. The appellant became aware that the deceased remained friends with the man with whom she had an affair. Before her death, the deceased took leave from work and the appellant monitored her phone calls and prohibited her from returning to work. His unhappiness with the deceased was increased because of her failure to participate in the family’s morning prayer ritual. The appellant then killed the deceased in the living room by hitting her on the right side of a head on at least three occasions with a hammer that he had bought that morning. Mitigating factors included the appellant’s early plea of guilty and good character. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 17-year non-parole period.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Buss JA (with whom Mazza JA agreed) found that the seriousness of the offence was demonstrated by (among other things), the brutality and repetitive nature of the attack, the appellant’s intent to kill the deceased, the fact the appellant confronted the deceased when she was alone and vulnerable and the history of domestic violence inflicted by the appellant on the deceased (see further at [40]). The Court upheld the following statement by the sentencing judge in relation to general deterrence –
‘The law is clear that disputes between partners, no matter how emotionally hurtful, must be resolved peacefully. People must understand that marriage is not a licence to treat a spouse as a chattel and violence in the course of a marriage breakdown will be met with deterrent sentences. It is obvious that the minimum term must recognise the high value that the Western Australian community places on a person's life and a person's right to live without violence from their partner. Domestic violence continues to be a significant cause of violent death and serious injury in our community. The courts must impose sentences which continue to reflect the community's abhorrence and intolerance of such offending, particularly where it results in the death of the victim’ (see at [42]).
The State of Western Australia v Naumoski [2013] WASCA 215 (18 September 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and the victim were married and had a young daughter. Their relationship ended. When the respondent returned to the victim’s unit to retrieve his property, the victim called police due to his behaviour. He left before police arrived. He then returned to the unit. The victim again called police who issued the respondent with a 24-hour move-on notice. The following evening, the respondent entered the unit using his own key, confronted the victim, struck her on the top of her head, placed his hands around her neck then stabbed her multiple times. The victim managed to exit the unit while the respondent chased after her and continued to stab her in the back. The victim almost died and suffered extremely serious injuries and is disfigured for life. She lost the use of one hand and use of her thumb on the other hand and could no longer look after her daughter on her own. The mental effects were also severe – she became depressed, highly dependent on others, unemployed and ‘cannot stand the sight of herself’ (see at [11]). The appellant had a previous conviction for violence and the sentencing judge noted that he was intoxicated at the time of the offence and had a propensity for violence whilst intoxicated. He was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. McLure P (with whom Buss JA and Mazza JA agreed) noted that the offending was premediated, with the respondent having waited more than an hour for the victim to return home. He acted ‘out of hate related to his wife’s attempt to take control of her own life’ (see at [21]). See in particular at [25]-[41] where McLure P provided summaries of all comparable cases. Her Honour described this offending as ‘high on the scale of seriousness just short of the worst category’, noting its premeditated nature, ferocity, the nature and extent of the harm and the tragic effect on the victim. A further aggravating factor was that the respondent intended not only to do her grievous bodily harm but to disfigure her body. This made the sentence manifestly inadequate notwithstanding the mitigating factors and the respondent was resentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with no change of parole eligibility.
Her Honour discussed the prevalence of domestic violence and the fact that is often connected with conduct in a relationship that, ‘understandably generates high emotion, volatility and associated loss of control.’ Notwithstanding, the fact that violence occurs in a domestic relationship is not a mitigating factor (see at [43]). As to whether it would be an aggravating factor, her Honour stated at [41]– ‘I am not persuaded that the sentencing subtleties are appropriately conveyed by characterising the domestic relationship (whether past, existing or anticipated) setting as itself aggravating the offending’ and at [43], ‘Deterrence is called for in relation to all offences involving serious violence, domestic and otherwise.’
Abfahr v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 87 (5 April 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Failing to report car accident’ – ‘Failing to stop after car accident’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Orders affecting children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, failing to stop after a car accident, failing to report a car accident to police.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the victim for 16 years. They had two children. Both parties claimed to have been the subject of threats and violence by the other. The appellant was served with an interim violence restraining order. He received a call from his children who said that their mother was not home and requested food. While claiming to be driving to a supermarket to purchase food for his children, he saw the victim at a bus stop. Once the victim had alighted from the bus, the appellant drove onto the footpath and struck her with the middle of the bonnet. She was thrown into the air and landed on the pavement, causing serious injuries. He continued without stopping – he claimed he saw her attempt to get up and assumed she was okay. A psychologist’s report indicated that the appellant showed no empathy or remorse, and that rehabilitation would be difficult. Another psychologist’s report indicated that the victim had significant mental health issues and serious difficulties in providing adequate care for her children. A total effective sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in failing to suspend the term of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that in not suspending the term of imprisonment, the trial judge erroneously concluded that the inability of the victim to care for her children was due to the appellant’s conduct. This argument was rejected. The trial judge’s conclusions were that the victim was unable to care for her children due to her mental illness and that the appellant also contributed to her incapacity because of his having caused her grievous bodily harm.
2.
In noting the ‘egregious’ nature of the offending, Buss JA (with whom McLure P and Mazza JA agreed) held that the sentence was appropriate. Punishment and deterrence (both personal and general) were the relevant considerations, in the absence of any significant mitigating factors and the appellant’s lack of remorse and prospects of rehabilitation. While the sentence will cause the children to suffer ‘hardship and distress’ (see at [80]), his Honour was not persuaded that this amounted to an ‘extreme or exceptional case’ or that the hardship would be severe enough to warrant a lesser sentence.
McLaughlin v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 204 (12 October 2012) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possess weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, making a threat to kill (two counts), arson, possessing a weapon.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: After consuming alcohol, an argument between the appellant and his current partner ensued. He threw an ashtray which hit her in the back. He used a knife to cut the cord to a vacuum cleaner that she was using. Later, he spat on, grabbed and shook her. He then used the knife to smash a coffee table and stab walls while threatening to kill her, her son and others. He prevented her from leaving the lounge room. She was fearful of him and remained awake all night. After being arrested and released on bail for these offences (assault and threat to kill), the appellant broke into the home of his estranged wife, ignited a lounge chair and again made threats to kill by leaving voice messages on her mobile phone. The appellant had a history of violent offending against his partner and his estranged wife. A psychologist described him as having ‘deep seated rejection fears’ attributable to his traumatic childhood. The total effective sentence imposed was four years eight months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The Court noted the extremely serious nature of arson and the fact that the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) provided a summary of sentencing patterns for arson at [48]-[58]. The fire had a potential to destroy the house. His Honour also noted the threats to kill against his partner, ‘occurred in the context of a persistent course of conduct designed to denigrate and humiliate (her) and cause her intense fear and anxiety’ (See at [68]). As such, the sentence was not disproportionate.
Wongawol v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 222 (17 October 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On the day of the offence, the appellant (an Aboriginal man) was intoxicated and had been smoking cannabis. He returned home and an argument ensued relating to his partner’s confession that she had been ‘sexually misbehaving’ (see at [4]). The appellant became angry and attacked her with a knife. The blows were struck mainly in the region of her legs. The sentencing judge held that the fact he mainly stabbed her in the legs, as opposed to, (for example) in the chest was not particularly relevant to establishing the requisite intention – the appellant struck a considerable number of blows randomly with the intention of causing serious harm. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge failed to recognise the significance of the stabbing being in the legs when making conclusions with respect to the intention with which the blows were inflicted.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that he was a traditional full-blood tribal Aboriginal man and was familiar with the concept of spearing or stabbing in the legs as punishment. The sentencing judge found that the appellant intended to hurt the deceased severely by punishing her for sexual misbehaviour. In the past, the appellant had self-harmed by stabbing himself and the deceased in the thigh. The appellant submitted that this was relevant to the sentencing judge’s conclusion with respect to intention. This argument was rejected – McLure P (with whom Buss JA and Mazza J agreed) held that the number and distribution of the wounds ‘reflect the frenzied nature of the appellant's attack on the deceased and more than adequately support the sentencing judge's finding’ (see at [30]).
2.
The appellant had a long history of violent offending. He was described as being ‘aimless’ and as having a problem of habitual intoxication and use of cannabis. The appellant submitted that the sentencing judge placed too much weight on these ‘lifestyle issues’ and grossly dysfunctional background. This argument was rejected – a psychologist’s report confirms that the appellant uses violence in order to solve conflict. Further, his substance abuse contributed to his offending and he had limited insight into his problems. His prospects of rehabilitation were poor. As McLure P noted at [39] –
‘This is a case where the protection of the community in which the appellant lives and both personal and general deterrence are very weighty sentencing considerations. The incidence of alcohol and drug fuelled violence within Aboriginal communities is distressingly high. A new generation of children are scarred. The cycle continues. Having regard to all relevant sentencing factors, there is no merit in the claim that the minimum period of 14 years is manifestly excessive.’
Evans v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 182 (5 September 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: During an altercation, the male appellant slashed his fiancee's arm with a knife (the first injury). Realising the seriousness of the injury, the appellant dropped the knife and applied a tourniquet to her arm. The deceased further goaded the appellant to kill her. The appellant slashed her twice in the neck, causing her death (the second and third injuries). The deceased was a person who frequently consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. During the months prior to the death, the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was characterised by frequent incidents of domestic violence, with the appellant usually being the victim. A few hours after the killing, the appellant was taken into custody and admitted to killing the deceased in a recorded interview. In the 8 years prior to the killing and thereafter, the appellant was admitted to psychiatric hospitals. It was accepted that he suffered psychotic episodes from time to time.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made material errors of law in his direction to the jury on the provocation defence resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
2.
The verdict of the jury was unsafe or unsatisfactory on the ground that the jury should have found the appellant insane at the time of the killing.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground 1 and a retrial was ordered. The State conceded that the trial judge made an error of law in his direction to the jury on provocation but argued that the error did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice because the evidence was incapable of supporting the defence of provocation. McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) found that the evidence was capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant was provoked to cause all three injuries. There was a resulting miscarriage of justice (See [142]-[143]). Pullin JA in dissent found that while the trial judge erred in directing the jury as to provocation (See [231]), there was no miscarriage of justice as provocation should not have been left as an issue to be decided by the jury. The appellant was no longer deprived of self-control when he caused the third injury (See [238]-[239]).
Ground 2 was dismissed. McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) held that it was reasonably open to the jury to fail to be persuaded on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was deprived of the capacity to know he ought not to kill the deceased. There was evidence in the police interview that the appellant was thinking rationally before and after the deceased’s death (See [125]-[126]). Pullin JA, in a separate judgment, also held that while there was unanimous evidence from psychiatrists that the appellant suffered from a mental illness and that suffered from psychotic episodes, whether he was psychotic on the night of the killing and whether he lacked the capacity to know the act of slashing in the neck was wrong was a matter of controversy. Pullin JA was unable to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant lacked the relevant capacity (See [219]-[220]). See also Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34 (26 February 2010) and The State of Western Australia v Evans [No 2] [2012] WASC 366 (9 October 2012).
O’Driscoll v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 175 (10 August 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Remoteness of evidence’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his de facto partner.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased, particularly statements made by the deceased as to the nature of the relationship and previous violence she suffered at the hands of the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The prosecution relied on common law principles in relation to admissibility of the evidence. Martin CJ (with whom Pullin JA and Hall J agreed) at [25] – [41] considered various High Court decisions on the correct test to apply including Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 and Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283. The Court held firstly that the evidence was not hearsay, because it was only used to establish the deceased’s state of mind. The jury could then draw an inference as to the nature of the relationship. The crucial issue was the way the evidence was used. If the jury had regarded the evidence as facts asserted by the deceased and then went onto conclude that the appellant was prone to violence, it would have been prejudicial to the accused. However, the prosecution did not use the evidence in this way and the trial judge directed accordingly. An argument that statements made by the deceased earlier than one or two weeks prior to her death was ‘too remote in point of time’ to be admissible was also rejected. The Court held that while it may be possible for evidence to be so distant as to be inadmissible, this was not the case here. The relationship was relatively short and the statements that were made completely spanned this period. This increased rather than reduced its probative value.
MJS v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 112 (9 May 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of character’ – ‘Indecent assault in family or domestic relationship’ – ‘Indecent dealing with lineal relative under 16 years’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual penetration of a lineal relative under 16 years’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: 18 charges of a sexual nature relating to the appellant’s two biological daughters.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was charged with various sexual acts relating to his two daughters (see at [22]). He was convicted by a jury of 11 offences of indecent dealing, 4 offences of indecent assault and acquitted of three charges. There was previously an interim violence restraining order (VRO) in place against the appellant. The appellant later breached this order. Evidence of this breach and his subsequent imprisonment for a weekend was inadvertently admitted at trial after one of the complainants mentioned it during cross-examination.
Issue/s: Some of the issues in the appeal against conviction concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge should have discharged the jury after one of the complainants gave evidence during cross-examination of a prior breach of a VRO in place against the appellant.
2.
Whether the directions of the trial judge in respect of this evidence were sufficient.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against sentence was upheld but the appeal against conviction was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the admission of the interim VRO evidence was inadmissible and so prejudicial it required the trial judge to discharge the jury. The appellant also submitted that this failure to discharge the jury led to further inadmissible evidence concerning other VROs and alleged breaches which compounded the initial prejudice. Mazza J (with whom Buss JA and McLure P agreed) held that the only basis upon which this evidence could be admissible was with respect to the appellant’s character. Generally, evidence of bad character is inadmissible but can be admissible where an accused puts their character in issue, in which case the prosecution is able to call evidence of bad character in rebuttal (see at [144]). In this case, the accused asserted that he was of good character. As such, the prosecution was entitled to adduce rebuttal evidence. The evidence of the VROs could only be admissible for that purpose.
The Court held that in isolation, the making of an interim VRO was not of relevance to an accused’s character. However, the evidence also included the alleged breach of the VRO. Mazza J held that a breach of a VRO ‘amounts to deliberate disobedience of a court order’ and ‘is conduct which is prima facie inconsistent with the usual behaviour of a person of good character. It is evidence capable of rebutting an assertion of good character’ (see at [153]). As such, it was admissible. However, the evidence that he had spent a weekend in jail was not relevant to character and thus inadmissible, but capable of being dealt with by judicial direction. Furthermore, even if the VRO evidence was inadmissible, it was general in nature – ‘There was no detail as to when the VRO was made, who was the protected person, what was the basis for the order and what the appellant did to breach it’ (see at [157]). As such, any potential prejudice could be dealt with by judicial direction.
2.
The Court held that while the trial judge’s directions in relation to this evidence could have been ‘fuller’, they were sufficient. It would have been desirable for him to ‘use the authority of his office to confirm that a court had not determined on its merits whether a final VRO should be made’. However, the judge explained to the jury the ex parte nature of an interim order. While the judge did not explicitly tell the jury that it could only take the breaches into account for the purposes of character, he did tell the jury that the State’s case was that these breaches were relevant to character and that the ex parte VROs and the time spent in jail were irrelevant. This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to understand that the evidence was only relevant in relation to the appellant’s character.
The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reconciliation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Deprivation of liberty (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, threatening unlawfully to kill.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The first victim (K) was the respondent’s former partner, with whom he had a 2-year old child. The second female victim (C) commenced an intimate relationship with K. The respondent believed that the relationship between K and C had begun before he had separated with K. After the separation, the respondent asked K and C to meet at his home to discuss their relationship with each other. The respondent then left with K, at which point an argument developed. The respondent refused to permit K to leave his car and detained her while he drove her back home. He prevented her from escaping the house. He then armed himself with a spear gun and loaded it with a barbed spear. C then returned to the respondent’s home, whereupon the respondent pointed the spear gun at her, forced her to enter the house and prevented her from leaving. C refused to give the respondent her car keys. In response, the respondent punched C hard in the left cheek which knocked her down. He then picked her up by the throat and lifted her from the ground. He made a number of threats to kill C. C was left with severe injuries and the mental effect has been ‘profound’. She was in fear of her life (see at [47]-[53]). He later reconciled with K. There was no evidence of domestic violence by the respondent towards K before he became suspicious about her relationship with C. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended for 18 months) for both counts of deprivation of liberty, fined $1000 for assault occasioning bodily harm and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended for 18 months) for threatening to kill. These terms (as well as a fine for unrelated offending) were imposed concurrently which resulted in a total effective sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 18 months and a $2000 fine.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the fine imposed for assault occasioning bodily harm was manifestly inadequate.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in suspending the terms of imprisonment by not having sufficient regard to the seriousness of the conduct and the impact on the victims
3.
Whether ordering the sentences be suspended resulted in a sentence that was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues 1 and 3.
1.
Buss JA (Mazza J agreeing) noted that the assault against C was serious, unprovoked, committed against an unarmed victim who offered no resistance and part of a prolonged episode of intimidation. The fact that the respondent was armed with a spear gun was likely to have increased the victim’s fear. The context of the assault (the breakdown of the domestic relationship between the respondent and K and the new relationship between K and C) made personal and general deterrence relevant. This made a $1000 fine manifestly inadequate notwithstanding the respondent’s personal circumstances, including that he was suffering from a mental illness. McLure P agreed and noted that a fine cannot be justified on totality grounds and ‘falls well short of appropriately recognising the degree, effect and context of the physical violence inflicted by the respondent on C’ (see at [1]).
2.
Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) held that the remarks of the sentencing judge did sufficiently refer to the seriousness of the conduct and the impact on the victims, as he noted that the issue of suspension required him to consider all aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the objective features of the offence (see at [89]).
3.
Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) noted that the deprivation of liberty and threat to kill offences were objectively very serious. His Honour disagreed with the sentencing judge and noted that a matrimonial breakdown, reconciliation and the presence of a child in the relationship cannot be regarded as mitigating factors. However, the fact that the respondent’s mental state has improved following therapy could indicate progress towards rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the offending and the associated need for deterrence outweighed other factors such as rehabilitation and mercy. McLure P noted that C suffered greater actual and threatened violence than K, such that it was difficult to understand the sentencing judge’s explanation for suspending the deprivation of liberty and threat to kill sentences.
See also her Honour’s remarks at [3] – ‘The circumstances to which the sentencing judge referred are neither unique nor mitigatory. The hallmark of domestic or relationship related violence is the readiness of many victims to return to, or remain in, a relationship with the perpetrator of the violence. The otherwise appropriate penalty should not be reduced because there is a return to the status quo that existed prior to the breakdown of the relationship which precipitated the violence. It is also circular to rely on the return to the relationship status quo as the route to rehabilitation. Moreover, the emphasis on the domestic context marginalises the actual and threatened violence inflicted by the respondent on C.’
As such, these offences warranted immediate imprisonment. A total effective sentence of 18 months’ immediate imprisonment was imposed.
Papas v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Obstructing a public officer’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, criminal damage, obstructing a public officer, breaching protective bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the father of the appellant’s former partner. The appellant attended the complainant’s house and obtained entry. He was confronted by the complainant who demanded he leave. A verbal altercation occurred, at which point the appellant’s former partner came to the aid of the complainant. The appellant then grabbed her by the hand and bent her middle finger which caused it to fracture. One another day, the appellant again obtained entry to the house, this time by throwing a pot plant through a door. His former partner was inside and she barricaded herself and her 2-year-old son in a bedroom with a chest of drawers. The appellant rammed the door with a table which enabled him to unlock the door. She managed to flee the bedroom and the appellant was detained by a neighbour until police arrived. The appellant suffered from depression and anxiety and was intoxicated on both occasions. He had no relevant criminal history. A total effective sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in failing to find that the appellant’s depression and anxiety reduced his moral culpability and the need for general deterrence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) held that the appellant’s mental impairment did not impair his functioning to the extent that his culpability or the need for general deterrence should be reduced. Instead, the offending can be attributed to his level of intoxication.
2.
The Court held that the seriousness of this offending was heightened by the extent of the actual and threatened violence committed by the appellant, and as McLure P (Mazza J agreeing) noted – ‘The seriousness of the offending is not reduced because it occurred in the context of a failed or failing domestic relationship. It is necessary to protect actual and potential victims of domestic violence’ (see at [16]). The mitigating factors, such as the appellant’s remorse and good character were given sufficient weight by the sentencing judge.
Austic v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110 (11 June 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the murder of the deceased; with whom he had been in a casual sexual relationship for 12 months. The deceased was 22 weeks pregnant with the appellant’s child at the time of her death. The appellant was intoxicated, attended the deceased’s home and stabbed her 21 times in her bedroom. He then walked back to his home, threw away the knife and left the deceased. He destroyed evidence that could implicate him in the murder. The prosecution’s case relied purely on circumstantial evidence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge erred by not directing the jury that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of certain facts because these facts were indispensable links in the chain of reasoning towards a finding of guilt.
2.
Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The Court held that there was a very strong circumstantial case against the appellant and the trial judge’s directions were sufficient for the jury to understand that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the opportunity to and in fact did kill the deceased.
2.
The appellant submitted that the 25-year non-parole period was excessive given various comparable cases, the objective seriousness of the crime and the appellant’s personal circumstances. He also submitted that the fact that the crime did not involve multiple victims or multiple offences and the lack of any lengthy premeditation was significant. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was previously in a de facto relationship which did not involve violence, had two daughters and had numerous references attesting to his good character. The appellant’s increasing alcohol consumption had been a factor in the breakdown of the relationship. He had been suffering from depression for which he was receiving psychological treatment. However, the Court found the non-parole period was not manifestly excessive. A significant aggravating factor was the deliberate killing of the unborn child. While a psychologist’s report indicated that the appellant was a low risk of re-offending, he refused to admit guilt or show remorse. Further, the crime was committed ‘in a calculated and savage manner and for a shallow and appalling motive’ (see at [186]) such that little weight could be afforded to the appellant’s antecedents.
Heijne v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 86 (11 May 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Intention’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant and the male deceased had been in an intimate personal relationship for nearly 25 years. The prosecution case was that this relationship deteriorated particularly because of the development of a relationship between the appellant and a younger man (Mr X). The prosecution argued that the appellant strangled the deceased. The defence case was that the evidence did not exclude that the deceased died of a heart attack not strangulation. The defence further asserted that the State failed to prove the appellant had a motive to kill or intention to kill the deceased. The defence also relied on self-defence against an unprovoked assault. The appellant asserted that the deceased struck his face with the back of his right hand before the strangulation occurred.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether there was material on which the jury acting reasonably could fail to be satisfied that the prosecution had excluded the application of self-defence against unprovoked assault.
2.
There was insufficient evidence to enable the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause some form of injury, of whatever kind, falling within the definition of grievous bodily harm.
3.
The trial judge erred in directing the jury as to causation.
4.
The trial judge gave inadequate directions with respect to the intent necessary to sustain a charge of murder.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, there was no basis in the evidence for the jury to have entertained the possibility that the appellant reasonably apprehended that he faced death or grievous bodily harm. Assaults committed by the deceased on the appellant in the past were not of a kind to cause apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, and the deceased striking the appellant with the back of his hand would similarly not be of a kind to cause such fear (See [44]-[49]). Further, the jury could not have entertained the possibility that the only practical means of averting the threat was through application of force to the deceased’s throat. Other options open to the appellant included brushing the deceased off or punching him in the head (See [50]).
Second, there was ample evidence sustaining the inference that the appellant intended to cause some form of injury within the definition of grievous bodily harm. This included the pathological evidence given in relation to the extent of the deceased’s injuries, the evidence of animosity in the relationship, the appellant’s description of the struggle preceding the killing, the appellant’s evidence that when he realised the deceased was dead he thought he must have strangled him, the appellant’s conduct before and after the killing, the appellant’s admissions to Mr X and another man, and a witness’s evidence of lies told by the appellant (See [71]).
Third, the trial judge did not err in his approach to the issue of causation in his direction to the jury. He reminded the jury of the most pertinent evidence on the subject and clearly identified the issue they had to resolve and the manner in which they should resolve it (See [81]-[85]).
Finally, the trial judge specifically referred the jury to all the evidence that was relevant to the intent of the appellant at the time of the death. The evidence was relevant to both the question of intent required to sustain the charge of wilful murder, and the intent required to sustain the charge of murder. The difference between those two intentions was made abundantly clear to the jury (See [106]-[107]).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Hellings v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 255 (27 April 2005)).
Atherden v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 33 (26 February 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Effect of guilty plea’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Violence restraining order’ – ‘Vulnerable - women’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the deceased for some three and a half years before the relationship ended. The deceased obtained a violence restraining order against the appellant which prohibited him from coming within 100m of her home or work and within 20m of her person. The appellant went to the deceased’s house for the purpose of discussing the restraining order – he wanted to ask the deceased to remove the restraining order because it would be difficult to renew his licence as a car dealer with the restraining order in place. When she yelled at him to get off the property, he hit her with a rubber mallet multiple times until she lost consciousness. He then hit her with a brick. She sustained severe head injuries and she later died. The appellant did not seek medical attention for the deceased. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 16 years. The appellant had some history of domestic violence – an ex-partner had obtained a violence restraining order against him after he stalked her and punched her several times.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the original sentence was within range of comparable sentences and whether the trial judge gave sufficient weight to the prosecution’s concession that the appellant only intended to cause grievous bodily harm, not death.
2.
Whether the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the early plea of guilty in combination with the long non-parole period.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of ground 2.
1.
This argument was dismissed. Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA and McLure P agreed) firstly accepted that given the value which the community places on human life, it is likely that (generally) killing with intention to cause death will be more seriously regarded than killing with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm. However, this will not always be the case, and intention is only one of a range of relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence (see at [30]-[31]). Indeed, there were other aggravating factors which were relevant in this case. These included – ‘the brutality of the attack on a defenceless woman, the fact that two weapons were used, the stalking behaviour which occurred in the months leading up to the attack, the presence of the violence restraining order, and the appellant's callous disregard for the victim's obvious need for medical attention’ (see at [48]).
2.
The trial judge did not state that the guilty plea was a mitigating factor for which some reduction in sentence should be made. Furthermore, both parties accepted that that a non-parole period of 16 years was severe for an offence involving no premeditation and a relatively brief (albeit violent) attack. Wheeler JA stated that where an early plea can be regarded as a mitigating factor, sentencing judges should expressly state in open court that a reduction in sentence has been made for that reason (see at [45]). The non-parole period was reduced to 14 years.
Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34 (26 February 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Accident’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant and the deceased woman had been in a seven-month relationship. The police had been involved on at least five occasions including an incident in which the appellant broke the deceased’s hand. The deceased, an alcoholic, was not inclined to cooperate with police and declined to provide a statement on these occasions. The appellant convinced police that he was the victim of the deceased’s aggression. On 13 November 2007, the appellant caused the deceased knife wounds to her right arm, her neck, and her chest near her armpit. After cutting her neck, the appellant pressed on the deceased’s chest, accelerating her blood loss and her death. During an interview with police, the appellant admitted that he killed the deceased. The appellant had a history of mental health problems from August 1999. At trial, evidence was adduced from Ms Maton about conversations she had with the deceased regarding acts of violence perpetrated upon her by the appellant. The two broad issues at trial were whether the State negated the defence of accident and whether the appellant had established the defence of insanity.
Issue/s: Some of the issues included that –
1.
The trial judge erred in her directions on accident.
2.
The trial judge erred in her directions on insanity.
3.
The trial judge erred in directing the jury as to the use that could be made of out-of-court statements made by the deceased.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA agreed) found it unnecessary to deal with ground 1. The respondent accepted that the trial judge erred in her classification of the infliction of the fatal wound as an ‘event’ for the purposes of applying the defence of accident. The appeal would have to be allowed unless there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. Wheeler JA found it unnecessary to undertake such analysis because the appeal was allowed on other grounds (See [46]). On ground 1, McLure P found there had been a substantial miscarriage of justice (See [15]-[17]).
Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA agreed) allowed the appeal on ground 2. The trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury that the appellant could be found not guilty by reason of insanity, even if the appellant knew what he was doing was contrary to law (See [57]-[58]). Further, the trial judge failed to direct the jury that, when considering whether the appellant was deprived of the capacity to know he ought not to do the act, the issue was whether the appellant was incapable of reasoning with some moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongness of the act or of comprehending the nature or significance of the act of killing (See [61]-[62]). McLure P held that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that a person can lack the relevant capacity even if they know the act is unlawful (See [24]-[27]).
The appeal was also allowed on ground 4. Wheeler JA (with whom McLure P and Owen JA agreed) noted that the evidence of Ms Maton was provided in graphic and striking detail, and had the potential to be significantly prejudicial to the appellant. Not only was the evidence admitted but the trial judge invited the jury to treat the account given by Ms Maton as evidence of the truth of the matters recounted to her. This direction was plainly erroneous (See [72]-[74]). A retrial was ordered. See Evans v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 182 and The State of Western Australia v Evans [No 2] [2012] WASC 366 (9 October 2012).
The State of Western Australia v Bennett [2009] WASCA 93 (26 May 2009) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stealing motor vehicle’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Wilful damage by fire’
Charge/s: Stealing a motor vehicle, wilful damage by fire, threat to kill.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On a number of occasions, the male respondent threatened the female complainant who he was in a relationship with. The respondent put his face against her, and said aggressively, ‘I’ll do 25 over you. If I can’t have you, no one will have you’. A few days later, the complainant told the respondent she was leaving him, and he said to her, ‘If you think you’re going to walk away I will kill you’. A few days after that, the intoxicated respondent grabbed the complainant’s throat and said, ‘I am going to kill you. If I can’t have you, no one can’. Afraid, the complainant left for a few days. The drunk respondent then stole a motor vehicle and crashed it into a wall at the front of the house. He spread petrol through the house and lit it on fire. The sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to 15 months’ imprisonment on the arson offence, 6 months’ imprisonment for stealing a motor vehicle, and 9 months’ imprisonment for the threat to kill. Her Honour recognised that the offence of threatening to kill took place on a different occasion but thought all sentences should be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds included –
1.
The sentences imposed on the offences of arson and threat to kill was manifestly inadequate.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in her application of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The respondent was resentenced to an aggregate sentence of 4 years and 9 months’ imprisonment. The sentence of imprisonment was manifestly inadequate. The arson offence required the imposition of a deterrent sentence. The respondent’s personal circumstances carried less weight because this was a case of arson but regardless these did not provide much by way of mitigation. The appellant was a mature age, had an extensive criminal record, and his substance abuse problem could only be offered as an explanation rather than an excuse for his behaviour. This was a very serious case of arson ‘because the respondent’s offending was apparently motivated by revenge, it caused the destruction of a residential building, and it was against the background of a violent domestic relationship’ (See [48]-[51]). Further, the threat to kill was a very serious one. It was made against a history of domestic violence, and the complainant was afraid of the respondent (See [54]-[56]).
Miller JA additionally held that the sentencing judge erred in her application of the totality principle. There was nothing crushing about imposing a cumulative sentence on the threat to kill offence. The sentence on the offence of threat to kill should instead have been lowered to reflect the totality principle (See [58]-[62]).
Gilmour v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 42 (28 February 2008) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: After the marriage between the male appellant and female complainant ended, the complainant noticed the appellant following her around. Several items went missing from her home. The appellant then damaged the property of a complainant’s male friend resulting in the imposition of a violence restraining order (VRO). The appellant subsequently breached this VRO. An altercation between the appellant and complainant led to the appellant being charged with assault and damage to property. He was acquitted on the assault charge. The appellant continued to follow the complainant around, telephoned her and would not speak, and made noises around her property at night. The complainant obtained a VRO. Notwithstanding this, the appellant changed a white light bulb at the complainant’s home to a red bulb. Cameras she installed at her property also detected the appellant wearing a gorilla mask and holding a knife in his hand. The appellant also attempted to pervert the course of justice in relation to this incident by requesting his neighbours provide him with an alibi. He received a term of 4 years' imprisonment in respect of the aggravated stalking and 10 months in respect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice, to be served cumulatively. That produced a total effective sentence of 4 years 10 months' imprisonment.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence in respect of the aggravated stalking offence was manifestly excessive, particularly in view of the appellant’s antecedents.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing cumulative sentences.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The personal circumstances favourable to the appellant (being only the absence of a prior record) could have limited weight in the circumstances, having the regard to the absence of remorse and a clear need for personal and general deterrence. This was determined and persistent pursuit of the complainant, in circumstances where she had obtained a restraining order and where he had been charged with offences arising out of his conduct towards her (See [12]-[13], [16]). Wheeler JA further held that the sentencing judge did not err in making the sentence of attempting to pervert the course of justice cumulative. This was more serious offending than the giving of a false name to police or entering a false recognisance. It was an attempt to pervert the course of justice in relation to an offence of a relatively serious nature and involved the use of innocent and unconnected third parties to engage in criminal conduct (See [17]-[19]). See Gilmour v State of Western Australia [2005] WASC 243 (8 November 2005).
Lydon v Lydon [2008] WASCA 8 (8 February 2008) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Elder abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Meaning of emotional abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sibling abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Proceedings: Protection order appeal.
Facts: The appellant man was the respondent to a protection order protecting his mother and sister. The appellant resided in a shed adjacent to the mother’s home, which his sister frequently visits. All parties are in dispute in relation to the deceased father/husband’s estate, discussions in relation to which resulted in the allegations of emotional abuse upon which the protection order was granted. The brother stood in his sister’s way, blocking her from leaving, got in her face, poked her in the chest and shouted at her and her mother. There was an allegation that on at least one occasion he made a threat to kill his sister. The order included terms that the appellant not contact the other parties or enter the house.
Issue: Whether provocation defence applies to application for restraining order; Whether finding of emotional abuse requires supportive expert testimony.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The argument that provocation was required to be considered was misconceived as the Magistrate’s decision was founded on emotional abuse.
Le Miere AJA held that:
[49] Emotional abuse is not defined in the Act. Emotional abuse involves improper or inappropriate behaviour, verbal or non-verbal, that adversely impacts upon another person's emotional wellbeing. Emotional abuse improperly excites strong unwelcome feelings in another. Emotional abuse may involve coercion by intimidation, inducing fear, stalking, or harassment, that is words, conduct or action, usually repeated or persistent that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms or causes substantial emotional distress to that person.
[50] There are two aspects to emotional abuse. The first is the adverse impact upon another person's emotional wellbeing. The second is the behaviour that causes the negative impact upon the emotional wellbeing of another.
And:
[57] It is open to the court to be satisfied that a person has behaved in an ongoing manner that is emotionally abusive towards another person without the benefit of any psychiatric or psychological evidence. Behaviour that is emotionally abusive is behaviour that is reasonably capable of adversely impacting upon another person's emotional wellbeing. This does not require psychological or other expert evidence.
Iveson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 25 (23 February 2005) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Throttle’ – ‘Unlawful detention’
Charge/s: Unlawful detention, assaults occasioning bodily harm (x 2), breach of restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant struck the female complainant, his de facto partner, across her back with a pole (the first assault). The applicant retrieved a knife from the kitchen but did not use it. The complainant tried to escape out the front door but the applicant prevented this. He began to throttle her (the second assault). The complainant tried to attract attention through the open front door but the applicant shut the door (unlawful detention). The complainant passed out. When she came to, she was again choked by the applicant and lost consciousness. The complainant obtained an interim violence restraining order which the applicant subsequently breached by telephoning her. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 4 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The total criminality of the applicant’s conduct did not justify the imposition of a cumulative sentence for the second, more serious assault. The conduct of the unlawful detention merged with the throttling of the complainant.
2.
The proper application of the totality principle would lead to the conclusion that the aggregate term of 4 years and 10 months was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the individual sentences were well within the discretion of the sentencing judge. The two assaults were of a different character to each other and were further distinguishable from the unlawful detention offence because this did not cause her bodily harm. The decision to order the sentence on the second assault (throttling) to be cumulative was also appropriate in recognition of its particular seriousness and additional criminality (See [25]-[26]). Second, the aggregate term was not manifestly excessive. Although the applicant was a young man, his criminal history was not as bad as it might have been, he was remorseful, and appreciated that his conduct was largely driven by the effects of his drug abuse, the offences were very serious. The second assault was ‘about as serious an example of this offence as it would be possible to find’. The applicant endeavoured to throttle the victim, she lost consciousness twice, he renewed his attack, he persisted in the attack even after she tried to escape, and he obtained a knife (which he did not use, to his credit). Further, he ignored the terms of the violence restraining order (See [31]).
Brown v Roe [2004] WASCA 210 (16 September 2004) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: State appeal against dismissal of charges of violence restraining order.
Facts: The protected person (the former de facto wife of the respondent) obtained a violence restraining order (VRO). The respondent was charged with three offences of breaching the VRO by communicating or attempting to communicate with the protected person. There was no dispute that the protected person had contact with the respondent during the period the VRO was in place. However, there was a dispute between the parties as to how many times there was contact and whether it was made with the consent of the protected person. The magistrate dismissed the charges because he considered all the evidence showed the protected person, by her actions prior to the contact alleged, had consented to the contact.
Issue/s:
1.
The magistrate erred in law in finding that the protected person’s earlier course of conduct could create a continuing general consent entitling the respondent to thereafter breach the restraining order.
2.
The magistrate erred in fact in finding that the protected person consented to the respondent’s breaches of the restraining order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2. Counsel for the appellant argued that there could not be ‘continuing general consent’ given by a protected person to a person bound by a VRO. Barker J noted that this proposition was probably right ‘but whether or not consent has been given to any particular contact must be decided on the facts of each case’ (See [14]). In relation to ground 2, Barker J held that the magistrate erred in finding that the protected person consented to the respondent’s breaches. The evidence did not support such a conclusion (See [57]-[59]). Barker J further stated that, ‘it is not appropriate for a Court, while a VRO is in place, effectively to suspend the operation of a VRO by taking the view that a person protected is inclined to use the VRO as a "walking stick", as the Magistrate in this case suggested’(See [46]). As the protected person explained, it was sometimes easier to tolerate the applicant’s presence and other times it was necessary to call police and enforce the terms of the order (See [42]).
‘It may be recognised that, in many circumstances, the continuing relationship between persons who were once in a close personal relationship will be strained, especially after a VRO has been granted by a Court. Nonetheless, a person who is bound by a VRO must take all appropriate steps to ensure that the terms of the order are complied with. It may well be that, on some occasions, by virtue of a course of conduct, a person bound by the order may feel entitled to approach physically or telephone a protected person. It may be that a prior course of conduct in some cases implies a consent to approach the protected person in that way, at least initially. But if the protected person makes it plain that she or he does not consent to that contact or that initial contact continuing, then it behoves the person bound by the order to back off and strictly comply with the order’ (See [44]).
The State of Western Australia v Anderson [2004] WASCA 157 (29 July 2004) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Parole eligibility order’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, threat to kill.
Appeal Type: State appeal against sentence.
Facts: While intoxicated, the respondent, an Aboriginal man, found the complainant (his de facto partner) in bed asleep with another man. The respondent slapped and punched the complainant which woke her. The respondent then pulled her from her bed and dragged her 200m down a street, at which point he hit her repeatedly with a steel stake and ripped her bra off. He then grabbed her throat, threatened to kill her repeatedly and pinned her to the ground. She was in genuine fear for her life. The respondent’s criminal history included serious incidents of domestic violence committed against his former partner and other offences of violence. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence, to be served concurrently. A parole eligibility order was not made.
Issue/s: Whether the sentencing judge erred in reducing the length of the sentence to allow for the fact that he did not make a parole eligibility order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court held that the sentencing judge erred by reducing the sentence on account of not making a parole eligibility order. Jenkins J (with whom Murray and McLure JJ agreed) noted that the sentence imposed at trial was significant, given the respondent’s plea of guilty and the maximum penalties. However, the Court noted the seriousness of the offence and described it at [26] as ‘close to the worst category of cases of this kind’. The offending was aggravated by the repeated use of a weapon and the complainant being humiliated by the removal of her bra which rendered her half naked during the beating. The context in which the respondent found the complainant amounted to ‘some mitigation’ but this was ‘not significant’, given the respondent’s history of domestic violence and having previously undergone counselling in anger management and substance abuse (see at [28]). Indeed, an exchange with the sentencing judge showed that it was unlikely his plea was indicative of true remorse (see at [14]). The sentence was increased to two years’ imprisonment.
Hellings v The Queen [2003] WASCA 208 (3 September 2003) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Parole’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Threat with intent’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (x 2), threat with intent to prevent the complainant doing an act she was lawfully entitled to do.
Appeal type: Appeals against conviction and sentence.
Facts: While in a relationship with the male applicant, the female complainant were in a relationship obtained two restraining orders. The relationship ended and she obtained another violence restraining order. The applicant was charged with two counts of aggravated stalking. Further, he was charged with making a threat with intent to prevent the complainant doing an act she was lawfully entitled to do because of a 10-page letter he sent to the complainant. This was ‘abusive in the extreme’ and threatened violence against the complainant if she participated in the court action. The applicant was acquitted of the indictable offence for the first aggravated stalking charge and convicted of the alternative simple offence. He was found guilty in two other trials for the second indictable aggravated stalking offence and for the threatening letter. The complainant gave evidence of the relationship between her and the applicant. On occasions, her answers were unresponsive to questions and rambling but neither counsel made any effort to prevent the complainant answering questions in that way. The applicant was sentenced respectively to 6 and a half years’ imprisonment and 5 years’ imprisonment, cumulative. The applicant sought leave to appeal against these latter two convictions and sentences.
Issue/s: Some of the issues included –
1.
A miscarriage of justice arose because evidence of the relationship should have been deemed inadmissible or should have been excluded on discretionary grounds in both the stalking and threatening letter trials.
2.
In the stalking trial, the trial judge erred by failing to give adequate directions to the jury as the relevance of the ‘context’ or ‘relationship’ evidence and to the extent they could use it in their deliberations.
3.
The trial judge erred in not making a parole eligibility order.
4.
The sentences were manifestly excessive in all circumstances concerning their commission and, when accumulated, the total term of 11 and a half years’ imprisonment is disproportionate to the total offending behaviour.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed. First, while some of the complainant’s evidence in both the stalking and threatening letter trials was inadmissible or might have been objected to on discretionary grounds, there was no resulting miscarriage of justice (See [34]-[36] and [60]-[63]). The evidence that was inadmissible or might have been excluded was insignificant having regard to the evidence that was admissible relating to relevant aspects of violence and harassment in the relationship (See [34]-[36]).
Second, a direction to the jury regarding the use of the complainant’s relationship evidence as ‘propensity evidence’ was not necessary here. ‘Such a direction will be very necessary in cases where there is a danger that the jury might reason that because an accused person has conducted himself in a particular way in the past towards his victim he might be found to have done so again at the time alleged by the indictment’ (See [39]). This was not the case here as there was no real dispute that the applicant breached the violence restraining order or that his actions fell within the meaning of pursuit (See [37]-[39]).
Third, the discretion not to order parole eligibility did not miscarry in this case. The applicant remained beset by a deep-seated psychological disorder. His aggression was unchecked and his past behaviour showed that if parole eligibility was ordered he would be likely to reoffend (See [85]-[87]).
Finally, the sentences were not manifestly excessive. The stalking offence was of a very serious kind. The offending occurred when the applicant was already charged with an offence of aggravated stalking, he failed to appear on the date for trial, and was eluding authorities. The nature of the stalking itself was serious and persistent with 160 calls over a 22-day period and overt threats being made (See [92]-[97]). Further, in relation to the threatening letter offending, the threats were credible, and ‘serious and graphic’. The purpose of the threat, to prevent a person engaging in lawful activities, significantly aggravated the offending (See [98]-[99]). In terms of totality, the total sentence was not disproportionate to the offending given the persistent nature of the applicant’s conduct, the period of time over which it took place and the serious nature of the offending (See [101]).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Hellings v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 255 (27 April 2005)).
Owen v Jilba [2002] WASCA 283 (17 October 2002) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of misconduct restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Lawful conduct’
Charge/s: Breach of misconduct restraining order.
Appeal Type: State appeal against dismissal of charge.
Facts: A misconduct restraining order was in place against the respondent which prevented him from behaving in an ‘intimidatory or offensive manner’ towards the complainant. He was charged with breaching that order by intimidating the complainant. The alleged intimidatory conduct included the respondent driving past the complainant’s house and staring at her such that she felt intimidated. At trial, the Magistrate accepted a no case submission made by the respondent’s counsel. The Magistrate concluded that an order which restrained the respondent from behaving in an ‘intimidatory or offensive’ way was not authorised by the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (the Act). The Magistrate concluded that the respondent’s alleged conduct would constitute an offence under the Police Act 1892. As such, because the Act only provides for the restraint of ‘lawful’ activities, an order which purported to restrain ‘unlawful’ conduct would fall outside the scope of the section. The Magistrate was also concerned with the subjective nature of the alleged intimidation. The order appears to prevent conduct which is objectively intimidatory, but the evidence referred to the subjective experience of the protected person.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate was correct in concluding that the purported intimidatory behaviour was not ‘objectively intimidating’ within the meaning of the order.
2.
Whether it is open for restraining orders to restrain unlawful conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
Wheeler J agreed with the Magistrate’s concerns and held that while conduct that is subjectively intimidating will often coincide with conduct that is objectively intimidating, ‘it is self-evident that not all conduct which is experienced by a person as intimidating will be regarded as intimidatory from the point of view of an objective observer. The person who feels intimidated may be hypersensitive or may simply misunderstand the nature of the conduct’ (see at [6]). In this case, the Court found that given there was little context or background before the Magistrate (such as acts of prior violence, property damage or threats), merely driving near someone’s house and staring at them for a ‘relatively short period’ is difficult to perceive as intimidatory. While the respondent’s conduct may have upset and intimidated the protected person subjectively, it could not objectively be regarded as intimidatory.
2.
Wheeler J concluded that it was unlikely that the purpose of the Act was to substitute the sanctions of the criminal law or provide another means for deterring and punishing the commission of offences. However, her Honour then held that the Magistrate erred in finding, ‘that the mere fact that conduct which was alleged to be in breach of a restraining order was at the same time conduct which might be punishable under some other legislation took it outside the scope of the order, or alternatively meant that the order was not a "proper" order as applicable to such conduct’ (see at [17]). Rather, the power to impose restraints of ‘lawful activities and behaviour’ under the Act should be read as granting a power to impose restraints on broadly lawful behaviour. Her Honour gave the example of an order purporting to restrain ‘threatening’ behaviour which could be lawful or unlawful behaviour, depending on the context. On the other hand, an order which restrains a person from murdering another would fall outside the scope of the Act. As such, depending on the circumstances and context, conduct in breach of a restraining order could be conduct which contravenes other legislation, and should not for that reason be determined to be outside the scope of the Act.
Ugle v The Queen [2001] WASCA 268 (31 August 2001) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘High risk’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, unlawful wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a de facto relationship with the complainant and had 1 child. The assault offence occurred after the couple split up. The applicant repeatedly called the complainant. He approached the complainant as she walked to a shopping centre. He then grabbed her by the hair and punched her to the back and head. The applicant made numerous threats to kill the complainant during the assault and she attempted to run away but he dragged her back. The unlawful wounding offence involved the applicant forcing his way into the complainant’s house. He stabbed her numerous times in the chest, back and neck and also attempted to stab her in the face. She pretended to be dead so as to stop the attack. While he was in remand, police officers made a number of telephone calls on the applicant’s behalf indicating that he wished her to visit him. She did not do so and moved into a refuge after her release from hospital. However, her whereabouts was discovered by members of the applicant’s family so she was forced to move. The complainant suffered lasting psychological injuries and her daughter was severely traumatised as the events occurred in her presence. The applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the assault offence and 9 years’ imprisonment for the wounding offence, to be served cumulatively such that the total effective sentence was 12 years, with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was granted and the appeal was upheld.
The appellant submitted that the 9-year sentence imposed for the unlawful wounding offence was excessive. Malcom CJ (with whom Steytler J and Burchett AUJ agreed) held that this was a vicious, pre-meditated attack which put the complainant’s life in danger. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge’s starting point for the wounding offence (before the applicant’s guilty plea) was 12 years, which the Court held was excessive and that a starting point of 9 years would have been appropriate. It was noted at trial that the appellant remained a high risk of reoffending and prison based alternatives to violence programs to develop more appropriate strategies for resolving conflicts in relationships were recommended. This recommendation was not disapproved by the Court of Appeal. The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment for the wounding charge, which resulted in a total effective sentence of 7 years and 4 months.
Sandle v Crofts [2001] WASCA 106 (30 March 2001) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant arrived home late at night and asked his wife if she had had anyone in the house while he was overseas. She said no, at which point he punched her in the face. She then told him she did have a man in the house. He then started hitting her in the face and head with closed fists. He pulled her by the hair to a chair. He then hit her again and kicked her in the side while on the floor which caused her to black out. She was awoken by her son calling for her. Fearing for her life, she jumped off the balcony which was about three metres off the ground. The appellant tried to drag her up the stairs by the ankles which she resisted. She sustained severe injuries. The defence case was that the complainant’s injuries were as a result of self-harm and she jumped off the balcony by choice. The appellant had no criminal history. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the conviction was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the Magistrate gave insufficient weight to the ‘mitigating circumstances of great provocation’ leading up to the incident.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [28]-[50].
2.
McKechnie J found that this offence was ‘a vicious assault by a husband upon his wife without reason or provocation’ (see at [52]) and that in cases of domestic violence a sentence encompassing general and personal deterrence is called for. The Court then held that a 12-month term of imprisonment was called for given the circumstances of the offence. However, the Court did acknowledge that given this was the appellant’s first offence (he had no history of violence), it may have been appropriate for the sentence to be suspended for two years so as to provide for rehabilitation. However, ultimately the 12-month sentence was within the discretion of the Magistrate.
Mead v Couper [2000] WASCA 345 (10 November 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been told (untruthfully) that his de facto wife of six years had been sleeping with another man. The appellant accused her of doing so and then punched her in the face with a clenched fist multiple times. The complainant fell to the ground and the appellant kicked her in the back. He then grabbed her and carried her to a nearby yard. After the complainant yelled at the appellant to let her go, he released her and raised a wooden fence post above his head in a threatening way. The complainant suffered a broken jaw, facial swelling, various cuts and a sore back. The appellant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment with parole edibility.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or should have been suspended.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in rejecting a supervision order coupled with an anger management course as a suitable penalty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that: he had no prior convictions involving violence; he had favourable prospects of rehabilitation; he demonstrated remorse and entered an early plea of guilty; his wife did not want him to be sent to prison and a prison sentence would have a harsh effect upon his wife and children. The Court rejected these arguments. Steytler J held that the assault was ‘vicious’ and caused serious injuries. His Honour also upheld previous authorities which indicate there is a general public concern with domestic violence (see at [13]).
2.
The sentencing Magistrate commented that some in the community would view a supervision order coupled with an anger management course as a ‘soft option’. Steytler J held that the Magistrate was simply concluding that the offence was so serious as to justify only a period of imprisonment and that general deterrence was of paramount concern. His Honour held that general deterrence is an important consideration in cases of domestic violence and that it was open for the Magistrate to conclude that general deterrence would not sufficiently be met by anything other than a sentence of imprisonment.
Bartlett v Scantlebury [2000] WASCA 234 (29 August 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a de facto relationship with the complainant. On Christmas Day 1999, the appellant was heavily intoxicated. An argument occurred. The appellant then assaulted the complainant by squeezing her arms and pulling her hair while she attempted to leave the house. The Magistrate also accepted that the appellant had engaged in intimidatory and threatening conduct over the previous two days. The appellant’s evidence differed substantially. The Magistrate found that the appellant’s evidence was contrived and manipulative and sought to paint his actions without fault. The Magistrate noted the protracted and serious nature of the offending. The complainant was left with no substantial physical injuries but there was a significant mental impact. The Magistrate also noted the fact that domestic violence cases are insidious, difficult to detect and have significant implications for the parties and the general community (see at [8]). The appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
Miller J disagreed with the Magistrate’s conclusions that deterrence outweighed all other sentencing considerations and that the seriousness of the offence meant that the only justifiable sentence was imprisonment. His Honour noted that this case concerned only one assault, which was the combination of seizing the complainant by the arm and pulling her hair. The Court also held that the Magistrate had placed undue weight on the events leading up to the assault and noted that the appellant had only been charged with one offence. While it was appropriate to take into account the traumatic effect of the assault on the complainant and correct that assaults involving domestic violence call for deterrent sentences, ‘this assault could not be categorised as being of the most serious kind’ and the description of it as such was an ‘over-reaction to the facts of the case’ (see at [17]). Miller J therefore set aside the sentence of imprisonment and fined the appellant $6000.
McCormack v The Queen [2000] WASCA 139 (25 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his wife began conversing together with a man online. After some time, the appellant’s wife’s conversations with this man became ‘more flirty and intimate’ and eventually his wife agreed to stop using the internet. She said goodbye to this man and she refused to tell her husband what they discussed in this conversation. The next day, after attempting to discuss the issue with his wife, he stabbed her in the upper back while she was in bed either asleep or attempting to sleep. He then stabbed her again as she attempted to flee. He then unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide. The appellant was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of grievous bodily harm with intent and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could use evidence of the relationship between the appellant and his wife in the months leading up to the attack for the purposes of determining intention.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the judge had misdirected the jury in allowing them to use evidence of disagreements between the appellant and his wife about her use of the internet and the breakdown of their relationship to infer the presence of intent. Kennedy J (with whom Pidgeon and Ipp JJ agreed) rejected this argument and held that the relationship was clearly admissible evidence which the jury could take into account in considering the appellant’s intention when he attacked his wife (see at [19]).
2.
The sentencing judge took into account various mitigating factors including the appellant’s high degree of emotional distress arising from his childhood which left him with a ‘dependent personality disorder, chronic depression and anxiety’. The sentencing judge also took into account the victim impact statement, which described the devastating effect of the attack on the appellant’s wife and children. The sentencing judge also correctly noted the need for personal and general deterrence in domestic violence cases and that no form of domestic violence is acceptable, especially when it includes the use of a weapon. Kennedy J (Pidgeon J and Ipp J agreeing) held that although the sentence imposed was high, it was within the range of the sentencing discretion and correctly weighed the mitigating factors (see at [27]) and the need for general deterrence.
Dawes v Coyne [2000] WASCA 134 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Proceeding: Violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal from decision of magistrate to place appellant on violence restraining order.
Facts: The female appellant and the male respondent had been in a relationship for six years. The appellant obtained an interim violence restraining order against the respondent. The respondent was subsequently charged with one offence of unlawful assault and four offences of breaching a violence restraining order. The magistrate dismissed the charge of assault and two charges of breach of the violence restraining order but convicted the respondent of two charges of breach. No penalty was imposed in respect of these breaches. Without warning, the magistrate also placed the appellant on a violence restraining order.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in placing the appellant on a violence restraining order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the violence restraining order set aside. The magistrate’s actions were in every way a complete breach of the Act. The magistrate ‘gave no indication of what it was that he intended to do, failed to alert the appellant to the possibility that an order might be made against her, and made no invitation to her to respond in any way’ (See [10]).
Miller J also noted that the magistrate ‘started by stating that it was a tragedy that ‘domestic matters of this sort get into the criminal court’ and made the observation that ‘both parties had been causing trouble for the police who do not want to be involved in these sort of things’’. These observations were ‘entirely inappropriate’ (See [6]). See also Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135.
Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Importance of appropriate penalties’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Technical or trivial breach’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant and the male respondent had been in a relationship for six years. The appellant obtained an interim violence restraining order against the respondent. The respondent was charged with one offence of unlawful assault and four offences of breaching a violence restraining order. The magistrate dismissed the charge of assault and two charges of alleged breach of a violence restraining order. He convicted the respondent of two charges of breach for going into the bedroom of the complainant in the early hours of the morning and communicating with her by telephone on the same morning. The magistrate gave no real reasons for either the acquittals or the convictions he recorded (See [6]). The magistrate also decided to impose no penalty, without giving any reasons for doing so (See [7]).
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in law and in fact in imposing no penalty or sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The magistrate made no reference to the provisions of the section of the Act allowing for the imposition of no penalty if certain preconditions are met. This constituted sufficient grounds for allowing the appeal. Further, this section also had no relevance in this case. The circumstances of the offence were neither trivial or technical (See [9]-[12]), and it was not unjust to impose a sentence in light of the fact that respondent was 42 years of age, employed with a regular income, and had a prior record of convictions (See [13]). Miller J also noted the clear social importance of the Restraining Orders Act 1997. His Honour provided, ‘protected persons in the community generally must have confidence that restraining orders will be obeyed and complied with … [When] they are not, there must be significant consequences to support the fact that restraining orders mean something … [The] courts [must] ensure that their orders are not ignored’ (See [13]-[15]). Fines of $750 and $250 were substituted. See also Dawes v Coyne [2000] WASCA 134.
Vickers v Bailey [2000] WASCA 136 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Assault (eight counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the appellant’s de facto partner. After returning home intoxicated, the appellant ‘lost the plot’ after discovering that the cat had defecated on the bed. He assaulted the complainant. The following day, there was a further altercation and the appellant assaulted the complainant several times, including by squeezing her throat, throwing coffee and the contents of an ashtray over her and ‘(pushing) up her chin and started spitting into her face’ in the presence of their children. The complainant then obtained a restraining order against the appellant but was unable to particularise many of the assaults due to the length and nature of the incident. The appellant conceded that the assaults were a build-up of frustrations over the last 12 months of the relationship and submitted that he suffered from depression, was remorseful and had never previously been violent towards the complainant. The appellant was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending, a sentence of imprisonment was not the only option. Counsel for the respondent submitted that while each assault in isolation may have warranted a lesser penalty, the combination of all the counts and the time period over which they were committed aggravated the circumstances of the offence. The respondent also submitted that cases of domestic violence call for a sentence of personal and general deterrence.
Miller J agreed but emphasised that regard must be had to the individual circumstances of the case – ‘I entirely agree with the submissions of counsel for the respondent that in general terms, a deterrent sentence for domestic violence offences will be called for. Much, however, depends upon the extent of the violence. Whilst here there were multiple offences and offences committed over a period of time, the complainant fortunately appears to have escaped injury. Further, seven of the offences appear to have occurred as one group of offences. Additionally, the appellant does not appear to have ever assaulted his de facto in the past, there being no allegation to that effect in the pre-sentence report, statement of facts or elsewhere and there being no victim impact statement from the complainant’ (see at [12]). Miller J noted the pre-sentence and psychological report which suggested the appellant needed counselling in relation to anger. The appellant himself initiated contact with a domestic violence program and was proposing to participate in that program. As such, the Court found that the appellant should have been given the opportunity of a suspended sentence as an inducement for him to reform.
Gallegos v R [1999] WASCA 191 (6 October 1999) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Complainant and applicant ex-lovers’ – ‘Complainant pregnant at time of assault’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Sentence not excessive’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary and assault occasioning bodily harm
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: the applicant and complainant shared a brief sexual relationship, but did not live together. The applicant saw the complainant in a night club in Fremantle. He spat on her and wiped faecal material on her face. She went home. He followed her, without permission. At the house, he punched her repeatedly and kicked her. He also threatened her with a knife. The assault caused significant injuries to the complainant. The applicant pleaded guilty and, at first instance, was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Application refused. The applicant was self-represented. Chief Justice Malcolm considered that the way in which the earlier assault at the night club had preceded the aggravated burglary showed some persistence in the offending. It also exhibited an element of premeditation. The seriousness of the offending was elevated by the fact that the applicant knew that the complainant was pregnant at the time and the nature of the attack was such that no regard was paid to the safety of the foetus. His Honour said at [28]:
“It is now clear that in cases of domestic violence a sentence which gives effect to both personal and general deterrence will normally be called for. The circumstances may be such as to justify a substantial sentence of imprisonment”.
Supreme Court
Read v DPP (WA) [2024] WASC 10 (19 January 2024) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Mitigating factors’ – ‘ Suspended sentence’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 1; aggravated criminal damage x 1; aggravated strangulation x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim were in a de facto relationship for approximately two years, residing together six months prior to the offending. At random, the appellant physically assaulted the victim, punching, kicking and strangling her as she returned home one night. The victim was able to contact the police before the appellant destroyed her phone. [11]–[14] In August 2023, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced to immediate 15 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence, raising the following grounds of appeal:
1.
The Magistrate erred in failing to properly regard the principles to suspend a term of imprisonment;
2.
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive.
3.
The Magistrate erred in failing to give adequate weigh to the appellant’s personal circumstances (e.g., PTSD-diagnosis and persistent depressive and attachment disorder)
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
Justice Whitby upheld the Magistrate’s decision not to suspend the term of imprisonment imposed on the appellant. [41] Justice Whitby acknowledged significant mitigating factors present in the appellant’s case, including the appellant’s good character and rehabilitative prospects and the anomalous nature of the offending. [42] However, the appellant’s offending occurred in an intimate relationship, whereby ‘general deterrence is an important sentencing consideration’: [45]
The nature of the offending was extremely serious, as recognised and referred to by the learned Magistrate. In such circumstances, the need for denunciation of this type of offending and general deterrence looms large. In determining the appropriate sentencing option, there is the need to demonstrate the condemnation of the community for offences of this kind. It means that the personal circumstances of the offender carry less weight [46]
Accordingly, it was reasonably open to the Magistrate to be positively satisfied that a suspended imprisonment sentence was not appropriate. [47]
Having regard to the totality principle, Whitby J upheld the total effective sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive:
The learned Magistrate, correctly in my view, recognised the seriousness of the appellant’s offending. The appellant kicked and stomped on the victim and repeatedly applied pressure to the victim’s throat [63]
Lastly, Whitby J dismissed the appellant’s third ground of appeal, finding the Magistrate to have properly considered the role of the appellant’s mental health disorder in the context of his offending. [79] According to Whitby J, the appellant was a person ‘clearly able to exercise control and judgment in the past’ such that his mental health was not the cause of his offending.
Supljeglav v DPP (WA) [2023] WASC 453 (29 November 2023) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ Inconsistent verdict’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; common assault x 1; endangering the life, health or safety of a person x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In May 2023, the male appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment for assaulting his wife. [1] The appellant was acquitted of common assault and endangerment, following the Magistrates’ concerns with inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence. [2]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The guilty verdicts with respect to assault occasioning bodily harm are inconsistent with the not guilty verdict with respect to the common assault and endangering life charges
2.
The guilty verdicts were unreasonable and not supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
With respect to ground one, Justice Tottle reviewed the relevant legal test concerning inconsistent verdicts: ‘whether the inconsistency is of such a character that the verdicts cannot stand together as an exercise in fact finding based on logic and reasonableness’. [31] In so doing, Tottle J upheld the Magistrates’ treatment of the complainant’s evidence; namely, the Magistrates’ rejection of certain aspects of the complainant’s evidence and acceptance/reliance on others [38] finding that the consequent inconsistency in the verdicts did not meet the ‘high hurdle’ raised by this ground of appeal.
With respect to ground two, Justice Tottle upheld the Magistrates’ approach to fact-finding. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the case was not one in which ‘the Magistrate must have entertained a doubt about the appellant’s guilt’. [48]
Arkeveld v DPP (WA) [2023] WASC 264 (17 July 2023) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘ Breach of protection order’ – ‘ Miscarriage of Justice’
Charges: Breaching a protection order x 6; aggravated stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to six charges of breaching a protection order and a single charge of aggravated stalking in the Magistrates’ Court. The offending occurred between April and October 2021, against the appellant’s former female partner (‘complainant’). The complainant ended the relationship in March 2020, and obtained a protection order against the appellant in June 2020. [5] The appellant breached this order, contacting the complainant via social media and phone calls. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the convictions by reason of ‘coercive influence, unsound mind and unsounded legal advice’. Justice Lundberg collectively interpreted these ground as constituting an allegation of a miscarriage of justice. [3]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed.
Justice Lundberg found ‘no evidence … to support an assertion that the appellant was coerced or pressured into entering’ guilty pleas. [49] Equally, Lunberg J found no medical evidence to demonstrate that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of entering guilty pleas: [50]
But even assuming, favourably to the appellant, that the appellant was suffering from these illnesses at the time, it remains for the appellant to demonstrate that his pleas entered on 12 April 2022 were somehow influenced by these matters or that he was unable to understand the effect of entering such pleas. There is no positive assertion made by the appellant to this effect. Nor could one sensibly be put. The charges were not complex and were constituted by the conduct described in the proceedings before the magistrate. There is no indication on the transcript that the appellant was confused about the conduct or the charges. And there was no doubt the appellant was bound by the [protection order] which was identified in the charges [52]
Kritskikh v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 130 (21 April 2022) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Body-worn camera footage’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Evidence act 1906 (wa) ss 37 and 39g’ – ‘Failure to consider family violence provisions’ – ‘Failure to have regard to the dynamics of family violence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Previous incident of family violence’ – ‘Self defence’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Significance of being first reporter of incident’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issues:
1.
Whether the court’s reasoning was consistent with how a jury would be directed in respect of the family violence provisions
2.
Whether evidence relevant to the appellant’s degree of intoxication was wrongly excluded
Facts: The female appellant and Mr Williams were in a de facto relationship [19]. On the night of 1 December 2020, after the appellant and Mr Williams had attended a work function, Mr Williams formed the view that he ought to drive the appellant home because she was intoxicated, and carried her to his car. While Mr Williams was driving, the appellant allegedly attempted to take hold of the steering wheel, before punching and kicking Mr Williams. In response, Mr Williams repeatedly pushed the appellant away forcefully, making contact with her face. Mr Williams then called the police, who took photos of his injuries [4]-[8]. The appellant was found guilty by a Magistrate, and appealed on the following grounds:
1.
Firstly, that the learned magistrate erred by excluding relevant evidence.
2.
Secondly, that the magistrate erred by reasoning in a manner that was inconsistent with the family violence provisions of the Evidence Act 1906.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with orders setting aside the convictions and ordering a retrial.
Justice Hall found that grounds 3, 4 and 5 were made out because the Magistrate ‘failed to address the issue of self-defence and reasoned in a way that was inconsistent with the family violence provisions’ [126]. ‘The circumstances of this case required that express consideration be given to self-defence and that, in dealing with that issue, the reasons be consistent with s 39E and s 39F.’
His Honour stated that self-defence was an issue due to ‘evidence of the appellant being forced against her will into the car, the evidence of the significant injuries sustained by the appellant during the incident and the evidence of the prior incident of family violence’ [112].
In considering the credibility and reliability of the evidence given by the appellant and Mr Williams, the Magistrate made the following findings:
1.
Because Mr Williams had called the police in relation to both the current and previous altercations between the couple, his credibility was enhanced, and it was less likely that he had been the aggressor on those occasions.
2.
‘[T]he claim by the appellant that she had previously been the victim of domestic violence lacked credibility because she had not made a complaint about that earlier incident until after she was charged with the present charges’ [122].
The Court found that in making these findings the magistrate failed to have regard to the dynamics of family violence (s 39F). In particular, the fact that victims of family violence often do not make reports to police. Instead, ‘the magistrate relied on the delay in the appellant reporting the earlier incident of family violence to impugn’ her credit [115]. Therefore, the magistrates’ findings were inconsistent with s 39F [124].
In respect of the second ground of appeal, Justice Hall stated:
‘The body worn camera footage was potentially cogent evidence of the appearance and condition of the appellant close in time to the alleged incident. The relevance of that evidence was that it went to the question of how intoxicated the appellant was. This was, as the magistrate noted, a matter of significance both to the likelihood that the appellant had behaved in the way alleged and in regard to the reliability of her memory of the events’ [134]. Therefore, ‘the magistrate was in error in excluding it’ [136].
Sellenger v Turner [2021] WASC 308 (7 September 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Economic and financial abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Breach of protection order x 2, stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Applications for extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 29-year-old male appellant and female victim had been in a relationship for 6 months. When the relationship ended, police protection orders were served on the appellant with a condition that the appellant not go within 100m of where the protected person lives or works. In contravention of the orders, the appellant followed the victim while driving and made repeated attempts to contact her via phone. The appellant also attended the victim’s workplace. The appellant also deposited small amounts of money in the victim’s bank account. He was charged with breaches of the orders and with stalking. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that the sentence imposed infringed the first limb of the totality principle [4].
Decision and Reasoning: Applications for extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence allowed, appeal dismissed.
Justice Strk found that the breach of the protection order was serious, occurring within 24 hours of the order having been served, by deliberate and repeated conduct. Her Honour noted that the victim felt intimidated by the appellant’s behaviour including his deposits of money in the victim’s bank account after their separation [100]. Her Honour explained that because the offences had not overlapped, it was not inconsistent with the totality principle that the sentences be served cumulatively [97], [105], [107]. Her Honour noted the appellant’s ‘troubling history of similar offending… which made personal deterrence a significant factor in sentencing’ [108], and the fact that the appellant’s guilty plea was the only mitigating factor [109]. Her Honour repeated the sentencing Magistrate’s remarks on the victim impact statement, which detailed the significant and lasting psychological impact of the offending on the victim and her 10-year-old daughter [40].
Pedrochi v Brown [2021] WASC 81 (25 March 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant strangled his female partner until it was hard for her to breathe, and punched her in the face, causing significant bleeding from her left eye. He told her: “You did this. I didn’t do this.” The appellant was convicted, following trial, and sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The magistrate erred in her calculation of the date on which the appellant's sentence was to be backdated (out by 4 days).
Held: Application for leave to appeal granted on both grounds but appeal only allowed in part to correct a mathematical error in sentencing (vary date of commencement from 21 to 17 August 2019).
Ground 1 alleging manifest excess was rejected. While the sentence was at the top of the range of appropriate sentences, it was not unreasonable or plainly unjust. The offence was extremely serious: “unprovoked, sustained and vicious.” Little could be said by way of mitigation, with the applicant’s complete lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility. General deterrence is an important sentencing consideration in family violence offences. In particular at [62]-[63]:
“It is characteristic of offences of this kind that they involve significant power imbalances (as the offence in this case did), that they are committed behind closed doors (as the offence in this case was) and that they are accompanied by lies and gas lighting (as the offence in this case undoubtedly was).
These features underscore the need for the courts, in imposing sentences commensurate with the seriousness of the offence in each case and applying all relevant sentencing principles, to send a strong signal that violence of this kind is intolerable and will be dealt with accordingly. The “firming up” of sentences for such violence, referred to in Duncan v The Queen [2018] WASCA 154, reflects that need.”
In addition, the court emphasised at [64] that:
“offences involving strangulation are particularly serious. As [the magistrate] said “a case of non-fatal strangulation … is extremely serious” and that “the courts now recognise how serious that action is.” In my view, her Honour can here be taken to be referring to the growing appreciation of the particular dangers associated with offences involving strangulation and with the role they play in cases of intimate and family violence. That recognition has, of course, led to legislative action, introducing a specific offence of suffocation or strangulation. That offence was, of course, not in existence at the time of the appellant’s offending against Ms Hallam. Nevertheless, as the learned Magistrate recognised, the recognition of the seriousness and danger of non fatal strangulation predated those legislative reforms and was a relevant sentencing consideration.”
Ground 2 upheld but only to correct the date from which the sentence commenced from 21 August 2019 to 17 August 2019.
Hill v Tomkin [2021] WASC 54 (3 March 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Act causing bodily harm’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Glassing’ – ‘Imprisonment’
Charges: Act causing bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim had been in a domestic relationship but had lived separately for 7 months. The appellant and the victim had a verbal argument through the glass window pane of a side door. The appellant punched the glass window pane, causing the glass to break and strike the victim on her face, resulting in injuries requiring medical attention including stitches. The appellant pleaded guilty on the first morning of trial and was sentenced to 10 months immediate imprisonment, with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The magistrate erred in the calculation of the discount afforded for the guilty plea.
2.
The magistrate erred in failing to take into account any factor in mitigation other than the guilty plea.
3.
The magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment when a sentence of last resort was not warranted.
4.
The magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of immediate imprisonment when it was not inappropriate to suspend the sentence.
Held: Appeal was upheld on grounds 3 and 4, and the appellant re-sentenced by way of a community based order.
The injuries sustained by the complainant were severe but was not comparable to “glassing” distinguishing: “[a] glassing involves an intentional breaking of a glass into a person’s face with the obvious potential for very severe injury. The appellant’s act involved the appellant breaking a window in a momentary loss of control with no intention of causing harm to the complainant.”
Ground 4: The term of immediate imprisonment was manifestly excessive having regard to sentences imposed in other cases and factors mitigating the seriousness of the offence (absence of weapons and intention to cause injuries suffered, impulsivity and lack of foresight of the consequences, no threats of violence, and isolated nature of the act). The appellant was also remorseful, had no history of violence or violent offending and had positive antecedents. Further, on Ground 3: It was not open to impose a sentence of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment greater than 6 months would not have been appropriate.
Dickerson v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASC 425 (18 November 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful wounding x 1; Breach of protective bail conditions x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female applicant was awaiting trial for an aggravated unlawful wounding charge against her male ex-partner, the complainant, intending to argue she acted in self-defence. She had pleaded guilty to and was awaiting sentence for a breach of protective bail conditions charge. These conditions had prevented the applicant having any contact with the complainant but she submitted he had forced her to see him. While remanded in custody, the applicant’s ex-partner had tried to contact her, but she had refused. She had obtained a Family Violence Restraining Order protecting her from the complainant. She had taken steps towards rehabilitation, including drug and alcohol rehabilitation following an earlier breach of bail conditions for consuming alcohol.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional reasons why the accused should not be kept in custody.
2.
Whether the grant of bail would otherwise be proper, having regard to other factors the court must consider under cl 1 and cl 3 of Sch 1 Pt C of the Bail Act 1982 (WA).
Decision and reasoning: Bail granted.
Issue 1: There were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody. The breach of protective bail conditions charge was towards the lower end of seriousness for offending of its kind, particularly so “if it is accepted, in due course, that the applicant felt under pressure to go with the complainant. It was, in any event, the complainant who initiated the contact on that occasion”. There was no suggestion that the applicant was violent or intending to interfere with the complainant as a witness ([90]-[93]).
Further, the applicant had demonstrated a concerted effort to engage in rehabilitation. It was particularly significant that she had engaged in alcohol and drug rehabilitation after she was sentenced for an earlier breach of bail due to consuming alcohol ([94]-[95]).
In addition, it was significant that the applicant had refused to have contact with the complainant while remanded in custody, even though she was permitted to do so. The court noted at [96]:
“It is an irony in matters of this kind that a person who is remanded in custody for having breached a condition that prevented contact with a complainant is not prohibited from having contact with the complainant once they are in custody”.
And continued at [97]:
“Of course, in circumstances in which the applicant is well aware that she may put her prospects of being released on bail at risk if she were to have contact with the complainant, one might understand that she would exercise caution in that regard. However, the applicant has gone further. She has made an application and been granted the FVRO to prevent the complainant, Mr N, from having contact with her or approaching her. In other words, she has taken positive steps to give effect to the purpose to which cl 2(c) and (d) of sch 1 pt D of the Act are directed. That, it seems to me, is an unusual situation which, in combination with the applicant’s steps towards rehabilitation and the hardship that she will be required to endure if she remains in custody in the metropolitan area while her mother and her young child remain in Carnarvon, does amount to exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody”.
Issue 2: The conditions outlined at [100]-[108] were sufficient to guard against the risk that the applicant would commit a further offence or would either endanger or interfere with the complainant as a witness in these proceeding ([109]).
S v Barnes [2020] WASC 327 (11 September 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Defence of provocation’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Social media confession’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant admitted to assaulting his female partner; the sole issue at trial was whether the assault was unlawful. The complainant and appellant had a ‘prolonged and heated argument’ regarding the complainant buying plants and because the appellant refused to leave the TV room so that the children could watch TV. The context proceeding the assault included: the complainant slapping the appellant and trying to pull him off the couch where he was sitting; the complainant threatening to smash a hard disk drive unless the appellant left the TV room and when he did not leave throwing the hard disk drive against the wall; the complainant threatening to smash a PlayStation device and, when the appellant refused to leave the room, smashing it on the floor; the complainant kicking the appellant to try and force the appellant off the couch and allegedly saying ‘If you don’t do as I say, you’ll never see your son again’.
The appellant then grabbed the complainant around the neck with his right hand and squeezed her throat. The complainant collapsed and lost consciousness. The appellant’s evidence was that after she regained consciousness, she immediately started hitting him again. The complainant’s evidence was that she left the room but returned some minutes later and punched the appellant in the face. The appellant recounted these events two months after the incident in an extended Facebook post.
Grounds: (1) In making an assessment of the severity of the provocation, the magistrate failed to assess the totality of the complainant’s conduct.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
It is clear from the magistrate’s reasons as a whole, and particularly the following passages, that the magistrate considered the totality of the complainant’s conduct:
[60] “To say to a person in the course of an argument, ‘You will never see your child again’ if it was said, and I’m assuming that it was, is an unpleasant thing to say, and I would expect that it would have an effect on any father. It would make anybody angry, in my view, or perhaps more angry than they already were. But applying what was said in paragraph 35 of the Hart case which is been brought to my attention, I do not accept that saying that would be sufficient to cause a reasonable person to lose control to such an extent as to choke the person who said it into unconsciousness.
Many things get said in the course of heated domestic arguments; I don’t consider that it can be said to justify such an extreme response. Although there is no medical evidence on the subject, I am sure that to choke a person into unconsciousness requires a considerable force and sustained over a period of time. It’s a requirement of provocation defences the force used must not be disproportionate to the provocation which is offered, and my view, this force which I have been talking about clearly is disproportionate.
[61] … So at the end of the day, I am satisfied that the conduct of the complainant may well have provoked the accused to some extent, that it may well have provoked him to lose control and act on the sudden. But I do not consider that her conduct was sufficiently provocative in all of the circumstances to justify an assault of this magnitude and of this seriousness. And I am of the view that choking her into unconsciousness was clearly disproportionate to any provocation that she may have offered.
Had I concluded that the magistrate had erred in any of the respects alleged by ground 1, I would have granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the basis that there had no substantial miscarriage of justice. In my judgment looking at the totality of the evidence and, for the purpose of the objective element of the defence of provocation, attributing to the ordinary reasonable person each of the characteristics identified by the appellant in ground 1, the prosecution discharged the burden on it to negative the defence of provocation. Faced with the provocation offered by the complainant as described by the appellant in the Facebook post, an ordinary reasonable person would not have ‘choked out’ the complainant.”
Stockley v Bailey [2020] WASC 193 (8 June 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breaches of protection order’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Breaching a family violence restraining order x 6; possessing a controlled weapon x 1; aggravated home burglary x 1; deprivation of liberty x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In February 2020, the applicant man was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment following his conviction after guilty pleas to 6 offences of breaching a family violence restraining order (FVRO) and one offence of possessing a controlled weapon. Three days earlier the applicant was sentenced, following a guilty plea, to 3 years’ imprisonment in relation to a charge of aggravated home burglary and deprivation of liberty. These offences occurred at the same time as one of the FVRO offences and the possession of the controlled weapon, and the day before another two of the FVRO offences.
The applicant man and female victim were in a relationship which ended around April 2019. On 26 May 2019, the applicant was served with the FVRO which prohibited him from, among other things, communicating or attempting to communicate with the victim. Approximately 2 hours after being served, the applicant sent a series of 88 text messages to the victim. He was arrested, charged with breaches of the FVRO and released on bail. Several days later the applicant entered the victim’s house, pointed a replica pistol at her, forced her into his car and handcuffed her. That night, the pair discussed their relationship and had consensual sex. The applicant continued calling the victim and told her that he had entered her house again and accessed her Facebook account. He also repeatedly approached the victim on her commute home, including getting into her vehicle with her. The applicant was eventually arrested near the victim’s home, and police searched his premises and located the replica firearm. The applicant had a modest criminal record, including convictions for breaching restraining orders and assault.
Grounds:
1.
7 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive; and
2.
the total sentence of 3 years, 7 months was disproportionate to the overall criminality involved and the total sentence was crushing.
It was also argued that the learned magistrate failed to give sufficient weight to his early guilty pleas, his lack of a relevant record and reasonably good antecedents, his efforts at rehabilitation, and his mental health at the time of his offending, which had been treated at the time of sentencing.
Held: Leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
Ground 1 was not established. The applicant’s breaches of the FVRO were not minor or technical. Rather, he repeatedly refused to obey the order which was imposed for the victim’s protection, and flagrantly disregarded both the authority of the court and the rights of the victim ([56]). The offences were serious as they involved the applicant entering the victim’s home on two separate occasions (one of which involved a replica pistol and handcuffs), and following her on the train home. These breaches were terrifying for the victim who believed that she was going to be murdered. The offences were further aggravated by the fact they were committed when the applicant was on bail for earlier breaches of the FVRO ([57]). However, Hill J noted that the Magistrate did not comply with s 9AA(5) Sentencing Act by failing to state the extent of the reduction given for his guilty plea ([70], [85]), but this did not result in the applicant’s sentences being overturned ([71]). Hill J also found that the Magistrate took the applicant's antecedents and mental health issues into account. It was clear that the Magistrate considered that the applicant’s mental health issues were not such that he was an unsuitable vehicle for personal and general deterrence ([74]-[75]).
In relation to Ground 2, Hill J found that the total effective sentence was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust, and was not crushing ([82]-[84]). Any error made by the Magistrate did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice ([91]).
Hosking v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASC 167 (20 May 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Breach of Police Order x 1; Common assault x 1; Assault causing bodily harm x 1; Being armed in a way that may cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Whether the applicant might reoffend if released from custody; whether there were conditions that could be reasonably imposed if bail were granted to ameliorate the risk of reoffending.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were married for 11 years and had three children. The victim also had another child (Ryan) from a previous relationship. One night at the family residence, the applicant pushed Ryan in the chest, causing him to stumble backwards, then punched him in the face. A 72-hour police order was served on the applicant following this incident which prohibited him from entering or remaining within 10 metres of the residence, from going within 10 metres of the victim, and from acting in a violent or intimidating manner towards her. The night following the incident, the applicant entered the residence. An altercation ensued in which the applicant pushed the victim to the ground, punched her in the head and kneed her in the head and body, for which she required medical attention. A Mr Ledgerton was at the residence and intervened to protect the victim. The victim left the house. The applicant then armed himself with a knife and went out to the front drive where he threatened Mr Ledgerton and a neighbour with the knife.
The applicant plead guilty to breaching the police order but not guilty to the remaining charges and was remanded in custody. The applicant applied for bail for the charged offences, but this was refused by the Magistrate on grounds of the seriousness and nature of the alleged offending, the fact that the applicant had breached a police order shortly after it was made, and fears by the victim (and concerns by the police) that the applicant posed a risk to the victim and her children. The applicant subsequently applied for bail again after the victim visited him in custody, but the Magistrate again refused on the basis that the prosecution case was strong and no conditions could be imposed that would ameliorate the risk of offending in a violent manner or interfering with witnesses. The applicant then applied for bail a third time.
Judgment: The judge granted bail subject to several conditions which His Honour stated would "sufficiently remove the possibility of the applicant reoffending" [8]. These conditions included: curfew and reporting conditions; conditions to protect the victim, Ryan, Mr Ledgerton and the neighbour from contact by the applicant; and conditions regulating the applicant’s conduct with his children [20].
The respondent opposed the bail application because there was a risk the applicant would reoffend if released [8]. However, the victim submitted an affidavit to the court stating that she wanted the applicant to be released on bail [7]. The affidavit provided that: the victim did not resile from any of the allegations made; during the relationship, the applicant engaged in controlling behaviours that caused the victim distress; and the applicant continued to telephone her while in custody causing her more stress [16]. However, the affidavit also provided that the applicant’s alleged conduct was out of character and the victim wanted bail to be granted because she was concerned that the applicant’s continued detention would adversely affect his relationship with his children and make it more difficult for her to establish a new life [16].
His Honour had reservations about the victim’s change in attitude [7] but granted bail due to a number of factors including: accommodation and employment arrangements that had been made for the applicant; the likely length of any sentence that would be imposed if he were convicted; the likely time until trial (next year); the incentive he had to abide by his bail undertakings (ie: access to his children); the time since the alleged offending occurred; the victim’s attitude (she expressed a wish that the applicant be granted bail and had visited him in custody with two of her children); and evidence concerning the applicant’s behaviour at the time of the offending (the behaviour occurred in a particular context that no longer prevailed – the applicant now accepted that the relationship was over) [7], [12].
Riddoch v Chiera [2020] WASC 114 (7 April 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x1;
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate's conduct during the sentencing hearing did not allow defence counsel to make full submissions as to the appellant's personal circumstances and the nature of the relationship between the appellant and complainant, which hindrance resulted in a miscarriage of the sentencing exercise; and
2.
The type of sentence imposed was manifestly excessive as it was reasonably open to His Honour, in all the circumstances, to suspend the term of imprisonment imposed. Particulars:
1.
The plea of guilty and the relevance of the discount for that plea;
2.
The appellant's antecedents;
3.
Sentences imposed in, broadly, comparable cases;
4.
The prosecution's concession as to the type of sentence open to the Court.
3.
The learned Magistrate erred when he failed to adequately consider the imposition of a type of sentence less than one of immediate imprisonment.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been in a domestic relationship for six years and had a child together. At the time of offending, the victim and appellant were arguing in a car while the child was in the backseat. During the argument, the victim pulled over to the side of the road out of fear of the appellant and ask him to get out of the car. The appellant then punched the victim to the upper-left arm and grabbed her and squeezed her arm. He then "punched the victim to her left breast and the left side of her stomach". The appellant continued to assault the victim until he hit her head against a window and strangled her until she could not breathe.
The appellant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. The magistrate declined to suspend the term.
Judgment: The first ground was dismissed; as the Magistrate was not discourteous and did not prevent the plea from being made, the contention was without foundation. McGrath J observed that “His Honour directly challenged counsel as to whether a submission was effectively being made that the victim was to blame. Counsel then positively engaged with the judicial officer, clarifying the submission.” [26]
The second ground of appeal was also dismissed; it was noted that the sentencing judge "carefully reviewed all relevant sentencing factors" and only after doing so correctly concluded that imprisonment was the only appropriate punishment [37-8].
The third ground was also dismissed. McGrath J found the domestic relationship and presence of young children to be aggravating factors and thought the 15% discount afforded for the guilty plea by the sentencing judge was appropriate. After placing minimal weight on the offender’s personal circumstances, such as his age, as mitigating factors, the Court concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Clarke v Cantatore [2019] WASC 385 (28 October 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Aggravated administration of a noxious thing to another person x 1; Aggravated common assault.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentences
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had, at the time of the allegations, been in a relationship for approximately five years and were engaged to be married. The appellant verbally abused the complainant and threw her onto the bed. The complainant managed to kick the appellant off her and the appellant threw items around the room. The complainant’s attempt to use pepper spray to keep the appellant away only angered him further. He picked the complainant up by her neck and jaw before throwing her back a couple of metres into the fridge. The accused hit the complainant against the fridge again, causing her to drop to the ground in pain. When she stood up again the accused sprayed the back of her neck with pepper spray.
The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issues: The appellant appealed on grounds the sentences were manifestly excessive and that the magistrate erred in ordering the sentences be served cumulatively and that the total sentences should not be suspended.
Decision and reasoning: Jenkins J held that the magistrate had correctly balanced the appellant’s personal circumstances including the domestic relationship with the complainant and repeated significant force against any aggravating factors and that the sentences were therefore not manifestly excessive. The total effective sentence was held to be plainly unjust given the offending was close in time and in one incident, the appellant had good prospects of rehabilitation, and had never been sentenced to imprisonment or convicted of violent offending previously. There was no error in choosing not to suspend the sentences.
RE Magistrate G Benn; EX Parte Gethin [2019] WASC 380 (15 October 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for review order’ – ‘Cyber stalking’ – ‘Interim fvro’
Case type: application for review of an interim FVRO
Facts: The respondent was granted an interim FVRO based on allegations in an application, affidavit and oral evidence that his sister(the applicant) was communicating in an intimidating and abusive manner by phone calls, text messages and emails in a manner consistent with the meaning of ‘cyber-stalking’. The communications related to the way in which he was caring for their father, who was in a nursing home. The applicant submitted that the magistrate applied the wrong meaning of the term ‘family violence’ and there was no evidence of any act that could arguably constitute ‘family violence’ within the correct definition under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), arguing that the magistrate therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the FVRO, or alternately that her application be treated as an appeal.
Issue: Did the magistrate apply the wrong meaning of ‘family violence’
Held: The magistrate did not make an error in jurisdiction by applying the wrong definition and the application for review was dismissed. The application, supporting affidavit and oral evidence heard all disclosed matters that were within the definition of "cyber stalking". In any event if the matter were to be reviewed the final hearing on the FVRO would need to be vacated and the matter would be more quickly dealt with by way of final hearing.
[Summary prepared by Lily Philp for Western Australian Magistrates Court]
Howell v Davies [2019] WASC 220 (27 June 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Court safety’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Repeated breaches’
Charges: 1 x breach of restraining order
Case type: Application for leave to appeal out of time and leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to a charge of breaching a family violence restraining order. He breached the order by approaching his female former partner outside court immediately following the restraining order final hearing for which he had failed to appear and asking "when am I going to see my kids?" He was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment. He sought leave to appeal against that sentence. The application for leave to appeal was lodged 12 days after the last date for filing an appeal. An application for expedited hearing had already been granted.
Ground: The learned magistrate erred in finding that it would be necessary to find 'unjust circumstances' in order to suspend the term of imprisonment ([24]).
Held: The breach in question did not involve any actual or expressly threatened violence, however Hall J noted that ‘protected persons can feel intimidated or threatened by being contacted or approached by the person they fear’. The orders intended to provide protection from such fear, as well as the risk of physical harm ([31]).
In assessing the gravity of the offence, Hall J listed relevant factors:
•
The breach occurred in the surroundings of a court, where the protected person was entitled to feel secure;
•
The appellant attended court for a hearing in relation to the order, so its requirements must have been known to him;
•
The approach was physical, and it is more likely that fear would be caused to a protected person in such a case;
•
This was the third breach of the same order within a 4-month period, demonstrating a persistent disregard for court orders and the appellant’s failure to be deterred by previous prison sentences;
•
The breach occurred just over 10 days after the appellant was released after serving, concurrently, 2 months for previous breaches (aggravating feature);
•
This was the eleventh offence of this nature over a 5-year period. The appellant had clearly shown contempt for authority on previous occasions, which thereby increased the need for specific deterrence.
These factors, as well as the appellant’s explanation for and nature of the breach, his early guilty plea and the risk of institutionalisation, led his Honour to find that it would have been inappropriate to suspend the term of imprisonment. Accordingly, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice and the appeal was dismissed ([39]).
Goodacre v Lumbers [2019] WASC 184 (27 May 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against conviction - guilty plea’ – ‘Breach of fvro’ – ‘Meaning of fvro term’
Charge/s: 1 x breach of FVRO
Case Type: Application for extension of time to appeal, appeal against conviction following plea of guilty
Facts: On 29 December 2018 the appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court on his plea of guilty to one offence of breaching a FVRO contrary to s 61(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). The appellant applied for an extension of time to appeal and for leave to appeal against conviction. The appellant appeals the conviction on the ground that he could not in law, on the basis of the admitted facts, have been guilty of the offence. The appellant was said to have breached the FVRO by ‘harass[ing] the Person Protected by any electronic means, including by using the internet and any social network application (such as ‘Facebook’) to depict or refer in any manner to the person protected’, and appeals on the basis that he was dealt with in the Magistrates Court on the basis that he referred to the person protected and not on the basis he harassed her.
Issue: Is a reference to a protected person in a SMS message not sent to the protected person a breach of the FVRO? Is it a mere reference via electronic means that constitutes a breach, or is it actual harassment?
Held: Application allowed and leave granted. A breach occurs if the person subject to the order ‘harasses’ the person protected. The reference to ‘including by using the internet and any social network application (such as ‘Facebook’) to depict or refer in any manner to the person protected’ serves only as an example of what could constitute harassment, and was not intended by parliament to mean that any electronic reference to the person protected constitutes a breach.
[Summary prepared by Lily Philp for Western Australian Magistrates Court]
Masoud v Dhaliwal [2019] WASC 56 (1 March 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Fines’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Security officer’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault in circumstances of aggravation x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted on his plea of one offence of assault in circumstances of aggravation. The relevant circumstance of aggravation was that the appellant and the victim, the appellant's wife, were in a family relationship. The assault comprised of the appellant hitting the victim, grabbing her by the throat, and holding her around five seconds until other family members intervened ([6]). At the time of the offence, the appellant held a security officer’s licence and worked as a security officer. The licence was suspended and he resigned from his job before the sentencing hearing ([7]). Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and mitigating factors, the magistrate imposed a fine of $1200 and made a spent conviction order ([1]).
Issues: The appellant appealed the sentence. Submissions included that:
•
The appellant's counsel did not make submissions about the amount of the fine or the possible impact of a fine on the appellant's ability to continue to hold a security licence, and therefore the magistrate did not consider such implications.
•
The sentence would lead to a loss of employment, hardship and a loss of financial security.
•
The imposition of a fine under $500 would be within the range of an appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion given the circumstances of the offence and relevant mitigating factors (appellant's age and evident remorse, absence of any prior offending, the fact that the appellant is the main financial provider for his family).
Decision and reasoning: The Court was not satisfied that there was any substantial miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal. At [29]-[32], Tottle J noted numerous issues with the appellant’s case. First, as the respondent submitted, reducing the fine imposed on the appellant under $500 would undermine the operation of the Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA). His Honour accepted that this was a case involving a nexus between the offending and the appellant's occupation as a security officer. Security officers must often exhibit self-restraint in the performance of their duties. The offending was contrary to this. Second, there was force to the respondent's submission that the appellant's argument does not rest on the proposition that the fine should be reduced because of the extra-curial punishment constituted by the financial hardship resulting from the loss of the appellant's security officer's licence, but that the fine should be reduced to avoid that extra-curial punishment with the result that the appellant is doubly advantaged in relation to mitigation. Third, the maximum penalty for the offence of common assault in circumstances of aggravation is a $36,000 fine or 3 years’ imprisonment, or both. A fine of less than $500 would not constitute an appropriate sentence. Although the offence was considered to be 'towards the lower end of the scale’, there is no single correct sentence for any offence, and his Honour held that a fine of less than $500 would not be adequate given the seriousness of the offending.
Smartt v Sloane [2019] WASC 35 (5 February 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Coercive and controlling’ – ‘Cumulation’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breaches of a restraining order and a protective bail condition, stalking.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant breached a Family Violence Restraining Order (FVRO) which restrained him from communicating or attempting to communicate with the victim (his former partner) by any electronic means. He was also charged with an offence of stalking, based on repeated calls he made to the victim which had the effect of intimidating her. He also failed to comply with a protective bail condition ([3])-[12]). He pleaded guilty to all the offences and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. The Magistrate noted that the appellant’s conduct was coercive and controlling, causing fear to his former partner. His behaviour was ‘persistent and intimidatory’, and the breaches showed a repeated disregard of the court orders ([16]).
Issues: The appellant sought to appeal his sentence on the ground that the Magistrate’s sentencing discretion miscarried, and that the sentence was manifestly excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the appellant’s breaches of the restraining order could not be described as ‘minor or technical’ ([33]). Although the breaches did not involve actual or threatened violence, his repeated acts showed a refusal to accept the authority of the order imposed for the protection of the victim. The Court was satisfied that the term imposed for the offences was manifestly long so as to show an error in principle ([35]). The Court considered the personal circumstances of the appellant – he was 36 years old, a self-employed businessman, and had previous convictions for serious breaches of a VRO against the same victim for which he was sentenced to imprisonment ([37]). Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and resentenced the appellant. A cumulative sentence was found to be appropriate to reflect the additional element of intimidation. The head sentence was reduced to 8 months, and the appellant was eligible for parole ([40]-[41]).
Bryant v Witts [2018] WASC 194 (27 June 2018) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Disclosure’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 2; Aggravated unlawful assault causing bodily harm x 4; Cruelty to an animal causing it unnecessary harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a de facto relationship. On multiple occasions over 2 years, the appellant punched or struck the complainant, causing a broken arm ([25]) and a split lip ([26]). On the occasions where he struck her with a hairbrush and mobile phone, her head split open and she required stitches ([18]-[21], [24]). The appellant also kicked her small dog, causing it to become paralysed and die ([29]). Her children were present on most of the occasions. The assaults were unprovoked. While the police were sometimes called by witnesses, the complainant did not feel safe enough to tell the police about all the assaults until she had left the relationship ([31]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 22 months’ imprisonment ([48]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; whether the sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle; whether a suspended sentence should have been imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Derrick J found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. His Honour stated that “over an extended period of time the appellant engaged in a serious course of criminal conduct comprised of subjecting the vulnerable complainant to a number of significant acts of domestic violence. The fact that the offences were committed in a domestic setting increases the seriousness of what the appellant did” ([73]). Factors such as the appellant’s relative youth and relatively limited prior record provided some mitigatory value.
For largely the same reasons, Derrick J considered that imposing an immediate term of imprisonment, compared to a suspended sentence, was not outside the range of the magistrate’s sentencing discretion ([94]).
Re Magistrate G Mignacca-Randazzo; Ex parte Chown [2018] WASC 157 (11 May 2018) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Adjournments and timely decision making’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Family violence restraining order’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Case type: Application for review of Magistrate’s decision not to make a final family violence restraining order and application for stay of proceedings.
Facts: The applicant made an application for a family violence restraining order pursuant to s 24A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (‘Restraining Orders Act’) against her former partner ([9]). The Court made an interim family violence restraining order ([10]). The respondent objected to the interim order ([11]). The next hearing was listed as a 'Restraining Order Final Order Directions Hearing'. The respondent did not attend at that hearing. The Magistrate did not make a final order, and adjourned the hearing ([14]-[17]).
The applicant applied for a review order under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) ([2]), to review the Magistrate’s decision not to make a final restraining order. The applicant also applied for a stay of the substantive hearing.
Issues: Whether the applications should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Tottle J granted the review order and the stay of proceedings.
Tottle J set out the principles governing judicial review under s 36of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) at [4]-[8]. His Honour set out the principles governing when a final order must be made under s 42 of the Restraining Orders Act at [20]-[24]. Tottle J held that it was irrelevant that the hearing was described as a 'Restraining Order Final Order Directions Hearing' even though no hearing of that nature is contemplated or provided for by the Restraining Orders Act (discussing Kickett v Starr [2013] WADC 52) ([27]-[32]). Tottle J was satisfied that the Magistrate made a jurisdictional error by not exercising the jurisdiction conferred on him by the Restraining Orders Act ([33]).
Tottle J set out the principles governing when a stay ought to be granted at [40]. Tottle J granted a stay of the proceedings on the grounds that the applicant’s medical conditions and stress would be exacerbated by having to face the respondent in a contested hearing ([41]-[42]). Tottle J noted that s 10B of the Restraining Orders Act requires courts to have regard to the possibility of re-traumatisation during the proceedings ([43]).
Labriola v Morgan [2017] WASC 256 (30 August 2017) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Domestic violence incident report’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Frequency of abuse’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Obstructing a police officer x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of obstructing two police officers by resisting arrest ([2]). The appellant was arrested on suspicion of committing an offence by breaching a violence restraining order ([2]). The breach occurred when the appellant attended a dog training class when he allegedly knew the victim would be there ([56]). The victim later reported the incident and the incident was recorded with a Domestic Violence Incident Report (‘DVIR’):
•
‘Prior family domestic violence incidents between the involved parties? Yes
•
Is the victim frightened? Yes
•
Is the abuse happening more often? Yes
•
Is the abuse getting worse? Yes
•
Financial issues? Yes (Issues surrounding the ownership of the two dogs)
•
Does the perpetrator try to control everything the victim does? Yes
•
Is the perpetrator excessively jealous? Yes
•
Does the perpetrator constantly text, call contact, follow, stalk or harass the victim? Yes
•
Has the perpetrator ever threatened to hurt or kill the victim? Yes
•
Has the perpetrator eve attempted to strangle/choke/suffocate/drown the victim? Yes
•
Other information: [the appellant] has grabbed [the complainant] by the throat in Dec 2014 and has tried to strangle one of the two dogs in the past’ ([57]).
Issues: One issue was whether the police could form a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had breached a violence restraining order by relying on a DVIR ([61](iv))
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Tottle concluded that the officer’s ‘suspicion of a breach of the order by the appellant was reasonable. The narrative section of the incident report read in the context of the DVIR section of the report (that is the allegation of breach assessed against what had allegedly taken place in the past) provide a basis for a suspicion that the appellant had breached the order’ ([70]).
Dennis v Lanternier (No 2) [2017] WASC 5 (12 January 2017) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing-protection of victims’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order (VRO) x 20.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the victim were married for 14 years but were separated at the time of the offences ([13]). A VRO was granted with the victim as the protected person ([13]). The appellant was prohibited from contacting the respondent except to arrange for contact with his son ([15]). The appellant breached the VRO over a period of 7 months by making a significant number of phone calls to the victim and sending text messages and letters beyond the bounds of the VRO ([18]-[53]). In some instances, the messages included threats to kill the victim and himself. The Magistrate imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: There were 6 grounds of appeal:
1.
the total sentence was manifestly excessive;
2.
the Magistrate did not properly take into account the appellant's pleas of guilty which were entered at an early opportunity;
3.
the Magistrate failed to consider totality when determining the aggregate sentence;
4.
the Magistrate overlooked the appellant's personal circumstances including his wife's breaches of the Family Court consent orders and the appellant's mental state at the time of the offences;
5.
the Magistrate made an error of fact by taking into account an untrue submission made by the prosecutor that the appellant had threatened his child; and
6.
there was an error in recording the appellant's aggregate sentence as 18 months' imprisonment rather than 15 months' imprisonment ([3]).
Decision and Reasoning: Jenkins J dealt with the grounds of appeal in the following manner:
1.
Dismissed ([142]-[175]).
2.
Error made out. Jenkins J held that the Magistrate failed to correctly apply s 9AA(5) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) by failing to state the extent of reduction given to the pleas of guilty for each head sentence ([122]-[124]).
3.
Dismissed ([125]-[127]).
4.
Dismissed ([128]-[137]).
5.
Not possible to decide because part of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court had not been recorded. Jenkins J did not take this fact into account in deciding the appeal ([138]-[141]).
6.
Dismissed. It was clear that the Magistrate meant to impose an aggregate sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment ([109]-[110]).
While Jenkins J accepted that ground 2 was made out, the appeal was dismissed because the error did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice ([184]).
Jenkins J referred to the role of the Restraining Orders Act in deterring domestic violence at [152]:
The long title of the Restraining Orders Act reflects Parliament's intention for the Act to provide for orders to 'restrain people from committing acts of family or domestic or personal violence by imposing restraints on their behaviour and activity'. In order for the Act to be effective, offenders must appreciate that if they breach a VRO they will receive a significant penalty. The community and the courts have [an] intolerance and abhorrence of violence and threatened violence in domestic and former domestic relationships. The penalties imposed for breaches of VROs must reflect that intolerance and abhorrence, in the hope that the penalties deter offenders and protect victims.
Bindai v Armstrong [2016] WASC 341 (20 October 2016) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Notice of application’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order (‘VRO’) x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: There was a final VRO in place protecting the applicant’s partner. The applicant’s partner applied for a variation of that order. The applicant was not served with notice of the application to vary the VRO ([10]). The Magistrate granted the application to vary the VRO even though the appellant was not present ([11]). The appellant pleaded guilty to breaching the VRO ([1]).
Issues: Whether the appellant’s conviction upon his own plea was a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed ([30]). The variation to the restraining order was a nullity ([16], [22]). It was an essential condition of the jurisdiction to hear the application to vary the VRO under s 48(2) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) that the Court be satisfied that the appellant was served with the summons ([23]). Since the Court was not so satisfied, the VRO had no legal force. It was a miscarriage of justice for the appellant to be convicted of breaching the order ([24]).
BV (on behalf of M, N and O) v TP [2016] WASC 228 (28 July 2016) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against Magistrate’s decision not to grant final violence restraining order (FVO).
Facts: The appellant, BV, and the respondent, TP, were married but separated. BV obtained an interim FVO against TP in the Children’s Court. The FVO was to protect BV and TP’s three daughters, M, N and O ([1]-[2]). At the final order hearing, after BV had given her evidence in chief, the Magistrate interrogated TP’s counsel about the likely content of further evidence proposed to be given by the children. The Magistrate expressed a strong disinclination against exposing the children to cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel. The Magistrate summarily dismissed BV’s application for a final order VRO on the basis that even if their evidence was accepted, it would not be enough to justify an FVO being granted ([7]-[8], [45]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in law by summarily dismissing the proceedings.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Kenneth Martin J held that the Magistrate was correct in expressing concern for the children’s welfare if they were cross-examined ([118]). His Honour held that the Magistrate had the power to summarily dismiss the final order VRO application ([133]-[143]) and that the Magistrate’s discretionary exercise of power to dismiss the proceedings was justifiable ([144]-[147]).
His Honour discussed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in the circumstances that the interim order was made in the Children’s Court at [21], [46]-[90] and [149]-[161]. His Honour discussed the principles applicable to children giving evidence in VRO proceedings at [99]-[119].
Bacchelli v Merchant [2015] WASC 205 (9 June 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to breaching a violence restraining order in favour of his wife and was fined $500 with costs. The breach arose out of the appellant’s attendance at his wife’s home to retrieve some of his property. He claimed he had misunderstood the terms of the violence restraining order and that if he had known that the order did not permit him to attend the house, he would have attended the police station and asked officers to accompany him while he retrieved the property. The appellant had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had tendered medical records to the Magistrate.
Issue/s: Whether there was a miscarriage of justice because when the appellant pleaded guilty he was unaware he had an arguable defence of unsoundness of mind.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and a retrial was ordered. The appellant’s affidavit on appeal stated that he was suffering a relapse of his bipolar disorder when he pleaded guilty to the charge. A psychiatrist’s affidavit indicated that it was more likely than not that the appellant was, ‘in such a state of mental impairment so as to deprive him of the capacity to know that he ought not to assault someone or return to his house’ (see at [36]). However, at the time he pleaded guilty, he was not aware that his mental state was not normal. As such, the evidence indicates that he may have had an arguable insanity defence at the time of the guilty plea. Furthermore, when the appellant consulted with a solicitor, there was no discussion in relation to a possible insanity defence, even though the solicitor knew of the appellant’s history of mental illness. There was no available evidence at the time that the lawyer should have considered the availability of a mental impairment defence. Nevertheless, Beech J held that, ‘through no fault of his own, Mr Bacchelli had no practical opportunity to raise the possible defence of insanity, or the facts relevant to it, with his lawyer’ (see at [54]). The appellant had an arguable defence but had no way of knowing of that defence, such that his plea was fundamentally not an informed one. Beech J noted that this does not mean a plea will always be set aside in these circumstances but in this case, the nature of the appellant’s ignorance of the defence resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Bernard v Williams [2015] WASC 182 (30 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Immediate imprisonment’ – ‘Repeated breaches of a restraining order’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to two breaches of a violence restraining order. He breached the order by living with the protected person and by being within a hundred metres of the protected person (in the same house as her). At the same time, the appellant was also dealt with for an earlier breach alleging that he was within a hundred metres of the protected person (attending and remaining at the protected person’s address). This was a ‘third strike’ case in which the magistrate was required to impose a penalty that is or includes imprisonment. The magistrate imposed a term of imprisonment for six months for each offence. A sentence of six months or less may not be imposed (Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s86). The day before the hearing of this appeal, the Magistrates Court recalled the sentence and imposed a sentence of 6 months and 1 day.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence contravened the Sentencing Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. If it was not for the error in imposing a sentence of six months, the decision of the magistrate to impose a sentence that included imprisonment would have been within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion. The appellant had breached a VRO repeatedly (See Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 at [13]-[15]). The correction of the sentence to 6 months and 1 day was not made in compliance with s 37(2) of the Sentencing Act as the magistrate did not give the appellant the opportunity to be heard. The appellant fell to be resentenced.
A sentence of suspended imprisonment would have been appropriate but for the fact that the appellant had already served 6 weeks in prison. The term of imprisonment was set aside and the appellant fined $1,500. The court took into account a number of factors including that the protected person expressed no fear of the appellant at the time of appeal; it was important to demonstrate to the appellant that he could not disregard the order of the court with impunity; the consent of the protected person was not a mitigating factor but it was relevant in considering the circumstances of the offence; and although there had been repeated breaches of the order, there was nothing to suggest actual violence or threat of violence (See [25]-[28]). His Honour also cited Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 where his Honour Miller J described the Restraining Orders Act as social legislation of the utmost importance:
‘…protected persons in the community generally must have confidence that restraining orders will be obeyed and complied with … [When] they are not, there must be significant consequences to support the fact that restraining orders mean something … [The] courts [must] ensure that their orders are not ignored [14].’
Wallam v Grosveld [2015] WASC 145 (24 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was subject to a violence restraining order (VRO) in favour of his former partner which prevented him from approaching her and from being within a nominated distance of her premises. He attended her premises in breach of the order. He claimed that he and the protected person were ‘back in a relationship’. His had a history of breaching restraining orders in place against the same protected person. He was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether it was reasonably open for the Magistrate to conclude that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was the only appropriate sentencing option.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. It seemed that the protected person invited the applicant back to her premises to collect his clothes. Notwithstanding, any breach of a VRO is serious. Justice Kenneth Martin commented on the penalties for the offence and then noted at [78]:
‘Those significant statutory penalties speak loudly as to the seriousness of a breach of a restraining order and dictate how closely and carefully the underlying circumstances of such an offence must be assessed in every case. In the past there have, of course, been well referenced instances where terrible crimes of violence have been committed in the community against protected persons by individuals otherwise bound by a restraining order, but who chose to ignore it. Plainly, the statutory right to apply for a VRO is meant to assist the more vulnerable to protect themselves from violence, especially (but not solely) women who are the victims of domestic violence. Thus, issues of general and specific deterrence concerning offenders are more than usually important in this arena.’
In this case, there had been no threatening or intimidatory behaviour. While an adverse inference could be drawn from the apparent fact that the applicant was hiding when police arrived, the applicant’s actions cannot be seen as a ‘calculated and flagrant’ contempt of the VRO – ‘Ignorance about the strict workings of a VRO, in the face of periods of separation and reconciliation and then heavy alcohol consumption at the end of a long-term relationship, are a more viable explanation for his misconduct, in my view’ (see at [80]).
His Honour expressly stated that he was not meaning to convey that for some VRO breaches which include a ‘flagrant disregard’ for court orders, ‘a term of immediate imprisonment will not present as the only appropriate sentencing option’ (see at [81]). However, in this case the circumstances (including that the penalties imposed upon him for his prior breaches were only fines and the benign nature of the breach) meant that an escalation in punishment from these pecuniary penalties up to a term of 8 months’ imprisonment, was not within the discretion open to the Magistrate. (Note: this position would be altered if s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) applied, which provides for a requirement of imprisonment after 2 discrete offences within a 2-year period).
2. This argument was also upheld.
Rogers v Hitchcock [2015] WASC 120 (7 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of police order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was at a caravan park with his wife and two-year-old child. The appellant and his wife were drinking heavily when a disagreement occurred and police attended. Police issued a 72-hour order under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) which prevented the appellant from communicating with his wife or approaching within 100 metres of her. The next day, police attended to check on the appellant’s wife and discovered the appellant hiding in the house. The appellant had a minor but relevant criminal history involving two breaches of prior police orders made in favour of his wife. He pleaded guilty, was granted bail and was placed on a ‘domestic violence behaviour change programme’ under the supervision of a Family Violence Court. He completed the majority of the program but was unable to complete it because he was remanded in custody after attending his wife’s home in breach of bail. A progress report about his participation in the program was provided to the Magistrate, which stated that he generally ‘reported as directed and engaged well’ but that he ‘had made no identifiable treatment gains during the programme and was not considered suitable for a further community based disposition’ (see at [16]). He was sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant to a term of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in failing to suspend the term.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred in failing to backdate the sentence of imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of ground 3 – the Magistrate erred by not backdating the sentence to give credit for time already spent in custody.
1.
The issue of imprisonment was decided in the context of s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), which provides for a presumption of imprisonment for repeat offenders under the Act. Hall J held that while there was no actual or threatened violence involved in the current or prior breaches, the appellant had deliberately refused the authority of the orders. See in particular at [46] – ‘Deliberate breaches of court orders or police orders made under the Act undermine the efficacy of such orders. Deterrence both personal and general must play a significant role when orders are breached. If those who are the subject of such orders believe that they can breach them without suffering any real consequence then there will be little incentive to be compliant.’
2.
The Court held that it was within the Magistrate’s discretion to refuse to suspend the sentence.
Given error was demonstrated by the failure to backdate the sentence, it was appropriate to resentence the appellant. In that regard, Justice Hall took into account some further steps that the appellant had taken towards rehabilitation, including drug and alcohol programs. Given these circumstances and the time already spent in custody, the prison sentence was set aside and the appellant was fined $1500.
Weston v Cartmell [2015] WASC 87 (16 March 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: Trespass, Breach of bail (numerous counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage with his wife (the complainant) ended. The complainant had purchased a new house and the appellant climbed the fence and walked around the property for some time. He had some property including vehicles at the house. The appellant then forced entry and was restrained by the complainant’s male friend who was at the home before police arrived. After being released on bail with conditions that he not contact or attempt to contact the complainant, he breached this bail by attempting to contact her via email 153 times. He also made 126 phone calls or text messages. These communications occurred while the appellant was living in New Zealand. The appellant and the complainant had shared business interests. The appellant also had an interest in the complainant’s home because part of the deposit for the home had been paid from a bank account in which the appellant had an interest. The prosecution accepted that many of the communications related to these business matters. A total effective sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s: Whether the total effective sentence did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that the sentence should have been suspended.
Hall J noted that while the large number of breaches of bail made this offending serious, the personal circumstances of the appellant were exceptional. Given that many of the communications related to business issues, it is difficult to conclude that the communications were intimidatory. As his Honour noted at [39] – ‘The number of the communications could not be viewed in isolation from their purpose and subject matter. There was no evidence that any of the communications were harassing or threatening in tone, content or nature. There was no information regarding communications being at inconvenient times or being deliberately repetitive.’
Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the conduct was out of character. The appellant had previous good character, a solid employment history, surrendered himself to police and fully cooperated. This indicated an acceptance of responsibility and remorse. He was at minimal risk of re-offending so specific deterrence was not significant. While general deterrence is important in sentencing breaches of bail and ‘Compliance is likely to be undermined if breaches are dealt with by derisory penalties’ (see at [43]), this did not mean that the term of imprisonment could not be suspended in this case. As such, the total effective sentence was suspended for 12 months.
Bropho v Hall [2015] WASC 50 (9 February 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated common assault’ – ‘Breach of protective bail condition’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated common assault, breach of a protective bail condition.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, a male Aboriginal man, was in a domestic and family relationship with the female victim. The appellant and the victim had been drinking alcohol with three friends. Their two children were also present. The appellant took exception to a comment made by the victim about his behaviour towards one of her female friends. He grabbed the victim by the T-shirt, causing scratches to the side of her neck. They continued shouting at each other. The appellant punched the victim in the face, causing bruising and swelling to her left eye. The victim moved away but was followed by the appellant and he delivered a further blow to the side of her head. The appellant stopped hitting the victim after their two children told him to stop. The appellant was arrested and entered into a bail undertaking with protective conditions. He breached those bail conditions by attending and remaining at the home of him and the victim. The appellant was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault and 2 months’ imprisonment for the breach of protective bail condition, served cumulatively.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentences imposed for the aggravated assault and breach of protective bail conditions were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The case represented a relatively serious example of the offence of common aggravated assault involving domestic violence, falling within the midrange of these types of cases (See [24]). It involved two circumstances of aggravation. First, the appellant was in a family or domestic relationship with the victim. Mitchell J provided:
‘The fact that the aggravated assault occurred in a domestic setting is a significant aggravating factor of the offence. An offence of this nature generally involves an abuse of the trust which one partner places in another, often where the victim is in a vulnerable position by reason of greater physical strength of the offender. The vulnerability of the victim is generally increased by the difficulty which she (it is usually a she) may have in extricating herself from the situation. As McLure P has noted, the readiness of many victims to return to, or remain in, a relationship with the perpetrator is a hallmark of domestic violence. Recognising that common feature, it remains important for a court sentencing an offender for that kind of offence to take account of the need to protect persons in that vulnerable position, so far as the courts can do so by the imposition of a sentence, bearing a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offence, which has a deterrent effect and, in an appropriate case, removes the offender to a place where there is no opportunity to violently attack their partner’ (See [16]).
The second circumstance of aggravation was that children were present when the offence was committed. Mitchell J noted:
‘The facts of this case illustrate a tragic cycle of violence with which the courts are depressingly familiar. A person exposed to domestic violence in his early life goes on as an adult to perpetrate the violence to which he was exposed as a child, damaging members of his community in the same way he was damaged as a child. For that reason, the fact that the appellant's offence was committed in the presence of children was a significant aggravating factor’ (See [18]).
However, following an examination of cases, Mitchell J held that cases where a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment had been imposed involved a significantly greater level of violence than committed by the appellant here. The sentence was manifestly excessive (See [23], [35]-36]). The appellant was resentenced to an intensive supervision order.
The State of Western Australia v Carlino [No 2] [2014] WASC 404 (31 October 2014) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Proceeding: Application to adduce certain expert evidence.
Facts: The accused and the deceased were both male. They lived together, but it was not a sexual relationship. The accused was the deceased's assistant and helped with the deceased's drug dealing activities. The accused admitted killing the deceased by shooting the deceased to the head while the deceased was sleeping. The main issue at trial was to be whether he acted in self-defence. The accused sought to call evidence of a psychologist regarding his state of mind. The psychologist was to give evidence, ‘that the accused was in a compromised mental state at the time as a result of being in an abusive relationship with the deceased. The accused is said to have felt powerless in relation to (the deceased), and to have thought that the only way out of the relationship was to kill (the deceased)’ (see at [2]). The State objected to the admission of this evidence on the basis that it was not a recognised psychological condition and that it was not analogous to cases falling within the ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS). The state further submitted that the matters to be the subject of the evidence from the psychologist were not outside the ordinary experience of jurors.
The accused described himself as a ‘lackey’, the deceased as ‘possessive’ and that the deceased would threaten violence and control his ‘movements, communications and finances’. The psychologist’s evidence was that the relationship was consistent with the learned helplessness associated with BWS. The psychologist also stated that the syndrome was not confined to females or sexual relationships, and that this relationship was of a sufficient duration to be consistent with the syndrome.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence of the psychologist should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. This did not preclude a claim to self-defence, but was relevant to the issue of whether the accused believed his actions were necessary. Hall J held that the psychologist’s evidence was opinion evidence and admissible only if it met the requirements of expert evidence (see at [15]). His Honour noted that BWS is widely accepted as an area of specialised knowledge, but that it is important to pay close attention to what is actually recognised as BWS. He referred to Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 where Kirby J stated that the syndrome should extend beyond females as victims. Hall J held that this relationship differed from a typical ‘battering’ relationship – it was not a long term marriage relationship and was not characterised by ‘recognisable cycles of tension, violence and reconciliation’ (see at [25]). While there were similarities in the ‘assertion of increasing control, emotional volatility and increasing feelings of helplessness’ (see at [25]), his Honour held that the differences between these circumstances and other BWS cases required that, ‘the application of the syndrome to a situation like this is accepted by the majority of experts in the field of psychology’ (see at [26]). There was no evidence of majority acceptance of experts. As such, the evidence was inadmissible. Evidence of the violent and controlling behaviour of the deceased could still be considered by the jury in order to assess whether the accused’s actions were necessary to prevent the deceased from harming him (see at [31]).
Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 292 (19 August 2014) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Appeal type: Bail application.
Facts: On 4 October 2013, the applicant was charged with assaulting his former de facto partner. He was released on bail. The bail undertaking included a condition that he was not to contact or attempt to contact the victim by any means. While on bail, the applicant committed a further assault on the victim causing her bodily harm. He was arrested and charged with that assault and with failing to comply with a protective bail condition. Bail could not be granted again unless the applicant showed there were exceptional reasons he should not be kept in custody. The applicant’s criminal history showed that he had two prior convictions for breach of protective bail conditions in 2012 and 2013. The applicant was also alleged to have breached protective bail conditions on another occasion but this had not been the subject of prosecution.
Issue/s: Whether there were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for bail was refused. There were not exceptional reasons why the applicant should not have been kept in custody. The applicant had breached protective bail conditions on multiple occasions in the past. While the victim had a conviction for assaulting the applicant, this did not justify the applicant’s failure to comply with protective bail conditions (See [29]-[30]). Although the prosecution case against the applicant could not be said to be overwhelming, it could not be said to be particularly weak. ‘A less than overwhelming case does not provide exceptional reasons to grant bail. If the prosecution case was particularly weak one or there was a high probability of acquittal the position might be different: Bertolami v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASC 269’ (See [32]). Based on the offending conduct, the judge could not accept the applicant’s argument that if he was convicted and imprisoned, the minimum term of any such sentence would be likely to be equal to or less than the time already spent in custody (See [33]). There was a risk that the applicant would commit further offences if released on bail, in particular by breaching any protective bail condition in regard to contacting the victim (See [34]).
Sturt v Ball [2013] WASC 343 (9 September 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Definition of 'approach'’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was subject to a violence restraining order which provided that the appellant must not approach within 20 metres of the protected person ([4]). The evidence was that the protected person walked up to the appellant ([6]-[8]).
The magistrate convicted the appellant on the basis that even though the appellant did not ‘approach’ the protected person, it was incumbent upon the appellant to immediately walk away ([12]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld, and the conviction quashed. Beech J held that the charge should have been dismissed once the Magistrate was satisfied that the appellant did not approach the protected person ([16]). The word “approach” should be construed in its ordinary meaning: “to come nearer or near to (someone or something) in distance or time” ([14]). An obligation to walk away from a protected person cannot be implied into a violence restraining order ([17]).
Mills v Hawley [2013] WASC 261 (3 July 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had previously been in a relationship with the protected person and they had a 2-year-old child. He sent about 49 text messages and made 31 phone calls on a daily basis in breach of a violence restraining order (VRO). He claimed he was attempting to make arrangements to see his child. He had one prior conviction for breaching the same VRO. The prosecution accepted that the text messages were not threatening and the phone calls were not answered. However, the seriousness of the offence was increased because it occurred immediately after he had been dealt with by the Court for the previous breach. The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of breaching a VRO. He was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment and failing to reduce the sentence to take account of the appellant’s early plea of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
Under s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), ‘ if a person has committed and been convicted of at least two offences within the period of two years before the conviction of the offence for which he or she is to be sentenced, the person is to be sentenced for a 'repeated breach'’ (see at [12]). This did not apply to the appellant. As such, under s 6(4) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) the Court cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it concludes that it is justified by the seriousness of the offence or the protection of the community. This offence was serious (see at [4]). However, Allanson J concluded that a sentence of imprisonment was not the only appropriate penalty. His Honour noted (at [19]) various mitigating factors including the appellant’s youth ([19]) and the fact that no violence nor threats of violence were involved in the offending. Therefore, it could not be said that the protection of the community or the protected person required a sentence of imprisonment. The Magistrate also did not refer to the plea of guilty as a mitigating factor. The sentence was set aside and sent back to the Magistrates’ Court for re-sentencing and his Honour stated at [23] that a community based order may be appropriate.
Brown v Bluett [2013] WASC 189 (14 May 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Repeated breaches of a restraining order’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm, breach of violence restraining order (x 3).
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: A violence restraining order was obtained by the female victim against the male, Aboriginal appellant. This included conditions prohibiting the appellant from communicating or attempting communication with the victim, from remaining on premises where the victim lived or worked and from remaining within 10 metres of the victim. The first breach of the restraining order occurred at a Native Title meeting where the appellant spoke to the victim. He also assaulted her by hitting her on the back of the head with a jaffle iron. The second breach occurred when the appellant went to the victim’s home and persuaded her to take him to Meekatharra. Finally, the appellant breached the order by ringing the victim on 52 occasions and also by persuading the victim to drive him to Bondini Reserve. In sentencing, the magistrate noted that the appellant had pleaded guilty immediately and was entitled to a reduction of a maximum of 25% as provided for by s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. Her Honour took the maximum penalties as a starting point and reduced these by 25% in imposing sentences. This resulted in a head sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in the application of the Sentencing Act in particular by construing it as requiring a (potentially) significant increase in the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed and a starting point being the maximum penalty open to the court.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The respondent conceded that the magistrate's interpretation of s 9AA was erroneous and that the appeal ought to be allowed. That concession was properly made. The magistrate’s application of the Sentencing Act was erroneous and the error resulted in a sentence beyond the range of sentences customarily imposed for offences of this type. The appellant was resentenced.
In resentencing the appellant, Allanson J noted that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was the only penalty appropriate in light of repeated violations of a restraining order and one act of significant violence. His Honour provided:
‘The law is limited in the manner in which it can respond to domestic violence. One important part of that response is by the issue of violence restraining orders. It is essential that those orders are not ignored. When they are repeatedly breached, the need for general and individual deterrence will ordinarily outweigh subjective and other mitigating considerations’ (See [16]).
The offence of assault was a serious example of its kind as it involved a blow to the victim’s head and was committed with an object capable of causing serious injury (See [17]-[18]). The breaches of the restraining order did not in themselves involve acts of violence but it was particularly serious that in each of the last two offences the appellant was breaching the order soon after appearing in court in relation to the first breach (See [19]). The appellant had made some attempt to turn his life around but the mitigating weight of this factor was limited by the nature of the offending and the need to emphasise the importance of complying with the restraining order (See [21]-[22]). Taking these factors into account and with the full benefit of the 25% reduction, Allanson J imposed a head sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
Hamlett v Whitney [2013] WASC 100 (22 March 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Breach of bail (x 2), breach of protective conditions.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was on bail for a charge of common assault in circumstances of aggravation namely, that the appellant was in a domestic relationship with the female complainant. The appellant’s bail was subject to a number of conditions including that he was not to contact or attempt to contact the complainant, he was not to approach within 20 metres of an address at which the complainant was living, and he was not to behave in a provocative or offensive manner to residents at that house. The applicant was subsequently charged with breach of protective bail conditions when he verbally abused and threatened the complainant at Centrelink offices. He was further charged with a number of offences of stealing and aggravated burglary and failed to appear in Court after being released on bail. He was charged with two breach of bail offences.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the breach of protective bail conditions and the two other charges of breach of bail. In sentencing, the magistrate noted: ‘Protective bail is placed on people for a purpose and that is to protect the victim, the person who is protected by the protective bail; and people who breach protective bail, like people who breach restraining orders, in a manner that you did, that is, actually threatening the protected persons, in my view ought be sentenced to a term of imprisonment […] These three offences, in my view, show a total disregard for court orders. There really is nothing that can be said by way of mitigation in relation to this offending. Ms Svanberg has pressed upon me that when you breached your protective bail you were intoxicated, but being intoxicated may explain why you breached your protective bail and why you breached your normal bail undertakings but it doesn't excuse your behaviour. The fact of the matter is you were on protective bail for a reason and you breached it’ (See [17]). The appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 months and 1 day.
Issue/s: The appellant did not suggest that the 4-month sentence for the breach of protective bail conditions was excessive. The sentences of imprisonment for the other two offences were manifestly excessive. Further, the total effective sentence was disproportionate to the total criminality and therefore offends the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was refused. In light of the maximum penalties available, the seriousness of the offences, and the personal circumstances of the appellant the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The total effective sentence was also not disproportionate to the total offending (See [35]).
Rowe v Gaunt [2013] WASC 90 (20 March 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Expiration of restraining order’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’
Charge/s: Breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An interim violence restraining order was granted which prohibited the appellant from approaching within 5m of any premises where the protected person lived or worked. This order was later made final. The appellant was charged with breaching the order by going to the house of the protected person and placing a letter in the letterbox. She pleaded guilty and was convicted. However, the police later became aware that the order had expired when the offence occurred.
Issue/s: Whether the conviction should be set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court set aside the conviction because the conviction amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Hall J noted the following at [13] –
‘I am compelled to note that this is the second occasion in recent times on which I have been called upon to set aside a conviction for breach of a violence restraining order where the alleged breach has occurred after the order has expired. See Topic v Lynch [2012] WASC 446.It is of course a necessary element of an offence under s 61 of the Act that there be a restraining order in force at the time the breach is alleged to have occurred. It is always possible that a protected person may complain to the police on the basis of a mistaken belief that a restraining order is still in force. Care must be taken to ensure that that is the case.’
Cramphorn v Bailey [2012] WASC 462 (30 November 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Whether police restraining order must be served on the protected person’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Breaching a police order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against convictions.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with a Mr Michalaros. While driving her car, the appellant punched Mr Michalaros in the face. There was evidence that Mr Michalaros was the subject of a restraining order in favour of the appellant.
The police attended and issued the appellant with a police order, with one of the conditions to not contact Mr Michalaros for a 24-hour period. Mr Michalaros alleged that she sent him threatening text messages in breach of the order.
The appellant was convicted following a trial and was fined a total of $1,300 and granted a spent conviction order.
Issues: Multiple grounds, including that the restraining order was invalid because the police did not serve Mr Michalaros with a copy.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant was a self-represented litigant. The judge rejected all grounds of appeal. In relation to the argument that the police order was invalid the judge stated:
It would be contrary to the purposes of the ROA (Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)) if the validity of an order depended upon service on the protected person. There could be circumstances where the police have grounds to issue a police order but where the protected person cannot be located or it is impractical to serve a copy upon him or her. Given the shortness of time for which such orders remain current and the urgent circumstances in which they must often be made, it would produce consequences that are contrary to the purposes of the ROA if an order only became effective when a copy was served on the protected person. This is a procedural requirement only and not one upon which the validity of an order depends.
Harrison v Hunter [2012] WASC 166 (30 April 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Interests of child’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Subsequent engagement in family violence programme’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship for almost three years. They had a daughter. The complainant and daughter were financially and emotionally dependent on the appellant. The appellant returned from work intoxicated. An argument developed. The appellant struck the complainant to the face with a closed fist. No injuries were caused by the blow. The matter was resolved by a plea of guilty, at the earliest reasonable opportunity. When his Honour, Chief Justice Martin, considered the seriousness of the offence he noted at [27]:
“The offence committed by the appellant in this case was serious. Domestic violence is an offence that rightly provokes community condemnation and rightly requires courts to respond to the community abhorrence of such offending by imposing sentences that are commensurate with the seriousness with which the community rightly regards this type of offence.”
Despite those observations, his Honour considered that the 8 month term of imprisonment could be suspended for 12 months for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was in the best interests of the complainant and her child, cohabiting with the appellant, that he not be imprisoned: [33]. Secondly, the appellant had attended eight sessions of a family violence programme: [38]. His Honour stated that the offence was not in the upper range of seriousness: [15].
Kjellgren v Cameron [2012] WASC 80 (1 March 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with the complainant for about four months. The appellant was intoxicated and following a dispute, he was arrested and ordered not to approach the caravan park where the complainant was residing. After being released, he knocked on the door of the complainant’s caravan and verbally abused her, threatened her and punched her to the face multiple times. He then knocked her to the ground. He stopped her from escaping. She was left with serious injuries. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
McKechnie J acknowledged the seriousness of the offence especially considering it amounted to a deliberate breach of a police order. This type of violence to women cannot be condoned and as such a sentence of immediate imprisonment was appropriate. However at [11]-[16], his Honour considered various comparable cases and came to the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive. His Honour especially had regard to Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63 where it was held that an 18-month sentence for aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (including other charges) was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending. Nevertheless, general and specific deterrence and the significant injuries that the complainant suffered remained important considerations. The appellant was re-sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63 (24 February 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to injure’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault, threat to injure, three counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (circumstances of aggravation: that the appellant was in a family or domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant engaged in a verbal argument with his wife. The appellant punched and grabbed the side of her face. She attempted to escape, at which point he threatened to kill her, grabbed her around the neck and stabbed her with a screwdriver. She feared for her life. The appellant then bit her twice and told his son who was attempting to stop the assault to get away several times. The appellant had a serious drug problem and the offending occurred while he was under the influence of drugs. He had prior convictions for violent offences but they did not involve domestic violence. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 18 months’ imprisonment for all offences.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the total aggregate sentence infringed the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
The Court firstly noted that the offending was sustained, premediated and ferocious. It occurred in the family home in the presence of two young children.
The appellant submitted inter alia that the sentences should have been made concurrent because they constituted a single course of conduct. The Court rejected this argument and held that the so called ‘one transaction rule’ is a general rule and the operative question is whether the total effective sentence properly reflects the overall criminality involved. In this case, the course of conduct had distinct features which increased in seriousness over time so it was open to the Magistrate to impose some cumulative penalties.
The appellant also submitted that the Magistrate erred by giving the appellant’s criminal record undue weight, given it did not involve domestic violence. This argument was rejected – the Magistrate correctly stated that the record showed a lack of mitigation in that the appellant did not have past good character. Hall J was of the view that there is little merit in distinguishing past violent offending as irrelevant if it is not committed in domestic circumstances. These offences do have relevance, not necessarily as showing a tendency but in showing ‘an absence of mitigation as to past good character’ (see at [31]).
Another issue concerned whether the Magistrate erred by not having sufficient regard to the appellant’s longstanding relationship with his wife, the fact they have dependent children as well as his wife’s wishes. His wife filed an affidavit on appeal indicating that the appellant’s imprisonment was causing her extreme hardship. Her mortgage was in arrears. If the appellant was released, she claimed that there would be the prospect that the appellant would obtain employment so the arrears could be paid. The appellant and his wife were migrants and she had no wider family in Australia. The Court referred to McLure P’s remarks in The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) and held that the wishes of victims of domestic violence for reconciliation has to be seen in context. Offenders cannot expect leniency because their punishment impacts others. While this issue could be relevant in some cases, it should not have been given much weight in this case.
The appellant also submitted that the fact he had successfully completed three community based orders should have been afforded more weight by the Magistrate. This argument was rejected – the Court held that the mitigatory effect of past completion of community orders can be diminished by reoffending. Reoffending can put into doubt whether the order was successful in bringing about attitudinal and behavioural change (see at [37]).
In relation to the presence of the children at the time of the offending, while it was not included as a formal circumstance of aggravation, it was open to take these facts into account (see at [41]).
The Court then noted that there was no history of domestic violence but the offending was serious and justified immediate imprisonment. In applying comparable cases, the Court concluded that the aggregate sentence was particularly high and did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offending. In noting that the appellant had apologised, expressed remorse, expressed a wish to assist his wife with the mortgage and children and that he had his wife’s support, the total aggregate sentence was reduced to 15 months’ imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
Musgrove v Millard [2012] WASC 60 (22 February 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Unlawful installation of a tracking device’
Charge/s: 113 offences including: Stalking, unlawful installation of a tracking device, breach of violence restraining order (104 counts), breaching a protective bail condition (7 counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was served with an interim restraining order prohibiting him from communicating with his former partner in any way. In breach of this order, he attended her address and/or workplace, sent her a number of text messages and unlawfully installed a tracking device on her vehicle. This conduct also comprised the stalking offence. Later, the applicant called his for partner 80 times. The Magistrate noted that there were a significant number of offences committed over an extended period which had a considerable impact on the victim. A total effective sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was imposed which comprised of 8 months’ imprisonment for stalking, 4 months’ imprisonment for unlawfully installing the tracking device (to be served cumulatively on the sentence for stalking) and 4 months’ imprisonment for 15 convictions including breaching bail conditions and the restraining order. All the other convictions for breaching the restraining order were to be served concurrently for the stalking offence.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in making the sentence for unlawfully installing a tracking device cumulative upon the sentence imposed for stalking - the conduct which formed the basis of the stalking charge including the installation of the tracking device, such that a cumulative sentence resulted in the applicant being punished twice for the same conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was granted and the appeal was upheld.
The Court noted the ‘complexities’ involved in this issue and found it was not necessary to be resolved directly because of the application of the ‘common elements principle’ which states ‘when two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements… it would be wrong to punish that offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common’ (see, for example Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610). This principle applied directly to this case. The facts indicated that the conduct which formed the basis of the tracking device charge was the same conduct, ‘which was part of the conduct relied upon to support the stalking charge’ (see at [40]). This falls directly within the common elements principle.
The Court found that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice caused by this error. The application of the common elements principle means that there could have been no additional punishment for the unlawful installation of the tracking device. As such, the 4-month sentence for the surveillance device offence was made concurrent, which resulted in the overall sentence being reduced to 12 months.
Stokes v Auckland [2012] WASC 2 (10 January 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘substance abuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant, (an Aboriginal man) engaged in an argument with his de facto partner. He punched her in the head multiple times until she fell over. He dragged her by the hair to a nearby tap to wash the blood off her. The appellant was very intoxicated at the time. He had a significant history of alcohol and drug abuse and violence including prior convictions for violent offences against the complainant. In fact, the offending was committed while he was subject to three suspended sentences relating to offences committed against the complainant. The complainant wished to continue her relationship with the appellant and at one stage indicated that she did not want to proceed with the charges. However, the appellant pleaded guilty at an early stage and was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment. He was also re-sentenced for the suspended sentences which resulted in a total effective sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the plea of guilty was made under duress and did not reflect his acceptance of the facts alleged by the prosecution.
2.
Whether the sentence of 16 months for the latest assault was manifestly excessive and whether the total effective sentence was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [23]-[32].
2.
Hall J accepted the Magistrate’s conclusion with respect to the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct. His Honour then noted that the attack was ‘prolonged’, instigated by the appellant and aggravated by the fact that it was committed notwithstanding previous court orders imposed for similar offending. This showed a disregard for the law and a need for a personal deterrent. Hall J noted that other than the early plea of guilty, there was little by way of mitigation. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant was intoxicated when the offence was committed was not mitigatory, as the appellant was ‘acutely aware that alcohol was a risk factor in respect of his past offending behaviour’ (see at [41]). In relation to the complainant’s wishes for reconciliation, his Honour noted McLure P’s remarks in The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) and held that, ‘An otherwise appropriate penalty should not be reduced on account of an expression of willingness on the part of the complainant, for whatever reason, to forgive the offender and continue a relationship with him’ (see at [43]).
As such, the Court held that while the one-month sentence was at the higher end of the range for offences of this kind, it was within the Magistrate’s discretion, having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the need for personal and general deterrence. In relation to totality, the Court held that the earlier offences were separate and unrelated to the latest assault. It was appropriate to activate these suspended sentences and orders of cumulation did not make the total effective sentence disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending.
Corrigan v Kirkman [2011] WASC 254 (11 July 2011) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated common assault’ – ‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Aggravated commons assault, breaches of violence restraining orders, breaches of protective bail conditions.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offences related to a female complainant, with whom the appellant had been in a domestic relationship with. The appellant committed 29 breaches of a violence restraining order which prohibited the appellant, amongst other things, from communicating with the complainant. He did so by communicating with her by mobile phone (the ‘VRO offences’). He also committed four offences of breach of protective bail conditions by being 50-100 metres of the complainant on three occasions and by sending her a text message on one occasion (the ‘bail offences’). Finally, the applicant committed one offence of common assault in circumstances of aggravation at the same time as one of the bail offences. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to a total effective term of 12 months’ imprisonment, made up as follows: on aggravated assault 8 months’ imprisonment, one of the bail offences 4 months’ imprisonment (concurrent), 2 of the bail offences 4 months’ imprisonment (cumulative), one of the bail offences 2 months’ imprisonment (concurrent), and VRO offences 6 months’ imprisonment concurrent.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the total sentence was contrary to the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The total effective sentence in this case was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending behaviour. The aggravating circumstances in respect of the assault offence, i.e. the breaches of the VRO and protective bail conditions, called for concurrency between the sentence on that offence and all other sentences. There should have been partial concurrency or a reduction in the length of sentence to avoid multiple punishment for these acts (See [97]-[99]).
Isenhood v Green [2011] WASC 70 (10 February 2011) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Prejudicial material in victim impact statement’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threats to injure’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order, making threats to injure.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the ex-partner of the appellant’s current partner. There was one daughter of that relationship. The appellant’s partner remained principally responsible for the welfare of the daughter. This meant that the appellant and the complainant often had contact with each other. Events at the complainant’s home prompted the complainant to seek a violence restraining order (VRO) on behalf of his daughter against the appellant, to prevent the appellant from committing an act of abuse against his daughter and from ‘behaving in a way that could reasonably be expected to cause fear that the child will be exposed to an act of family and domestic violence’ (see at [4]). The complainant then later obtained another VRO which prevented the appellant from communicating in any way with him. The appellant then made repeated telephone calls to the complainant and threatened to kill him and his daughter, which constituted both the breach and threat to injure charges. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment on each of the charges, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred by taking into account hearsay and irrelevant material in the victim impact statement.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred by taking into account prior property damage offences in concluding that the appellant has the potential to act violently in the future.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues one and two.
1.
Firstly, Jenkins J noted that the breach offence was not at the upper range because it did not involve any physical contact or actual violence. However, it was not trivial and included a threat of actual violence. Furthermore, there were no significant mitigating factors – the appellant had six prior convictions for breaching a VRO, was not remorseful and the previous penalties imposed had clearly not been effective as a personal deterrent. Notwithstanding, there were no attempts to carry through with the threats and no indication that the appellant intended to do so. Also, the appellant was no longer in a relationship with his partner and had ceased contact with the complainant’s daughter.
2.
The victim impact statement detailed the history of the dispute between the appellant and complainant from the complainant’s point of view. The appellant described it as ‘inflammatory’ and Jenkins J agreed with that description. The appellant was not given an opportunity to respond to the matters in the statement. The respondent conceded that the Magistrate should not have taken these matters into account. The Magistrate needed to make clear that these matters were not taken into account.
3.
Jenkins J held that it was ‘drawing too long a bow’ to suggest that the appellant’s violent attack on an ATM machine was reason to believe that he may attack people in the future. However, this of itself was not cause to allow the appeal as no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred.
The appellant was re-sentenced to a 12-month intensive supervision order which included programs to address anger management and alcohol abuse.
Morgan v Kazandzis [2010] WASC 377 (10 December 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm (x 2).
Appeal type: Appeals against conviction and sentence.
Facts: One of the appeals concerned two occasions where the appellant, an aboriginal man, unlawfully assaulted the victim who he was in a family and domestic relationship with. They were living at the Oombulgurri Aboriginal Community, and the victim was pregnant to the appellant. On both occasions, the victim, bleeding, with multiple injuries to her face and head, sought assistance from the police at the police facility. The victim told the police she was afraid of the appellant and wanted to get away from Oombulgurri. The police arranged for an aeroplane to take the victim to another centre for a time. The appellant was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment and 15 months’ imprisonment on each charge respectively. In light of the nature and seriousness of the offences, the Magistrate determined an immediate sentence of imprisonment was required.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
The learned magistrate erred by failing to suspend the terms of imprisonment imposed, when:
1.
the learned magistrate failed to give consideration to whether the terms ought to be suspended; and
2.
a suspension of the sentence was open in all of the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. These were serious offences committed by the appellant, who had two recent convictions of aggravated assault causing bodily harm. The violent conduct towards the victim was repeated less than five weeks later and the victim had a well-founded fear of the appellant. The victim was vulnerable as she was much younger than the appellant, had been in a relationship with him and was pregnant (see at [69], [72]).
‘Violent treatment of women in this fashion cannot be tolerated anywhere in the State, but it is of particular importance that in isolated communities such as Oombulgurri that the punishment of an offender who commits such offences in a short space of time should be such as to demonstrate to all members of the community that that conduct is unlawful and that effective punishment will be imposed in order to deter the general community from the use of violence. Specific deterrence of the individual offender was, in this case, also a necessary and essential ingredient of the sentence’ [72].
A longer term of imprisonment was warranted on the second offence because it was more serious in that it was a repetition of the same unlawful conduct, and it was an unrelated offence.
Baudoeuf v Venning [2010] WASC 322 (17 November 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Extenuating circumstances’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order, breach of suspended imprisonment order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant (aged 24) was the subject of a violence restraining order (VRO) in favour of the protected person (aged 52). They had been living together in an ‘off and on’ de facto relationship for about 18 months. The protected person had unsuccessfully applied to the Magistrates’ Court to have the order withdrawn. The breach occurred when the appellant had been living with the protected person for three days. An argument occurred, the police were called and the appellant was arrested. There was a history of violence in the relationship and the order had been breached four times in the past. According to a psychiatric report, the appellant presented with a ‘schizo-affective disorder, an ADHD history, personality disorders and mental retardation’ (see at [11]). Despite the orders being in place, it was the protected person who repeatedly invited the appellant back to live with her which constituted the repeated breaches. The breach of the VRO also constituted a breach of a suspended imprisonment order which had been imposed in relation to a prior breach in respect of the same protected person. He was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment for both offences, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing immediate sentences of imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
At trial, the Magistrate concluded that the psychiatric evidence did not support a conclusion that the appellant’s mental illness or disturbance led to the commission of the offences. She concluded that the ‘non-aggressive resumptions of cohabitation’ (by the appellant) were ‘part of a course of conduct over which the appellant could and should have exercised restraint and control in obedience to the VRO’ (see at [42]). Em Heenan J held that this amounted to an error of fact and that his breaches could ‘to a material degree’ be explained by his history of mental illness (see at [44]). The appellant’s mental health problems, in combination with significant personal stress related to his relationship with the victim ‘impaired his ability to exercise appropriate judgment and his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, so contributing causally to the commission of the offence’ (see at [48]). This reduction in culpability could lead to a reduction in the severity of the sentence and this was not sufficiently taken into account by the Magistrate. The appellant was re-sentenced as follows – no punishment was imposed in relation to the earlier breach. A conditional period of suspended imprisonment for 7 months (wholly suspended for 9 months) was imposed for the later breach.
Lutey v Jacques [2010] WASC 78 (28 April 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat of self-harm’
Charge/s: Breach of a violence restraining order (VRO).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of breaching a VRO. Only the second count was the subject of the appeal. The appellant’s relationship with the complainant had recently ended. He was served with a VRO which prohibited him from contacting her by any means and from entering or being within 200m of any place where she lived or worked. The second breach of the order (the subject of the appeal) occurred when the appellant attended the Karratha Women’s Refuge (where the complainant was staying) and wrote in the dust on the rear window of her car – ‘I am a dead man walking’. He later returned to rub the message off. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred by failing to adequately consider sentences other than imprisonment.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 2.
1.
The Court held that the Magistrate did sufficiently have regard to the possibility of other sentencing options, such as an intensive supervision order or a fine.
2.
Simmonds J firstly noted that the maximum penalty for breaching a restraining order had been increased which indicates Parliament’s intention is that the courts regard these offences more seriously. At [53]-[61], his Honour provided a summary of relevant authorities. He stated at [61] that these authorities (decided before the increase in penalty) take the following approach in sentencing breaches of VROs –
‘The approach is one recognising that the Act is social legislation of the utmost importance as part of the legal response to domestic violence: Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 [13] (Miller J); it is essential the courts ensure their orders are not ignored: Kenny v Lewis (Unreported, WASC, Library No 990113, 12 March 1999) (Kennedy J) 10; and violence restraining orders are notoriously difficult to enforce, and the need for general and individual deterrence will ordinarily outweigh subjective or other mitigating considerations: Dominik v Volpi [2004] WASCA 18[80] (Roberts-Smith J).’
However, this does not mean that a custodial sentence will be appropriate in all cases. Simmonds J found that there are various circumstances which made this offence of a less serious kind. The appellant was surprised that the relationship had ended. There was no indication of any ‘offence or serious misconduct’ that led to the making of the VRO. Furthermore, the appellant made no attempt to enter the refuge and there was no threatening or intimidatory conduct. However, the complainant had recently been hospitalised for heart treatment. The respondent submitted that this as well as the fact that she was living in a refuge was relevant to assessing the seriousness of the offence. Simmonds J found that while these factors would make the offence more serious, evidence of the subjective impact on the complainant would be needed (see at [70]).
The respondent also submitted that the message left on the car might indicate a potential for the appellant to self-harm. His Honour then referred to the equivalent Victorian legislation which defines ‘emotional abuse’ (see at [71]) and accepted that a threat of self-harm intending to or producing the effect of causing distress or hurt to someone is a factor capable of aggravating the offence of breaching a VRO. However, in this case there was no evidence pointing to a threat of self-harm made with that intention or effect. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant’s counsel referred to the protected person as the ‘complainant’ at trial did not of itself show that she suffered distress or hurt (see at [72]). In fact, the Court accepted that this potential for self-harm indicated the presence of a mental condition which contributed to the offending, notwithstanding the absence of a report from any mental health professional. This lessened the weight to be assigned to general and specific deterrence (see at [93] – [94]).
The respondent submitted that the offences occurred in the remote Pilbara region which had the second highest rates of violence against women in the state. There was data before the Court indicating that remote areas have about five times the rate of domestic violence compared to capitals. His Honour responded to this submission at [81] –
‘I accept without deciding that I can take judicial notice of these matters, and that I should regard them as going to the prevalence of offences of domestic violence to which the Restraining Orders Act is part of the legal response. On the relevance of the prevalence of offending of a particular type, see Yates v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 144[55] (Steytler P), [94] (McLure JA). I also accept without deciding that sentences for the same offending committed in different parts of the state may be affected by differences in the prevalence of that offence in those parts of those magnitudes.’
This could result in the offence being viewed more seriously than otherwise. However, given that there was no element of physical threat or intimidation, the offence remained less serious (see at [82]). The Court held that the main mitigating factor was the appellant’s plea of guilty. Given this and the mental condition as discussed above, the Court concluded that the sentence was manifestly excessive and stated that a community based order was likely to be appropriate.
Sakkers v Thornton [2009] WASC 175 (22 June 2009) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Concurrency’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Possession of firearm’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (circumstance of aggravation – that the offence was committed in breach of a violence restraining order), breach of violence restraining order (12 counts), possession of firearm with circumstances of aggravation.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with the complainant for three years which ended. The appellant then continually sent emails and text messages to the complainant (including at her workplace) and made threats to kill her. The complainant obtained a violence restraining order (VRO) which prevented the appellant from communicating with her by any means. His conduct then continued in breach of the order. He was arrested and Police found a firearm and ammunition at his home. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for the stalking charge, a global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for the breach offences (cumulative on the sentence for stalking) and 7 months and 2 weeks’ imprisonment for the possession of firearm offence.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned -
1.
Concurrency: Whether the sentence imposed for the breach offences should have been made concurrent with the sentence for the stalking offence because both offences involved the same acts.
2.
Totality: Whether the Magistrate failed to have proper regard to the totality principle.
3.
Whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
4.
Whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 1.
1.
The prosecution conceded that the appeal on the issue of concurrency must succeed. Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 provides that a person is not to be sentenced twice on the same evidence. Simmonds J stated at [22] – ‘Here the offence of aggravated stalking was constituted by the course of conduct whose constituents were the 12 breaches of the violence restraining order. The sentences for the 12 breaches of violence restraining order, globally, are the same as the sentence for the aggravated stalking.’ As such, the global sentence for the breach offences was set aside.
2.
The appellant submitted that a total effective sentence (without the sentence for the breach offences) of 19 months and 2 weeks was a crushing sentence and was not a just measure of the criminality involved. Simmonds J acknowledged that the Magistrate failed to recognise an overlap in the criminality between the stalking and breach offences, in that he did not have regard to the issue of double punishment, as noted above. However, this did not result in the sentence infringing the totality principle.
3.
An argument that the sentences for the aggravated stalking and firearms offences were manifestly excessive was dismissed. The appellant had some modest criminal history which did not involve violence. While he pleaded guilty, he showed minimal insight into his actions or empathy towards the victim. Simmonds J also noted the seriousness of the offending. In comparing analogous cases (see [70]-[72] for summaries) his Honour concluded that the sentence was within range.
4.
The Magistrate did not suspend the sentence because he was concerned that a suspended sentence would act as a sufficient deterrent to the appellant and would not provide adequate protection for the victim, as well as other matters. This approach was appropriate and this ground was dismissed.
Paskov v Hull [2008] WASC 163 (28 July 2008) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Proximity of offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Two counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (aggravating factor: that the applicant was in a domestic relationship with the victim), escaping from lawful custody, failure to comply with bail conditions.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had an argument with the complainant (his de facto partner). The applicant then pushed the back of her head into a window which caused the window to smash and the complainant to fall on the ground. He then dragged her out of a door and kicked and punched her multiple times which caused her head to hit a railing, at which point she passed out. The applicant then evaded arrested for some days. After being granted bail, he phoned the complainant in breach of protective bail conditions. The second assault occurred 6 months later. The applicant became aggressive and dropped the complainant onto the ground and kicked her repeatedly in the rib area. He also used a ring on his left hand to gouge her left eye, resulting in a bruised and swollen eye and a cut to the eyeball. He had long standing problems with drug and alcohol abuse. His criminal history included a violent offence in a previous de facto relationship. He was sentenced to an effective term of 2 years and 2 months’ imprisonment. The sentences for the escaping custody and second aggravated assault offences were made cumulative.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in making the sentences for the second count of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm and escaping custody cumulative because the offences occurred on the same day.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused.
1.
Hasluck J noted that the offences were particularly serious. The Magistrate gave appropriate consideration to this as well as to personal and general deterrence. This was, ‘apt in respect of a severe attack on a defenceless woman who was in a relationship with the applicant, especially when the attacks were sustained and persistent’ (see at [52]). As such, the sentences could not be described as manifestly excessive.
2.
The Court held that there was a separation in time between the offences and they were of a different kind. Hasluck J referred to the ‘common elements principle’ and acknowledged that it would be wrong two punish an offender twice where ‘there is essentially one transaction or commonality is evident’ but that this did not arise on the facts (see at [51]).
Elliot v Blanchard [2007] WASC 289 (14 November 2007) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (circumstance of aggravation: that the appellant was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in an intimate personal relationship with the complainant after meeting on the internet. The appellant was intoxicated. An argument occurred and the appellant verbally abused the complainant. He then pushed her into a chair, threatened to kill her and grabbed her around the throat almost to the point of making her lose consciousness. He repeatedly slapped her face and choked her for several minutes. He threw her into a bed before dragging her by the arms into another room. The appellant then calmed down and stated that the complainant was free to leave but informed her that he was in possession of two firearms. The complainant made him dinner to pacify him and eventually managed to escape. The appellant later left a message on her phone in which he apologised for hitting her. She sustained various injuries including bruising and swelling. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of other issues such as the weight given to the plea of guilty and the time already spent in custody and the sentence was reduced by 1.5 months. In relation to the issue of manifest excess, the appellant emphasised the effect of alcohol and prescribed medication which he was taking as well as his prior good character, remorse and progress in rehabilitation. However, McKechnie J held that the Magistrate was not in error. While this was the appellant’s first violent offence, he had a number of previous offences of driving while intoxicated and on the day of the offending he had been fined $8000 for other offences which he had committed while intoxicated. The Magistrate did sufficiently take the appellant’s remorse into account. His Honour also noted that there is no offence of domestic violence. It is a term which ‘euphemistically describes serious criminal conduct’ (see at [10]). In this case, the offending was particularly serious. The sentence was appropriate, taking into account the public interest in general deterrence and just punishment.
Gilmour v State of Western Australia [2005] WASC 243 (8 November 2005) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, breach of violence restraining order, attempt to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal of bail.
Facts: The decision concerned a bail application arising from three charged offences following the estrangement of the applicant from his second wife. The first alleged offence was the theft of mail from the complainant by the applicant. The second alleged offence was the commencement of a series of events said to amount to stalking. Some of these events included the applicant damaging the property of the complainant’s male friend, and the male friend obtaining a violence restraining order which the applicant subsequently breached. The applicant also became involved in an altercation with the complainant and she obtained a violence restraining order against him. The applicant stole items of women’s clothing from the complainant’s home, stole a security camera the complainant had installed, and was seen in the complainant’s backyard disguised with a mask and carrying a knife. The third offence occurred when the applicant asked his neighbours to provide him with a false alibi for the evening he was seen in the complainant’s yard wearing a mask and carrying a knife.
Issue/s: Whether there were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The applicant had not made out exceptional reasons for the grant of bail in this case. The character of factors pointing towards the grant of bail, namely, hardship to the applicant, the applicant’s antecedents, and the likely time before trial, were not sufficient to establish exceptional reasons. This was particularly so when weighed against the strength of the State’s case, the adverse effects on protected persons of a release on bail, the concern for the failure of achievement of the purposes of protection orders in this case, and any difficulties in proving any future breach of a protective order (See [69]). See also Gilmour v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 42 (28 February 2008).
Family Court
Ahmed and Gupta [2020] FCWA 140 (31 August 2020) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to extended family’ – ‘Use of threats by extended family’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Issue: What is the appropriate parenting arrangement for the children of Mr Ahmed and Ms Gupta?
Facts: Ahmed and Gupta are the mother and father of Child A and Child B, two girls aged four and three years respectively. Both parents are from Country A where they had an arranged marriage in 2013. After the birth of Child A, the mother and Child A moved to Perth to join the father in 2016. Less than a year later the parties separated. Child B was born after separation. The mother alleges a history of sexual and physical violence and controlling and coercive behaviour by the father. The mother alleged the father locked her in the house and only allowed her to leave once a week in company with him. Both parties alleged that the other’s extended families had engaged in threatening behaviours and legal proceedings towards each other’s extended families in country A and there was dispute as to whether these proceedings were ongoing. The father strongly denies the mother's allegations. Against the background of these contested allegations and other family and cultural issues, the Court is asked to determine the parenting arrangements for the children. Currently the children live with the mother and spend a few hours each fortnight with the father.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court considered the mother’s allegations that she was subjected to controlling and isolating behaviour by the father. The mother alleged there was a hidden camera in the home and that the father or Mr B always listened to her conversations. The mother alleged Mr B was violent towards her and at times she was alone in the house with him.
The Court, while unable to make findings on each finding of family violence, was satisfied that the mother has been the victim of family violence as defined in s 4AB(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). It was accepted that the father controlled and coerced the mother, that he controlled her financially and isolated her from others, and that the father's behaviour towards the mother caused her to be fearful of him.
It was ordered on the basis of this coercive relationship that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the long-term care, welfare and development of the children, the children reside with the mother and the father have contact, and there were also orders for a review of the orders in twelve months.
Shelley and Dickens [2020] FCWA 52 (3 April 2020) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: Ms Shelley (mother) and Mr Dickens (father) had a short relationship which ended when G (their child) was 18 days old. Since that point, G has lived with the mother and spent limited time with the father. The mother and father each seek an order that G live with them.
The mother’s case is that the father has physically, sexually and emotionally harmed G and he poses an unacceptable risk of harm. She says the father has perpetrated significant and sustained family violence towards her during their relationship. The father’s case is that the mother has emotionally and psychologically harmed G, by fabricating and repeatedly raising false allegations against him, by failing to comply with orders to facilitate G’s relationship with him and through her failure to adequately provide for G’s needs in terms of her education and health. He alleges he was the victim of family violence perpetrated by the mother.
The parties agree that their relationship involved family violence, but largely deny the allegations of the other.
Decision and reasoning: It was accepted that the child, G, is at risk of psychological harm — as well as exposure to physical violence — both with the mother and the father.
Orders were made to the effect that:
•
All previous parenting orders in relation to [G] born [in] 2011 be discharged.
•
The mother and father are to communicate by way of email in relation to [G], with all emails to be copied onto the ICL.
•
[G] live with the mother.
•
G spend time with her father as specified in the orders (at [306]).
The Court was satisfied that the father was the perpetrator of physical violence, which included the mother suffering significant injuries including two broken teeth and two broken wrists. During the parties’ arguments, particularly on the yacht, there were occasions when the fights escalated and the father physically restrained the mother, to protect himself and prevent her from assaulting him. In doing so, the mother suffered injuries and property belonging to her was damaged. The father’s reactions to the mother were physically abusive and aggressive.
The father was also found to have behaved in a controlling and coercive manner, which falls within the definition of family violence. For example, he prevented the mother talking to her family by removing the telephone from her on the yacht; he demanded the mother answer his calls when in hospital after G’s birth and suggested the maternal grandmother required his permission to provide assistance with meals after G was born.
The Court was also satisfied that the mother has perpetrated acts of family violence against the father. For instance, she has yelled, sworn and called him names. She has hit him and kicked him. She has instigated arguments and attempted to prevent him from leaving. It was accepted that the father suffered injuries including bruises and a bloodied lip, and had property damaged by the mother.
Orders were made to the effect that:
•
All previous parenting orders in relation to [G] born [in] 2011 be discharged.
•
The mother and father are to communicate by way of email in relation to [G], with all emails to be copied onto the ICL.
•
[G] live with the mother.
•
G spend time with her father as specified in the orders (at [306]).
Breckenridge & Kudrna [2019] FCWA 9 (10 January 2019) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Psychological harm’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children and sought parenting orders. The mother maintained that she and the children now suffered significant mental health issues because of the father’s alleged physical and psychological abuse. The father denied these allegations and instead claimed that the mother’s own serious mental health issues have harmed, and continue to harm, the children. Each parent sought orders according sole responsibility of the children and allowing the other parent to have limited supervised visits.
The mother’s mental health issues created evidential gaps and several contradictions in the evidence she provided. Sutherland J was satisfied that the mother and the children’s psychologist had effectively coached the children to corroborate her story given their impressionable age.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate in the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Sutherland J’s reasoning was guided by Part 5 of the Family Court Act 1997 (‘the Act’)and the Full Court’s decision in Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 and consequently concerned the underlying presumption that ‘it is in the best interest of the child that the child’s parents have equal shared parental responsibility, subject to the qualifications set out in the relevant section’. Sutherland J provided in relation to this presumption:
‘should I make an order for equal shared parental responsibility then I must also consider the obligations placed upon me by s 89AA of the Act which requires me to then consider whether the child should spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent.
In determining the outcome of these parenting matters, I must, pursuant to s 66A of the Act, consider the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration. In determining what is in a child’s best interests, I must consider the matters set out in s 66C of the Act.’ [197]-[198]
Sutherland J ordered that the father was to have sole parental responsibility for the children, for Child A to receive continued therapeutic support from Child A’s psychologist, and for the mother to eventually be allowed supervised visits. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply for the following reasons: (1) Sutherland J was not satisfied that the mother experienced any family violence and/or abuse from the father; and (2) the children suffered significant, ongoing psychological harm while in the mother’s sole care and were at risk of further harm if they remain in her sole care.
Janz & Bagley [2018] FCWA 210 (8 November 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had one child and sought parenting orders. The mother sought sole parental responsibility and that the child live with her. She also proposed that the child should not spend any time with the father. The father sought orders that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility; that the child live with the mother while gradually increasing the time she spent with the father; injunctions as to the parties’ alcohol consumption; and non-denigration orders. The father was a self-represented litigant while the mother and ICL were represented by counsel.
The parties had a history of family violence and the father had used explicit photos of the mother to blackmail her throughout their relationship. The child was exposed to some of this violence during the relationship and to the father’s denigration of and threats towards the mother after the parties’ separation.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Reasons: The child had a meaningful relationship with the mother and a close and loving relationship with the father. However, the child was at risk of physical and/or psychological harm while in the father’s care. Duncanson J also found that this, along with the child possibly ‘absorbing’ the father’s negative and unhealthy beliefs and confrontational behaviour, formed an unacceptable risk that could not be managed by mere supervision. With the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility being displaced by the family violence between the parties, Duncanson J ordered the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the child live with the mother. It was also ordered that the child spend no time with the father as he posed an unacceptable risk of harm.
Byrne & Krilly [2018] FCWA 158 (23 August 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parental orders’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father had one child and sought parenting orders and the mother sought relocation orders. Each party sought sole parental responsibility for the child while the ICL proposed the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for him. The mother and ICL proposed that the mother be able to relocate the child to Europe.
The father had mental health issues and was violent towards the mother. This violence caused the mother to develop severe trauma and a desire to return to her home country to receive the support of her family. The mother described her future in Australia as ‘bleak’ and was of the view her employment prospects would be better back in Europe.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: While the child was exposed to family violence during the parties’ relationship and when they were separated, the father addressed the issues causing his abusive behaviour. As such, Duncanson J found that the child did not need to be protected from harm in the care of either parent at the time of proceedings. This, coupled with the findings that the child had a meaningful and loving relationship with both of his parents which was in the child’s best interests to maintain, led Duncanson J to order that the child must spend time with the father despite relocating overseas. As the mother had been the child’s primary caregiver up until proceedings, Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility; the child live with her; and that the mother can relocate the child to Europe. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the history of family violence.
Hobbs & Roth [2018] FCWA 163 (21 August 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Relocation orders’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Undefended proceedings’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father have one child. The mother was granted leave to proceed on an undefended basis. The mother sought sole parental responsibility for the child and that he live with her. The mother also sought permission to relocate the child to another town; injunctions relating to non-denigration of herself and her sister; and injunctions restraining the father from consuming alcohol while with the child.
At the time of the proceedings, the child lived with the mother and spent time with the father. The child was exposed to family violence – primarily directed towards the mother – and to problems of excessive alcohol consumption while living in the same town as his father. The father was controlling and abusive. He had slashed the tyres of the mother’s car and threatened to place intimate pictures of her on social media. The mother wished to remove the child from this environment and wanted to relocate due to fear for her own safety.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Although ‘it is to [the child’s] benefit to have a meaningful relationship with the father, this must be balanced against the need to protect [the child] from harm’ [28]. Given the history of family violence and the family violence of the father towards his new partner, there was a need to protect the child from harm while in the father’s care. There is no need to protect the child from harm while in the mother’s care.
The history of family violence rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility being in the best interests of the child. Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child; that the child live with the mother and that she is permitted to relocate him to another town as the mother had been the primary caregiver up until proceedings; and that the child spend time with the father at such times and on such terms and conditions that the mother thought fit.
Trigg & Rowland [2018] FCWA 136 (26 July 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties had one child and sought parenting orders and orders regarding the child’s living arrangements. The mother wished to leave the town where they had lived as a family lived and return to her home town. The father, having come from another country, wished to remain in the town as that was were his only connections in Australia were. The father sought orders for sole parental responsibility and proposed that the child live with him four nights a week and with the mother the remaining three provided that the mother can meet all the child’s needs. The mother sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility and orders permitting her to relocate to her hometown. She also proposed that the child predominately live with her.
There was evidence of domestic violence. The parties were also unable to agree on a form of communication at the time of the proceedings.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders for the circumstances?
Reasons: The presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply due to the issues of family violence. Thackray CJ, however, still ordered equal shared parental responsibility - with the exception that the mother have sole parental responsibility for issues concerning the child’s physical health – as the child had a meaningful relationship with both parties and was found not to be at risk of harm in either parties’ care. Thackray CJ also ordered that for the next few years the child live with both parents on a ‘5-2-2-5’ roster before eventually transitioning to a week-about arrangement.
In regard to the sought relocation orders, Thackray CJ found that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in the parties’ current town. Thackray CJ considered the dysfunction within the mother’s family in her hometown, the child’s current stability, and the possibility of separating the child from the father to be the main factors supporting this decision.
Kazi & Kazi [2018] FCWA 61 (13 April 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father have four children and sought parenting orders. The mother proposed that the children continue to live with her and have no communication or contact with the father. The father sought orders that the children spend time with him. The mother’s proposal was based on the parties’ history of family violence and fear of the children’s well-being. The ICL proposed ‘that the children live with the mother who should have sole parental responsibility for them, although the mother should keep the father informed of all significant health issues’ [36]. The ICL also proposed that the two older children spend time with and communicate with the father as they wished while the younger child spend time with him in accordance with their wishes in consultation with a therapist.
The parties’ relationship was characterised by family violence inflicted upon the mother and the children from the time of their marriage. The mother deposed that the violence directed towards her was both physical and emotional, with the father also often forcing her to have sex against her will. The father was physically abusive towards the children, who were eventually terrified of him. This fear caused psychological harm to the children.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The children had a meaningful relationship with the mother and it was to their benefit that it continued. The children did not have a relationship with the father at the time of proceedings and did not wish to. While there was no need to protect the children from harm in the mother’s care, there was a need to protect them from physical and psychological harm in the father’s care.
The family violence rebutted the presumption that it is in the children’s best interests that their parents have equal shared parental responsibility. Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the children live with her, but that she inform the father of all significant health issues affecting the children. He found that the mother has the capacity to provide for the children’s needs including their emotional and intellectual needs. Duncanson J also ordered that the father eventually be able to contact the children provided he undertook psychological assessment and subject to the children’s wishes.
May and Blackthorn & Anor [2018] FCWA 23 (16 February 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Issues of welfare of children and stability’ – ‘Living arrangements’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: Prior to proceedings, the child lived with her paternal grandmother. The child had very limited, if any, contact with the parents. The paternal grandmother sought sole responsibility of the child and for the child to live with her. The orders sought also permit overseas travel, orders for the provision of information and a non-denigration order, and for the child to occasionally spend time with the parents. Prior to the proceedings and the parents’ separation, the father physically assaulted the mother on several occasions, exposing the child to family violence when she lived with them.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The proceedings were determined under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The objects in Part VII ‘ensure that the best interest of the children are met’ [37]. Given the circumstances, Duncanson J paid specific attention to s 60CC(2) which sets out the primary considerations of the ‘benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both the child’s parents and the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm’ [42]. Attention was also given to s 60CC(2A) which ‘provides that in applying the above considerations, the Court is to give greater weight to the need to protect the child from harm’ [40].
In reaching his decision, Duncanson J considered that: (1) the child had neither communicated nor seen either parent for a considerable period of time; and (2) while ‘there was not a need to protect the child from harm in the care of the paternal grandmother’, there was ‘a need to protect [the child] in the care of the father, by reason of drug and alcohol use, and his violent and aggressive behaviour towards others’ [42]. There was also a need to protect the child from the mother’s unstable circumstances. Duncanson J consequently affirmed the orders sought by the paternal grandparent as it was in the best interests of the child.
Headley & Steners [2017] FCWA 169 (30 November 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disabilities and impairments’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother sought sole parental responsibility for the children; an injunction restraining the father from approaching either her or the children within 50 metres; and an injunction restraining the father from communication with the mother and children by any means. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility; an order that the children live with the mother; and that the children spend time with the father.
The parties’ relationship was ‘characterised by significant family violence perpetrated by the father against the mother’ [2], with the father also negatively influencing the mother’s financial position post-separation. The father’s behaviour was partially attributed to the effects of a traumatic head injury which caused loss of inhibitory control, irritability, frustration and verbal aggression.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply given the parties’ history of family violence. It was open to the judge to make an order for equal shared parental responsibility if, and only if satisfied that despite the presumption not applying it remained in the best interests of the children that such an order should be made [187]. This led Moncrieff J to turn to the primary and additional considerations set out in s 60CC(3) (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)). ‘The very real difference between the two classes of considerations is that the additional considerations do not all necessarily apply to each and every case whilst the primary considerations do’ [189]. From these considerations, Moncrieff J concluded that ‘the father is incapable of controlling his behaviour and as such the children remain at risk of psychological harm, if not physical harm, and of being exposed to physical abuse of the mother by the father’ [201] and ordered that there should be no contact between the children and their father. It was ordered that the children consequently live with the mother; the mother have sole parental responsibility; and the father be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining the father from approaching the mother or children within 50 metres.
Peak & Cleary [2017] FCWA 166 (24 November 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father had one child and sought parenting and, in the mother’s case, relocation orders. The mother sought sole parenting responsibility and for the child to live with her, proposing for the father to be allowed limited visits. The mother also sought an order permitting her to relocate the child to another country. The father proposed equal shared parenting responsibility and for visitation while the child lived with the mother. Both parties sought orders regarding the cost and conditions of travel.
‘During the [parents’] relationship the father was overbearing and aggressive and violent. The mother coped by drinking alcohol and was often intoxicated. The parties’ relationship was marred by incidents of violence mostly perpetrated by the father upon the mother. Both parties abused drugs and alcohol. [The child] was exposed to family violence between his parents.’ [130]
Issues: What would be the appropriate parenting, spend-time and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: When dealing with the issue of parental responsibility, Duncanson J found that the child had a meaningful relationship with both of his parents. It was to his benefit that it continues. However, the history of family violence between the parties rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, with Duncanson J finding that it would be in the child’s best interests for the mother to have sole parental responsibility. Duncanson J subsequently ordered that the child live with the mother.
Turning to the issue of relocation, Duncanson J considered that while the child did have a meaningful relationship with his father, he had a much deeper relationship with and dependency on his mother. Although it may be initially distressing for the child to be separated from the father if permitted to relocate to another country, the separation would minimise the risk of exposing the child to harm and be in his best interests. The father will still be able to spend time with the child several times a year and will be able to communicate with him electronically.
Richey & Morty [2017] FCWA 113 (19 September 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Proceeding: Parenting and financial orders.
Facts: The parties had two children and sought parenting and financial orders. The father sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility; the children live with both parents on a week about basis; regular telephone communication with the children; and injunctions restraining the parties from denigrating each other. The father also proposed that each party retain their own property and superannuation and for payments from the mother. The mother sought orders ‘apportioning’ parental liability 80%:20% in her favour. She also proposed that the children predominately live with her and sought orders to alter her property interests such that she received half of the father’s superannuation, child support payments and cash payment for the parties’ shared car.
The mother was a self-represented litigant. O’Brien J was satisfied she understood his explanation of the trial’s processes and his obligations.
There were two separate violent incidents between the parties’ post-separation, however there was no evidence to suggest a history of family violence while the parties were married.
Issues: What parenting and financial orders are appropriate for the circumstances?
Reasons: O’Brien J first dealt with the parenting orders sought by the parties and provided that the presumption that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child is rebutted if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child was exposed to family violence.
‘The phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” is not unimportant. The legislation does not require that abuse or family violence be proven for the statutory presumption to be displaced; it is sufficient for there to be reasonable grounds to believe that a party has engaged in abuse or family violence. [59]
O’Brien J found that the presumption did not apply because the two children were exposed to family violence during the second of the two separate violent incidents that occurred post-separation. Despite this, O’Brien J also found that the children were not at any risk of physical or psychological harm in the care of either party. Upon also finding that both parties have the capacity to provide for all of the children’s needs, O’Brien J ordered equal shared parental responsibility and that the children spend equal time with each parent.
In turning to the competing financial orders sought by the parties, O’Brien J stated that
‘the court has a wide discretion conferred by s 79(1) of the Act. That discretion is to be exercised in accordance with legal principle, and without assuming that the parties’ interests in assets, or responsibilities for liabilities, are or should be different from those determined by common law and equity. The court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order adjusting existing property interests, including equitable interests. That requirement is readily satisfied in most cases, including this one…In determining what orders will be just and equitable, the court’s power is not confined by any ‘steps’ or ‘stages’, let alone a prescribed sequence of such.’ [135]
The parties were found to have a total net pool of -$3,932.00, with most of the liabilities being the joint responsibility of the parties. It was also found that ‘neither party retain[ed] reliable assets of any real value’. O’Brien J consequently ordered that ‘the only just and equitable outcome achievable’ was that each party retained their assets and, considering the mother being currently unemployed, that the father retain responsibility for the liabilities.
O’Brien J then considered the child support orders sought be the mother. O’Brien J declined to provide the orders sought as the mother did not provide sufficient evidence to justify them.
Finton & Kimble [2017] FCWA 106 (24 August 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal parental responsibility’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father and mother had two children and sought parenting orders. The father sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility and for the children to live with their mother while also spending time with him. The mother sought orders for sole parental responsibility, the children to live with her, for the children to not spend time with the father and for the issuing of passports to the children without the father’s consent. The Independent Children’s lawyer (ICL) submitted that the orders which best meet the children’s interests were as set out by the mother.
The children’s parents separated when the children were very young. ‘The relationship between the parties has been described as one of significant conflict and domestic upheaval. Their separation was surrounded by allegations of violence, abuse and aggressive and erratic behaviour, levelled against the husband in particular’ [6]. ‘In the period following separation, the husband’s life descended into turmoil and conflict. There is evidence of significant hostility, anger and threatening behaviour directed by the husband towards a wide range of people and institutions’ [9].
The children were in the mother’s care after the parties separated and had limited opportunity to form a relationship with their father.
Issues: Should the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Decision and reasoning:
Walters J provided that
‘[t]he Court’s paramount consideration is the welfare or best interests of two very young girls. The history of this case and the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the parents are matters which must be taken into account – but it is the children’s future, welfare and best interests upon which the Court must concentrate. The Court is responsible for determining what orders best meet their needs and advance their interests – including the need to be protected from the risk of harm… The Court has no interest in or enthusiasm for rewarding one party or punishing the other. Its preoccupation is with, and concentration is on, the best interests of the children…Generally speaking, what parties do, how they behave and the attitudes that they display towards their roles as parents or carers are far more relevant to the decision process in a parenting case, and of much greater significance, than the vague and often highly complex emotion known as love.’ [59]-[105]
Here, the father demonstrated ‘an “entrenched pattern of abusive behaviour over a significant period of time”…The husband seems to have been oblivious to or unconcerned about the real or potential harm he caused or could have caused others’ [109]. Any spend time orders or orders allowing the children to communicate with the father were determined likely to cause the mother ‘significant psychological detriment – and in turn, psychological harm to the children’ [120]. This, coupled with the fact that the mother was deemed to have the capacity to sufficiently provide for the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the children led Walters J to decide that ‘[i]t [was] not in the children’s best interests to spend any time with the husband’ despite his belief that ‘it is a grave and far-reaching step for a Court to deprive children of a relationship with a parent – or, put another way, to deprive a father of a relationship with his children’ [191]-[192]. Stemming from this belief, Walters J noted that
‘[p]arenting orders are not ordinarily regarded as “final” and immutable. If circumstances change significantly, and in a manner that relates to the best interests of the children, then there is a possibility that the orders I propose to make can be revisited – and, if required in the children’s best interests, varied’ [195].
Vieri & Vieri [2017] FCWA 101 (9 August 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disability or impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders and property settlement orders.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children and sought parenting and property orders. For the parenting orders, the mother sought sole parental responsibility, for the children to live with her, and proposed that the father be allowed to spend time with the children. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and for the children to live with both parties on a fortnightly cycle.
For the property orders, the mother sought an order that the father transfer his interest in the former matrimonial home to her and she would refinance the mortgage to Bankwest into her sole name. She also sought to have a car transferred to her, proposing a 7:3 division in her favour. The father proposed to transfer the above home to the mother and refinance the mortgage into her sole name contemporaneously with the transfer. The father also sought for the mother to pay him $250,000 from the transfer. Both parties sought to retain all other assets and superannuation. The property pool was estimated to be around $900,000.
Both children have been diagnosed with medical conditions. The parties did not communicate well and the mother did not keep the father informed of important issues regarding the children’s health. The mother frequently denied the father’s requests to see the children and had a Violence Restraining Order against the father.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning:
Parenting Orders
The presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child ‘does not apply in circumstances where there is abuse or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the Court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.’ Notwithstanding this presumption, [Duncanson J was] of the view that it is in the children’s best interests that their parents have shared parental responsibility for most, but not all long-term issues. In all but medical issues, I think both parties should jointly make the decisions.’ This decision was based on Duncanson J’s findings that the children had a meaningful relationship with both of their parents and it was to their benefit that it continued. The children were not at risk of harm in the care of either parent - although they had previously been exposed to conflict between the parties - and both parties have the capacity to provide for the children’s needs.
Duncanson J ordered an increase in the time the children spent with the father, but predominantly live with the mother during school terms. Keeping in mind the children’s disabilities and anxiety, this increase was to be implemented incrementally.
Property Orders
The proceedings were governed by s 79 of the Act and the decision in Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108. Having regard to the mother’s care of the children, the father’s superior earning capacity and the father’s property entitlement comprising significant superannuation benefits, Duncanson J divided the property in favour of the mother, ordering a 6:4 division.
Rhodes & Lewington [2017] FCWA 75 (6 June 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with mental illness * psychological harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting and financial orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children and sought parenting and financial orders. The proceedings primarily concerned whether the children should have any contact with their father. The mother sought sole parental responsibility and orders that the children live with her. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and shared care of the children.
The father often deceived and manipulated the mother, children and people around him during the parties’ relationship, feigning several severe and terminal illnesses. Through this deception, he spent large sums of the parties’ money for personal use (such as travel and accommodation) under the guise of paying for medical treatment. The father also frequently threatened the mother and occasionally their children, leading the mother to apply for a Violence Order.
Issues: What parenting and financial orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the father’s psychological abuse of the children. Walters J found that that the father’s psychological abuse of the children displaced the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility. He also found that the father’s behaviour amounted to an unacceptable risk to the children’s psychological and emotional wellbeing. As such, Walters J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the children not have any contact with the father.
The parties had a net property pool of $970,381. Upon considering the father’s spending while deceiving the mother along with his limited contributions towards household expenses and the children while the parties were together, Walters J ordered that the mother receive 84% of the net property and superannuation.
Dempsey & Brahms [2017] FCWA 59 (12 May 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father have two children and sought parenting orders. The father proposes that the older child decides where he lives with a week-about arrangement for the younger children (save for the holidays when they would spend up to two weeks with each parent). The mother sought sole parental responsibility; for the children to live with her; and for the children to only spend time with the father subject to her consent. The ICL proposed that the mother have sole parental responsibility.
The father sought to undermine the children’s relationship with the mother and after the parties’ separation threatened the mother on several occasions. The father’s negative attitude towards the mother influenced the oldest child’s opinion of and behaviour around her, with the child eventually mimicking some of the father’s negative behaviours. While the oldest child did leave the mother’s home to live with the father for two years, he eventually returned and had a hostile relationship with the father until the time of proceedings.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders in these circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Thackray CJ ordered the mother have sole parental responsibility for the three children; the children live with the mother; and that the children only spend such time with the father as the mother deemed appropriate.
Thackray CJ ‘did not doubt’ that there were great benefits to the children having a meaningful relationship with their mother. ‘She [was] focused on their well-being and has been their primary caregiver. She [was] a stable and steadying influence’ [109]. On the other hand, the father’s conduct towards the mother and children was damaging. ‘[T]he benefit to the children of having a meaningful relationship with their father [was] outweighed by the importance of protecting them from the harm that often arises when they spend time with him’ [110]. Thackray CJ provided that the presence of family violence rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and that it was inappropriate for the parents to share responsibility given their inability to communicate.
Thackray CJ found (at [15]) that the father was: an ‘aggressive, controlling and manipulative man’ with a propensity to bend the truth, skilled at turning accusations against him back onto the accuser, that he demonstrated no insight into the way that he made the lives of the mother and her adult sons (and to a slightly lesser extent his own children) a complete misery and that he was quite oblivious to the harm his violent, abusive and controlling behaviour has caused.
Thakray CJ held (at [111]) that the father has engaged in coercive, controlling and abusive behaviour towards the mother and children and that he has damaged every vehicle the mother has ever owned (sometimes when children have been in the vehicle and sometimes when they have been observing). His Honour accepted that “the mother remained in the relationship for as long as she did because of the father’s manipulative behaviour and because she considered this was the best way to keep her and the children safe. The father’s manipulation has included his efforts to drive a wedge between the mother and her friends and between the mother and the children.” [113]
Arthur and Joyner [2015] FCWAM 197 (4 September 2015) – Family Court of Western Australia (Magistrates Decisions)
‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Proceedings: Interim parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children. Both parties had criminal histories, mental health issues and problems with drugs and alcohol. The mother previously obtained an interim violence restraining order and a family violence offence had been reported to the police against the father but both matters were dropped. Before the hearing, the parenting arrangements were that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time with the father once a week. The father sought orders for unsupervised time with the children. At the end of the hearing, the Court made immediate orders for unsupervised time between the father and the children.
Issue/s: What ought to be the extent of ongoing time between the children and the father?
Reasoning/Decision: The strict and comprehensive guidelines for determining an interim parenting application were set out in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 (see [27]). Magistrate Kaeser cited the Full Court of the Family Court’s decision in Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36, which provided guidance on the application of these principles. The Court in Banks stated at [48]-[50]:
‘It should also be said that in parenting proceedings, as in all civil litigation, it will be the issues that are joined that will dictate which s60CC factors are relevant. By their nature, interim parenting proceedings should be confined to those issues which, in the best interests of the child, require determination prior to a proper determination at a trial [emphasis in original]. The fact such disputes are commonly dealt with in overcrowded Court lists makes it even more desirable to identify with precision those issues which can, or should, be resolved on an interim basis.
[…]
When it is obvious that the findings made as to some of the s60CC factors will be determinative of the child’s best interests on an interim basis, it is a sterile and unnecessary exercise to address other factors. Moreover, it would be a sterile exercise to determine whether or not particular facts are disputed if they are relevant only to one of the nondeterminative s60CC considerations. Properly understood, we do not interpret what was said in Goode as meaning that in an interim case, each and every fact must be characterised as disputed or not; and that each s60CC factor must be traversed where it is obvious on the facts and issues joined that there are only one or two decisive factors’.
Magistrate Kaeser affirmed the orders that the father ought to have unsupervised contact with the children. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply given that there was reasonable grounds to believe there had been family violence in the relationship. In these circumstances, the issue of equal time or substantial and significant time did not need to be determined. It was reasonable for the children to spend one overnight occasion with their father every fortnight (see [33]-[44]).
Sampson and North [2014] FCWA 75 (25 November 2014) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Court management’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father was verbally, physically and emotionally abusive towards the mother throughout their relationship. He assaulted her, forced her to have sex against her will, posted comments on Facebook referring to kill her and threatened to kill her. After their first child was born, a safety plan was put in place by the Department of Child Protection (DCP) specifying that the father have no unsupervised contact with the child. Their second child was born. The mother left the home with the children. She obtained a violence restraining order and a filed a Notice of Abuse with the DCP.
Issue/s: What parenting orders were appropriate in the circumstances?
Reasoning/Decision: This case raised significant issues relating to case management in circumstances where the father was a self-represented litigant. The father’s behaviour at trial soon was unmanageable, despite several requests from the court that he refrain from using foul language and despite warnings regarding his conduct. The mother was cross-examined by the father and kept her composure in extremely difficult circumstances (see [43]-[44]). Likewise, counsel for the mother questioned the father in a calm and measured way, despite his behaviour.
Following threats made in the courtroom by the father, the Court took the unusual step of asking counsel for the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to his chambers. He informed them that the trial could not safely proceed with the father present in court. Upon the resumption of the trial the Court made an order that the father attend trial from an alternative venue by way of video link (see [47]-[48]). The father’s behaviour did not improve throughout the rest of the hearing. The Court warned the father on several occasions that if he continued to use foul language the Court would switch on the mute button. After several disruptions, the Court activated the mute button (see [51]-[67]).
Duncanson J stated here at [68] that: ‘The trial was conducted in the most difficult circumstances by reason of the father’s conduct, threats and appalling language. Both the ICL and counsel for the mother conducted themselves properly throughout and are to be commended for their perseverance and tolerance. An order sought by the mother was that the children spend no time with the father. In these circumstances it was important that the relevant evidence be provided to the court and properly tested by cross-examination to ensure that the Court is able to determine all issues and make orders which are in the best interests of the children. It was also important that the Court not allow the father to distract it from those issues’.
In making parenting orders, Duncanson J held that the presumption of shared equal parental responsibility did not apply here because of family violence committed by the father. The mother was given sole parental responsibility for the children. It was also in the best interests of the children that they live solely in the care of their mother as the children would be placed at an unacceptable risk of harm in the care of their father.
Finally, the Court held that the father have no contact with the children. This was appropriate in circumstances where ‘the children’s relationship with the father is not a meaningful one and as such will not be of benefit to them in the future. The children are at risk of both physical and psychological harm in the care of the father. His unrelenting denigration, criticism and vitriol towards the mother could undermine the children’s relationship with her and impact upon her parenting of the children in the future’ (see [184]-[197]).
Eddon and Eddon [2012] FCWA 104 (6 November 2012) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceedings: Relocation and parenting orders.
Facts: The mother was born in England and the father was born in Australia. They had one child together. The mother sought orders to have sole parental responsibility for the child and permission to relocate the child to the UK. Her case revolved around the claim that the father’s sustained emotional abuse towards her transformed her from a strong, independent woman into a nervous wreck who needed the support of her family in the UK (see evidence [31]-[80]). The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and that the child live with the mother in Australia.
Issue/s: What parenting and relocation orders were appropriate in the circumstances?
Reasoning/Decision: First, in relation to the issue of allocating parental responsibility, Thackray CJ noted that the presumption in favour of shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the father’s violence. In the circumstances, it was appropriate for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child. His Honour was satisfied that the mother would seek to involve the father in any important decisions about the child and that she would make the right choices for the child (see [157]-[160]).
Second, Thackray CJ turned to the issue of the planned relocation. His Honour noted that this case involved choosing the least bad alternative, as neither of the proposed outcomes was in any way satisfactory. If the mother relocated, the child would effectively be denied a meaningful relationship with his father, at least for some years until the father could afford to see him more regularly. If the mother was not permitted to relocate, there was a serious risk that she would fall into a state of depression, leading to the likelihood of a damaged attachment with her child. This would be extremely damaging to the child in the long term. In His Honour’s view, this factor was of far greater importance than the ‘significant, but not sever grief’, the child would face if not permitted to see his father regularly. The mother was therefore permitted to relocate to the UK to obtain support from her family to recover from the abuse she suffered.
His Honour concluded at [166]-[167]:
Although not a factor I need to take into account, there is potential for the outcome of cases such as the present to have a salutary impact on the behaviour of other parents. Unless the best interests of the child demand otherwise, it cannot reasonably be expected that one party to a relationship can behave in an abominable fashion, cause severe emotional harm to the other party, and then insist that they continue to live nearby so that they can continue to have a close relationship with their child. The strong emphasis given by our law to the importance of protection from violence would be undermined if any different message were conveyed.
Notwithstanding his past conduct, it is impossible not to feel some sympathy for the father who I consider not only has gained some appreciation of the consequences of his behaviour, but wants to do the best he can for his son. His behaviour has been much improved, and he should be commended for that. But, unfortunately, as was put to him in cross-examination, it is a case of “too little, too late”. The damage has been done. All the father can do now, which I am satisfied he wants to do, is to make amends. It is not too late for him to be a good father, but he will have to achieve that by allowing the mother time to recover, which I am persuaded she can only do if she is permitted to go home’.
P and J [2010] FCWA 53 (9 March 2010) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children together, Jack and Helen. The father breached a violence restraining order on four occasions and had been convicted of assaulting the mother. The father sought orders for shared parental responsibility for major long term issues concerning the children. The mother proposed that she have sole parental responsibility for issues concerning the children’s health, education and Jack’s speech and language therapy requirements, but otherwise agreed that there ought to be shared parental responsibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues was should the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Reasoning/Decision: In relation to the issue of shared parental responsibility, Thackray CJ was satisfied that the father had engaged in family violence and therefore the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. His Honour noted that just because the presumption did not apply, did not mean that it could not be in the best interests of the children for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. However, in the circumstances, equal shared parental responsibility was not an option. The parents had shown no capacity to come to any agreements in relation to significant matters concerning the children and any order requiring them to consult would fail.
His Honour concluded that the mother have sole parental responsibility for all major long term issues concerning the children. This was appropriate in circumstances where she was also to have primary care responsibility for the children and further, she was more in tune with the children’s needs and was better equipped than the father to make decisions for the children’s long term welfare (see [75]-[81]).
W and W [2006] FCWA 103 (6 October 2006) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceedings: Parenting proceedings.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children together and sought parenting orders. The mother proposed that she be given sole responsibility for decisions concerning the children’s welfare while the father sought orders for shared parental responsibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Reasoning/Decision: The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply here because the father assaulted the mother. However, Thackray J went on to state at [23]-[24]:
‘The fact the presumption does not apply is by no means the end of the matter. Judges in this Court have long taken the view that it is generally appropriate for both parents to have an equal say in major decisions about their children. This is particularly true of cases where the parents have a shared-care arrangement. The fact there has been family violence is clearly an important factor in determining whether it is appropriate for the parents to share parental responsibility; however, the nature of the violence needs to be assessed to determine whether it should have any impact.
It is my assessment that the nature of the violence here was not such, in itself, as to have any real impact on the allocation of parental responsibility. However, I consider there are other reasons why it would not be in the best interests of the children for their parents to be left with shared parental responsibility’.
His Honour held that the mother ought to be given sole parental responsibility in circumstances where the parties had an extremely poor relationship, they did not communicate with each other than by email (which the father used to abuse, annoy and denigrate the wife) and the father was extremely controlling, argumentative and pedantic (see [25]).
District Court
Re AB [2023] WADC 28 (17 March 2023) – Western Australia District Court
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Compensation’ – ‘Corroboration’ – ‘Criminal injuries compensation’ – ‘Criminal injuries compensation act 2003 (wa)’ – ‘Finding of child abuse’ – ‘Sexual abuse’
Proceeding: Appeal pursuant to s55 and s56(1) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) from a decision of the chief assessor refusing an application for compensation for harm suffered as a result of incidents of sexual abuse allegedly committed against the appellant by her former partner W.
Issue: Whether compensation should be ordered for injuries arising from sexual assaults (x2) and other abuse.
Facts: The appellant made an application for compensation for injuries arising from alleged emotional/verbal and physical/sexual abuse between 1999 and 2015 and two separate alleged sexual assaults in 2015 allegedly committed by her former de facto partner, W. At first instance, the chief assessor refused compensation.
The appellant had been in a de facto spousal relationship with the alleged offender between 1999 and 2015. After leaving him she made a formal complaint to police of two occasions of non-consensual anal penetration, which she later advised police she did not wish to proceed with. The appellant later asked police to reopen their investigation into her earlier complaint alleged that her ex-partner had also been physically and verbally abusive during their relationship and had threatened self-harm and suicide when she tried to leave him. Police decided not to charge the alleged offender with any offence as there was not evidence to corroborate her account, despite corroboration not being required to prove an offence of sexual assault.
The chief assessor found the sexual abuse of the appellant was not non-consensual. There was evidence of contact with medical and mental health practitioners including reports of non-consensual anal sex and a 17 year history of sexual assault by her de facto partner. J, a child who the appellant cared for pursuant to Family Court orders, was successful in a criminal injuries compensation claim as both a secondary victim of W’s abuse of the appellant and primary victim of other abuse by W, and reasons subsequently published by the assessor of J’s claim reversed the finding that W’s abuse of the appellant constituted an offence and found that although the incidents of anal penetration of the appellant by W while she was crying and W had his hands around her neck were not non-consensual the appellant and AB and W committed an offence by exposing J to the incidents.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal allowed, awarding the appellant $120,000 for non-pecuniary loss and $1,846 for reimbursement of expenses.
Staude DCJ was satisfied that the two offences of aggravated sexual penetration without consent had been committed and were not isolated offences. The appellant’s statements were consistent with her reports to police and other agencies, and the judge accepted that she had been stuck in an abusive relationship and too embarrassed to report the incidents in more detail. He was not able to be satisfied that the other offences had occurred.
Staude DCJ found that the appellant had suffered injury as a consequence of the offences and assessed the injury in context of the harmful relationship. It was determined that the sexual assaults had materially contributed to the appellant’s diagnosed depression, anxiety and functional impairments and had led to her loss of self-esteem and confidence. However, some of the injury was not considered compensable as it was attributed to other abuse in the relationship and would therefore have been suffered regardless of the offences.
The judge was highly critical of the assessor of J’s claim’s findings that the appellant had committed an offence under s 101 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 by exposing her son to abuse.
DB v RB [2020] WADC 93 (29 June 2020) – Western Australia District Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal from magistrate’s decision to make final Family Violence Restraining Order (Final Order) pursuant to Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (‘the RO Act’).
Facts: The magistrate was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that DB had committed acts of family violence against his wife (RB): a sexual assault, letting down RB’s car tyres (controlling behaviour), and two physical assaults. The magistrate was also satisfied that RB had reasonable grounds to apprehend he would commit acts of family violence against her. In relation to their daughter, TB, the magistrate found that DB had committed acts of family violence against her, exposed her to family violence, and she had reasonable grounds to apprehend further family violence/exposure to family violence. The magistrate made the Final Order protecting RB and her eldest daughter (TB) for a term of two years.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The magistrate did not accord DB procedural fairness in refusing to grant leave to call overseas witnesses.
2.
The magistrate erred in relying on his finding that TB was a credible witness to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that incidents of family violence had occurred.
3.
Text messages sent by RB to her sister that she had been raped, shortly after the incident occurred, were inadmissible as they were sent to an unknown number.
4.
The magistrate disregarded one instance where DB was not the aggressor.
5.
The decision the magistrate made was excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: Evidence of the two proposed overseas witnesses was irrelevant as they had only observed the relationship in the past. Evidence was also inadmissible as it was only intended to bolster the credibility of DB.
Ground 2: The magistrate’s finding as to TB’s credibility (a child witness) was open to make based on his assessment of the way she gave evidence, and in light of all of the evidence.
Ground 3: While the probative value of/weight given to the text messages may have been an issue for the magistrate to consider, the magistrate did not err admitting them into evidence. They were relevant to the matters to which he was required to have regard. The court also noted that s 44A(i) of the RO Act provides that the court is not bound by the evidence in a final order hearing and the court may inform itself on any matter in such a manner as it considers appropriate.
Ground 4: The magistrate did not rely on this incident as one of the acts of family violence he was satisfied DB committed. In any event, the fact that DB may not have been the instigator of the events described did not detract from the fact that DB acknowledged he acted violently towards his wife in the course of that incident.
Ground 5: The magistrate correctly applied the test set out in s 10D(1) of the RO Act that a final order must be made where the magistrate is satisfied of the matters set out in s 10D(1)(a) or s 10D(1)(b), unless special circumstances exist.
Potschick v Bruce [2018] WADC 107 (31 August 2018) – Western Australia District Court
‘Protection orders’ – ‘Summary of considerations’
Charges: The Magistrate was satisfied that the respondent committed two acts of abuse against the appellant.
Appeal type: Appeal from a decision of the Magistrate refusing to make a final violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant appealed a decision of the Magistrate to refuse to make a final violence restraining order against the respondent. The appeal was conducted by way of a rehearing of the application.
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in fact in finding that the respondent was not likely, in the future, to commit an act of abuse against the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Before the Court’s power to grant a Final Violence Restraining Order (VRO) is enlivened, it must be satisfied that the respondent committed an act of abuse against the appellant and that he is likely to commit such an act again. The Court noted that the Magistrate was not satisfied to the requisite standard that the respondent was likely to commit an act of abuse against the appellant again, or that the granting of either a Family Violence Restraining Order FVRO of an Misconduct Restraining Order (MRO) was justified. As the Court was not prepared to disturb the Magistrate’s finding as to the respondent’s likely future conduct, there was no statutory basis on which the Court could order an MRO (there being no family relationship between the appellant and respondent). Having regard to the issue of the respondent’s likely future conduct in relation to the appropriateness of granting a Final VRO or a MRO, there was no utility in undertaking a consideration of a hypothetical question of whether the Magistrate erred in exercising his discretion to refuse an order in the event that the finding was overturned and the jurisdiction to make an order enlivened ([36]).
Commonwealth
High Court of Australia
Director of Public Prosecutions v Benjamin Roder (a pseudonym) [2024] HCA 15 (17 April 2024) – High Court of Australia
‘ Jury directions ’ – ‘ tendency evidence ’ – ‘ standard of proof ’ – ‘ whether tendency evidence needed to be proved beyond reasonable doubt ’ – ‘ risk of applying a less rigorous standard of proof ’ – ‘ Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ’ – ‘ sequential approach ’ – ‘ sexual abuse ’
Proceedings: Application for special leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s judgment regarding a direction proposed to be given by the trial judge.
Charges: The respondent was charged with 27 sexual offences committed against two children of his former domestic partner.
Facts: Prior to the accused’s trial, the applicant served a notice on the respondent stating an intention to adduce evidence that the respondent had a tendency to have a particular state of mind and to act in a particular way, both of which were said to be relevant to the alleged offences [4]. The alleged tendencies were all related to the respondent’s sexual interest in the children and his engagement in sexual activity with them [4].
The tendency notice included a table specifying 33 pieces of evidence that were said to support the alleged tendency. Six of the entries concerned alleged incidents that were not the subject of any charges (uncharged acts). The other 27 entries corresponded with an incident that was the subject of the charges on the indictment (charged acts) [5].
In response to the tendency notice, the respondent applied to the trial judge for a ruling about the form of the direction to be given to the jury about the standard of proof to be applied when addressing the evidence of the charged acts for the purpose of determining whether the alleged tendency was established [6]. The trial judge ruled that the jury would be directed that in order to use the charged acts for tendency purposes, they must find that conduct to be proved beyond reasonable doubt [7]. His Honour also ruled that the jury should approach the evidence of the 27 charges sequentially – e.g., if established beyond reasonable doubt, the first charge could be used as tendency evidence in respect of the second charge and so on [7].
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal [8]. The Court of Appeal found that to direct the jury that they need not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of any charged act in order to use it for tendency purposes, whilst also directing that they could not find the respondent guilty of any particular charge unless satisfied that the elements of that charge (including the particular charged act) had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, would be "confusing" and invite the jury to "indulge" in "impermissible circular reasoning" and "apply a less rigorous standard of proof to the charges" than beyond reasonable doubt [9]. The Court added that it was not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury "sequentially", provided it was made clear that the charged conduct could not be used for tendency purposes unless it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt [9]. The applicant sought special leave to appeal this decision to the High Court.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant relied on two proposed grounds of appeal [11]:
•
The direction proposed by the trial judge was precluded by s 61 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (Act) (i.e., the trial judge was precluded from directing the jury that they needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of any charged act in order to use it for tendency purposes).
•
Even if the Act did not preclude such a direction, it would be erroneous for the trial judge to give the proposed direction.
Decision and reasoning: Special leave to appeal was granted and both grounds of appeal were upheld.
Ground 1: The High Court observed that section 61 of the Act provides that, subject to an enactment otherwise providing, “the only matters that the trial judge may direct the jury must be proved beyond reasonable doubt are… (a) the elements of the offence charged or an alternative offence; and (b) the absence of any relevant defence” [14]. Section 62 of the Act abolished any common law rule requiring a trial judge to direct the jury that any matter other than those referred to in section 61 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt [14].
The High Court noted that in concluding that the direction proposed by the trial judge was not precluded by s 61, the Court of Appeal had reasoned that the tendency evidence was evidence of the elements of the offence charged, and therefore it had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt [18]. The High Court stated that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning elided the difference between “the elements of the offence” and the evidence that supports the proof of such elements [19]. Only the former requires proof beyond reasonable doubt [19]. It followed that the first ground of the appeal was upheld [20].
Ground 2: The High Court noted that, per Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, a tendency is an “intermediate fact” that the prosecution seeks to establish and rely on as circumstantial proof of the elements of the offence [24]. Unless the tendency is an “intermediate fact” which is “indispensable” to proof of guilt, it need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt [24]. The High Court acknowledged the Court of Appeal’s concern that the jury would be directed in terms that first invited them to apply a lesser standard in finding whether the charged acts took place for the purposes of determining whether the alleged tendency was established, and then instructed them to determine whether each charge was proved beyond reasonable doubt [25]. In the Court of Appeal’s view, this would risk the jury engaging in “circular reasoning” and “applying a less rigorous standard of proof to the charges on the indictment” [25]. The High Court observed that this concern had been addressed and resolved in recent decisions of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, and cited JS v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 145 in support [26]. The High Court affirmed the statement in JS v The Queen that the differing standards of proof did not involve circular or incoherent reasoning. They simply meant that the jury may consider the same evidence “at different stages of its deliberations with a different onus of proof and for a different purpose” [27].
The High Court concluded that, even leaving aside the Act (subject of ground 1), the trial judge erred in ruling that the jury should be directed that, to use the evidence of the charged acts for tendency purposes, the jury must find those charged acts proved beyond reasonable doubt [31]. The High Court took issue with the sequential approach proposed by the trial judge. It stated that while a trial judge in Victoria may direct a jury on the order in which they must or may consider multiple offences, that power cannot be invoked to limit the jury’s consideration of evidence that is conceded to be relevant to (and substantially probative of) the facts in issue in relation to each charge [31]. The sequential approach had this effect, and therefore was improper. Further, the sequential approach might result in verdicts being dependent on the order in which the jury approached the charges [31]. The second ground of appeal was accordingly upheld.
Finally, the High Court addressed the respondent’s new and alternative argument, that had not been raised before the trial judge or the Court of Appeal [32]. The respondent contended that the jury should be directed that, when considering the respondent’s guilt for each particular charge, they could not use the direct evidence of the corresponding charged act as part of the body of evidence relied upon by the prosecution to support the alleged tendency [32]. The High Court found that to give effect to the respondent’s alternative submission, the trial judge would be required to give the jury a tendency direction at each point in the summing up where a particular charge is being addressed [34]. Directions of this kind would require the jury to repeatedly revisit their own reasoning and conclusions in relation to the existence of the tendency in relation to each successive charge, making their task significantly more complex [34].
Furthermore, the proposed direction misunderstood the nature of tendency evidence, being evidence that on “another occasion or occasions” different to the occasion the subject of a charge, the accused “acted in a particular way”. So described, the direct evidence of a particular charged act would not be admitted as tendency evidence in relation to that same charged act [35]. The proposed direction was accordingly rejected.
The King v Rowan (A Pseudonym) [2024] HCA 9 (13 March 2024) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Defence of duress’ – ‘ Necessity’ – ‘ Threat’ – ‘ Battered women syndrome’
Charges: Incest x 11; act of indecency x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: Following a trial by jury in June 2021, the female respondent was found guilty of eleven charges of incest and indecency. The victims were the respondent’s daughters. The prosecution case was that the respondent had committed the offences with her partner, the daughter’s father (‘JR’).
The female respondent, who has a mild intellectual disability (IQ of 70), sought to rely on a defence of duress. Evidence of a forensic psychologist opined the respondent’s behaviour to be consistent with battered women syndrome, and evidence of JR’s controlling behaviour and sexually and physically abusive treatment of the respondent. The respondent was financially and socially dependent on JR. The defence of duress was not left to the jury at the respondent’s trial in June 2021. [26]–[27]
The respondent successfully appealed this ruling in the Court of Appeal. The Court (Kyrou, McLeish and Niall JJA) unanimously held duress should have been left to the jury for their consideration.
Grounds of Appeal: The Crown/prosecution sought leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal on the following sole ground:
•
The Court of Appeal erred in finding that the trial judge had erred in ruling that the respondent could not avail herself of the defence of duress.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The Majority (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ) held the Victorian Court of Appeal to have adopted and applied ‘the accepted understanding … of the form of threat necessary to establish duress at common law’, as opposed to the doctrine of duress of circumstances. [53]–[57]
The necessity for the accused to be subject to a threat of infliction of the relevant form of harm if the accused fails to commit the acts that constitute the offence charged has been a consistent feature of the consideration of the common law of duress by intermediate courts of appeal in the common law jurisdictions in this country [37]
Accordingly, the Majority dismissed the appellant’s concern that the Victorian Court of Appeal’s judgment reflected the adoption of the doctrine of duress of circumstances — a relatively recent doctrinal development occurring in England and Wales. The doctrine suggests that pressure on the accused’s will ‘can arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or others’ and not merely ‘the wrong threats or violence of another’ (R v Martin [1989] 1 All ER 652, 653 (Simon Brown J) [47]. The Majority, however, refused to explores this doctrine as neither party contended the common law of Australia should adopt duress of circumstances. [49]
The Majority further held the evidence adduced before the trial judge — namely, the forensic psychologist’s report — could engender reasonable doubt in a reasonable jury that the prosecution negatived the existence of a threat to inflict the threatened harm if the respondent failed to commit the charged offences:
In this case, the evidence of pervasive violence, intimidation, control and sexual abuse perpetrated by JR on the respondent and their children over a sustained period raised a reasonable possibility that any express or implicit demand JR may have placed on the respondent to join in the sexual abuse of [the daughters] carried with it the implication that serious violence and more severe sexual abuse would be inflicted on the respondent or their children if she refused [62]
In a separate judgment, Edelman J dismissed the appeal, finding there to be a foundation in the available evidence sufficient for the defence of duress to be left to the jury. [113]
Lang v The Queen [2023] HCA 29 (11 October 2023) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Murder’ – ‘ Suicide’ – ‘ Unreasonable verdict’ – ‘ People with mental illness’ – ‘ Evidence’ – ‘ Expert testimony’ – ‘ Appeal dismissed’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: By special leave, Mr Lang appealed an unanimous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Brown J) to uphold his conviction following a trial by jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland for the murder of Maureen Boyce.
Mrs Boyce had a sporadic extra-marital relationship with Mr Lang over several years; of which her husband (Mr Boyce) knew. At the time of the incident, Mr Lang and Mrs Boyce were the only two in Mrs Boyce’s apartment. Mrs Boyce suffered from bipolar disorder and longstanding borderline personality disorder [47]. The victim experienced intermittent suicidal ideation, described as a ‘preoccupation with thinking about ending one’s life’ [56].
At trial, Mr Lang accepted only two feasible explanations for Boyce’s death: suicide or murder. A forensic pathologist opined that the injury sustained by Mrs Boyce (a single wound with multiple internal stab wounds) was not self-inflicted.
Grounds of Appeal: Mr Lang appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
Unreasonable jury verdict (ie, the verdict of the jury could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence for there is a reasonable possibility that the deceased committed suicide).
2.
Wrongful admission of expert evidence (ie, the evidence of a forensic pathologist, opining that the injury sustained by the victim was not self-inflicted, was wrongly admitted into evidence).
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed, and order confirmed. The High Court unanimously dismissed the first ground of appeal, finding that the jury’s verdict was not unreasonable. Strong and compelling evidence of Mr Lang’s motive, combined with his conflicting testimony to police ([352]-[356]), was sufficient for the jury to exclude the hypothesis that Mrs Boyce died by suicide ([159]–[160]; [158]; [248])
(Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [2]; Gordon and Edelman JJ at [41], [145]–[185]; Jagot J at [419])
Gordon and Edelman JJ cautioned judicial and prosecutorial/defence care in reasoning Mr Boyce’s death was either a consequence of suicide or murder, in light of the evidence of Mrs Boyce’s mental health, specifically her diagnosis of, and experience with, depression and bipolar disorder (269]-[270]; [284]-[285]):
There is need for great caution in the reasoning that as Mrs Boyce was unlikely to have committed suicide, or more specifically to have committed suicide by the method of stabbing, it is more likely that she was murdered by the appellant. In this case, whoever inflicted the wound, something highly improbable did occur. All of the evidence must be considered, going to the relative likelihood of both hypotheses, in determining whether the prosecution failed to exclude as a reasonable hypothesis that Mrs Boyce committed suicide. In particular, the likelihood of Mrs Boyce deciding to commit suicide cannot be considered in isolation from the likelihood of the appellant deciding to commit murder’ [158]
With respect to Ground Two, the majority (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J at [3], Jagot J at [470]) held that the evidence was admissible. The majority deemed the evidence sufficient to establish that the forensic pathologist’s opinion was based on his expertise.
Gordon and Edelman JJ dissented ([42], [220]–[242]):
‘The problem for Dr Ong’s opinion on this issue, and the reason that it was both inadmissible and of no weight, is that he failed to expose how his expertise was the substantial basis for connecting the facts to which he referred to this opinion’ [234]
BA v The King [2023] HCA 14 (10 May 2023) – High Court of Australia
‘ Appeal allowed’ – ‘ Tenancy/Property’ – ‘ Meaning of 'breaking’
Charges: Breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence
Proceedings: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales R v BA [2021] NWCCA 191 (20 August 2021) to acquit.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a domestic relationship. They resided together in an apartment, which they occupied as co-tenants pursuant to the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW). The breakdown of the relationship resulted in the appellant ceasing rent payments and moving out. After forcibly entering the complainant’s apartment, the appellant intimidated and assaulted the complainant (see Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ [4]–[5]).
The trial judge directed a verdict of not guilty on the basis that the accused had a right to enter as a lessee. The Crown appealed this direction, submitting that the trial judge erred in holding that the prosecution was required to establish that the appellant did not have a pre-existing right to enter (as a pre-condition to proof of ‘breaking’). The Court of Criminal Appeal (Brereton JA and Fullerton and Adamson JJ) upheld this appeal and ordered a re-trial.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the decision on one ground:
1.
The Court of Criminal Appeal erred in holding that an entry into a dwelling-house pursuant to a pre-existing right to enter will nonetheless involve a “break” if made without the consent of the actual occupant.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed and orders set aside. The majority (Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) concluded that the appellant could not break into the apartment by law as he was still a co-tenant, pursuant to the Residential Tenancy Agreement. [42] That is, he possessed a right of exclusive possession over the apartment and therefore had lawful authority to enter it without the complainant’s consent.
This difficult case illustrates the complexities of the concept of “break and entry”, the meaning of which was established in historical circumstances quite different from contemporary society, including when domestic and family violence was generally not treated a criminal [36]
The Crown observed that the complainant was entitled to protect herself from apprehended violence to her person in the security of her own home by refusing to unlock the front door. In a practical sense, this is true. However, the complainant’s power to keep the appellant, as a co-tenant, out of the apartment was not unlimited. The source of the appellant’s liberty to enter the … apartment was the residential tenancy agreement. It was not the complainant’s consent. It was not within the complainant’s power unilaterally to alter the appellant’s liberty to enter. For example, neither the landlord nor the complainant could lawfully change the locks for the premises to exclude the appellant without the appellant’s consent, or without a reasonable excuse [80]
The minority of Kiefel CJ and Gageler and Jagot JJ dissented:
The appellant’s status as a co-tenant under a residential tenancy agreement did not give him a right to forcibly enter the apartment and assault his former partner who resided in the dwelling-house and who had refused him entry [3]
Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25 (10 August 2022) – High Court of Australia
‘Adverse inferences’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Circumstantial case’ – ‘Drowning’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent assessment of evidence’ – ‘Inference of guilt’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence’ – ‘Unreasonable verdict’ – ‘Unreasonableness ground’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: By special leave the defendant appealed the majority decision of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal (Parker and Livesey JJ, Nicholson J dissenting) to uphold his conviction following trial by judge alone (Lovell J) in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the murder of his wife. He argued that the trial judge’s verdict could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
Following a stroke in 2005 the female victim was confined to a wheelchair and she could no longer speak. For two years before her death she had been living in a nursing home. The Crown alleged that while on an outing her husband pushed her wheelchair into a pond, resulting in her drowning. Lovell J drew inferences adverse to the appellant’s credit from the appellant's behaviour during interviews with police ‘that his relationship with his wife had changed since she had been living permanently in the nursing home, such that he had come to see her as "taking up his time" and no longer had a caring relationship with her.’ In assessing the appellant’s account of his wife’s death as implausible, Lovell J found support for the prosecution case in circumstantial evidence that he had left his watch, wallet and a spare change of clothes in the car and had done internet searches on funerals in the month before. Lovell J found 2 distinct interconnected motives, financial and relationship, concluding the only rational inference available on the whole of the evidence was that the appellant deliberately pushed the wheelchair into the pond with intent to kill his wife and therefore his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Ground: The majority in the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in how it approached the ground that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence. In particular, the majority misinterpreted and misapplied the approach required to be taken to that ground in accordance with M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487 as applied in Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and the matter remitted for rehearing. Livesey J’s judgment in the Court of Criminal Appeal, with which Parker J agreed, erred. ‘What was missing from this analysis, because it had been eschewed as raising “jury” questions, was any independent consideration of whether the evidence left open reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence’ [35].
Peniamina v The Queen [2020] HCA 47 (9 December 2020) – High Court of Australia
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Exclusion of provocation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Partial defence of provocation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appeal concerned the partial defence of provocation, which operates to reduce what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter, under s 304(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld). Section 304 was amended in 2011 to exclude the defence (save in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character) in the case of the unlawful killing of the accused's domestic partner where the sudden provocation is “based on anything” done by the deceased, or anything the accused believes the deceased has done, to end or to change the nature of the relationship or to indicate in any way that the relationship may, should or will end or change. The 2011 amendments placed the burden of proof of the defence on the accused. The issue raised by the appeal is whether in discharging this burden the appellant was required to prove that the provocation was not "based on" anything done (or believed to have been done) by the deceased to change the relationship, notwithstanding that such conduct (or believed conduct) was not the conduct that he claimed had induced his loss of self-control. The appellant killed his wife in circumstances that left it open to find he was angered by a belief that the deceased had been unfaithful and planned to leave him. But the appellant’s case was that, for the purpose of s 304(1), his loss of self-control was ’based on’ the deceased “grabbing [a] knife, threatening [him] with it and cutting his right palm.” The jury found the appellant guilty of murder. On appeal, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to direct the jury to consider whether the exception set out in s 304(3) excluded the availability of the partial defence under s 304(1).
Grounds of appeal: The Court of Appeal erred in holding that the exclusion of the defence of partial provocation pursuant to the exception in s304(3) was not confined to the provocative conduct of the deceased which the defence relied upon as causative of the appellant's loss of self-control.
Held: Appeal was allowed. The majority (Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ) found that, correctly understood, s 304(3) excludes the defence of provocation where the accused was in a domestic relationship with the deceased and his/her loss of self-control was induced by anything done (or believed to have been done) by the deceased to change the relationship. Whether the defence does not apply is a question of law.
Here, it was the appellant’s defence that it was the deceased’s conduct with the knife that induced his loss of self-control. There was no evidentiary foundation to suggest that the conduct with the knife was itself a thing done to change the relationship. It was therefore not open to find that the defence was excluded under s 304(3). The trial judge was wrong to direct the jury that, in addition to proving the elements of the defence, the appellant was required to prove that his loss of self-control was not based on anything done by the deceased to change the relationship.
Note: The appellant was subsequently retried and convicted of manslaughter (the sentencing judge found that the jury accepted the partial defence of provocation, and that the appellant’s belief that the victim had been unfaithful was reasonable) and resentenced: R v Peniamina (No 2) [2021] QSC 282 (25 October 2021).
Roy v O’Neill [2020] HCA 45 (9 December 2020) – High Court of Australia
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Implied licence to enter’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘Police powers’ – ‘Pro-active policing’ – ‘Whether police had any basis to request to submit to a breath test’ – ‘Whether police have powers to attend the threshold of private property to ensure compliance with a domestic violence order’
Proceedings: Appeal from the decision of the Northern Territory Court of Appeal O'Neill v Roy [2019] NTCA 8 (4 September 2019).
Issue: Scope and limits of implied licence.
Facts: The respondent woman was the subject of a DVO that protected her male domestic partner (Mr Johnson, the victim). The DVO contained various conditions including that she was restrained from consuming and/or being under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicating substances when in the company of the victim [2]. In April 2018, the Northern Territory Police Force conducted Operation Haven which was designed to address issues concerning domestic violence and alcohol related crime and as part of that operation three officers from the Northern Territory Police Force visited the respondent and victim’s unit. One of the attending officers gave evidence that he had observed ‘antisocial behaviour coming from the property over the weeks prior to the operation’ [3]. One of the officers had previously observed the respondent in an intoxicated state ‘and she was in an intoxicated state every time he had dealt with her’.
Officers approached the shared unit and observed that the respondent "appeared to be just sort of laying on the ground" through the window and called her to come to the door "for the purposes of a domestic violence order check". Officers noted that the respondent’s eyes were bloodshot, her speech was slurred and had "a very strong odour of liquor on her breath", which lead them to conduct a breath test. The respondent was taken to Katherine Watch House after testing positive to alcohol for further breath analysis.
The apartment was accessible to the public and there were no signs suggesting the police were not welcome to approach the unit and knock on the front door. They were not asked to leave by the occupants.
The Northern Territory Court of Appeal held that the case involved an implied licence from the occupier of the premises for visitors to be on the footpath and approach the door of the unit rather than an implied licence for a specific purpose. The respondent sought special leave to appeal. The application regards the scope of the licence. It was agreed that the content of the implied licence is determined objectively while the infringement of the implied licence is determined by reference to some subjective characterisation of purpose.
Judgment: The Court per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ dismissed the appeal, having earlier granted special leave to appeal subject to noting that the proposed grounds of appeal might be reframed with greater precision HCATrans 43 (20 March 2020). Keane and Edelman JJ observed that the making of a coercive direction is beyond the scope of the licence generally implied by the law to enter the curtilage of a property but that there was no need for a coercive direction here as Ms Roy complied with the request for a breath test. No question of coercion would arise unless and until Ms Roy refused to consent to provide a breath test, and Constable Elliott decided to invoke the power conferred by reg 6(1)(a). [93]
Kiefel CJ held that either of two lawful purposes (to check compliance with a domestic violence order where Ms Roy was known to be invariably intoxicated or to ascertain the state of Ms Roy and Mr Johnson by way of a proactive domestic violence check) was sufficient for the law to imply a licence for Constable Elliott to enter the dwelling unit in question. He was not a trespasser. The evidence of the results of the breath test was admissible.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41 (11 October 2017) – High Court of Australia
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Current sentencing practice’ – ‘Instinctive synthesis’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of case’
Charges: Incest x 2; Sexual penetration of a child under 16 x 1; Indecent assault x 1.
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The charge subject of the appeal was one count of incest. The appellant pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The total head sentence was 5 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years ([12], [23]).
Section 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provided that the court must have regard to current sentencing practices when sentencing an offender. The Court of Appeal stated that ‘but for the constraints of current sentencing practice’, it would have imposed a longer sentence ([33]).
Issues: Whether the sentence for the charge of incest was manifestly inadequate. In resolving this question, the High Court clarified the relevance of ‘current sentencing practices’ to sentencing.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Victorian Court of Appeal for determination of the appeal against sentence ([77]). The High Court (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ, Gageler and Gordon JJ agreeing) held that the Court of Appeal erred by treating the range established by current sentencing practices as decisive of the appeal before it ([2]).
Kiefel CJ, Bell and Hayne JJ stated: ‘the terms of s 5(2) are clear such that, while s 5(2)(b) states a factor that must be taken into account in sentencing an offender, that factor is only one factor, and it is not said to be the controlling factor’ ([9]).
Further, their Honours stated at [50]:
section 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act informs the process of instinctive synthesis as a statutory expression of the concern that a reasonable consistency in sentencing should be maintained as an aspect of the rule of law. Reasonable consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles does not, however, require adherence to a range of sentences that is demonstrably contrary to principle.
Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017) – High Court of Australia
‘Meaning of “significant probative value”’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Sexual offences against underage girls x 11.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant was Robert Hughes, the star of the TV show Hey Dad! The 11 complainants were friends of his daughters or workers on the set. The prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of each of the 11 complainants to support each of the other counts. The prosecution sought to prove tendencies of ‘having a sexual interest in female children under 16 years of age’ and ‘using his social and familial relationships … to obtain access to female children under 16 years of age so that he could engage in sexual activities with them’ ([3]). The tendency evidence was admitted, and the appellant was convicted ([8]).
Issues: Whether tendency evidence is required to display features of similarity with the facts in issue before it can be assessed as having “significant probative value”. This issue had been the subject of diverging lines of authority between the Victorian and New South Wales Court of Appeal.
Decision and Reasoning: The High Court (4:3) dismissed the appeal.
The majority (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Edelman JJ) held that the evidence was admissible. The majority identified that there is likely to be a high degree of probative value when (i) the evidence, by itself or together with other evidence, strongly supports proof of a tendency, and (ii) the tendency strongly supports the proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged ([41]).
The majority endorsed the test for “significant probative value” posed in Ford, that ‘the disputed evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the offence charged ([40]). The majority at [40] added the following qualification:
it is not necessary that the disputed evidence has this effect by itself. It is sufficient if the disputed evidence together with other evidence makes significantly more likely any facts making up the elements of the offence charged. Of course, where there are multiple counts on an indictment, it is necessary to consider each count separately to assess whether the tendency evidence which is sought to be adduced in relation to that count is admissible.
Gageler, Nettle and Gordon JJ dissented.
Gageler J advocated for a more conservative approach: his Honour argued that admitting all the evidence risks the jury placing too much emphasis on the series of allegations, and not assessing each charge individually ([109]).
Nettle J emphasised that the fact that an accused has committed one sexual offence against a child is not, without more, sufficiently probative of the accused committing another sexual offence against a child ([158]). Something more is required, for example a similarity in the relationship between the alleged victims, a connection between the details and circumstances of each offence, or a system of offending ([158]). Nettle J also reiterated the dangers in admitting tendency evidence ([174]).
Gordon J agreed with Gageler and Nettle JJ and set out her Honour’s own set of principles at [216].
The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48 (7 December 2016) – High Court of Australia
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Appeal allowed’ – ‘Dousing with petrol and setting alight’ – ‘Drug misuse’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Methylamphetamine’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of offence’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; Using a prohibited weapon x 1; Dealing with suspected proceeds of crime x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and victim were in a relationship; the victim was 12 weeks’ pregnant with the defendant’s child ([5]). The defendant pleaded guilty to dousing the victim with petrol and setting her alight ([10]). The victim’s injuries were ‘horrendous’ ([11]), and she terminated her pregnancy ([13]). The sentencing judge said that he found it hard to recall a more serious example of the charge in his 38 years of working in criminal law ([14]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 15 years with a non-parole period of 11 years ([1]). The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal against sentence on the basis that there was ‘such a disparity between the sentence imposed and current sentencing practice’ ([1]).
Issues: Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The High Court (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) overturned the Court of Appeal’s decision and reinstated the original sentence. The High Court discussed two aspects of the Court of Appeal’s decision: first, the Court of Appeal employing the term ‘worst category’ of offending; and second, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of ‘current sentencing practice’.
First, the High Court held that it is an error to describe offences as being within ‘the worst category of cases’ if the offence does not warrant the maximum penalty ([19]), as the term is likely to cause confusion ([17]-[20]).
Second, the High Court remarked that ‘current sentencing practice’ is likely to change over time, ‘current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence [may] depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’ [21]. The High Court found that the cases were too few to establish a pattern, one case was 12 years old, and most did not occur in a domestic violence context ([25]-[31]). The High Court said that ‘violence perpetrated in the course of a domestic relationship against the offender's female partner … involve the abuse of a relationship of trust’, and such violence ‘must steadfastly be deterred’ ([28]). This was a distinguishing factor from cases with comparable serious injuries ([28]).
Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 (2 October 2013) – High Court of Australia
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Antecedents and personal circumstances’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social disadvantage’ – ‘Traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment’
Charge/s: Manslaughter
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his de facto spouse. He was sentenced to five years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and three months’. The DPP appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and resentenced the appellant to seven years and nine months’ imprisonment with the same parole eligibility conditions. The appellant and the deceased had been in a relationship for approximately 16 years. On the day the deceased was killed, the appellant and the deceased spent the afternoon at a local tavern and both became intoxicated. After returning home, an argument ensued and the appellant assaulted the deceased in a prolonged and brutal way. He threw the deceased about the room, rammed her head into walls and repeatedly punched her on the face and head. There was a history of significant domestic violence in the relationship, including a conviction for grievous bodily harm for which the appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended) as well as a conviction for common assault. The appellant was subject to a lifetime violence restraining order in favour of the deceased which prohibited him from having any contact with her. However, this order had been ignored by both parties and the relationship had continued.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
a.
Whether the Court of Appeal incorrectly applied the principles which govern manifest inadequacy of a sentence.
b.
Whether the Court of Appeal erred by failing to pay sufficient regard to the appellant’s antecedents and personal circumstances, in particular the systemic deprivation and disadvantage (including endemic alcohol abuse which is prevalent in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities) that the appellant faced.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Bell J dissenting).
a.
The joint majority (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) found no error in the Court’s approach to the issue of manifest inadequacy. In the Court of Appeal, McLure P made express reference to the gross over-representation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system (particularly in relation to manslaughter) which is directly related to alcohol and drug abuse. Her Honour also made reference to various ‘weighting errors’ in the sentencing at first instance. The Court held that there was no error in this approach. See in particular at [37], where the joint majority noted ‘her Honour was proceeding to make the point that, even in the context of the circumstances of social disadvantage in which domestic violence commonly occurs, the seriousness of the offence is such as to make a compelling claim on the sentencing discretion. And that is so notwithstanding that the number of Aboriginal offenders (and victims) is "grossly disproportionate".
See also McLure P’s statement quoted at [41] – "In this case, the offence is one of the most serious known to the law. The maintenance of adequate standards of punishment for a crime involving the taking of human life is an important consideration. While the role of the criminal law in deterring the commission of violent acts is problematic, and particularly so in relation to Aboriginal communities, it is important to indicate very clearly that drunken violence against Aboriginal women is viewed very seriously". The joint majority approved these remarks at [42] – ‘The passage of time has not lessened the force of that statement. While the appellant's offence may not have been in the very worst category of offences of manslaughter, it is not easy to think of worse examples. Given that the maximum available sentence was 20 years imprisonment, and given the prolonged and brutal beating administered by the appellant upon his de facto spouse, a conclusion that the sentence imposed at first instance was manifestly inadequate cannot be said to have been wrong.’
b.
The appellant did not submit that ‘Aboriginality per se warrants leniency’ (see at [47]). Rather, the appellant contended that social and economic issues commonly associated with Aboriginal communities affected the appellant and that these should have been treated as mitigating factors. He also contended that he was likely to receive traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment when released from prison and that he was ‘willing, and indeed anxious’ (see at [49]) to subject himself to this payback. He submitted that this should have received greater significance as a mitigating factor.
In dismissing these arguments, the Court noted that while mitigating factors such as social disadvantage need to be afforded appropriate weight in sentencing, this cannot result in the imposition of a penalty which is disproportionate to the gravity of the offending. In particular, the Court noted at [53] – ‘To accept that Aboriginal offenders are in general less responsible for their actions than other persons would be to deny Aboriginal people their full measure of human dignity’ and ‘Further, it would be wrong to accept that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender is somehow less in need, or deserving, of such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide.’
The Court also addressed the argument that general deterrence has less significance in relation to crimes which are not premeditated in the context of social disadvantage. In dismissing this assertion, the Court noted that the criminal law is not limited to the ‘utilitarian value of general deterrence’ and stated that the obligation of the State is ‘to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’ (see at [54]). Furthermore, the gravity of the offending in this case was extremely high - see at [55] –
‘A consideration with a very powerful claim on the sentencing discretion in this case is the need to recognise that the appellant, by his violent conduct, took a human life, and, indeed, the life of his de facto spouse. A just sentence must accord due recognition to the human dignity of the victim of domestic violence and the legitimate interest of the general community in the denunciation and punishment of a brutal, alcohol-fuelled destruction of a woman by her partner. A failure on the part of the state to mete out a just punishment of violent offending may be seen as a failure by the state to vindicate the human dignity of the victim; and to impose a lesser punishment by reason of the identity of the victim is to create a group of second-class citizens, a state of affairs entirely at odds with the fundamental idea of equality before the law.’
In relation to the appellant’s alcohol addiction, McLure P held that this factor would increase the weight to be given to personal deterrence and community protection. The joint majority of the High Court agreed and noted that the fact the appellant was affected by an environment of alcohol abuse should be taken into account in assessing personal moral culpability, but this has to be balanced with the seriousness of the offending. See further at [57] where the majority of the High Court said– ‘It is also important to say that it should not be thought that indulging in drunken bouts of domestic violence is not an example of moral culpability to a very serious degree.’
In relation to the relevance of traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment, the High Court’s disposition was that the appellant’s willingness to submit to this punishment was not a relevant consideration in sentencing. However, the first instance judge did take it into account, which was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. While the joint majority of the High Court did not offer a conclusive opinion, they noted that the courts cannot condone the commission of an offence or ‘the pursuit of vendettas’ and held that the appellant did not suffer injustice because the prospect of traditional punishment was given only limited weight (see at [61]-[63]).
Bell J dissented. Her Honour held that it was open to the primary judge to reach the sentence that he did, based on comparable authorities. Bell J was also critical of the practice of giving too much weight to the maximum penalty, given the wide variety of circumstances in which manslaughter convictions can arise. Her Honour stated that a sentence well short of half the maximum penalty does not of itself give rise to legal error.
Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 (4 May 2011) – High Court of Australia (appeal from Queensland Court of Appeal)
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Mr Roach was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm of his female partner. At trial, Howell DCJ admitted evidence of previous (uncharged) assaults that Mr Roach committed on the complainant during their relationship. The relevant Queensland provision—s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977—applies to proceedings for assault occasioning bodily harm and provides that ‘[r]elevant evidence of the history of the domestic relationship between the defendant and the person against whom the offence was committed is admissible in evidence in the proceeding’. However, s 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 gives the judge power to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it is deemed unfair to the accused to admit.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge should have applied the test in Pfennig v The Queen [1995] HCA 7; (1995) 182 CLR 461 and whether ‘viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of [the relationship evidence] which is consistent with innocence’. Only if there is no reasonable view, can the evidence be admissible because its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused.
The appellant argued that in considering whether to admit evidence under s 132B, the trial judge ought not to admit that evidence if there was a reasonable view of that evidence consistent with innocence (‘the rule in Pfennig’). The appellant argued that the rule in Pfennig recognises the prejudicial effect of evidence used to prove a propensity of the accused ("propensity evidence"), and applies at common law to propensity evidence as a measure of the probative force of that evidence. (see Roach v The Queen [2010] HCATrans288 (5 November 2010)).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ of the High Court held firstly that s 132B has a ‘potentially wide operation’. Section 132B contemplates evidence of other acts of domestic violence throughout the relationship being admitted. The section could also be used to admit similar fact evidence to prove the accused’s propensity to commit similar crimes. The Court found it could also be used to admit other types of evidence including evidence of a person’s state of mind, evidence of the circumstances of the crime or to provide context to the history the relationship. It could also be used as evidence in a provocation or self-defence case, or where the offender is a victim of domestic violence. (See at [30]-[31]). The Court then held that the Pfennig test has no application to the common law residual discretion enshrined in s 130. As such, the test of admissibility under s 132B is whether the evidence is relevant, which is subject to the exercise of the discretion preserved in s 130.
The purpose of admitting the evidence here was not to show a propensity of the accused (re the rule in Pfennig); rather, the evidence:
‘was tendered to explain the circumstance of the offence charged. It was tendered so that she could give a full account and so that her statement of the appellant's conduct on the day of the offence would not appear "out of the blue" to the jury and inexplicable on that account, which may readily occur where there is only one charge. It allowed the prosecution, and the complainant, to meet a question which would naturally arise in the minds of the jury’ at [42].
The High Court noted the permissible ambit of ‘relationship evidence’, and the need for clear directions for juries about the use of such evidence and the purpose for which it is tendered:
[45] In the present case the evidence, if accepted, was capable of showing that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was a violent one, punctuated as it was with acts of violence on the part of the appellant when affected by alcohol. Without this inference being drawn, the jury would most likely have misunderstood the complainant's account of the alleged offence and what was said by the appellant and the complainant in the course of it. To an extent Holmes JA acknowledged this in the conclusions to her reasons. Whilst her Honour identified the relevance of the evidence as showing the particular propensity of the appellant, she also concluded that it made the appellant's conduct in relation to the alleged offence intelligible and not out of the blue.
[47] The importance of directions in cases where evidence may show propensity should not be underestimated. It is necessary in such a case that a trial judge give a clear and comprehensible warning about the misuse of the evidence for that purpose and explain the purpose for which it is tendered. A trial judge should identify the inferences which may be open from it or the questions which may have occurred to the jury without the evidence. Those inferences and those questions should be identified by the prosecution at an early point in the trial. And it should be explained to the jury that the evidence is to allow the complainant to tell her, or his, story but that they will need to consider whether it is true.
[48] The directions in this case were sufficient. At the conclusion of the evidence the trial judge directed the jury of the need to exercise care and that it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant's evidence alone unless they were convinced of its accuracy. His Honour told the jury that the history of the relationship between the complainant and the appellant had been led "for a very specific purpose" and that they must be "very, very careful in relation to the limited use that [they] may make of such evidence." He explained how evidence could be used as evidence of propensity and directed them that they were not to use the evidence in that way. His Honour informed the jury that the evidence was led so that the incident charged was not considered in isolation or in a vacuum but "to give [them] a true and proper context to properly understand what the complainant said happened on the 13th of April 2006."
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27 (5 August 2009) – High Court of Australia
‘Adjournments’ – ‘Amendment’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Case management’ – ‘Pleadings’ – ‘Practice and procedure’
Hearing: Appeal against decision to allow amendments to statement of claim.
Facts: ANU applied for an adjournment at trial to make substantial amendments to its statement of claim against Aon. The adjournment was granted and the primary judge allowed the application to amend the statement of claim. Aon appealed against the decision.
Decision and Reasoning: This case did not concern family violence but contained a number of relevant statements regarding adjournments. French CJ referred to the decision in Sali v SPC Ltd, which concerned the refusal by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria to grant an application for an adjournment of an appeal. By majority, the High Court held there ‘that in the exercise of a discretion to refuse or grant an adjournment, the judge of a busy court was entitled to consider ‘the effect of an adjournment on court resources and the competing claims by litigants in other cases awaiting hearing in the court as well as the interests of the parties’’ (see [26]). Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ went on to say:
‘What might be perceived as an injustice to a party when considered only in the context of an action between parties may not be so when considered in a context which includes the claims of other litigants and the public interest in achieving the most efficient use of court resources’.
Toohey and Gaudron JJ dissented in the result but acknowledged that:
‘The contemporary approach to court administration has introduced another element into the equation or, more accurately, has put another consideration onto the scales. The view that the conduct of litigation is not merely a matter for the parties but is also one for the court and the need to avoid disruptions in the court's lists with consequent inconvenience to the court and prejudice to the interests of other litigants waiting to be heard are pressing concerns to which a court may have regard’.
In the present case, French CJ stated at [27]:
‘The observations made in the two joint judgments in Sali were linked to the particular knowledge that a judge or court, called upon to exercise a discretion to adjourn, would have of the state of that court's lists. However, the mischief engendered by unwarranted adjournments and consequent delays in the resolution of civil proceedings goes beyond their particular effects on the court in which those delays occur. In that connection, there have been a number of cases after Sali in which it has been accepted, in the context of Judicature Act Rules, that the public interest in the efficient use of court resources is a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretions to amend or adjourn’.
Osland v R [1998] HCA 75; 197 CLR 316 (10 December 1998) – High Court of Australia
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony - psychologist’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and her son were jointly tried in the Supreme Court of Victoria for the murder of her husband Mr Osland (the appellant’s son’s step-father). The jury convicted the appellant but was unable to reach a verdict with respect to her son. Her son was later retried and acquitted. The prosecution case was that the appellant and her son planned to murder her husband. The appellant mixed sedatives with her husband’s dinner in sufficient quantity to induce sleep within an hour. The appellant’s son later completed the plan by hitting Mr Osland on the head with an iron pipe while he was asleep. He and the appellant then buried Mr Osland in a grave they had earlier prepared. At trial, the appellant and her son relied on self-defence and provocation raised against ‘an evidentiary background of tyrannical and violent behaviour by Mr Osland over many years’ which had allegedly been ‘escalating in the days prior to his death’ (at [4]). The prosecution accepted that Mr Osland had been violent in the past but maintained that this behaviour had ceased well before he was murdered. The appellant raised expert evidence of the ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS) in support of her case. A psychologist’s evidence indicated that the appellant’s relationship with her husband was ‘consistent with it being a battering relationship’ (at [50]).
The psychologist outlined the general characteristics of battered women as follows (at [51]):
1.
they are ashamed, fear telling others of their predicament and keep it secret.
2.
they tend to relive their experiences and, if frightened or intimidated, their thinking may be cloudy and unfocussed.
3.
they have an increased arousal and become acutely aware of any signal of danger from their partner.
4.
they may stay in an abusive relationship because they believe that, if they leave, the other person will find them or take revenge on other members of the family.
5.
in severe cases, they may live with the belief that one day they will be killed by the other person.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Provocation - Whether the trial judge erred in ‘failing to make clear the connection between the evidence of "battered woman syndrome", admitted at the trial, and the law of provocation’ (see at [155]).
2.
Self-defence – Whether the trial judge erred in ‘failing to make clear the connection between the evidence of "battered woman syndrome", admitted at the trial, and the law of self-defence’ (see at [155]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Gaudron and Gummow JJ dissenting). However, all members of the Court were unanimous in holding that the trial judge’s directions with respect to ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS) were appropriate.
Gaudron and Gummow JJ:
“Expert evidence is admissible with respect to a relevant matter about which ordinary persons are "[not] able to form a sound judgment … without the assistance of [those] possessing special knowledge or experience in the area" and which is the subject "of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience"” (at [53])
“…there may be cases in which a matter of apparently slight significance is properly to be regarded as evidence of provocation when considered in light of expert evidence as to the battered woman's heightened arousal or awareness of danger. And evidence of that may also be relevant to the gravity of the provocation, as may the history of the abusive relationship.” (at [55])
“So, too, expert evidence of heightened arousal or awareness of danger may be directly relevant to self-defence, particularly to the question whether the battered woman believed that she was at risk of death or serious bodily harm and that her actions were necessary to avoid that risk. And, of course, the history of the particular relationship may bear on the reasonableness of that belief.” (at [56])
“…there is an obligation on counsel to make clear to the jury and the trial judge the precise manner in which they seek to rely on expert evidence of battered wife syndrome and to relate it to the other evidence and the issues in the case. In circumstances where evidence of battered wife syndrome is given in general terms, is not directly linked to the other evidence in the case or the issues and no application is made for any specific direction with respect to that evidence, it cannot be concluded that the trial judge erred in not giving precise directions as to the use to which that evidence might be put.” (at [60])
Callinan J (while agreeing that the directions with respect to BWS were appropriate) held that to adopt a new and separate defence of BWS ‘goes too far for the laws of this country’ (see at [239]). His Honour also noted that these issues could be matters for expert evidence as well as matters of common sense for a jury to decide with the assistance from the trial judge.
McHugh J did not make any comments on BWS.
Kirby J:
His Honour discussed the relevance of the BWS defence in abusive relationships. His Honour was of the opinion that the term should not be restricted to women because there may be situations where men are the victims such as similarly abusive same-sex relationships, and ‘unlike conception and childbirth, there is no inherent reason why a battering relationship should be confined to women as victims’ (at [159]).
His Honour was broadly supportive of BWS evidence but did note some controversies around it and was somewhat critical of it: “…it appears to be an “advocacy driven construct” designed to “medicalise” the evidence in a particular case in order to avoid the difficulties which might arise in the context of a criminal trial from a conclusion that the accused's motivations are complex and individual: arising from personal pathology and social conditions rather than a universal or typical pattern of conduct sustained by scientific data’ (at [161]).
Further, he was critical of the term itself and stated it should not be used. He was also aware that the syndrome was ‘based largely on the experiences of Caucasian women of a particular social background’ (whose) ‘”passive” responses may be different from those of women with different economic or ethnic backgrounds’ (at [161]).
Ultimately however, his Honour was supportive – ‘Although BWS does not enjoy universal support, there is considerable agreement that expert testimony about the general dynamics of abusive relationships is admissible if relevant to the issues in the trial and proved by a qualified expert. The greatest relevance of such evidence will usually concern the process of "traumatic bonding" which may occur in abusive relationships’ (at [167]).
M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68 (8 December 1988) – High Court of Australia
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Custody order’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Test to be applied’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody order.
Facts: The trial judge made an order giving the wife guardianship and custody of the child. The wife alleged that the father had sexually abused the child and that the child’s welfare would be put at risk in allowing the father custody. The trial judge was not satisfied that the father had abused the child. However, His Honour considered that there was a possibility that the child had been sexually abused by the father. Accordingly, in the interests of the child, His Honour held that he should eliminate the risk of such abuse by denying access to the father. The father appealed this decision.
Issue/s: What is the correct approach in dealing with sexual abuse allegations and unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The approach to be taken in these matters is not one of competing rights of the parents or ever purely a finding for or against either based on the evidence in support of the allegations. The approach is to determine on all of the evidence what is in the best interests of the child.
The Court concluded and held at [25]:
‘Efforts to define with greater precision the magnitude of the risk which will justify a court in denying a parent access to a child have resulted in a variety of formulations. The degree of risk has been described as a “risk of serious harm”, “an element of risk” or “an appreciable risk”, “a real possibility”, a “real risk”, and an “unacceptable risk”. This imposing array indicates that the courts are striving for a greater degree of definition than the subject is capable of yielding. In devising these tests the courts have endeavoured, in their efforts to protect the child's paramount interests, to achieve a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access. To achieve a proper balance, the test is best expressed by saying that a court will not grant custody or access to a parent if that custody or access would expose the child to an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse’.
With regards to the consideration of risk, it is in “achiev[ing] a balance between the risk of detriment to the child from sexual abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child from parental access”. A finding of sexual abuse need not be made to make a finding of unacceptable risk.
Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334 (17 June 1970) – High Court of Australia
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Statements made by deceased's wife charging accused with desire to kill her’
Charges: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for special leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The facts of this case were summarised concisely by Martin CJ (with whom Pullin JA and Hall J agreed) in O’Driscoll v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 175 (10 August 2011) [DT1] at [26] as follows -
‘[T]he appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife by shooting her in the back of the head. A critical issue at trial was whether she was deliberately shot or whether the gun had discharged by accident. The Crown led evidence that the deceased said to the accused, in the presence of other witnesses, 'I know you want to kill me for my money' and 'I know you want to kill me, why don't you get it over with'. These statements were admitted by the trial judge, subject to a direction that the jury should not treat them as evidence of the state of mind of the accused.
Issue/s:
a.
Whether the statements made by the appellant’s wife were admissible.
b.
If they were admissible, whether they should have been excluded by the trial judge because their probative value was outweighed by the potential prejudice to the accused.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court unanimously dismissed both grounds of appeal and held that the evidence was admissible.
a.
Barwick CJ noted at [3] that, ‘The fundamental rule governing the admissibility of evidence is that it be relevant. In every instance the proffered evidence must ultimately be brought to that touchstone.’ Evidence of the ‘nature of the current relationship between the applicant and his wife’ was relevant to the appellant’s guilt. Evidence of a ‘close affectionate relationship’ could be used by the jury to conclude that the appellant was not guilty. Evidence of hostility in the relationship could be used by the jury to conclude that the appellant’s argument that the shooting was accidental lacked credibility. His Honour did concede that if the deceased’s statements ‘had not been part of the evidence of a quarrel of a significant kind’ ([8]), they would have been inadmissible. However, in this case the statements were part of a ‘quarrel’ between the parties and were indicative, ‘of the nature of the quarrel and of the levels which the mutual relationship of the parties had reached’ (see at [8]). More generally, his Honour concluded that ‘evidence of the relations of the accused with others’ is admissible not only in cases where it establishes motive, though this may be the most common way in which it is used. This type of evidence could also be admissible if it explains an ‘occurrence’ or assists in the choice between two explanations of an ‘occurrence’ because such evidence satisfies the test of relevance (see at [7]).
Menzies J (with whom McTiernan J and Walsh J agreed) reached the same conclusion –‘To shut the jury off from any event throwing light upon the relationship between this husband and wife would be to require them to decide the issue as if it happened in a vacuum rather than in the setting of a tense and bitter relationship between a man and a woman who were husband and wife’(see at [4]).
b.
Barwick CJ held that while the deceased’s statements were damaging to the appellant, they were not prejudicial, and showed, ‘the depths to which the relationship of the parties, as husband and wife, had sunk’ (see at [9]).
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; HCA 34 (30 June 1938) – High Court of Australia
‘Civil cases’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Standard of proof’
Proceedings: Petition for divorce on the ground of adultery.
Facts: The applicant sought a dissolution of his marriage to his wife on the ground of her adultery.
Issue/s: What is the standard of proof required in civil matters?
Decision and Reasoning: In explaining the civil standard of proof, Dixon J stated that ‘when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence…It cannot be found as a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities’. His Honour went on to explain that the standard is one of ‘reasonable satisfaction’:
‘But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. Everyone must feel that, when, for instance, the issue is on which of two dates an admitted occurrence took place, a satisfactory conclusion may be reached on materials of a kind that would not satisfy any sound and prudent judgment if the question was whether some act had been done involving grave moral delinquency’.
Walpole & Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2020] FamCAFC 65 (25 March 2020) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Fatal strangulation’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of family and domestic violence’ – ‘Intolerable situation’ – ‘Non’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Issue: Application for leave to appeal, application to adduce further evidence re criminal history and family violence.
Grounds:
•
The primary judge erred in the application of the grave risk of physical or psychological harm defence (Ground 1);
•
The primary judge erred in the finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship (Ground 2);
•
The judge erred by assuming that the current protection orders in New Zealand would remain in place (Ground 3);
•
The intolerable situation defence applies (raised by the Court).
Facts: The appellant fled New Zealand with the assistance of New Zealand Police with her two children, in mid-2019 she believed the children’s father posed a real risk to her and the children. The father had an extensive criminal history which demonstrated "a pattern of increasingly serious charges against the father (not all of which resulted in convictions), domestic violence offences and breaches of bail and parole" [29]. The mother gave evidence of her intention to remain separated from the father but argued that the extensive history of repeated reconciliations between them meant the court should not have accepted that her intention to remain separated would ensure the children’s safety if they were returned to New Zealand. The father invoked the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the ‘Abduction Convention’) to secure the children’s return [1]. The application for recovery was made by the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the "Central Authority" under the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) ("the Regulations"), an Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL) was appointed and argued at first instance against the Hague Convention Application being granted, but the judge accepted the mother’s evidence she would not resume cohabitation with the father and the application was granted. The mother sought leave to appeal and applied to lead more evidence of the father’s criminal history and family violence history. The ICL did not participate in the application for leave to appeal despite the order for their participation remaining on foot.
Judgment: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal allowed on basis of the intolerable situation defence (not raised as a ground of appeal but by the Court).
Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 contended that the primary judge erred in finding that there is no immediate prospect of a resumption of the parental relationship. This error was based on the judge’s acceptance "of the mother’s evidence that she had permanently separated from the father and had taken necessary steps to keep him away from her and the children" [51]. In support of these contentions, the mother submitted that the primary judge should have considered her history of separation and reconciliation with the father and instead concluded that it was thus unsafe to assume she would cooperate with attempts to keep her and the children safe. The Court noted that this position was inconsistent with the evidence submitted by the appellant at trial and concluded that "given the manner the case was run at trial" the grounds could not succeed [534].
Ground 3 contended that the primary judge erred in assuming that the protection orders against the father in New Zealand would remain in place. As the mother did not submit as part of her case at trial that she would agree to the father’s application to discharge these protections orders being granted, nor was there evidence that the father’s application had any prospect of success, the third ground was "not made good" [55].
Ryan, Aldridge and Watt JJ all, in separate judgements, granted leave and allowed the appeal after considering the intolerable situation defence under reg 16(3) of the Family Law (Child Abduction) Regulations 1986 (Cth). It was noted that the father’s previous convictions and violence, the pattern of parental separation and reconciliation, and the totality of the circumstances in which the children would find themselves if they were to return to New Zealand were unsafe and intolerable [63].
Ryan and Aldridge JJ criticised the role of the Secretary of the Department of Communities and Justice (NSW) as the Central Authority in pursuing the matter: [78] ‘We have been troubled by what occurred in this case and it is timely to mention the importance of adherence to Model Litigant guidelines. The NSW Guidelines, which apply to the Central Authority, requires more than merely acting honestly and in accordance with the law and court rules. Essentially, the guidelines require that the Central Authority acts with complete propriety and in accordance with the highest professional standards. Relevantly, this includes not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the state or an agency knows to be true.’
[79] ‘In this case, the application disclosed the father’s final term of imprisonment in NSW. Even though the Requesting Authority knew that the father was permanently banned from Australia, had effectively been deported and had lived in New Zealand for many years, it would seem that no attempt was made to establish his criminal antecedents or the involvement (if any) of child protection agencies in New Zealand in relation to his other children. The same applies in NSW. To be fair, the Requesting Authority and the Central Authority disclosed the mother’s application for a protection order and thereby flagged that, on the mother’s case, serious risk issues arose.’
[80] ‘It is our understanding that systems are in place in NSW which enable the Central Authority to access/request information from the NSW Police. We assume New Zealand operates in the same fashion. Thus, the Requesting Authority and Central Authority were able to examine and present the father’s complete criminal history and an entire set of COPS records. Instead, it was left to the mother and the ICL to gather records from New Zealand and domestically. It is no small thing to obtain records from abroad, particularly when time constraints are tight. Fortunately, the mother was granted legal aid, but, what we ask, if she was not? How would this young mother on social security benefits have managed to place this vitally important evidence before the court? The prospect that she would not have been able to do so is obvious.’
Stringer & Nissen (No. 2) [2019] FamCAFC 185 (23 October 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Failure to consider evidence relevant to the child's best interests’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relocation’
Case type: Appeal against interim parenting orders as to with whom the child, X, should live.
Facts: The parties separated in 2015 when X was around 6 months old. In 2015, the parties entered into a parenting plan. In early 2019, the mother and X moved from Town A to live in Sydney. The mother did not tell the father she was leaving Town A because she was afraid of what he might do to her or X, and said that, during the relationship, the father was aggressive and abusive towards her. After leaving Town A, the parties made arrangements for X to spend time with the father until March 2019. At the end of that time, the father refused to return the child to the mother. The primary judge ordered that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility of X and that if the mother returns to live in Town A, then X will live with her, but that if the mother does not return to Town A, then X will live with the father. At the heart of the Court’s decision was the denunciation of the mother’s unilateral decision to move away from Town A.
Issue: Whether it was in the best interests of X to live with his mother in Sydney or with his father in Town A?
Held: The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia allowed the appeal against the orders of the primary judge. Their Honours found that the primary judge did not engage in a careful consideration of the evidence, as he failed to take into account the mother’s evidence that she did not tell the father she was moving because she feared him. The Full Court was also perplexed as to why the father’s unilateral decision not to return X to his mother was not denounced in the same way as the mother’s unilateral decision to relocate without telling the father. The Full Court also found that the primary judge misapprehended the nature and extent of the family violence and misapplied legal principles.
At [45], the Court found:
“The allegations of family violence, together with the mother’s concern as to the father’s alcohol abuse were matters on which she relied to demonstrate that it would not be in the child’s best interests to live with the father and his Honour ignored a fundamental integer of the mother’s case which was that there was a risk to the child from being exposed to family violence. The orders she sought for time would however, provide for the maintenance of the child’s relationship with the father while he remained living with his mother. His Honour’s approach was erroneous in principle and to the facts.”
Keating & Keating [2019] FamCAFC 46 (21 March 2019) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Property settlement’
Case type: Appeal.
Facts: The husband was a tradesman and operated a business, called the Keating Group, through a complex trust and corporate structure. The Group traded throughout the marriage, and since the parties separated in 2010, the husband managed and operated it. Its value and dramatic increase in the husband’s director loan account to the Group were key issues in the proceedings. The primary judge separated the parties’ property into 2 pools: non-superannuation assets and property and liability, and superannuation. The non-superannuation property was worth $1,784,854; however as a result of the husband’s indebtedness to the Group and expenses associated with a failed taxation minimisation scheme, liabilities exceeded assets by $804,805. The husband’s and wife’s contributions were assessed at 70% and 30% respectively. Their superannuation contributions were assessed as equal. No adjustment was made under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The wife was ordered to retain her personal possessions, her bank account, car and $12,000 previously received by way of partial property settlement. She also received a superannuation split of $119,000 and 50% of any payment received as a result of a pending class action relating to the tax scheme. The husband retained the Group, which had an annual turnover of $4 million and which provided him with a superior standard of living. He remained personally liable for his loan account and debts due in relation to the tax minimisation scheme.
The wife alleged that she was subject to family violence at the hands of the husband during and after their relationship. Her evidence included that the husband broke her nose, beat her on an overseas trip until she passed out, and that she suffered serious bruising and broken ribs. The primary judge dismissed all incidents of violence towards the wife except that which resulted in her broken wrist, apparently because her evidence was uncorroborated ([41]).
Issue: The wife appealed the property settlement orders on 7 grounds. Relevant grounds of appeal include that:
•
The primary judge failed to give adequate reasons for his conclusions and to sufficiently engage with the wife’s case (Grounds 1 and 5).
•
The wife claimed an adjustment, which the primary judge refused to make, arising from family violence under the ‘Kennon’ principles (Ground 4).
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the property order.
Grounds 1 and 5.
At [23]-[24], Ainslie-Wallace and Ryan JJ held –
‘[H]is Honour went no further than to say that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme was unsuccessful…The issue was whether she knew of and supported the husband’s investment in the scheme to the extent that she should shoulder half of the resulting debt. In the result, his Honour’s decision to fix both parties with responsibility for the debt was made ‘…because [the debt] actually exists…’
‘His Honour’s finding that the wife was ‘aware’ that the investment scheme failed falls considerably short of engagement with the reasons why the wife said she ought not to be fixed with joint responsibility for the debt. The same applies to the finding that the debt ‘actually exists’. Although parties would ordinarily be expected to take the good with the bad, there was no active engagement by the primary judge with the wife’s case that the husband should bear sole responsibility for the debt and why.’
Given the primary judge’s failure to engage with the wife’s case on these matters, the Court held that Grounds 1 and 5 had been established.
Ground 4.
The wife argued that she was exposed to significant family violence by her husband during and after the relationship. She sought an adjustment under the principle in Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 where it was held that family violence, which is demonstrated to have a significant adverse impact upon one party’s contributions to a marriage, is a relevant consideration to the assessment of contributions within section 79. According to the Court in Kennon, it is necessary to adduce evidence to prove the incidence and effect of domestic violence, and to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the parties’ capacity to ‘contribute’ under section 79(4) ([37]). The Court in Kennon also stated that family violence will be relevant if the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party ([36]).
However, at [33] the Full Court held –
‘The fact that the wife gave evidence of family violence during periods when the parties were separated and after they separated for the last time ought not to have minimised the significance of her evidence of that which occurred during the relationship.’
The Court went on to state that Kennon should not be interpreted as laying down a precise rule that ‘post-separation family violence to a spouse who seeks to continue to contribute to the welfare of the family as a parent is irrelevant’. The reference to ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi & Spagnardi [2003] FamCA 905 appeared ‘to elevate the need for an evidentiary nexus or ‘discernible impact’ between the conduct complained of and its effect on the party’s ability to make relevant contributions, requiring expert or actuarial evidence of the effect of the violence.’ Their Honours stated that perhaps the use of the word ‘quantification’ in Spagnardi was ‘infelicitous’ when in truth, the Court ‘was merely reinforcing the need for there to be an evidentiary nexus between the conduct complained of and the capacity (and or effort expended) to make relevant contributions’ ([39]). Their Honours also affirmed the well-settled view that a party does not require his or her evidence to be corroborated before evidence of family violence can be accepted ([42]).
The Court could not conclusively determine whether the primary judge’s decision not to make a ‘Kennon’ type adjustment was wrong due to the absence of a transcript ([43]). While Kennon appears to remain sound law, its considerations apply to ‘a relatively narrow band of cases’ ([67]).
Atkinson v Atkinson [2017] FamCAFC 266 (13 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Alleged false allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Recovery order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Father’s appeal against interim parenting orders, including a recovery order.
Facts: The mother applied for, and was granted, a recovery order for the return of the child after the father failed to return the child to the mother following fortnightly weekend contact. The father argued that the mother physically abused the child and the mother alleged that the father engaged in a pattern of emotional abuse such as to constitute family violence by persistent allegations that the mother physically abused the child.
Issue: Whether the primary judge erred in failing to appoint a single expert before making a recovery order.
Judgment: Appeal dismissed. Interim orders that the child reside with the mother.
In finding that the primary judge did not err in failing to appoint a single expert before making interim orders including a recovery order after the father retained the child Ryan J noted (Johnston and Thackray JJ agreeing):
[49] …the mother’s application was for a recovery order after the father retained the child. The application demanded a prompt response and in my view an adjournment for in all probability many months would not have been in the best interests of the child.
Ralton and Ralton [2017] FamCAFC 182; (7 September 2017) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Application of domestic and international human rights law under the family law act 1975 (cth)’ – ‘Bias’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘No merit’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Unsuccessful application for stay of proceedings’ – ‘Weight of evidence’
Matter: Mother’s appeal against parenting orders that the children B and C reside with the father, he have sole parental responsibility and the mother have limited supervised contact, to progress to alternate weekends and half the school holidays.
Facts: Earlier orders made in 2010 had provided for the children to reside with the mother and have contact with the father. In 2014 and 2015 the children only spent time with the father intermittently. B, in particular, became reluctant to spend time with the father, and in 2016 twice avoided contact by running away from school. The trial judge found that the children were “at risk of longer-term psychological harm in the mother’s household” and would not have any real relationship with their father if they remained in the mother's care [4]. The Independent Children’s Lawyer (‘ICL’) supported the father’s position.
Grounds: The mother’s grounds of appeal were “difficult to follow and understand” and her submissions “did not seek to explain why the primary judge erred but were rather a lengthy and detailed assertion of wrongdoing by his Honour.
Decision: ICL granted leave to appear. No error established and appeal and applications in an appeal dismissed. Mother to pay the father’s costs of the appeal.
Parental alienation was considered in circumstances where the mother appealed against parenting orders on the basis that orders had been made with insufficient consideration of the alleged family violence of the father and the expert witnesses were biased (the Full Court - Bryant CJ, Strickland & Aldridge JJ).
[187] The primary judge was at pains to avoid the use of labels such as “parental alienation” or “enmeshment”. Speaking of the Associate Professor’s evidence, which included a discussion of these concepts, his Honour said:
The issues that he raises with respect to the concept of alienation as a syndrome are well set out in the literature. However, to become focused upon the academic discussion of alienation and whether or not it is a syndrome – and it seems clear that it is not – becomes more of a distraction than anything in this individual case. What is necessary in this case is a careful analysis of the evidence of the parties, the circumstances confronting these two children in each of the households and the behaviours exhibited in order to ascertain what is going to be in their best interests. (quoting from the primary judgment at [70])
[192] … There is therefore no need for us to consider whether or not the evidence justified a finding of parental alienation or enmeshment or whether or not they are valid concepts.
Saska & Radavich [2016] FamCAFC 179 (1 September 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Definition of family violence in section 4ab’ – ‘Key statutory provisions in the family law act’ – ‘Meaning of ‘family violence’’ – ‘Mother a family member by operation of section 4(1ab)’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Section 61da’ – ‘Whether mother a member of the family of the father within the meaning of section 4ab’
Proceedings: Appeal - parenting orders.
Facts: The trial judge made final parenting orders which included an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child of the mother and the father. In making these orders, the trial judge found that the father’s behaviour towards the mother amounted to ‘family violence’ within the meaning of s 4AB of the Family Law Act. As a result of this family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility for the child in s 61DA of the Act did not apply: s 61DA(1). Further, even if the presumption had applied, the trial judge held that it would still not have been in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility: s 61DA(4). The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in finding that the father’s behaviour towards the mother constituted family violence within the meaning of s 4AB(1) because the mother was not ‘a member of the [father’s] family’ as defined in s 4(1AB). Accordingly, the trial judge erred in finding that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted because the father had not engaged in family violence: s 61DA(2)(b).
•
The trial judge erred in finding in the alternative that the presumption was rebutted because equal shared parental responsibility was not in the best interests of the child: s 61DA(4).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court held that the father’s appeal was always doomed to fail because it rested on a misconceived interpretation of s 4(1AB) of the Act. Relevant to the proceedings, the combined effect of s 4(1AB)(e) and s 4(1AC) was that the child was a member of the father’s and a member of the mother’s family. It was never in issue in the proceedings that the mother resided with the child at the material times, the child being a member of the father’s family. Thus, by operation of subparagraph (h) of s 4(1AB), the mother was a member of the father’s family. Further, within the meaning of subparagraph (i) of s 4(1AB) each of the mother and the father, respectively and alternatively, ‘is or has been a member of the family of a child of [the other]’. Accordingly, the father had engaged in family violence against ‘a member of his family’ (see [17]-[24]).
The father’s contention that the trial judge erred in rebutting the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility because the father had committed family violence was therefore dismissed. As demonstrated above, the contention that there was no family violence in this case because the mother was not a member of the father’s family was based on an erroneous reading of the Act.
Additionally, while the trial judge was correct to apply s 61DA(2) and conclude that the presumption did not apply, it was also well within her discretion to conclude that even if the presumption had applied, it would have been rebutted in the child’s best interests: s 61DA(4).
The father also argued that the mother wasn’t fearful, and so the finding of family violence was erroneous. For this argument to be effective, the words of s 4AB(1) would need to be read conjunctively, not disjunctively, as the section is worded. The family member being ‘fearful’ is one possible manifestation of family violence, but is not necessary to make a finding of family violence.
Salah & Salah [2016] FLC 93-713; [2016] FamCAFC 100 (17 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Ignoring allegations of family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Treatment of issues of family violence’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: At the contested interim hearing, the mother made allegations of significant family violence perpetrated by the father in the presence of the children. In light of this and one of the children’s epilepsy and developmental delay, she sought an order directing the father’s care of the children to be supervised by another adult. The father disputed the allegations of family violence. In making interim parenting orders, the trial judge said (see [23]-[27]):
‘The evidence lead [sic] as to alleged family violence made by each parent is not capable of sustaining a finding at this interim stage of proceedings. In circumstances of conjecture given no other evidence. The presumption for equal shared [parental] responsibility is still applicable.
[…]
Findings with respect to whether either party perpetrated family violence cannot be made at this interim stage given the conflicted evidence. The civil standard of proof is met by neither.
As such and for the same reasons the need for the father’s time with the children to be either in the “presence of” or “supervised by” another adult is not made out’.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made several errors of principle in considering the issues of family violence namely, His Honour erred in his consideration of the family violence issues, failed to have regard to s 61DA(3) of the Act and failed to follow the legislative pathway in his determination of the interim issues.
2.
The trial judge failed to take into account relevant facts.
3.
The trial judge failed to give adequate reasons for his determination.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. The Court noted at [36] that, ‘[i]t is very common in interim parenting proceedings to see factual disputes which cannot be determined without the evidence being tested in the context of a trial’.They continued at [39]-[40]:
‘In SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13, the majority of the Full Court (Boland and Thackray JJ) said:
…Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
The trial judge here faced just that challenge. His Honour, when confronted with significant allegations of violence was required to do more than merely note the contention (or “conjecture”) and not to “simply ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue” (see SS v AH)’.
The Court held that while the trial judge was correct in stating that, at that point, he could not make findings on the disputed allegations, he erred by ignoring the allegations of family violence and finding that the presumption of equal shared responsibility applied. His Honour further erred in his treatment of the allegations of family violence by suggesting with that comment ‘given no other evidence’ that the mother’s allegations required corroboration or objective support and erred in incorrectly referring to the civil standard of proof (see [41]-[45]). Grounds two and three were also successful for similar reasons (see [60],[65]).
Holsworth & Holsworth [2016] FamCAFC 98 (9 June 2016) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the trial judge could not make findings on allegations of family violence until the evidence was properly tested at trial’
Proceedings: Appeal of interim procedural orders in relation to parenting proceedings
Facts: The parties reached agreement in November 2010 that the children live with the mother and spend time with the father. Almost a year later the mother was “psychiatrically unwell” and the children began to live with the father and spend time with the mother. After many years of litigation, including the appointment of an ICL, one child had returned to live with the mother and was to spend time with the father. The matter was listed for trial and an updated family report was ordered.
One ground of appeal was that “[t]he trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the mother’s evidence of family violence and did not accept the mother’s evidence of it because she had not produced “third party evidence”.
Issues: In the context of apprehended bias, was the trial judge correct in not determining issues of family violence at an interim hearing?
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court found that the mother’s assertions regarding the trial judge’s consideration of the evidence of family violence were “unsupported by the transcript”. In addition, her Honour was correct in not making findings “until such time as the evidence had been tested” – something which would happen at the final hearing of the matter. Despite the grounds purportedly being a challenge to the trial judge’s “failure to recuse herself”, it was apparent to the Full Court that they were really a complaint that the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence, including that of family violence, at the interim stage of proceedings.
The appeal was dismissed.
Baghti & Baghti and Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71 (5 May 2015) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Family reports’ – ‘Findings of fact in relation to allegations of family violence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weight on the expert evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and property orders
Facts: There is one child of the marriage. The parties married in 2002 and separated in late 2008/ early 2009, continuing to live under the same roof until November 2009. The mother claimed that up until November 2004 she was the primary carer for the child and the father worked. In November 2004 the mother went back to work and the father became the primary care-giver for the child. The child had health issues which would require visits to the hospital. The father consulted medical practitioners about the child’s weight and would weigh the child after time in the mother’s care. Around “September 2009 the husband arranged for ongoing surveillance of the wife”. In October the mother became aware of the surveillance and asserted stress and digestive issues as a result. This also affected the child. A consultant psychiatrist provided a Family Report to the Court on 9 January 2011. This report included discussion of risk associated with physical violence during the marriage in addition to the conflict and hostility between the parties in association with the child’s medical issues. It also included risk to the child in regards to the father’s obsession with “health and welfare”.
Issues: Whether the judge erred in attributing significant weight to the family report.
Whether the judge should have made a finding in relation to family violence.
Reasoning/Decision: Despite the father having opportunity to cross-examine the report writer at trial, and opportunity to raise his concerns about the report with the writer, and opportunity for the father to submit to the judge that the report be given little weight, no such cross-examination was forthcoming at trial, and no like submission was made to the trial judge. It was determined that not only was the judge entitled to rely on the expert report as he did, the father was not entitled to make his complaint about its handling to the appeal court.
In the “background facts” of the judgment the trial judge discussed allegations of family violence made by the mother but made no finding that the violence, as alleged, had occurred. The trial judge was not in error by not making findings – “A court need only determine those facts that are necessary for the determination of the issues between the parties”.
Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, Magistrate Coates made interim parenting orders. The father unsuccessfully appealed against those interim orders (see Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011)).
Subsequently, final orders were made providing that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time for two hours per fortnight with the father. The order for supervised time was for an indefinite duration (see Slater & Light [2011] FMCAfam 1021 (22 September 2011 ) ([1]).
Magistrate Coates’ orders turned on a finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of emotional harm to the children ([2]). The emotional harm was said to take the form of imposing on the children negative views of their mother, alienating the children from their mother and a chaotic regime for the children ([22]).
Issues: Whether Magistrate Coates erred in:
•
finding that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children; and
•
ordering supervised time of an indefinite duration ([2], [29]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially allowed. The Court held that the Magistrate did not err in finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children ([69]). This conclusion was open on the psychiatric reports
However, the Court found that the Magistrate erred in ordering an indefinite supervision order, when this was not requested by either the mother or the Independent Children’s Lawyer ([69]-[70]).
The issue of the time and the circumstances in which the father should spend time with the children be remitted for rehearing by a Federal Magistrate other than Federal Magistrate Coates (see Order 3).
McGregor v McGregor (2012) FLC 93-507; [2012] FamCAFC 69 (28 May 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Failure to properly admit academic opinions as evidence’ – ‘Information sharing’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Parties unaware of use of material’ – ‘Reliance upon academic literature as basis for orders’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders and property orders.
Facts: Prior to the trial, the three children of the relationship lived with the father. In parenting and property proceedings, the Federal Magistrate concluded that the father had been physically and verbally aggressive to the mother and that the father had alienated the children from the mother. The Federal Magistrate accordingly made orders for the children to live with their mother. In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Magistrate referred extensively to external literature. The father appealed against this decision.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to accord the husband natural justice/procedural fairness because the husband was not given the opportunity to cross-examine, respond to or introduce contrary evidence in relation to a number of academic opinions relied upon by the magistrate in reaching his decision.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was upheld and the matter remitted for hearing. The Full Court held that the Federal Magistrate placed considerable reliance on the academic literature on the topic of alienation of children. None of it was introduced into evidence as opinion evidence, and accordingly no consideration was made by the Federal Magistrate as to whether to exclude the evidence and, if not, to consider what weight to give it. Accordingly, none of this evidence was able to be tested by the father nor was it the subject of submissions or contrary evidence. There was therefore a failure to afford the father natural justice and procedural fairness (see [118]-[121]).
Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18 (10 February 2012) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Where the court was not persuaded that the learned federal magistrate erred in his approach to the wife's claim for a 'kennon type adjustment'’ – ‘Where undisturbed findings of fact made by the learned federal magistrate amply supported the conclusion he reached in relation to this issue’ – ‘Whether the learned federal magistrate impermissibly relied upon extrinsic material and failed to accord the parties procedural fairness’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and property orders.
Facts: The parties had twins. Serious incidents of family violence occurred during their relationship and after separation. At the hearing of the trial, the father was in prison having been convicted of aggravated assault on the mother. Mother granted sole parental responsibility and the children to live with her. The father was to have supervised time (these orders were interim). Property – 25% adjustment re Kennon.
Issues: In making findings regarding family violence and its effect on the mother and children, did his Honour impermissibly take account of extraneous material? Did his Honour err in making a “Kennon type adjustment”?
Decision/Reasoning: The Court held that despite including reference to the mother’s conduct in the courtroom when faced with the father and the discussion about a report, the passages of which were included and relied upon in Re: L (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2000] 2 FLR 334, a decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division). They were on the public record and so “materially different from matters appearing in reports” which have not yet undergone judicial consideration. While this alone does not guarantee that procedural fairness is achieved in circumstances where the parties were not on notice about the report and did not have opportunity to cross-examine accordingly, the Full Court held that “anything said in Re: L was not necessary to establish the relevance of the findings” made by the Federal Magistrate.
Regarding the property settlement and the “Kennon type adjustment”, the Full Court found that while it represented the “top of the range” it did not “exceed the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion”. Regarding the violence that was perpetrated post-separation, the Full Court held it was correctly included by the Federal Magistrate and was a relevant consideration in determining whether the mother’s contributions as a whole were more arduous.
Wolfe & Director-General, Department of Human Services [2011] FamCAFC 42 (4 March 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of child abuse’ – ‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’
Matter: Hague Convention return order appeal.
Facts: The mother unsuccessfully opposed the father’s application for return of the children to New Zealand. There were ongoing parenting proceedings between the mother and father in New Zealand, where the mother conceded the children had been habitually resident for their whole lives. The current New Zealand orders (made following a hearing in which the mother alleged the father had abused the children and been violent towards her) provided that the children reside with the mother and have one and a half hours contact with the father each weekend. The mother’s new partner was violent towards her and the children were exposed to that violence. The mother fled New Zealand and returned to her native Australia after leaving her new partner. She gave evidence that the children were fearful to return to New Zealand due to concerns about her new partner.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Bryant CJ, Finn and May JJ noted the first instance judge’s comments with approval:
“[i]n part, she relied on her own refusal to establish that a return of the children would place them in an intolerable situation”. Her Honour disposed of this aspect of the mother’s case by saying, correctly, in our view, that “[i]t is well established that, ordinarily, the objects of the Convention should not be frustrated by a parent’s refusal to return with children to their country of habitual residence”. [32]
Slater & Light (2011) 45 Fam LR 41; [2011] FamCAFC 1 (11 January 2011) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Notice of risk’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Psychiatric report’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal type: Appeal against interim parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had three children together and separated in 2006. In March 2010, the Federal Magistrates Court made interim parenting orders. The effect of these orders was to allocate parental responsibility for the children solely to the mother, require the children to live with the mother and require the children to spend weekly supervised time with the father at a contact centre. The orders were made pending the preparation of a psychiatric report on the risk the father presented to the children. These orders radically altered previous arrangements, as the Federal Magistrate was concerned about the need to protect the children from physical or psychological harm that would arise from them being exposed or subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate erred in finding that it was in the best interests of the children (a) for the father’s time to be supervised and (b) to significantly reduce the time they spent with the father.
•
Whether the Federal Magistrate had erred by allocating parental responsibility solely to the respondent.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In dismissing the first ground of appeal, the Court held, amongst other findings, that if evidence of abuse or family violence is adduced at trial, the Court is obliged to deal with it. The Court must always critically assess the evidence placed before it in determining the issue (see [46]). It was also noted that a finding of family violence may be made in the absence of a Form 4 Notice.
The Court held that it was clearly open on the evidence for the Federal Magistrate to find that family violence had been perpetrated by the appellant.
In relation to the second ground of appeal, the appellant contended that the Federal Magistrate relied upon erroneous finding of family violence to then improperly find that the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. The Court dismissed this argument by again noting that the finding of family violence was open to the Federal Magistrate (see [64]-[69]).
Note: final orders were subsequently made, but the finding of family violence was not affected (see Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4 (5 February 2013)).
Vasser & Taylor-Black [2010] FamCAFC 36 (11 March 2010) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Re F: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother from parenting orders that challenged part of the process followed and some of the rulings made during the conduct of the trial. On the final day of the hearing, the self-represented mother sought to tender a 52 page document in response to the report of an expert witness.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that trial judge failed to provide the mother with procedural fairness in not ascertaining the reason behind the preparation of this document and in not advising her that she may wish to seek legal advice before tendering the particular document, contrary to the litigants in person guidelines: Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed as the mother here was not the victim of unfairness. Although this appeal did not relate to family violence, the Court relevantly observed that the Litigant in Person Guidelines were no more than guidelines.
See Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001).
Amador & Amador (2009) 43 Fam LR 268; [2009] 43 FamCAFC 196 (3 November 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Determining allegations in relation to family violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Requirement of corroboration’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties met online and were married in Belgrade. Their child, who had autism, was born in Belgrade. The mother and the son came to live in Australia with the father when the child was 20 months old. The parties subsequently separated, with the mother alleging that the father had perpetrated domestic violence and sexual assault against her. The father denied these allegations. In 2008, a Federal Magistrate made orders granting the mother sole parental responsibility for the child. The mother was also permitted to relocate to Serbia with the child and the father’s contact time with the child was reduced from weekly to possible annual contact. The father appealed against these orders.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Federal Magistrate erred in accepting the mother’s uncorroborated evidence that domestic violence and sexual assault was perpetrated by the father on the mother.
Reasoning/Decision: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. In dismissing this ground of appeal, the Court held that a positive finding may be made on the evidence of the victim without corroborating evidence. See [79].
The Court expressed concern at the manner in which the Federal Magistrate had expressed a finding of insufficient evidence re family violence. They were concerned that the Federal Magistrate had felt in some way constrained by law in being able to make a positive determination in relation to allegations of violence even if the evidence had satisfied her on the requisite standard that the violence occurred as alleged. See [95]-[96].
Oakley & Cooper [2009] FamCAFC 133 (30 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Full court referred to, and discussed, the best practice principles for use in parenting disputes when family violence or abuse is alleged’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Whether the federal magistrate erred by giving insufficient weight to issues of family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders
Facts: The parties were together for approximately 7 years, separating in March 2006 – there were 2 children of the relationship. The mother had 6 children from previous relationships. The Federal Magistrate described their relationship as “extremely volatile”, ending in an incident of domestic violence. The Federal Magistrate made findings inter alia: that the parties were unable to effectively communicate with each other due to them being “aggressive, provocative … show[ing] a lack of maturity and complete absence of child focus”; that the mother used physical discipline on the children; and that on at least one occasion the mother’s behaviour at changeover was “appalling and did severely distress the children”. The family report included the opinion that the children “have positive attachments to both parents, but experience some trauma associated with the continuing conflict in their parents’ relationship”. Despite the conflict between them, the parties agreed to an order for equal shared parental responsibility. As such, the Federal Magistrate was obliged to consider equal time, or significant and substantial time with each parent. Orders were made that the children live with the mother 9 nights a fortnight and with the father for 5. The father appealed these orders.
Issues: Did the Federal Magistrate give appropriate consideration to the evidence and findings of family violence when making the parenting orders that he did?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The Full Court referred to the 2009 publication “Best Practice Principles for use in Parenting Disputes when Family Violence or Abuse is Alleged”, specifically Section F of the 2009 principles which sets out considerations where children are ordered to spend time with a parent where positive findings of family violence have been made against that parent.
The Full Court found that while they agreed with the argument of the mother’s counsel, that the discussion of weight in relation to family violence had been “clipped” they found that there was no appealable error established. The Federal Magistrate had evidence of both parties and their associates hitting the children, and that both parties were verbally and physically abusive of one another in the presence of the children. Despite acknowledging that the mother’s behaviour was, at times, worse than the father's, when taken in the context of the best interests of the children, the conclusion was that it was in their best interests to remain predominantly in the care of their mother.
M & L (2007) FLC 93-320; (2007) 37 Fam LR 317; [2007] FamCA 396 (4 May 2007) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of cultural evidence’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: Both parents were Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander, and lived in the NT, one close to Darwin, one quite remote. There was family violence where the father would physically and verbally abuse the mother. On one occasion the paternal grandfather punched the father for hitting the mother. The mother had been the primary care giver of the children. At trial evidence was led about the communities in which each parent lived. The trial judge found that the children would have a greater connection to their father’s culture by living with him.
Issues: Whether the trial judge had adequately considered the evidence of family violence and its potential effects on the children.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court held that there was inadequate consideration of the risk to the children given the father’s history of violence and alcohol consumption. The lack of consideration of the evidence that the children had been primarily cared for by the mother, and that there was no evidence that her care was lacking was overlooked, was also an error. A finding was made by the trial judge that the mother’s parenting was reliant on others in the community, referring to it as “collectivist”. He based his finding on an anthropological report quoted in another judgment. There was no anthropological evidence that the mother’s community engaged in such “collective” parenting, and that the mother was not, herself, the children’s primary care-giver. The trial judge’s finding that the best interests of the children would be met by them living with their father cannot be sustained when evidence of the mother’s adequate care, the fact she was the primary care giver and the father’s violence towards the mother, is balanced against the finding of the cultural benefits to the children of living in the father’s community.
Napier & Hepburn (2006) FLC 93-303; (2006) 36 Fam LR 395; [2006] FamCA 1316 (5 December 2006) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence and contact orders.
Facts: The proceedings involved competing applications for residence and contact to the child of the parties. The mother made allegations that the father sexually abused the child. While no finding of abuse was made, the Trial Judge did make a finding of unacceptable risk. On appeal, the father challenged the orders made for contact, in particular, the requirement that the contact be supervised.
Issue/s: The trial judge provided inadequate reasons supporting his finding of unacceptable risk of abuse.
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, the Court made observations relevant to the assessment of unacceptable risk. Bryant CJ and Kay J held at [84] that:
‘There remained an obligation on the trial judge to not only evaluate the harm that might befall the child if there is a future act of abuse, but to also evaluate the prospect of such an act occurring. This is not a search for a solution that will eliminate any prospect of serious harm. It is a search to balance the harm that will follow if the risk is not minimised and the harm that will follow if a normal healthy relationship between parent and child is not allowed to prosper’.
S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions must be affected by the violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on past contributions’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Reference to exceptional cases should not mean rare’
Appeal type: Appeal against property orders.
Facts: The parties had two adult children and separated in 2000. The trial judge made a Kennon style adjustment in favour of the wife. His Honour held that the evidence clearly revealed that there had been some violent behaviour by the husband towards the wife. Although there was no explicit evidence from the wife as regards to the effect of the violence on her contributions, the trial judge accepted that the wife’s contributions must have been made significantly more arduous than they ought to have been because of the violence inflicted upon her by the husband.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in adjusting the wife’s contributions to account for the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed. Here, the evidence could not have properly led to a Kennon adjustment under section 79 (see [48]). In reaching this decision, the Court made a number of statements of principle, elaborating upon the decision in Kennon.
It was held that evidence of violence alone is not enough, but that the “violent conduct by one party towards the other” must be demonstrated to have an effect on contributions.
In addition, the Court also stated that the reference in Kennon to ‘exceptional’ cases should not be understood to mean rare. They adopted the trial judge’s comments that ‘the references to ‘exceptional cases’ and ‘narrow band of cases’ occurs in the context of the principle of misconduct in general rather than the more narrow formulation about domestic violence. … It seems to me that reading these passages carefully, the key words in a case where there are allegations of domestic violence are ‘significant adverse impact’ and ‘discernible impact’. (see [47]).
B & B [2003] FamCA 274 (8 April 2003) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Failure to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘Kennon not an award for damages’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Property orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders and division of property.
Facts: The parties had two children together. At trial, the mother made extensive allegations of physical, verbal and emotional abuse against the father, much of which the father conceded (see [38]). The trial judge made an order that the children should predominately be in the care of their father. Additionally, the trial judge rejected the wife’s submission that the division of property ought to be adjusted to 60/40 from 70/30 division on the basis of the decision in Kennon.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were –
•
Did the trial judge err in failing to provide adequate reasons to deal with the allegations relating to violent and abusive behaviour?
•
Did the trial judge err in attributing responsibility for the domestic violence that occurred during the marriage to the wife?
•
Did the trial judge err in his application of the Kennon principle.
Reasoning/Decision:
The Court held that the trial judge was ‘obliged to adjudicate the violence issue as raised by the wife and to make specific findings in respect of the course of conduct conducted by the husband in the course of the marriage so that he could properly assess relevant aspects of the behaviour of each of the parents in determining in whose care he should place the children’. However, from reading His Honour’s reasons for judgment, it was not clear that he considered and evaluated the relevant evidence and took all the relevant factors into account. The issues raised by the wife in the grounds of appeal could not be described as ‘pernickety or overly critical’ (AMS v AIF) when matters of such significant serious and prolonged violence were clearly raised and left virtually undiscussed in the judgment (see [32]-[53]).
Secondly, the Full Court found that, the trial judge did not attribute responsibility for the domestic violence to the wife: while the trial judge found the wife to have engaged in passive/aggressive conduct, His Honour indicated in the clearest terms that he was not condoning the husband’s conduct in response to such behaviour(see [54]-[57]).
Thirdly, the Full Court held that the application of the principles in Kennonis “not the equivalent of an award for damages”, but used to determine whether the husband’s conduct had the effect of making the wife’s contributions more arduous.
T & S (2001) FLC 93-086; [2001] FamCA 1147 (29 October 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Effect of family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Re f: litigants in person guidelines’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Proceedings: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: This was an appeal by the mother against orders made by the trial judge in relation to the residence, contact and other specific issues relating to the child of the parties’ relationship. The effect of the trial judge’s order was that the father was to have residence of the child and be responsible for the child’s day to day care, welfare and development; and that the mother was to have specified contact with the child. The mother was unrepresented for five days of the six day hearing. A claim by the mother of domestic violence at the hands of the father was raised but the trial judge did not accept the mother’s evidence. The trial judge instead made a number of adverse findings against the mother.
Issue/s: A major ground of appeal advanced on the Mother's behalf was that she did not receive a fair trial and that a new trial should be ordered. The gravamen of the Mother's case was that because she was a victim of domestic violence who was unrepresented at trial, she was unable to effectively meet the case of the Father and present her own case. As a consequence, and because the Mother suffered from a personality disorder, the trial judge made negative findings against her, and in particular against her credibility.
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was allowed on the basis of further evidence tendered on appeal which contained detailed evidence of ongoing domestic violence by the husband, and reports from a psychologist and social worker providing evidence as to the effect of the domestic violence on the mother’s ability to conduct her case at trial. The Court held that if the evidence had been tendered before the trial judge, it would have produced a different result and the best interests of the child required a re-hearing.
B & K [2001] FamCA 880 (14 August 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against residence orders and property settlement.
Facts: The parties had two children. The trial judge made an order for shared residency of the children. The trial judge accepted evidence that the husband had anally raped the wife.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge give sufficient weight to the family violence the husband had inflicted on the wife and the subsequent effect or impact on her of that violence in making residence orders?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed. At [32] the Court noted the authorities referred to by counsel for the wife in support of the argument that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to the effect of the domestic violence perpetrated by the husband against the wife: JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515, Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580, Blanch v Blanch & Crawford [1998] FamCA 1908; (1999) FLC 92-837, and Re Andrew [1996] FamCA 43; (1996) FLC 92-692.
The Full Court determined that consideration of the family violence and its effect upon the wife was adequate and orders for fortnight-about care of the children was within the trial judge’s discretion.
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) FLC 93-072; [2001] FamCA 348 (4 June 2001) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact orders’ – ‘Guidelines for matters involving self-represented litigants’ – ‘Parenting orders and effect on children’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting and contact orders.
Facts: While not a case specifically dealing with family violence, there is a large proportion of self-represented litigants in family law proceedings and as such the guidelines set out in this case pertain.
Issue/s: Did the trial judge contravene the guidelines in respect of the litigants in person set out by the Court in Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764?
Reasoning/Decision:
The Full Court provided guidelines as follows (taking a number from Johnson v Johnson (1997) FLC 92-764):
1.
A judge should ensure as far as is possible that procedural fairness is afforded to all parties whether represented or appearing in person in order to ensure a fair trial;
2.
A judge should inform the litigant in person of the manner in which the trial is to proceed, the order of calling witnesses and the right which he or she has to cross examine the witnesses;
3.
A judge should explain to the litigant in person any procedures relevant to the litigation;
4.
A judge should generally assist the litigant in person by taking basic information from witnesses called, such as name, address and occupation;
5.
If a change in the normal procedure is requested by the other parties such as the calling of witnesses out of turn the judge may, if he/she considers that there is any serious possibility of such a change causing any injustice to a litigant in person, explain to the unrepresented party the effect and perhaps the undesirability of the interposition of witnesses and his or her right to object to that course;
6.
A judge may provide general advice to a litigant in person that he or she has the right to object to inadmissible evidence, and to inquire whether he or she so objects. A judge is not obliged to provide advice on each occasion that particular questions or documents arise;
7.
If a question is asked, or evidence is sought to be tendered in respect of which the litigant in person has a possible claim of privilege, to inform the litigant of his or her rights;
8.
A judge should attempt to clarify the substance of the submissions of the litigant in person, especially in cases where, because of garrulous or misconceived advocacy, the substantive issues are either ignored, given little attention or obfuscated. (Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 at 150);
9.
Where the interests of justice and the circumstances of the case require it, a judge may:
◦
draw attention to the law applied by the Court in determining issues before it;
◦
question witnesses;
◦
identify applications or submissions which ought to be put to the Court;
◦
suggest procedural steps that may be taken by a party;
◦
clarify the particulars of the orders sought by a litigant in person or the bases for such orders.
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and there may well be other interventions that a judge may properly make without giving rise to an apprehension of bias.
In the Marriage of Blanch; Blanch v Blanch and Crawford (1999) FLC 92-837; (1998) 24 Fam LR 325; [1998] FamCA 1908 (27 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Erroneous findings of fact’ – ‘Incorrect attribution of fault to the victim’ – ‘Perpetrator responsibility’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The parties were married but separated after seven years. There were two children of the marriage. The wife made allegations of domestic violence against the father; these were denied by the father. The trial judge found at [325] that both parties were responsible for violence in the relationship, and that the relevance of family violence in custody proceedings was to be indicative of a risk ‘to … children in later years that … could cause them harm’. The wife brought an appeal against orders made by the trial judge that the children of the relationship reside with their father.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial judge erred in his findings regarding domestic violence?
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Counsel for the wife submitted that the trial judge addressed the questions of the husband’s domestic violence ‘in almost a passing manner’, despite the presence of overwhelming evidence from the wife that she was the victim of consistent and frequent violence and abuse. It was held that “in cases such as this, where a case of sustained and severe domestic violence by one party is advanced by the other, the court is obliged to give a clear indication whether it accepts or rejects that case and, in any event, to explain why it has reached that conclusion” (see [333]).
In addition it was held that the trial judge’s conclusion that the responsibility for violence between the parties was fairly evenly shared was not available on the evidence.
Other aspects of His Honour’s treatment of domestic violence were also in issue. First, His Honour’s perception of the relevance of violence to the overall welfare of the children was inadequate. The trial judge failed to consider the significant risk of such violence to the children’s emotional development such as “insecurity, fear, unhappiness, anxiety and hyper vigilance”: Patsalou and Patsalou [1994] FamCA 118 and JG and BG (1994) FLC 92-515 (see [334]). Second, Lindenmayer J also strongly disapproved of the trial judge’s finding that the husband’s violence towards the wife was a product of the marital relationship rather than of the husband’s personality.
Re: Cassandra Kathleen Kennon (Appellant/Wife) and Ian William Kennon (Cross-Appellant/Husband) Appeal (1997) FLC 92-757; [1997] FamCA 27 (10 June 1997) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contributions’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Relevance of domestic violence’ – ‘Section 79’ – ‘Significantly more arduous’
Proceedings: Property settlement.
Facts: The parties cohabited for approximately five years before separating. The husband was very wealthy and the wife had far more modest means. The property pool was nearly $9 million. There were no children of the marriage. In 1994, the wife filed a property application under s 79 of the Family Law Act. The husband filed a cross application. The wife subsequently filed an amended application which included a claim under the cross-vesting legislation that the husband pay her damages for assault and battery. The husband denied the allegations of assault and restated his position regarding the property claim. The trial judge accepted that a number of assaults had occurred and awarded damages, but found that the husband's conduct had not affected the wife's contributions to allow an adjustment in relation to s 79(4).
Issue/s: The wife did not challenge the trial judge’s finding that the husband's conduct had not affected her contributions. Consequently, the Full Court's comments on the relevance of domestic violence in claims under s79 of the Family Law Act were made in obiter.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed but the Full Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevance of violence in s79 property adjustments. The Full Court said that earlier authorities on s 79 precluding evidence of domestic violence were no longer binding, acknowledging that the ‘pervasiveness and destructiveness of domestic violence’ was now better recognized by the Australian community and courts.
The Full Court cautioned that s 79 of the Act is not a source of ‘social engineering’ or to be used as ‘a means of evening up’ the financial positions of the parties. They held:
‘Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. We prefer this approach to the concept of "negative contributions" which is sometimes referred to in this discussion’.
The Court also referred to this principle as including ‘exceptional cases’ and noted, ‘[i]t is essential to bear in mind the relatively narrow band of cases to which these considerations apply. To be relevant, it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the other party’.
(See also subsequent interpretation in S & S (Spagnardi & Spagnardi) [2003] FamCA 905 (8 September 2003), Baranski & Baranski & Anor [2010] FMCAfam 918 (1 September 2010) and Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012).)
Re Andrew (1996) FLC 92-692; [1996] FamCA 43 (23 May 1996) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Fear of violence’ – ‘Supervised access order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Proceedings: Appeal against supervised access orders.
Facts: The parties separated. Satisfactory access arrangements were in place for 3.5 years. However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and the husband assaulted the wife. The wife held a genuine belief that the husband had tried to kill her and the child on this occasion and subsequently denied the husband access to the child. The husband filed an application for unsupervised access.
The trial judge found that each parent alone could provide adequately for the needs of the child. However, the wife’s fears had become even more entrenched over time and these fears were a major impediment to access, because they were genuine even if they may not be founded in fact. Her capacity to provide care to the child would be impaired and cause detriment to the child if the husband was given unsupervised access. The trial judge made orders for supervised access.
Issue/s: The trial judge gave too much weight to the mother’s attitude and not enough weight to the benefits to the child of unsupervised contact with the father.
Reasoning/decision: The Full Court dismissed the appeal. After citing extensively from past authorities, it was concluded that the finding that the wife’s genuine fear of the husband would significantly affect her ability to provide adequately for the needs of the child as custodial parent despite the benefits to the child from contact with the father was open to the trial judge.
In the Matter Of: N Appellant/Wife and S Respondent/Husband and the Separate Representative [1995] FamCA 139 (20 December 1995); (1996) FLC 92-655; (1995) 19 Fam LR 837. – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Assessment of unacceptable risk’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Not a family violence case, but it discusses principles in determining unacceptable risk in the context of sexual abuse allegations. In custody proceedings, the mother alleged that the father sexually abused their child and sought to have access by the husband to the child prevented. The trial judge was not satisfied on the civil standard of proof that the sexual abuse had occurred. However, he did not conclude that the abuse certainly did not happen. The mother was steadfast in her belief that the child had been abused by the father. The trial judge did not find the father unfit to have custody or access to the child by reason of sexual abuse or unacceptable risk of abuse, however, mitigated against the concerns and effect on the mother by making interim supervised contact orders.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred in finding that the father was not an unacceptable risk?
Reasoning/Decision: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Full Court held that the trial judge should not have made interim custody orders and failed to take into consideration the effect this would have not only on the child but also on the mother’s ability and capability to parent effectively. However, as the interim custody order was not challenged the Full Court did not set it aside. As regards to no finding of unacceptable risk, on the evidence, this was open to the trial judge.
Patsalou and Patsalou (1995) FLC 92-580; [1994] FamCA 118 (27 October 1994) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Custody proceeding’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Independent research by judge’ – ‘Relevance of family violence’ – ‘Social science research’
Appeal type: Appeal against custody orders.
Facts: Allegations of family violence were made in custody proceedings. The trial judge accepted the wife’s evidence that prior to separation the husband had been hitting her on a regular basis, in front of the children on a number of occasions. Her Honour stated that the denigration of one parent by the other and the perpetuation of violence by that parent against the other is of importance when assessing where the interests of the children lie and what future arrangements might best advance their welfare. Her Honour also noted a number of articles on the effect upon children of inter-spousal violence including that such effects may be profound and long-lasting. The trial judge concluded that the children’s welfare would be best promoted by remaining in the custody of the wife.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
•
Whether the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the violence and denigration by the husband of the wife was inappropriate and contrary to law.
•
Whether the trial judge erred in referring to the body of research as the articles cited did not constitute evidence before her and the parties were not invited to make submissions with respect to them.
Reasoning/Decision: The Full Court upheld the trial Judge's finding that allegations of domestic violence were relevant to custody proceedings and found that the reference by the trial judge to published social science literature about the impact of family violence on children was permissible as the published research was referred to as background information rather than evidence.
Evidence of family violence was held to be relevant in custody matters, to the extent that it assisted the court to determine what is in the best interests of the children, as its impact could be ‘profound and long-lasting’. The Full Court approved the comments by the trial judge that denigration and assault cause ‘considerable unnecessary strain’ to the victim and ‘may erode the confidence, dignity and self-esteem of the children’s other parent’. Baker, Kay and Tolcon JJ agreed with the trial judge that such conduct modelled inappropriate behaviour for children and could ‘impinge upon the quality of parenting able to be offered to the children’ and ‘reflects poorly upon the assailant’s capacity to provide children with a positive role model for their own behaviour and methods of resolving disputes and dealing with tensions and stress’.
Between: R Appellant/Husband and C Respondent/Wife [1993] FamCA 62 (25 June 1993); Russell & Close (Unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, Fogarty, Baker & Lindenmayer JJ, 25 June 1993) – Family Court of Australia (Full Court)
‘Allegations of sexual abuse’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Meaningful relationship’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separate representative/independent children’s representative’ – ‘Unacceptable risk to child’ – ‘Weight to be given to impact of access on custodial parent’
Appeal type: Appeal against access orders.
Facts: Post separation, an access arrangement for the two children of the relationship was established. The relationship between the parties deteriorated and the mother refused to allow the husband access to the children. One child was found to have been sexually abused, but it was not possible to identify the perpetrator. The mother believed that the father was the perpetrator, however the trial judge was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial judge made orders giving the father unsupervised daytime access to the children to reduce the risk of the mother from making unfounded allegations in the future. The father appealed against these orders. The mother did not challenge the orders, but cross-appealed in relation to findings of fact made by the trial judge.
Issue/s:
•
Whether it was open to the trial judge to make orders giving the husband unsupervised daytime access, where the court was not satisfied that the father had sexually abused the child.
Decision/Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part. Amendments were made to the trial judge’s orders, clarifying the father’s access period and altering the proposed changeover location. The mother’s appeal against factual findings made by the trial judge and the father’s appeal against daytime access were dismissed.
The Full Court found that the relevant considerations when making access orders in cases involving sexual abuse of children were whether sexual abuse had occurred, whether the perpetrator could be identified, the potential risk of harm to the child from sexual abuse, the potential benefit to the child from parental access and the impact of the custodial parent’s beliefs on the welfare of the children. The Full Court said that the custodial parent’s beliefs regarding the child’s exposure to harm are relevant to the extent that they are likely to adversely affect that parent’s parenting ability and that a subjective test is used to assess the custodial parent’s beliefs.
The Full Court was satisfied that it was open to the trial judge to draw inferences regarding the likely future conduct of the mother. As the trial judge had found the mother genuinely believed the child had been sexually abused, that it was highly likely the mother would make further allegations of sexual abuse against the father if unsupervised overnight access was granted and that this risk did not apply to unsupervised daytime access, it was at the trial judge’s discretion to give the husband unsupervised daytime access.
Family Court of Australia
Bennett & Bennett [2021] FamCA 182 (21 April 2021) – Family Court of Australia
‘Abuse of children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Family violence evidence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Sexual abuse’
Proceedings: Parenting and property proceedings.
Facts: The mother and father separated in 2016. The father was found guilty of assault and aggravated indecent assault in relation to their children. He was also found guilty of multiple assault and intimidation charges against the wife and children.
Issues:
1.
Application to change the children’s surnames, issue of passports and overseas travel, and the father’s access to school information.
2.
Division of net available asset pool.
Decision and reasoning: Parenting and property orders made.
Parenting orders: It was in the children’s best interests that they eradicate their father’s name from their names, given the damage and violence he inflicted on them, noting that “[t]he children need to close this chapter in their lives and this is one practical way of assisting them to do so” (at [124]).
Property orders: The decision of Kennon v Kennon was highly relevant to the facts: “where there is a course of violent conduct during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant impact upon that party’s contribution to the marriage, this is a factor which the trial Judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions under section 79 of the Act.” As per Baker J in Kennon at [84]:
“The incidence of domestic violence in a marriage would generally be a relevant factor when a court comes to assess contributions…for the reason that the contributions made by a party who has suffered domestic violence at the hands of the other party may be all the more onerous because of that violence and therefore attract additional weight.”
The wife’s entitlement was to 95% of the property comprising of the following:
•
The husband’s violence and conduct towards the children and wife made her role as a parent and homemaker far more arduous than it needed to be. Her entitlement for past contributions was assessed at 70% being direct financial contributions, contributions as parent and homemaker, and solely since separation in the most difficult of circumstances (given the husband’s behaviour and offending).
•
In relation to her future needs, her contribution to the children post-separation would continue to be overwhelming. Moreover, “the husband’s conduct towards the children…made her parenting role more arduous as the children have suffered psychologically from their father’s violence.” She would be solely financially, emotionally and psychologically supporting the children for the next 6 years. An adjustment of 25%.
The husband was entitled to 20% of the pool, reducing the wife’s entitlement to 80%.
Pollard and Nordberg [2019] FamCA 365 (7 June 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged child victims’ – ‘Appeal against recovery order’ – ‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’
Proceedings: Appeal against grant of recovery order.
Facts: The father had sought, and been granted, a recovery order for the return of the children following the mother’s unilateral removal of the children from the family home in Victoria. She took the children with her to her mother’s home in New South Wales. The mother alleged that the father has been violent to the children, independently of the allegations of his violent behaviour towards the mother.
Issue: Whether the recovery order ought to be revoked pending a final order hearing.
Judgment: Wilson J upheld the mother’s appeal against the father’s recovery order on the basis of family violence allegations against him, despite no expert report being admitted:
[155]If I dismiss the mother’s appeal, the recovery order will operate in such a way that the children are physically, and if necessary, forcibly, returned by police to the father in Victoria. If the allegations of family violence are proved at trial, that means I will order the children to be returned to a violent environment. It must not be overlooked that the mother has alleged that the father has been violent to the children, independently of the allegations of his violent behaviour towards the mother. I refuse to make an interim order returning the children to the father in circumstances where the father may at trial be found to have engaged in family violence. In my judgment this court must act protectively towards the children and remove them from any risk associated with family violence. To do so is consistent with the imperative recorded in s 60CC(2A).
Behn & Ziomek [2019] FamCA 298 (10 May 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Assault child’ – ‘Best interests of child’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relocation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Supervised contact’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Matter: Application for children’s orders for relocation, mother to have sole parental responsibility, supervised contact
Facts: The German national mother wished to return the Germany with the child. The court considered whether the child faced an unacceptable risk in spending time with the father.
Issue: Application for leave to appeal.
Decision and reasoning: Relocation allowed; mother to have sole parental responsibility.
McClelland DCJ accepted that the child faced an unacceptable risk spending time with the father because (1) he had an extensive history of coercive and controlling behaviour towards the mother, and (2) his controlling nature manifest itself in physical violence towards the child.
[200] His Honour accepted evidence that the father had a history of engaging in controlling and coercive conduct in respect to the mother and that that controlling nature had manifested in physical violence to the child. Matters found to constitute controlling and coercive conduct during the relationship included setting up a camera in their home, telling the mother an investigator was following her while she was overseas, questioning her presence at her brother’s wedding, frequent accusations of infidelity, inspecting her used underwear and telling her it tested positive for sperm; attending her medical appointments and attempting to sexually belittle mother by asking questions of and making comments alleging her infidelity to multiple doctors, sending her a divorce kit in response to an argument about money and financially controlling her by draining her bank account and using her credit card.
His Honour accepted that the father’s post-separation manner of conduct of the proceedings and behaviour questioning medical treatment of the child amounted to coercive and controlling behaviour, as did calling the police for seven times for unnecessary police welfare checks. His Honour also accepted that the father’s assault of the child was child abuse.
Frangoulis and Xennon [2019] FamCA 103 (28 February 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Anger management’ – ‘Application in a case’ – ‘Disputed compliance with therapy order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Substantially supervised contact’ – ‘Therapist's expertise disputed’
Matter: Father’s application in a case for reinstatement of contact with the three children X, Y and Z, additional make up contact and that the child X engage in re-unification therapy with the father with a therapist to be agreed or as nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.
Facts: The mother alleged serious family violence against the father. A previous interim order required the father to engage with either Mr B or another therapist nominated by the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”). The parties were in dispute as to whether the father had complied, the mother disputing the professional expertise of the father’s chosen therapist, who was neither Mr B nor nominated by the ICL. The father contended the ICL approved the father’s proposal to undertake the therapy with Mr F.
Earlier orders provided for the father to have contact with the children supervised by Mr and Ms C in the first week on Saturday from 2:00pm until 5:00pm and in the second week on Sunday from 2:00pm until 5:00pm save and except that the father’s time with X is subject to her wishes. The mother stopped contact pursuant to that order alleging he had spent time with the children without supervision. Berman J had previously held that the father had contravened the supervision order.
The mother referred to a report of Mr B dated 28 August 2017 which observed:
“[the father] was not open to consideration of any difficulties with reactivity or emotional regulation. He was not open to consider any role that he might play in the conflict with [the mother] or any contribution to [X]’s difficulties or possible dilemmas that might arise for the other children. I have decided to terminate contact with [the father] after 2 visits, rather that continue for 6 consultations as had been initially ordered. I did not feel that further contact would enable any helpful resolution to this matter and was concerned that continued discussion might only serve to further entrench a fixed and limited position.” [17]
The mother unequivocally stated she would reinstate the father’s contact once he had complied with the therapy requirement. Berman J expressed surprise that the parties had been unable to negotiate a resolution to the issues in the application.
Decision: Inter alia, Berman J ordered:
1.
That the father will attend upon Mr F for a further two (2) sessions and at the conclusion of which Mr F will prepare a report directed to the following matters:
(a)
A summary of his expertise, experience or skillset in respect of family violence and anger management;
(b)
A report directed to the father’s engagement with therapy and focussing on anger management and family violence;
2.
That to assist with the therapeutic intervention by Mr F, the father will provide to him the following:
(a)
The report of Mr B;
(b)
The report of Ms D;
(c)
The judgments of 27 July 2018 and 19 November 2018.
3.
That upon the expiration of twenty one (21) days from the provision of the report by Mr F, indicating that the father has successfully engaged with counselling and therapy directed to family violence and anger management, the father’s time with the children will be reinstated pursuant to paragraph 1 of orders made 4 August 2017, with further amendment that his time with the children will only require the substantial presence of either Mr or Ms C.
Berman J considered the father’s application for reunification therapy with his child:
[49] … For reunification therapy to be appropriate I consider that there needs to be an assessment undertaken that would satisfy the Court that the potential risk to the child of engaging in what can be an intensive program is outweighed by the reasonable prospect of a successful reinstatement of X’s relationship with her father.
[50] The concept of reunification therapy is not a matter of abstract consideration but rather, should be the subject of evidence that it is a proper therapeutic process and will be undertaken by a practitioner with demonstrated expertise.
[51] A report should be obtained from the nominated practitioner that brings to account the issues raised in the proceedings and provides an assessment as to the prospects of success, limited or otherwise.
Farina & Lofts and Ors [2019] FamCA 27 (23 January 2019) – Family Court of Australia
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Family violence evidence’ – ‘Kennon principles’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Case type: Interim ruling.
Facts: The applicant and first respondent were in a de facto relationship for 14 years and have two children. They agreed that their respective contributions during the relationship (apart from the Kennon argument) should be regarded as equal ([8]-[10]). The first respondent alleged that the applicant’s conduct amounted to family violence, occurring during and subsequent to their relationship. Her evidence of such violence included a history of protection orders made against the applicant; allegations of physical, verbal, psychological, financial, emotional and mental abuse; allegations of property damage and animal cruelty; and allegations of exposing the children to family violence ([13]).
Issue: The applicant sought a ruling on whether or not family violence evidence relied upon by the first respondent sufficiently met the requirements of the Kennon principles and resulted in an ‘additional adjustment’ to the first respondent.
Held: Carew J ruled that the first respondent’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Court should make an adjustment on the basis of the Kennon principles. Her Honour stated that ‘[w]hile it is settled at law that family violence can be a relevant factor in determining contributions in property proceedings, the difficulty often faced by a trial judge is the inadequacy of evidence to support any relevant finding and adjustment’. Even if there is no direct evidence as to how the conduct affected the victim’s ability to make his or her contributions, the impact may be inferred provided that the evidence clearly supports it. A person’s conduct will be relevant if it has had a ‘significant adverse’ or ‘discernible’ impact on the contributions of another ([6]).
The applicant submitted that the evidence failed to demonstrate a discernible or significant adverse impact on the first respondent’s contributions ([15]). In relation to direct and indirect financial contributions, the first respondent deposed to finding it difficult to contribute financially because of the domestic violence inflicted upon her by the applicant. In relation to non-financial contributions for the welfare of the family, she gave evidence that the applicant also made it difficult for her to contribute as a ‘mother’ ([17]). The applicant further submitted that the first respondent’s evidence to occasionally feeling nervous or humiliated represented a personal impact on the first respondent, but fell short of establishing that those feelings had any discernible or significant impact on her ability to contribute ([18]).
Carew J noted that the need to establish ‘fault’ has been replaced by a ‘no-fault’ system in order to obtain a divorce or other relief, such as a property settlement or spouse maintenance. The repeal of the ‘fault’ based system avoids the humiliation and expense associated with presenting the necessary evidence ([22]). Nevertheless, according to the Kennon principles, there are circumstances where conduct will be relevant to the determination of a property settlement application ([23]).
Her Honour accepted the applicant’s submission that the evidence relied upon by the first respondent was insufficient to establish the impact of the conduct on her ability to make contributions or the quantification of that impact on her contributions, either expressly or impliedly ([24]).
Garrod & Davenort [2018] FamCA 825 (12 October 2018) – Family Court of Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Issue: Parental responsibility.
Facts: The mother alleged that the child was repeatedly struck by the father causing bruising and that the father engaged in intimidating conduct towards her and the child, often following drug use by the father. The father was subject to several intervention orders, none of which successfully prevented his violent and intimidatory conduct. One incident of violence followed the mother’s discovery the father had spent money set aside for payment of bills. The father was persistently in arrears of his child support obligations and viewed child support as a benefit to the mother.
The mother led evidence that the father’s conduct towards her and the child made her highly anxious. The child allegedly made disclosures to the mother in July 2014 after spending time with the father that ‘daddy hit me’ and ‘he was just angry and he hit me’. The following day, the mother alleged a bruise appeared on the child’s hip. [344]
Decision and Reasoning: The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, the father have no contact with the child and there be a moratorium on the father seeking further parenting orders for a period of two years. The father’s conduct towards the mother and the child had made the mother highly anxious.
It was held that that ‘the father’s behaviour ha[d] been manipulative and the violence, which has been physical violence as well as coercive controlling violence, insidious. It was often perpetrated in the presence of the child.’ [5]
Despite the father’s recent admissions regarding his conduct, the Court was unconvinced that he does not pose an unacceptable risk to the child’s safety and wellbeing.[5]
The Court considered the definition of ‘coercive controlling violence’. It was held that: ‘Coercive controlling violence is an ongoing pattern of use of threat, force, emotional abuse and other coercive means to unilaterally dominate a person and induce fear, submission and compliance in them. Its focus is on control, and does not always involve physical harm.’ [223]
Xuarez & Vitela (No 3) [2017] FamCA 1108 (22 December 2017) – Family Court of Australia
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Child-related proceedings’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious proceedings’
Case type: Application by both parties for a vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Mr Xuarez and Ms Vitela (both pseudonyms) had been involved in court proceedings in relation to parenting orders for over 10 years ([7]-[21]). The father had filed 19 separate Applications in a Case between 11 April 2012 and 16 November 2017 ([16]), which were all dismissed, and Notices of Appeal in relation to the dismissals ([17]). Both the mother and the father filed applications for a vexatious proceedings order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Issues: Whether the Court should make the vexatious proceedings order against the mother or the father or both.
Decision and Reasoning: The application made by the mother was granted, while the application by the father was dismissed. An order was made prohibiting Mr Xuarez from instituting proceedings against Ms Vitela or any of her legal representatives and dismissing all extant applications ([45]).
Justice Carew at [29] cites Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy & Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 to set out 11 principles to consider when making an order in relation to vexatious litigants. Applying the principles to the father’s conduct, Carew J highlighted the facts that most of the applications were instituted without reasonable grounds, the father sought orders that the Court did not have jurisdiction to make, and the repetitive nature of the applications amounted to an abuse of process ([34]). It was noteworthy that in 2010, the father was declared a vexatious litigant in another court, in relation to proceedings where the father stalked the mother’s former legal representative ([37]). These facts justified the order being made against the father.
Janssen & Janssen [2016] FamCA 345 (1 February 2016) – Family Court of Australia
‘Discretion to admit the audio recordings and transcripts into evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Recordings made without consent’ – ‘Serious allegations of family violence’ – ‘Whether recordings were reasonably necessary to protect lawful interests’
Proceedings: Application relating to the admissibility of evidence and application as to whether the rules of evidence ought to apply in a Family Court hearing.
Facts: On the first day of a four day hearing, counsel for the applicant (the mother) sought leave to tender voice recordings and transcripts that had been made without the knowledge of the father. Under s 7 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW), it is unlawful to record private conversations without the consent of the parties to that conversation unless the recording of the conversation falls within one of the exceptions in s 7(2) and (3).
Issue/s:
•
Whether both the voice recordings and transcripts were admissible.
•
Whether there were ‘exceptional circumstances’ as per s 69ZT(3) requiring the proceedings to be determined according to the rules of evidence set out in the Evidence Act and not according to the procedures set out in s 69ZT(1) and (2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the FLA’).
Reasoning/Decision: First, McClelland J held that both the voice recordings and the transcripts were admitted in evidence under s 7(3) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (the recordings were reasonably necessary to protect the applicant’s lawful interests) and, in the alternative, under s 138 of the Evidence Act (the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence that had been obtained improperly).
McClelland J noted the ‘floodgates’ caution from senior counsel for the father i.e. that there was a danger of parties to a marital relationship experiencing difficulties surreptitiously recording their partner. However, in this regard, His Honour stated that his decision was very much one based on the facts of the case, including the allegations that the father had maintained a charming public face but had engaged in conduct within the family home that was alleged to have constituted family violence in terms of the provisions of s 4AB of the FLA. His Honour also had regard to the potential difficulty of obtaining evidence of family violence when it occurs behind closed doors without any witnesses present other than the perpetrator and victim. Further, His Honour noted that the recordings and transcript would be directly relevant to the issue of credibility as to whether family violence occurred in the proceedings (see [6]-[14]).
Notwithstanding the findings above, senior counsel for the father submitted that the Court ought to exclude the voice recordings (permitting the inclusion of the typed transcript) because the danger of the evidence being unfairly prejudicial to the father outweighed its probative value (s 135 Evidence Act). This was because the mother had knowledge and control of the recording and the circumstances in which the conversation occurred and was recorded. McClellan J dismissed this argument and held the voice recordings were admissible. This could be a matter for cross-examination by the father: Huffman & Gorman (No. 2). Further, His Honour noted submissions from counsel for the applicant and counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer that an important aspect of the evidence contained in the tapes was not simply what was said but how it was said. This was relevant to whether the father’s behaviour could be modelled or mimicked by the children and whether the parenting abilities of the primary carer had been compromised as a result of the content and tone of the communication (s 69ZN of the FLA) (see [15]-[23]).
Second, McClelland J held that the rules of evidence were to be applied in respect to the issues of the events on 10 September 2013 (these events were the subject of criminal proceedings) and to the issue as to whether the father made threats to the children or to the mother in respect to the children (s 69ZT(3)). For the remainder of the issues, the rules of evidence would not apply (s 69ZT(1) and (2)) and His Honour would therefore have the discretion to consider the probative value of such evidence. His Honour stated, ‘evidence in relation to the question of family violence will have to be established clearly, and matters of opinion put in appropriate context and given appropriate weight, depending upon who was expressing the opinion and on what basis, and the establishment of the necessary background facts’ (see [24]-[34]).
Sawyer & Sawyer [2015] FamCA 982 (10 November 2015) – Family Court of Australia
‘Application to discharge the icl’ – ‘Independent children's lawyer’ – ‘Legal practitioners’ – ‘Negligence or bias’
Proceedings: Numerous applications including an application to discharge the ICL.
Facts: The mother and the father separated in 2009.There were three children of their relationship. In 2012, a final parenting order was made with the consent of the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer (ICL). There was continued conflict between the parents. Numerous applications were considered by the court in this case in particular, an application brought by the father to discharge the ICL.
Issues: Whether the ICL had been negligent and demonstrated bias towards the mother?
Reasoning/Decision: The application was dismissed. Forest J referred to his previous discussion (in Dean & Susskind [2012] FamCA 897 at [19]-[28]) of the principles applicable to such an application:
‘…
The role is to be discharged independently and professionally, but it is not inconsistent with that duty for an ICL to make submissions to the Court that particular findings of fact, supported by the evidence, be made or that particular evidence be preferred over other evidence, or that a particular course of action be taken by the Court. It is also beyond doubt that an ICL’s duty to advance what he or she independently considers is in the best interests of the children in the case, does not require the ICL to slavishly follow what the children might want or what either one or both of the parents consider is in the best interests of the children.[20]
I consider it to be accepted principle that a court should be slow to remove or discharge an ICL simply where one party complains, in an unsubstantiated way, about the ICL because they do not like or accept the position being taken by the ICL overall or in respect of any particular aspect of the conduct of the case by the ICL. [21]
…
It will, in my opinion, be a matter of considering the evidence presented on each application for the removal of an ICL to determine if it demonstrates sufficient lack of objectivity and professionalism on the part of the ICL such as to justify his or her discharge. The mere appearance of partiality to a particular party’s position will not necessarily suffice to warrant the ICL’s removal. [26]
Parents, particularly in high conflict parenting litigation, must understand that as part of his or her role, the ICL may legitimately and responsibly say things that are challenging and confronting to the parent in respect of his or her views about parenting and the best interests of his or her children in the particular circumstances of the case, but that does not necessarily mean that the ICL is not acting in accordance with his or her duty in the case’. [27]
The father submitted a number of facts as evidence of bias. First, the ICL sought the appointment of a new, female report writer (Ms C). The father argued that the ICL failed to give him an opportunity to argue against Ms C’s appointment and, by retaining Ms C, evidenced ‘significant gender bias’ by removing ‘the only male person within our entire court process’. The fact that the ICL disagreed with the father on the issue of appointing a new family report writer, as she was entitled to do, did not prove that the ICL failed to adequately consider the father’s argument. Further, the selection of a report writer alone, who happened to be female, did not demonstrate or prove gender bias (see [58]-[63]).
Second, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated negligence or bias against him because she would not give him a copy of her instructions to the report writer. Forrest J noted that there is nothing in the Federal Circuit Court Rules or the Family Court Rules that obliges an ICL to provide copies of her instructions to an expert retained by her to each of the parents. Further, the father did not actually request the ICL to provide him with a copy of her instructions; he instead asked whether he would receive a copy of the instructions to which the ICL replied ‘you don’t see the letter of instruction’. In these circumstances, the ICL had not demonstrated negligence or bias that warranted her disqualification (see [65]-[70]).
Third, on the day of the interviews for the report, the father argued that the ICL demonstrated bias in directing the waiting arrangements in her office for the parents and children. Forrest J held that, at the interim stage, where the evidence invited a number of possible findings that could not be made without cross-examination of deponents, he was not in a position to say that the ICL had acted in a way that warranted her immediate discharge (see [71]-[78]).
Finally, the father asserted that the ICL was incompetent as well as negligent and biased against him. Forrest J was not persuaded by the father’s evidence and held that (see [79]-[81]):
‘It is most certainly not the case that where a parent might be able to point to a mistake made by an ICL that the Court will necessarily accede to an application by that parent to discharge that ICL. The authorities I have discussed clearly disclose that significantly more than that is required’.
Theophane & Hunt [2014] FamCA 1038 (24 November 2014) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family reports’ – ‘Impact of loss of relationship with parent’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection of the parent’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Statutory framework’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious proceedings’
Proceedings: Application for final parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had one child together. During the relationship, the mother alleged that the father often forced her to have non-consensual sex with him. The parties separated and the mother obtained a DVO against the father. The mother initiated proceedings seeking parenting orders and over the next four years a number of parenting orders were made and amended. However, after an incident at handover, the wife formed the belief the husband would abduct or remove the child from her care, and she attacked the father whilst in a dissociative state. She was convicted of unlawful wounding and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, and immediately released on probation.
The applicant father sought orders for sole parent responsibility for the child, who would live with him and spend supervised weekend and school holiday time with the mother. He argued that the mother presented an unacceptable risk of sexual, physical and emotional harm to the child (the mother suffered sexual abuse as a child). At the time of these proceedings, the father was committed to stand trial on six charges of rape of the mother and one charge of grievous bodily harm against the mother.
The mother sought orders, supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, that she have sole parental responsibility for the child, who would live with her and spend no time, nor have any contact or communication with the father. She later amended her orders and sought to include provision for a card or letter for her birthday and for Christmas. The mother sought no contact as she believed any continued interaction between her and the father in relation to the child, was likely to adversely affect her capacity to parent the child.
Issue/s: What parenting order was in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made providing for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child and sole custody of the child, and for the father’s access and communication with the child to be limited to postal correspondence twice a year until the child turned eighteen. His Honour also made a vexatious litigant order against the father, restraining him from bringing further proceedings without leave of the court.
In relation to making a no contact order, his Honour stated that it is a serious matter that a child neither spend time with nor communicate with a parent. Accordingly, such orders ought to be restricted to cases where the outcome is plainly mandated in the best interests of the child, and no other regime of orders is appropriate or workable. Three scenarios were considered in which ‘no contact’ orders had been made in the past. First, these orders are commonly employed where the Court is satisfied that a parent poses an unacceptable risk of harm to a child. Second, ‘no contact’ orders have been made where the other parent entertained a genuine, but not necessarily reasonable, belief that such a risk of harm existed (on the basis of protecting the child from the consequences of that parent’s belief): Re Andrew. Finally, this approach was taken one step further in Sedgley & Sedgley where the Court held that while the welfare of the child may require some continuity of contact with the non-custodial parent, the need for peace and tranquillity in the custodial parent’s household may be a more compelling need for the child. However, a Court would only cut the relationship between the child and parent on such a ground with considerable hesitation (see [55]-[58]).
The best interest considerations in s 60CC let the court to determine the child live with her mother. His Honour accepted that by time the child turned 12 she would likely come into conflict with the father and was at real risk of harm from his coercive, controlling, dominating and self-serving personality traits (see [177]-[178]). Further, the father was to have no contact with the child except for a card/letter at Christmas and on the child’s birthday. It was found that the father deliberately calculated his interaction with the mother with a view to destabilising her mental health conditions, and even the smallest opportunity for debate or conflict with the mother would be seized upon by the father. If the mother was required to continue to interact with the father in any form of co-parenting, there was a substantial risk that she will either attempt to kill herself, attempt to kill the father, or both.
It was ultimately decided that the prospect and magnitude of the risk of harm to the child if her mother was required to maintain contact with the father far outweighed any benefit the child would obtain by a continuation of any time or communication with her father. It was held that the best interests of the child lay with making a no contact order.
In relation to family violence, his Honour was satisfied that on occasion the father had engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with the mother. However, it was both unnecessary and undesirable to make a finding regarding the father’s conduct in relation to the criminal offence of rape (see [168]-[169]). However, the father’s controlling and domineering behaviour was considered and had bearing on the court’s decision for no contact (see [170]-[171]).
His Honour considered each of the many proceedings instituted by and conducted by the father and was “satisfied that on numerous occasions, either the proceedings have been instituted vexatiously or they have been conducted vexatiously.” He was “therefore satisfied that the father has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings.”[243]
At [246] his Honour stated:
I am satisfied that many of the applications that the father has brought or prosecuted in relation to the mother have been vexatious, although I accept that some, on occasion, have had merit. Some have been vexatious in the sense that they were intended to harass and intimidate the mother into either a further destabilisation and perhaps dissociation, or to attempt to otherwise coerce her to his will. Some were vexatious as being without reasonable foundation. Some may have been both.
And at [248]:
I accept that it is a grave matter to deny a parent the opportunity to litigate in relation to their child. However upon analysis, my order does not prevent the father doing so per se: if there is a legitimate basis for further litigation, sufficient to warrant a grant of leave, then he may do so. However he cannot be trusted with the unfettered right to issue proceedings against the mother in relation to the child, because he will abuse it. For that reason, any application for leave should be, in the first instance made ex parte: s 102QE(4).
Note: this case was confirmed on appeal, see Theophane & Hunt and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 87.
Cannon & Acres [2014] FamCA 104 (6 March 2014) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious litigant’ – ‘Views of the child’
Proceedings: Parenting orders and vexatious proceedings order.
Facts: Over many years, the mother and the 12 year old child experienced harassment, physical violence and stalking behaviour by the father. The father had little or no insight into the impact of his behaviour on the child. This was the third final parenting hearing. The current proceedings were brought about by the father in circumstances where the application was doomed to fail. Seeing the profound impact of these fresh proceedings on her mother, the child resolved that she no longer wanted to see or communicate with her father. Benjamin J was satisfied that the views were her own.
Issue/s:
•
What parenting orders were in the best interests of the child?
•
Whether in the circumstances of this proceeding a vexatious proceedings order should be made and if so the nature and extent of that order.
Reasoning/Decision: In making parenting orders, Benjamin J noted that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s 61DA of the Act did not apply because there were reasonable grounds to believe here that the father had perpetrated family violence. This family violence included the father’s entrenched pattern of behaviour (referred to by a psychologist), the father’s stalking behaviour, the verbal abuse, harassment and the assaults by him on the child. Further, shared parental responsibility could not effectively operate given the views of the child, the approach adopted by the father and the impact upon the mother. Accordingly, Benjamin J made an order that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child (see [379]-[384]). Benjamin J also made an order that the child spend no time with the father and have no communication with the father (see [387]-[404]).
Benjamin J made a vexatious proceedings order prohibiting the father from instituting further proceedings without leave. This order was made under s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). At [420], His Honour noted that the fundamental differences between the old section (s118) and s 102QB were: (1) the test was no longer a court having frivolous or vexatious proceedings before it but rather whether or not there was a history of a person having frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings; and (2) Vexatious proceedings were now defined by statute in s 102Q(1).
To make an order under s 102QB(2), Benjamin J noted at [438] that a two part threshold test needs to be met, namely:
•
That there have been vexatious proceedings instituted or conducted in Australian courts or tribunals; and
•
That the person, in this case the father, has frequently instituted or conducted such proceedings.
Applying this test, Benjamin J proceeded in three parts. First, His Honour determined a number of proceedings initiated by the father constituted vexatious proceedings on the facts (see [441]-[481]). Second, His Honour held that the proceedings amounted to the father ‘frequently’ instituting and conducting vexatious proceedings. In making this determination, Benjamin J noted that the test of ‘frequently’ was used as opposed ‘habitually and persistently’. The term ‘frequently’ is a relative term and is to be considered in the context of the facts of an individual case and, in this case, in the context of the litigation between these parties. This test was said to be satisfied on the facts (see [482]-[494]).
Finally, with the threshold being met, Benjamin J considered whether to exercise the discretion set out in s 102QB(2) of the Act and make a vexatious proceedings order. His Honour noted that a vexatious proceedings order must be considered in the context where there is a need to balance the serious step of restricting a person from commencing proceedings against the need to protect the mother and the child from the constant impact of litigation. In the circumstances, a vexatious proceeding was made (see [495]-[540]).
Modlin & Anstead and Anor [2013] FamCA 955 (6 December 2013) – Family Court of Australia
‘Family reports’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parental capacity’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection of the parent’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Single expert report’
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and the father, who both had compromised mental health: the mother diagnosed as Bipolar and the father also being previously diagnosed as Bipolar, had two children together. Both children had intellectual and developmental disabilities. The parties separated and reconciled several times before final separation, with the mother obtaining Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders (ADVO) on a number of occasions. The father breached one of these orders in February 2010 by breaking into the mother’s home and assaulting the mother. He was charged and spent time in a psychiatric facility. The mother formed a relationship with another man (‘the stepfather’). In 2011, one of the children went temporarily missing in a National Park under the care of the father, the father deliberately sent photographs of his penis to the mother, and one of the children told the mother that the father swore at her. Contact ceased between the father and the children and the mother received victim’s compensation in relation to domestic violence by the father. Proceedings were commenced in relation to the parenting of the children.
Issue/s: It was agreed that the mother and the stepfather would have parental responsibility for the children. However, some of the remaining issues were –
•
Whether the father should have shared parental responsibility or no responsibility for the children;
•
Whether or to what extent the father should spend time or communicate with the children.
Reasoning/Decision: Orders were made giving the mother and stepfather equal shared parental responsibility for the children, giving the father no parental responsibility, making provision for the children to live with the mother and stepfather and to have no contact with the father, restraining the father from approaching the children, their school and residence and the parents from discussing proceedings with or near the children.
The Court found that the s 61DA presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply as the father engaged in family violence. Further, in relation to the children’s best interests, including consideration of the evidence about family violence, the Court determined that in any case the presumption would be rebutted on the evidence. It was held that any further contact between the father and the mother would destabilise the mother and prevent her from being able to adequately care for the children (see [197]-[205]). Additionally, on this basis, it was ordered that the father spend no time with either child (see [206]-[210]).
Loughnan J also made a number of orders restraining the father from communicating with the children or the mother or stepfather. These orders were necessary for the physical and mental protection of the mother, especially in light of the evidence of family violence. However, Loughnan J ordered that, if required, the father communicate with the step-father through a post office box and be notified if the family relocated from the region (see [217]-[232]).
Schieffer & Schieffer [2013] FamCA 168 (20 March 2013) – Family Court of Australia
‘Best interests of the child’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Inconsistency of parenting orders with existing family violence order made by state court’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Intersection of legal systems’ – ‘Living arrangements’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Protection orders’
Proceedings: Application for parenting orders.
Facts: The parties separated and made consensual arrangements for the care of their child. In June 2012, the father detained the child citing a belief that the child had been sexually abused by the mother’s partner. Subsequently the mother, having happened upon the child and the father’s partner, attempted to detain the child herself. This resulted in an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) being made against the mother in favour of the father’s partner. It applied to the child and the father as well as they lived with Ms E.
The mother refuted the allegation of sexual abuse but her relationship with her partner had ended and the mother acceded to an order precluding any future contact between the child and her former partner. The father then contended that the mother’s deteriorated emotional state constituted a further risk of harm to the child and militated against the child’s return to live with the mother.
Issue/s: What orders regarding the residence of the child and shared parental responsibility were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court was persuaded to make an order for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, consistent with their mutual wish, the Independent Children’s Lawyer’s suggestion and the Family Consultant’s recommendation (see [95]-[100]). His Honour ordered that it was in the child’s best interests to live predominately with the mother. Although both parents were equally capable of meeting the child’s intellectual needs, he considered that the mother was better able to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs (see [106]). The child was to spend substantial and significant time with the father (see [105], [109]-[116]).
The parenting orders were inconsistent with the existing family violence order, as the AVO prohibited the mother from approaching and contacting the child or the father. Although the order made an exception for contact that occurred pursuant to the Act, it was only for the restricted purpose of ‘counselling, conciliation, or mediation’. It was noted that where the terms of the parenting and family violence order were inconsistent, the parenting order should take precedence to facilitate communication between the parents regarding the child and to ensure the child was exchanged for periods of contact (see [91]-[94]).
Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535 (9 July 2012) – Family Court of Australia
‘Court to consider family violence (60cc)’ – ‘Family violence in property proceedings’ – ‘Kennon adjustment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Property proceedings’
Proceedings: Application for property orders.
Facts: The parties married and lived together for 19 months. They had one child. The husband contributed the bulk of the capital to the marriage and was on a far superior income. The wife had cared for the child since separation, nearly eight years prior. During the marriage, the husband perpetrated family violence against the wife on five occasions, over a period of 15 months. This caused the wife to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The wife claimed the family violence made her contributions in the role of homemaker and parent significantly more arduous. The husband had financially supported the wife and the child during the period since separation.
Issue/s: Whether the court should make a Kennon style adjustment in the property settlement proceeding?
Reasoning/Decision: The Court referred to the Full Court in Kennon where the principles regarding family violence making contributions more arduous lie. The Full Court’s further refinement of the Kennon principles in Spagnardi & Spagnardi was also noted (see [138]-[144].
The Court discussed the approach regarding family violence in property proceedings as broken down into three steps: (1) Make findings of fact about one party’s conduct; (2) (If applicable) make findings about the physical or psychological effect of the conduct on the other party; and (3) Make findings of fact about the effect of the conduct of one party upon contributions made by the other party. It was also noted that it could not be assumed in a particular case that an effect on a party’s condition automatically means there is an effect upon the party’s contributions. At trial, the wife had to establish to the judge’s satisfaction a connection between any proven family violence in the case and the contributions she made (see [145]).
On the facts, Watts J first concluded that the wife’s contributions in the role of homemaker and parent during the period over which the violence took place were made significantly more arduous by the violence of the husband. Second, while His Honour also held that the wife’s role as parent post-separation was made significantly more arduous by the family violence during co-habitation, His Honour observed that it was more difficult to make such an assessment. The wife did experience apprehension and heightened emotion around dealing with the husband’s time with the child after the separation. However, the effect of violence on contributions was not constant over the previous eight years, with the wife’s post-traumatic stress disorder having significantly dissipated (see [174]-[179]). Accordingly, it was appropriate to increase the wife’s assessed contributions by 25 per cent for the duration of the relationship and by 5 per cent post separation to take account of the effect of the husband’s conduct on the mother (see [179].
Russell & Russell [2012] FamCA 99 (7 March 2012) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged breach of indian dowry law’ – ‘Dowry’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Final parenting and child orders’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Overseas relocation to india’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Rebuttal of presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Relocation’ – ‘Sole parental responsibility order’
Matter: Application for final parenting and child orders.
Proceedings: Final parenting and child orders hearing, including application for overseas relocation.
Facts: The mother had limited English skills, poor work prospects and no family support in Australia and there was a high level of conflict between the parties exacerbated by cultural issues. Both parties’ extended families remained in India. The mother alleged a history of family violence perpetrated by the father against the mother. The father stated that it was his intention to remain in Australia regardless of the final outcome. There were allegations that India’s dowry laws had been breached by the demand for and payment of dowry by the wife’s family to the husband’s family.
Issue: Was the presumption of shared parenting responsibility rebutted? Ought the mother be allowed to relocate to India with the child?
Judgment: Presumption of shared parenting responsibility rebutted, relocation allowed.
Young J found the presumption of shared parental responsibility was rebutted due to the conflict between the parties, their lack of communication and cultural issues.
The mother was permitted to relocate to India where she had family support available.
Kreet v Sampir [2011] FamCA 22 (18 January 2011); (2011) 252 FLR 234; (2011) 44 Fam LR 405 – Family Court of Australia
‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Marriage occurring in a country other than australia’ – ‘Nullity application’
Proceedings: Nullity application.
Facts: Ms Kreet (the wife), an Australian born woman, married Mr Sampir (the husband) on June 2009 in India. She travelled to India with her parents believing she was going to marry her Australian boyfriend, Mr U. Upon arrival, her parents confiscated her passport and was introduced to Mr Sampir. Her father told her that he would have Mr U’s sisters and mother kidnapped and raped if she refused to marry Mr Sampir. Under duress, the wife married Mr Sampir and submitted his Australian visa application to the authorities. She returned to Australia, resumed her relationship with Mr U and withdraw her sponsorship of the respondent’s visa application. She obtained an indefinite Intervention Order against her father.
Issue/s: Whether the marriage was void?
Reasoning/Decision: Section 23B(1)(d) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) states that a marriage is void if ‘the consent of either parties is not real consent because: (i) it was obtained by duress or fraud; (ii) that party is mistaken as to the identity of the other party or as to the nature of the ceremony performed; or (iii) that party is mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony’.
While the legislation does not define duress in the context of a marriage, Cronin J found that ‘there was no reason to give it any other meaning than that which is normally known to the law. It must be oppression or coercion to such a degree that consent vanishes: In the Marriage of S (1980) FLC 90-820’ (see [39]).
Cronin J was satisfied that ‘the wife’s physical state at the time of the ceremony was such that she was physically and mentally overborne. Her consent was not real because it was obtained by duress’ (see [43]).
Harridge & Harridge [2010] FamCA 445 (4 June 2010) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father of the two children subject to the parenting proceedings was convicted of three offences involving child pornography.
Issue/s: What parenting orders were in the best interests of the child?
Reasoning/Decision: Although this case did not relate to family violence, it contains observations relevant to risk assessment. The Court held that an allegation of potential risk of harm ought not to divert the court from the central task of assessing the best interests of the children. At [53] Murphy J quoted from an article by psychiatrist and barrister, Mahendra, who stated that risk assessment in any situation involves, in essence, asking the following questions:
•
What harmful outcome is potentially present in this situation?
•
What is the probability of this outcome coming about?
•
What risks are probable in this situation in the short, medium and long term?
•
What are the factors that could increase or decrease the risk that is probable?
•
What measures are available whose deployment could mitigate the risks that are probable?
Maluka & Maluka [2009] FamCA 647 (24 July 2009) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Matter: Application that mother have sole parental responsibility, the children live with the mother, the mother be permitted to change the children’s names and relocate without notice to the father, that the father be restrained from bringing applications in relation to the children for a period of time.
Facts: The mother alleged serious history of domestic and family violence throughout the history of the relationship, including “serious assaults of the mother, stalking, vandalism to property of the mother and her present partner, intimidation, threats of violence (including a history of death threats), verbal abuse, controlling behaviour, isolation and dominance”[4] such that the mother and children live in terror of the father and have done for years.
Held: Mother have sole parental responsibility for the children and they reside with the mother, the mother be permitted to everything necessary to change the children’s surnames, the mother be permitted to relocate the residence of the children to any place in Australia without notice to or permission of the father, the father be subject to a restraining order.
[396] “In many ways the facts as between the parties that I have determined in this case fit most, if not all, of the indicators of coercive controlling violence. The father has used coercion, control, violence, intimidation and threats throughout the relationship, including after separation. He seeks to intimidate and control the mother with the attendant violence, abuse, isolation and aggression. From time to time he focuses this on the children. He dominates and controls the children, particularly X, but his behaviour with regard to Y and her reaction to his verbal abuse of her in June 2008 is indicative of his continuing coercive controlling violence.
[397] The father exercised economic power to control and manipulate the mother and effectively the children. He endeavoured to isolate mother and in effect continues to do so. In that process he denies or minimises his involvement and culpability.
[399] The effect of that long term violence, control and manipulation imposed by the father on the mother has from time to time undermined the mother’s parental authority and undermined her parenting role…”
Note this case was subject to further litigation, although the judge’s comments about the type of family violence experienced were not challenged. See for example Maluka & Maluka [2011] FamCAFC 72; (31 March 2011).
HZ & State Central Authority [2006] FamCA 466 (7 June 2006) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: The mother’s appeal against orders made by Bennett J on 11 April 2006 requiring the return to Greece of three children, C, D and E pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986.
Facts: The mother was an Australian-born woman of Greek parentage and the father was Greek. They met and married in Greece and throughout the marriage the mother and three children resided with the father’s parents in Greece. With the father’s consent the mother brought the children to Australia for what she said was a holiday and conceded that the habitual residence of the children was Greece. There was evidence of threatening text messages from the husband to the wife and the eldest child’s evidence of the father’s violence and threatening behaviour towards the mother and his own mother in the presence of the children supported the mother’s allegations.
Grounds: The trial judge erred in failing to find that Article 13(b) (grave risk of physical or psychological harm or place them in an intolerable situation) and Article 13(c) (the eldest child’s views should be taken into account) should prevent the return of the children.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The court was unable to identify error in the trial judge’s decision.
The court acknowledged the limitations of the Hague Convention in cases where domestic and family violence is alleged:
[48] The operation of the Convention which has the effect of potentially sending a mother back into a situation of risk to her own physical wellbeing has been a matter of significant academic criticism …
[75]…As we have already indicted, the return of these children to Greece was anticipated to be in their mother’s company. She had found accommodation for herself remote from that of the father. She led no evidence to suggest that the Greek authorities would be unable to provide her and the children with appropriate protection pending her utilising lawful means to relocate the children from Greece. The finding by the trial Judge that the mother had not persuaded her that the return of the children to Greece would raise a grave risk of harm to the children or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation was a finding clearly open to the trial Judge.
[78]…Given that these were children who were born in Greece and had spent effectively the entirety of their life in Greece until the mother unilaterally determined to retain them in Australia, Greece was clearly the appropriate forum for issues relating to the welfare of these children to be determined. In those circumstances it was appropriate for her Honour to place significant weight on the first of the objects referred to in Article 1 of the Convention namely the prompt return of the children who had been wrongfully retained in Australia.
T and N (2003) FLC 93-172; [2003] FamCA 1129 (4 November 2003) – Family Court of Australia
‘Anger management course’ – ‘Applications’ – ‘Applications and orders for child residence, contact and parenting orders (in fam law proc)’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Consent orders’ – ‘Contact proceedings’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Inadequate undertakings’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Judge refusal to accept consent orders for unsupervised contact’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘Parenting proceeding’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’ – ‘Women’
Proceedings: Orders sought by consent for supervised and unsupervised time with the father
Facts: The parties had two children. There was a history of violent and abusive conduct by the father against the mother and one of the children (including that he bit the child as a baby). This resulted in a number of periods of separation and reconciliation, with a number of Apprehended Violence Orders being brought against and breached by the father (see [17]-[24], [27]-[28]). The father also regularly smoked cannabis (see [25]-[26]). In April 2001, the mother left the family residence without notice, taking the children with her. At the hearing, the parties attempted settlement. The parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer proposed consent orders for children to progress from supervised to unsupervised to block periods of time with the father, who would give undertakings regarding his conduct, discipline of the children, substance use and participation in an anger management course.
Issue/s: What orders were appropriate in the best interests of the children?
Decision and Reasoning: Moore J declined to make the consent orders as proposed as the untested evidence raised concerns for the judge that the orders may not be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the judge made orders by consent for supervised contact only. The allegations against the father indicated him to be a violent and abusive person who represented a high risk of harm to the well-being of the mother and a high risk of harm to his children.
While Her Honour acknowledged that the parents’ consent to arrangements about their children is a powerful, and in most cases a deciding, factor, consent does not displace the obligation of the Court to make orders that are in the best interests of children (see [39]). Moore J also expressed her concern that the Independent Children’s Lawyer would provide support for the proposed consent orders in the face of behaviour that had the potential to place the children in serious jeopardy and in light of orders that would give no protection whatsoever to the children (see [40]).
M & M [1998] FamCA 1742 (12 November 1998) – Family Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Contact’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Impact of violence on children’ – ‘Inability to acknowledge inappropriateness of behaviour’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’ – ‘Supervised by court’
Proceedings: Contact orders.
Facts: The parents had two children together (B and E) and the mother had another son from a previous relationship (D). The children had witnessed violence by the father against their mother, siblings and extended family. The father had several convictions for assault against the mother and one against D, and had been subject to AVOs. After separation, B and E lived with the father, with interim orders made for the mother to have contact with the children. At trial, the parties agreed that B and E should live with the mother but a number of issues were left to be determined. At hearing, a counsellor gave evidence that both children displayed concerning behaviours consistent with early onset and repetitive physical violence.
Issue/s: One of the issues was what contact should the children have with the father?
Reasoning/Decision: On the evidence, the Court held that it was in the children’s best interest that all but in the very short term they should have no contact with the father. Orders were made to reduce contact over the space of 12 months to minimise the distress that could be caused to the children by immediate complete separation (see [96]-[100]). The Court held that the father’s abusive behaviour presented a ‘multi-faceted danger for the children’ including danger of injury as well as “fear, insecurity & vigilance”. It was held there was a risk of the children learning behaviour from the father which would affect their future interactions e.g. the daughter accepting abuse as part of life and the son believing violence is acceptable. See [94]-[95].
In the Marriage of JG and BG (1994) 122 FLR 209; (1994) FLC 92-515; (1994) 18 Fam LR 255 (30 September 1994) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Custody proceedings’ – ‘Impact of domestic violence on children’ – ‘Impact of family violence on children’ – ‘Parenting’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Parties represented by counsel’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Relevance of family violence in cases concerning the welfare of children’
Facts: The case concerned the custody of two children aged four and two. The wife alleged that the husband had been physically and verbally violent towards her on a number of occasions.
Issue/s: What is the relevance of family violence in custody, guardianship and access matters?
Decision and Reasoning: The court accepted that the relevance of family violence will vary according to the nature of the proceedings.
Chisholm J went on to consider the relevance of family violence in proceedings relating to children. His Honour considered at [257] that although it is ‘not the objective of the law in custody and similar proceedings to punish wrongdoers or to provide compensation or redress for victims’, family violence is by no means irrelevant. His Honour held that ‘[family violence] is to be taken into account if it is relevant to the determination of the child’s welfare, which is the paramount consideration’. The standard of proof is the civil standard on the balance of probabilities. However, the conduct of a parent is relevant in custody matters only to the extent that it relates to the welfare of the children.
Where violence is directed at the children themselves, or occurs in the presence of the children, it is obviously and directly relevant to their welfare (see [260]). However, other forms of violence could also be relevant to the welfare of the children such as violence affecting the custodial parent, threats, etc. The Court must assess the nature and extent of the harm in light of the evidence and findings before them. See [261].
The Court also stated that it may be possible for the court to decline to make findings in relation to family violence, where it could determine the case without reference to them.
In the Matter Of: Re K Appeal [1994] FamCA 21; (1994) FLC 92-461 (10 March 1994) – Family Court of Australia
‘Alleged murder of mother by father’ – ‘Custody’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Over-emphasis of conduct of father’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Prejudice’ – ‘Separate representation’ – ‘Welfare of child’
Matter: Father, grandparents and paternal aunt’s appeal against orders granting sole guardianship and custody of the child to the maternal aunt and permission for her to remove the child from Australia to the United States where she resided.
Facts: The mother died and the father was charged with her murder and was awaiting trial at the time of the hearing before the trial Judge. Those proceedings concerned applications by the maternal aunt and the paternal grandparents and aunt for custody of the only child of the marriage. The applicant father indicated that he supported the application of the grandparents and paternal aunt that they be granted custody of the child. The trial Judge made a finding that on the balance of probabilities the husband shot the wife.
Grounds:
Husband:
•
As he was unrepresented and awaiting trial for murder the trial judge should have made interim rather than final orders, exercised his discretion to stay or adjourn the proceedings, or at least adjouned final determination until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
•
The trial judge failed to give reasons or adequate reasons for his decision to make final orders.
•
It was neither necessary or desirable for his Honour to have made the finding that the husband shot the wife.
Grandparents and paternal aunt:
•
The trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of Mrs Holmes in support of the appellants’ case, particularly in relation to methods of dealing with grief in eastern European families.
•
The trial judge over-emphasized the conduct or involvement of the husband in the wife’s death and this influenced him against the proposals of the appellants.
Intervention by Commonwealth Attorney-General:
The case warranted the appointment of a separate representative pursuant to s 65 of the Family Law Act because (a) permanent removal of the child from the jurisdiction was contemplated which would likely lead to cessation of any contact with the father; and (b) the relationships between and circumstances involving the parties and interveners.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
In considering the Attorney-General’s intervention, the Full Court (Nicholson CJ, Fogarty and Baker JJ) suggested guidelines for appointment of separate representatives for children involved in proceedings, one of which was that separate representatives should normally be appointed where there is an apparently intractable conflict between the parents:
[95] In this regard we lay stress upon the words "intractable conflict". There is a dispute of course in all contested custody cases and there is usually a degree of conflict, but we have in mind that category of cases where there is a high level of long standing conflict between the parents. In such cases the child is very much a pawn in the dispute and is often used as such by either or both parents. In these circumstances we think it important that the child have the support and assistance of an independent person and that the Court similarly have the assistance of such a person to present the child's point of view.
[96] If the child is alienated from both parents, the need for such representation is obvious. Where the child is alienated from one of them, this may or may not be for good cause and may have been largely brought about or contributed to by the conduct of the parent from whom the child is not alienated. In most cases it seems to us to be highly desirable for the child to have access to a person independent of the conflict who will have his or her interests at heart and who will be capable of assisting the child and putting both the child's view and submissions as to the child's best interests to the Court: see Law Council of Australia (1989) "Law Council Submission on Role of Separate Representatives" Vol. 4 No. 4 Australian Family Lawyer, 15. In this regard we also see the separate representative as having an investigative role which may be of great assistance to the Court. Further, the separate representative may well, in this and the previous category of cases, perform the role of an "honest broker" as between the child and or the parents.
Murray & Director of Family Services ACT [1993] FamCA 103 (6 October 1993) – Family Court of Australia
‘Child abduction’ – ‘Hague convention’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Motorcycle gang’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons’
Matter: Appeal against Hague Convention return order.
Facts: The husband was a member of the New Zealand motorcycle gang known as “the Mongrel Mob”. The mother brought her children aged five, four and two to Australia from New Zealand. Her evidence was that she was the victim of several violent attacks which included head butting, punching, kneeing her at the base of the spine. She had received death threats. The acts of violence either took place in the presence of or in close proximity to the children.
She said the husband had an arsenal of weapons which included firearms, knives, chains and meat cleavers and was likely to use the weapons against her. The husband whilst admitting to a ‘turbulent’ relationship with the wife and some incidents of violence said her claims were exaggerated. The trial Judge had rejected regulation 16(3)(b) defence commenting that it was not possible to determine the veracity of the allegations and that the evidence relating to them would be available only in New Zealand.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
The Full Court in rejecting the mother's appeal characterised the evidence as:
“almost entirely directed at the prospective threat to the wife of a return to New Zealand and more particularly to a return by her to Dunedin.” [170]
They said:
[171] Whilst there is nothing that requires the wife to return to New Zealand, it is obviously desirable and from the point of view of the children that she does so. However, there is no requirement imposed by this court that she or they must return to Dunedin. It is open for her to return to another part of New Zealand where the danger to her may be less and it is of course open to her to seek orders from the New Zealand courts both for personal protection and interim and final custody immediately upon her arrival in New Zealand. She can also, if she wishes, seek leave from the New Zealand court to take the children to Australia.
[172] As his Honour pointed out, New Zealand has a system of family law and provides legal protection to persons in fear of violence which is similar to the system in Australia.
[173] It would be presumptuous and offensive in the extreme for a court in this country to conclude that the wife and the children are not capable of being protected by the New Zealand courts or that relevant New Zealand authorities would not enforce protection orders which are made by the courts.
[174] In our view and in accordance with the views expressed by this Court in Gsponer's case, the circumstances in which Regulation 16(3) comes into operation should be largely confined to situations where such protections are not available…
[175] For us to do otherwise would be to act on untested evidence to thwart the principal purposes of the Hague Convention which are to discourage child abduction and where such abduction has occurred to return such children to the country of habitual residence so the courts of that country can determine where or with whom their best interests lie. These children are New Zealand citizens who have lived all their lives in New Zealand and it is for a New Zealand court to determine their future.
In the marriage of Merriman and Merriman [1993] FamCA 115; (1994) FLC 92-497; (1993) 116 FLR 87 – Family Court of Australia
‘Allegations of violence and abuse’ – ‘Interim custody application’ – ‘Issues of welfare of children and stability’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Proceedings: Interim custody application
Facts: Parties married in 1978 and separated under one roof in March 1993. There are 2 children of the marriage aged 13 and 9 at the hearing. There was corroborated evidence of violence perpetrated by the father on the mother. The husband was convicted of assault upon the wife earlier in the same year of the hearing. He was “ordered not to assault, molest or interfere with” the mother. Regardless of these orders he continued to contact the mother and make threats to her and her family. The husband also verbally abused and belittled the mother in front of the children during the marriage. There were also multiple occasions of physical abuse throughout the marriage. Since separation the husband had given the 13 year old daughter Rohypnol and shared a bed with her. He was advised by the Department of Community Services not to do this. Also post separation, the father took out a life insurance policy for the mother. The mother moved from the matrimonial home to her mother’s house in June 1993. The children remained with the father.
Issues: In light of the father’s history of domestic violence and threats, what interim arrangements should be made for the care of the children?
Reasoning/Decision: Due to the violence of the father, the Court held that he was a risk to the children both physically and developmentally (he is an “inappropriate role model”). It was held that the children were to remain in the former matrimonial home to “preserve stability for the children and for their safety” and their mother was to have interim care of the children. The father was restrained from coming within 2 miles of the home due to “serious concerns as to the safety of the wife and the children”.
Federal Circuit Court of Australia
Khoury and Ganem [2021] FCCA 869 (1 April 2021) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Allegations of serious family violence’ – ‘Application for no contact with father’ – ‘Application for sole parental responsibility’ – ‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Child present’ – ‘Child's fear and anxiety’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control ** financial abuse’ – ‘Criminal charges’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Independent children's lawyer’ – ‘Parenting applications’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Social isolation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to family’ – ‘Threats to kill family’
Matter: Parenting applications: father’s application for interim orders that he and the child X attend ongoing reunification therapy at his expense and subject to the recommendations of the therapist, he spend supervised time with X; mother’s application that she have sole parental responsibility for X, X reside with her and X only spend time with the father in accordance with X’s wishes. The Independent Children’s Lawyer sought orders in the terms proposed by the mother, and a restraint on the father attending X’s school. Earlier final parenting orders made by consent had provided for X to have graduated contact from supervised contact to each Thursday to Sunday. Between 2013 and 2015 the father had sporadic contact with X and each alleged the other was to blame for the lack of contact. Proceedings were recommenced in 2018 and orders made for the parties and child attend therapy with a view to reunification. The reunification therapy was unsuccessful with the therapist reporting the session was terminated early due to the father’s inability to focus on the child’s feelings or regulated his behaviour in response to the child, pressuring the child who was crying and distressed, despite the therapists attempts to encourage the father to engage in behaviour which was not experienced by the child as threatening.
Among other orders the father sought orders for reunification therapy in circumstances where the mother argued it was not in the child’s best interests to see the father because of controlling behaviours, disrespect of women and extreme religious beliefs [98]. The father denies the mother’s allegations.[99]
Decision: Inter alia X reside with the mother, the mother have sole parental responsibility and the father have contact in accordance with X’s wishes, the father be restrained by injunction from attending or being within 500 metres of any school X attends, the mother obtain therapeutic counselling for X to better address her fears and anxieties.
Per Bender J:
[100] As has been set out in this judgment, therapeutic reunification counselling to assist in rebuilding the relationship between X and the Father was not successful and was a distressing and unhappy experience for X.
[101] [expert witnesses] both expressed the view that a further attempt at such therapy could be too distressing for X, especially given her current levels of anxiety and fear and her resistance to spending any time with the Father.
[102] Therefore, the real question for this Court is whether the risk to X of a meaningful relationship with the Father is outweighed by the emotional and psychological risk to X in forcing her to undertake further counselling in the hope that a relationship with the Father might be achieved.
Boden & Boden [2018] FCCA 82 (25 January 2018) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility rebutted’ – ‘Unacceptable risk of harm’
Proceedings: Contested parenting application.
Facts: The father was physically violent and verbally abusive to the mother and children ([79]). There were two Domestic Violence Orders in favour of the mother ([217]). The two eldest daughters suffered from depression and anxiety, cut themselves, and had self-esteem issues ([2]). The youngest son was diagnosed with autism, but the father refused to accept the diagnosis, and refused to make arrangements to reduce the son’s emotional distress ([162]).
Issues: Parenting orders to be made.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Willis identified ‘grave concerns’ about the father’s ability to regulate his emotions and about his parenting skills to independently parent ([248]). The children had ‘suffered catastrophically’ from their parents’ separation and their exposure to the family violence ([2]). Due to the father’s admissions to family violence, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility was rebutted ([238]).
Judge Willis remarked at [247]:
I have the impression that the mother has significant insight into her own behaviour and that of all of the children. She is acutely aware and has the skills to deal with Z and Y cutting themselves, of them suffering depression and anxiety and having self-esteem issues. Some of these issues will, no doubt, be directly related to their exposure to family violence. Day in day out, experts in this Court talk about the effect of family violence in children and their inability to sustain relationships, become depressed and blame themselves for breakdowns. All of these things have happened for Y and Z.
Judge Willis ordered that the father undertake an anger management course, and that the mother undertake a Domestic Violence course in relation to the cycle of violence ([232]-[233]). The judge ordered that the son have limited contact with the father (see Orders).
Atkinson & Atkinson (No 3) [2016] FCCA 2284 (2 September 2016) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parental responsibility’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Matter: Mother’s application for residence, sole parental responsibility and contact for child X; Father’s application for residence, sole parental responsibility and contact for child X.
Issues: Best interests of child, whether the Father has been violent towards the Mother; and whether the Mother suffered from any mental illness or disorder which “significantly negatively affects her parenting”.
Facts: Each party’s evidence was that the other was not an appropriate parent. The mother alleged the Father perpetrated family violence against her and the Father alleged the mother had a mental illness or disorder which caused her to manufacture malicious allegations against the Father. The father had engaged in a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour by repeated texts and telephone calls and at least one late night attendance at her home. The Court expressed concerns that the Mother’s reports of the Father’s domestic violence towards her to hospital staff following hospital attendance whilst injured and pregnant were not investigated by the Department of Family and Children’s Services of New South Wales (“the Department”) as the parties had resumed their relationship when the mother refused service.
It emerged in cross-examination of the Father that he had failed to disclose his involvement in other litigation, in the Family Court with his ex-wife and various local courts in relation to other family violence matters. The Father had made repeated groundless, repeated, repeated allegations against the Mother to Police, the Department and various medical practitioners. He also failed to comply with procedural and counselling requirements expeditiously.
Decision and reasoning: Ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and reside with the mother, the father to have contact. The father denied all allegations against him and had a complete lack of insight into the impact of his behaviour.
The allegations raised by Mr Atkinson at various points in the proceedings have, on their face, appeared highly concerning. The Court has, accordingly, proceeded with some caution and consumed vast resources in the determination of serial Interim Applications. When each of those allegations, serious on their face, have been examined they have been found wanting substantial, if any, support. Indeed, the actions taken by Mr Atkinson in seeking to obtain evidence, photographing the child, presenting the child to a Doctor on a weekly basis and presenting the child to the Police, is, upon the evidence as it has unfolded, far more injurious to the child than that complained of. The repetition of those behaviours is a far greater concern as to future risk than anything complained of as regards the mother.[440]
In light of the findings that have been made by the Court regarding the perpetration of family violence by Mr Atkinson upon Ms Atkinson, it would be entirely unreasonable and onerous to impose upon Ms Atkinson a burden to consult and endeavour to make joint and consensual decisions with Mr Atkinson. To that end and whilst it is submitted on behalf of Mr Atkinson that the Court should find that these parents have “differing parenting styles rather than family violence”, I make clear that this submission is rejected. What has occurred in the relationship between Mr and Ms Atkinson is, I am satisfied, family violence.[473]
Corby & Corby [2015] FCCA 1099 (16 April 2015) – Federal Circuit Court of Australia
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Independent children’s lawyer’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Recorded conversations’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Whether recordings were reasonably necessary to protect lawful interests’
Proceedings: Application for the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: On the first day of the final parenting hearing in relation to the parties’ only child X, counsel for the mother sought the Court’s leave to tender four short audio recordings of conversations between the mother and father that took place prior to separation. The mother accepted that these recordings were made without the knowledge of the father, that they are ‘private conversations’ and were therefore prima facie made in contravention of s 7 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). However, counsel for the mother submitted that the recordings were admissible because the recordings were ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect her lawful interests (s 7(3)) or, alternatively, the evidence ought to be admitted under s 138(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) because the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of doing so.
Issue/s:
•
Whether the recordings were reasonably necessary to protect the mother’s lawful interests and consequently, admissible?
•
Whether the recordings ought to be admitted on the basis that the desirability of the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting the evidence?
Reasoning/decision: Sexton J held that the mother’s conduct was lawful under s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) and therefore the recordings were admitted on this basis. In making this finding, Sexton J held that first, s 7(3)(b)(i) was satisfied in relation to the term ‘lawful interests’ as the mother had the right to protect her interest not to be intimidated or harassed, and not to be forced to respond to the father’s demands for sexual activity: DW v R (see [19]-[23]).
Second, Sexton J was satisfied that the recordings were ‘reasonably necessary’ (‘reasonably appropriate’ as opposed to ‘essential’ and judged objectively at the time of the recordings) to protect those lawful interests: DW v R. Here, the mother made the recordings for the purpose of having evidence which she could use to convince others to believe her, or to corroborate her word, or to protect herself and the child from further behaviour. Sexton J stated that, ‘[w]hile the complainant in the present case is an adult, she was, if her evidence is accepted, caught up in an abusive relationship with a man who damaged her self-worth and left her miserable and exhausted. If this was so, as the Court found in R v Coutts, it may not have been a realistic option for her to report her predicament to police and obtain a warrant for conversations with her husband to be recorded’ (see [29]). The evidence also disclosed that the father may have had a very different public face to his private face. The mother was not trying to obtain a confession but to establish her credibility if there was ever a dispute about what actually happened (see [24]-[31]).
Although the matter did not turn on the issue, Sexton J also considered whether the evidence should be admitted on the basis that the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting the evidence. Sexton J concluded that had it been necessary, she would have exercised the discretion to admit the evidence for a number of reasons including that the evidence was highly probative to making parenting orders in the best interests of the child, the allegations were extremely serious and it was necessary for the court to determine if the child was at risk in the father’s care, the impropriety of the mother in making the recordings was not of the “worst kind”, and it was “unlikely” the mother could have gained consent to make the recordings (see [32]-[36]).
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) Appellate Division
Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 (20 December 2024) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) Appellate Jurisdiction
Appeal from Pickford & Pickford (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 500
‘Parenting’ – ‘coercive control’ – ‘coercive and controlling behaviour’
Case type: Appeal against final parenting orders
Grounds: The grounds for appeal put forward by the father included:
•
The primary judge erred in concluding that an intention on the part of the perpetrator is not a necessary component of coercive or controlling behaviour (Ground 1 - rejected)
•
The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in coercive and controlling conduct, and in particular in relation to the findings made at paragraphs 2.1 to 2.6. The grounds of appeal centred on the primary judge’s apparent finding that the existence of coercive and controlling conduct could be centred solely upon the mother’s “experience and perception” of the conduct (Ground 2, 3, 4 & 5 - successful)
•
The primary judge erred when making findings about the father’s influence of the children’s expressed views (as were relevant to s 60CC(3)(a)) on account of there being no evidence to support the finding (Ground 6 – successful)
•
There was a denial of procedural fairness arising out of the dismissal of the father’s application to re-open the evidence whilst judgment was still reserved (Ground 7 – successful)
•
Two orders (Orders 10(i) and 10(j)) were not sought by either party or the Independent Children’s and were made without warning to them, thereby depriving them of the chance to be heard in respect of the orders (denial of procedural fairness). Without reciting them, the orders reciprocally provide for the children to spend time with each party on the parties’ respective birthdays (Ground 8 - rejected)
Facts:
The parties were married in 2014, and their two children were born in 2015 and 2017. The parties separated in late 2018, and the mother and children remained in occupation of the former family home (at [246]). Proceedings were commenced by the mother in 2019. Numerous sets of interim parenting orders were made in July 2019, May 2020, August 2020, December 2020, and June 2021. The last of those orders in June 2021 were made with the parties’ consent and required the children to spend substantial time with the father, comprising four nights per fortnight in school terms and parts of the school holidays. No further interim parenting orders were made before the trial started in February 2023.
The trial concluded in February 2024, though written submissions were then filed in July 2024. Judgment was delivered in late July 2024. The parenting orders (Orders 1–33) conferred sole parental responsibility for the children upon the mother, declared the children will live with her, and made provision for the children to spend substantial time with the father, comprising four consecutive nights per fortnight in school terms, one-half of all school holidays and other special occasions. The level of ‘parental conflict’ militated against the father’s proposal for the children to live with the parties for equal time (at [194]–[196]) or, for that matter, even any increase in the amount of time they spend with him (at [197]). However, the children’s meaningful relationships with the father (at [114] and [116]) meant they must still spend a substantial amount of time with him.
Held: The Full Court allowed the appeal against the final parenting orders and remitted the matter for retrial
•
Majority judgment: Aldridge, Carew JJ and Mccelland DCJ
•
Dissenting judgment: Austin and Williams JJ
Reasons:
Ground 1: The Majority found that intention, whilst potentially a decisive factor, is not an essential element of a finding that behaviour was “coercive or controlling” [2]. The majority held that the definition of “family violence” in s 4AB is both remedial and protective and should not be artificially read down by artificial limitations ([43]; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority). According to Aldridge and Carew JJ at [50]-[51] “The definition of family violence is necessarily broad and any interpretation that may be perceived to, or actually, create unnecessary hurdles to an alleged victim proving an allegation of family violence should be avoided… the statutory focus is simply on behaviour that coerces or controls and not the intention of the perpetrator.”
Grounds 2, 3, 4 & 5: These grounds focus on the appellant’s contention that “the primary judge erred in finding that the appellant had engaged in coercive and controlling conduct” and, in particular, the primary judge erred in finding that the following conduct amounted to coercive and controlling conduct:
2.1. The appellant opposing the respondent’s request for partial property settlement
2.2. adhering to Orders in relation to the payment of school fees, and in acting in a manner agreed to by the respondent
2.3. the appellant’s application for an injunction in relation to [the respondent’s friend]
2.4. the appellant had unreasonably maintained an application for equal time and maintained proceedings simpliciter
2.5 the position adopted by the appellant in relation to certain proposed medical treatment for [the elder child]; and
2.6 the position adopted by the appellant in relation to mental health concerns related to the respondent
There was no challenge that the appellant engaged in coercive or controlling behaviour in respect to surveilling the respondent and the family home from late 2019, using a company called U Company (at [78]). However, the appeal highlighted problems with other findings. These concerned the broader allegations of coercive or controlling conduct, where the primary judge seemed to rely heavily on the mother’s "experience and perception" of the appellant's actions. The appeal court agreed that while the mother's perspective is relevant, a more detailed and contextual analysis of whether the appellant's behaviour could be regarded as coercive or controlling was necessary. It emphasised that coercive and controlling behaviour requires a thorough evaluation of the conduct, its form, intensity, context, and its impact on the person, rather than relying solely on one party’s perception.
Ground 6 This ground argues that the primary judge wrongly found the father had influenced the children’s views about spending more time with him, as there was no evidence to support this. The expert only met the children once when they were aged two and four and too young to express meaningful views (at [133]). The trial had no updated evidence on their views as the mother resiled on the agreement for an updated report. The judge critically noted ‘…that the father has subtly but persistently sought to create opportunities from which [the elder child’s] views could be inferred’ [135]. The appeal court found that the judge’s impression was not based on any evidentiary foundation and could be considered speculative. The ground of appeal was successful.
Ground 7 “Ground 7 is a complaint of the father’s denial of procedural fairness arising out of the dismissal of his application to re-open the evidence whilst judgment was still reserved. The complaint is well founded” [72].
Ground 8 Ground was unsuccessful and considered “trifling and unworthy of appellate attention” [71]. According to Aldridge and Carew JJ at [71], “Judges are obliged to make orders under Pt VII of the Act which promote children’s best interests, not to simply choose between the alternate suites of orders proposed by the parties (U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 at 263 and 284–285).” Whilst procedural fairness must be observed by giving parties a chance to respond to unheralded orders that could not be reasonably anticipated, these orders do not fall within this category.
Carter and Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9 (10 February 2023) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)
‘Appeal from order for equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Context of coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Controlling conduct’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Father perpetrator’ – ‘Findings of family violence’ – ‘Genuine concerns for child's welfare’ – ‘Limitation of contact’
Matter: Mother’s appeal from order for equal shared parental responsibility.
Facts: A final parenting order made 8 April 2022 provided that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for their child, X, born in 2016. The order was made subsequent to a consent order which provided for a graduated increase in the father’s contact with the child to the point he spends alternate weekends and one night in the alternate week with the father. The father had been physically violent towards the mother on one occasion and the father accepted that he had held his hand over his older daughter, Y’s mouth to prevent her screaming. No criminal charges were laid re Y’s allegations but she was named as the protected person in a protection order issued against the father and had not had contact with him since September 2017. The primary judge held that the father’s admission of violence against the mother was relevant to the determination that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply to the matter. The primary judge held that the mother’s conduct in limiting the time the child spent with the father and her insistence upon supervision amounted to controlling conduct for the purpose of the definition of family violence in s4AB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Held: Appeal dismissed, costs certificates issue in favour of the mother, the father and the independent children’s lawyer.
The primary judge’s error in finding that the mother’s behaviour amounted to controlling conduct did not impact the result of the case, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.
McClelland DCJ and Campton JJ) observed that ‘controversially… the primary judge also found that the mother’s conduct in limiting the amount of time the child spent with the father and her insistence upon such time being supervised amounted to controlling conduct for the purpose of the definition of family violence as set out in s 4AB of the Act’ [6], noting:
[16] In the context of the facts and circumstances of this case, we respectfully agree with Bennett J that the conduct of the mother in limiting the amount of time that the child spent with the father could not reasonably be determined to be coercive or controlling conduct for the purposes of s 4AB(1). In that respect, there was no finding that the mother’s concerns for the welfare of the child were other than genuine in the context where she had herself been the subject of one violent assault by the father and had witnessed the father’s admittedly unacceptable conduct towards Y. There was no finding that the mother acted capriciously or maliciously. Indeed, as noted by Bennett J, the mother was acting in accordance with orders of the Court after 30 January 2019.
[17] The mere fact that the mother’s conduct in limiting the child’s time with the father could fall within the example provided in s 4AB(2)(i) does not, in and of itself with nothing more, condemn the conduct as being family violence as defined in s 4AB(1). Context is all important. There was no finding that the mother was acting other than protectively towards the child. Such conduct, in the context of the Act, which has a strong focus on the promotion of the welfare of children and protecting them from being exposed to violence, cannot, in our respectful opinion, in the circumstances of this appeal, reasonably ground a finding of family violence as defined in s 4AB of the Act.
Bennett J observed:
[71] Section 4AB of the Act is drafted in very wide terms in order to catch behaviour which is thought to be undesirable. In so doing, the section also catches behaviour which is both acceptable and necessary (for example, exerting control over a child in the exercise of the parenting powers). Therefore, in practical terms and save for blatant acts of family violence, an evaluation of evidence to ascertain the context in which alleged behaviour took place may be a precondition to the Court characterising behaviour as family violence within the meaning of s 4AB. Contextualising the behaviour calls for findings of fact.
[85] In placing the mother’s behaviour in context, I assume that the relevant period during which the primary judge found that the mother’s behaviour constituted family violence was from the child’s birth until the first parenting order, that is, from 2016 to 30 January 2019. However, there is no analysis of evidence or reasoning by the primary judge as to why the mother’s behaviour around the child spending time with the father “initially” (or otherwise) is evaluated as behaviour that controlled the child in the sense contemplated by s 4AB(1) as family violence.
[87] Whilst it is uncontroversial that the mother did not allow unsupervised time between the father and the child when she and the father were living separately and apart prior to orders being made, the primary judge does not identify the extent to which the father’s limited participation in the first three years of the child’s life is attributable to the mother’s behaviour, or why the control exercised by the mother was not consistent with steps taken by a parent who is acting protectively.
[88] The primary judge refers to the mother’s behaviour as controlling of the child, the father and of the child’s relationship with the father. However, his Honour’s reasons do not include an analysis of the evidence or findings about the respects in which he was satisfied that the mother’s behaviour exceeded legitimate parental control and should be characterised as family violence.
Isles v Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97 (1 July 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1)
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Child exploitation material’ – ‘Child protection’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Family law parenting’ – ‘Risk of sexual abuse of child by father’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Sexual interest in children and adolescents’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Use of tendency evidence’
Matter: Appeal against family law parenting decision.
Facts:
The appellant father and first respondent mother had four children. When he was nearly 7, their eldest son alleged that his father had sexually assaulted him. As a result, the mother sought to prevent the father from having access to all four children. The father argued that the mother had encouraged the son to make false allegations against him. The mother agreed to consent orders allowing the father to have unsupervised access to the children knowing that the second respondent, the Department of Communities, would intervene to prevent this [66]. The independent children’s lawyer was also party to the proceedings.
At trial, the central issue was whether the father posed an unacceptable risk of harm to the children [69]. The primary judge found that, although it was not possible to find on the balance of probabilities that the father had perpetrated the abuse, he posed an unacceptable risk to the children and contact should be supervised [75].
Grounds:
(1) In relation to the standard of proof, the primary judge misapplied s140 of the Evidence Act (balance of probabilities in civil cases) and should have made a finding about unacceptable risk on this basis.
(2) In relation to tendency evidence, the primary judge considered tendency evidence that should not have been admitted under Part 3.6 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), regardless of the father’s failure to object [98].
Held: Appeal dismissed.
The court noted the comprehensive and prescriptive requirement to consider “unacceptable risk” when making parenting orders:
[58] …s 60CG of the [Family Law] Act [1975] exhorts courts to avoid making orders which expose any person to an “unacceptable risk of family violence” and, when determining how children’s best interest will be advanced, s 60CC(2)(b) of the Act obliges courts to heed any need to protect children from physical or psychological harm through their subjection or exposure to “abuse”, “neglect” or “family violence”, for which purpose the terms “abuse” and “family violence” are very widely defined in ss4(1) and 4 AB of the Act respectively.
(1) On the standard of proof, the primary judge was correct in separating the need to make a finding on the balance of probabilities in relation to fact (ie did the father sexually assault his son?) and the question of future risk (ie is the father an unacceptable risk to the children?) [83]. While the question of future risk is ‘evidence-based’ and ‘not discretionary’ [85], the court held that even if the risk were only possible, not probable, it would be unacceptable [86].
(2) On tendency evidence, under Part VII of Family Law Act (children), large tranches of the Evidence Act do not normally apply [88]. However, given that the mother and Department sought a finding that the father had committed the criminal offence of sexual assault, the primary judge decided under s69ZT(3) before proceedings had commenced that the Evidence Act would apply [91]-[93]. The relevant tendency evidence was the father’s apparent sexual interest in other adolescents and his alleged interest in child exploitation material [103]. Although the father could have objected to the admission of this evidence at trial, he did not and so could not object on appeal [95, 97]. Despite the admission of this evidence, the primary judge was unable to find that the father had committed the sexual assault, so the appeal court held that the father had suffered no prejudice [103].
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) Family Law
Campi and Ferrin [2022] FedCFamC2F 1621 (24 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Application in a proceeding’ – ‘Best interests of the children’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Family report’ – ‘Interim hearing’ – ‘Parental alienation’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Reportable intensive family therapy’ – ‘Significant risk of psychological harm’
Matter: Mother’s application in a proceeding, seeking orders for reportable intensive family therapy to be conducted by Dr B. to address alleged parental alienation of the mother by the father.
Facts: The children resided with the father and there was evidence the children’s relationship with the mother was fractured and the children had been resistant to contact with the mother since March 2022 when they last had supervised contact with the mother at a contact centre. It appeared the children had refused to participate in contact pursuant to a consent order made September 2022 that the younger child have unsupervised contact with the mother from after school until 7 pm each Friday afternoon which the older child could join if he desired. The court was unable to consider the mother’s allegation that the father had alienated the children from her in the interim hearing.
Newbrun J considered proposals for children to attend intensive family therapy in the context of mother’s allegations of parental alienation by father:
[9] The Court has a real concern that the children may be exposed to a significant risk of psychological harm if they participate in the intensive therapy Reportable Intensive Family Therapy (“RIFT”) model proposed by the Mother to be afforded by the psychologist Dr B. And further, the Court has a real concern that should the children be required to participate in the proposed intensive therapy RIFT model that they may well become even more resistant to spending time with the Mother; if this risk comes to pass, then the prospect of restoring the children’s relationship with the Mother may become even more difficult.
[38] As to the Mother’s proposed order that Dr B be permitted to conduct intensive four day family therapy RIFT model [Reportable Intensive Family Therapy], and provide an expert report in relation to the issue of parental alienation, the Court is of the view that such an order would not be in the best interests of the children, and nor would such an order be in the interests of justice, and in reaching these views, and in summary, takes into account the following matters having regard to rule 7.04 and section 13C(1)(c) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth):
(a)
The Court’s concern that the children may be exposed to psychological harm if subjected to the proposed intensive four-day family therapy RIFT model;
(b)
The lack of material before the Court relating to risk screening of the children prior to participating in the proposed intensive family therapy;
(c)
The lack of material before the Court relating to the nature of the proposed intensive family therapy;
(d)
The lack of any independent evaluation of the proposed intensive family therapy;
(e)
The content of the Family Report does not suggest that expert evidence from a clinical psychologist such as Dr B and/or further family therapy is required to elucidate the issue of parental alienation;
(f)
The Family Report writer, appointed under section 62G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to provide a Family Report, is well able to provide appropriate evidence and opinions in relation to the issue of parental alienation (the Family Report writer, refers to and/or discusses the issue of parental alienation in paragraphs 76, 100, 102, 104, 108, 111, 112, 113 albeit she does indicate that the Court needs to conduct a further assessment of this issue). The Court is of the view that it is not necessary in this case for it to have a range of opinion on the issue of parental alienation;
(g)
The content of the Family Report does not refer to and/or support Dr B’s proposed intensive four day family therapy RIFT model.
Wylder v Wylder [2022] FedCFamC2F 1366 (9 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Best interests of child’ – ‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Covert recording’ – ‘Manipulation’ – ‘No contact order’ – ‘Parenting’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Selective misrepresentation’ – ‘Social media’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Weapons’
Case type: Appeal against parenting order.
Facts: The father was an Australian resident who met and married the mother in Country B. They moved to Australia where their daughter was born in 2017. The father made repeated notifications to the Department of Child Safety alleging that the mother used corporal punishment to discipline the child contrary to Australian standards [44], [68]. From videos posted on social media by the father, it was evident that the father did not listen to the child and coached her to make allegations of violence against the mother [56], [111]. The mother did not speak English well and she yielded to the father’s demands to agree to his unsupervised contact with the child in consent orders [26]-[30].
In previous proceedings the Court ordered the father be assessed for drug and alcohol use but he refused to participate [19]. In a search of the premises executing a recovery order for return of the child, police found weapons at the father’s house and charged him with offences under the Weapons Act [36]. In 2015, the father was self-medicating with anti-anxiety drugs when he admitted himself as an inpatient in a mental health unit. He said he had daily intrusive thoughts about killing the mother [124]. He discussed with other inpatients a plan to stalk his treating psychiatrist with intent to harm him and his family [129]. The father’s mother (ie the child’s paternal grandmother) applied for a domestic violence order against the father in 2019 [143]. The Court considered that there was ‘ample evidence’ that the father had engaged in family violence towards the mother [149].
Issue: The best interests of the child.
Held: The Court ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child, that the child live with the mother and that the mother be permitted to relocate with the child. The Court ordered that the father should have no time and no communication with the child.
The mother did not pose a risk to the child [116]. After an intervention by police and a social worker, the mother changed her approach and reduced her reliance on physical discipline [67]. The child was happy living with the mother [290].
The father was assessed by a forensic psychiatrist as being a high risk of suicide and murder-suicide, including kidnapping and absconding with the child, and an even higher risk to others generally [234]. He was also assessed as having a narcissistic personality and an anti-social personality disorder [219]. His postings on social media and abusive threats against his wife were in breach of a court order and he demonstrated contempt towards the Family Court and legal processes [305].
Although the father claimed to be the victim of physical violence from the mother, what concerned Judge Vasta was the father’s coercive control of the mother:
1.
However, it is not the spectre of physical violence that concerns this Court; rather, it is the spectre of coercive control. Whilst it had been documented that the parents had separated on occasions, the mother said that the father spoke to her in such a way that she felt compelled to return to the relationship. The father denies any such conduct.
2.
What has been of concern is the documented history of the litigation. It is incongruous that the mother would make the complaints that she made during the previous filing in this Court (BRC 11666/2019); have a Court make an order that mandated supervised visits between the father and the child; and, then choose to ignore that and, instead, come to a compromise solution with the father that gave him unsupervised equal time with the child.
3.
There seems to be no other rational explanation for this other than the father implementing coercive control over the mother to the extent that she felt that she had no other choice but to comply with the father’s demands. The judicious use of covertly recorded conversations with one parent by the other parent and then referring to selective excerpts is a feature that is often found in cases of coercive control.
4.
In this case, the father did give to the Court such selective recordings. The father pointed to one particular recording where the mother made an “admission” that the father was the favoured parent by the child. In another recording, the mother “admitted” that the father treated her like a queen. In another recording, the mother is said to convey that she arranged custody arrangements for her financial benefit. In a further recording, the mother has “conceded” that she was “not going back to court again”. And in a final recording, the mother “admitted” that the father would never hurt his daughter.
5.
These recordings were used by the father to intimidate the mother into not pursuing any parenting matter because these recordings would be used against her, as if they were repudiations of her stance. Of course, they have little evidentiary value as they are excerpts from a larger conversation upon which the Court has no information, and therefore, no context.
6.
The behaviour in making constant notifications to the Department of Child Safety can also be seen as a manifestation of the coercive control. Further, posting the videos to social media can also be seen as a manifestation of coercive control. One such video records a “Tik Tok” dance that the mother had uploaded to social media. The father recorded himself watching the video where the father made derogatory comments suggesting that the manner of solo dancing in the video was not befitting that of a woman who had a boyfriend, let alone a woman who was a mother.
7.
….
8.
The father will attempt to draw the child into his world; a world where the mother is evil and cannot be trusted and a world where institutions such as the police and the Courts are malevolent and must be resisted. This was perfectly illustrated by the manner in which the father dealt with the child when making the videos. He ignored what the child was saying and imposed his own version of the facts and would not brook any variation to that. The child will never be truly free under the care of the father and she will not have the opportunity to grow and experience life because she will be made to conform to his world view.
9.
And this is just part of the danger that the father represents. The evidence that the father planned to do harm to his treating psychiatrist because that psychiatrist would not support his application for a pension is concerning enough. But when this is added to the father’s manipulation of the mother to avoid having to endure supervised visits with the child, the reaction of the father to police attempting to serve him with the police protection order, the obsessive determination with which he wished to expose a “rapist” at the school, his Facebook comments to a Member of Parliament as to his capacity for violence and the nonchalance with which he violated a Court order and injunction about posting on social media, the jeopardy at which he places X cannot be overstated.
10.
There are absolutely no safeguards that the Court could put in place that would allow the father to have any form of contact with X and yet keep the child safe.
11.
It is never an easy task for a Court to make orders that prohibit contact between a parent and child, however there are those rare cases where such an order is the only order that can be made in the best interests of the child. This is one of those cases.
Ramzi & Moussa [2022] FedCFamC2F 1473 (4 November 2022) – Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)
‘Application that child spend no time with a parent’ – ‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Cultural and spiritual abuse’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Economic and financial abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic violence’ – ‘Fear’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Impact on mother's parenting capacity’ – ‘Injunctive orders’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Mitigation of risk’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘No time ordered’ – ‘Parenting arrangements’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Poor literacy skills’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Sole parental responsibility’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: The proceedings were for the determination of parenting arrangements for a five-year old child (X) of the two parties.
Issue: The parties agreed that the child should live with the mother. However, at issue was:
1.
Whether the mother should be ordered to return to Melbourne with the child;
2.
How parental responsibility for the child should be exercised;
3.
Whether the father poses a risk of harm to the child;
4.
If the child is to spend time with the father in Melbourne, how much time should be allowed and should it be supervised
The alleged risks posed by the father were that:
1.
X had been exposed to and would be exposed to family violence;
2.
He had engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;
3.
Orders allowing contact may pose a risk to the mother’s caring capacity.
Facts: The mother left her home country at a young age for another foreign country for an arranged marriage with the father and the couple later moved to Australia. The mother had only a basic level of education and spoke very limited English.
The parties separated after living together in Melbourne for two years. The mother applied for a protection order and the child (X) lived with her. Pursuant to an interim parenting order, X spent a few hours of supervised contact with his father each week. Subsequently, unsupervised contact was ordered with changeover at a supervised contact centre. The mother was late to changeover on several occasions and eventually stopped bringing X altogether before moving with the child to Sydney.
The mother made extensive allegations of family violence against the father which occurred over the course of their marriage and afterwards. These included coercive and controlling behaviour, physical abuse such as choking and beatings, sexual assault, threats and humiliation (both from the father and family/community members), monitoring her movements, denying her economic autonomy and depriving her of liberty.
The alleged risks posed by the father were that:
1.
X had been exposed to and would be exposed to family violence;
2.
He had engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour;
3.
Orders allowing contact may pose a risk to the mother’s caring capacity.
Reasoning: Beckhouse J accepted the mother’s account, finding that:
•
family violence was established (Family Law Act 1974 (Cth) s4AB(1)); and
•
the risk of X being subject or exposed to violence outweighed the benefit of having a meaningful relationship with his father (s60CC).
Beckhouse J stated that it was not necessary to make factual findings about the occurrence of each alleged individual incident ([202], s4AB(1)). The lack of eye-witnesses, inconsistencies and delayed reporting were not an impediment, particularly given the cultural barriers to disclosure. The mother’s evidence was detailed and specific, corroborated by external agencies and was understood in the context of the cyclical nature of family violence and her cultural and personal background. The father’s ‘blanket denials’ offered no plausible explanation or alternatives.
Beckhouse J found that this risk could not be ameliorated. The father had displayed a lack of responsibility for his conduct and demonstrated no desire to change. His extensive familial and community support network was viewed as a ‘double-edged sword,’ as the paternal family potentially helped conceal his conduct and he failed to understand how ongoing communication with the maternal family impacted the mother.
It was determined that contact orders would cause the mother stress and anxiety, to the detriment of her parenting ability. Given this and the risk that X would be leveraged as a weapon, both supervised time and video communication were deemed unviable.
Orders: The child reside with the mother and she have sole parental responsibility. The child have no contact or communication with the father, the child be removed from the international travel watchlist and the mother be permitted to obtain a passport for the child and travel overseas without the father’s consent.
Additionally, the father was permitted to send X a birthday message every year.
Backhouse J noted at [243] that in establishing whether a person is ‘fearful’ under s4AB(1): “fear can arise from a culmination of events and patterns of behaviour”.
Backhouse J observed at [202]:
…There are some specific individual characteristics in this matter that lead me to place less weight on inconsistent versions of events given by the mother. English was not the mother’s first language. She was poorly educated. She spoke through an interpreter. I cannot be satisfied she would have understood how domestic and family violence is defined in Australia.
Federal Magistrates' Court of Australia
Heilig & Cabiness [2011] FMCAfam 97 (2 March 2011) – Federal Magistrates’ Court of Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Parental responsibility’ – ‘People affected by drug misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Separation’
Issue: Contact.
Facts: Orders for the children to reside with the mother and have alternate weekend contact with the father had been made following trial in 2003. The father has multiple criminal convictions for violent family violence offending against numerous former partners which predated the first trial for which he was convicted after the 2003 trial. The father commenced the current proceedings by filing a contravention application, which related to his lack of contact in accordance with the 2003 orders for a seven-year period (a portion of which time he was in custody serving a term of imprisonment for violent offending against the mother and two other former partners). Interim orders suspended all previous contact orders. The father sought orders for contact and to receive updates on the children’s educational progress.
The father had a long history of illicit drug consumption, controlling abusive behaviours to domestic partners, had mental health issues and conceded that, at the time of the hearing, had no meaningful relationship with the children. It was also conceded that the children were present in the same building in which quite serious family violence occurred up until 2004, though it was not conceded that the family violence was necessarily perpetrated against the mother.
Decision and Reasoning: It was ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, the children reside with the mother and have no contact with the father.
At [30], the Court favourably refers to research quoted in the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal on the Crown manifest inadequacy appeal in relation to the father’s sentencing, cited as R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) at [77]:
An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control: J Stubbs, “Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence and Family Violence”, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House, Issues Paper 9, 2004, pages 6-7.
It was concluded, on the basis of the father’s criminal history, the children’s fear of and lack of relationship with their father that no order for contact or communication should be made. The children were found to be at risk of psychological or physical harm if their relationship with the father was to resume.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
1807390 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 4216 (5 October 2022) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Ability to leave abusive relationship’ – ‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Cultural and spiritual abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Forced marriage’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of decision to refuse protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Facts: The female applicant and her husband were in an arranged marriage in Sri Lanka. Over the course of the marriage her husband was physically violent – including striking and choking her,– he humiliated her, verbally abused her with sexual language, tormented her about her religion and forced her to do sexual acts. He prevented her from contacting her family over a17 year period. The husband was emotionally and psychologically abusive towards their daughter and on one occasion threw their 8-year-old son against the wall when the applicant disobeyed him. Given her husband’s respected status as a doctor and the lack of responsiveness of the Sri Lankan police to domestic violence reports, the applicant never reported the conduct.
She fled to Australia in 2012 on the pretence of visiting her son and daughter who had moved here to study, ceased contact with her husband and subsequently applied for a Protection Visa.
Issue: Did the applicant have a well-founded fear of persecution from her husband upon returning to Sri Lanka such that she was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations as a refugee pursuant to s36(2)(a) Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
Decision and reasoning: The tribunal accepted the applicant’s evidence that she was subjected to domestic and family violence from her husband in Sri Lanka and she had a well-founded fear of persecution. The tribunal acknowledged that some confusion and possible exaggeration from the applicant in giving evidence “may be attributable to the impact of past trauma and her psychological disorder, as referenced by her treating psychiatrists”, citing the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book on trauma-informed judicial practice[28]. The tribunal accepted that the experience of domestic violence victimisation may negatively impact memory and recount in court. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant and her daughter’s evidence described constant controlling and threatening behaviour by the applicant’s husband, referring to the description of coercive control in the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book.
The Tribunal found that while the applicant had not had contact with her husband for ten years, his past behaviour, her defiance of him and his proximity to the applicant’s family home in Sri Lanka posed a real risk that he would try to harm her [36]. The intentional and selective nature of the harm involved systematic and discriminatory conduct [37], s5J(4)(c) and was characterised as gender-based violence, meaning that her fear of persecution related to membership of the social group of women in Sri Lanka [38], s5J(1)(a). DFAT country information evidenced the unchecked occurrence of such violence in Sri Lanka and lack of effective protection available [40]-[42]. Cultural factors also substantiated the applicant’s claim that internal relocation would not mitigate the risk of harm, as the presence of a single woman would attract attention and likely enable her to be found [43].
X (a pseudonym) (Migration) [2022] AATA 1149 (21 March 2022) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Cancellation of visa’ – ‘Deportation’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Immigration’ – ‘People affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Risk to domestic partners’ – ‘Risk to health, safety and good order of community’ – ‘S.116 of the migration act 1958 (the act)’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: Application for review of the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to cancel Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Facts: The applicant, Mr X, came to Australia at the age of 7 and was 47 years old at the date of decision. He had an extensive criminal history commencing in 1996 including multiple series of domestic violence offending, the first commencing December 2001, the second commencing November 2007 and the third in 2009. There was also a series of domestic violence offences in 2016 and 2018. Mr X’s explanations did not fully correlate to the convictions and tended to minimize his offending. His former partner’s children were removed from her care following the offending and returned to her care after Mr X’s visa was revoked and he was taken into immigration detention. He has a history of breaches of community corrections orders, bipolar disorder and drug and alcohol misuse (addressed while in prison). He is the father of 4 children, 3 of whom are adults, the youngest 17 years old, and has contact with and good relationships with 3 of his children. He has no family or support in New Zealand. The delegate relied on his ongoing risk of offending to women with whom he may be in a domestic relationship pursuant to s116(1)(e) of the Act.
Issues:
1.
Whether the ground for cancellation in s116(1)(e) of the Act - Mr X is or may be, or would or might be, a risk to:
◦
the health, safety or good order of the Australian community or a segment of the Australian community; or
◦
the health or safety of an individual or individuals;
is made out, and if so,
1.
whether the visa should be cancelled.
Decision and Reasoning: Decision to cancel the applicant’s Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa affirmed.
The Tribunal held that Mr X may be a risk to individuals in the community and in particular previous and future domestic partners and a risk to children in the household (shown by the removal of his former partner’s children). The factors which favour Mr X remaining in Australia do not outweigh the risk he poses to a segment of the community.
The Tribunal considered the distress and hardship Mr X would experience if returned to New Zealand, the likely impact on his children and mental health, his strong ties to the Australian community, his continued minimization of his offending, longstanding issues of aggression towards domestic partners and repeated non-compliance with court orders. The Tribunal also considered the fact that if the decision to cancel his visa is affirmed, he will be removed from Australia and be unlikely to be able to return. Consideration was also given to the fact that since his visa was cancelled he was sentenced to a further period of imprisonment, meaning he has a substantial criminal record as defined in s 501(7) of the Act; thus, if the visa cancellation is revoked his visa is likely be cancelled again.
A (a pseudonym) and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2021] AATA 5499 (7 September 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Child support’ – ‘Child support agency’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Counselling records’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Non-compliance with parenting orders’ – ‘Percentage of care’ – ‘Risk to children’ – ‘Section 51, child support (assessment) act 1989’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: The mother’s application for review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal) of a decision to dismiss her objection to the determination of Services Australia – Child Support (the Agency) that the care percentages of 80% to the mother and 20% to the father of the two younger children should be reflected in the child support assessment for an interim period.
Facts: The mother and father are parents of three children in respect of whom there has been a child support assessment in place since 8 January 2020, which reflected that the mother had 100% care of all three children In March 2021 the father advised the Agency that since September 2020 there had been court orders in place granting him 14 per cent care of the children and that the mother had withheld care since November 2020. On 7 December 2020 the father filed an application for interim orders seeking 100% care of the children and to enforce the existing orders and commenced contravention proceedings on 11 February 2021. The Agency made an interim care decision that from the November 2020 to September 2021 the care record must reflect that the father had a care percentage of 20% care on the basis the mother withheld care and the father was taking reasonable action to have the court-ordered care arrangement complied with. The mother’s evidence was that the children ran away from the father when he attended their school to collect them, that they are fearful of him due to his history of violence towards the mother during the relationship, and that they have not had contact with the father for three years. The mother consented to disclosure of confidential notes from counselling sessions with her psychotherapist (including some sessions with the children in which they expressed their fear of the father) spanning a 10 year period from the time of separation.
Issues:
1.
Whether the father (for the purpose of section 51, Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act) was taking reasonable action to ensure the court orders were complied with; and
2.
whether there were special circumstances such that an interim care determination should not be made.
Decision and Reasoning: The decision under review was set aside, and in substitution the tribunal decided that from 7 November 2020 the mother has had 100 per cent care of the children for the purpose of s51 of the Act.
The tribunal was satisfied that the father took reasonable action to ensure the court-ordered care arrangements were complied with for the purposes of section 51 of the Act. In respect of the father, as required by subsections 51(2), (3) and (4) of the Act, the first care percentage is 14% while the second percentage is 0%.
In the special circumstances of this case as they relate to the children of the assessment, the father should not have the benefit of an interim period. On balance, the tribunal was satisfied that the father’s own behaviour had significantly contributed to the care arrangements not being complied with. The tribunal placed significant weight on contemporaneous counselling records which reflected that the children had disclosed that they were exposed to family violence perpetrated by the father and were subsequently fearful of the father.
B and C (pseudonyms) (Child support) [2021] AATA 5500 (3 September 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Child support’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘Non-compliance with parenting orders’ – ‘Percentage of care’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk to child’ – ‘Section 51, child support (assessment) act 1989’ – ‘Suicide threat by child’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia.
Proceedings: The father’s application for review by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the tribunal) of the decision to dismiss his objection to the determination of Services Australia – Child Support (the Agency) pursuant to s51 Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that the mother’s actual 100 per cent care of the child should be reflected in the child support assessment and no interim care determination should be made.
Facts: The mother and father are parents of one child (aged 12) in respect of whom there has been a child support assessment in place since 30 September 2009. Parenting orders dated June 2020 provide that the child will spend 5 nights per fortnight and half of each school holidays in the care of the father. The pre-existing care determination was 33% care to the father and 67% care to the mother, which accorded with the care provided for in the parenting orders. On 18 December 2020 the mother advised the Agency that the child was in her 100% care due to a medical crisis, namely that the child had threatened suicide if returned to the father’s care. The child’s psychiatrist directed the child should reside with the mother and not be required to reside with the father. Medical records confirming this advice were adduced at the hearing. The father disagreed with the care change due to the court orders. The father did not respond to a disputed care contact letter issued by the Agency and on 16 February 2021 a delegate of the Agency decided that care of the child was 100% to the mother and 0% to the father from 2 November 2020. The father provided the court orders and reason for decision which make mention of the child’s mental health and the mother provided a provisional protection order made on 8 March 2021 for the protection of the child (which was later withdrawn). On 24 March 2021 an objections officer disallowed the father’s objection and the father sought review by the tribunal.
Issues:
1.
What were the care arrangements in relation to the care of the child in the relevant care period and should a new determination of a percentage of care for the child be made? If so, what is the percentage of care and from when should it apply?
2.
Should an interim care determination be made in relation to the care of the child, or were there were special circumstances such that an interim determination should not be made?
Decision and Reasoning: Decision affirmed.
From 20 November 2020 the child’s actual care was 100% to the mother and 0% to the father. The tribunal acknowledged that there was a court-ordered care arrangement in place that was not being adhered to, and that the father contended that he was taking reasonable action to have his court-ordered care restored. However, the tribunal found that special circumstances existed on the basis of the psychiatrist’s advice that the child remain wholly in the mother’s care due to his medical crisis, and that it was therefore appropriate to determine the respective care percentages based on actual care, rather than making an interim care determination by reference to the parenting orders.
Simpson v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2021] AATA 78 (1 February 2021) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Another reason to revoke mandatory cancellation decision’ – ‘Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of visa’ – ‘Character test’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Proceedings: Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of visa.
Facts: A delegate of the Minister (the respondent) mandatorily cancelled the applicant’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on the basis that he did not pass the character test and was serving a full-time custodial sentence. The applicant made written representations to the respondent requesting revocation of the cancellation of the visa. The respondent declined to revoke the cancellation.
Issues: Under s 501CA(4) of the Act, the original decision may be revoked if –
1.
The applicant passed the character test (subsection (b)(i)).
2.
There is another reason why the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be revoked (subsection (b)(ii)).
Decision and reasoning: Application for review of decision not to revoke cancellation of the applicant’s visa was dismissed.
Issues 1: The applicant had a “substantial criminal record”. He did not pass the character test defined in s 501(6) of the Act and could not rely on s 501CA(4)(b)(i) as a reason for the mandatory cancellation of the visa to be revoked.
Issue 2: The Tribunal was required to consider “Primary Considerations” under Direction 79 (as well as “Other Considerations”).
On Primary Consideration A “Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct”, the Tribunal member noted that under the Direction she was “not limited to considering proven offences” but “required to consider the nature and seriousness of the applicant’s ‘conduct to date’.” This included an incident where the applicant damaged his ex-partner’s new partner’s car, grabbed his ex-partner, and threatened her and her new partner with violence. This was “very serious conduct” (at [52]). The applicant had also committed 34 criminal offences and had a lengthy traffic history. There was a moderate risk he would commit further offences. Primary Consideration A weighed heavily against revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant’s visa ([49]-[84]).
D (a pseudonym) (Migration) [2020] AATA 3488 (30 June 2020) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for review’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘Evidence of de facto relationship’ – ‘Evidence of family violence’ – ‘Immigration’ – ‘No family violence’ – ‘Partner visa’ – ‘S.65 of the migration act 1958’
Note: Names have been anonymised at the request of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
Proceedings: Application for review of the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
Facts: The applicant, Ms. D claimed that her relationship with Mr P, the visa sponsor, had ceased and she had been the victim of family violence. She applied for Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). A delegate of the Minister refused to grant a visa to the applicant on the basis that she did not meet cl.820.211(2)(a) of the Migration Regulations (1994) because the evidence failed to demonstrate that the applicant was the de facto partner of the sponsor, as defined under section 5CB of the Act.
Issues: To grant a Partner (Temporary) visa (Class UK) visa, the Tribunal must be satisfied:
1.
The evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the applicant and the sponsor had been in a de facto relationship and that the relationship has ceased to exist.
2.
The evidence is sufficient to demonstrate family violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that there was a de facto relationship and it had ceased but found there was no family violence, so affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
After considering the financial and social aspects of the relationship, the nature of the household and the persons’ commitment to each other, the Tribunal member was satisfied that the applicant and sponsor had been in a de facto relationship, and the relationship had ceased [14].
Relying on statutory declarations provided by a social worker and a psychologist and a mental health plan written by a medical practitioner, the applicant made a non-judicially determined (see r1.24 and 1.25 Migration Regulations (1994)) claim of family violence.
After considering the evidence, the Tribunal member was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered relevant family violence. The Tribunal member found no evidence of physical violence and was not convinced that the psychological trauma experienced by the applicant met the test required by the legislation to sustain a claim of family violence [28]. The Tribunal sought the opinion of an independent expert.
The Independent expert report (the report) found that “the sponsor’s conduct did not cause [Ms. D] to reasonably fear for, or to be reasonably apprehensive about, her well-being or safety. … [Ms. D] said that she has maintained a friendship with the sponsor despite him reportedly continuing to verbally abuse her.”[33] The report found the applicant had not experienced family violence outlined in r1.21 Migration Regulations (1994).
The applicant challenged the report. The Tribunal member was concerned as to whether the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness [42] and a second hearing took place.
The Tribunal member considered the written responses of the applicant and her agent to the report, the responses of the independent expert to the matters raised by the applicant and her agent and discussed these issues with the applicant and her agent at the second hearing [62]. The Tribunal member found that the applicant had not suffered family violence committed by the sponsor.
Hamilton and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2020] AATA 1918 (26 June 2020) – Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘New start allowance’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Workers compensation’
Case type: Review
Facts: The female applicant sought review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Social Services and Child Support Division, which affirmed the decision of the Department of Human Services rejecting her new start allowance claim because she had a compensation lump sum preclusion period from 2 March 2010 to 21 April 2025. The applicant had received a workers compensation lump sum payment for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident. Her evidence was that she suffered severe financial hardship as her abusive male ex-partner had accessed and gambled her savings. She terminated the relationship and had to sell her home due to her financial difficulties, retaining about $400,000. The relationship resumed and he used her ATM card to take money from her bank account threatening to beat her if she did not provide access to her funds. The applicant finally terminated the relationship and said he had taken all the money which she had following the sale of her house which represented all that remained of the settlement sum she had received ([67]). The applicant was unable to obtain continuous employment and was experiencing severe financial hardship ([79]).
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist.
Held: The Tribunal set aside the decision and held that the applicant’s circumstances were "special" pursuant to s 1184K, such that much of her compensation payment should be treated as not having been made so as to reduce the preclusion period applicable to her compensation payment so that it ended on 21 May 2020 ([82]). The special circumstances in accordance with s 1184K(1) related to the totality of the applicant’s circumstances, including her financial hardship, her injuries, her financial deprivation following domestic violence and financial abuse ([79]).
The hearing was conducted via telephone in accordance with the provisions of the Tribunal’s COVID-19 Special Measures Practice Direction - Freedom of Information, General and Veterans’ Appeals Divisions ([29]).
Australian Information Commissioner
‘WZ’ and CEO of Services Australia (Privacy) [2021] AICmr 12 (13 April 2021) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Audit of policies, procedures and systems’ – ‘Complainant had notified of separation from partner’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Privacy’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Residential address disclosed to the complainant's former partner’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The female complainant was receiving Centrelink payments administered by Services Australia (the respondent) while living with her former male partner. She obtained an Apprehended Violence Order (which her partner was imprisoned for breaching). The complainant notified the respondent of her separation from the partner, but the respondent considered the separation unverified. Their online records continued to be linked meaning that if the complainant updated her address online, her partner’s address would also be updated. Her former partner posted a screenshot of the complainant’s new address to social media and made threats against her and her current partner.
Issues: Whether Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy as defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
Decision and reasoning: The Commissioner found that the respondent interfered with the complainant’s privacy by:
1.
Disclosing the complainant’s personal information, namely, her new address to her former partner, for a purpose other than that for which it was collected, in breach of Australian Privacy Principle (APP) 6.
2.
Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that it used accurate and up-to-date personal information of the complainant in the form of her relationship status having regard to the purposes of its use, being to update her former partner’s address, in breach of APP 10.2.
3.
Failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that it used accurate and up-to-date personal information of the complainant in the form of her address at which she could be contacted in breach of APP 10.2.
4.
Failing to take reasonable steps to protect the complainant’s personal information, being her updated address, from unauthorised disclosure to her former partner in breach of APP 11.1.
In addition to ordering compensation for non-economic loss (including re-activation of psychological symptoms and distress) and expenditure incurred in association with the privacy complaint, and ordering an apology, the Agency was required to undertake an audit of policies, procedures, and systems to ensure the privacy breach was not repeated or continued. The Commissioner noted at [156]-[160]:
The effect of this privacy breach on the complainant has been significant. This is in large part due to the fact that she feared harm from the former partner… While the changes the respondent has made are encouraging, I remain concerned that individuals are at risk of their personal information being disclosed to former partners.
[…]
It is appropriate for the respondent to put in place more robust measures where the consequences for individuals are more significant. It is therefore appropriate to have special measures in place to protect individuals identified as being at risk of domestic violence. However, I remain concerned about the risks to individuals seeking to update their own address and not that of their former partner, where the respondent is not satisfied that the individual has in fact separated from their partner, regardless of whether they have a history of family or domestic violence. The ‘reasonable steps test’ is one that takes into account all relevant circumstances, including what is practical and what is required where the adverse consequences to particular individuals are significant.
I therefore see no reason to limit the audit to a particular cohort of individuals, including those at risk of family domestic violence. It is appropriate in order to address the grievance to target the situation where an individual makes unverified claims to have separated from, or to be no longer living with, their partner, and seeks to update their address, whether online or in person.”
‘ST’ and Chief Executive Officer of Services Australia (Privacy) [2020] AICmr 30 (30 June 2020) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Damages for non-economic loss’ – ‘Disclosure for tribunal proceedings’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Information privacy principles’ – ‘Privacy’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The female complainant’s complaint concerned the disclosure of her personal information, collected by the former Child Support Agency for a Tribunal hearing, to the complainant’s ex-partner. She claimed that the personal information revealed the places she visited which she had attempted to keep hidden from the ex-partner as she feared harm.
Issues: Whether Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy as defined in the Privacy Act.
Decision and reasoning: Services Australia interfered with the complainant’s privacy, breaching the Information Privacy Principles (IPP), by disclosing the complainant’s personal information in breach of IPP 11. The locational information disclosed was not relevant to the decision under review by the Tribunal and the complainant was therefore not likely aware that information of its kind would be disclosed.
In terms of damages, the Commission accepted that the complainant had already disclosed some of the places she had frequented through other processes. The Commissioner noted at [75]-[76]:
“I do not consider that the previously disclosed information negates the complainant’s claim to have feared the ex-partner locating her. The complainant clearly went to some lengths to redact certain information from the documents she provided in the primary decision process and I accept her claim that she thought carefully about what information to disclose.”
“However, I am of the view that in all the circumstances, the degree by which the disclosure contributed to the complainant’s fear of being located by the ex-partner was not significant. I place weight on the fact that the complainant had disclosed some locations to the ex-partner during the COA process and that she continued to maintain a PO Box at the same post office as the ex-partner. I also note the absence of any evidence showing that the complainant sought the assistance of police. While I accept the complainant’s claims to have feared being located by the ex-partner, these claims are not so specific and detailed (nor are they supported by specific and detailed corroborating evidence) as to cause me to form the view that the disclosure exacerbated her fear of being located to a significant extent.”
The Commissioner was satisfied that the privacy breach had caused the complainant distress, but no other claimed damage. She was awarded $3,000 for non-economic loss.
‘PJ’ and Australian Federal Police (Freedom of Information) [2018] AICmr 64 (10 September 2018) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Confidentiality’ – ‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Public interest’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Whether disclosure of personal information unreasonable’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant applied to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for access to “any notes made on myself by the Australian Federal Police. Not criminal records, but any and all police files/notes made on me.” The AFP exempted access to 13 folios in part under s 47F (the personal privacy exemption) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). Some exempt material included names, dates of birth and contact details of third party individuals, and information pertaining to an alleged domestic violence incident.
Issues: Whether the material the AFP found to be exempt under s 47F was conditionally exempt. If so, whether giving the applicant access to conditionally exempt documents would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest (s 11A(5)).
Decision and reasoning: Access to personal information of third party individuals and about an alleged domestic violence incident involving the applicant was refused.
Taking into account the nature of the information, that the information was provided for a limited purpose and was not well-known or available from other public sources, the Commissioner accepted the AFP’s submission that disclosure could undermine a range of processes intended to protect individuals and could discourage those who may be affected by domestic violence from coming forward to police. The Commissioner was satisfied disclosure would be unreasonable and the relevant material was conditionally exempt under s 47F. It was also contrary to the public interest to give the applicant access to the conditionally exempt documents at this time.
‘DK’ and Telstra Corporation Limited [2014] AICmr 118 (30 October 2014) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Family law judge’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Non-economic loss’ – ‘Privacy’
Proceedings: Complaint under s 36(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act).
Facts: The complainant worked as a judge in the family law jurisdiction. He requested that Telstra connect a phone line to his home for the sole purpose of an alarm system installed by the Court. Telstra set up the phone line and published the complainant’s name, address and the phone number in both the White Pages online and in the hard copy directory.
Issues: Whether Telstra had breached the complainant’s privacy.
Decision and reasoning: Telstra interfered with the complainant's privacy by failing to take reasonable steps to provide notice to the complainant that it would use and disclose his personal information for the purpose of publishing it in the White Pages, in breach of National Privacy Principle (NPP) 1.3. Telstra was ordered to apologise, review its processes and review its Privacy Statement.
Telstra was also ordered to pay the complainant $18,000 for non-economic loss. In reaching this amount, the Commissioner noted the following evidence from the complainant:
“Since the publication of my details a litigant from a matter decided by me has begun to loiter at and about our home. As my details and those of my partner are suppressed on every public register I infer his knowledge of our address is the White Pages site…
“We have just moved to our home and our enjoyment of it has been rudely interrupted…We both jump whenever the street bell rings. I have applied to be transferred interstate. On moving we will incur moving costs, expenses re sale of our home and costs of resettling… We will both have expenses travelling to visit family and friends as our lives, to date, have been in [omitted]…
“The invasion of and prejudice to my privacy and personal safety can be readily envisioned as arising for others such as victims of crime, women fleeing domestic violence and the like.”
In awarding compensation, the commissioner was guided by severity of the impact of the privacy breach on the complainant (with concerns for his/his partner’s safely leading him to move interstate); the added security threat he/his partner were exposed to; the responsibility of Telstra as an organisation to have appropriate measures in place; and the extent of the publication to a very wide audience in both online and hard copy form.
‘AG’ and Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AICmr 55 (26 April 2013) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Material obtained in confidence’ – ‘Personal privacy exemption’ – ‘Request for access to documents’ – ‘Visa application’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant applied to the Department to access specific documents related to his ex-wife. The Department refused access to 11 documents saying disclosure would reveal information provided in confidence and personal information about third parties, of which disclosure would be unreasonable and contrary to public interest.
Issues: Whether the documents were exempt under ss 45 (material obtained in confidence) and 47F (personal privacy exemption) of the FOI Act.
Decision and reasoning: Access refused.
Documents exempt under s 45 included statutory declarations made by the applicant’s ex-wife and other third parties in relation to her application for permanent residency in Australia, as well as a record of interview with the ex-wife and letter sent by a third party. The commissioner was satisfied that disclosure of the documents sought would cause detriment to the applicant’s ex-wife. The Commissioner was satisfied that disclosure of the documents sought would be a breach of confidence and the documents were exempt under s 45.
Documents exempt under s 47F were general correspondence in relation to the applicant’s ex-wife visa applications. The documents contained personal information of the applicant’s ex-wife, the applicant and or third parties, which was of a sensitive and personal nature (including names/other information). Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the protection of an individual’s right to privacy, and an agency’s ability to obtain confidential information and to obtain similar information in the future. Giving the applicant access to the documents was contrary to the public interest.
In reaching the decision, Acting Information Commissioner Pirani stated:
“[20] The Department has created Form 1040 for the purposes of a visa applicant providing documentation in relation to family violence matters. This was the form used by the applicant’s ex-wife in support of the visa application. Form 1040 states that the information provided in the form ‘is given and received on the understanding that it will be treated in confidence’.”
‘AF’ and Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AICmr 54 (26 April 2013) – Australian Information Commissioner
‘Freedom of information’ – ‘Material obtained in confidence’ – ‘Request for access to documents’ – ‘Visa application’
Proceedings: Review of refusal access decision under Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
Facts: The applicant’s relationship with his former partner ended and she applied for a Subclass 100 visa on domestic violence grounds. The applicant applied to the Department for access to all material in any form relating to his former partner. The Department applied the material obtained in confidence exemption (s 45) and the personal privacy exemption (s 47F) to statutory declarations made by the applicant’s former partner and a competent person in relation to a visa application made by the applicant’s partner under the family violence provisions of the Migration Regulations.
Issues: Whether the documents were, inter-alia, exempt under s 45 (material obtained in confidence).
Decision and reasoning: Access refused. In particular, the Commission was satisfied that the statutory declarations were communicated and received on the basis of a mutual understanding of confidence between the applicant’s former partner and the Department and the competent person. Disclosure “would result in detriment to the authors of the statutory declarations as it would reveal private matters relating to the allegations of family violence. The disclosure of this information may cause a level of embarrassment and discomfort to the authors of the statutory declarations”. The Commissioner was satisfied that unauthorised disclosure of the information contained in the documents would cause detriment to the applicant’s former partner and the competent person.
Australian Capital Territory
Court of Appeal
Murphy v R [2025] ACTCA 10 (4 March 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘multiple victims’ – ‘whether manifestly excessive’ – ‘assessment of objective seriousness’ – ‘prior family violence as aggravating factor’ – ‘adjustment of start date due to miscounting error’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The appellant appealed against his convictions of negligently causing grievous bodily harm (x1- count 3), recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm (x1- count 6), sexual intercourse without consent (x3- counts 9,15,17), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x3-counts 10,12,17), common assault (x6 – counts 18, 19 and others), damage property (x1), choke, strangle or suffocate (x1- count 1).
Facts: The appellant offended against four female complainants.
Ms A: Ms A was 16 years old; the appellant was 20 years old [9]. The relationship was controlling and aggressive [10]. The appellant negligently caused Ms A grievous bodily harm by instructing her to take a knife and cut herself [12]. The appellant recklessly inflicted bodily harm on Ms A by cutting her with a house key [14]. The appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms A without her consent [17].
Ms B: The appellant was in a relationship with Ms B from July 2012 to November 2018. The appellant assaulted her on four occasions by punching her to various parts of her body. The appellant damaged Ms B’s property – he used a screwdriver to break her phone. He assaulted Ms B occasioning actual bodily harm by lifting her and slamming her on a slate floor. He assaulted Ms B by waterboarding her and by pressing his forearms into her neck with force until she was unable to breathe and became incontinent. The appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms B without her consent on two occasions.
Ms C: The appellant and Ms C were in a relationship from February 2019 to July 2020 [43]. The appellant choked Ms C by putting both arms over her shoulders and around her neck and pressing hard against the front of her neck and throat [50]. The appellant damaged the door and walls of Ms C’s home [53]-[55]. The appellant assaulted Ms C by shoving her four times, grabbing her breast and spitting phlegm into Ms C’s eyes [57]-[58].
Ms D: The appellant and Ms D were in a relationship from July 2021 to January 2022 [60]. The appellant was verbally abusing Ms D [67]. The appellant then assaulted Ms D by pushing her over twice [67]-[68]. The appellant grabbed Ms D’s shoulders and threw her onto a dirt verge – she fell on her hip and hit her head on something hard [68].
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on several grounds of appeal:
(a) the sentences imposed on count 3 and count 6 were manifestly excessive;
(b) the primary judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of count 3 and count 6;
(c) the primary judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of count 18 and count 19 by finding these offences as being in “the worst case”;
(d) the primary judge erred in treating prior family violence by the appellant against the victim (Ms B) as an aggravating factor for count 18 and count 19;
(e) the primary judge erred in having regard to an irrelevant consideration for count 19, namely the possibility that the victim had suffered an unproven injury; and
(f) the primary judge erred in failing to have regard to an additional 19 days served by the appellant in pre-sentence custody.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground (a): The appellant submitted that the individual sentences imposed in respect of counts 3 and 6 were manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge found that the first offence (count 3) was at the low end of objective seriousness and that the second offence (count 6) was in the low to mid-range of objective seriousness. The offending involved controlling, manipulative and violent behaviour in circumstances where there was a significant power differential [84].
On appeal, the Court concluded that a consideration of the objective seriousness of the offences in light of the maximum penalty, together with the appellant’s lack of remorse, the need to recognise the harm to the victim and to protect the community, as well as the limited prospects for rehabilitation and absence of remorse, did not reveal the sentences to be outside of the available range as to be “plainly unjust” [99].
Ground (b) and ground (d): These grounds were dealt with together. Ground (b) stated that the sentencing judge had erred by treating the appellant’s behaviour prior to the commission of the offences as an aggravating factor for counts 3 and 6. Ground (d) stated that the sentencing judge erred by characterising count 18 as occurring “within a long-standing context of manipulation, violence and control by the appellant”, and that the primary judge was in error to treat s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act as operating to increase the objective seriousness of counts 18 and 19.
On appeal, the Court agreed that the appellant’s “controlling and aggressive” conduct aggravated the objective seriousness of counts 3 and 6 [107], and so disposed of ground (b). On ground (d), the Court found that the primary judge had been correct to treat s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act as operating to increase the objective seriousness of counts 18 and 19 [142]. The primary judge had also been correct to find that count 18 occurred “within a long-standing context of manipulation, violence and control” [141].
Ground (c): The Court found that, whether by reference to “worst category” or “at the very high end” or “at the very upper end of seriousness”, the finding made by the primary judge as to the objective seriousness of the offending was entirely justified [162].
Ground (e): The appellant submitted that the primary judge erred by having regard to an irrelevant consideration in assessing the objective seriousness of Count 19, namely that the victim, Ms B, suffered an unproven injury [164]. The Court found in this instance the victim defecating was relevant not because it was an injury but because it was part of the response she had to the application of force to her neck by the appellant. Just as it was relevant that the victim’s response to the force included that she could not breathe or talk while the force was being applied; so too was her involuntary defecation. It was a factor that informed the nature and extent of the common assault perpetrated against her and thus was a matter that properly informed the objective seriousness of the offence [173].
Ground (f): It was accepted on appeal that the sentencing judge had been provided with the incorrect number of days that the appellant had served by way of pre-sentence custody referable to the offending. As at the date of sentence, the appellant had in fact been held in custody for 207 days (an additional 19 days) [176]. The Court found that the start date of the sentence may be adjusted to fix the error without re-exercising the discretion (as the appellant had been arguing for) [186].
TS v DT [2025] ACTCA 6 (21 February 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against extension of final protection order’ – ‘Family Violence Act 2016, s 86’ – ‘relevant criterion for applications to extend protection orders’ – ‘hardship’
Proceedings: Appeal against extension of final protection order.
Charges: N/A
Facts: The appellant appealed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal from an order of the Magistrates Court extending a final protection order made against him. The respondent is a protected person under the order.
The appellant and the respondent were married. They separated following a domestic violence incident where the appellant assaulted the respondent and their teenage son while brandishing a knife [2]. Some time later, the appellant and the respondent moved back in together into a house they had jointly purchased. They resumed living together until, following another domestic violence incident, the respondent applied for a protection order against the applicant prohibiting the applicant from being at the family home [3]-[4].
Grounds of appeal: The central complaint made by the applicant in the Court of Appeal was that the appeal judge in the Supreme Court failed to address the grounds before him [65]. The applicant had submitted the order should be varied on the basis of hardship caused to the applicant (he was “practically homeless” [14]).
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the Supreme Court judge had been correct in their interpretation of s 86 of the Family Violence Act 2016 [68]. The criteria that apply to decisions about the making of a family violence order might be relevant to applications to amend an order other than an application for extension [68(e)]. Decisions on applications for extensions are governed by a single criterion – whether the court is “satisfied that a protection order is no longer necessary to protect the protected person from family violence by the respondent”. An application to extend an order is not an invitation to reconsider or redraft provisions of that order.
The Supreme Court judge was therefore not required to consider the appellant’s hardship grounds [71], and the appeal was dismissed [72].
Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30 (15 November 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘aggravated threat to kill’ – ‘aggravated stalking’ – ‘breach of family violence order’ – ‘texts and calls’ – ‘attending complainant’s residence’ – ‘manifest excessiveness’ – ‘degree of sentence accumulation’- ‘threats’ - ‘following harassing and monitoring’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The appellant had been convicted of making an aggravated threat to kill another person (x1), aggravated stalking (x1), and contravening a family violence order (x1).
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had been in a relationship which commenced in 2021 and concluded in early 2023 [6].
The threat to kill involved the appellant going to the complainant’s house armed with a large knife. He banged on the door and threatened to kick the front door in. The complainant let him in, whereupon the appellant grabbed her, pointed the knife at her and said he was going to kill her. After a while, the appellant handed the complainant the knife and asked her to kill him. He eventually left the house [14].
The aggravated stalking offence included the appellant sending hundreds of text messages and making dozens of phone calls to the complainant in a roughly two-week period. It also involved the appellant texting threats while standing outside the complainant’s house [10].
The breach of the family violence order involved the appellant being served with the Family Violence Order, then calling the victim every day (making a total of 34 calls and sending 9 text messages) [17]. The appellant also attended the complainant’s house on 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 27 March. On some of those occasions he was there more than once. On 29 March 2023, the appellant sent the victim threatening texts. The complainant rang the police, and the police located the appellant lying in bushland [19].
Grounds of appeal: In the notice of appeal, the appellant contended that both the individual sentences imposed, and the overall total sentence, were manifestly excessive [36]. In submissions, the appellant sought leave to expand the grounds to include that the primary judge erred in not applying the full 25% discount for the appellant’s guilty plea; and that the primary judge erred in failing to properly apply the Bugmy and Verdins principles [37].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused for the two grounds of appeal raised in submissions (based on these grounds having no merit):
(1) Guilty plea: Counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant should have obtained a 25% guilty plea discount on each offence. In respect of the aggravated stalking and breach of FVO offences, the sentencing judge had found that the prosecution case was overwhelmingly strong and therefore arrived at discounts below 25% [72-73]. The Court found that s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act was correctly interpreted and applied (the subsection states that in deciding any lesser penalties, the court must not make any significant reduction for the fact that the offender pleaded guilty if, based on established facts, the court considers that the prosecution’s case was overwhelming strong) [84].
(2) Bugmy and Verdins principles: There was no dispute that the Bugmy principles were relevant [39]. On appeal, the Court found that the sentencing judge was correct to assess the result of the appellant’s adverse childhood experiences as relevant to the risk he presented of future reoffending and the need for the community to be protected. Therefore, while moral culpability was reduced due to childhood disadvantage, the re-offending risk and need for community protection justifiably pulled in the other direction [52-53].
In relation to the Verdins principles, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s mental health “could be treated through therapy” and thus her Honour’s view that the appellant’s mental health created a risk to the community was an error. The Court did not agree [60]. The sentencing judge was correct to find that potential for treatment and rehabilitation was not a complete answer to the risk posed to the community due to mental impairment [64]. The appellant may not have been the best vehicle for general deterrence, but specific deterrence was justifiably given special weight [64].
As for the original ground of appeal based on manifest excessiveness, the Court found that this ground was not made out [107]. The Court accepted the respondent’s submission that while the offences were committed in the period of a month and bore factual similarities, the criminality in each was different [103]. In the Court’s view, the different criminalities of the charged offences required separate consideration and sentence [106]. The sentence structure which admitted of a degree of concurrency acknowledged the course of conduct while still paying proper regard to the relationship between the facts of the offences [106].
Robertson v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] ACTCA 26 (30 August 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Premeditation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ – Attempted murder – ‘Attempted breach of family violence order’ – ‘Guilty plea discount’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Attempted murder x1; attempted breach of a family violence order x1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The matter was an appeal against a sentence imposed by McCallum J (primary judge) for the defendant’s convictions of attempted murder and attempted breach of a family violence order.
The appellant eavesdropped on the victim’s phone calls outside her home before breaking in while she was in her bedroom. The appellant took the victim’s phone, grabbed a large knife from the kitchen and attacked her, slicing her ear and stabbing her 11 times. As the appellant returned to the kitchen, the victim then fled to the backyard, screaming for help. A neighbour woke up and called emergency services. Meanwhile, the appellant ignited a newspaper on the stove and used a cylindrical spray can to burn the victim’s face, chest, arms and torso. The Police arrived to find the property locked, hearing the victim’s screams and seeing bursts of flames. Upon gaining entry, they restrained and handcuffed him.
Grounds of appeal:
1. In respect of the offence of attempted murder, the primary judge erred in awarding a discount of 10% for the appellant’s plea of guilty; and
2. Each of the individual sentences, the total effective sentence (27 years and 3 months’ imprisonment) and the non-parole period (20 years) were manifestly excessive.
Held:: The Court (Mossop ACJ, Baker and McWilliam JJ) dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: The Court found no error in the approach the primary judge had taken, or the 10% discount applied.
The discount was calculated consistently with legal principles and legislative requirements. Given the family violence context, the previous assaults on the victim, and the appellant’s lack of remorse, the offence was classified as within the “worst category” for offending of that kind [30]. While recognising the utility of providing consistent discounts for guilty pleas, the primary judge determined that applying a discount greater than 10% would result in a penalty unreasonably disproportionate to the offence, this justified a departure from ordinary sentencing ranges [31]. Fixing the indeterminate life imprisonment sentence at 30 years before applying the 10% discount to reduce it by 3 years was appropriate [32].
Accordingly, no error was established.
Ground 2: The Court found no basis to conclude that the individual sentences, aggregate sentence, or the non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
For the attempted murder offence, the extreme physical, emotional and psychological harm the offending had on the victim, the appellant’s recent recidivism, and the appellant’s lack of remorse all justified imposing a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment prior to the discount [36-38]. The attempted breach of the family violence order, in the context of the recent attempted murder, demonstrated an extraordinary disregard for the victim’s suffering. The Court treats breaches of these orders seriously, therefore the three-month sentence was well-within the appropriate range [42-49].
The court observed: ‘The appellant is reported to have “felt bad” upon seeing the victim’s injuries, and then stated that a way of preventing his unlawful behaviour from occurring again in the future was to find a more reliable partner, as her actions were the cause of his offending behaviour. The lack of insight is disturbing.’ [38]
The Court accepted there was no basis for sentences to be served concurrently [55], and that consecutive sentencing properly reflected the overall criminality [56]. The non-parole period, a substantial portion of the sentence, was necessary to meet the deterrent and punitive aims of sentencing, hence it was not manifestly excessive [59].
Deng v Australian Capital Territory [2024] ACTCA 10 (15 March 2024) - Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against jurisdiction’ – ‘Arbitrary detention’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Family Violence Act’
Proceedings: Appeal against jurisdiction and finding that remand was not arbitrary.
Charges: 1x Breach of prevention order
Facts: The applicant was arrested in 2019 and charged with destroying or damaging property. The Magistrate initiated a prevention order pursuant to s 112 of the Family Violence Act (ACT), prohibiting the applicant from engaging in certain conduct “until all related charges are finalised’. Four months later, another Magistrate finalised the relate charge by convicting the appellant and fining him $2000. This had the effect of ending the restrictions imposed by the prevention order. Two months later, the appellant visited the house of his ex-partner and was subsequently arrested and charged for breaching the prevention order. The applicant was remanded in custody and released 58 days later as the restrictions on the prevention order had terminated months earlier:
As a result of the wording of the family violence order, there was, in fact, no prohibition upon his being at his former partner’s house … as the only “related charge” had been finalised before that date [14]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant contested the legality of the Magistrate’s order, arguing:
1.
The Magistrate(s) acted without jurisdiction by making remand orders for a breach of a restriction which had terminated;
2.
The primary judge failed to consider the effect s 40C of the Human Rights Act (which concerns legal proceedings in relation to public authority actions).
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The Court (McCallum CJ, Mossop and McWilliam JJ) agreed with reasoning of the primary judge: the fact that certain restrictions of a prevention order might end does not mean the prevention order also ends. The prevention order is only ended by operation of the Family Violence Act:
The inclusion of a statement as to the circumstances in which the prohibitions would cease (“until all related charges are finalised”) was unnecessary because s 30 of the FV Act itself determined when the order ended. Section 30 describes four specific circumstances in which an SIFVO [Special Interim Family Violence Order] comes to an end. That these describe the only circumstances in which the order may be ended is made clear by the language of the section: “A special interim order ends only when the first of the following happens …” [33]
Giving full effect to the terms of the statute and the terms of the order meant that the prohibitions upon being at a particular address or within a specified distance of a particular person within the order came to an end when “all related charges [were] finalised”. But the order itself, without any operative prohibitions, would continue in effect until, by operation of s 30, it came to an end [35]
Further, it was within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court to hear any arguments related to the charge and deal with the applicant, including by making remand orders where appropriate:
If the elements of an offence under s 43(2) were not established in the Magistrates Court beyond reasonable doubt, then there would be no jurisdiction to convict the appellant or impose a penalty. However, that there may not ultimately be jurisdiction to convict the appellant or impose a penalty does not deny the Magistrates Court jurisdiction to commence to hear the proceedings, including making any decisions about bail in the meantime, and determine whether or not the appellant is guilty or not guilty [44]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 (16 February 2024) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’– ‘Damaging property’– ‘Threat to kill’– ‘Strangulation/choking’– ‘History of domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x reckless threat to kill, 1x forcible confinement, 2x act endangering health (choke/suffocate/strangle), 3x common assault, 3x damage property less than $5000 in value, 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 1x damage property, 1x make a demand with a threat to endanger health, safety, or physical well-being.
Facts: The male respondent was convicted and sentenced to 5 years and 7 months’ imprisonment for 14 offences committed against his female intimate partner over an eight-month period (February–October 2020). [128]
Grounds of appeal: The prosecution appealed the original sentence on four grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in allowing a 25% discount for the respondent’s plea of guilty with respect to the offence of making a demand with a threat to endanger health, safety or physical wellbeing;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in allowing a discount in excess of 10% for the respondent’s pleas of guilty with respect to the offences of making a reckless threat to kill, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and two instances of common assault and
3.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, by failing to take into account and/or misstating the material facts relevant to that assessment; and
4.
The sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. [58]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. Respondent sentenced to 8 years and 9 months’ imprisonment. [171]
With respect to the first two grounds of appeal, the Majority (McWilliam and Abraham JJ) held that there was no ‘evident justification’ for the plea discounts. [90] The respondent’s plea of guilty were arrived at late [92]; [97].
With respect to ground three, the Majority held that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the conduct constituting the charge of occasioning actual bodily harm was premised on a factual error. The sentencing judge mistook the extent of the harm caused by the impugned conduct as requiring surgical procedures when it did not. [104]–[105]
With respect to ground four, the Majority held the sentences to be manifestly inadequate. In comparison to relevant cases, the sentence imposed for the offence of choking, threat to kill, making a demand with a threat to endanger life were ‘substantially lower’. [127]; [132]; [133]; [138]; [140]
With respect to choking, the Majority summarised the following relevant factors in assessing objective seriousness:
For this offence, without being exhaustive, the following have been referred to: (1) the length of time during which the “choking” persisted; (2) the amount of force used; (3) whether the victim’s breathing was restricted; (4) whether verbal threats were made at the time of the choking; (5) whether the victim sustained any injuries; (6) whether any aides like rope or cable were used; (7) the vulnerabilities of the victim; (8) whether the conduct was deliberate and sustained, designed to threaten and inflict harm; and (9) whether the conduct occurred in a family violence context [131]
In dissent, Loukas-Karlsson J regarded ‘leniency in sentencing’ to not ‘equate to manifest inadequacy’. [2] For Loukas-Karlsson, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate ‘that a successful appeal on … grounds one and two would amount to anything more than “tinkering” with the sentence, that is, nothing but a slight adjustment in sentence’. [13] In effect, the sentence was neither ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’ [26]; [43]
Day v R [2023] ACTCA 39 (11 October 2023) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘pro-social conduct’
Charges: 2x choke, suffocate or strangle, 1x threat to kill, 1x contravention of prevention order, 1x transfer offence (damage property)
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for offences committed in a domestic violence context. The applicant and complainant/victim had a short relationship 2015–16 that recommenced in 2019. In September 2021, the applicant, unprovoked, pushed the complainant off their bed, and manually strangled her on the floor. Despite demanding the victim to leave, the applicant obstructed her from doing so and strangled her again. [8]–[12] The complainant managed to escape the house, and three months later sought a prevention order against the applicant. [13] Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on the following grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to take into account the appellant’s subjective circumstances;
2.
The accumulation of the individual sentences was excessive or the sentencing judge failed to take into account totality; and
3.
The individual sentences, the aggregate sentence and the non-parole period imposed were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The applicant did not establish any of the grounds of appeal. With respect to ground 1, the sentencing judge demonstrated no error in their approach to the subjective circumstances of the applicant [48]:
In any event, the matters identified by the appellant as “strikingly pro-social” going to rehabilitation, which he submitted were not identified or taken into account in sentencing, or not having been dealt with appropriately were, save for one limited matter, expressly identified by the sentencing judge. It may be accepted that they were not referred to with the emphasis or in the manner that the appellant might have desired, but the references reflected the material before the sentencing judge. The matter not referred to is that he has had a stable housing record since 2016 and has a positive relationship with his neighbours. It is unclear how, in the context of family violence offences, this matter could be characterised as strikingly pro-social conduct such as to materially impact on the sentencing [33]
With respect to the remaining grounds, the Court upheld the sentence as not manifestly excessive nor in discordance with the principle of totality [66];[69]. In so doing, the Court stressed the limitation of considering current sentencing practice:
Current sentence practice is only one sentencing consideration. The Crown referred the sentencing judge to a number of other cases during the sentencing hearing but observed that they were not really comparable. Simply because a case has different features does not mean it may not provide assistance generally as to the range of sentences being imposed. Factually comparable cases are difficult to find, as the facts of the offence and the offender are both relevant. Given that reality, a sentence imposed in a factually more serious case (or less serious case) may, with other cases, provide some guidance. The assistance depends on the facts of the given cases. This is bearing in mind, the relevant inquiry for manifest excess is not just a comparison between cases. His Honour considered the cases referred to, analysing the circumstances in which the sentences were imposed [63]
Vuolo v Fall [2023] ACTCA 33 (3 August 2023) — Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Stalking’ ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ - ‘family law’
Charges: 1x stalking
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: Before a Magistrate, the applicant was found guilty of one charge of stalking and placed on a good behaviour order for 12 months. The offence was proven in relation to the applicant stalking his ex-partner, with whom he had been married between 2010 and 2017, on ‘six occasions, in just over a three-month period in the same year’. [1] The stalking occurred following handover of their children per shared-custody arrangements. [7]
The sentence was appealed, and subsequently overturned by a single judge of the Supreme Court (‘primary judge’) in favour of the complainant: the applicant was resentenced by a conviction and a good behaviour order imposed for a period of 12 months backdated to the original date of sentence.
Grounds of appeal: The applicants seeks to quash or set aside the orders of the Supreme Court judgement, and reinstate the orders imposed in the Magistrates Court. The applicant sought to appeal the order on seven grounds, which can be summarised as followed:
•
Grounds 1 and 4: The primary judge erred in finding that the non-conviction order (made by the Magistrate) was ‘an outlier’ [13]
•
Ground 2: The primary judge erred in finding that the use of a vehicle (to stalk) was relevant and aggravating [48]
•
Ground 3: The primary judge erred in adopting the Magistrate’s summary of the facts, which noted that the victim “felt fearful and harassed” by the applicant [52]
•
Ground 5: The primary judge erred in reasoning that if the sentence was treated as a guide for future decision, ‘it would lead to a wide range of offending not attracting punishment’ [28]
•
Ground 6: The primary judge erred in finding that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate [61]
•
Ground 7: The primary judge erred in failing to find that the Court on a review appeal retained a residual discretion to decline to interfere with the sentence even where error has been established [62]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The Court (Backer, McWilliam and Abraham JJ) dismissed grounds 1 and 2. The Court found no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that the sentence was an outlier. Previous sentences were considered, each including a term of imprisonment where the offending was objectively serious [21] (Ground 1 and 4). The Court held that ‘using a motor vehicle to follow a person is objectively more serious than other conduct which may also fall within the definition of stalking’ [50] (Ground 2).
The Court upheld the fifth ground of appeal, finding that the primary judge’s reasoning was not ‘directed to explaining why the sentence [of the Magistrate] is manifestly inadequate, but rather at the consequences of failing to correct it’. [45] The impugned statement was that a failure to correct the sentence would ‘erode sentencing standards’. [40] Consequently, the Court considered grounds 3, 6 and 7 in light of reconsidering the sentence.
The Court held the primary issue in dispute to be whether a conviction should have been recorded. [70] Having regard to sentencing objectives and considerations (Sentencing Act ss 7, 33), the Court held the original sentence (i.e. a good behaviour order without conviction) was manifestly inadequate and insufficient to meet the need for general deterrence. [86]–[88] The offending is ‘punishable by two years’ imprisonment’ [72]: it ‘was sustained conduct … sufficiently concerning to prompt evasive action by the victim’ and occurred in the context of family violence [73]–[75].
NS v Hotchkis [2021] ACTCA 13 (2 June 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Charges: Common assault x 1; Contravening a Family Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal from ACT Supreme Court against convictions imposed in the ACT Magistrates Court.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant were married and living together. The appellant kicked the complainant’s leg during an argument. The applicant breached a family violence order by engaging in offensive or harassing behaviour towards the complainant or by harassing, threatening or intimidating her. The complainant made an audio-recording and a central issue in the appeal was whether the magistrate in the initial hearing had erred in ruling that the audio recording was admissible. The appellant’s appeal to the Supreme Court against his conviction was dismissed: NS v Hotchkis [2019] ACTSC 309 (8 November 2019).
Grounds of appeal: The primary appeal judge erred in dismissing the first appeal on grounds that:
1.
The magistrate erred in ruling that the audio recording made by the complainant was admissible (pursuant to ss4 and 5(2)(d)-(e) of the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) (LDA).
2.
The convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion that ss 4 and 5 were not breached, as the complainant believed, on reasonable grounds, the recording was necessary for the protection of her lawful interests. Further, there was no error in concluding there was no prohibition in s 10 for the admissibility of the conversation. No question of the application of s 138 of the Evidence Act arose.
Ground 2: The primary judge reviewed the evidence, set out findings of fact and reasons given by the magistrate, and referred to the appellant’s submissions that the statements made did not breach the family violence order. There was no error in the primary judge’s conclusion:
“I have no hesitation in agreeing with the Magistrate that the evidence established a breach of the family violence order. Having listening to the recording on numerous occasions, I am satisfied that his conduct was, and was intended to be, harassing and intimidating. I agree with the Magistrate that he was yelling at [the complainant], and that his tone was aggressive. His suggestion that he was talking to the dog is improbable, but in any event I am satisfied that his conduct was really directed towards [the complainant], and intimidating her.”
“In finding the appellant guilty of assault, the Magistrate was entitled to take into account the clear aggression demonstrated by the appellant at the time that [the complainant] says she was kicked. She was also entitled to find that the appellant had threatened to “snot” [the complainant], and that this was a threat to hit her. The Magistrate was also entitled to find that the accused had kicked the rubbish bin just before he kicked the complainant, although his intention may have been to scare the dog. These were all circumstances supportive of the evidence of [the complainant]. Finally, the Magistrate had the benefit of seeing and hearing [the complainant] cross examined and the appellant giving his evidence. Her finding that [the complainant] was a credible witness, and the appellant was not, should not lightly be interfered with. I am satisfied that there was ample evidence upon which the Magistrate was entitled to convict the appellant.”
TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Accommodation’ – ‘Appeal of family violence order’ – ‘Exclusion from home’ – ‘Ongoing risk’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Proceedings: Appeal of Family Violence Order.
Facts: The matter was an appeal to the Court of Appeal following a final Family Violence Order (FVO) made against the appellant by the Chief Magistrate, and upheld on appeal by the Primary Judge: TS v DT [2019] ACTSC 295 (25 October 2019). The appellant sought that the FVO made by the Chief Magistrate be quashed, and no further orders made excluding the appellant from the premises of the family home (where the respondent was living).
Issues: The male appellant applied to adduce additional evidence in the appeal. The appellant also raised 12 grounds of appeal: the decisions of the Chief Magistrate (Ground 1) and Primary Judge (Ground 2) were unreasonable and not supported by evidence; the Chief Magistrate erred in running a final hearing on the FVO application (Grounds 3 and 10), making an FVO that was too long (2 years from final hearing) (Ground 4) and applying the Browne v Dunn principle (Ground 5); the Primary Judge attempted to cover up the Chief Magistrate’s alleged misconduct (Ground 6); the Chief Magistrate erred in law by relying on 2018 convictions (Ground 7) and the 2007/8 incident to support the making of the FVO (Ground 8); there was judicial misconduct by the Chief Justice in the conduct of the final hearing (Ground 9); and there was failure to have regard to evidence including relating to “property law issues” and the accommodation difficulties of the appellant (Grounds 11 and 12).
Decision and reasoning: The application to adduce additional evidence was refused ([52]-[64]), and the grounds of appeal were dismissed ([65]-[162]).
On Grounds 1 and 2, the decisions of the Chief Magistrate and Primary Judge were not unreasonable and were supported by evidence (including specific instances of violence against the respondent and her son, further supported by criminal convictions of the appellant) ([66]-[87]).
On Grounds 3 and 10, there was no error in making a final order excluding the appellant from access to the family home as the proceedings were run as a final hearing ([88]-[100], [142]-[143]). On Ground 4, the FVO’s duration was grounded in statute. Further, the Chief Magistrate weighed the competing interests of the appellant and the respondent (including the appellant’s accommodation difficulties) but found these could only be remedied by excluding the appellant from the family home ([101]-[112]). On Ground 5, there was no error in application of the Browne v Dunn principle ([113-[122]) and on Ground 6, there was no evidence of judicial bias ([123]-[125]).
On Ground 7, there was no miscarriage of justice relating to the 2018 convictions (which confirmed findings of instances of violence and substantiated the respondent’s fear) ([126]-[131]) and on Ground 8, appropriate regard was had to an incident in 2007/8 ([132]-[137]). On Ground 9, the Chief Magistrate’s conduct during the hearing was unremarkable ([138]-[141]).
On Grounds 11 and 12, the Chief Magistrate and Primary Judge had due regard to the evidence presented by the appellant, including evidence relating to “property law issues” and the accommodation circumstances of the appellant ([142]-[161]). On the property law issues, at [153]-[154], the Court noted:
“The appellant contends that the respondent had an additional purpose in seeking as a condition of the final FVO that the appellant be excluded from the family house – namely, an objective on the respondent’s part to obtain sole ownership of the family home. As I noted earlier, irrespective whether this was the case, there was clear evidence before the Chief Magistrate that the respondent would have difficulty relocating her place of residence and, further, that there was a history of violent conduct on the part of the appellant towards the respondent which supported the final FVO being made.
Further, and notwithstanding the submissions of the appellant to the contrary, the ultimate proper disposition of assets is a matter for the family law proceedings. That the respondent may seek sole ownership of the matrimonial home in those proceedings does not mean that her claims under the FV Act had no basis.”
Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 (7 July 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Inconsistent verdicts’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory verdicts’
Charges: Burglary x 1 (guilty); Unlawful confinement x 1 (guilty); Choking x 1 (guilty); Indecent assault x 1 (not guilty); Choking x 1 (not guilty); Intentionally causing property damage x 3 (not guilty); Stealing CCTV hard drive x 1 (not guilty).
Proceedings: Application for leave to amend notice of appeal and for leave to appeal (grounds 3, 4, 6 and 7) and appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The trial court found that the appellant man broke into his former partner’s (the complainant’s) house before dragging her from bed and strangling her. The complainant’s evidence was that the appellant ‘made her stay’ in the room by threatening to strangle her if she tried to leave, strangling her multiple times and threatening to kill her. The appellant allegedly committed property damage. There was some delay before the complainant alleged that the appellant had indecently assaulted her. The appellant allegedly ripped out the CCTV hard drive before leaving. The appellant also allegedly slashed the tyres of the complainant’s car.
Grounds of appeal: (1) Verdicts were inconsistent; (2) Verdicts were unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory; … (6) Trial judge erred in making factual findings; (7) Sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
Grounds (1)-(2) Dismissed. There were rational explanations why the jury may have acquitted the appellant of some charges while finding the appellant guilty on others. One factor identified was that the complainant was upset and frightened; she ‘may have misremembered matters or failed to appreciate details’, although the complainant did make some errors in her evidence and did not directly witness some of the alleged charges/events. Where there were inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, the jury may have accepted that this was because she had just ‘survived a gruelling series of events’ [101].
Ground (6) Allowed. Two of the trial judge’s factual errors did not reduce the objective seriousness of the offence to something less than ‘midrange’:
[155] The offence was committed in the complainant’s home, during the night. It was motivated by a desire to vent anger and assert physical control over the complainant in response to her termination of the relationship. The offence was of not insignificant duration. It was associated with violence and a threat to kill; whether the violence was properly described as “extreme violence” poses a semantic question that is unnecessary to answer.
A third factual error of substance required the Court of Appeal to resentence on Counts 1, 2 and 3.
Ground (7) Allowed. Total sentence reduced from 5 years and 5 months to 3 years and 6 months.
R v UG [2020] ACTCA 8 (27 February 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People with mental health issues’ – ‘Physical violence - threat to kill child - suicide threat- weapon’
Offences: Common assault x2; possessing offensive weapon with intent x1; d amaging property x 2; make demand with threat to kill x1; aggravated dangerous driving x1
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issues: The Crown submitted that the sentences were manifestly inadequate:
•
The length of sentence for the offence of making a demand with threat to kill failed to reflect the objective seriousness of the offence;
•
The very limited degree to which the offences were cumulative meant that the total sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
•
The actual imprisonment period of four months was manifestly inadequate having regard to relevant sentencing purposes.
Facts: R (the appellant man) and C (the complainant woman) were in a relationship at the time of offending. An argument had broken out after R told C he wanted to commit suicide. R grabbed C as she tried to leave their shared bedroom and pushed her onto the bed (first common assault). He then retrieved a large axe from their wardrobe. R pushed C to the ground while they struggled over the axe (second common assault) and swung the axe at her head, narrowly missing. R used the axe to damage items within the house before forcing the couple’s four children into his car. He left and returned several times to demand C get in the car. He eventually threatened to kill their eldest daughter with the axe if C did not get in but drove away once more as police approached his vehicle. This led to a large-scale search. The R was located and arrested later that evening. While all four children were physically unharmed, the eldest daughter was later assessed by a paediatrician who thought it was likely that the offences significantly impacted her emotional and behavioural wellbeing.
On the day of offending, the respondent had failed to take his prescribed antidepressant medication and had consumed a significant quantity of alcohol.
Initially R pleaded not guilty to all charges. Following discussions between the parties the respondent pleaded guilty to six charges and was committed to the Supreme Court for sentence.
The sentencing judge imposed a total sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment.
Judgment: In addressing the first aspect, the Court noted that while the offender’s mental health condition somewhat reduced his moral culpability, it was still necessary to consider the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation. By failing to reflect these purposes, along with the high objective seriousness of the offence, the sentence starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment for the offence of making a demand with threat to kill was "plainly unreasonable" [69-71]. For the second aspect, the Court believed the degree of cumulation failed to achieve a total sentence that was just and appropriate to reflect the overall criminality [73]. The Court did not make a decision as to the third aspect as they had found they had already found the sentences to be manifestly inadequate for other reasons. Despite finding the sentences manifestly inadequate, the Court refused to resentence the offender on the basis that the appeal raised no point of principle, had limited precedent value and would disrupt the offender’s rehabilitation [97].
The Court also discussed the preliminary issue of the correct approach to sentencing for family violence offences and the correct manner of dealing with the effect of a sentence of imprisonment on the offender’s family [44]. The Court rejected the Crown’s contention that family violence offences constitute a special category of offence in relation to which different sentencing principles apply, and instead provided that absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the same sentencing standards should apply to all offenders (Bugmy v The Queen) [48]-[51].
R v Wyper [2017] ACTCA 59 (11 December 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Complainant's credibility’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Intensive correction order’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Engaging in sexual intercourse without consent and being reckless as to whether the person was consenting x 1.
Appeal type: Defendant’s appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant and defendant were in a relationship ([11]). The defendant asked the complainant to leave the house; she did not want to leave. The complainant alleged that the defendant held her down and digitally penetrated her ([13]). The defendant denied that he digitally penetrated the complainant, and alleged that she damaged a number of his belongings ([14]). The defendant called the police about the property damage, and the complainant called the police about the sexual assault 2 hours later ([20]-[21]). A medical examination of the complainant revealed abrasions consistent with assault ([23]).
The defendant was convicted at trial. He was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, served by way of intensive correction order (‘ICO’), and 100 hours’ community service ([2]).
Issues: The defendant appealed against conviction on 3 grounds: (a) the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory; (b) the trial judge caused a miscarriage of justice by failing to fairly put the defence case to the jury; and (c) the trial judge caused a miscarriage of justice by failing to direct the jury that the complainant had a motive to lie.
The Crown appealed on the ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Both the defendant’s appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentenced were dismissed ([8]).
Appeal against conviction
On ground (a), the defendant argued that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory having regard to the unreliability of the complainant’s evidence. The Court (Murrell CJ, Bromwich J and Robinson AJ) held that while it was ‘somewhat implausible’ that the complainant did not cause the property damage, it was open to the jury to convict the defendant ([53]).
On grounds (b) and (c), the defendant argued that the judge should have directed the jury on the complainant’s possible motive to lie to avoid the consequences of her causing the property damage. However, the Court stated that the summing up was fair, given that the motive to lie was not a large issue in the trial ([66]-[68]).
Crown appeal against sentence
The Crown argued that by ordering an ICO, the trial judge failed to give adequate weight ‘to the principle that, for family violence offences, the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation are particularly important’ ([96]). The Court reiterated the importance of general and specific deterrence in sentencing family violence offenders ([97]), however, the Court emphasised the exceptional nature of the offending at [99]:
This was not a typical offence of family violence. There was no evidence of a history of domestic violence, controlling behaviour or psychological abuse. There were none of the typical indicia of power imbalance. Rather, the offence occurred in the context of a relationship ending, without those features apparently being present.
Imposing an ICO, while lenient, was justified by the defendant’s subjective circumstances, such as his lack of criminal history, and the fact that there was no history of domestic violence in the relationship ([129]-[130]).
O’Brien v R [2015] ACTCA 47 (15 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Double jeopardy- sentencing’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Perverting the course of justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentence cumulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Trafficking in cocaine’
Charge/s: Trafficking in cocaine, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts), forcible confinement, perverting the course of justice. Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The sentence imposed at first instance related to three distinct instances of criminality: the drug offence, the domestic violence offences and the perverting the course of justice offence. The domestic violence offences involved the appellant severely beating his then domestic partner which caused horrific injuries. He also choked her in the presence of his young son, restrained her from leaving their premises and forced her to take prescription sedatives so as to prevent her from seeking medical treatment which would reveal the assaults. He detained her for 24 hours. The perverting the course of justice offence involved the appellant encouraging his (by then former) partner not to attend court in relation to the domestic violence charges and encouraging her to produce false evidence about her psychological frame of mind. The aggregate sentence imposed was 12 years and 11 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 4 months.
Issue/s: Whether the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant submitted that the domestic violence sentences should not have been made cumulative on the sentences for the drug offences. He also submitted that the sentencing judge did not apply the totality principle. The Court held that while the aggregate sentence could be considered by some to be somewhat harsh, it was not unreasonable and was appropriate having regard to all the circumstances. There was no overlap in the three instances of criminality, nor could it be said that the three incidents arose from a single episode or course of conduct, ‘such that the criminality involved in one of the incidents was subsumed or comprehended in the others’ (see at [29]). The sentencing judge did take accumulation, concurrency and totality into account and did impose a degree of concurrency.
Kien v R [2012] ACTCA 25 (24 May 2012) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Choking so as to render unconscious’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Intentionally inflicting actual bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally inflicting actual bodily harm, choking so as to render unconscious.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage with his wife ended and she obtained a domestic violence protection order against him (though this was not in place at the time of the offence). The appellant went to the family home and an argument ensued, which developed into a physical fight. The appellant then took a chair from his wife (which she was threatening to throw at him) and struck her with it so forcefully that it broke into pieces. He then choked her until she became unconscious. He then wrapped a towel around her neck and used both hands to pull the material down toward the floor. A domestic violence protection order was previously in place in favour of the victim. He was subject to a good behaviour order at the time of the offences imposed for a prior breach of the protection order. He was sentenced to a total of four years and seven months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and one month.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the offences were unprovoked.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the fact the offences were not unprovoked should have mitigated the severity of the sentence. This argument was rejected — the actions of the victim were all in response to the appellant coming to the matrimonial home where he was not welcome. He was asked to leave but did not do so. His response to his wife’s actions were so disproportionate that they could not have been seen as provocative.
2.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that two comparable cases showed the sentence was manifestly excessive. This argument was rejected, with the Court holding that the offences were serious and resulted in severe facial injuries committed in a context where the appellant was not welcome in the house. While they were heavy sentences, they were proportionate to the criminality involved.
Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 (30 June 2006) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Hostile witness’ – ‘Incompetence of counsel’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unco-operative witness’
Charge/s: Assault, contravention of a protection order.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was charged with assaulting his female partner (‘the complainant’) and contravening a protection order in her favour. He pleaded guilty to assault but not guilty to contravening a protection order. The offending came to light after a police officer (‘the informant’) attended the complainant’s premises. The informant observed that the complainant was very distressed and had bruises on her body. A conversation between the complainant and the informant was recorded. In this conversation, the complainant made some allegations that the appellant had hit her but she was largely unresponsive to questions and was affected to a considerable degree by alcohol (See [41]-[43]). At trial, the prosecution sought to prove the tape and transcript of this conversation only for its possible use in refreshing the complainant’s memory. However, counsel for the appellant, Mr Elmaraazey, tendered this document as evidence (‘exhibit 3’).
The complainant was called to give evidence after the informant. When asked about whether there was an incident between her and the appellant, she stated ‘I can’t remember the exact details’ and proceeded to give an account of the evening that made no reference to any physical violence. She agreed that she had a conversation with the informant but could not recall its contents. The prosecution then proceeded to cross-examine the complainant about the various bruises that had been observed on her that evening. The complainant said she could not remember how the bruises happened. The prosecution applied to the magistrate for leave to cross-examine the complainant on the basis that the witness had made a prior inconsistent statement with reference to exhibit 3. Mr Elmaraazey did not object. The complainant’s response was to accept that exhibit 3 accurately reflected what she had told the informant but she could neither confirm nor deny that it represented what actually happened (See [26]-[40]). Accordingly, absent the tender of exhibit 3 as evidence, there would have been insufficient evidence to convict the appellant (See [47]).
The magistrate found the appellant had assaulted the complainant and sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment for the assault and 3 months imprisonment for the breach of protection order. He was sentenced to an additional 6 months imprisonment for breach of an earlier imposed recognisance.
Issue/s:
1.
The incompetence of counsel for the appellant, Mr Elmaraazey, led to a miscarriage of justice.
2.
The sentencing magistrate erred in assuming that the injuries sustained by the complainant were the result of a ‘violent and prolonged’ assault.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, in the absence of the tender of exhibit 3 by Mr Elmaraazey, it was, at the very least, unlikely that the statement would have been admitted as evidence that the appellant assaulted the complainant. It was open to the prosecutor to seek leave to give the statement to the complainant to refresh her memory, if s 32 of the Evidence Act were satisfied. However, the failure of this process to refresh the complainant’s memory meant the prosecutor could not tender the prior statement as evidence of the truth of its contents (See [145]-[180]). There was a resulting miscarriage of justice (See [181]-[191]).
Second, the sentencing judge erred in assuming that all the injuries resulted from the charged assault. Even if the terms of exhibit 3 had been properly proved, they included an allegation of assault that had occurred the previous evening. The only unequivocal allegation of recent violence was that the appellant hit her in the face on their return from the shops. It was an error not to attempt to distinguish between the violence inflicted the previous night and those in the hours preceding the interview with the informant (See [196]-[207]).
Supreme Court
DPP v Vaana [2024] ACTSC 46 (27 February 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaged property’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Bugmy principles’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Aggravated damage x 1; possession of offensive weapon with intent x 1; aggravated threat to kill x 1.
Facts: The male offender engaged in a pattern of ‘overbearing, controlling behaviour’ towards his female partner (the complainant). [8] Attending a football match, the offender demanded the complainant hand over her mobile phone and passcode. When the complainant refused to do so, the offender left to the supermarket, purchased a knife and returned to puncture the complainant’s car tyres. [8]–[11] While wielding the knife, the offender threatened the complainant’s family, all of whom were present at the football match and witnessed the incident. [19]
The Registrar of the Magistrates Court refused to list the matter that day and the temporary application was listed a week later. The applicant was informed that the application in the proceeding must be served on the respondent. The applicant then appealed from the decision not to list the matter on an urgent basis and the requirement to serve documents on the respondent. The appeal was listed on an expedited basis.
Decision and Reasoning: Total effective sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment. [44] In sentencing the offender, Berman AJ spotlighted the delayed recognition of domestic violence offences as a serious offence:
For many years, domestic violence offences were not treated with the seriousness they truly deserved. This has now changed, and proper recognition is now given to the harm that such offences cause to the victims of it, and society generally [1]
Acting Judge Berman emphasised the seriousness of the offending, particularly that it occurred in a public space in front of the offender’s children. [24] His Honour took into account the offender’s dysfunctional and violent upbringing, and criminal history which included offences of stalking/intimidation and damaging property. [27]–[30]
DPP v Mastalerz [2024] ACTSC 30 (19 February 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Tendency Evidence’ – ‘Relationship and context evidence’ – ‘Admissibility’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘breach of protection orders’ – ‘incidents of violence’
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Charge: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 6; aggravated common assault x 1; aggravated minor property damage x 1; contravention of protection order x 3.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in an ‘on-and-off relationship’ from April 2017 to December 2022. [9] The relationship was riddled with family violence perpetrated by the accused against the complainant. [9] The violence was physical, sexual and in disregard of several protection orders made by the complainant. [13]–[20]
On 23 November 2023, the prosecution filed an application to adduce tendency evidence (and subsequently, an Amended Notice). The evidence concerned prior incidents demonstrative of three tendencies: (i) the accused’s tendency to be violent towards and controlling of the complainant; (ii) the accused’s tendency to disregard court orders regulating his contact with the complainant; and (iii) the accused’s tendency to ignore the complainant’s protests when she declined sexual intercourse. [3] In the alternative, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence as relationship or context evidence. [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence of certain listed incidents is relevant and admissible as relationship or context evidence in support of counts 1–3 and 6–8 on the indictment. [5] Evidence of those incidents must not be used in support of the first two tendencies. Whether such evidence may be used in support of the third tendency is a matter for the trial judge. [6]
In arriving at these conclusions, Baker J made clear the distinction between context or relationship evidence and tendency evidence:
The reasoning process for context or relationship evidence is different to tendency reasoning. For example, evidence may be relevant as context or relationship evidence because it explains why the complainant did not respond to the alleged offending in a way that the jury might have expected if they were unaware of the broader context of the relationship. The use of evidence in this way does not engage tendency reasoning. It is concerned with the believability of the complainant’s response, rather than with the tendency of the accused [50]
Similarly, context or relationship evidence may also be relevant to a consideration of the accused’s state of mind without engaging tendency reasoning. For example, it may be necessary for the tribunal of fact to hear broader evidence of the relationship between an accused and the complainant in order for the tribunal of fact to draw accurate inferences about an accused’s state of mind, or their reason for acting in a particular way towards the complainant. Again, the use of evidence in this matter does not engage tendency reasoning. It is not reasoning which involves the tendency of an accused to have a particular state of mind or to act in a particular way [51]
Justice Baker held the uncharged incidents to be particularly relevant as context or relationship evidence, bearing a strong potential to provide assistance to the jury in understanding ‘why the complainant acted as she did’; specifically, ‘why the complainant permitted the accused to return to her in breach’ of the protection order. [62] This included those uncharged incidents which, when considered in isolation, seemed relatively minor:
In the present case, some of the incidents sought to be adduced by the prosecution may, when considered in isolation, seem minor. For example, as the prosecutor acknowledged, incident 13, where the accused is alleged to have thrown a cheeseburger at the complainant, may appear insignificant when considered alone. However, the relentlessness of the accused’s behaviour towards the complainant may be an important aspect of the complainant’s experience of the relationship, which in turn may be essential to an understanding of the complainant’s state of mind, and why the complainant responded as she did [68]
Accordingly, her Honour rejected the accused’s argument that the incidents should be rejected because they involved less serious conduct. [77]
With respect to tendency evidence, Baker J accepted that evidence of accused’s tendency to inflict violence on an intimate partner ‘may have significant probative value in assessing similar allegations of domestic violence’. [86] However, this is not determinative of the probative value of tendency evidence:
[T]he Court must consider two questions when considering the probative value of a tendency of this nature:
(1) Does the evidence that is sought to be adduced, either by itself, or considered with other evidence, strongly support proof of the tendency?
(2) Does the tendency strongly support proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged? [88]
In raising this test, Baker J had difficulty in determining how the tendency alleged is probative of the facts alleged in the relevant offences. [96]–[99]
DPP v Gale [2024] ACTSC 297 (17 October 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Bugmy prinnciples’ – ‘Threat’ – ‘Emotional and Psychological abuse’ – ‘Aboriginal’ – ‘Bail’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Threatening a witness x 1; intentionally and unlawfully choking x 2; aggravated stalking x 1; aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Facts: In July 2023, the male offender pleaded guilty to a series of offences committed against his former female partner (‘complainant’), with whom he had been in an intimate two year relationship. [3]
The offending occurred throughout their relationship, as early as May 2022 when the offender strangled the complainant. While detained in custody for this incident, the offender persistently communicated with the complainant via email in a ‘threatening manner’; specifically, the offender told the complainant ‘to retract her statement to police’ as she had lied due to ‘mental health’. [9]–[10] The complainant complied with these threats and the offender was released on bail. The offender continued to be violent towards the complainant, stalking, choking and verbally abusing her. [13]–[28]
Decision and Reasoning: Two years’ imprisonment. Judge Mossop took note of the offender’s guilty plea [60] and criminal history, with convictions for drink-driving, weapons and cannabis possession and previous conviction of choking the complainant. [58]–[59]
Further, Mossop J considered the offending to involve ‘serious family violence offending and other offending designed to control or manipulate the victim’. [63] Such violence was present throughout the offender’s childhood: ‘his father provided a role model involving violence against women and unlawful conduct’. [64]
DPP v Linsley [2023] ACTSC 255 (12 September 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Intentionally and unlawfully choking x 1.
Facts: The 20 year old male offender choked and rendered unconscious his female intimate partner. [5] The incident occurred at the complainant’s home, during an argument concerning who owned a gaming console. [7] The complainant regained consciousness, finding herself on the ground with the offender’s hands still pushing down on her neck. [7] The offender let go, and the complainant fled her home and informed a youth support worker of what occurred. [8]
Decision and Reasoning: Sixteen months’ imprisonment, Good Behaviour Order (16 months) and psychological treatment [36]. In sentencing the offender, Berman AJ regarded the protection of the community ‘best achieved’ by the imposition of a sentence focused on the offender’s rehabilitation:
If the sentence aids in bringing about a situation where the offender commits no further crimes, then the community benefits. This is one of those matters where it is appropriate to focus on rehabilitation, despite the serious nature of the offender’s misconduct[ 2]–[3]
Acting Justice Berman noted the offender’s young age (20 years old), anxiety, depression, history of suicidal ideation and ADHD-diagnosis, [15] balancing these considerations with the seriousness of the offence:
The objective gravity of the offender’s conduct is such that nothing less than a sentence of imprisonment would properly reflect what the offender did. At the risk of repetition, the complainant was in her own home, he choked her more than once and with enough force to cause her to lose consciousness and be unable to breathe. She had obvious injuries and, even in the absence of a victim impact statement, I am satisfied that she would have suffered psychologically as well. All this, simply because they were arguing over who owned the Xbox [31]
Groves (a pseudonym) v Everette (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 27 (22 February 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal from decision of registrar not to list a matter on an urgent basis for the hearing of an application to temporarily extend a protection order’ – ‘Matter remains listed in magistrates court’ – ‘No decision to refuse to amend protection order’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Supreme court jurisdiction not enlivened’ – ‘Whether court has jurisdiction to hear appeal’
Proceedings: Appeal from Registrar of Magistrate Courts’ refusal to list application for a temporary extension of a final protection order for urgent hearing.
Facts: The female applicant sought an extension of a final family violence order (and temporary extension pending the hearing) due to expire the same day. She sought an urgent hearing of the application and that it be heard in the absence of the respondent.
The Registrar of the Magistrates Court refused to list the matter that day and the temporary application was listed a week later. The applicant was informed that the application in the proceeding must be served on the respondent. The applicant then appealed from the decision not to list the matter on an urgent basis and the requirement to serve documents on the respondent. The appeal was listed on an expedited basis.
Reasoning and decision: The matter was adjourned without making a decision on the application or appeal, as the judge found that the court did not have jurisdiction over the Registrar’s decision.
Loukas-Karlsson J considered the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to deal with the matter under s 92 of the Family Violence Act, determining that the court would have power over a registrar’s refusal to make an amendment to the final order. However, Her Honour found the registrar’s decision in this case did not constitute a refusal and was effectively related to internal listing matters. The fact that the Registrar had listed the application for a week’s time was clear evidence that they had not refused the application.
The applicant had raised r 3803(c ) (Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT)), excluding family violence proceedings from appeals (r 6256), to argue that there was no avenue for an appeal in the Magistrates Court. However, Her Honour determined that the order could be varied at the Magistrate’s discretion as finding otherwise would leave the appellant with no avenue to challenge an order.
Her Honour considered that the appellant had taken reasonable steps to attempt to serve the application and affirmed that the Magistrate had the power to vary or amend the Registrar’s order requiring personal service.
In the addendum, Her Honour noted that the decision not to hear the application for a temporary extension on the day it was made was ‘remarkable’ and left the applicant with no protection.
DPP v McGary [2023] ACTSC 14 (2 February 2023) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Ground rules hearing’ – ‘Pre-trial application’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Special witness provisions’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Young people’
Proceedings: DPP pre-trial application for:
1.
An intermediary to be appointed for the complainant witness and a ground rules hearing be held
2.
The witness (complainant’s father) give evidence by audio-visual link
3.
The complainant’s father give evidence with a support person present
Facts: The respondent had been charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and plead not guilty to each.
The respondent and complainant had been in a relationship for a few months. The charges related to an incident during the relationship where the respondent digitally penetrated the complainant’s anus and had anal intercourse with her despite her objections and resistance. She claimed that she continued in the relationship for a short time following the assaults as a matter of self-preservation, feeling it would be dangerous for her to end the relationship. She sought medical assistance and subsequently disclosed the sexual assault before ultimately making a police complaint.
The complainant’s father, whose evidence included the changes he noted in the complainant’s demeanour after the alleged incident, suffered from a significant cardiac condition.
Reasoning and decision:
•
The Director’s application under s 4AJ of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) for the appointment of a witness intermediary for [the complainant] is dismissed.
•
The witness, [redacted], give their evidence at the trial by audio-visual link from a place in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) that is outside the courtroom, namely the Court’s remote witness room, pursuant to s 32(1)(a) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991(ACT)
•
The witness, [redacted], give their evidence at the trial with a support present, pursuant to s 49(1) of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991(ACT)
a.
Baker J was satisfied that the complainant suffered anxiety, stress, PTSD and elements of depression. While there was no evidence of these conditions continuing, her Honour emphasised that the stress of giving evidence in court could lead to an exacerbation of the issues.
While the conditions were recognised as potentially affecting someone’s ability to communicate, HH found that there was no evidence from the police interview or medical records indicating that the complainant’s conditions had affected her ability to communicate. Her Honour highlighted that the purpose of a witness intermediary is not to reduce stress or be a support person but to facilitate communication and refused the application.
b.
Baker J found that it was in the interests of the administration of justice that the complainant’s father testify via audio-visual link on account of his cardiac condition, as giving evidence would exacerbate stress and impact his health. No unfair prejudice was found as the evidence was not likely to be contentious and the jury could be given appropriate directions.
c.
Her Honour was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice that a support person be provided as the father’s cardiac condition met the threshold of ‘disability’ and the impact of stress on his health would affect his ability to give evidence.
Alvin (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] ACTSC 358 (20 December 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Bail review’ – ‘Change in circumstances’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Drug rehabilitation’ – ‘Offending whilst on bail or facing charges for other offences’ – ‘People who are affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Review of decision of magistrates court’
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant had been refused bail by a Magistrate. He subsequently pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including domestic violence offences against his former partner. The applicant gave evidence that he had remained drug free while in custody, despite drugs being readily available. He was unable to enter a rehabilitation program unless he was released and had the powerful motivating factor that he has been advised by Child Youth and Protection Services he would not have care of his two children until he completed a course of residential rehabilitation.
Reasoning and decision: Bail granted.
The applicant’s recent plea of guilty to a number offences constituted a change in circumstances, removing the risk to the applicant’s partner that she would be prevailed upon by him to withdraw complaints.
Special and exceptional circumstances were also found in the new incentives for the applicant to undertake residential rehabilitation. McCallum CJ reasoned that the fixing of the sentencing date would motivate rehabilitation and, more significantly, Child Youth and Protection Services has notified him that he had to undergo rehabilitation before they would restore care of his two children. This included the infant child he had with his current partner who was victim to some of the domestic violence offences.
While there was evidence of a history of conflict with his current partner, this occurred while he was addicted to ice and the Court accepted that he appears to have remained drug free since being in custody. While some risk of him returning to drugs was identified, McCallum CJ found that it was warranted to allow the applicant the opportunity to rehabilitate.
DPP v Dunn [2022] ACTSC 355 (16 December 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Proceedings: Sentencing following a plea of guilty to:
1.
Common assault (s26 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT))
2.
Choking, strangling or suffocating (s28(2)(a))
3.
Sexual intercourse without consent (s54)
4.
Contravening a family violence order (s43(2))
Facts: The offender and victim were in a relationship. A protection order had been granted on application of the victim but was ‘consensually not complied with’ and the relationship between the offender and victim continued [4].
Common assault: After an argument, the defendant took the victim’s phone from her and she went into the bathroom to take a bath. Further argument ensued in the bathroom, during which the offender put his hands around the victim’s throat without squeezing, before pushing her back against the vanity unit.
Choke, suffocate or strangle: After a verbal argument, the victim tried to make the offender leave. He forced his way into the house and carried the victim over his shoulder into the bedroom while she screamed for help. The defendant shoved her and pushed her down onto the bed, telling her to be quiet and placing his hand over her mouth. The victim had difficulty breathing and sustained a minor lip injury.
Sexual intercourse without consent: The offender visited the victim’s residence after she had been drinking all day and was substantially intoxicated. The victim fell asleep and woke to find the defendant rubbing her vagina. She initially responded consensually to avoid a fight but then feigned being asleep in the hope that by letting it continue, the seriousness of the offence would allow her to leave the relationship. While she pretended to sleep, the defendant had sexual intercourse with her.
Contravene family violence order: Following the sexual assault, the victim blocked the offender’s contact and social media but he continued to contact her. One evening he visited her residence and the victim activated security sirens, making him leave. She later told him to return to take away food he had left outside the house. He attended the premises several times that evening and during one visit the victim’s sister told him to leave. He also spoke briefly with the victim.
Reasoning and decision: An aggregate sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months was imposed.
Mossop J considered the objective seriousness of the four offences and the offender’s subjective circumstances.
The common assault was found to be in the mid-range of seriousness, attributable to the act’s demonstration of dominance and control within an intimate relationship. The strangulation was determined to be in the low-mid range, given the apparently short duration and fact that the victim did not appear to have approached passing out or sustained significant injury. The unusual circumstances of the sexual intercourse without consent charge – being the victim’s deliberate behaviour to first indicate consent and then pretend to be asleep in the hope that the offender would commit an offence – in the context of a relationship which included sexual intercourse led to a finding of low range objective seriousness.
The offender was found to have some relevant difficulties in his background, having been brought up with an alcoholic and abusive father. This moderated the significance of general deterrence slightly subject to the countervailing necessity for specific deterrence given his significant history of past domestic and family violence. This included assaults of the victim and a past partner and her child, and multiple contraventions of protection orders. Mossop J highlighted that while the present offending was not objectively high on a spectrum of seriousness, his criminal history revealed a disturbing pattern of offending directed towards intimate partners, making denunciation, deterrence and recognition of harm significant sentencing purposes.
While the offender had expressed some empathy about the victim and indicated a willingness to engage in family violence intervention programs, the evidence of his ‘patchy’ prior engagement in similar programs weakened his prospects of rehabilitation [41].
TS v DT [2022] ACTSC 137 (10 June 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application to extend protection order’ – ‘Domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of extended litigation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Whether protection order no longer necessary’
Matter: Appeal of decision of a Magistrate to extend the term of a protection order granted to the respondent woman DT, which among other terms prevented the appellant man, TS from residing in the matrimonial home (which protection order was the subject of TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) and an earlier appeal) for a period of 12 months (it having been extended a number of times previously on an interim basis).
Facts: The protection order, among other terms, prevented TS from residing in the former family home (that protection order was the subject of TS v DT [2020] ACTCA 43 (27 August 2020) and an earlier appeal) for a period of 12 months (it had been extended a number of times previously on an interim basis). TS argued DT had the means to obtain alternative accommodation and TS could not afford alternative accommodation, hence should be allowed to reside in the former family home, envisioning either the parties living separately under one roof (as they had between 2008 and 2017) or DT vacating the former family home so that TS could reside there. TS claimed the protection order application was a tactic to force TS to accept an outcome in property proceedings contrary to his best interests. DT gave (largely unchallenged) evidence that TS continued to subject her to daily abuse, and that she remained fearful of TS, particularly if they were to reside under one roof. TS had not filed a response to DT’s then Federal Circuit Court application for property orders in relation to the former matrimonial home and orders had been made in that court that if he did not respond orders would be made unopposed in terms of DT’s application (granting DT sole ownership of the former matrimonial home or proceeds of sale thereof). DT submitted evidence of his psychiatric disorder.
Grounds: (Taken from TS’s application)
1.
The decision is unreasonable and not supported by evidence.
2.
cross jurisdictional issues. The magistrate was totally focused on issues with property settlement under the jurisdiction of the federal circuit court, than what was before him in his own magistrate court, kicking the can into another jurisdiction. It clearly shows that this is a property matter and not a safety issue. corruption of the Family Violence Act in order to get property.
3.
Evidence presented that was beneficial to me was totally ignored.
4.
my lack of accommodation and resulting hardships was not considered.
5.
my human rights and ownership rights have been abused by keeping me out of my house for the last 4 years and now with the order given becomes 5.
6.
sex discrimination by allowing my wife to stay in the house without moving out while i because i am male have to be out for 5 years because of my gender. If men and women are treated equally then she should have been in the house for 2.5 years and then move out because she is permanent APS employee earning higher income than me.
7.
disability discrimination as ample evidence was given about my depression while my wife does not have any disability.
8.
There was much more time spent in the court for property matters than on other matters.as such the court was corrupted by matters not in its jurisdiction and as such its decision is heavily flawed.
Issues:
Whether the only consideration in an application to extend a protection order is whether the protection order is no longer necessary to protect the applicant from family violence (s86 Family Violence Act 2016) or whether the requirement to consider “hardship” to a respondent in s14 of that Act is a relevant consideration on an extension application.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed, decision appealed from affirmed.
While the Magistrate erred in considering s 14 of the Family Violence Act 2016, TS failed to demonstrate that there was any change in the circumstances (including his attitude or the circumstances of the parties reducing or eliminating the risk posed by TS to DT) justifying the grant of the protection order which had been twice affirmed on appeal. Kennett J held that in fact TS’s conduct of the proceedings and focus on his “right” to reside in the home demonstrated a continued need for the protection order, as did his continued minimisation of the 2017 events which resulted in his conviction for common assault and the original grant of the protection order. The parties’ continued conflict in relation to property matters in Australia and in Sri Lanka also indicated a continued need for the protection order.
TS v DT [2025] ACTCA 6 (21 February 2025) – Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against extension of final protection order’ – ‘Family Violence Act 2016, s 86’ – ‘relevant criterion for applications to extend protection orders’ – ‘hardship’
Proceedings: Appeal against extension of final protection order.
Charges: N/A
Facts: The appellant appealed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing an appeal from an order of the Magistrates Court extending a final protection order made against him. The respondent is a protected person under the order.
The appellant and the respondent were married. They separated following a domestic violence incident where the appellant assaulted the respondent and their teenage son while brandishing a knife [2]. Some time later, the appellant and the respondent moved back in together into a house they had jointly purchased. They resumed living together until, following another domestic violence incident, the respondent applied for a protection order against the applicant prohibiting the applicant from being at the family home [3]-[4].
Grounds of appeal: The central complaint made by the applicant in the Court of Appeal was that the appeal judge in the Supreme Court failed to address the grounds before him [65]. The applicant had submitted the order should be varied on the basis of hardship caused to the applicant (he was “practically homeless” [14]).
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the Supreme Court judge had been correct in their interpretation of s 86 of the Family Violence Act 2016 [68]. The criteria that apply to decisions about the making of a family violence order might be relevant to applications to amend an order other than an application for extension [68(e)]. Decisions on applications for extensions are governed by a single criterion – whether the court is “satisfied that a protection order is no longer necessary to protect the protected person from family violence by the respondent”. An application to extend an order is not an invitation to reconsider or redraft provisions of that order.
The Supreme Court judge was therefore not required to consider the appellant’s hardship grounds [71], and the appeal was dismissed [72].
Morrison v Maher (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 63 (1 April 2022) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Character evidence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing monitoring’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Re-sentence following appeal’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5; Property damage; Possess offensive weapon with intent; choking (common assault x 2; Non-consensual sharing of explicit images; Trespass x 2; Property damage; Contravention of a Family Violence Order x 7; Aggravated stalking; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2; Stalking x 3; Attempt to contravene a Family Violence Order; Use of a carriage service to harass.
Proceedings: Re-sentence following appeal.
Facts: The male offender was 43 years old with no prior criminal history. The offending against his wife spanned nearly 10 years and included multiple offences on numerous occasions. The complaints came to light when the victim separated from the offender and sought a Family Violence Protection Order. The offender subsequently repeatedly breached the Family Violence Order, including whilst in custody.
The offender had a traumatic childhood and was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Attachment Disorder and Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He and his former wife married in 2000 and had two children. He successfully appealed his original sentence of a total period of imprisonment of nine years and eight months, with a non-parole period of five years and eight months in Morrison v Maher [2021] ACTSC 312 (8 December 2021) on the basis of conceded errors of reasoning in the original sentencing decision (Maher v Morrison [2020] ACTMC 26 (17 December 2020)).
Decision and reasoning:
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Charge CC2019/6240 is amended by deleting “between 24 March 2019 and 26 April 2019” and inserting “on or about 20 May 2019”.
3.
An aggregate sentence of imprisonment is nine years, four months and 26 days imposed, with a non-parole period to equivalent of 60 per cent of the total effective sentence. As the appellant did not wish the matter to be remitted to the Magistrates’ Court for resentence Mossop J was unable to consider new evidence the appellant sought to adduce, noting that the appellant’s statement and evidence before the first instance court sought to shift a degree of responsibility for his offending to the victim and the controlling nature of the offending meant such behaviours indicated likely entrenched attitudes, making it difficult to assess his prospects of rehabilitation [117].
Mossop J observed at [105]:
The offending involves serious domestic violence offending. It is offending directed to the maintenance of control over the victim. It occurred in the context of a relationship where physical and emotional tools were used to maintain that control. It occurred in the victim’s home. Some of the offences directly involved the children. Others indirectly involved the children through the creation of a climate of fear. The assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending must be made with due regard to that context.
R v Teel (a pseudonym) [2021] ACTSC 183 (17 August 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Intimate images’ – ‘Intimate video footage’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stepchild’ – ‘Technology facilitate abuse’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 4; committing an act of indecency without consent x 8; committing an act of indecency in presence of a young person x 3; non-consensual distribution of intimate images x 7.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: Between1 January 2011 and 22 April 2012 the male accused committed the first series of offences against his then partner, KD. Between 12 December 2017 and 28 September 2018 the accused committed the second series of offences against his then wife, NM. Following her separation from the accused NM discovered evidence the accused had taken photographs of her naked while she was asleep, which she later reported to police. Coincidentally KD’s mother discovered an SD card containing images and videos of the accused committing sexual offences against KD while she was unconscious. The execution of a search warrant on the accused’s premises revealed further images and videos of sexual offences committed against NM, including some committed in the presence of NM and the accused’s son. A number of the images and videos were uploaded to pornographic websites without the consent of either victim, and a number were distributed to another person via email.
The accused was a victim of childhood sexual abuse and multiple psychological report suggested he had symptoms consistent with PTSD, major depressive disorder, ADHD and alcohol misuse disorder, although it was apparent he did not disclose the full extent of his offending to all of the report-writers. He entered pleas of guilty at an early stage.
Decision and Reasoning: Aggregate sentence of 9 years and 10 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Only sentences of full-time imprisonment were appropriate and Burns J noted at [115]:
It is also important that the sentences I impose mark the community’s abhorrence of sexual offending, particularly against intimate partners. All women have the right to feel safe in their domestic relationships. Like all members of the community, they have the right to have their physical integrity respected.
R v Smith [2021] ACTSC 114 (3 June 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Plea of guilty during trial’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threat’
Charge: Sexual intercourse without consent; contravention of family violence order (FVO); the pleas in full satisfaction of the indictment on the basis that the facts relating to a charge of choking, suffocating or strangling, and three transfer charges of common assault, would be taken into account in relation to the contravention of the FVO.
Facts: The offences were committed by the male offender against his female partner over 2 days in March 2020. Their relationship involved domestic violence, including controlling and abusive behaviour by the offender towards the victim. An incident of assault by the offender against the victim in February 2019 led to criminal charges and an FVO was made by the ACT Magistrates Court on 7 May 2019 for 12 months. On the offender’s release from custody after serving a sentence of imprisonment for the assault the parties resumed cohabitation. The victim sought to leave on 24 March, booking herself into a hotel. In a series of text messages the offender threatened suicide and urged the victim to return, which she did. The offender repeatedly applied force to the victim’s throat over a period of 10 minutes causing her to become short of breath, then removed her underpants and digitally penetrated her vagina without her consent and wiped his hands on her face. The offender forced the victim to drive him to McDonalds, and when they returned questioned her, and not accepting her answers, slapped her face. The victim was too frightened to leave. When the offender woke in the morning he elbowed her as he got out of bed, then they went to the hotel to retrieve the victim’s belongings. On the way out the victim was able to seek help from the receptionist who hid her from the offender, and police were called. The victim’s victim impact statement described a range of trauma-related impacts of the offending.
Sentence: 40 months and 12 days (three years, four months and 12 days), with a non-parole period of 28 months, approximately 70 per cent of the head sentence.
Mossop J observed:
[44] The circumstances of this case involve a disturbing example of domestic violence. The offender has a criminal history, including previous offences directed to the current victim, that means he is not entitled to leniency. I do not place any significant weight upon the remorse communicated to the author of the pre-sentence report. I accept that statements unsupported by evidence that is able to be tested should be treated with great caution: see Barbaro v R [2012] VSCA 288; 226 A Crim R 354 at [38] and Imbornone v R [2017] NSWCCA 144 at [57].
R v Heijm [2021] ACTSC 17 (5 February 2021) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Misuse of drugs and alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender applied force to the face of his pregnant female partner during an argument. The following day the victim’s face was observed to be swollen and red, she had a cut lip and blood coming from her mouth and nose. She attended the hospital and underwent a CT scan which revealed a fractured right eye socket and a blood clot around her right eye. The Forensic Medical Officer opined that her injuries were the result of blunt force trauma. The victim was reluctant to report the incident to police.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: An aggregate sentence of 21 months, suspended after 13 months, and a good behaviour order were imposed. This reflected the guilty plea and earlier breaches of good behaviour orders/suspended sentence.
The offending was at the low end of the mid-range of objective seriousness for grievous bodily harm. It was an example of domestic violence, occurred at the victim’s home and while she was heavily pregnant. The offender was on conditional liberty at the time ([11]). Other relevant circumstances included that the offender had a disrupted childhood and an early introduction to illicit drugs. However, notwithstanding the likely lifelong effects of this, the offender was not a young man and there was little evidence of strong motivation to address his drug and alcohol problems. He had a long criminal history, including previous domestic violence offending directed against the same victim. There was a high risk of re-offending ([30]-[34]).
The victim faced difficulty in reporting the offending:
“She disclosed to the hospital staff that she had been injured at home. She also spoke to police but did not want to disclose who had injured her or how it had happened. That evening the offender attended the hospital to see her but was refused entry. The victim told police that she was scared and wanted to speak to the offender in the presence of the police. She did so, before the offender left and she returned inside the hospital.
“DVCS members later contacted police on the victim’s behalf to report that she had been assaulted by the offender. The victim decided that she was prepared to make a statement to police and she participated in a family violence evidence-in-chief interview on 8 February 2020.
R v DQ [2020] ACTSC 352 (18 December 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Initial charge of damaging property by fire with intent to endanger life’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The case concerned the sentencing for the offender’s attempted murder-suicide of herself and her 2 children by setting the house on fire.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A total head sentence of 9 years and 5 months was imposed, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 4 months. This reflected the guilty plea and a degree of cumulation for 2 separate victims with a single set of acts.
The offending was above the mid-range of objective seriousness for attempted murder. It involved the offender’s children in “the most extreme breach of her parental obligations,” and exploitation of her parental authority to achieve the children’s compliance. There was a degree of premeditation. It was a persistent and serious attempt that, but for a neighbour and the fire brigade’s actions, would have been successful ([23]-[28]).
Further, the offending occurred in the context of a long and acrimonious breakdown of the offender’s relationship with her ex-husband and associated Family Court proceedings relating to division of property and custody of the children, which affected her mental health. The offender was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder which was given some weight as it was long-standing and had the potential to distort her thinking to an extent. It was not accepted that the evidence established a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder or chronic adjustment disorder. She had no criminal history, and was at low risk of re-offending. However, the sentence also needed to reflect accountability, denunciation, and just punishment ([29]-[56]).
R v Tonna (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 360 (2 October 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Driving whilst disqualified, repeat offender’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated burglary; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm; Possessing a drug of dependence; Driving whilst disqualified from obtaining or holding a driver licence as a repeat offender; Contravening a Family Violence Order committed on three occasions x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: Mr Tonna was in an intimate relationship with the female victim of the assault for about four years, before it ended in mid-2019. Mr Tonna breached Family Violence Order (FVO) made for the protection of the victim by attending her residence twice while she was sleeping, accusing her of having a man in the room and damaging property. Mr Tonna subsequently hit the victim with his car, causing injuries. Separately, Mr Tonna also broke into a block of units and was in possession of methylamphetamine. He pleaded guilty.
Decision and reasoning: A total sentence of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment was imposed.
The breaches of the Family Violence Order were serious. Refshauge J said at [26]-[27]:
“The reported comment made by Mr Tonna when attacking the victim’s window on 23 July 2019, namely accusing her of having a man in her room, apart from being none of his business, does show he had not accepted the end of the relationship. Difficult though that may be, it is something that he has to confront and acknowledge.
“It should be noted that the actions on that morning also constituted at least three separate approaches to the victim though relatively close together in time, at 6 am, 7:10 am and 7:30 am. Each could have constituted a separate offence. While not formally described in these proceedings as a rolled-up plea, it is appropriate to treat them in this way. I have described that approach in R v John[2017] ACTSC 144 at [106]- [107] and will follow what I there said.”
The assault, a violence offence, was also serious. Refshauge J said at [28]-[29]:
“It was, in the circumstances, in the nature of a family violence offence. It is the duty of courts to denounce such offences. It also shows an exercise by Mr Tonna of power which is, in reality, an abuse of power, an abuse that is often exacerbated by the vulnerability of women. The assault is an example of escalation and the use of the car, which can properly be described in this situation as a weapon, a potentially lethal weapon. Thus, such offending can escalate and lead, as family violence offences often do, to the death of the victim.
“Further, a victim who, as in this case, is on the ground is in a vulnerable situation (R v Hodge[2015] ACTSC 214 at [15]). The victim must have been terrified as her Victim Impact Statement shows. These are serious offences as explained in decisions such as:
Roberts v Smorhun at [120]-[127] and Goundar v Goddard [2010] ACTSC 56 at [32]- [36]. In relation to the assaults in the context of family violence, see R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322 at [65]-[66].”
Kibblewhite v Buik [2020] ACTSC 132 (11 June 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Autism spectrum disorder’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Specific error’ – ‘Step-children’
Charges: Contravening a family violence order x 1
Case type: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of contravening a family violence order protecting his female former partner (the victim) and her two children. A conviction was recorded and he was ordered to enter into a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
The family violence order prevented the appellant from being at the premises where the protected persons lived, being within 100 metres of them or engaging in behaviour that constituted family violence. He had attended her home at her invitation after mediation, they had rekindled the relationship and the police were called when the victim sent a text message to a friend asking her to call police. The victim said she sent the text message because the appellant "had begun playing psychological mind games on her and abusing her in relation to a number of morning after pills he had located" ([12]). The appellant claimed that because the victim initiated the contact, he thought that he did not breach the family violence order. The appellant was self-represented at the sentencing hearing. Further evidence of a forensic psychiatrist’s report was also admitted on appeal.
Grounds:
1.
The (self-represented) appellant was denied procedural fairness in being denied an adjournment by the learned Magistrate;
2.
Her Honour failed to consider whether a non-conviction order was appropriate;
3.
Her Honour placed undue weight on the need for general and specific deterrence and denunciation; and
4.
the sentence was manifestly excessive ([2]).
Held: The appeal was allowed, the Magistrate’s orders set aside and the appellant was ordered to enter into a good behaviour order for 9 months without conviction ([75]).
The appellant had faced prior charges of assaulting and resisting an officer and contravening a domestic violence order which were dismissed under the "Mental Health Act" ([18]). He suffered from autistic spectrum disorder which affected his thinking, increased his anxiety and interfered with his ability to maintain relationships. The offending was at the low end of the spectrum for this kind of offence. Extenuating circumstances included (1) the victim’s invitation to recommence contact; (2) the re-establishment of a physical relationship between the parties over a period of weeks before the conduct in question; (3) the victim’s consent to the appellant being at her home; and (4) the absence of any request for him to leave the house or cease contact prior to the police being called ([68]). Mossop J noted that the power in s17 Crimes (Sentencing) Act to not record a conviction will not often be deployed in family violence cases due to the need for general and specific deterrence, but the extenuating circumstances of the present case and the appellant’s personal matters meant a conviction should not have been recorded ([70]). The Magistrate made a specific error in failing to give consideration to the application of s 17 ([51]).
R v Palmer [2020] ACTSC 13 (3 February 2020) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Choking’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim history of trauma and abuse’
Charges: Burglary x1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x1; Choking a person and rendering them insensible x1;
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male offender was convicted on his pleas of guilty. The female victim was his former partner. He entered her house while she was asleep and remained in the property despite the victim asking him to leave. The offender assaulted the victim after a verbal argument and choked her so as to render the victim unconscious. The offender had a significant criminal history and had been dealt with in the Magistrate’s Court for other offending against the same victim. He attributed his violent and abusive behaviour towards the victim to his struggles to cope with the victim’s psychosocial difficulties due to her long history of trauma and abuse [13].
Held: Justice Elkaim sentenced the accused to 10 months imprisonment for the burglary, 5 months’ imprisonment for the assault, and 20 months imprisonment for the choking offence. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Elkaim J found the offence of burglary to have "just below medium objective seriousness" [6]. His Honour noted that "Although s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) says full-time imprisonment should be a last resort, I can see no alternative here. Domestic violence is abhorrent. Choking a person is a serious crime. The offender should not have been anywhere near his victim. He was already on bail for family violence offences against the same victim. When she told him to leave he should have done so. He should not have assaulted her and he certainly should not have choked her." [15]. The seriousness of the offence and the domestic violence were aggravating factors and a 15% discount for the guilty plea was allowed.
R v Laipato [2019] ACTSC 386 (20 December 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Burglary’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persons with mental illness’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Burglary x 1; Unlawful confinement x 1; Unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling a person x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The male offender was found guilty by a jury of burglary, unlawful confinement and unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling a person. He was acquitted of 6 other charges. The offender and female victim (his former partner) were engaged in SMS text conversation about their relationship in the hours leading to the offending conduct. The victim made it clear that the relationship was over, and the offender was angry as a result of this conversation ([4]). The offender attended the victim’s home after midnight, dragged her from her bed into the neighbouring room and choked her ([5]). The offence was accompanied by a death threat, calculated to increase the victim’s fear. The offender and victim had been in an intermittent relationship since 2012, and have a 4-year old son. In her Victim Impact Statement, the victim explained the impact of the domestic violence. She suffers severe anxiety, PTSD and depression, and sometimes "feels very angry that her former partner hurt her so much, both physically and emotionally". At the time of the offending conduct, she felt helpless, fearful and thought that she might die ([6]-[7]).
Held: The offender was sentenced to 5 years’ and 5 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. The offender has a very lengthy criminal history, including multiple convictions for burglary, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, aggravated burglary, recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, assault and drug and traffic offences ([8]). A significant aggravating feature of the offences was that they occurred in a family violence context ([9]). The unlawful confinement lasted for a minimum of 1.5 hours, and this was "impulsive and without any significant planning". The purpose of the confinement was to manifest his anger towards the victim for ending the relationship and to exercise control over her. During the course of the confinement, the offender inflicted extreme violence on, and instilled fear in, the victim, who now suffers continuing psychological consequences ([10]). The choking conduct was deliberate and sustained, and the victim’s ability to breathe was sometimes completely impaired ([11]).
Although the offender’s childhood was marred by instability, he now enjoys a supportive family relationship ([13]). In a pre-sentence report, the offender indicated that he had no intention to reunite with the victim and claimed to have been subjected to violence in the relationship ([14]). He also has a long history of alcohol and drug use, as well as Major Depressive Disorder, which was described as in full remission in 2017. He was also assaulted while in custody that same year. He plans to reunite with his son, with whom he is believed to have a "healthy, loving relationship" ([17]-[20]).
The offender has also shown no remorse for his current and previous offending. This gave rise to a concern regarding his ability and commitment to avoid criminal offending and to achieve a stable, co-parenting relationship with the victim. During his present period in custody, he did not take any steps to address his drug and alcohol abuse issues or his attitude to domestic violence. Therefore, his prospects of rehabilitation could not be described as good ([21]-[23]).
R v MZ [2019] ACTSC 341 (6 December 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sexual violence’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x1; Administration of certain declared substances x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The complainant woman and male offender were married and lived together. The offender engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant while she was asleep. An audio recording taken during the time reveals that the complainant did not consent to the offender’s conduct and that when she woke up she immediately asked the offender to stop. The offender then left the bedroom, only to return ten minutes later and force a bitter substance into the complainant’s mouth. The substances administered were temazepam and zopiclone.
Judgment: In determining the objective seriousness of the offence, Mossop J noted that "while the offending did occur in a domestic context, the evidence did not establish that it was part of any pattern of oppression of the victim through violence or sexual violence. Nor does it establish that there was any marked inequality of power between husband and wife." [9]. The judge found the offending to also lack other aggravating factors as the offender did not use a weapon or violence, threaten the victim, or have a significant degree of premeditation and the victim was not injured, humiliated or degraded in a way more explicit than the conduct itself [7]. Justice Mossop also did not consider the presence of the sleeping child to be an aggravating factor as the child had no awareness of what was going on. The Court accepted that the offender’s depression and general anxiety disorder meant that "he is likely to find a sentence of full-time imprisonment more onerous than a person without those conditions" [40]. The sexual intercourse offending was held to be in the lower range of objective seriousness for this offence [10]. It was not possible to find on the evidence that the administration of a declared substance offence "was an intention to cause harm to the victim other than through interference with her recollection of events".
The offender was sentenced to 22 months’ imprisonment for the first charge, with the sentence to be suspended after four months upon the offender entering into an undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations for 19 months. For the charge of administering a declared substance, the offender was convicted and sentenced to a suspended sentence of two months’ imprisonment.
R v Teer [2019] ACTSC 334 (29 November 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Act of indecency x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender attempted to strangle the victim when she refused to engage in sexual activity, pushing the victim face-down against a pillow. After releasing the victim and letting her partially roll-over, the offender grabbed the victim’s throat and restricted her breathing for 5 to 10 seconds while threatening if she continued making noise. There was medical evidence of petechial bruising.
Issue: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: Loukas-Karlsson J discounted the penalty for each charge by 5% as the offender entered guilty pleas one week before a re-trial for the offences. His Honour only reduced the sentences by 5% rather than the usual 10% because the offender demonstrated a lack of remorse and tried to justify his actions. It was also noted at [60] that ‘it must be recognised by the Court that the offences committed against the victim had a serious and significant impact upon her. Both the short and the long-term consequences of being the victim of these offences must be acknowledged’.
‘In respect to the offence of an act of indecency…the offender [was] sentenced to a good behaviour order with the core conditions requiring him to sign an undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations’ for a period of 20 months reduced to 19 months on account of the guilty plea. ‘In respect of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm…the offender [was] sentenced to a good behaviour bond’ with the same core conditions for a period of 32 months reduced to 30 months on account of the 5% reduction for entering guilty pleas. [64]
NS v Hotchkis [2019] ACTSC 309 (8 November 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Audio recording’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: 1 x common assault; 1 x contravention of a Family Violence Order
Case type: Appeal against convictions
Facts: The appellant allegedly kicked the complainant’s leg during an argument (assault charge). At that time, the appellant and complainant were married and living together. The complainant had obtained a Family Violence Order against the appellant, which the appellant allegedly breached during the argument by causing or threatening to cause injury to the complainant or by harassing, threatening or intimidating her ([3]). A central issue was whether an audio recording made by the complainant was admissible.
Issue: The appellant appealed the findings of guilt on the basis that 1) the learned Magistrate erred in ruling that the audio recording made by the complainant was admissible pursuant to s 5(2)(d)-(e) of the Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) (LDA), and 2) the convictions were unreasonable and could not be supported by the available evidence.
Held: The prosecution sought to adduce a recording of the alleged events said to have been made by the complainant on her mobile. The appellant objected on the ground that the recording was made in contravention of the provisions of the LDA ([10]). Burns J did not challenge the Magistrate’s finding that a ‘private conversation’, for the purposes of the LDA, existed ([13]), and turned his mind to whether any of the exception provisions applied such that the complainant’s use of the listening device was not proscribed by the LDA ([15]). In his Honour’s opinion, the Magistrate was correct in finding that the exception in s 4(3)(b)(i) was satisfied. The complainant feared that the appellant might seriously injure or kill her, and gave evidence that she had regularly been abused by him. Therefore, there were reasonable grounds for her to consider that the recording was necessary to protect her lawful interests ([21]). His Honour also found that the exceptions in s 5(2)(d) and (e) were established ([22]).
His Honour concluded that even if the recording had been obtained in contravention of the LDA, the proper exercise of the discretion found in s 138 of the Evidence Act would have resulted in its admission ([31]). The evidence was important, both in its own right and as support for the complainant’s evidence, and its probative value was significant. The gravity of the contravention was low, and there was no suggestion to the complainant that she knew that she was violating the LDA. Further, the offences charged against the appellant were serious domestic violence offences ([26]-[27]). At [30], Burns J noted that ‘[a] criminal has no right to keep their offending private, or to claim that the gathering of evidence of their crime is a breach of their privacy’.
As to the second ground of appeal, his Honour agreed with the Magistrate that the evidence established a breach of the Family Violence Order, as the conduct was harassing and intimidating. The Magistrate was entitled to consider the aggression by the appellant towards the complainant at the time she said she was kicked. As there was sufficient evidence on which the Magistrate was entitled to convict the appellant, the appeal was dismissed ([40]-[41]).
Davis v Stephens [2019] ACTSC 271 (1 October 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Victims who are (alleged) perpetrators’
Offences: Common assault x 2; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The female appellant and male victim had been in a relationship for about two years (which was ‘volatile’ and ’they tended to be jealous’ of each other and had numerous ‘fights’) but they had broken up the day before the offending and the appellant had moved out. Early in the morning of the offending, the appellant entered the front door and started punching the victim in the head. The appellant saw another woman on the couch and started moving towards her, so the victim grabbed the appellant’s arm. The appellant bit the victim’s arm hard and grabbed his testicles. She then chased after the other woman before taking the victim’s phone, leaving the house and knocking over the victim’s motorcycle. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to a 12-month Good Behaviour Order. She appealed her conviction on the following grounds:
1.
The Magistrate erred by not properly directing herself to the law of self-defence in terms of both personal self-defence and self-defence of property, and/or
2.
The Magistrate erred by returning inconsistent verdicts by dismissing charges of Damage to property but returning verdicts of guilty on the other charges in circumstances where the evidence was substantially the same between the counts. That error was compounded because the verdict of not guilty should have caused reasonable doubt in relation to the other counts.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal. His Honour found that the Magistrate accepted the evidence of the victim (the victim grabbed the appellant’s arm to stop the appellant coming further into the house, not to prevent her from retreating out of the house) and, as such, the basis for self-defence fell away [76]. Regarding Ground 2, his Honour held that "the bare fact of there being a guilty verdict in relation to some charges arising from a course of events and an acquittal in relation to one or more charges arising from the same course of events is not enough to establish that the guilty verdicts must be unreasonable. It is necessary for the appellant to demonstrate that the different outcomes cannot stand together as a matter of logic and common sense" [79]. His Honour found that the Magistrate was correct in distinguishing the verdicts in relation to events that occurred inside the house from those which occurred outside the house [82].
His Honour further held that the sentence imposed fell within the range of appropriate outcomes and was not excessive, let alone "manifestly excessive" [84].
Kumar v Love [2019] ACTSC 238 (30 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Common assault
Case type: Appeal against convicions
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of two charges of common assault arising out of an altercation with the victim (his wife). The acts of assault included slapping the victim across the face, pushing her forehead backwards striking the wall behind, grabbing her hair, twisting her head and hitting her face on the wall, and striking his daughter’s shoulder. The charges fell into the category of family violence. The appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge and did not testify. The defence argued that the victim fabricated the assaults with the intention of terminating the marriage ([17]).
Issue: The appellant appealed on the ground that the Magistrate’s findings of guilt were unsafe and unsatisfactory on the basis that:
•
It was not open to the Magistrate to wholly reject the appellant’s evidence; and
•
There were a number of significant parts of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution which should have given rise to a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt.
Held: Crowe AJ dismissed the appeal. His Honour rejected the first ground of appeal and saw no basis upon which to doubt the Magistrate’s rejection of the appellant’s version of events. His version of events changed as the interview progressed. For example, after he said that he had not touched the victim at all, he then said that he had tickled her ([35]). In relation to the second ground, the Magistrate was entitled to accept the complainant as a witness of truth, and reject the proposition that the victim fabricated the entire story in order to terminate her unhappy marriage with the appellant. The discrepancy between the victim’s evidence and that of her female friend did not provide a sufficient basis to reasonably doubt the victim’s evidence as to the appellant’s violence towards her. The discrepancy was explained by reference to the extent of the victim’s distress, and the physical and language communication difficulties at that time ([40]-[47]).Crowe AJ dismissed the appeal. His Honour rejected the first ground of appeal and saw no basis upon which to doubt the Magistrate’s rejection of the appellant’s version of events. His version of events changed as the interview progressed. For example, after he said that he had not touched the victim at all, he then said that he had tickled her ([35]). In relation to the second ground, the Magistrate was entitled to accept the complainant as a witness of truth, and reject the proposition that the victim fabricated the entire story in order to terminate her unhappy marriage with the appellant. The discrepancy between the victim’s evidence and that of her female friend did not provide a sufficient basis to reasonably doubt the victim’s evidence as to the appellant’s violence towards her. The discrepancy was explained by reference to the extent of the victim’s distress, and the physical and language communication difficulties at that time ([40]-[47]).
R v EP (No 3) [2019] ACTSC 242 (28 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 1 x threaten to capture or distribute intimate images; 1 x use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence; 2 x indecency; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x common assault; 1 x stalking
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim were in a de facto relationship for approximately 6 years and have a daughter. Despite the breakdown of their relationship, they remained on amicable terms ([7]). The offender was charged with a combination of Federal and Territory offences. The offender pleaded guilty to threatening to distribute an intimate image (Count 5) and using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (Count 6). He was found guilty of 2 charges of committing an act of indecency (Counts 2 and 4) and a charge of sexual assault in the third degree (Count 3). A charge of common assault and stalking were transferred to the Court, which required consideration of the provisions on back-up and related offences in the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ([13]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offences.
Held: The Court sentenced the offender to 3 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months for the Territory offences, and declined to make a recognizance release order with respect to the Federal offence as the offender would still be serving a period of imprisonment for the Territory offences after the expiration of that offence. The charge of common assault was dismissed.
The offender’s subjective circumstances were observed at [32]-[40]. He had 2 daughters from a previous marriage and worked as a self-employed technician prior to custody. However, he had not been working for the past 6 months due to mental health issues, and suffered financial distress as a result ([35]). The offender reported infrequent social use of cannabis and his self-reported alcohol use was deemed ‘risky’ ([36]). The offender showed some insight into the impact of his offending, but attempted to minimise and justify some of his actions ([39]). The offender was also being treated for symptoms of depression ([40]).
The Court did not attribute significant weight to the offender’s expression of remorse ([41]-[44]). He had no relevant criminal history and was of prior good character ([45]-[46]). He pleaded guilty to 2 charges before the trial commenced, and the 2 further transfer charges in the course of the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the Court allowed a discount of approximately 10% in each case ([47]-[54]). The Court also considered the time spent in custody ([55]-[56]), and analysed relevant cases and statistics ([57]-[69]). At [89], the Court found that all the offences committed against the victim significantly impacted her. The Court also took into account the principles of totality, concurrency and accumulation ([70]-[78]), and relevant statutory considerations ([79]-[88]). Significantly, it was noted at [88] that the ‘Courts have made it clear that women must not be treated by men as property’.
Barron v Laverty [2019] ACTSC 198 (31 July 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 5 x contravention of a Family Violence Order; 1 x use carriage service to harass/menace
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In early 2019, the appellant was sentenced to a total of 2 years’ and 8 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months, following guilty pleas to 6 charges, namely, contravening family violence orders obtained by his parents and his ex-partner against him and using carriage service to harass/menace.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on various grounds, including that the total sentence was manifestly excessive and that her Honour erred in her approach to s 110(2)(a) Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) by ordering that the suspended sentences imposed for the breach offences be served cumulatively.
Held: Murrell CJ noted that the appellant had a very significant domestic violence history ([52]). Her Honour considered the appellant’s prior convictions of matters of dishonesty, and contravening protection orders ([25]), for which he had been sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months. Offences 1 and 2 were committed while he was subject to these suspended sentences, and Offence 3 was committed 3 days after his release from prison (for contravening a protection order) ([26]). Further, the appellant’s illicit substance abuse rendered him unsuitable for an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO) ([29]).
Murrell CJ held that the appellant’s continued contraventions of court orders required a significant total sentence to be imposed. Her Honour was not satisfied that, when considering the appropriateness of the total sentencing, the sentencing judge erred in exercising her sentencing discretion ([41]).
The appellant argued that, as the original suspended sentences were concurrent, the sentencing judge fell into specific error when she made them cumulative ([56]). After analysing the interpretation of s 110(2) in some detail, her Honour concluded that the sentencing judge fell into error ([95]). The appeal was therefore allowed and the appellant was re-sentenced to a total sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 months ([100]).
R v NX (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 131 (24 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic violence offences’ – ‘Offender on conditional liberty at the time of offending’ – ‘Presence of child’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social abuse and isolation’
Charges: Sexual assault in the third degree x 1, sexual intercourse without consent x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 3; common assault x 2; capturing visual data in circumstances where the capture is an invasion of privacy and indecent x 1; damage to property x 3.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship since 2017. The offences took place over three days.
While the victim was driving her car with the offender in the passenger seat the offender took the victim’s mobile phone, snapped it in half and threw the pieces out of the car window. That afternoon he headbutted her in the middle of the forehead causing her pain and told her to “get the fuck out” of the house. The victim left the residence on foot with her son as the offender had taken her car keys. [5]
While she was gone the offender slashed two of the car’s tyres with a knife.[6] When the victim returned the offender told her that he had lost her keys and that somebody had popped the tyres of her car. He told her to go inside the house otherwise he would “start shit” with the victim’s flatmate. [7]
Later that night the offender held a Stanley knife with the blade out to the victim’s throat and near her face and directed her to “suck [his] dick”. The victim felt forced to do so and the offender filmed the incident. [8]
Two days later the offender attempted to cuddle the victim but she did not wish to cuddle and did not reciprocate. The offender became angry and began yelling. He punched the victim in the back of the head a number of times. The victim tried to put on a dress and the offender ripped it off her then grabbed her left breast and twisted and squeezed it causing pain and bruising. The victim’s son was present. [10]
Decision and Reasoning: Four years and eight months imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years.
In considering the objective seriousness of the offence, Mossop J observed:
The offending had some of the typical features of domestic violence in that it involved attempts to control the victim’s behaviour and sought to place responsibility for the offender’s unlawful conduct upon the victim. It occurred in circumstances where the victim was particularly vulnerable by reason of the need to care for and protect her small child. [14]
R v Cowling [2019] ACTSC 138 (23 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Intensive corrections order’ – ‘Options’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Unlawful confinement x 1; choking, suffocating or strangling x 1; common assault x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender engaged in controlling and violent behaviour towards the victim during their relationship and had threatened to kill her and her family if she ended the relationship. On 1 November 2016, the offender drove himself and the victim home. He did not allow her to exit the vehicle, pulled her hair and punched her in the face several times. On 21 March 2017, the victim visited the offender’s residence and an argument ensued. The offender grabbed the victim, pushed her down and squeezed her neck. Later that night, the offender choked the victim for ‘about 20 minutes’ and threatened to kill her, he intermittently released his hands [7]. On 22 March 2017, the victim fled and called her brother to get her. The offender later attended the brother’s residence, and made threats and attempted to drive his vehicle towards the brother. The brother was the victim of the common assault charge.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held: The Court considered the objective circumstances of the offending. The unlawful confinement charge was serious as it involved gratuitous violence against the victim, including punching her in the face. The choking charge was also serious as the victim felt that she could pass out and the conduct was accompanied by threats ([27]-[28]). The offender reported that he attended psychological counselling sessions in the past ([34]). His personal circumstances were also taken into account. His parents separated when he was young, he reported a supportive family environment, he has a four year son with an ex-partner with whom he maintains contact, and he is currently employed. He denied any past or current drug use. Although there was an almost decade-old matter for possession of prohibited drugs, no conviction was recorded ([33]). Further, his criminal history was limited. The Court refused to take into account a current family violence charge against him, as he had not yet been convicted and was entitled to a presumption of innocence ([44]-[45]). The offender’s remorse, references provided to the court, time already spent in custody, and sentencing principles, particularly rehabilitation, were also taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence ([38]-[43], [51], [80-[88]). The Court noted that the offender entered pleas of guilty 11 days prior to when the trial was listed to commence for a second time, and allowed a discount of approximately 15% ([46]-[50]). The offences were found to significantly impact the victim. ‘This sort of violence against women must be deterred and must be punished’ ([100]).
The Court recorded the convictions for the 3 offences. The sentence imposed was ordered to be served by way of an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO), which highlights the importance of rehabilitation. The ICO was made on the condition that the offender perform 400 hours of community service, continue to engage with psychological services to manage his mental health, and be assessed for and complete offence specific intervention ([114]).
R v Hudson [2019] ACTSC 110 (2 May 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Blackmail’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Using carriage service to harass x 2; Demand accompanied by threat to endanger x 1; Threaten to inflict grievous bodily harm x 1; Blackmail x 1; Arson x 1; Recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm x 1; Possession of a prohibited item (as a detainee) x 2; Obstructing a public official x 1; Possessing an offensive weapon with intent x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing and application for reparation order.
Facts: The accused had been in a relationship with the female victim for three years, with their relationship ending three months before the offence was committed. After the relationship ended, the accused became a member of a motorcycle gang and the female victim commenced a relationship with her current partner. Upon learning of the victims’ relationship, the offender harassed and threatened his ex-partner (via text message and Facebook). He also threatened and blackmailed her new partner, demanding $5000 for ‘whoring out [his] missus’ [26].
The appellant was arrested for these offences. While in custody, the offender started a fire in his cell and possessed dangerous items out of fear he was at risk from members of rival motorcycle gangs. The offender then injured an officer while being restrained.
Issues: What are the appropriate sentences given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Murrell CJ provided that ‘sentences must deliver appropriate punishment, and speak to the purposes of accountability, denunciation, and recognition of harm’ [81]. In reaching his decision, Murrell CJ consequently considered the high objective seriousness of the accused’s harassment of his ex-partner; the accused’s extensive criminal history; good behaviour during previous periods of imprisonment; his dysfunctional upbringing; and the fact that the accused had allegedly not been receiving proper treatment for his post-traumatic stress disorder.
The accused was sentenced to four years and two months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 33 months.
In sentencing the offender, Murrell J noted:
43. The family violence offences and associated offences bear the hallmarks of many serious family violence matters. At the time of the offences, the offender remained angry and distraught over the breakup of his relationship with Ms Lees. He was jealous, felt a sense of entitlement in relation to Ms Lees, and wanted to control her new relationship. He behaved in a volatile and irrational manner, elevating the danger and threat of danger perceived by the victims. In addition, the offender called his Nomads associates in aid, which would have considerably enhanced the fear felt by the victims.
R v Green (no. 3) [2019] ACTSC 96 (11 April 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Directed acquittal application’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Choking, suffocating or strangling a person x 2.
Proceeding type: No-case submission/Directed acquittal application.
Facts: The accused was charged with two counts of choking, suffocating or strangling his mother while in an argument. While the mother claimed that the accused strangled her in her initial accounts of the incident, she eventually recanted her allegations claiming she had fictionalised them while angry with the accused.
Issues: The proceedings focused on the questions of whether the words ‘chokes’ ‘suffocates’ and ‘strangles’ in s 28(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 should be interpreted with respect to their effects on the victim’s breathing and consequently whether the correct interpretations of these words warrant upholding the accused’s no-case submission.
Decision and reasoning: Although choking, suffocating or strangling is an offence under s 28(2), the terms are not defined within the legislation and prior to these proceedings were yet to receive judicial consideration in the ACT. Loukas-Karlsson J provided, in comparing s 28(2) of the Crimes Act to the corresponding offences in other jurisdictions, that the intention behind the provision may have been to build on the ACT’s existing offences which contain the elements of ‘choke, strangle or suffocate’ in an attempt to ‘lower the threshold of conduct to capture a broader range of conduct, particularly in the domestic violence setting’ [34]. Upon considering this intention along with the elements’ statutory context, ‘authoritative’ definitions from the Macquarie Dictionary and extrinsic material (such as the Explanatory Statement) Loukas-Karlsson J concluded that ‘the relevant element is constituted by the stopping of the breath’ [46].
In considering the accused’s directed acquittal application, Loukas-Karlsson J provided that “a verdict of not guilty may be directed only if there is a defect in the evidence such that, taken at its highest, it will not sustain a verdict of guilty” (Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51) [84]. Since the accused did not stop the victim’s breath on either attempt, his conduct failed to satisfy the necessary element. His Honour therefore concluded that there was a defect in the evidence such that a verdict of not guilty must be directed.
Lewis v Storey [2019] ACTSC 74 (22 March 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Five offences including two counts of common assault, one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one count of choking to render insensible, and one count of possession of an offensive weapon with intent.
Case type: Appeal of sentence.
Facts: The victim and the appellant had been in a relationship for approximately two months. The two counts of common assault were constituted by the appellant putting his hands around the victim’s neck and pushing her into a wall, as well as saying intimidating and threatening words. The appellant also armed himself with two knives (count of possession of an offensive weapon with intent), and had wrapped his arm around the victim’s neck cutting off her circulation and causing her to lose consciousness (count of choking to render insensible). The count of assault occasioning bodily harm was established by the appellant kicking the victim numerous times, grabbing her hair and repeatedly hitting her head on the ground, and slapping the victim’s face. The victim suffered significant injuries ([18]). Notably, a total head sentence of three years and six months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issues: The appellant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that that the sentence with the respect to the charge of choke render insensible and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive. He sought leave to add two grounds of appeal: 1) that the Magistrate offended the R v De Simoni principle by punishing him for attempted murder; and 2) that the Magistrate erred by not applying the full discount of 20% to the sentence imposed for the offence to choke to render insensible. He sought orders setting aside the Magistrate’s order, and that he be re-sentenced in respect of that charge.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal and re-sentenced the appellant, in relation to the offence of choking to render insensible, to three years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 17 months. At [43], the Court held that a head sentence of three years and two months was not manifestly excessive. With respect to the non-parole period of 18 months, the Court found that ‘as expressed as a percentage of a head sentence of 3 years and 2 months of imprisonment, the relevant percentage is approximately 47%’. This is outside the usual range of non-parole periods in the ACT. The proper approach to fixing a non-parole period is to have regard to all the sentencing purposes, the objective seriousness of the offence, and the appellant’s subjective circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation. The proportion of the sentence served by way of non-parole period is a matter of judicial discretion, and ordinarily, the non-parole period is a significant part of the total sentence ([52]). The appellant’s youth was important to his prospect of rehabilitation. It was necessary to fix a non-parole period that is relatively low, but also reflected the total sentence and was consistent with sentencing purposes ([53]).
R v KD [2019] ACTSC 62 (15 March 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Attempted sexual intercourse without consent x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to an offence of attempted sexual intercourse without consent. The accused and the victim lived together for two years prior to the accused entering custody, and had a child together ([21]-[22]). The victim was lying on her back when the accused pinned her down and repeatedly placed a pillow over her face. He then attempted to have non-consensual sexual intercourse with her ([4]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Loukas-Karlsson J found that the offence approached mid-range seriousness. The objective seriousness of the offence was informed by the fact that the accused pinned down the victim and repeatedly placed a pillow over her face ([15]-[17]). His Honour considered the accused’s personal circumstances at [18]-[28]. He was young (24 years old), had been diagnosed with PTSD at the age of five as a result of witnessing domestic violence between his parents, reported to have been sexually abused by a family member, left high school early, worked in hospitality and as a removalist, and used drugs from an early age. The accused accepted responsibility for the offence and acknowledged the negative impacts of his actions. He indicated that he was willing to participate in programs and interventions. In considering the objective seriousness of the offence and subjective matters, his Honour held that the appropriate sentence for the offence of attempted sexual intercourse without consent is two years and nine months imprisonment. However, his Honour reduced the sentence to two years and four months due to the guilty plea.
R v Kennewell [2019] ACTSC 125 (25 January 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Bystander intervention’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the offence of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm after the matter was committed for trial, but before the trial date was set.
The offender attended a friend’s party in the ACT, but started arguing with his girlfriend and left the party. Later that night, the victim heard the argument and, specifically, a female screaming. Concerned for her safety, the victim approached them. The offender stabbed the victim 3 times, and then ran away, followed by his girlfriend. The offender was arrested and granted bail the following day. He was subsequently imprisoned for offences (involving stabbing another person with a knife) committed in NSW while on bail.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Burns J held that the recent offending demonstrated that the offence in question was not an isolated incident. He was also found in possession of an instrument capable of being used to stab after he was extradited from NSW. These matters strongly suggest the need for specific deterrence. His Honour found the offending was unprovoked. The offender’s personal circumstances were also considered. He is a 20 year old Indigenous man, his parents separated when he was young, and he has anger management, drug and alcohol issues. However, he maintains a good relationship with his family, with whom he had remained in contact since he was incarcerated. It was noted that the offender is in good health, has a positive attitude, has employment available to him, and had completed an anger management course. His Honour was satisfied that the offender had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, provided that he ceases carrying weapons, and addresses his anger management, drug and alcohol issues and employment. Even though the offender said that he carries a knife for self-protection, Burns J held that ‘no law-abiding citizen in this country, not associating with criminals or engaging in criminal conduct, needs to carry a knife for self-protection’ ([30]).
Notwithstanding his young age and rehabilitation prospects, Burns J held that the sentence needed to reinforce the fact that using knives to seriously harm others will be met with harsh punishment. Nothing less than full-time imprisonment would sufficiently address the sentencing requirements ([31]). The offender was convicted and sentenced to 3 years and 1 month imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months.
KIC v Tennant [2019] ACTSC 145 (23 January 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Child contact’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant had previously been served with an Interim Family Violence Order (the Order). Among other things, the Order prohibited the appellant from being within 100 metres of the protected person, his wife, except when handing over their child. The wife alleged that shortly after being served, the appellant breached the Order by walking in front of her house at a time she was home. She claimed that when the appellant was walking past her property, he stopped and looked into the residence. She also claimed that the appellant returned twice after leaving and began to follow her when he saw her outside.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the breach in the Magistrate Court. This plea was later withdrawn, but then reinstated during these proceedings.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: During the proceedings in the Magistrate Court, the appellant attempted to tender a document detailing the events of the day the offence allegedly occurred. The magistrate rejected this document on the grounds that it sought to ‘traverse’ the plea of guilty [9]. While Burns J disagrees with the grounds on which the magistrate refused the document, His Honour believed it should have been rejected because it was self-serving. The contents and rejection of the appellant’s document formed the main focus of Burns J’s judgment.
Burns J had great difficulty accepting most of the appellant’s evidence both in the document and that which the appellant gave before Burns J. The appellant claimed that he visited the area near to his wife’s residence to find a spot for his daughter to wait for him to pick her up the next day. The appellant also claimed that he had recently undergone a procedure to his eyes which resulted in him being unable to see more than one metre in front of him. Burns J provided that given the condition of the appellant’s eyes and the fact that he visited the residence at 10 pm, ‘it does not make any sense whatsoever that in his circumstances’ he visited the residence for the reason he claimed [13].
Burns J also found it difficult to accept the appellant’s submissions as he had made no challenge to the Statement of Facts that were read before the magistrate. The Statement of Facts did not include any of the above claims and instead provided that the appellant walked passed the protected person’s house while he was out walking to take care of his health (as the appellant claimed to be diabetic). His Honour concluded that he was “not now prepared to find that the events occurred in the way in which the appellant now suggests that they did. On that basis, [Burns J] propose[d] to proceed on the basis that the circumstances of the offence went as put before the magistrate’ [17].
Burns J dismissed the appeal, commenting ‘it has not been demonstrated that the sentence [was] manifestly excessive, nor [was Burns J] satisfied that there was any relevant error which would have affected the outcome of the proceedings before the magistrate’ [21].
R v Vincent [2018] ACTSC 347 (12 December 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Vulnerable people’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Minor property damage x 2
Facts: The offender was in a relationship with the complainant for 12 years. They had a child, aged seven at trial. The relationship ended late 2017. The offender visited the complainant’s home to visit children. He entered the house, damaged property, and assaulted the complainant with a baton by hitting her on the arms and on the back of the head.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, one month’s imprisonment for the first count of damaging property, and one month’s imprisonment for the second count of damaging property. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The term of imprisonment for the offence of assault was suspended on the condition that the offender enter a Good Behaviour Order for 18 months.
The offender had a significant criminal record, which included a contravention of a protection order against the complainant for which he already served a period of time in custody. He grew up in difficult circumstances – his mother had a drug addiction and did not adequately support him. The offender also had a long-standing history with drugs and alcohol which was exacerbated by his separation with the complainant. Whilst in custody, he completed a drug and alcohol awareness program and commenced an anger management course. His Honour noted that domestic violence is an ‘appalling crime’ and ‘offends the most basic norms of society’ ([11]). There were positive signs of rehabilitation, such as the fact that the offender was in a stable relationship, had ongoing accommodation and employment, and was a valuable member at his workplace. The complainant had sent an email to the offender saying she had ‘moved on’ and wanted the offender to attend their child’s graduation. His Honour stated: ‘Expressions of reconciliation by victims of domestic violence are often a regrettable reflection of the dominance of the abuser. However, in this case, primarily because the offender is in a new relationship, I am prepared to accept the sincerity of the victim’s request.’
Fallon v Baker [2018] ACTSC 319 (9 November 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant had a history of heavy drinking. Despite having been prescribed medication to assist with his alcohol dependence, the appellant was heavily intoxicated on the night the offence occurred. His intoxicated state led him to punch his wife in the back on at least four occasions while she was pretending to sleep and to later threaten to strangle their youngest child to stop him crying. This threat prompted the mother to call the police.
In the magistrate’s judgment, he noted that the wife declined to participate in the Family Violence Evidence-in-Chief interview as she did not want the appellant to know she was the one who had contacted the police. The wife declined out of fear of losing the children due to the husband’s past behaviour and conduct in the relationship. The magistrate attributed the appellant’s behaviour to his dependence on alcohol.
Along with appealing the magistrate’s sentence, the appellant also sought to admit further evidence and to have the sentencing proceedings reopened.
Issues: (1) Was the sentence imposed manifestly excessive; and (2) did the magistrate fail to consider or give proper weight to the subjective circumstances of the appellant; (3) should further evidence be admitted and the sentencing proceedings reopened.
Decision and reasoning: Mossop J dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence imposed by the magistrate. His Honour was satisfied that the magistrate considered all possible consequences of a conviction for the appellant’s employment and other subjective circumstances and that the appellant’s submissions failed to demonstrate otherwise. As such, the appellant’s first ground for appeal was unsuccessful.
When considering the second ground, Mossop J used the wife’s fear of making a complaint and of losing her children, and the history of similar events during the relationship as evidence ‘that the offending conduct in the present case occurred in a context of typical domestic violence cases …[This] history of conduct within the relationship indicates that the offending conduct had a more objectively serious character than it would have had if that history was not present’ [21]. Mossop J used these facts to reject the appellant’s claim that the magistrate’s sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to the third issue, the appellant sought to admit evidence detailing the consequences of the conviction on his employment and job prospects given that the conviction caused his employer to consider terminating the appellant’s employment and the appellant to consequently resign. Mossop J, however, did not consider the admission of further evidence to be in the interests of justice as the evidence was of limited scope and addressed a matter already considered by the magistrate.
R v Williams [2018] ACTSC 354 (18 October 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Intensive correction order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Unlawful confinement x 1; Threat to kill x 1; Inflicting actual bodily harm x 1; Common assault x 2; Aggravated dangerous driving x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing and application for an intensive corrections order.
Facts: At the time the offences were committed, the accused was on bail in relation to family violence charges against his partner. The accused’s bail conditions prohibited him from assaulting or intimidating his partner, being near her, having contact with her and from attending her home. While on bail, the accused assaulted his partner, unlawfully confined her and threatened to kill her. When attempting to flee the home, the accused also struck his partner’s current boyfriend with a car, recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm.
Issues: (1) What are the appropriate sentences given the accused’s offences; and (2) is an intensive correction order appropriate for the accused?
Decision and reasoning: Burns J rejected the submission for an intensive corrections order on the grounds that the accused’s imminent deportation from Australia (due to his visa being revoked) made it unlikely that the accused would comply with the order. The accused was instead sentenced to two years and four months’ imprisonment. Burns J reached this decision by considering the relatively low seriousness of the harm inflicted upon the victim; the victim’s vulnerability; and the fact that the accused was on conditional liberty at the time of committing the offences.
Burns J notes at [5] [The offence of unlawful confinement] ‘involved an attempt by you to control the victim by means of intimidation. Some factors which are relevant to determining the objective seriousness of this offence, but also relevant to all of the offences, were that the offences occurred in the victim's own home and, in fact, in her bedroom. With respect to the particular offence, there was force and intimidation used to stop the victim leaving the room. It occurred in the context of threats being made to the victim. The victim was five and a half months pregnant at the time with your child. There was also another child in the house at the time of the commission of these offences. The offences which occurred with regard to KS, in the first tranche of offending, involved a breach of trust because you were only able to gain access to the premises because you had been in a relationship with the victim.’
R v Simonds [2018] ACTSC 265 (21 September 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Choke, suffocate or strangle x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Unlawful confinement x 1; Threat to kill another person x 1.
Proceeding type: Trial by judge alone.
Facts: The accused and the complainant went out to dinner. At about midnight the accused, apparently intoxicated, went out alone. Some hours later, he returned and although not obviously intoxicated, soon became violent. He dragged the complainant, hit her in the face, held a knife to her throat, and detained her in the flat for about four hours. During this time, he threatened to kill her, and demanded information from her about her mobile phone.
Issues: Whether or not the events as described by the complainant occurred; Whether or not the Court could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: A verdict of not guilty was entered as to each of the six counts in the indictment. The Court was satisfied that the complainant ‘was probably telling the truth’, but noted that the required standard was beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, his Honour could not accept the complainant’s evidence. The emails, particularly, appeared to seriously contradict her version of events, such that they had a significant effect on her evidence being accepted beyond reasonable doubt.
R v Rose [2018] ACTSC 237 (23 May 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aiding and abetting the commission of an offence - caused damage to two vehicles by fire and intended to cause, or was reckless about causing damage to the vehicles.
Proceeding type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender aided and abetted the co-offender to set fire to his former partner’s car using accelerant, which caused the destruction of the vehicle. As a result, an adjacent vehicle also caught fire and suffered damage.
Issues: Burns J determined the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Decision and reasoning: In determining the sentence, the Court took into account the age of the offender (19 years old), the fact that he had no previous convictions, his attempt to contact the owners of the vehicle to apologise for his actions, the contents of the Pre-Sentence Report (which revealed that he had continued family support and a positive peer network), the fact that he was in stable employment and that he was considered to be at low risk of re-offending. His Honour also took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, albeit that it was not entered at the earliest opportunity. These matters were relevant to a finding that he had good prospects for rehabilitation ([10]). A sentence of imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort, and accordingly, the Court ordered a Good Behaviour Order for a period of 12 months and recorded a conviction. He was also required to complete 150 hours of community service and accept supervision of ACT Corrective Services for that period.
SA v Badenhorst [2018] ACTSC 216 (21 May 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Intermediate sanctions’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing options’
Charges: Assault x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against decision to refuse adjournment; appeal against sentence.
Facts: In the course of sentencing submissions, the Magistrate was not willing to accept a submission relating to the likely impact of a conviction upon the appellant’s employment. The appellant sought an adjournment to obtain evidence to put before the Magistrate. The Magistrate refused the request.
Issues: Whether the Magistrate fell into error in refusing the application for an adjournment.
Decision and Reasoning: Burns J upheld the appeal.
The Magistrate’s refusal of an adjournment was unreasonable so as to bespeak error ([5]). Having received fresh evidence (a letter from the principal of the school where the appellant was employed), Burns J held that, if a conviction was recorded, she would lose her ‘working with children’ approval and, consequently, her job as a teacher. Such an outcome would be disproportionate compared to the nature of the offence ([11]).
His Honour took into account the appellant’s character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition, as well as the seriousness of the offence and extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed.
His Honour noted that there is no rule of law that a domestic violence offence cannot be the subject of non-conviction order ([15]). Consequently, the conviction was set aside and a non-conviction order made. The Court also imposed a good behaviour order.
Purcell v O’Reilly [2018] ACTSC 60 (9 March 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Separation’
Proceeding: Appeal from Magistrate’s sentence order following conviction for damage property causing damage of no more than $5000.
Grounds:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
2.
The Magistrate misapplied s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act (2005) (ACT) in failing to make a non-conviction order.
3.
The Magistrate erred in refusing to consider a non-conviction order on the basis that as a family violence offence the matter was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a non-conviction order. He also submitted the sentence was manifestly excessive as the appellant was entitled to a sentencing discount as without the appellant’s confessions the offence would have been difficult to prove.
Facts: The offence occurred when the appellant man was a guest in his former wife’s home so that he could take his son to football training in the morning. The appellant demanded to see his former wife’s phone and refusing, she retreated to her bedroom and locked the door. The appellant threatened to break the door down if she did not unlock it. The appellant’s daughter blocked his access to her mother’s bedroom door. The appellant went to the lounge room, picked up a flat screen TV and threw it to the ground, picked up the glass table it had been sitting on then threw the table onto the TV screen, causing it to shatter. His former wife declined to make a statement to police and police proceeded with the matter based upon the appellant’s admissions at the scene.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Magistrate was simply identifying this particular offence as involving family violence, and taking place in the complainant’s home where a child was present. On that basis, she concluded that the particular offence is too serious to be dealt with under s 17. This is not a case in which, but for Mr Purcell’s admissions, either the offence would never have come to light or it would have been difficult to prove in a defended hearing. The judge noted that in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302, Johnson J (with whom Hunt AJA and Latham J agreed) said at [77]:
An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control.
Penfold J observed:
[48] … the incident giving rise to Mr Purcell’s conviction, and its source in Mr Purcell’s determination to examine the victim’s mobile phone, seem to reflect both an attempt to exercise power or control over his former wife and a belief that this was justified. For this reason, the incident as a whole may legitimately be treated as more serious than it would have been if the TV had been destroyed in anger or frustration generated by some event unrelated to conflict between Mr Purcell and his former wife.
R v KN [2018] ACTSC 111 (26 February 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Intentionally and unlawfully choking a person so as to render that person insensible or unconscious x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant headbutted his wife, causing her to become unconscious. He tightly wrapped a piece of rope around her neck, causing her to again become unconscious. She had lost control of her bodily functions and urinated ([1]). The incident occurred in 2013. The complainant was unwilling to provide a statement previously, because she wanted to continue in her relationship with the defendant ([4]).
The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges ([5]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 2 years and 9 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended ([17]). Mitigating factors included the defendant’s: pleas of guilty; limited criminal history; childhood trauma; mental health issues; and engagement in psychological services ([11]). Burns J considered that the defendant had very good prospects for rehabilitation ([16]).
R v Kulczycki [2018] ACTSC 9 (30 January 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Blackmail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘History of breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Revenge porn’
Charges: Blackmail x 1; Stalking x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and complainant were in a relationship for 2 years. They sometimes filmed consensual sex ([6]-[7]). After the relationship broke down, the defendant sent the complainant emails and text messages threatening to release the video unless the complainant paid him $20,000 ([8]-[9]). The complainant obtained a protection order, and the defendant breached the order three times ([11]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Elkaim J remarked on the seriousness of the blackmail in the context of a domestic relationship at [16]: ‘blackmail of the type involved in this case must be regarded as serious. This is not so much because of the amount of money demanded but because it involved a threat to breach the privacy of a relationship and to cause severe embarrassment to the complainant’. While the defendant had promising prospects of rehabilitation and had taken steps to reduce his consumption of illicit drugs, Elkiam J considered that a period of imprisonment was necessary ([21-[22]). The defendant was sentenced to a head sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently with 6 months’ imprisonment for stalking [22].
Justice Elkaim remarked on the seriousness of the blackmail in the context of a domestic relationship at [16]: ‘blackmail of the type involved in this case must be regarded as serious. This is not so much because of the amount of money demanded but because it involved a threat to breach the privacy of a relationship and to cause severe embarrassment to the complainant’.
Parkinson v Alexander [2017] ACTSC 201 (4 August 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Administration offence’ – ‘False accusation’ – ‘Interpretation of evidence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Making a false accusation x 3; Public mischief x 6.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant and ‘EK’ had been in a relationship. After the relationship had ended, the defendant made allegations to the police that EK had sexually assaulted her, had followed her in his car, and had broken into her house ([5]-[12]). The police made investigations, but eventually determined that the accusations were false ([14]).
At trial, the prosecution relied upon the following evidence to show the defendant’s tendency to make false complaints: the fact that there were many allegations supported the inference that each one was false; a complaint of sexual assault made by the defendant against a neighbour when she was 17; and three other allegations made by the defendant against EK’s family ([26], [29]). The defendant was convicted of two counts of making a false accusation and three counts of public mischief (for wasting police officers’ time). She had not yet been sentenced.
Issues: One issues was whether the Magistrate correctly applied tendency evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partially upheld. Justice Refshauge found that the Magistrate applied the tendency evidence incorrectly for two reasons.
•
First, the sequence in which the Magistrate addressed the incidents was not logical. The Magistrate first found that the defendant made two false allegations in 2014. The Magistrate then used the evidence of the 2014 allegations to support reasoning that earlier accusations, in 2013, were also false ([52]).
•
Second, the Magistrate reformulated the tendency evidence to conclude that it showed a ‘vendetta against the family’ ([32], [45]). This was not how the prosecution framed the evidence in the notice of tendency evidence, and the defendant was not given an opportunity to respond to this argument ([45]). Therefore, the evidence was inadmissible ([68]).
Note: this case was subsequently remitted to the Magistrates Court for retrial before a different Magistrate, see Parkinson v Alexander (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 290 (9 October 2017).
R v Rappel [2017] ACTSC 38 (24 February 2017) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women as a vulnerable group’
Charges: Murder x 1; Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Contravene protection order.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and the deceased had formerly been in a domestic relationship and had a child together ([9]). The deceased had taken out a domestic violence order (DVO) against the defendant the day before the defendant killed her ([17]-[19]). When the defendant received the order, he bought an axe, drove to the deceased house and cut her neck with the axe, severing her spine. She was holding his newborn child at the time, and her two sons were in the same room ([33]-[36]). The axe severed her sister’s finger, which formed the basis of the grievous bodily harm charge. He then assaulted her brother, which formed the basis of the assault occasioning bodily harm charge ([37]-[39]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed. The defendant raised the mitigating factor of diminished responsibility.
Decision and Reasoning: Burns J described the objective circumstances of the murder ‘within the worst category of cases of murder, and would warrant a term of life imprisonment’ [133].
Burns J said at [131] ‘For many years now, the courts of this country have spoken of the need to protect members of the community, and particularly women, from domestic violence, and the need for courts to take seriously offences of domestic violence. If these statements are to have meaning, if the protection offered by the [Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT)] is to have significance, it is incumbent on courts to recognise the heinousness of offences of violence committed in retribution for a member of the community invoking the protection provided by the Act.’
His Honour took into account as mitigating factors the defendant’s plea of guilty, his experience of abuse as a child, and his long history of mental health issues ([103]). Other contributing factors included his use of anabolic steroids, methylamphetamines and a personality disorder, but his Honour did not place significant weight on these circumstances ([120]). His Honour also had regard to victim impact statements tendered by the deceased’s family ([124]-[128]). His Honour concluded (at [151]):
‘The present offence of murder was vicious and cowardly. Those who witnessed your violence will have to live with their memories for the rest of their lives. Your actions deprived three children of their mother, including your own infant daughter Ayla. You have effectively deprived Ayla of both of her parents. The effects of your actions will be felt for decades to come. There is a very substantial community interest in retribution, deterrence and punishment. This can only be achieved by a very substantial period of imprisonment.’
His Honour imposed a sentence of 32 years and 2 months’ imprisonment.
Note: the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT) referenced in this decision has been repealed and replaced by the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT).
R v Ennis [2016] ACTSC 72 (4 April 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Good behaviour order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Hearing: Breach of good behaviour order.
Facts: In 2012, Mr Ennis was involved in an altercation with his female partner of 27 years. He was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was subject to a good behaviour order for 2 years with a condition to perform 100 hours of unpaid community service work. In 2014, Mr Ennis breached this order by failing to perform the community service work (‘the first breach’). The good behaviour order was extended by 12 months and Mr Ennis ordered to perform 108 hours of community service work (See R v Ennis [2014] ACTSC 369 (4 November 2014)).
However, before the end of the good behaviour order in 2015, Mr Ennis breached the order again (‘the second breach’). Mr Ennis and his partner, who had been drinking alcohol, argued outside their house. Mr Ennis pulled her by her hair and dragged her inside. He let her go and slammed the door in her face (common assault). In March 2016, a magistrate sentenced Mr Ennis to 5 months imprisonment, suspended immediately, and made a good behaviour order for 18 months with various conditions. His Honour then referred the matter to Refshauge J for breach of the good behaviour order that had been extended upon Mr Ennis’ first instance of breach.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Ennis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: While Mr Ennis complied with nearly 2 years of the original good behaviour order without breach constituted by further offence and nearly 9 months of the additional period ordered by Refshauge J, Mr Ennis had failed at his attempts at rehabilitation. This offending was also facilitated by the consumption of alcohol. Further, the nature of offending was serious. Per Refshauge J, ‘It is, as his Honour Magistrate Morrison said, a family violence offence, and it is serious in that it was the commission of the offence against the same victim, although many years apart. It is a similar offence also, in that it is an assault and another family violence assault. Nevertheless, it is a much less serious version of the offence, although in this case, because of the earlier history, it attracted a sentence of imprisonment, although suspended’. It was relevant that Mr Ennis’ partner had moved away and it was unlikely that the relationship would resume in the near future (See [15]-[22]). Accordingly, the duration of the good behaviour order was extended to 2 years to run from the date of this decision.
R v BNS [2016] ACTSC 51 (24 March 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Accused has conviction for intimidating witness’ – ‘Evidence via audio visual link from remote location’ – ‘History of family violence by accused against witness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’
Hearing: Application for evidence to be given by audio visual link from a location outside the courtroom.
Facts: The accused, BNS, pleaded not guilty to 2 counts of incest and 5 counts of committing an act of indecency on TN. At the time of offence, BNS was in a relationship with SN, the mother of TN, and was the step father to TN. SN was called to give evidence at trial. She was expected to give evidence of complaint made by TN and relationship evidence (of her and the child’s relationship with BNS).
Here, an application was made for SN to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location. BNS was physically abusive to SN during the relationship. SN said she had ongoing anxiety and depression which would inhibit her ability to give her best evidence if she was required to give evidence in the courtroom. In light of the history of family violence, she felt intimidated in front of BNS. Finally, BNS also had a conviction for intimidating a witness.
SN did not have the right to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location under Part 4 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act because she was not a child, complainant, or a similar fact witness. In the absence of statutory provision, it was noted that there is no power at common law for a court to allow evidence to be heard by video link: R v Hampson [2009] EWCA Crim 1569. However, s 32 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act empowered the court to direct a person to give evidence by audio visual link from a remote location.
Issue/s: Whether the application to give evidence outside the courtroom via audio visual link should be allowed under s 32 of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed as the pre-conditions set out in s 32 were met. First, the necessary facilities were available (See [10]). Second, the evidence could be more conveniently given from a remote location by video link. SN’s aversion to the accused would make it more convenient for her to give evidence remotely. It was also more convenient for the court to have the evidence given free of the inhibitions troubling SN (See [12]-[13]). Finally, BNS did not object to SN giving evidence remotely and, accordingly, it could not be said that it would be unfair to the accused for SN to give evidence remotely. Although the general rule is that prosecution witnesses should give evidence in the presence of the accused, it was noted that there have been numerous past occasions where the giving of evidence by video link has not been unfair (See [14]-[22]). Further, there were no discretionary matters requiring the application to be refused (See [23]-[30]).
R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (26 February 2016) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of a good behaviour order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Young people’
Hearing: Breach of a good behaviour order.
Facts: Mr Curtis assaulted his female partner by punching her a number of times, causing her bruising. He was charged with assault occasioning bodily harm. In October 2013, Refshauge J sentenced Mr Curtis to 12 months imprisonment, wholly suspended, and imposed a good behaviour order with a probation condition for 2 years (See R v Curtis [2013] ACTSC 291 (16 December 2013)). In April 2015, within the period of the good behaviour order, Mr Curtis was found in possession of a number of electronic and other items reasonably suspected of being stolen. In December 2015, he pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court and was sentenced to a further good behaviour order for 18 months with a community service condition. The magistrate referred the breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour obligations to the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Curtis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: The offence subject of the breach was of a different character and less serious to the offence that Mr Curtis was originally sentenced for. This offending was not part of a life of serious criminal offending but a stupid criminal offence prompted by his perceived necessity. Mr Curtis had otherwise complied with the good behaviour order. His Honour was satisfied that this justified re-sentencing Mr Curtis rather than imposing the suspended sentence (See [45]-[49]).
In re-sentencing Mr Curtis, Refshauge J noted the need for general deterrence because the original offence was of family violence. He further noted that ‘Vindication of the victim is always important in family violence offences and, again, the expression of the court's displeasure with the offending by the imposition of imprisonment will meet that objective’ (See [52]). His Honour further noted Mr Curtis’ youth, his employment, and the birth of his child into a stable relationship (absent any family violence) (See [50]-[55]). Mr Curtis was re-sentenced to 12 months imprisonment to commence from 15 August 2015 (to take into account pre-sentence custody), wholly suspended. His Honour further imposed a good behaviour order for 18 months with probation conditions and a community service condition.
Note: the defendant subsequently breached his good behaviour order (although the breach was not related to further domestic and family violence) and was re-sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended (see R v Curtis (No 3) [2017] ACTSC 101 (27 April 2017).
R v Williams [2015] ACTSC 406 (18 December 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Brother’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After arguing with his brother, Mr Williams chased his brother down the street. He caught up with his brother and hit him with a guitar, rendering him unconscious. Mr Williams’ brother was found to have a depressed skull fracture and a haematoma on his brain. He underwent surgery and spent three weeks in hospital before being moved to a rehabilitation facility.
Decision and Reasoning: This was a serious offence, especially because it involved family violence. The offence was not premeditated but was aggravated because it took place at a time when Mr Williams was already subject to a NSW good behaviour order made in connection with an earlier family violence offence (against Mr Williams’ former partner). Further, Mr Williams tried to minimise his actions. The injuries sustained by his brother were quite serious (See [11]-[22]). Penfold J also had regard to Mr Williams’ subjective circumstances including his extensive criminal history (See [23]-[26]). He noted that Mr Williams had attended some anger management and drug and alcohol programs but these had not had an effective rehabilitative impact (See [27]-[31]).
In terms of general deterrence, His Honour noted, ‘This is an offence of a kind that requires general deterrence, and in some cases at least, general deterrence may be effective. I note defence counsel's comment that general deterrence in relation to the grievous bodily harm offence is particularly relevant in relation to “glassing” offences, but I consider that deterring violence within the family is at least as important as deterring alcohol-fuelled violence between strangers or acquaintances’ (See [33]). Personal deterrence was also relevant on the facts (See [34]). Penfold J sentenced Mr Williams to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
R v Pikula [2015] ACTSC 380 (12 November 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Brother’ – ‘Causing grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, causing grievous bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After consuming a significant quantity of alcohol, Mr Pikula, a man with Aboriginal and Tongan ancestry, began arguing with his step-brother (Mr Mapa). Another step-brother, Mr King, tried to intervene but was stabbed with a knife in the back of his thigh by Mr Pikula (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). The following evening, Mr Pikula again became highly intoxicated and argued with Mr Mapa. He stabbed Mr Mapa twice in the back. The knife wounds punctured his lung (grievous bodily harm).
Decision and Reasoning: Refshauge J sentenced Mr Pikula to 22 months imprisonment for assault occasioning actual bodily harm and 27 months imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm (cumulative). His Honour also recommended that a condition of Mr Pikula’s parole would include a requirement that he undergo treatment and counselling for alcohol abuse. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J noted the importance of both general deterrence and specific deterrence (in light of his violent criminal record). The offending was serious here and warranted denunciation. While it had some association with alcohol, which may provide some opportunity for rehabilitation, this could not be said to overwhelm the other purposes of sentencing. His Honour also had regard to Mr Pikula’s troubled childhood and his long history of alcohol abuse.
At [1], ‘There can be no doubt that one of the marks of a civilised society is that its members can be protected from violence in their lives. While there can, of course, be no guarantee of such protection, nevertheless, the community expects that appropriate steps will be taken to maximise such protection. This is especially true of the need for safety within the family’.
R v NQ [2015] ACTSC 308 (14 October 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Act of indecency without consent’ – ‘Assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Act of indecency without consent, assault with intent to engage in sexual intercourse.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The male offender and the female complainant were married. They had been in a relationship for 17 years and had 3 children. The offender and the complainant had been drinking alcohol together when the offender requested oral sex. The complainant declined and went to bed. Five minutes later the offender walked into the bedroom and demanded the complainant perform oral sex on him. She refused repeatedly and started crying. The offender said, ‘Do you think your crying is going to get you what you want? It’s your job to do it’. He then took all his clothes off and positioned himself on top of the complainant. She pushed the offender off but he continued to talk angrily. The offender then dragged the complainant across the bed and pushed her head close to his penis. He tried to slap her twice but was blocked by the complainant. She fell off the bed, hurting her head. The offender continued to demand oral sex. He pinned her down on the bed and yelled, ‘You need to suck me off, it’s not about love or intimacy’. The complainant, crying, pleaded for him to let her go and the offender replied ‘What can you do about it?’ The offender then became upset and the complainant called the police.
Decision and Reasoning: These offences were objectively serious. The assault lasted almost an hour and included physical and mental abuse. Robinson AJ noted, ‘I take into account the fact that prior sexual relationship is relevant in assessing the seriousness of sexual assault. Here it is not a sexual assault by an unknown stranger which would give rise to extreme terror in the mind of the complainant’ (See [8]). His Honour also took into account a number of subjective circumstances. There had been some measure of reconciliation between the offender and the complainant. While these events were not an isolated incident of abuse and this mitigated the leniency that could otherwise have been shown in this case, the offender had taken opportunities to assist himself and took responsibility for his offending (See [9]-[14]).
In sum, His Honour noted: ‘I have come to the view that only a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate to the level of offending in this case. There is a need to punish this offending and to send a clear message by way of general deterrence to others that participation in sexual behaviour is a matter of choice not subjugation. I have also determined to deal with the offending as if it were only one transaction and impose concurrent sentences’ at [15]. The offender was sentenced to one year and nine months on the charge of unlawful assault and seven months imprisonment for an act of indecency. These sentences were wholly suspended upon the offender entering a good behaviour order for three years.
R v Stanley [2015] ACTSC 322 (12 October 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts), damaging property, engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (two counts)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and the victim were in a relationship. After drinking three bottles of wine one night, the offender smashed a bottle and jar because ‘he was angry’. The victim decided to stay at her mother’s house and that it was best to take the offender’s car keys. When she went to get them, the offender grabbed her by her hair, threw her to the ground, stood over her, stomped on her face and chest and punched her a number of times. During the attack, the offender told the victim ‘This is what you get for lying to me’ and threatened to kill her. He then put his hands around her neck and tried to strangle her (count 1). When the victim tried to phone someone for help, the offender snapped her mobile in half (count 2). About 15 minutes after the initial attack had ended, the offender grabbed the victim by the back of her neck, smashed a mug over her head and hit her multiple times with the smashed mug. After the mug broke, he went to get another mug and again hit her, causing a large laceration to the victim’s head (count 3). After the victim had a shower, the offender told her ‘Now that I have done that to you, we are going to do everything my way from now on. It is not your way, it is going to be my way, okay.’ He then put his penis into the victim’s mouth despite her resisting and turning her head away (count 4) and forced her legs apart and had sexual intercourse with her (count 5).
The next morning the offender asked the victim what had happened. When she told him and asked to be taken to the hospital, he refused until later that day. The offender later apologised to the victim and told her, ‘If you tell the police then we will not see each other again’.
In relation to this conduct the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (counts 1 and 3), one count of damaging property (count 2) and two counts of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (counts 4 and 5).
Issue: What sentence the offender should receive.
Decision and reasoning: Refshauge ACJ began his judgement by emphasising the seriousness of domestic violence and the considerations relevant to sentencing offenders: ‘Domestic violence is a scourge in the Australian community. It has become so problematic that significant efforts are being made at the Federal, State and Territory levels to address it. Clearly, the courts have a part to play in denouncing such conduct and making it clear that in a civilised society it is completely unacceptable. In sentencing offenders who commit domestic violence against their partners, the courts must use the objectives to be achieved in sentencing: general deterrence, specific deterrence, accountability of the offender and vindication of the victim, as well as denouncing the conduct. Nevertheless, at all times a sentence for any criminal offence must be appropriate to the circumstances of the offence and proportionate to the criminality of the offence and the culpability of the offender’ ([1]-[4]).
The offender had a long history of alcohol abuse and alcohol related violence. He had previously been convicted of a violent assault on his previous partner, two offences of drink driving and driving while disqualified. While in custody, the offender completed the SMART Recovery Program and First Steps to Anger Management Program to address his alcohol abuse and violence. He also accepted that he had an alcohol problem and expressed remorse about the offending and its impact on the victim.
References about the offender were provided by his employer (he was employed as a wards person in a hospital), his brother-in-law and his pastor. All three references described him as a respectful and caring person of good character. His brother-in-law and pastor also commented on the positive changes the offender made while in custody. He developed his faith in God, was obedient and respectful of authority, enjoyed the education and rehabilitation programs available and was very remorseful about his conduct in harming the victim. The victim also prepared a victim impact statement in which she expressed her continued serious emotional trauma and its impact on all areas of her life including friends, family, work and finances.
The offending was very serious with the whole of the events constituting a ‘brutal, extended attack on a victim which not only left her with physical scars but with social and mental scars that will last for some considerable time’ ([70]). The facts the assaults occurred in the context of a domestic relationship and the victim suffered injuries were aggravating factors. The circumstances in which the property was damaged also made the offence more serious: ‘To deny a victim of a brutal assault the opportunity to gain assistance would have increased the terror she must have experienced and has aggravated the offence’ ([67]). The sexual assaults violated the victim’s integrity and were a serious intrusion into her personal life despite occurring in the context of a domestic relationship.
In sentencing, Refshauge ACJ emphasised the need for special and general deterrence to denounce the offences committed by the offender. While the offender had taken positive steps in rehabilitation, this could not overbear the other purposes of sentencing. Rather, it was taken into account in setting the non-parole period. The seriousness of the offending meant that imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence. After considering the principle of totality and ensuring the offender was not punished twice, Refshauge ACJ sentenced him to a total sentence of six years’ imprisonment, backdated for the time already spent in custody. A non-parole period of three years and three months was also ordered. The total sentence comprised of:
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Count 1: one year and eight months’ imprisonment;
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Count 2: one year imprisonment, cumulative as to four months on the sentence for count 1;
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Count 3: two years imprisonment, cumulative as to one year on the sentence for count 2;
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Count 4: three years imprisonment, cumulative as to one year and three months on the sentence for count 3;
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Count 5: three years and six months imprisonment, cumulative as to one year and nine months on the sentence for count 4.
Alchin v McInerney [2015] ACTSC 300 (25 September 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case referenced now superseded legislation, however the statements of principle are unaffected by the legislation change.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in an ‘off and on relationship’ with the female victim for 10 years. A Domestic Violence Order was made in favour of the victim against the appellant. Subsequently, one evening between 9.13pm and 10.04pm, the appellant made 10 telephone calls to the victim. He left one message saying: ‘You wait cunt. Your house is smashed and that fucking cunt you’re rooting. I am going to kill that cunt’. The appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity to the breach and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 22 months with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The offence was very serious but the objective circumstances did not warrant a term of imprisonment of 22 months. As per Robinson AJ: ‘Significantly, there was no face to face confrontation, no infringement of the prohibition to be on the property of or within 100 metres of Ms BC and no weapon was involved. Ms BC did not answer the telephone calls’. His Honour referred to R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172 as being a factually similar case. His Honour acknowledged that compliance with any type of protection order is essential to protect members of the community from violence and anti-social behaviour. It is therefore open to the Court to impose a stern penalty to achieve this end. However, the punishment must still be proportionate to the offending and here this could not be said to be the case (See [25]-[26], [32]-[35]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 14 months imprisonment. Robinson AJ stated: ‘In my view substantial weight should be accorded, in the circumstances of this case, to deterring the offender and others from committing the same offence. His conduct was a defiance of the orders of the Court. This was by no means the first such defiance. There is value in our society upholding all orders of Courts. There could be said to be even more value in upholding protection orders in the context of the role that protection orders now play in our society in all jurisdictions’ at [54].
McClung v Vince [2015] ACTSC 255 (27 August 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Common assault, damage to property.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his former female partner had four children together. They separated two months prior to the offending but the appellant had been staying at the family home for a week prior to the offences. On 6 November 2014 at about 11pm, the appellant banged on his former partner’s window demanding she wake up. She let him in and went back to bed (where her 5 year old daughter was sleeping). The appellant went to the bedroom and punched a hole in the door. He started yelling and abusing his former partner. Despite the cries of the 5 year old daughter to stop, the appellant restrained his former partner and started hitting her. He woke up the couple’s 3 year old son. The appellant then hit the bedroom door several more times and started yelling again. The couple’s 13 year old daughter called the police. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for common assault and 6 months imprisonment for damage to property, suspended after 8 months. The appellant had previously been convicted for offences of assault against his former partner in 2006 and 2012. These offences were also committed under the influence of alcohol.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing magistrate did not fail to consider the possibility of part of the sentence being served by way of periodic detention. Second, although counsel submitted that the appellant had been compliant with bail conditions imposed in 2014 (namely, sobriety), the magistrate was entitled not to place any great weight on this consideration. This was particularly so given that the appellant had assaulted his former partner before under the influence of alcohol. Finally, counsel for the appellant submitted that previous assaults had been dealt with by a non-custodial sentence and to impose a sentence of full-time imprisonment for at least 8 months was an oversized incremental step. Robinson AJ stated: ‘The argument regarding the oversized incremental step is answered by the proposition that the courts dealing with the earlier assaults allowed leniency (perhaps too much) in a desire to rehabilitate the appellant. Further there is no sentencing principle that requires courts to impose sentences incrementally according to some upward scale’ (See [18]).
R v Guy [2015] ACTSC 237 (5 August 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of good behaviour order’ – ‘Childhood disadvantage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Damaging property, assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Proceeding: Resentencing
Facts: The offender was charged and pleaded guilty to damaging property for breaking a window in his partner’s house. He was convicted and sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. This conviction breached a good behaviour order that was made after he was convicted for assaulting his partner. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended upon complying with a good behaviour order for two years. The good behaviour order was cancelled as a result of the breach and the six months’ suspended sentence was imposed, but was ordered to be served concurrently with another term of imprisonment. The offender successfully appealed this sentence. A sentence of six months’ imprisonment wholly suspended on the condition of a 12-month good behaviour order was imposed on appeal. A good behaviour order for the offence of damaging property was also made.
The offender was subsequently convicted of traffic offences, constituting a breach of both good behaviour orders. As a result, the good behaviour bond imposed for the offence of damaging property was extended for a further 12 months. He was also resentenced to six months’ imprisonment on the assault charge, suspended for a period of 12 months on the conditions of a further good behaviour order for 12 months and 80 hours of community service. This effectively increased the length of the good behaviour orders as well as requiring the offender to perform community service work.
The offender again breached these good behaviour bonds when he was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm. This conviction arose when the offender choked his partner and threw a chest of drawers that hit her in the head. In relation to this offence, he was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended after nine months with a good behaviour order for two years thereafter.
Issue: How should the offender be resentenced for the final breach of the two good behaviour orders?
Decision and reasoning:
The offender suffered a difficult childhood in which he was sexually abused and had great difficulties in school as a result of having ADHD and dyslexia. After leaving school at 14, he was homeless for many years. He also had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. The offender also suffered from various mental illnesses, including major depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality traits, for which he was receiving treatment. He had a long criminal history with 122 offences on his criminal record. This reduced towards the time of offending in question and suggested his criminality was abating.
The final breach of the good behaviour orders was serious when considering ‘the offence was a family violence offence committed on a complainant who had been the victim of earlier offences of a similar type committed by [the offender], for which the current Good Behaviour Orders owe their genesis’ ([37]). However, there was a need to take into account the offender’s mental health. Refshauge J considered that ‘the option for rehabilitation can be given greater prominence without minimising the need for some level of special and general deterrence’ ([38]).
Refshauge J cancelled the good behaviour orders in accordance with s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT). The conviction of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was confirmed. The offender was convicted to six months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for a period of two years. A good behaviour order was made for two years with the conditions that the offender would be supervised, must complete 180 hours of community service, and must participate in the Detention Exit Community Mental Health Outreach Program for three months. The conviction for damaging property was also confirmed and the offender was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment, taking into account the time already spent in custody.
Refshauge J concluded by telling the offender, ‘If you are genuine in your efforts, the Court will support you in this, as I hope I have shown you, but if you are not, then you can expect further custodial sentences and a revolving door’ ([57]).
For Refshauge J’s previous decision on appeal, see Guy v Anderson (No 2) [2013] ACTSC 245.
R v McLaughlin [2015] ACTSC 201 (16 July 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Contravening a protection order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contravening a protection order, resisting a public official
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: When the offender returned home he tripped after his dogs walked in front of him. In front of his wife (the victim) and children, the offender became angry and started kicking the dogs. After the victim asked him to calm and stop hurting the animals, the offender punched her in the stomach (count 1). Approximately 10 minutes later when they were discussing the punch, the victim said ‘You grew up watching your dad hit your mum and now you think it’s okay to hit me too’. In response, the offender punched her again to the back of her head, causing her to fall to the ground. He then punched her twice more, kicked her in the head five times and stomped on her head. As a result, the victim suffered a large cut to her forehead requiring seven stitches and a bloody nose (count 2). Both children were present during this assault. When the offender was arrested by police he became aggressive, spat at one of the officers (count 3) and resisted the arrest (count 4). Approximately 3 months later a domestic violence order was made against the offender restraining him from engaging in conduct that constitutes domestic violence to the victim, including offensive, harassing or threatening conduct. The offender subsequently had an argument with the victim where he was abusive and threatening towards her (count 5). When someone attempted to intervene, the offender threatened to kick him. At the time this offence took place the offender was on bail for the previous 4 offences.
In relation to this conduct, the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to two counts of common assault (counts 1 and 3), one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (count 2), one count of resisting a public official (count 4) and one count of contravening a protection order (count 5).
Issue: What sentence should be imposed.
Decision and reasoning:
In assessing the objective seriousness of the offences, Burns J took into account that the offender was significantly larger than the victim, that the offences occurred in the context of a domestic relationship and that the children were present during the attack. Burns J considered the offender’s conduct to be ‘cowardly, shameful and rightly characterised as criminal’ ([7]). A victim impact statement was also prepared by the victim, explaining the trauma and anxiety the offences caused her and the children. Burns J noted that ‘As is so often the case in domestic violence offences, the long term burden of your violence will not only be felt by your wife, but also by your children’.
The offender’s childhood was marred by exposure to domestic violence and he ‘was disappointed in [his] actions and how [he] exposed [his] children to that type of domestic violence, which [he] despised as a child’ ([22]). He had secure employment to return to after being released from custody. The offender had a history of drug and alcohol abuse and mental health issues including suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. Due to these concerns, he was assessed as being at moderate risk of reoffending. However, Burns J noted that the offender had been attending numerous rehabilitation programs for his alcohol and drug abuse and was receiving treatment for his mental health issues. Expert psychologist reports noted that the offender’s behaviour was ‘strongly influenced by [his] background of mental health issues arising out of [his] traumatic childhood, particularly [his] ongoing complex post traumatic stress disorder’ and that he was unable to make calm or rational choices at the time of offending ([32]).
The offender demonstrated a degree of remorse in his statements to psychologists and his guilty pleas. Therefore, the sentence was reduced by 25 per cent as a result of these early pleas. The offender’s mental illness was causally connected to his offending and to his abuse of alcohol. It also impaired his mental functioning at the time of the offences and reduced his moral culpability by impairing his ability to exercise appropriate judgement and make calm and rational choices. Full time imprisonment would have a deleterious effect on his mental health and prospects of rehabilitation. Burns J concluded that the need for general and specific deterrence should be moderate in light of the offender’s reduced culpability as a result of his mental illness.
Burns J convicted and sentenced the offender to:
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Count 2: Nine months’ imprisonment to be served by way of periodic detention;
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Count 5: Three months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence for count 2, suspended after 13 days on the condition of complying with a good behaviour order for 18 months;
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Count 1: Good behaviour order for a period of nine months;
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Count 3: Fine of $600.00; and
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Count 4: Good behaviour order for three months.
R v Ross [2015] ACTSC 22 (1 July 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, burglary and choking a person so as to render them insensible or unconscious
Proceeding: Bail
Facts: While on bail for previous offending, the accused allegedly entered his ex-partner’s (the victim) home and attacked her, placing his hand around her neck and squeezing until she felt light headed. At the time these offences were committed, the accused was subject to a protection order in favour of the victim. The breach of this order was a serious offence for the purposes of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) (the Act) and therefore the presumption against bail did not apply to the accused. In order for bail to be granted, the court must have been satisfied that there were special and exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail under s 9D(2) of the Act.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was not granted. The charge of contravening a protection order was ultimately withdrawn because of procedural issues relating to service. However, s 9D of the Act still applies where a person is on bail for a serious offence of which offence that person is acquitted. Therefore, the fact that the charge was withdrawn did not amount to special and exceptional circumstances in favour of granting bail. The accused allegedly committed very serious offences of family violence. He had a history of offending, having previously been convicted of two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, four offences of assault, two offences of contravention of a protection order, numerous traffic offences including drink-driving offences and fives offences of failing to appear in accordance with a bail undertaking. He had also shown an unwillingness to obey and disrespect of court orders. Given the accused’s history and the real risk that he would not attend trial and reoffend, bail should not have been granted even if there were special and exceptional circumstances in favour of granting bail.
R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172 (23 June 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a protection order’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Threat to kill, breach of a protection order x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was charged with and pleaded guilty to 2 counts of breaching a protection order (where the protected person was his former female partner) and making threats to kill. On 18 January 2015, the offender contacted the protected person, asking to see his son. She refused because he had been using ice and was acting aggressive and demanding. The offender then sent her a number of text messages that were indecent, offensive and aggressive. The protected person ignored these messages as he had sent similar messages in the past. However, the next day, the offender called again and left a voice mail and text messages threatening to kill her.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment, including 12 months imprisonment for the breaches of the protection order and 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for the threat to kill. This sentence was appropriate in light of a number of factors. The offences required punishment and denunciation, and considerations of general and specific deterrence were also significant. Refshauge J accepted that the offender genuinely sought rehabilitation but noted that agencies the offender had been referred to in the past had had no significant impact on his behaviour. His Honour took into account the plea of guilty, the offender’s mental health and accepted that the offender felt remorseful (See [44]-[48]).
His Honour further took into account the seriousness of the offences, which were particularly concerning as they were committed in the context of family violence. First, the threat to kill was serious. The use of ice, earlier harassment and changed tone from the earlier conversation all showed the serious intent of the offender and the fear that this threat was likely to have had engendered in the victim. The fact that this offence was brought on by the use of ice was not a mitigating factor but Refshauge J took into the offender’s desire for rehabilitation and the, so far unsuccessful, attempts he had made at rehabilitation. The denial of access to his son also provided explanation for the offence but was not a mitigating factor in any way (See [37]-[40]). Second, the breaches of the protection order were also serious, albeit less serious than the threat to kill. The breaches were deliberate and intentional. While they were not the most serious versions of the offence, they were not made by personal approach, they were still serious as the contact was made over two days and was abusive and indecent (See [41]-[42]).
Refshauge J stated:
There is no doubt that the addiction to drugs creates significant problems for the community, as well as for the user and his or her family. When the drug is methylamphetamine, or ice, the violence that it also generates can create further problems, particularly if there are stressed family situations leading to family violence. When mental health issues are added to the situation, it creates great complexity in trying to deal with the multiple issues that arise (See [1]).
R v Peadon [2015] ACTSC 132 (14 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community views’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Charge/s: Recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, burglary x 2, common assault x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: On two occasions on one evening, the offender attended the residence of his former partner. On the first occasion, the offender entered through a window and engaged in a physical confrontation with his former partner’s boyfriend. The offender then left the premises. He returned later in the evening and picked up a knife from the kitchen. The offender started a physical confrontation with his former partner’s boyfriend. To protect himself, the victim placed his hand on the blade of the knife and sustained a serious injury to his hand.
Decision and Reasoning: On the burglary charges, the offender was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and 16 months imprisonment, with the balance suspended and a good behaviour order imposed. On the charge of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, the offender was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, wholly suspended upon entering into a good behaviour order. In imposing this sentence, Burns J took into a number of considerations that warranted greater punishment. His Honour noted that, ‘these offences [were] family violence offences and as such must be treated very seriously by [the] Court. [The] community views with great abhorrence the infliction of violence by people in family relationships’. It was also significant that the offences occurred in the victim’s own home. In mitigation, Burns J took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, the steps taken by the offender to address his alcohol abuse (which was a significant factor in all his offending), his remorse and general prospects for rehabilitation.
LE v SX [2015] ACTSC 79 (11 May 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application for a domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic and family abuse in the context of family law proceedings’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Order sought: Application for a domestic violence order (DVO).
Appeal type: Application for extension of time in which to bring an appeal from the decision of the Magistrates Court dismissing an application for a domestic violence order.
Facts: On 25 February 2014, the applicant applied for a DVO against her former male partner. Both parties were represented. The transcript of the proceedings extended over some 86 pages. The applicant gave evidence in chief of a number of incidents involving the applicant and her daughter being followed and stared at by the respondent, being grabbed and punched by the respondent, and the respondent sending threatening messages. Of particular relevance to the appeal, the applicant gave evidence of an incident that occurred on 1 December 2010 at the time of the couple’s separation. The applicant thought the respondent was overseas but he appeared in her house and dragged her into the hallway, sat on top of her, and smashed her head onto the floor (‘the December 2010 incident’). The next day the applicant made an application for housing assistance to the Commissioner for Social Housing stating that she was homeless and escaping violence from her partner.
On 27 May 2014, the magistrate found that the principal incidents of which the applicant gave evidence did not occur or did not constitute domestic violence. In particular, the magistrate was satisfied that the respondent was not in Australia on or about 1 December 2010 and he did not return until after the applicant had gone to the Commissioner for Social Housing. Although the applicant had been injured by someone at the time she went to the Commissioner for Social Housing, Her Honour was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent caused that injury.
The application for leave to appeal was not filed until 2 January 2015 (a period of 7 months delay). The applicant was prompted to lodge this appeal because of an adverse decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court on 18 December 2014. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court related to parental responsibility and living arrangements for the child of the applicant and the respondent. One of the reasons the applicant sought to overturn the decision of the Magistrates Court was that this decision had an impact on the findings and outcome in the Federal Circuit Court decision.
Issue/s: Whether the grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success and whether the extension of time within which to appeal should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Mossop Ass J dismissed the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. His Honour accepted that, at least in relation to the December 2010 incident, there was a reasonably arguable ground of appeal based on documentary evidence presented to the Supreme Court on appeal. Essentially, this paperwork demonstrated that there was at least a possibility that the dates originally provided were incorrect and the respondent could have been in the country at the time of the incident (see [82]-[92]).
However, there were other factors telling against the grant of an extension of time: the length of time since the decision; the limited prospects of ultimately obtaining an order even if domestic violence was ultimately established; the interests of SX in not having a long finalised decision reopened; and the availability of protection under the Act if circumstances warrant it. The way in which the Federal Circuit Court relied on the findings and decision reached in the Magistrates Court was a matter of significant concern to the applicant but the correctness of the Federal Circuit Court’s approach and conclusions was a matter to be resolved in that appellate hierarchy (See [112]-[113]).
Note: this case was affirmed on appeal (see LE v SX [2017] ACTCA 34)
McElholum v Hughes [2015] ACTSC 78 (24 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victim and witnesses’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his former partner had commenced family law proceedings relating to parenting orders for their son. The appellant, a solicitor, was self-represented while his former partner (the complainant) was represented by a firm of solicitors and a barrister. While at the Federal Magistrates Court, the appellant knocked on the interview door where his former partner and her counsel (the solicitor, barrister and a law clerk) were conferring. He asked if they had considered his proposal. When he was told they would be another 10-15 minutes, the appellant replied ‘that’s not good enough’. The barrister attempted to close the door with her left wrist but the appellant forced it open and said, ‘who are you?’ in a raised voice. The barrister called security. 30 minutes later she complained of pain in her wrist. The appellant was charged with assault and pleaded not guilty. The magistrate found the charge proved and fined the appellant $100 and ordered the appellant to pay costs of $69, a criminal levy of $50 and a victim’s service levy of $10.
Issue/s: The appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence. The notice of appeal was nearly 70 pages long and contained many convoluted and repetitive grounds of appeal. Two relevant grounds were:
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The evidence of the witnesses called by the prosecution was tainted by interest or was perjured (appeal against conviction).
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The magistrate erred in placing significance on the location of the assault namely, the court building (appeal against sentence).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence were dismissed. First, one of the grounds in relation to the appeal against conviction was that the evidence given by the barrister, the solicitor, the law clerk and his former partner was tainted because they all had an ulterior motive i.e. to gain advantage in the family law proceedings. Refshauge J held that there was no evidence to support this allegation and stated, ‘the incident was reported to a security officer of the Commonwealth Law Courts promptly, the evidence of the various parties was not identical, usually a matter indicative of truth, because identical recollections of different witnesses, especially as to inessential facts, is often an indication of concoction and it is not explained what benefit [his former partner] would obtain from such a device’. Further, the allegation that the witnesses perjured themselves was unsustainable. The evidence given was corroborated by the CCTV footage and by the evidence of the other parties(See [301]-[323]).
Second, in relation to the appeal against sentence, the magistrate did not err in placing significance on the fact that the assault took place in a court building. Refshauge J stated, ‘while [the appellant] certainly possessed the right to be within the bounds of the court precinct, this is not an unlimited right and does not give him the right to assault other people. A court precinct is a place where people should be able to expect the law to be observed at all times’. Further, His Honour quoted from Grimshaw and Mann [2013] ACTSC 189, ‘intermediate Courts of Appeal have regularly referred to the fact that violent offences committed in public are more serious’. However, this was not to state that assaults occurring in a private home are not serious (See [372]-[377]).
Note: this case was affirmed on appeal (see McElholum v Hughes [2016] ACTCA 37 (29 September 2016)).
R v Seears [2015] ACTSC 109 (23 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Intentionally cause damage to property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary (armed and intent to cause harm).
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: S left her male partner, the offender, to be in a relationship with another man (the victim). Thereafter, the offender sent many abusive and threatening text messages to S. On the morning of 26 May 2013, the intoxicated appellant drove to the victim’s house, where S was now living. He was carrying a 1.2 metre spirit level and a bag with an angle grinder, cable ties, electrical tape, a kitchen knife and a timber-handled holding knife. The offender used the spirit level to smash the window of the victim’s bedroom, where the victim and S were asleep. The victim asked the offender what he was there for to which the offender replied, ‘You know what I’m here for; I’m going to kill you’ and ‘You’re sleeping with my wife’. He continued to scream at the victim as the victim walked away. The offender then struck the victim with the spirit level on the left arm and left side of his head, causing significant lacerations. S tried to intervene as the offender punched the victim in the face, threatening to kill him. The police were called and the offender removed.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 3 years and 1 month imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. In imposing this sentence, Murrell CJ took into account a number of considerations. First, the offender had a history of taking the law into his own hands. He was on bail for common assault at the time of the offences and had previously committed offences of common assault. Second, Her Honour took into the offender’s subjective circumstances namely, the offender’s intention to ‘settle down’ by continuing his employment in the building industry and removing himself from his involvement in the Rebels Motorcycle Gang. However, she noted that it was surprising that someone at age 63 had not ‘learnt his lesson from a series of prior similar incidents’. Third, the objective circumstances were of at least moderate seriousness (See [26]-[33]). Finally, Her Honour took into account general sentencing considerations (See [35]-[40]).
R v Saedam [2015] ACTSC 85 (1 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Views of victims’
Charges: Engaging in sexual intercourse without consent (3 counts), assault, assault with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse, theft
Proceeding: Bail
Facts: The applicant and his wife (the victim) lived together for some time after migrating to Perth from Syria. While living in Perth, the victim left the applicant and moved into a refuge as a result of domestic violence in the relationship. After the applicant and victim reconciled, they moved to Canberra where their relationship remained volatile. One day the applicant went into the bedroom and had sexual intercourse with the victim, despite her asking him not to, attempting to push him away and crying throughout. Later in the day, the applicant verbally abused the victim and threatened to withdraw his immigration sponsorship of the victim’s family to come to Australia. He then again had intercourse with the victim, who continued to cry but otherwise did not move. The next day, the applicant slapped the victim and dragged her by her hair, rolled her on her back and again had intercourse with her. The victim continued to struggle, hitting the applicant’s chest and pushing him away. The applicant was charged with three counts of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent, one count of assault, one count of assault with the intent of engaging in sexual intercourse and one count of theft. He pleaded not guilty to each charge.
While in custody, the victim visited the applicant every two or three days. She subsequently made a statutory declaration that she was ‘a little tired and confused’ at the time of making her complaint to the police. She sought to change her statement that all sexual intercourse was consented to and that she had been drinking before the assault. The victim wrote a letter to the Court in respect of the bail application, in which she said she did not object to the applicant being granted bail. She also stated that she was not pressured into writing the letter, that the applicant was not harmful to the community, and that as a pregnant woman she did not want her child to grow up knowing their father was in gaol.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was granted on conditions including that his family pay a surety of $5000, he surrender travel documents, he not contact the victim, and that he reside in Perth.
The offences that the applicant was charged with were serious. However, Refshauge J determined he could not assess the strength of the Crown case given the absence of much evidence and the victim’s damaged reputation as evidence because of her apparent retraction of the complaint. The applicant also had a substantial cash surety available to him and proposed to live with his parents. He had no criminal record. His departure from Canberra to Perth immediately after the offences were alleged was an indication of his intention to flee. However, this risk could be mitigated by imposing conditions on bail such as the surrender of travel documents, that he report to police and be prohibited from being at a place of international departure. Refshauge J accepted that the applicant was likely to commit further violent offences against the victim if he had contact with her. However, this could also be mitigated by the applicant living in Perth and on the condition that he not contact the victim. The Crown’s submission that the applicant could intimidate and interfere with witnesses if bail was granted was rejected. The fact the applicant could withdraw his sponsorship of the victim’s family was unlikely to be affected by his bail status. Further, the victim had already retracted her initial complaint, with no evidence from the prosecution that this was a result of intimidation from the application.
R v Elphick (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 23 (1 April 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of personal protection orders’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threatening to commit arson’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Threatening to commit arson, stalking, breach of a personal protection order x 2.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offences arose out of the breakdown of a relationship between the offender and his former female partner. The relationship ended acrimoniously, particularly in relation to the care and access arrangements relating to the care of the couple’s child. The offender’s former partner obtained Domestic Violence Order against the offender and her parents obtained Personal Violence Protection Orders. Subsequently, the offender and his former partner had an argument over the telephone over the care and access arrangements for their daughter. The offender went over to the house of his former partner’s parents and began shouting and swearing at his former partner. He produced a cigarette lighter and threatened to burn her parent’s car. Further, the offender pleaded guilty to a count of stalking on the basis of 25 phone calls made to his former partner. Most were for relatively short periods and were made at varying hours of the day. Finally, the offender breached the Personal Protection Orders by calling his former partner’s parents on multiple occasions.
Decision and Reasoning: Refshauge J imposed a total sentence of 2 years and 4 months imprisonment, suspended for a period of two years. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J took into account the purposes of sentencing and in particular, specific deterrence and vindication of the victims (in light of the Victim Impact Statements delivered in court — See [67]-[70]). He also took into account the offender’s plea of guilty and his subjective circumstances (including the offender’s drug problem).
These offences were serious and warranted a term of imprisonment. The offence of arson was serious because the offender produced a cigarette lighter, there was a threat with intent to achieve an objective to which he may otherwise not have been entitled, and it was committed at the home of the victim. The stalking offence was also a serious offence particularly because it was committed with a circumstance of aggravation, namely in the presence of a Domestic Violence Order. Finally, the breaches of Personal Protection Orders were serious because they involved a disregard of a court order designed to protect the subjects of the orders.
R v Thompson [2015] ACTSC 69 (20 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Young people’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, unlawful confinement, common assault, carry/use a firearm with disregard for own safety or safety of other persons.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The 26 year old male offender and the 21 year old female complainant commenced a relationship after meeting on an online dating website. Five weeks after their first meeting, the complainant told the offender that she wanted to end the relationship but wished to remain friends. The complainant then went overseas for 2 months. Upon her return, the offender tried to re-commence their relationship but the complainant did not want to. At a meeting between the pair, the offender said the complainant was ‘cruel’, ‘yelled at him’ and ‘humiliated him’. A month later, the complainant was home alone in her apartment. The offender sprung out from behind a door, covered her mouth with a gloved hand and told her not to scream. In his other hand, he was holding a gun. There was a struggle in which the offender tackled the complainant onto the bed and held a gun against her chest. The complainant was confined to the apartment for 3 hours.
Decision and Reasoning: Imprisonment was the only penalty appropriate in the circumstances. These were very serious offences — the complainant was in her own apartment which the offender broke into, he carried a gun, he wore medical gloves, held the gun against the complainant’s chest, and confined the complainant in terrifying circumstances for 3 hours. However, on the balance of probabilities, Robinson AJ found that the offender was suffering from a depressive mental illness on the day of the offence. The moral culpability of the offender was reduced, although not eliminated, by this depressive illness. There was a moderate risk of reoffending but His Honour concluded the offender had very good prospects for rehabilitation in light of the treatment of his mental illness and his new relationship. In the circumstances, it was desirable to give weight to the promotion of the rehabilitation of the offender. Accordingly, the offender, was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 2 years imprisonment, suspended from 9 December 2015.
Note: the convictions in relation to this case were set aside and a retrial was ordered because the trial judge failed to provide a warning about having a support person (see Thompson v The Queen; The Queen v Thompson [2016] ACTCA 12 (6 May 2016).
Hutcheon v West [2015] ACTSC 55 (13 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Choking a person so as to render them unconscious, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and victim were in a domestic relationship for three and a half years and lived together with the complaint’s son. One afternoon the respondent and victim got into a fight that resulted in the respondent striking the victim across her face and placing her in a chokehold. The respondent then placed his knee on the victim’s shoulder. After the victim asked him to stop, he asked ‘You want to die?’. The respondent then placed his hand around the victim’s throat and started squeezing before placing his other hand over her mouth and nose. As a result the victim briefly lost consciousness. Later the same day the respondent grabbed the victim by her hair and began shaking her. Attempting to free herself from the respondent’s grip, she ended up on the ground when the respondent kicked her face, and jumped and stomped on her arm and head. When the respondent realised the victim’s son witnessed the attack he told him ‘I didn’t do anything wrong. Mum’s flipping out’.
In relation to this conduct the respondent was charged and made late guilty pleas to choking a person so as to render that person unconscious, for which he was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment; assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for which he was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment, with three months to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed for the offence of choking; and common assault, for which he was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence imposed on the charge of choking. A non-parole period of 12 months was ordered. While the offending occurred, the respondent was on parole for burglary, theft and unauthorised possession of a firearm. The respondent’s parole was subsequently revoked and he was liable to serve the remainder of his sentence. The sentence imposed for the offence of choking was ordered to commence at the expiration of the sentence the respondent was serving as a result of the cancellation of the parole order.
The respondent had an extensive criminal history, having been convicted for approximately 80 criminal offences in the past 20 years. He also had a long history of substance abuse and mental health issues including being previously diagnosed with antisocial and paranoid personality traits. A pre-sentence report noted that the respondent made derogatory comments about the victim and demonstrated minimal victim empathy. The report also considered the respondent was at high risk of reoffending.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on the sentences imposed for the offences of choking and assault occasioning bodily harm. These sentences were set aside and the respondent was resentenced to a term of three years and one month’s imprisonment for the offence of choking and 20 months’ imprisonment for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
The starting point of 18 months’ imprisonment adopted by the magistrate before a reduction for the guilty pleas was manifestly inadequate in relation to the choking offence when considering the maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, the objective circumstances of the offence and the subjective circumstances of the offender. Burns J held that an appropriate starting point was three years and nine months’ imprisonment with a reduction of eight months for the plea of guilty. Likewise, the starting point of 14 months’ imprisonment for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was also manifestly inadequate. An appropriate starting point when considering the seriousness of the offending was two years’ imprisonment, reduced to 20 months’ imprisonment to reflect the plea of guilty.
In coming to this conclusion, Burns J considered that the seriousness of offences of violence within intimate relationships requires sentences that strongly denounce and deter such offending. Citing Wood CJ in R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, ‘such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence’.
R v Eimerl [2015] ACTSC 72 (12 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Parent/s’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: Forcible confinement, damaging property, theft.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender, who was on parole at the time, confined his mother in her home for 2 hours. During the course of confinement, the offender verbally abused his mother, threatened violence and damage to property, and damaged a heater and a wooden cedar door. The offender’s anger was based on his belief that his parents were communicating with Corrective Services, putting in jeopardy his parole order. His parents were in fact communicating with Corrective Services because they were concerned he had resumed his methamphetamine use. The offender completed a substance misuse program before being paroled in 2013. His initial response to parole supervision was satisfactory — his urinalysis results were negative and he obtained employment. However, at the time of the confinement, he had resumed his methamphetamine use.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 2 years and 1 month imprisonment was imposed. Burns J took into account the circumstances of the offence (it was committed out of anger and a sense of betrayal, it caused a significant degree of fear but no injuries were inflicted). His Honour also noted the guilty plea, the youth of the offender and that rehabilitation was an important consideration (however, this had to be ‘considered guarded’ (see[16])). There was a need for both general and specific deterrence.
His Honour further took into account that this was a family violence matter and stated, ‘that is relevant because the only reason that you were able to commit this offence was because of the relationship of trust that existed between you and the victim. If you had not been a family member who was loved and trusted by your victim you would not have had the opportunity to commit this offence. I also note that the offence occurred in the victim's own home, where she should have been entitled to feel safe’ (See [17]).
R v Brown [2015] ACTSC 65 (5 March 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perjury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victims as alleged perpetrators’
Charge/s: Perjury.
Proceeding: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant gave false evidence in a bail application involving an allegation of assault that had been made against her ex-partner. It was alleged that her ex-partner assaulted his mother. The defendant’s ex-partner also assaulted her prior to the alleged assault on his mother. A psychologist’s report indicated that the defendant was suffering from ‘a major depressive disorder of moderate severity’ (see at [4]) when she was in a relationship with her partner. The report described the relationship as physically and emotionally abusive which resulted in a gradual deterioration of the defendant’s mental health and reported low self-worth and feeling overwhelmed. Notwithstanding this, she felt that her partner was the only person who she could rely on. The defendant had no prior convictions. She was 18 years old when the offence occurred.
Issue/s: The appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was ordered to enter into a good behaviour order for 15 months with conditions that she accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Service and not to associate with her former partner. No conviction was recorded. Burns J noted that this offence, while serious, was at the lower end of the spectrum for offences of this nature. His Honour accepted that her mental illness affected her judgment and also noted the fact she was in a controlling relationship with her ex-partner. The defendant had good prospects of rehabilitation. The offence of perjury is serious and normally results in the recording of a conviction and imprisonment. However, in this case, the mitigating factors including her youth and mental illness meant that rehabilitation, rather than general deterrence were the primary sentencing considerations. His Honour warned the defendant that relationships like those with her ex-partner are characterised by a significant degree of manipulation and that the defendant ought to be aware of the likelihood of her ex-partner to attempt to recommence the relationship using protestations that he has changed and is going to behave in a different way. He urged the defendant to be mature enough to understand that such change is not going to happen.
R v East [2015] ACTSC 54 (16 February 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Offender’s traumatic childhood’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Forcible confinement, common assault.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was the complainant’s carer and partner. They had been in an ‘on again off again’ sexual relationship for 3 years and the offender had recently moved back into the complainant’s flat. On 14 October 2013, during an argument, the complainant told the offender to get his belongings and leave the flat. She then attempted to leave herself but the offender grabbed her arms and forced her back into the flat. The complainant made a number of unsuccessful attempts to escape and the offender took her mobile phone. The offender refused to leave. At one stage, he agreed to pack his belongings and asked the complainant for some money. When she refused, he forced her onto the couch. She tried to yell but the offender grabbed her throat, restricting her ability to breathe. After 5 hours, the offender gave the complainant her mobile and left the flat. These offences put the offender in breach of a good behaviour order imposed in respect of an earlier offence of a reckless threat to kill made against the same complainant. That offence involved the heavily intoxicated and distressed offender threatening his partner with a knife, a hammer and a piece of concrete.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 months. Penfold J took into account a number of factors in imposing this sentence. In determining the charged offences to be of mid-range seriousness, His Honour noted that in some cases being confined in one’s own home by a partner might be less frightening than being confined in a strange place by a stranger (depending on past experiences with the partner); during confinement, the offender was physically violent to the complainant; the offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offence; the domestic relationship put the parties into a position of trust and, to an extent, the offender abused this trust (however, the offender’s role as a carer did not mean that the offence involved any extra abuse of a position of trust because the complainant was 14 years older and the offender had a very disturbed upbringing); the offences had a distressing and more than short-term effect on the complainant; and the offender accepted responsibility for his actions (See [13]-[14]).
Penfold J also took into account the subjective circumstances of the offender. He did not seem to have any tendency towards criminal behaviour except in the context of this relationship. However, His Honour noted that ‘much of violent crime committed within domestic relationships is committed by men who otherwise live entirely within the law’. Further, the offender had a very disturbed upbringing. His mother suffered with severe mental illness and schizophrenia and would alternate between being a loving mother to being emotionally and physically abusive towards her children. He witnessed his mother kill herself when he was 8 when she set herself alight. The offender was then raised by his adoptive father, who would drink heavily to cope and belt the children (See [15]-[17]). The relationship between the offender and the complainant was ‘toxic’ and characterised by substance abuse and conflict (See [18]-[22]). Penfold J also took into account general and specific deterrence, the offender’s guilty plea and the offender’s acceptance of counselling.
R v BJ [2015] ACTSC 47 (4 February 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a good behaviour order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Young people’
Hearing: Breach of 12 month good behaviour order.
Facts: In February 2014, BJ was sentenced for burglary, minor theft and common assault. These charges arose out of the breakdown of a relationship between BJ, then aged 17, and the female complainant. He was sentenced to a 12 month good behaviour order, including a condition that he undertake the Cognitive Self-Change Program. Nearly 5 months after BJ was sentenced, he began another serious of offences against another ex-partner. These offences involved: taking his ex-partner’s car keys, damaging her car and stealing the car; using a false Facebook identity to taunt her with pictures of the car hidden in a forest; attempting to get her (alone) to meet him in the forest; further damaging the car; and making a series of harassing phone calls to his ex-partner. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for these offences, 3 months served in full time custody and 6 months suspended subject to a 24 month good behaviour order. The matter was referred to Penfold J here to deal with the breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour order.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of BJ’s breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: Penfold J noted that he was incorrect in his 2014 sentencing remarks and BJ did in fact have a tendency to behave inappropriately in the context of failed intimate relationships. He noted that this behaviour needed to be addressed as early as possible. Penfold J imposed a new good behaviour order for 2 years subject to the following conditions: accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services and obey all reasonable directions, under take counselling courses, programs or treatments, and undertake either one or both of a Men’s Cognitive Self-Change Program and a Family Violence Cognitive Self-Change Program.
R v Mazaydeh [2014] ACTSC 325 (13 November 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threatening to cause damage to the complainant’s property’ – ‘Victim impact’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault x 3, threatening to cause damage to the complainant’s property.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was a friend and former partner of the female complainant. The offender became jealous when the complainant received a phone call because he suspected it was from another man. The complainant asked the offender to leave her apartment. He refused. He pushed and attempted to choke the complainant and held a knife to the throat of her cat. The assaults were accompanied by verbal abuse and abusive text messaging. The offender also rifled through the victim’s belongings and demanded her phone. The incident lasted about 15 minutes.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a good behaviour order for 3 years and fined $1750. In terms of the objective seriousness of the offending, Murrell CJ noted that the conduct constituting the assault occasioning bodily harm was extremely serious. It was a very forceful and frightening assault that involved the offender taking hold of the victim’s throat. The actual bodily harm that resulted was at the lower end of the spectrum but the incident had a considerable psychological impact. The other offences were less serious. The incident, while not fleeting, was relatively short. It was not only frightening but designed to humiliate. It occurred within the victim’s home, in circumstances where she had asked him to leave.
Further, this was an incident of domestic violence. Her Honour noted:
‘These offences occurred in the context of a previous relationship between the offender and the victim and involved violence within the victim's home, an apparent sense of entitlement on the part of the offender, and humiliation through verbal and text abuse of the victim.
The sentencing purposes of punishment, general deterrence and denunciation are very important, as well as the recognition of harm to the victim personally and the community generally through offences of this nature. The victim provided a victim impact statement in which she referred to impacts upon her of the type that frequently result from offences of domestic violence, including feelings of anxiety, difficulty sleeping, difficulty concentrating at work and elsewhere, and an adverse effect on her ability to form relationships. Since the incident, the victim has moved house because she felt unsafe in the apartment where the offence occurred’ (See [15]-[16]).
Her Honour also took into account the subjective circumstances of the offender including that the offender had been assessed as being at low risk of re-offending, he was employed, is a member of a close and supportive family and has no problems with drug dependence or mental health. However, Murrell CJ further noted that the offender lacked insight into the seriousness of his conduct and the impact on the victim. Although this was probably a one-off incident, Her Honour considered that it would be of assistance to the offender to undertake courses that may guide him towards greater insight and maturity in relation to interpersonal relationships.
R v Ennis [2014] ACTSC 369 (4 November 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Good behaviour order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Hearing: Breach of community service condition to a good behaviour order.
Facts: In 2012, Mr Ennis was convicted for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Mr Ennis and his female partner, who had been together for 27 years, were both drunk and fought ‘over money’. During this argument, Mr Ennis caused his partner to suffer a fracture to the left forearm and a laceration to the outside of her lower leg. Mr Ennis had a long history of cannabis and alcohol abuse. He claimed that this alcohol abuse led to his criminality. The sentencing judge made a good behaviour order for 2 years, with a condition that Mr Ennis perform 100 hours of community service within 12 months. Mr Ennis breached this order by failing to complete the community service work conditions. He submitted that the breach was the result of his alcohol abuse.
Issue/s: Whether further action is warranted in light of Mr Ennis’ breach of a good behaviour order.
Decision and Reasoning: The order was amended by extending the good behaviour period to a further 12 months, extending the number of hours of community service work to 108 hours to be completed in 12 months, and requiring Mr Ennis to be subject supervision by the Director-General. In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J noted that while Mr Ennis’ breach was unsurprising in light of his alcohol abuse, this did not provide an excuse for his behaviour (See [16]). In favour of Mr Ennis, it was significant that he had not committed any offences in the two years since the order was made. His Honour noted, ‘This is a very important matter, for that is the fundamental objective of the criminal law, namely, as Brennan J described it in Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 437, the protection of society which is achieved by the prevention of crime and the eradication of recidivism’ (See [21]).
Further, Mr Ennis had taken steps towards rehabilitation namely, enrolling in a number of programs including drug and alcohol counselling, a Men and Anger Program and an Employment Pathway Plan (See [23]-[27]). Mr Ennis’ partner was also addressing her alcohol abuse and they were both accessing counselling at relationships Australia (See [28]). However, Refshauge J remained sceptical in his assessment of this reform and nevertheless extended the good behaviour order (See [30]-[33]).
His Honour noted: Despite the considerable contribution that illicit drug use makes to criminality in the community, alcohol remains a problem for those addicted to it. Alcohol abuse remains a very significant source of crime and leads the addict to unhealthy and anti-social behaviour and situations (See [1]).
See also R v Ennis [2016] ACTSC 72 (4 April 2016).
Pasa v Bell [2014] ACTSC 303 (30 October 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘At the complainant’s home’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General and personal deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to an offence that he assaulted his former fiance and de facto partner of 2 years (the complainant). The offence occurred about 1 month after the appellant and the complainant had separated in the presence of the complainant, a friend, and the appellant’s young son. The appellant and the complainant argued and the complainant asked him to leave. The garage door hit the appellant on the head as he left and he turned around the pushed the complainant. She fell backwards into the car. The appellant spoke in a threatening manner to the complainant. He pushed her again, kicked her car twice, and left.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the primary judge erred in his assessment of what constituted an aggravating feature of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence was dismissed. In relation to the appeal against conviction, the appellant submitted that the mere fact the offence was committed at the home of the victim is not enough to aggravate the offence; there must be some level of intrusion. Murrell CJ noted that a sentencing court must consider all relevant objective and subjective matters. She stated,
‘When considering the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, including general and personal deterrence, a sentencing court is entitled to consider the fact that an offence involved domestic violence, and that the violence has occurred at the victim’s home. An offence involving domestic violence is one that involves abuse of a partner, former partner or other family member (using the term “family” in the broadest sense). Frequently, such offences occur in the home, where the inhibitions of an offender may be lowered, the impact on the victim may be heightened (as she or he is made to feel that a formerly safe place has been violated) and the occurrence of the offence is more readily concealed. Further, where a domestic violence offence occurs in the victim’s home, it is often associated with secondary abuse to other family members’ (See [16]; See also R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 [30]-[31]).
Here, the primary judge did not approach the matter on the basis that the ‘mere fact’ that the incident took place at the complainant’s home was an aggravating feature. He considered the location of the offence in the context of other relevant circumstances namely that it occurred at a place where the complainant was entitled to feel safe, it occurred in the presence of the appellant’s son, and the appellant refused to leave.
Reid v Smith [2014] ACTSC 349 (21 October 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Damaging property, breach of domestic violence order, assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, and the victim were in a relationship and had a son together. The appellant and victim also both had a daughter each from previous relationships. He was charged and convicted of damaging property, assault and breaching a domestic violence order made to protect the victim. No further information about the offending or factual matrix was provided. Since his arrest and while on bail, the appellant attended Oolong House several times where he received rehabilitative treatment. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to 12 months’ imprisonment each for the assault and damaging property offences, to be served concurrently, and two years’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order. In sentencing, the magistrate stated ‘The current offences continue a pattern of behaviour that appears entrenched in the context of the relationship with the victim. Despite legal sanctions and protection orders, [the appellant] has yet to demonstrate the responsibility to abide by conditions to uphold the safety of vulnerable people in his life. Under the influence of substances his behaviour poses unacceptable risks for such people’ ([5]).
The appellant had a somewhat difficult childhood with his parents divorcing after his father suffered a stroke and his mother abusing alcohol. He finished school at year 10 and had very limited and sporadic employment since then. He had a long history of alcohol and drug abuse and engaged in residential rehabilitation several times. The appellant also suffered depression, stress and anxiety and was housed in the AMC Crisis Support Unit since his remand due to his risk of suicide and/or self-harm. He had an extensive history of criminal offending, including convictions for common assault, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and contravening protection orders against the victim.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether the magistrate failed to take into account the time spent at a rehabilitation centre.
2.
Whether the magistrate failed to give adequate weight to the decision in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 (‘Bugmy’).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
There is no requirement in sentencing to give credit and discount the sentence for time spent in residential rehabilitation between the commission of an offence and the sentencing for that offence. The magistrate therefore did not err in failing to explicitly take into account the appellant’s successful completion of the Oolong House rehabilitation program.
2.
In Bugmy, the High Court of Australia considered, ‘An Aboriginal offender’s deprived background may mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate for the offence in the same way that the deprived background of a non-Aboriginal offence may mitigate that offender’s sentence… Aboriginal Australians as a group are subject to social and economic disadvantage measured across a range of indices but to recognise this is to say nothing about a particular Aboriginal offender… An offender’s childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender’s recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender’s moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender ’. While Penfold ACJ acknowledged that the appellant had a ‘somewhat troubled background’, she did not consider that a failure to give adequate weight to a particular consideration was a sufficient ground to evoke the court’s appellant jurisdiction, relying on R v Ang [2014] ACTCA 17, [22]-[24].
Hossen v Hughes [2014] ACTSC 101 (21 May 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravating and mitigating factors’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, his wife (the complainant) and their children moved to Canberra in order for him to complete a PhD. After their daughter complained that she did not like the lunch the complainant was preparing, the complainant struck the daughter’s hip with a plastic doll to ‘chastise her for her behaviour’. The appellant became angry at the complainant’s actions and slapped her. When questioned by police, the appellant said ‘I do not think I did anything wrong. In my culture, I did not do anything wrong’. He pleaded guilty to assault at the earliest opportunity and expressed remorse in a letter to the court.
At trial, the appellant was unrepresented but had a Bangladeshi interpreter. A conviction was recorded and the appellant was ordered to sign a good behaviour undertaking for two years. The magistrate noted that ‘cultural differences may be in play here, but I don’t accept them on the basis that you’ve been here for two years, you’ve acknowledged in your own statement to me today that you understand what you did was wrong’.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
The magistrate erred in treating the presence of their daughter as an aggravating factor when the assault of the complainant would not have occurred but for her hitting their daughter;
2.
The magistrate erred in not giving sufficient reasons for refusing a non-conviction order pursuant to s 17 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (the Act).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed and the sentence imposed by the magistrate was confirmed.
1.
In sentencing, the magistrate referred to Refshauge J’s comments in Elson v Ayton [2010] ACTSC 70 to conclude that the presence of their daughter was an aggravating factor and that ‘the courts have no tolerance, or very little tolerance, for people who engage in domestic violence, and certainly in the presence of children’. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the presence of their daughter should not have been an aggravating factor because the complainant’s action in hitting her provoked the appellant’s assault and that this provocation was a mitigating factor. However, Penfold J held that there was nothing in the nature of the assault that meant their daughter’s presence was an inherent part of the objective circumstances of the offence. Further, while the complainant’s conduct in hitting her daughter with a doll may reduce the culpability of the appellant’s assault, it is not properly described as a mitigating factor. Therefore, there was no error in the magistrate’s approach to the presence of their daughter.
2.
The magistrate was obliged to provide an explanation to the appellant for declining to make a non-conviction order. He was unrepresented, inexperienced in the procedures of Australian courts and English was not his first language. The magistrate performed this obligation in explaining that a non-conviction order could not be made due to the nature and circumstances of the offence. However, the magistrate did not allow the appellant to put forward evidence or a proper explanation when he attempted to explain the detriment to his future should a conviction be recorded. Therefore, the magistrate erred in dealing with the appellant’s application for a non-conviction order by failing to give proper consideration to the application, having regard to the particular difficulties faced by the appellant.
Despite this error, the appeal was dismissed because re-sentencing was not appropriate. Having regard to the factors in s 17 of the Act, Penfold J held there were no grounds sufficient to make a non-conviction order. In particular, the appellant’s character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition; the seriousness of the offence; his extenuating circumstances; and the absence of any properly explained or substantiated claim that a conviction would have negative impacts on his future prospects, would not have excluded the making of a non-conviction order.
R v Rogers [2014] ACTSC 124 (1 April 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Late plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor-strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charges: Unlawful confinement, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim were in a domestic relationship. The victim had a son from a previous relationship. Six months after moving in together, the offender sat on the victim’s stomach, held both arms above her head and tied her wrists to the bed. The offender told the victim, “you’ve hurt my feelings. Now you have to pay. I’m going to take you for a drive to the forest and I’m going to kill you”. He then slapped her across the face several times and stuck a piece of clothing in her mouth. The victim was gagging and choking and believed that she would suffocate. The offender then hit the victim’s thigh with a car aerial and held a lit match to her face, threatening “have you ever played ‘light the match’ game?”. The next day the offender brought the victim flowers and apologised. Several days later the victim woke up to the offender slapping her face. Her son then walked into the room but returned to his bedroom after the offender screamed at him. The victim packed herself and her son into the car to escape after the offender had left. However, the offender returned and parked his car behind the victim’s car. He grabbed the victim’s shoulders, pushed her backwards causing her to hit to head and dragged her into the house. When inside, he grabbed her throat, kicked her, forced her face under a running tap, slapped her and threatened her.
The offender was charged with unlawful confinement and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He maintained a plea of not guilty for nearly two years until changing his plea to guilty on the date the trial was to begin.
The offender had a long history of offending including convictions of nine common assaults, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, stalking and two breaches of domestic violence orders. He also had a history of dysfunctional relationships, with many of these convictions resulting from domestic violence. He abused prescription drugs and suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder, depression and bipolar. During one period of excessive drug use, the offender was diagnosed with amphetamine-induced paranoid psychosis. The offender engaged in the methadone program and drug and alcohol counselling to address his substance abuse. He reported that since the offending, he had ceased using drugs or drinking heavily and that he was no longer short-tempered and jumpy.
Issue: What sentence should the offender receive?
Decision and reasoning: Penfold J emphasised the need for general deterrence and denunciation for domestic violence offences. Having regard to the offender’s criminal history and his repeated failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities, rehabilitation was not the highest priority in sentencing. His Honour accepted some concession was needed for the offender’s improved behaviour in the two years since the offending and his continued engagement with mental health services. However, no sentence other than imprisonment was appropriate when considering the gravity of the offending and the effect on the victim and her son.
The offences were all serious examples of the relevant offences. The presence of the victim’s son during the second assault occasioning actual bodily harm aggravated the offence. All the offences were further aggravated by the breach of trust that is ‘inherent is most if not all domestic violence offences, especially those that occur in the privacy of a home shared by the victim and the perpetrator, a circumstance which of itself — that is the sharing of the home — seems to me to establish a mutual relationship of trust’ ([7]).
Penfold J sentenced the offender to a total sentence of 38 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 24 months. This total sentence comprised of 25 months’ imprisonment for the offence of unlawful confinement, 18 months’ imprisonment for the first offence of assault occasioning bodily harm, and 20 months’ imprisonment for the second offence of assault occasioning bodily harm. The first assault occasioning bodily harm sentence was ordered to be accumulated so as to add three months to the unlawful confinement offence and the second assault occasioning bodily harm sentence was ordered to be accumulated so as to add 10 months to the total sentence.
Beniamini v Storman [2014] ACTSC 2 (22 January 2014) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing damage to property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing damage to property x 2, trespassing without reasonable excuse, assault, minor theft.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with a young woman, the complainant, and they had two children together. The relationship was characterised by ongoing conflict, caused largely by the appellant’s ongoing abuse of alcohol, and subsequently the relationship broke down. Later, the appellant went to the complainant’s house to see the children but she refused to let him in. The appellant damaged the front security door and shouted threats. He was arrested and granted bail for this offence. However, before the proceedings could be resolved, the appellant again went to the complainant’s property, and broke open the front door. The appellant began to strangle the complainant (assault). The complainant’s daughter rang the complainant’s mother who arrived and manage to calm the appellant down. The police arrived and the appellant ran off. On another subsequent occasion, the appellant was charged with minor theft for leaving a petrol station without paying.
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to: intentionally causing damage to property — fine of $1,500; intentionally causing damage to property — 3 months imprisonment to commence on 1 August 2013; trespassing without reasonable excuse — fine of $500; assault — 17 months imprisonment to commence on 1 September 2013; minor theft — fine of $250. A non-parole period of 12 months was set on the total period of 18 months imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the terms of imprisonment imposed, including the non-parole period, were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence for the assault was manifestly excessive, the appeal allowed and the appellant re-sentenced (see R v Beniamini; Beniamini v Storman [2014] ACTSC 40 (22 January 2014)). The offence of assault was serious: it was committed late at night in the complainant’s home; it was an offence in the context of family violence; and the offence was protracted. It was more serious by the fact that the appellant was on conditional liberty at the time, the offence was committed in the presence of children, and the appellant had prior convictions for personal violence (but not family violence).
However, despite the seriousness of the assault, the sentence was manifestly excessive because the magistrate started her calculation of sentence on the basis that this was almost the worst category of the offence (See [119]). Since the time of offences, the appellant had made no further inappropriate contact with the complainant, had managed to resolve issues of access to the children, and had stopped drinking. This was also his first offence of violence in the family context. It was also relevant that the denial of access to his children at the time was arbitrary and not under any court order. He was remorseful and showed insight into his actions (See [94]-[104]).
R v Curtis [2013] ACTSC 291 (16 December 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Young people’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: Mr Curtis, an 18 year old Aboriginal man, and the female victim were in a relationship. On 1 June 2013, Mr Curtis became agitated and aggressive towards the victim. He started punching her legs, arms, torso and stomach, causing bruising. When interviewed by police, he said that the victim had wanted him to teach her how to ‘stick up’ for herself and that they were just ‘mucking around’ but he stopped when he thought that what was happening did not ‘feel right’.
Decision and Reasoning: Mr Curtis was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, suspended for 2 years, and ordered to comply with good behaviour obligations (a probation condition making Mr Curtis subject to the supervision of the Director-General and required to obey all reasonable directions as to counselling or treatment for his mental health and his abuse of alcohol and other drugs). In imposing this sentence, Refshauge J took into account Mr Curtis’ plea of guilty. He also took into account the subjective circumstances of Mr Curtis including his troubled childhood, his relationship with his 20 month old child, his current committed relationship, his use of alcohol and illicit substances, and his history of mental health issues (See [6]-[19]).
Refshauge J also took into account that the offence was serious especially because it was committed in the context of a relationship. His Honour quoted Higgins CJ in R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 at [30]: ‘I appreciate that personality disorders may often underlie the criminal behaviour of men who beat women. Alcohol or other substance abuse may sometimes be a triggering factor. Nevertheless, they must take responsibility for their actions and be seen to have done so. The offence is often hidden, so general deterrence is a factor that is quite prominent. So also is specific deterrence. No offender engaging in this kind of behaviour, nor their victims, should feel that it is to be treated lightly. Rather, it must be made the subject of condign punishment. That is not to say, of course, that any mitigatory factors or prospects for rehabilitation will be disregarded’ (See [28]-[32]).
Refshauge J further accepted that the youth of Mr Curtis and his prospects for rehabilitation were very relevant to the sentencing exercise. Per His Honour, ‘for youthful offenders rehabilitation is usually more important than general deterrence, especially when retributive punishment may in fact lead to further offending. A youthful offender should not be sent to an adult prison if it can be avoided’ (See [20]). A lengthy good behaviour order was warranted in light of the need for rehabilitation. In this context, His Honour noted the influence of excessive alcohol on the offending which, although not mitigating the offending, was very relevant to rehabilitation (See 36].
See also R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (26 February 2016).
Roberts v Smorhun [2013] ACTSC 218 (1 November 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
*Note: this case referenced now superseded legislation, however the statements of principle are unaffected by the legislation change.
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and the male appellant had been in a relationship for 6-12 months and had lived together until mid-December 2012. After the complainant was granted an interim domestic violence order against the appellant, the appellant telephoned the complainant to meet him at a friend’s place so he could give her the keys back to her place. At this meeting, an argument developed and the appellant started chasing the complainant, yelling abuse. When he caught up to the complainant, he raised his arm as if to punch her, but instead he grabbed the complainant’s sunglasses, snapped them in half and threw them in her face. This caused the complainant injury. The appellant was sentenced to 32 months imprisonment for the charge of contravening a protection order, with no further penalty for the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm..
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant re-sentenced to 23 months imprisonment. Refshauge J noted that there was no doubt that the offending was serious. The fact that the appellant had been convicted of 9 prior offences of the same character against another woman meant that he could be afforded little leniency. However, the sentence was nonetheless disproportionate to the offending conduct.
The prosecution submissions on sentence at first instance referred to the fact this was a family violence offence, referring to dicta of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) that:
When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterized as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape.[81]
The court noted that this statement had been cited with approval by the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in Parker v R [1994] TASSC 94 (21 July 1994) and in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302. [82]
Three features listed by the sentencing judge as aggravating the offence, were not in fact aggravating features. First, while domestic violence orders play a special place in the criminal law’s efforts to prevent domestic violence, His Honour erred in finding that a domestic violence was a feature of aggravation for the offence of contravening a domestic violence order. Second, His Honour also incorrectly found that the fact the offence occurred in public was a circumstance of aggravation in this particular case as there were no people present at the time of offence. His Honour also previously referred to this issue in the case of Grimshaw v Mann [2013] ACTSC 189 at [49]-[51], where he expressed some difficulty with characterising the public nature of an assault as an aggravating feature, as it implies that a private assault is less serious. Finally, the sentencing judge inferred that the broken part of the complainant’s glasses was sharp and this aggravated the offending. However, this conclusion was not supported by the evidence (See [132]-[138]). Further, the sentencing judge did not take into adequately discount the sentence to account for the appellant’s plea of guilty (See [143]).
In dicta, His Honour considered the principles in Pearce v The Queen. The sentencing judge pointed out that the appellant’s assault covered most, if not all, of the conduct prohibited by the protection order, and decided to impose no penalty, other than the conviction, for the assault offence. His justification was that there was no element in the assault offence that had not been encompassed in the offence of contravening the protection order. Refshauge J stated that ‘[i]f that were strictly correct, then the conviction for the offence of contravening the protection order would have resulted in a requirement that there be a verdict of autrefois convict in respect of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. That would have been the appropriate response if the elements [were] such that the whole of the criminality of offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was contained in the offence of contravening the protection order.’ However, as the parties did not argue on this issue, it was unnecessary for His Honour to resolve it on the appeal. The appellant brought the appeal against the sentence on the charge of contravening the protection order. There was no cross-appeal that the sentence for the assault offence was manifestly inadequate, ‘which would be likely if it was thought that there was criminality in that offence separate from the other such that, for example, the plea of autrefois convict would not apply’ ([150]).In any event, Refshauge J concluded that the offence of contravening the protection order did not include any of the fault element of the offence of assault ([151]).
Refshauge J quoted from R v BG (an unreported judgment from December 2010):
Compliance with any sort of protection order is essential for the court in protecting members of the community from violence and other unwanted behaviour. Breaches of protection orders risk the success of the regime from achieving that purpose, especially if they encourage people to think that they can breach with impunity. A severe approach is necessary, consistent with fairness to the accused. Thus, the Court cannot punish beyond what is appropriate to the offence (See [4]).
Khan v Evans [2013] ACTSC 211 (4 October 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breaches of an interim protection order x 4, breach of a personal protection order, failure to comply with a bail undertaking to appear in court, common assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, had been in a relationship with the female complainant and they had 3 children together. The complainant was granted a personal protection order against the appellant. The appellant breached these orders on 5 occasions by being at the premises of the complainant. The common assault offences occurred when the appellant assaulted his father. The appellant pleaded guilty to 4 breaches of an interim protection order made on 23 July 2012 and breach then of the personal protection order subsequently made on 23 August 2012, a failure to comply with a bail undertaking to appear in court, and 2 offences of common assault. In the Magistrates Court, a total period of imprisonment of 16 months was imposed from 21 March 2013, with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Issue/s: The grounds of appeal were –
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
The magistrate erred in failing to take into account a period of pre-sentence custody.
•
The good behaviour order for which the appellant was sentenced had been cancelled and could not have been breached by the offences.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on grounds 2 and 3 but not ground 1. The magistrate failed to take into account a period by pre-sentence custody by starting the sentences on 21 March 2013 rather than 23 February 2013. Further, the good behaviour order for which the appellant had been sentenced had previously been cancelled (See [42]-[49]). However, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Refshauge J stated,
‘While the offence against Mr Khan’s father could also be described as domestic violence, the fact is that the interim personal protection order and the personal protection orders are there to protect the complainant from what might be described as domestic violence in its widest sense. Therefore, such orders are an important component of the criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence. Breaches of personal protection orders are serious matters which the courts must treat seriously to ensure the integrity of the system which the protection orders are intended to put in to effect’ (See [52]).
Grimshaw v Mann [2013] ACTSC 189 (29 August 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Applications and orders for child residence, contact and parenting orders’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Public/private space’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The Aboriginal male appellant was involved in an altercation with his former female partner (the complainant) of 7 years. The relationship ended in 2010 due to the appellant’s use of drug and alcohol, and he had not seen the children since. In May 2012, the appellant moved to Canberra to be closer to his children and commenced proceedings in the Family Court for access rights. On 2 June 2012, outside a late night convenience store, the appellant started arguing with the complainant and struck her three times with a closed fist. She fell to the ground and hit her head. She was helped up by her two friends and threw a glass soft drink bottle at the appellant. She missed but smashed another glass bottle over his head. The appellant needed four stiches. The appellant voluntarily handed himself into the police two days later. The complainant had previously obtained two protection orders against the appellant. Both had expired at the time of offence.
At the sentencing hearing, a lengthy Victim Impact Statement was tendered. However, it contained a good deal of irrelevant and inadmissible material. Refshauge J on appeal stated:
‘Allegations of further serious offending cannot come within the definition of “harm suffered by the victim [as a result of, or in the course of, the commission] of the offence”: s 47 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). While defence counsel may be wary of exercising their rights to cross-examine a victim on a Victim Impact Statement, discussions with prosecutors should result in an appropriate response from responsible prosecutors about inadmissible material and such statements. Without that proper approach, it is likely that such statements will lose their value and that the courts will have to intervene to ensure that the legislation is respected to ensure inadmissible, and often inflammatory, material is not included in such statements’ (See [41]).
The appellant pleaded guilty to common assault and was sentenced to 10 months imprisonment, three months to be served by full-time custody, three months by periodic detention and the balance suspended and a two year good behaviour order made. The appellant sought assistance for his alcohol and drug issues, made contact with the Aboriginal Justice Centre, and enrolled in a men’s anger program.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant re-sentenced to 10 months imprisonment to commence on 28 May 2013, suspended for two years from 27 August 2013. The sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. First, the sentencing magistrate did not take into account the appellant’s injuries caused by the complainant which occurred when the appellant was no longer a threat to the complainant. Second, the injuries sustained by the complainant, as apparent from photographic evidence, were not as serious as what was described in the Victim Impact Statement. Finally, the appellant’s criminal history, although containing prior convictions for violent offences, did not demonstrate a propensity to violence. He had not been charged with any domestic violence offences and he had not breached two personal protection orders (See [77]-[82]).
His Honour further stated:
‘The prosecution referred to the aggravating factor that the assault “took place in a public place.” I have some difficulty with that factor as an aggravating one. It implies that an assault in private is less serious. I am not sure that this follows.
Most family violence occurs in private yet is regarded as very serious. Indeed, privacy can emphasise the vulnerability and helplessness of the victim.
However that may be, intermediate Courts of Appeal have regularly referred to the fact that violent offences committed in public are more serious. See, for example, R v Freestone [2009] QCA 290at [30], Ludeman v The Queen (2010) 208 A Crim R 298 at 321; [132], Smith v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 3at [32], R v Edwards [2012] QCA 117at [23], Shoard v Van Der Zanden [2013] WASC 163at [41]. This is the not the place to consider the rationale for such an approach; that will have to wait for another day. It is enough that the reliance by the learned Magistrate on the fact that the assault occurred in public as an aggravating factor was not an error’ (See [49]-[51]).
Cranfield v Watson [2013] ACTSC 160 (1 August 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two counts)
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship and resided together with their son. While arguing one day, the appellant grabbed the complainant’s arm and punched her in the face a number of times. In response, the complainant struck the appellant in the torso. The pair continued to exchange blows throughout the day with the appellant striking the complainant to the face and punching her thigh, and the complainant hitting the appellant in the torso and face and bitting his arm. A week later, the appellant became angry after having computer difficulties and started swearing at the complainant. When she told him to stop being pathetic and throwing tantrums, the appellant slapped the complainant and caused her eardrum to rupture.
In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was sentenced to 11 months’ imprisonment for the first offence and five months’ imprisonment, of which two months’ was to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the first offence, for the second offence. The total sentence was therefore 14 months’ imprisonment. Five months of that sentence was to be served in full custody, with the following five months to be served by way of periodic detention, and the remaining four months suspended upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour order for two years.
The magistrate considered that it was an aggravating feature of the first offence that the assault was comprised of several violent, physical contacts that extended over a period of time. He also considered it was an aggravating feature of both offences that they included blows to the head and face of a female. Finally, his Honour considered the ruptured eardrum of the complainant was an aggravating factor of the second offence.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant was re-sentenced.
The magistrate erred in considering that the nature and duration of the violence in relation to the first offence was an aggravating feature. Rather, it was a circumstance that was relevant to the sentencing of the appellant. Further, the fact the complainant suffered a ruptured eardrum was not an aggravating feature of the second offence. It was merely an element of that offence — namely, that the assault resulted in actual bodily harm. The magistrate also failed to properly consider a psychiatrist report put before him. That report noted that the appellant’s domestic violence was likely related to his on-going mental health difficulties including suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Burns J considered the term of imprisonment with respect to the offences was excessive where there was evidence that the appellant’s conduct was either caused by or contributed to by mental health conditions. These conditions were capable of being treated. Further, the appellant did not have a significant history of violent offending, having only been convicted of two offences of common assault 11 years prior to the offending.
In resentencing the appellant, Burns J accepted that the offences warranted terms of imprisonment. The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the first offence and two months’ imprisonment for the second offence. The total sentence of seven months’ imprisonment was backdated to recognise the two months the appellant had already spent in custody, and suspended thereafter. Burns J imposed a good behaviour order for two years with the conditions the appellant accept supervision and obey reasonable directions; undertake programs or counselling as directed, including the Family Violence Cognitive Self Change Program if appropriate; and undertake counselling or treatment with respect to mental health issues.
Guy v Anderson [2013] ACTSC 5 (14 January 2013) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Forgiveness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reconciliation’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Damaging property, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant was in an intermittent relationship with the female complainant. During the course of an argument, the intoxicated appellant shouted in the complainant’s face and hit her. The appellant then sat on top of the complainant and attempted to choke her. He stood up and kicked her in the ribs when she screamed for help. The appellant sat on top of her again and choked her until her vision went blurry. She started retching and the appellant dragged her to the toilet by her hair. When she finished retching, he poured half a bottle of wine over her head and again placed his hands around her throat. The appellant then pulled the complainant into the lounge room and the complainant tried to calm him down. She went to the police the next day. He was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment for common assault and 6 months imprisonment, wholly suspended and conditional on a good behaviour order, for assault occasioning bodily harm.
On a subsequent occasion, the complainant and the appellant again started arguing. The appellant went outside the house to have a cigarette and the complainant locked him out. She packed his bag and left it at the rear door. The appellant, who had not seen the bag, began knocking on the rear door and the window. As the complainant was on the phone to police, she heard the sound of the appellant breaking the window. The complainant told the appellant his belongings were at the front door and he left. He pleaded guilty to damaging property and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment. The conviction constituted a breach of the earlier imposed good behaviour order and the magistrate imposed the full 6 months of this sentence.
Issue/s: The sentence for damaging property and the action taken in respect of the breach of the good behaviour order was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, the sentence for the offence of damaging property was manifestly excessive in the circumstances. Although this was a domestic violence offence, this did not mandate a particular response and the circumstances as a whole needed to be considered. Refshauge J accepted the fact that complainant and the appellant had reconciled needed to be treated cautiously. He stated that, ‘Forgiveness by victims of domestic violence offences is highly problematic and must be treated with considerable caution for the reasons outlined by Simpson J in R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994)at 8. As her Honour said, “the victim’s attitude to sentencing … was not a matter which should have influenced the sentencing decision”.’ However, reconciliation of the complainant and the offender (as opposed to her forgiveness) can be relevant as to prospects of rehabilitation.
Second, the magistrate’s decision to impose the full 6 months suspended sentence was manifestly excessive. While the breaching offence was not trivial, it was at the low end of seriousness for the offence and was also of a different character from the original offence. Significantly, the appellant had also complied with the probation condition, sought mental health assistance of his own volition and participated in the Family Violence Cognitive Self-Change Program. See re-sentencing [1]-[5].
Saddler v Pavicic [2011] ACTSC 199 (9 December 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Family members’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Parent/s’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault.
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of an argument, the 31 year old respondent and his 60 year old mother (the first complainant) began pushing and shoving each other. This culminated in the respondent grabbing the complainant by the neck and pushing her, causing her to fall and fracture her wrist (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). Later that afternoon, the first complainant was visited by the male second complainant and his 4 children. The second complainant heard a revving noise and saw the respondent holding a chainsaw outside the window. The respondent said, ‘You fucking Australian cunt, come out here, I am going to cut you, like this’, and then tried to enter the backdoor. When he failed, the respondent picked up a fish gaff and swung it above his head (assault). The magistrate recorded a conviction and fined the respondent $1,000 for assault occasioning bodily harm and $1,500 for assault.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was not entitled to leniency in sentencing on the basis of his prior criminal history or on the basis of his plea. The sentence imposed gave little, if any, weight to the requirements of specific and general deterrence, nor did it reflect the objective seriousness of the offence, even taking into account the provocation from the complainant. The appellant was re-sentenced to a suspended sentence of 7 months imprisonment.
In reaching this conclusion, Burns J noted that this was clearly a domestic violence offence. He noted that, ‘It is now well settled that offences of domestic violence must be treated seriously, and frequently display aggravating features not present in offences occurring outside a domestic relationship. The only reason the respondent was in a position to commit the offence on his mother was because of that relationship. As such, the offence involved a serious breach of the trust reposed in the respondent as a son by his mother. Additionally, the age of the complainant was an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the offence’at [12].
The sentence imposed by the magistrate in relation to the assault was also manifestly inadequate.
Donoso v Koster [2011] ACTSC 192 (24 November 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘Non-conviction order’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant forcibly pulled sheets from on top of the complainant when she was in bed. The sheets caught on the complainant’s necklace and this caused pain and a red welt on her lower neck. The magistrate recorded a conviction.
Issue/s: A conviction should not have been recorded.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The prosecution submitted that, as this was a family violence offence, it had a certain degree of seriousness and a conviction ought to be recorded. Burns J accepted that ‘there are circumstances and principles relating to family violence offences which that they must be taken particularly seriously’. However, the objective seriousness of the offence and the subjective circumstances of the offender are always relevant. Objectively, this offence came very close to the bottom of the range of seriousness of offences of this nature. Further, the appellant was otherwise a man of good character. He had no prior convictions and was spoken of highly in provided testimonials. Further, he was employed in an area in which the recording of a conviction would result in particular hardship (i.e. termination of employment). The conviction was set aside and a good behaviour order for a period of 12 months was imposed.
Connelly v Allan [2011] ACTSC 170 (13 October 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Voice recognition evidence’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order (two counts)
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence
Facts: The appellant was subject to a domestic violence order that prohibited him from contacting his former partner (the applicant), behaving in a harassing manner towards her or threatening her. The appellant breached this order by making a number of phone calls to the applicant. He was charged with two counts of breaching the domestic violence order and was convicted of both charges. Those convictions amounted to a breach of two good behaviour orders previously made when the appellant was convicted of stalking and two additional counts of contravening a protection order in December 2007 and common assault in June 2007. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on each of the counts of breaching the domestic violence order, to be served concurrently. On the breach of the first good behaviour order he was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, one month of which was to be cumulative on the other sentences. All the imprisonment to be served by periodic detention.
In convicting the appellant, the magistrate accepted evidence from the applicant and a friend that they recognised the appellant’s voice. The phone calls were allegedly made using a public phone, so this voice recognition was the only evidence to support that the appellant was guilty of the offences.
The appellant had a long history of criminal offending comprising of 52 charges. A pre-sentence report stated that the appellant had suffered a dysfunctional, violent and unstable family background. His father was an alcoholic and was violence towards his mother. The appellant also abused alcohol, drinking about six stubbies every night. Since the offending, the appellant reported that he was still drinking but not at a problematic level. However, there was no evidence to support these assertions. The appellant suffered from depression and anxiety that ‘result in markedly diminished capacity in judgement’, according to a psychologist’s report. Another psychologist concluded that the appellant’s offending history was alcohol induced and based.
Issues:
1.
The ground of appeal against the conviction was that the magistrate failed to direct and warn herself adequately in relation to the voice identification evidence.
2.
The grounds of appeal against the sentence were:
(a)
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
(b)
The magistrate failed to have proper regard to the significance of the appellant’s alcoholism in structuring an appropriate sentence; and
(c)
The magistrate erred in not finding that community service was appropriate in all the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal against the conviction was dismissed. In considering whether the appellant was guilty, the magistrate scrutinised the applicant’s evidence as to voice recognition carefully. Both witnesses knew the appellant well and recognised his voice on the phone. While the magistrate should have given a warning, it would have been confined to the fact that the conversations were limited and that people can be mistaken about the voices of those they know well. Despite the lack of warning, Refshauge ACJ held there was no miscarriage of justice, as even if a warning was given, it would not have affected the magistrate’s conclusion.
However, the appeal against the sentence was allowed and the appellant was ordered to be re-sentenced. The appellant’s offending was at the lower end of the spectrum of contravening a domestic violence order. However, the magistrate did not err in concluding that imprisonment was the appropriate punishment when considering his offending history and breaches of good behaviour orders. Rather, the magistrate erred in dismissing the option of suspending a term of imprisonment with a good behaviour order to include a community service condition. The offences were not so serious that a suspended sentence was too lenient.
In the matter of an application for bail by Hutchings [2011] ACTSC 83 (20 April 2011) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of conditions’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Uncharged allegations’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: Mr Hutchings breached an interim Domestic Violence Order by sending the female complainant a letter summarising his feelings towards her and the end of their relationship. This was also in breach of bail conditions imposed for a dangerous driving offence. He was granted bail with a condition included that he not contact the complainant in any way. The complainant later received a telephone call and message, alleged to be from Mr Hutchings. He was arrested and charged with breaches of the Domestic Violence Order. This activated s 9D of the Bail Act which provided that bail could not be granted unless there were special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail. The magistrate refused bail in those circumstances.
Issue/s: Whether there were special or exceptional circumstances favouring the grant of bail.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was rejected. The Police were concerned that Mr Hutchings would commit further breaches of the Domestic Violence Order if allowed on bail. They noted that the complainant had made further complaints against Mr Hutchings but there was insufficient evidence to justify the commencement of proceedings. Burns J noted that the courts must be very cautious about relying on uncharged allegations but concluded that it was a concern to be taken into account [10]. While Mr Hutchings’ daughter was pregnant and needed Mr Hutchings to drive her around, Burns J noted that she could make other arrangements [12]. Accordingly, there were no special and exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail.
Ross v Mothersole [2010] ACTSC 125 (19 October 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Glassing’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's views’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault, threatening to harm a public official, obstructing a public official.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim of the two assaults were in a relationship. The first offence occurred when the intoxicated appellant swore at the victim and smashed a beer glass in her face. She required five stiches (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). At the watch house, the appellant threatened violence against police officers and resisted search attempts. On a subsequent occasion, the appellant and the victim were out drinking together and, during the course of argument, the appellant yelled, ‘I could kill you right now and no-one would ever know’. He then put the victim into a headlock, and head-butted and punched the complainant in the face (assault). A total head sentence of 36 months imprisonment was imposed with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: The sentence for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentencing magistrate failed to take proper account of the appellant’s plea of guilty in sentencing (See [78]). Refshauge J noted that it is very desirable that a sentencing magistrate or judge makes express reference to the issue of a plea of guilty to show that it has been taken into account. Further, the sentencing magistrate did not address the relevant mental state of the appellant (intention or recklessness). Refshauge J stated, ‘there is no doubt that “glassing” is a serious offence, whether intentionally (significantly more serious) or recklessly. It is a cruel and vicious offence, especially where the damage done is to the victim’s face, the scars from which will be long obvious and distressingly disfiguring. It is a serious offence which ordinarily will need to be visited by a sentence of imprisonment, mostly served by full-time custody’ (See [88]). However, notwithstanding this, on the facts, it was more likely than not that the appellant did not intend to use the glass as a weapon (See [90]).
In re-sentencing the appellant, Refshauge J had regard to a letter from the victim. It showed that she was still devoted to the appellant and wanted to maintain their relationship. She stated, ‘ I know he is truly sorry for hurting me and the time he has spent in jail he has not wasted one day doing everything possible to completely turn his life around, every course available in the prison Egan has not only completed but done so with proud achievement’. This showed that the insight and rehabilitative opportunities noted in the original sentencing hearing had been fulfilled and the appellant had addressed his offending behaviour (See [92]-[94]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm. The other sentences were confirmed leaving a head sentence of 30 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Tuckey v Ede [2010] ACTSC 95 (8 September 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Non-conviction order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Summary offence of assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The intoxicated male appellant started arguing with his partner (the female complainant) in their house. The appellant kicked a chair at the complainant and broke it. She threw the broken chair at him and he slapped her in the face. The complainant called the police. After discussion, the appellant agreed to plead guilty to a summary charge of assault and the prosecution agreed to make submissions not opposing the making of a non-conviction order. Her Honour refused to make a non-conviction order, convicted the appellant and imposed a 12 month good behaviour order.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing process was flawed.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld because the sentencing process in the Magistrates Court was flawed in light of further evidence provided about the agreement between the prosecution and the defence before the hearing. Although the appellant was not entitled to assume that the magistrate would make the orders that had been agreed upon, he was entitled to expect that the prosecution’s attitude to a non-conviction order would have been articulated during the hearing (See [26]-[42]).
Another sentence was appropriate in this case. The appellant had no criminal record nor any identified problem with alcohol or anger management. The offence was an isolated incident in which the complainant also took part. The couple had reconciled and were again living with their child. The appellant had a sound employment record, had already been punished by spending the night in police custody and was unable to return home for 3 weeks because of his bail conditions. Finally, the conviction would make it difficult for him to see his partner’s family in Vietnam (See [43]-[45]).
The appellant’s conviction was set aside and a good behaviour order imposed for 12 months. In re-sentencing the appellant, Penfold J stated:
‘However, the appellant should not interpret this conclusion as in any sense condoning of his use of physical violence on his partner (or anyone else for that matter). Rather, it is a recognition that while it is vital for domestic violence to be taken seriously by the police and the prosecuting authorities and the courts, it is also important for a victim of domestic violence to be able to call for help when she needs it in the belief that after her immediate needs have been addressed, the longer-term consequences of the call for help will be decided in a calmer environment in which her longer-term interests and wishes will also receive recognition. The appellant should be aware however, that if there were any repetition of this kind of behaviour by him, I expect that a sentencing court would take it very seriously’ (See [47]).
Elson v Ayton [2010] ACTSC 70 (15 July 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence accumulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, assault x 3, damaging property x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. The appellant became very angry with the complainant and she got in her car with her daughter to leave. The appellant punched the driver’s side window of the car causing the window to shatter. He then punched the complainant in the nose and eye, causing her nose to bleed. On a subsequent occasion, in breach of his bail conditions, the intoxicated appellant went to the complainant’s house. He abused her saying, ‘he would kill her and hurt her,’ and put his right arm around her throat. He threw a jar and punched his fist through the microwave door. On a third occasion, again in breach of bail conditions, the appellant went to the complainant’s home with his teenage son. He grabbed her by the throat, punched her in the face, and kicked her. The appellant only stopped when the complainant’s 10 year old son called the police.
While the sentencing magistrate stated that she intended to impose a total sentence of 48 months, with a 24 months non-parole period, the accumulation of sentences the magistrate articulated in court was only a total of 30 months. However, amendments were subsequently made to the bench sheets to reflect what Her Honour intended.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing magistrate erred in amending the sentences.
2.
The sentencing magistrate erred in imposing the maximum penalty for the damaging property offences.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive and the sentencing magistrate misapplied the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. First, the parties should have been given an opportunity to be heard before the sentences were amended. This failure amounted to an error requiring the sentence to be set aside (See [81]-[93]). Second, the offences of damaging property were not in the worst category of offences — the damage was not considerable and there were no matters of aggravation of either offence such as planning or premeditation. The magistrate erred in imposing the imposition of the maximum penalty on these offences (See [94]-[103]).
Third, the sentence of 15 months imprisonment imposed for the second assault was excessive in light of the sentence of 18 months imprisonment for the first assault. The first assault was more serious. It involved the smashing of a window, the appellant caused the complainant’s nose to bleed, it was committed in the presence of a child, and the appellant pleaded not guilty to this offence (See [105]-[109]). Further, by merely accumulating the sentences for the three episodes, the sentencing magistrate could not be said to have applied the principle of totality (See [109]-[116]).
The appellant was re-sentenced by Refshauge J to a total sentence of 34 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months based on evidence that the appellant had taken steps to address his drug and alcohol use (See [121]-[130]). His Honour noted, ‘these offences are serious, particularly because they are offences of family violence, some committed in the presence of children, some committed whilst on bail and in breach of conditions of that bail. The repetition of assaults on the victim also makes the offences serious’ [122].
Goundar v Goddard [2010] ACTSC 56 (29 June 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Purpose of sentencing’ – ‘Rehabilitation’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and his wife, the complainant, were involved in a lengthy argument regarding the conduct of the complainant’s daughter. The appellant swore at the complainant and said, ‘I’m going to kill you’. He then pushed the complainant on her forehead, causing her to fall backwards into her chair. The complainant went to her daughter’s bedroom and was followed by the appellant. The argument continued and at one point the appellant came so close he caused the complainant to stumble backwards onto the bed. The appellant pleaded guilty to assault. Counsel for the appellant sought a non-conviction sentence and the prosecution made no opposing submissions. The magistrate imposed a good behaviour order which required the appellant to subject to probation for 18 months and required the appellant to attend counselling on anger management and inter-personal relationships.
Issue/s: The condition of the good behaviour order requiring the appellant to be subject to probation for 18 months was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the period of supervision set aside. This was an offence at the lower end of the scale of seriousness for such offences, notwithstanding that this was a family violence offence. It was committed by a person with no criminal history. Further, a substantial number of very positive references were submitted attesting to the appellant’s good character (See [44]-[47]).
The respondent submitted that weight had to be given to general and specific deterrence because this was a family violence offence. Refshauge J accepted this but noted that ‘supervision on probation is not ordinarily seen as part of the deterrent component of sentencing’. It is generally a rehabilitative part of sentencing. Here, unless actual supervision was required for a rehabilitative purpose, i.e. to ensure the appellant attended counselling, it was not appropriate to make a probation condition. There was no suggestion on the facts that the appellant would benefit from such guidance (See [48]-[59]).
Twerd v Holmes [2010] ACTSC 55 (25 June 2010) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charge/s: Unlawful confinement.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant unlawfully confined his former partner by forcing her into a taxi and compelling her to travel with him, against her will. He then took her to another person’s house where she was prevented from answering her phone. She was held captive for approximately 2 hours. The magistrate imposed a sentence of 20 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. This was a very serious offence. Its seriousness was not diminished by the fact that it occurred within the context of a relationship breakdown, that it was not carried out for financial gain, and that it was committed in the presence of third parties. Further, the appellant had a long criminal history (See [3]-[4]).
In the matter of an application for Bail by Breen [2009] ACTSC 172 (31 December 2009) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Presumption against the grant of bail’ – ‘Threatening to kill’
Charge/s: Threatening to kill, failing to surrender firearms x 3, possessing a quantity of cannabis.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: Mr Breen, an Aboriginal man, was in a relationship with a woman and they had three children. Mr Breen rang the mother of his partner, asking if she knew where his partner was. He was extremely agitated and said, ‘If we were married, we would now be divorced’ and ‘I’ve got big problems with my head’. Mr Breen then said, ‘and if [his partner] gets boyfriends out of this, I will get my gun and blow all their heads off. I will kill us all. Better that than have them molested as I was’. Mr Breen stayed on the phone to his partner’s mother for an hour and on two occasions he threatened to kill the whole family. When police later arrived, Mr Breen said he was depressed and ‘wanted to end it all’. A search of the property uncovered three unregistered rifles and cannabis. He was arrested and was refused bail by a magistrate for ‘mental health issues’ and his access to ‘illicit’ firearms.
Issue/s: Whether Mr Breen should be granted bail.
Decision and reasoning: Section 9B of the Bail Act meant that the presumption in favour of bail did not apply. Refshauge J noted that, in determining whether to grant or refuse bail, the court had to engage in an assessment of ‘future risk’. Given that refusal of bail is tantamount to preventative detention, the court should not make a decision on the basis of suspicion or speculation (See [57]-[61]). His Honour stated, ‘the appropriate initial view was that this was a serious offence which was engendered in emotional circumstances where very serious violence, at least to Mr Breen himself if not to his partner and children, was threatened and where there were apparent means to carry out such a threat. This was exacerbated by the fact that Mr Breen clearly [had] some mental health issues which [made] the likelihood of unpredictable outcomes greater’ at [61].
However, on the basis of tendered evidence, Refshauge J was satisfied that the imposition of strict bail conditions could manage these concerns (See [91]). Mr Breen’s behaviour was caused by a mental impairment that was treatable (and treatment were already occurring). While Mr Breen had a worrying fascination with guns and weapons, he was not in a realistic position or had the immediate capacity to carry out his threat. There was no evidence to satisfy Refshauge J that Mr Breen’s partner would be in danger with the provision of suitable bail conditions. Mr Breen had work available and his parents were prepared to offer a cash surety.
Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 (16 April 2009) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Anger management programs’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Common assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had been married for eight years and had two children. An argument arose between the appellant and the complainant. Their 12 year old son stepped between them but was pushed away by the appellant. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the hair, pulled her into the bedroom and threw her on the bed. The complainant called the appellant’s mother a prostitute and he twisted her arm behind her back and slapped her face several times. The police were called. The appellant made full admissions. In sentencing submissions, counsel for the appellant informed the magistrate that a conviction would prevent the family from migrating to Canada and asked for a short adjournment to procure such evidence from his office. The magistrate refused. The appellant was convicted and made subject to a good behaviour order for 12 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate failed to provide procedural fairness by not permitting an adjournment.
Decision and reasoning: The magistrate erred in refusing to allow an adjournment for the material relating to the potential barriers of a conviction to migrating to Canada to be procured. The adjournment would only have been brief and the issue of migration status was of major concern to the family. It was not appropriate to deny the appellant the opportunity of putting his case before the court just because his legal representation had failed to have the requisite documents on hand. The appeal was allowed and it fell to Refshauge J to re-sentence the appellant (See [34]-[51]).
In re-sentencing the appellant, His Honour had particular regard to the issues of the migration process to Canada and the views expressed by the complainant in a letter to the court. First, Refshauge J accepted that there was a real likelihood that in a case of domestic violence the appellant would be refused admission to Canada. This would adversely affect the family (See [73]-[78]). Second, in relation to the letter from the complainant, His Honour stated that:
‘In my view, there is a great danger in putting a victim of domestic violence in the position where they are seen to have some power to influence a sentence. This is often likely to be an intolerable choice between the bonds of affection which often persist despite the violence and their need for protection against recurrence and for the offender to be held accountable’ at [82].
His Honour accepted the letter for the following: the appellant had previously good character, the incident was a one-off occurrence, he voluntarily participated in an anger management course, and it confirmed the effect on the family if they were unable to migrate to Canada. But, in light of the issues mentioned above, accepting the letter as evidence of reconciliation needed to be treated with caution (See [79]-[84]).
The appellant had no prior convictions and previous good character. The offence was serious but at the lower end of the criminal calendar and, as a matter of marginal extenuation, the victim was equally as abusive. A non-conviction order was warranted because of the appellant’s immediate engagement in a rehabilitation program, his plea of guilty and early confession, and the risk to the family if their immigration plans were thwarted (See [92]-[97]).
R v Taylor (No 2) [2008] ACTSC 97 (12 September 2008) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Good behaviour orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator programs’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Purpose of sentencing’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order.
Hearing type: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: On 16 January 2007, the offender was found guilty for breaching a Domestic Violence Protection Order, protecting Ms Perrin (with whom he had two children). He drove past Ms Perrin’s residence, yelled at her, and summonsed another man at the premises to fight him. The offence was committed in breach of two earlier imposed and unrelated good behaviour orders for aggravated robbery and assault occasioning bodily harm (‘the 2004 offences’). Accordingly, it fell to Rares J to sentence the offender for the breach of the protection order and re-sentence the offender for the 2004 offences. At the time of sentencing, the offender and Ms Perrin had reconciled.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, wholly suspended with conditions [2]. In sentencing the offender, Rares J was satisfied that the offender had made a serious and concerted effort to turn his life around — the offender had stopped taking cannabis and alcohol, had obtained employment, paid for his own attendance with Ms Perrin at a Relationships Australia course, and had the support of his family and Ms Perrin’s family to make a good life for their children. His Honour also took into account the fact that he had pleaded not guilty to the offence of breaching the domestic violence order and that he had a prior criminal history.
Rares J noted that while he did not want to undermine the offender’s ‘terrific’ improvement, a penalty had to be crafted that appropriately reflected the offender’s criminality, the seriousness of the conduct and general deterrence. His Honour noted:
‘In many, many cases before the courts, the subjective impact of a punishment on an offender once brought to justice can be seen to be great. But to do justice according to law, must be to uphold the laws themselves and their purpose to ensure that we all obey the law. The community must know that offenders, whatever their personal circumstances are, receive a punishment that is appropriate and recognises the seriousness of the offending and the breaches of the community’s standards embodied in its criminal laws’ at [17].
Redden v Slavin-Molloy [2008] ACTSC 37 (29 April 2008) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of a protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated breaches’ – ‘Specific deterrence’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant obtained a protection order against the male appellant, her former partner. In breach of this order, the appellant attended her home. When she refused to let him inside, he began yelling and attempted to break down the door. She called for help and the appellant fled. The next day, the appellant again tried to obtain entry to the complainant’s home. He struck and damaged the front door when he was refused entry and again ran off when he was told the police had been called. In December 2007, the offender was sentenced to 10 and 15 months imprisonment respectively for these breaches. Earlier, in May 2007, the offender had been sentenced for a number of other offences, including four charges of contravening a protection order. For the most serious of these breaches, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment to be served as periodic detention.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence of 10 months imprisonment and 15 months imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Penfold J noted that:
‘To the extent that punishing an offender ever more severely because of repeat offending, rather than because the individual offences have become more serious, is justifiable, such an approach must relate to the need for specific deterrence of an offender who appears unwilling to learn from previous penalties. Even in that case, the penalty must still remain referable in some way to the actual offence committed’ at [38].
Here, the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [42]). In particular, the two sentences imposed were at least twice as severe as the most severe penalty previously imposed for breach of a protection order in May 2007. However, if the May 2007 breaches were so much less severe than the conduct here, it was hard to see how they would have justified imprisonment at all (See [37]). Further, at the time of the August breaches, the offender had not served any full-time custody or even any periodic detention. It could not be assumed that his actions in August were informed by any understanding of the reality of a custodial sentence (See [39]). Other relevant mitigating factors were taken into account (See [30]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for each breach.
Miller v MacDonald [2006] ACTSC 76 (30 June 2006) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Conflict between orders’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Explaining the orders’ – ‘Family court orders’ – ‘Mistake of law’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Recklessness’ – ‘Repeated breaches’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s former wife, with whom he had a daughter, obtained a domestic violence protection order against him, prohibiting contact. Shortly before the appellant left for an extended visit to the United States, the Family Court made an order which vacated this contact order. It stated that while the appellant was out of the country, he could send gifts and correspondence or postcards to his daughter provided that the contact was directed to the child and that he could send a photograph from time to time. When he was back in Australia, the appellant sent his daughter a package containing photographs, gifts and a letter. Additionally, the appellant mistakenly sent his former wife an email when he sent a group message to his siblings. He had previously been interviewed by police for a similar mistake. The appellant had spent 42 days in custody on remand. The magistrate imposed a six month term of imprisonment from the date he was taken into custody and directed he be released after serving 42 days, effectively that he be released the day following the hearing. He also imposed an 18 month good behaviour bond, subject to some conditions (see[22]).
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant made an honest and reasonable mistake of law by sending his daughter a package.
2.
The email to his wife was sent in error.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, His Honour held that: ‘[I]t is certainly fair to say that if a person seeks to rely on a Family Court order that varies what is otherwise a clear domestic violence order, it is incumbent upon that person to take steps to understand what the Family Court order says. And it seems to me that the Magistrate was perfectly entitled to find that Mr Miller was at least reckless in assuming that that order, which on its face only covers the time that he was out of the country, continued to apply after he had returned to Australia’ at [5].
Second, on its own, the email sent in error to his former wife would have been unlikely to meet the requisite standard of intent or recklessness. However, given that the appellant had made the same mistake before and had been interviewed by police for this, there was at least recklessness in relation to the sending of that message.
Third, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. His Honour noted that these were low level breaches of a domestic violence order, they involved recklessness rather than intent, and the nature of the correspondence in both the letter and the email was non-violent and non-threatening. However, the appellant had three prior appearances relating to seven convictions for breaches of a protection order. Connolly J stated:
‘It seems to me that even though these were lower level, indeed very low level breaches in the sense that there was no actual or apprehended or threatened violence, repeated breaches however low level, do inevitably meet with an increase in sentence on the basic premise that when low level sentences do not stop the offending behaviour a court has little option but to continue a pattern of steadily ramping up the sentence’ at [20].
R v Bell [2005] ACTSC 123 (1 December 2005) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Impact of domestic violence on women and children’ – ‘Persons affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Risk factor- strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim had previously been in a relationship and had two children together. The offender and victim’s version of events differed. The victim alleged that after consuming alcohol with the offender one night, the offender dragged her out of bed, hit her three time in the face and put his hands around her neck and pushed his thumbs into her throat. While doing so, the offender said something to the effect of “Slut, I’ll kill you, I’ll kill you”. When she woke up the next morning the offender continued to follow and abuse her. The offender said that the offending occurred after he blacked out after drinking substantial amounts of alcohol. He said that the assault occurred after the victim, who was drunk, was following him between pubs and abused him verbally and physically by kicking him. After she got in an altercation with a patron, she was removed from the pub and was spoken to by police officers. The offender agreed to take the victim home, where they sat outside smoking marijuana and drinking bourbon. They then got in an argument over their children and the victim struck the offender. According to the offender, this is when he grabbed her throat and beat the victim.
Higgins CJ, after hearing corroborating witnesses, accepted that the assault occurred in the way described by the offender. However, he did not suggest that the victim was fabricating her account: ‘She was savagely beaten, she had a lot to drink and it is unsurprising that some of the details became confused in her mind’ ([26]).
In relation to this conduct the offender was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
For three months prior to the assault, the offender had undergone rehabilitation at Oolong House. He had a long history of offending, including 28 prior assaults. Most of the previous offending occurred after the offender had consumed alcohol. While he acknowledged his alcohol abuse, the offender did not consider he needed drug and alcohol intervention. He also admitted to feeling ‘horrified by what he had done’ and said ‘violence towards women is not in his makeup and he has no excuses for what he has done’.
Issue: What sentence should the offender receive?
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. While the preceding conduct on the night of the offending and the alcohol abuse engaged in by both the parties may explain the offending, it did not excuse it. There were some prospects of rehabilitation for the offender. However, having regard to the severity of the attack and the offender’s criminal history and alcohol abuse, a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate: ‘No other sentence will say to men who abuse women that such conduct is abhorrent and will result in severe punishment whatever the status or record of the offender’ ([32]).
In considering the purposes of sentencing domestic violence offending, Higgins CJ noted that while alcohol may have been a triggering factor, offenders must take responsibility for their actions and be seen to do so. As domestic violence offences are often hidden, general deterrence is also an important consideration in sentencing. So too is specific deterrence. Higgins CJ emphasised that domestic violence ‘is a pernicious and evil phenomenon not only because of the immediate trauma to the victim. Its evil influence spreads to children as well. It is no coincidence that, in my experience, young offenders, more often than not, present with a family history of domestic violence. It used to be regarded as a family matter, to be kept private. Victims would be made to feel humiliated, and ashamed to complain; in truth it is entirely the criminal conduct of the perpetrator which is at fault. It is entirely in the public interest that such conduct be exposed and deterred’ ([30]).
Gray v Burt [2005] ACTSC 93 (23 September 2005) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Application to revoke domestic violence order’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal of a magistrate to revoke a Domestic Violence Order.
Facts: On 22 October 2003, a Domestic Violence Order was made by the Deputy Registrar of the Magistrates Court for the protection of the female respondent against the appellant, with whom she was in a sexual relationship. Both parties had disabilities. During their ‘physical relationship’, the respondent suffered three separate fractures of her legs. She had no history of such injuries prior to the physical relationship and no history of such injuries subsequent to the physical relationship. On 24 May 2004, the Order was varied by consent and in particular the Order restrained and prohibited the male appellant from taking certain actions in relation to the respondent. The appellant applied to have the order revoked but a magistrate declined to revoke the Order. His Honour concluded that the physical nature of the relationship represented a genuine risk to the well-being of the respondent.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in failing to revoke the order. His Honour made three errors in reaching his decision to not revoke the order –
1.
The magistrate failed to take into account the fact that the injuries occurred while the respondent was living in an apartment with the appellant and was not receiving the same degree of care as she did now.
2.
The magistrate failed to take into account evidence about counselling that the parties had commenced and intended to continue.
3.
The magistrate failed to take into account the likelihood of future sexual contact between the parties in circumstances where the appellant was now under full-time supervision at Hartley Court (a disability support facility).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the location of where the injuries occurred was not relevant because it was the physical relationship that caused the injuries. Second, there was no evidence that the counselling had been concluded nor that it would reduce the likelihood of injury if the physical relationship was to continue. Accordingly, this was not a relevant consideration. Finally, the magistrate did consider the fact that such a relationship was likely to continue on the basis of evidence before him.
Further, the magistrate did not fail to take into account the fact that persons with disabilities had the same basic rights as other members of Australian society. The magistrate specifically referred to the wishes of the respondent to continue the relationship with the appellant. However, His Honour concluded that the risk to the respondent resulting from such a relationship as such that he was unable to be satisfied that the order preventing such a relationship was no longer necessary for her protection.
R v In [2001] ACTSC 102 (2 November 2001) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor-suicide threats’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’
Charge/s: Unlawful confinement, assault occasioning bodily harm.
Hearing type: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offences occurred after the male offender and his wife, the complainant, had separated and the offender had moved out of the family home. He occasionally stayed overnight to see the children. After seeing his wife kiss another man, the offender arrived at the family home late at night, when the children were present in the house. The complainant let him in and went back to bed. The offender followed her and sat on top of her. He placed a sharp object against her throat and said, ‘This is a knife. If you move I will fucking kill you’. He then placed pre-cut strips of duct tape over the complainant’s mouth and eyes. He bound her wrists and ankles and tied her hands and feet together. He said, ‘You’ll have your wish — you’ll see me die tonight, you’ll see me die’.
The complainant had difficulty breathing and the offender removed the duct tape. He interrogated her about her relationship with the other man, hitting her several times around the head and shoulders. He left the room saying, ‘If you fucking move I’ll kill you’ and returned with a telephone book. The offender asked for the other man’s phone number before leaving the room again. The complainant heard him enter the nearby bedroom, occupied by two of their daughters and heard him say, ‘Now take this darling. I know it tastes awful, doesn’t it’.
He returned to the complainant and resumed interrogating her, striking her. He said multiple times that he was going to kill himself and take the children with him. The offender eventually became tearful and untied the complainant. She rang the emergency number and asked for an ambulance, thinking her children had been poisoned. The police and ambulance arrived. The children were unharmed. The offender left the premises and went to the police station the next morning.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment for unlawful confinement and 3 years imprisonment for assault, concurrent and a non-parole period of 18 months. Crispin J took into account a number of subjective factors in imposing this sentence. The offender pleaded guilty. At the time the offender entered the house, while there was some measure of pre-meditation in the appellant’s actions (the decision to confine and interrogate the complainant), the offender did not intend to threaten the complainant with a knife or to kill his children. The offender stopped the violence and threats of his own volition.
At the time of offending, the offender was suffering from serious psychological illnesses including acute depression and adjustment order. It was submitted on the offender’s behalf that, because of this illness, this made the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. Crispin J disagreed and stated,
‘The extent of his psychological condition is relevant to the issue of general deterrence but, in my view, the need to protect former spouses or partners from conduct of this nature cannot be so easily dismissed. Many people no doubt experience great stress upon the breakup of their marriages or other close relationships and in some cases they may suffer from symptoms of an underlying psychological illness or even become psychologically ill for the first time. One may and should respond with sympathy. However, when a person commits serious criminal acts against a former spouse or partner the court must take into account the need to deter other people from similar conduct. The risk of serious injury and, as in this case, grave emotional trauma may be at least as serious when the offender is psychologically ill. Accordingly, the need for deterrence should be given due recognition, though the weight which should be given to that factor will vary according to the circumstances of the case, and the actual sentences must be determined by reference to all relevant factors’ (See [19]).
Other relevant factors included that the offender was remorseful, he had no prior convictions and was previously a committed father and a person of impeccable character. He had taken steps to obtain counselling and achieved a significant measure of rehabilitation. He had already been imprisoned for 8 months and this caused significant distress in light of his inability to see his children and his potential to be a suicide risk.
However, Crispin J was unable to accept counsel submissions that the offender should be released on parole immediately. The offences were too serious to be dealt with in that manner — the complainant was confined for an extended period and intended to cause significant fear in the complainant.
R v Lorenz [1998] ACTSC 275 (14 August 1998) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful confinement’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Robbery with an offensive weapon.
Trial: Judge only trial.
Facts: On 20 November 1996, Ms Lorenz (‘the accused’) entered a supermarket and attempted to purchase some cigarettes with her EFTPOS card from the complainant. The transaction could not be completed because there were insufficient funds in the account. The accused maintained she was sure there were funds in the account and re-tried the card but it was again declined. She then left the store. Ten minutes later, the accused returned to the store with a pen knife. She approached the complainant, held the knife out in front of her and said, ‘give me all your fucking money or I’ll slit your throat’. The complainant gave the accused $360 in cash and the accused left the store. While initially denying any involvement, the accused made admissions to the police.
Counsel for the accused argued that the accused was acting out of duress on the basis of a threat made by Ms Lorenz’s partner on the night before the robbery and repeated the following morning to the effect that if she did not obtain enough money to enable him to re-register his car he would kill her. This threat followed a pattern of violent and threatening behaviour towards the accused over a number of years (See [11]). On the morning of the robbery, the accused, who was pregnant with the couple’s third child, found out that she was unable to get the immediate payment of an advance payment from the Department of Social Security to pay the re-registration.
Decision and Reasoning: There was some discussion in this case of ‘battered woman syndrome’ (See [26]-[31]). Crispin J accepted that upon failing to receive advance payment from the Department of Social Security, the accused became frightened and confused and the robbery was an impulsive act due to her fear that her partner would kill her. His Honour stated: ‘In my view her failure to attempt to extricate herself from the situation whether by leaving him or otherwise is largely explicable by her fear and confusion. Furthermore, she may have thought that any escape would have been only temporary and that sooner or later [her partner] would have been bound to have caught up with her and carried out his threat’ at [30].
However, ‘a diagnosis of battered woman syndrome does not of itself give rise to any defence. The law does not recognise any general principle that people should be absolved from criminal conduct because they had been beaten or abused or because a psychological condition caused by such treatment may have led them to commit the offences with which they are charged. Nonetheless, evidence that such a person may have had a psychological condition of this kind may be relevant to several defences known to the law’ at [31].
Here, counsel for the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to rely on the defence of duress. In the accused’s favour, His Honour found that the threat was effective at the time of the offence, the accused did not fail to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to render the threat ineffective, and, in light of the extremity of the actual and threatened violence displayed by the accused’s partner, a person of ordinary firmness of mind may have acted in the way the accused did (See [35]-[37]). However, the accused’s partner did not direct the accused to commit the offence and accordingly the defence of duress failed (See [38]-[41]). In the alternative, counsel for the accused attempted to rely on the defence of necessity. However, His Honour held that the imminence of danger fell well short of the required standard for the successful proof of the defence (See [42]-[45]). She was accordingly found guilty.
The accused left her partner shortly after the robbery and had formed a relationship with another man. She had just turned 23, had three children and was pregnant to her new partner. The new relationship was apparently a happy one. In these circumstances, and to give her the opportunity to start a new life for herself and her children, Crispin J found it appropriate to defer passing sentence on the condition that she enter into recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of three years.
Magistrates' Court
Police v Blackwell (A pseudonnym) [2024] ACTMC 5 (19 March 2024) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Family Violence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harrassing and monitoring’ – ‘Threats to distribute intimate images’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘text messages’
Proceedings: Sentence.
Charge: Stalking with intention to harass in contravention of protection order x 2; threat to distribute intimate image of another x 1; contravention of protection order x 2; attempt to contravene a protection order x 1.
Facts: The male defendant and female complainant were married in 2008 and separated in 2022. In June 2022, the complainant obtained a protection order against the complainant, prohibiting any communication. [3]–[5]
The defendant breached this protection order, sending the complainant a total of 250 messages between June and August of 2022, and a total of 341 messages between August and November 2022. 290 of these messages were sent on 11 October 2022 and were of a threatening nature. [11] Included among these messages was a threat to distribute ‘intimate video footage’ of himself and the complainant engaged in sexual activity. [14]
In May 2023, the defendant was served a special interim protection order, as a result of the defendant’s persistent breach of the original order. [18]
Decision and reasoning: Partially suspended sentence of 81 days’ imprisonment and undertaking to comply with good behaviour obligations for 24 months. [157] Magistrate Temby had regard to the complainant’s impact statement, satisfied that the defendant’s ‘voluminous messaging, and … threats’ heavily impacted the complainant’s sense of safety and isolation. [29]
The defendant’s offending was regarded as ‘a serious example’ of stalking, occurring over an extended period (2.5 months) and involving a large volume of unlawful communication. [30] Similarly, the defendant’s threat to distribute a particular intimate image of the complainant was ‘an insidious kind of threat’, falling above the middle of the range in terms of objective seriousness [40] Magistrate Temby observed this offending occurred while the defendant was on ‘conditional liberty’. This is an aggravating factor on sentence. [50]–[51]
Magistrate Temby further noted the defendant’s mental health conditions (inc. anxiety, depression and Autism Spectrum Disorder) and alcohol use disorder. [98] However, the Magistrate queried the extent to which these conditions contributed to the defendant’s offending. [100] The Magistrate lastly observed the defendant’s lack of appreciation with respect to the harm of his actions and consequent lack of responsibility. [122]
TS v PU [2019] ACTMC 22 (12 July 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Employment’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Final protection order application’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Police domestic and family violence’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for final family violence order (FVO).
Facts: The male respondent and the female applicant both worked for the Australian Federal Police. An interim FVO prevented the respondent from working as an active officer as he was not allowed use of firearms. The circumstances of the offending included exposing the couple’s child to domestic and family violence, and text messages from the respondent threatening suicide including images of the respondent with a firearm in his mouth.
Decision and reasoning: A 24-month FVO was granted. In particular, the Magistrate considered the hardship to the respondent in making a FVO but noted at [34]-[35]:
“Those who have the professional privilege of using and carrying firearms in the workplace know full well that this grant of privilege for firearms can be revoked if their behaviour is inconsistent with a continued grant. The consequential effect of any order made in favour of the applicant relating to depriving the respondent’s ability to access firearms has weighed heavily in this decision. Ultimately, the respondent must take responsibility for his conduct in terms of the professional repercussions he has brought upon himself and the personal (and legal) repercussions caused by involving the applicant in his behaviour. Encouragement of him to so do is expressed in s 6 as an object of the FV Act.
Bearing all of the issues in mind, I find that in the circumstances of this matter, the level of hardship to the respondent caused by granting a final order does not outweigh the need to grant an order. That is, any s 14 hardship upon the respondent has not outweighed the s 6 and other competing s 14 considerations. I have decided to impose a final order and I turn my mind to the conditions of that order.”
Love v Kumar [2018] ACTMC 23 (31 October 2018) – Australian Capital Territory Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse background’ – ‘Visa threats’
Charges: Common assault x 5.
Matter: Judgement.
Facts: The events relating to the charges took place between 2014 and 2017. The defendant male and complainant female were married and had one child. The 5 assault charges relate to the following alleged incidents:
1.
slapped complainant wife across face
2.
slapped complainant wife across face
3.
struck his child on the her back of shoulder because she was crying;
4.
pushed complainant wife’s forehead backwards striking the wall behind
5.
grabbed complainant wife’s hair and twisted her head and hit her face on wall
Decision and Reasoning: In relation to charges 1-3, the Magistrate was not satisfied that the case had been sufficiently made out to justify a finding of the accused’s guilt.
In relation to charges 4 and 5, the Magistrate found the accused guilty.
Special Magistrate Hunter OAM observed:
Taken together the evidence if accepted of giving information to officials at Immigration, the refusal to recant that information, the bruise to the head which is consistent with the allegation on 18th and the general information such as not allowing Ms Devi to have a phone, not allow her to contact her brother and the like which could lead to a conclusion that the defendant was controlling her life, (which is not unknown in domestic violence situations). It also leads to a conclusion that Ms Devi is speaking the truth and should be believed. [207]
And:
I am also satisfied that she had been controlled at least to some extent. That is supported by uncontroverted evidence that she had to secret a SIM card so that she could contact her family and brother by phone. This is consistent with the evidence from her brother that she had no access to contact him except by public phone until he gave her the SIM card. I am also satisfied she had limited access to friends and family. That evidence was corroborated by her brother and by the fact she used the SIM card he gave her to make the various phone calls she made to family and friends. I also note the Defendant had alluded to that control in some of his answers in the ROI such as those referred to by Prosecution counsel in her submissions. [209]
[Note: This decision was unsuccessfully appealed: Kumar v Love [2019] ACTSC 238 (30 August 2019) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court]
New South Wales
Court of Appeal
Rock v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 47 (28 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO)’ – ‘Trespass’ – ‘Delay in giving reasons for judgment’ – ‘Alleged battery’ – ‘Relationship breakdown’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘PTSD’-‘systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal of dismissed claims; application for leave to appeal dismissed claims.
Charges: Malicious prosecution x1, trespass x 1, battery x6
Facts: The applicant, Mr Rock, and the respondent, Ms Henderson were married and had two children [7]. Ms Henderson had provided material to Constable Pitt who applied for a provisional ADVO against Mr Rock. The material included an incident at Sydney Airport when Mr Rock had confronted Ms Henderson and the man she was travelling with [8]. Mr Rock consented to an interim ADVO pending a final hearing [12], at which the judge found that the test had not been met for a final ADVO to be issued [16].
Later, Mr Rock and the two children were returning from a holiday when they found Ms Henderson at their home [17]. According to Mr Rock, she was tampering with a fuse box. She left promptly, but was charged with contravening the ADVO that was in place against her. Mr Rock made claims for malicious prosecution in respect of the ADVO taken out against him by Ms Henderson, and for trespass in respect of Ms Henderson’s presence at the home [18]. Ms Rock, one of the children, brought a proceeding for six alleged counts of battery against Ms Henderson relating to separate events [21]. The two claims were heard together. Orders were made, with the reasons for the orders given 3 months later [23], [29].
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant raised several grounds on appeal. It is helpful to have reference to the court’s framing of these into three issues [34]:
1.
What consequences, if any, follow from the fact that the primary judge did not give her reasons for decision until 3 months and 4 days after delivering judgment?
2.
Is the tort of malicious prosecution available in respect of the procuring of an ADVO?
3.
Should the appeal succeed on its merits?
Ms Rock’s appeal relied on the same ground as the applicant regarding the delay in giving reasons after making orders. Her remaining grounds concerned liability and damages [35].
Decision and Reasoning: The Court reviewed the case law in respect of delays in delivering reasons for judgment. The Court found that, in general, a court should not make final orders without giving reasons (where reasons are required) unless there is sufficient cause to take that course, e.g. because of urgency [60]. The reasons are due “as soon as reasonably practicable after judgment is delivered” [60]. The Court found that the reasons in this case were not delivered “as soon as reasonably practicable”, but concluded that nothing came of this other than some delay in hearing of the appeal – this did not merit a retrial [65].
Regarding the tort of malicious prosecution and whether this tort would encompass taking out an ADVO, the Court again began by canvassing the case law and the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 [66]. The Court held that the tort did not encompass taking out an ADVO [166]. The Court went on to explain why the applicant would not have been successful on the tort in any event [189]. The Court found that the trespass claim had been made out, but that since there had been no loss, the applicant was entitled to nominal damages only [215]. The grounds comprising Ms Rock’s appeal were either dismissed, or leave was refused in request of them [218].
Rahman v Rahman [2024] NSWCA 198 (8 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
'Following, harassing and monitoring' – 'Stalking' – 'People with children' – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Jurisdictional error’ –‘telephone evidence’
Case type: Application for judicial review in the NSW Court of Appeal.
The applicant, Fahmid Rahman, challenged a decision of the District Court to dismiss his appeal against an extension of a final apprehended domestic violence order (‘ADVO’) made under the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The application was treated as seeking judicial review on grounds of jurisdictional error.
Charges: Stalking (x1); intimidation (x1) [NB: These were the previous convictions, please note the court did not consider these charges, the Court treated the matter as an application to review for jurisdictional error only.]
Facts:
1.
The applicant and the first respondent were formerly married. They have two children. The children are in the sole care of the applicant, Mr Rahman.
2.
On 17 February 2022, a final ADVO was made against Mr Rahman for the protection of Ms Rahman, prohibiting him from approaching her residence or workplace, including the former matrimonial home. Although Mr Rahman had previously been acquitted of assault, he was convicted of stalking and intimidation.
3.
Before the ADVO expired, Ms Rahman sought an extension under s 73(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), alleging ongoing fear of Mr Rahman and citing his controlling behaviour and continued litigation against her. Magistrate Swain extended the ADVO by two years. Mr Rahman appealed to the District Court, which dismissed the appeal after a rehearing, finding that the complainant continued to fear personal violence.
4.
The primary judge referred to the applicant’s litigation conduct as ‘systems abuse’ and upheld the extension.
5.
Mr Rahman then sought judicial review of the upholding of the extension in the Court of Appeal.
Grounds of Appeal: Mr Rahman relied on four grounds of alleged jurisdictional error.
1.
Denial of natural justice. This ground asserts jurisdictional error on the part of both the magistrate and the primary judge, that error being identified as denying the applicant natural justice.
2.
Failure to consider material considerations. This ground asserts a failure by the primary judge to consider a material consideration “being the reasons for the appellant’s failure to cross examine with proper identification/failure to attend court”.
3.
Procedural unfairness. This ground complains of procedural unfairness, describing this as “being not transparent in actions/decisions” and goes on to make a serious allegation that the decision was in bad faith.
4.
Consideration failures. This ground alleges that irrelevant considerations were taken into account and/or relevant considerations were not taken into account.
Decision: The NSW Court of Appeal (Ward P, Adamson and Stern JJA) dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the District Court proceedings. The Court ordered Mr Rahman to pay the respondent’s costs.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The applicant alleged that both the magistrate and the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by denying natural justice [32]. The Court first held that judicial review of the magistrate’s decision was not competent, as those orders had merged into and been superseded by the District Court’s orders on appeal [33].
As for the primary judge, the applicant argued that natural justice was denied because the judge allowed evidence from three telephone witnesses without proper identification or affidavit and failed to refer to section 73(3) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) [34]–[35]. These actions were said to breach procedural fairness and amount to a jurisdictional error under Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 177 and Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 [36]–[37]. The Court rejected this. It confirmed that permitting telephone evidence, particularly where the applicant had introduced late evidence himself, did not breach procedural fairness. Further, there was no jurisdictional error, as the applicant’s own counsel had accepted the procedure at trial without objection [41].
The core argument advanced in oral submissions was that the primary judge failed to identify a “change in circumstances” as required by s 73(3) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The Court held this was misconceived; s 73(3) does not impose a jurisdictional condition, but merely allows a court to decline to hear an application where there has been no change, and it appears to be an appeal in disguise [45]–[47].
In any event, the judge did address the relevant facts, noting a proliferation of litigation and continued contact attempts through emails as evidence of changing circumstances, satisfying the test under s 73(1) that it was "proper in all the circumstances" to extend the order [48].
Ground 2: The applicant argued that the primary judge failed to consider a material issue, namely, his inability to cross-examine witnesses who gave evidence via telephone without “proper identification” [50]. The Court rejected this argument. The telephone evidence arose only because the applicant sought leave to rely on a late-served affidavit from Mr Syed. In response, the judge allowed the respondent to call three reply witnesses by phone to avoid prejudice from the late filing [52]–[54].
Before the affidavit was read, the judge confirmed with the applicant’s counsel that this course was understood and accepted. The applicant’s counsel raised no objection at the time and each witness was properly sworn, identified, and cross-examined [55]–[57].
The applicant’s later claim that he could not verify the identity of phone witnesses or cross-examine them effectively was inaccurate, his counsel conducted cross-examination and made no complaint during the hearing. The Court confirmed that admitting telephone evidence was within the judge’s procedural discretion and did not amount to a denial of procedural fairness or jurisdictional error [58]–[59].
Ground 3: The applicant claimed that the District Court proceedings were procedurally unfair due to a lack of transparency, that the decision was made in bad faith, and that the wrong legal test was applied when assessing whether to extend the ADVO. The Court firmly rejected all aspects of this ground [70].
First, the Court found no lack of transparency or procedural unfairness. While the primary judge’s reasons were brief and delivered ex tempore, they were adequate in context. The Court reiterated that when evaluating the sufficiency of reasons, it is essential to consider the nature of the proceedings and the constraints on the decision-maker, particularly where reasons are given orally at the conclusion of a full-day hearing with another matter the Court needed to hear (Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [56]; NSW Land and Housing Corp v Orr (2019) 100 NSWLR 578 at [70]) [62].
Second, the Court found no evidentiary basis for the serious allegation of bad faith. It warned that such assertions should not be made lightly and must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence, especially where submission are made by or under the name of a solicitor, as an officer of the Court [64]–[65].
Third, the applicant contended that the judge erred by applying the balance of probabilities standard rather than a higher threshold. This was found to be legally incorrect. Under s 16(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), the correct standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. The Court explained that Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 does not alter the standard but recognises that more serious allegations require stronger evidence to reach that standard (at 362–363). The judge had properly applied this principle, as well as s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) [66]–[68].
Finally, the Court held that the primary judge clearly indicated his independent state of satisfaction that the complainant feared the applicant, the core requirement under s 16(1) of the Act. No error, and certainly no jurisdictional error, was established [69].
Ground 4: The applicant argued that the judge erred by referring to outstanding costs orders and to the National Domestic Violence Bench Book. The Court held these were both permissible references. The costs orders were part of the procedural history and directly relevant to the respondent’s evidence about the stress and anxiety as a result of the proliferation of litigation [73]. The Bench Book was cited in relation to "systems abuse", in the context of the submission by the first respondent’s solicitor as to the persistence in the applicant’s pursuit of litigation against the first respondent. The Court affirmed that neither point gave rise to jurisdictional error [74].
Rock v Henderson [2021] NSWCA 155 (29 July 2021) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Family court proceedings’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Improper purpose’ – ‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Trespass’
Proceeding: Application for leave to appeal against striking out Statement of Claim in full.
Facts: The male applicant and female respondent were formerly husband and wife with financial and child proceedings pending in the Family Court. In 2018 there was an incident at Sydney Airport between them where it was alleged the applicant approached the respondent and her current partner and caused her humiliation and embarrassment [58]. The respondent made a written statement which led to the police obtaining a provisional protection order against the applicant [54]. It was dismissed in June 2019 [4].
The applicant sued the respondent for damages for malicious prosecution and for trespass to land. The malicious prosecution submission related to the protection order application [4]. The trespass to land submission related to the respondent entering the applicant’s property in July 2019 where the children, whom she was prohibited from approaching by a separate protection order, resided with him [4]. The respondent filed a Notice of Motion to the District Court seeking the claim be struck out, in full or in part pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedural Rules 2005 (NSW), rule 14.28 [5]. The primary judge ordered the applicants’ claim be struck out in full as the applicant commenced the proceedings for an improper purpose, namely to circumvent or derive some advantage in the family law proceedings. The applicant applied for leave to appeal.
Grounds of Appeal:
The Primary judge erred in finding the appellant’s actions for malicious prosecution and trespass were an abuse of process in that they were commenced for an improper or collateral purpose in that:
1.
there was an absence of evidence capable of supporting that finding; and
2.
as a matter of law, the purpose ascribed to the applicant was not an improper or collateral purpose as a matter of law.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave granted, appeal upheld.
Wright J considered the evidence that the claimed amount was the same as the proceeds from the sale of the Lilydale house provided no basis for a claim of circumventing the family law proceeding or obtaining an advantage [87],[91]. Naming the children in the claim for damages for trespass was not an improper purpose [92]. The evidence was insufficient to cross the high threshold to prove the proceedings were instituted for an improper or collateral purpose and therefore the primary judge erred in his judgement.
Wright J found that the elements of malicious prosecution were sufficiently clear and the minor defects in the applicant’s statement did not justify the claim being struck out [117]. Further, the distress caused to the applicant by the children’s distress was relevant to his claims for damages and therefore was not liable to be struck out as tending to cause prejudice, delay or embarrassment [117].
Brereton JA and Belle P agreed with the orders proposed by Wright J [50].
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305 (14 September 2001) – New South Wales Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘General principles’ – ‘Negligence’ – ‘Opinion’
Appeal Type: General civil appeal.
Facts: This decision was not concerned with domestic and family violence but is relevant in relation to the admission of expert evidence in cases involving domestic and family violence. The plaintiff was injured after falling down the stairs at work and sued her employer for negligence. At trial, her employer was found to have breached their duty of care because the stairs were slippery and this was the reason the plaintiff fell. This finding of fact made at trial was largely based on expert evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The expert attested to the slipperiness of the stairs. The plaintiff was awarded damages. But for the expert’s report, ‘a conclusion that the stairs were not slippery would have been inevitable’ (see at [56]). The defendant appealed on the basis that, inter alia, the trial judge erred in accepting the expert evidence.
Issues: Whether the trial judge erred in accepting the opinion of the expert regarding the slipperiness of the stairs.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. All members of the Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge ought not to have accepted the evidence. Importantly, this appeal was concerned with whether the evidence ought to have been accepted by the trial judge, not with its admissibility. Heydon JA firstly considered whether the expert’s testimony ‘(complied) with a prime duty of experts in giving opinion evidence: to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the validity of the expert's conclusions’ ([59]). It was in this context that his Honour engaged in general discussion about the admissibility of expert evidence. Expert evidence cannot usurp the role of the trial judge (or jury if present) in making findings of fact. The task of the tribunal of fact is to make an independent assessment of expert evidence in forming its own conclusion. It cannot do this, ‘if the expert does not fully expose the reasoning relied on’ (see at [67]). The Court is not obliged to accept the opinion of an expert, even if no other evidence is called to contradict it (see at [87]). This is important especially where the evidence goes to the ultimate issue in the case. Evidence which goes to the ultimate issue is not inadmissible for that reason (see s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). Essentially, an expert gives opinion based on facts, and as such must prove ‘by admissible means the facts on which the opinion is based, or state explicitly the assumptions as to fact on which the opinion is based’ (see at [64]).
See at [85] where his Honour summarises the general principles of the admissibility of expert evidence –
‘In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of "specialised knowledge"; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be "wholly or substantially based on the witness's expert knowledge"; so far as the opinion is based on facts "observed" by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on "assumed" or "accepted" facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert's evidence must explain how the field of "specialised knowledge" in which the witness is expert by reason of "training, study or experience", and on which the opinion is "wholly or substantially based", applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert's specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ's characterisation of the evidence in HG v R [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414, on "a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise" (at [41]).’
Court of Criminal Appeal
Sampson v The King [2025] NSWCCA 25 (21 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm’ – ‘application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘erred by rounding down discount’ – ‘erred by failing to consider offence was unplanned’ – ‘erred by failing to properly evaluate the applicant’s mental illness’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Intentionally cause grievous bodily harm (x1).
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 8 years. One evening, the applicant and complainant were at home. The applicant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The applicant began to argue with the complainant, culminating in him striking the complainant with a garden stake. The stake made contact with the complainant’s right eye area. The complainant suffered injuries to her right eye for which she underwent corrective surgery. Her vision in her right eye is very poor due to the scarring, and it is unlikely that there will be substantial improvement.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the following grounds:
(1) The sentencing judge erred in applying the sentence discount of 10 per cent by rounding down the discount to even months.
(2) The sentencing judge erred in assessing the objective seriousness of the principal offence by failing to analyse the intent component of the offence and consider the submission that the offence was unplanned.
(3) The sentencing judge erred in failing to properly evaluate the applicant’s mental illness in accordance with the principles stated in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The Court considered each ground of appeal as follows:
(1) The Court identified the basis of the 10% discount as s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) [36]. The Court agreed that by rounding the discount (such that the head sentence was 5 years’ imprisonment rather than 4 years, 11 months and 12 days), the sentencing judge had effectively reduced the discount [44]. The Court found that this was not the type of error where there can be an arithmetical correction [52], and accordingly, found it was necessary to resentence the applicant [58].
(2) The Court found that although a written submission was made to the effect that the lack of planning was a mitigating factor, nothing further was said about the matter in oral submissions [66]. The Court observed that the fact that there was little planning does not necessarily mean the offending was mitigated; the onus was on the applicant to establish that this mitigation was in order [69]. The Court rejected the ground on the basis that the lack of planning was of little or no significance [72]-[73].
(3) The Court upheld the third ground of appeal [107]. It found that the effect of the applicant’s mental health issues on general deterrence had been expressly put forward as a submission on behalf of the applicant [106]. The sentencing judge ought to have dealt with the fact that the offender was an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [105].
Sentence quashed. Appellant resentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years 8 months commencing on 9 September 2022 and expiring 8 May 2025 with a balance of term of 1 year 10 months expiring 8 February 2027.
Wardell v R [2025] NSWCCA 26 (3 March 2025) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘aggravated indecent assault’ – ‘aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘two complainants’ - 'standard of proof' - 'no misstatement of law in tendency direction' - 'sentencing older offender' - 'appropriateness of outlining indicative prison sentences'
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Charges: The applicant was convicted of 10 counts of aggravated indecent assault and 13 counts of aggravated sexual assault against two complainants. The aggregate sentence imposed in respect of those offences was imprisonment for 14 years with a non-parole period of 9 years.
Facts: At trial, the prosecution relied on tendency evidence in support of each of the counts. The tendency evidence was identified paragraphs of the statements of each of the two complainants and of a third woman, Ms Hetherington [11]. The asserted tendencies all related to the applicant’s tendency to have a sexual interest in young females working for him aged between 16 to 19, and more specifically, an interest in the two complainants. [7].
Grounds of appeal:
The ground of appeal relied upon for the appeal against conviction was that the trial judge had erred in his directions on tendency reasoning, resulting in a miscarriage of justice [24].
The two grounds of appeal relied upon for the appeal against sentence were [24]:
(1) that the sentencing judge had erred in nominating indicative sentences in respect of offences for which his Honour did not think it appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment; and
(2) that the trial judge erred in how he determined the aggregate sentence by failing to properly consider the applicant’s life expectancy.
Decision and reasoning: Leave was granted in respect of both the appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence; both appeals were dismissed.
Appeal against convictions
While the ground of appeal against conviction did not allege a “wrong decision on any question of law” in the trial judge’s directions on tendency reasoning, it did make four complaints about aspects of the tendency directions [25]. The Court began its consideration of this ground by observing the general principle that there will be a miscarriage of justice as a result of a trial judge’s directions to the jury if the directions deflected the jury’s attention from the need to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt before returning a verdict of guilty [27].
The Court observed that three of the four complaints relied on by the applicant raised the same general issue of whether the directions led to a miscarriage of justice in light of the High Court’s reasoning in DPP v Roder [2024] HCA 15 and the Court’s statement that a single tendency evidence direction should be given and should not direct or invite the jury to make findings in respect of charged conduct as a basis for then considering whether the alleged tendency or tendencies had been established [32]. The fourth complaint related to the form of the third and fourth tendencies [33].
In regard to the first three complaints about the tendency directions, the Court noted that the trial took place prior to the High Court’s judgment in Roder and the Court’s own judgment in JS v The Queen [2022] NSWCCA 145 [64]. In future, the Court expected that tendency directions would comply with the approach set out in Roder [64].
The applicant submitted that the directions had not complied with the instruction in Roder not to direct or invite the jury to make findings in respect of charged conduct for the purposes of considering whether any of the alleged tendencies was established [65]. The result of this was that the jury would “carry forward” satisfaction about charged conduct for tendency purposes to proof of the charged conduct at a lower standard of proof [65]. The Court accepted that the directions on tendency evidence were not an example of the simpler approach referred to in Roder which emphasises the tendency as the intermediate fact to be found rather than focusing on the conduct said to support the tendency [68]. The Court therefore found there was the potential for the directions to have given rise to a miscarriage of justice [68]. A miscarriage would be avoided, however, if the summing up taken as a whole ensured that there was not a risk of the jury failing to apply the required standard of proof to the determination of whether the accused was guilty of any count [68].
In the Court’s view, the tendency directions did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case [74]. The summing up as a whole effectively instructed the jury so that, notwithstanding the length and problematic aspects of the tendency directions, the jury would not have been deflected from their fundamental task of determining guilt beyond reasonable doubt [74]. The Court reached this conclusion for several reasons:
•
First, it was not contended by the applicant that there was any specific misstatement of the law in the summing up, including in relation to tendency evidence [75].
•
Second, the trial judge’s directions in relation to the tendency evidence were consistent with the principle in Bauer [2018] HCA 40 and the conclusion in Roder that tendencies ordinarily need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, none of the evidence of charged or uncharged acts, when relied upon as tendency evidence, was indispensable to reaching a verdict of guilty in respect of any charged act. There was direct evidence of each charged act as well as, in some cases, supporting evidence [76].
•
Third, the trial judge made clear that it is not enough to convict the respondent on any of the charges that the jury was satisfied (on the balance of probabilities) of the tendency evidence [79]. The tendencies were intermediate facts, and the jury had to be satisfied of the respondent’s guilt on each charge beyond reasonable doubt [80].
•
Fourth, as part of the tendency directions, the trial judge gave an example of how the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applied, saying that “in practical terms what this means is that if you were satisfied as to the tendency evidence establishing the tendency, when you then come to consider that same material as a charge, you would then need to apply the high standard of beyond reasonable doubt. ...” [80].
•
Fifth, the summing up included careful directions as to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt and the onus on the Crown to prove the elements of each charge beyond reasonable doubt; the need for separate consideration of each count; the need to accept the evidence of the relevant complainant as to the occurrence of each count; and, the direction that a tendency, if proved, “may assist the Crown to prove the accused committed the offences, but it is not enough by itself” [82].
•
Sixth, the fact that the jury did not convict on all counts, and in particular did not convict on all counts involving the second complainant, is consistent with the jury not treating the tendency evidence in an unthinkingly uniform way or as allowing them to apply a lesser standard of proof than beyond reasonable doubt in respect of each charge [85].
•
Finally, counsel for the applicant at the trial did not seek any additional directions or redirections [86]. As explained in Astill v R [2024] NSWCCA 118 at [62], this could be an indication that, in the context of the trial, the tendency evidence directions and the summing up were not perceived to have involved a miscarriage of justice.
The fourth complaint about the tendency directions related to the third and fourth tendencies alleged by the Crown. These were that the applicant had a tendency to have sexual interest in each of the complainants respectively [88]. The applicant submitted that the trial judge should have directed that only the evidence of the first complainant could be relied on to establish the third tendency and only the evidence of the second complainant could be relied on to establish the fourth tendency. By failing to give such directions, it was submitted that the trial judge must have left the jury thinking that the whole of the evidence in the case was admissible to establish those tendencies [88]. The Court dismissed this complaint by stating that evidence of a sexual interest in one of the complainants was indeed relevant to whether he had a sexual interest in the other. Both complainants were females within the same age range (16-19) who were in the same relationship to the respondent – his interest in one was logically probative of interest in the other [90].
Appeal against sentence
The applicant also sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon him, on two grounds: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in nominating indicative prison sentences for offences for which he did not think imprisonment was appropriate; and (2) that his Honour erred in the manner in which he determined to fix the ultimate aggregate sentence [106].
Regarding the first ground, the Court found there was no error in his Honour specifying indicative periods of imprisonment for these offences, confirming the significant notional concurrency between offences in this matter, although he may not have found the threshold in s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) crossed if he had been dealing with the four relevant offences in isolation [130]. His Honour was obliged to consider these offences in light of the broader pattern of offending, and the sentencing options available. The applicant was not entitled to the benefit, in mitigation of penalty, of any of these four offences being isolated [130]. Leave to appeal was granted on this ground, but this ground was dismissed [132].
Regarding the second ground, the Court observed that although there are many ways in which advanced age can ameliorate the sentence to be imposed, to give determinative weight to age would be inconsistent with principle [138]. The Court opined that his Honour did not use the applicant’s life expectancy as a short-cut in sentencing him [139]. Returning to the impact of age on numerous occasions, in appropriate contexts, his Honour ameliorated this sentence very significantly – but not mechanically – because of the applicant’s age [139]. It was not erroneous for His Honour to have rejected the approach proposed by the parties if this would have resulted in a non-parole period that would not be sufficient [140]. Leave to appeal was granted, but this ground was dismissed [141].
Shen v R [2024] NSWCCA 252 (20 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘manifestly excessive’ – ‘assault occasioning actual bodily harm – ‘alcohol-fuelled’ – ‘advanced age’ – ‘mental health’ – ‘general deterrence’ – ‘no previous criminal record’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Aggravated detention, intending to commit a serious indictable offence (assault occasioning actual bodily harm), causing actual bodily harm x1.
Facts: The complainant was the ex-wife of the applicant. After consuming a bottle of Chinese wine during the day, the applicant knocked on the complainant’s door with mooncakes and armed with a wooden stick [7]. The complainant allowed the applicant to enter the apartment, and the applicant proceeded to strike her face and body with the stick and his fists [7]. The applicant disconnected the complainant’s landline, took her mobile phone, tied her feet together, covered her with a blanket and left. The victim escaped 3-4 hours later after she had freed herself sufficiently to plug her landline back in and call an ambulance [8].
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive [3]-[4].
Decision and reasoning: The sentence was found to be unjust; it was quashed and the applicant was resentenced.
The principles relevant to an intervention by the Court in a sentence imposed are well-known: there has to be disclosed identifiable error in the sentencing judge acting upon a wrong principle, allowing extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide/affect the sentence imposed, mistaking facts, or not taking into account some material consideration [21]. If identifiable error is not disclosed, the Court may still intervene where the result of the exercise of the sentencing discretion is unreasonable or plainly unjust [22].
Rothman J ( Kirk JA & Yehia J agreeing) ‘Domestic violence is a particularly pernicious and serious class of offending. It invariably involves a vulnerable victim and repeat offending. Further, given the incidence of domestic violence, it requires, ordinarily, significant attention to general deterrence.’ [26]
Not all subjective circumstances pertinent to the applicant were ameliorating [24]. He did not display the level of insight one would hope to be present in a person of advanced age. He had no criminal record and was not otherwise known to police or law enforcement authorities. The sentencing judge, based on a psychologist’s report, was not satisfied that depression, anxiety or the applicant’s traumatic brain injury (TBI) was causative of the offending [28]. Instead, her Honour considered the TBI “as part of the general mix of matters affecting the applicant’s health” [29].
On appeal, the Court acknowledged that the advanced age of the applicant, together with his TBI and psychological conditions, made him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [32]. The Court also noted that the custodial sentence will weigh more heavily on him, and that the lack of previous convictions/complaints about domestic violence mean that community protection is less of a consideration [33]. Finally, the Court noted that as a first-time offender, the applicant was entitled to leniency [34]. On those bases, the Court was satisfied manifest error had been disclosed and the sentence imposed was “plainly unjust” and “unreasonable”. The sentence was quashed, and the applicant resentenced to a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months with a remainder term of 2 years and 3 months.
R v Karim [2024] NSWCCA 234 (13 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘manifestly inadequate’ – ‘indicative sentences” – “different forms of offending” – “COVID-19 related hardship’ – ‘double counting’ – ‘double jeopardy’– ‘notional accumulation’ – ‘aim of killing unborn fetus’ – ‘sexual and reproductive abuse’- ‘adult-like offending by young person’ – ‘strangulation’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: The “domestic violence offences” were cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x1, intentionally choke with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1, and sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation x 1.
The “drug offences” were supply prohibited drug on an ongoing basis x 1, participate in a criminal group x1, and deal with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime x1 (NB: these offences are beyond the scope of this summary).
Facts: The facts of the “domestic violence offences” were as follows. The respondent and the complainant had been in an intimate relationship. In April or May 2021, the complainant discovered she was pregnant. The respondent pressured the complainant to terminate the pregnancy. The complainant was planning a gender reveal party on the day the offending occurred, 17 September 2021. The complainant attended the respondent’s home at his request, and they argued.
The complainant attempted to leave. The respondent prevented the complainant from leaving, pushed her to the ground and stomped on her stomach with force. The respondent then placed his hand around the complainant’s neck and choked her. The complainant lost consciousness. The respondent revived her with cold water and recommenced kicking her stomach (ultimately causing demise of the fetus). The respondent inserted his finger into the complainant’s vagina three times to check whether she was bleeding. The respondent left to wash his hands, during which time the complainant tried to escape the house, but the respondent caught her and dragged her back to the loungeroom to resume kicking and stomping on her stomach.
The respondent eventually stopped and left the house, breaking the complainant’s phone. The complainant ran out of the house, collapsing outside her car.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown argued that the sentencing judge had handed down a manifestly inadequate sentence. The inadequacy was due to the sentencing judge:
- arriving at manifestly inadequate indicative sentences;
- double-counting of the onerous conditions of the respondent’s custody because of the COVID-19 pandemic; and
- allowing for an inadequate degree of notional accumulation.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed, sentence quashed, and respondent resentenced.
The Court agreed with the Crown’s submission that the sentencing judge’s findings regarding the objective seriousness of the domestic violence offences were not reflected in the indicative sentences [76]. In so finding, the Court noted that a judge’s assessment as to the degree of objective seriousness is not expected to bear a “mathematical equivalence to the legislative guideposts” [76].
The Court also found that the respondent’s subjective case (youth, mental health issues, remorse and onerous nature of custody during pandemic) did not significantly counteract the seriousness of the domestic violence offences [77]. As for the respondent’s youth, the Court observed that the weight accorded to rehabilitation over general deterrence and retribution may be lesser when the young person has conducted themselves like an adult and committed a crime of violence [79]. It was accepted by all that the respondent’s remorse and insight into his offending was limited [81].
As for custodial hardship, the Court noted that the sentencing judge had stated that but for this factor, the indicative penalties for both sets of offending would have been “more significant” [66]. While respondent’s custody involved spending time in pandemic-related lockdowns with restricted family visits, the Court held that the severity of the offending meant the indicative sentences imposed in light of this hardship were unduly lenient [84]. The Court did not decide whether the finding of special circumstances based on the pandemic restrictions was “double counting”, but affirmed that the indicative sentences adopted did not reflect the severity of the offending [90]. The Court held that these indicative sentences, together with the way in which the sentences were accumulated, had resulted in a manifestly inadequate sentence [95].
The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was quashed. The respondent was re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment with a 10-year non-parole period [105].
Barker v R [2024] NSWCCA 227 (6 December 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Resentence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘threats’
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant pleaded guilty to three domestic violence-related offences, using an offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence of intimidation (x1), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (‘AOBH’) and damaging property.
Facts: The victim and the offender had been in an intimate relationship. After a period of instability, during which the couple separated and reunited following the victim’s pregnancy in late 2022, the relationship ended definitively in January 2023. The applicant had a history of violence during the relationship and was regularly using drugs and alcohol.
On the night of 4 February 2023, the victim encountered the applicant at a pub in Albury. At the pub the applicant smirked at her and called her pathetic. At the end of the evening the victim asked her friend to drop her off at the offenders’ units to collect belongings. She had stopped living there after their relationship ended. The offender was not home at the time the victim arrived, and she let herself in. The applicant returned unexpectedly and became confrontational.
•
Count 1: The applicant retrieved a kitchen knife and confronted the victim, holding the knife close to her face. The victim said, “I just want to grab my stuff and leave”, to which the offender replied, “If you leave, I will kill you.”
•
Count 2: The offender dropped the knife and grabbed the victim by the hair and pulled her downwards. The offender punched the victim twice, once to the back of the head and once to the left side of the face and threw her to the ground.
•
Count 3: The complainant took her mobile phone, an iPhone 13 and fled to the toilet to lock the door. The offender kicked the door in, damaging the lock. He grabbed the mobile phone from the victim and walked into the lounge room, where he smashed the mobile telephone on the floor, causing it to be inoperable
The victim was unable to leave until the next morning, when the applicant contacted her mother for a pickup and apologised for his actions.
Procedural history: The District Court sentenced Mr Barker to an aggregate term of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 3 months.
Grounds of appeal: Mr Barker relied on four grounds of appeal:
1.
The learned sentencing Judge erroneously took into account unproved matters in a way that was adverse to the interest of the applicant.
2.
The learned sentencing Judge erred in his consideration of matters dealt with in the Children’s Court.
3.
The sentencing proceeding miscarried as a consequence of admitting into evidence the applicant’s Children’s Court criminal record.
4.
The learned sentencing Judge failed to properly apply the principles enunciated by the High Court in Bugmy v R (2013) 249 CLR 571.
Decision: The Court (Sweeney, Hamill and N Adams JJ) granted leave, allowed the appeal, and quashed the original sentence.
The applicant was resentenced to an aggregate term of 14 months imprisonment, to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order commencing 6 December 2024, with conditions including supervision and participation in rehabilitation programs.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The Court accepted that Judge Grant erred by taking into account unproven allegations adverse to the applicant’s interests, contrary to the principles in R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 [8];[13]. Specifically, the judge remarked that the applicant had “bashed his girlfriend twice”, despite the fact that the applicant had been acquitted of the second alleged assault [10]. These remarks suggested that the judge had acted on disputed material not proven beyond reasonable doubt, in breach of Olbrich and s 4(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which requires factual findings adverse to the offender to be proved to the requisite standard [12].
Ground 2 and 3: The Court also accepted that the sentencing judge had erred by relying on the applicant’s juvenile record, in breach of s 15(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) [15]. That provision prohibits admission of juvenile matters where no conviction was recorded and the offender has not been subject to punishment within the preceding two years [17]. Despite this, the judge referred to the applicant being “dealt with as a juvenile for common assault and domestic violence”, and used this to infer a history of relationship violence inconsistent with the applicant’s self-report [18]. This was impermissible and infected the judge’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility and prospects of rehabilitation [19].
Ground 4: The Court did not need to determine Ground 4 independently due to the established errors on Grounds 1–3. The Court noted that the applicant is a young offender with no prior record, which entitles him to some leniency. His upbringing clearly involved abuse, neglect and trauma and it appears he lacked guidance to develop appropriate attitudes. The circumstances of his upbringing reduce to some extent his moral culpability for his offending, in accordance with the principles in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 [51].
Per Sweeney J (Hammil and Adamas JJ agreeing) ‘Domestic violence must be denounced, especially as the applicant maintains troubling attitudes towards his partner and his conduct towards her, still justifying his behaviour and blaming her for his offending.’ [50]
R v Rose [2024] NSWCCA 193 (28 October 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breaking and entering dwellinghouse’ – ‘Detaining with intent to obtain a psychological advantage’ – ‘Armed with a knife’ – ‘Threats of self-harm’ – ‘Smashing backdoor’ – ‘Concern for victim’s welfare’ – ‘Manifest inadequacy’ – ‘Double counting’ – ‘Objective seriousness’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: Breaking and entering dwellinghouse and committing a serious indictable offence therein, namely, detaining with intent to obtain a psychological advantage while armed with a knife (x1).
Facts: The respondent and the victim had been in a casual sexual relationship, which had ended. The victim asked the respondent not to contact her [9]. A week later at about 1am, the respondent arrived at the victim’s residence knowing she was alone in the house. The respondent gained entry to the house by smashing the glass backdoor with a crowbar he had brought for the purpose. He was equipped with tools and a “miner’s lamp” [10]. The victim woke to the respondent leaning over her armed with a 9cm knife which he had pointed very close to her face. The respondent threw his and the victim’s phones to the ground and continued to hold the victim down on the bed for several minutes, eventually releasing her [11]. He detained the victim for 2 hours and 43 minutes and made threats of self-harm, saying his actions were the victim’s “just deserts” [12]. The victim dissuaded the respondent from carrying out his threats [14]. At 4am, the respondent left. He told the victim to call the police and himself called the police, asking them to hurry so he did not harm the victim. The police arrived at 4:17am and arrested him [16].
Grounds of appeal: The Director relied on two grounds of appeal [7]:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence:
(a)
by failing to find that the offence was aggravated by reason of the actual or threatened use of violence pursuant to s 21A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999; and
(b)
by failing to have regard to the actual and threatened use of violence (including by the use of a knife) in assessing objective seriousness.
2.
The sentence pronounced is manifestly inadequate
Decision and Reasoning: As to the first ground of appeal, the Crown prosecutor had at sentencing conceded that an evaluation of the objective seriousness of the offending as falling in the mid-range was open. The Court held that this made the case for non-interference “irresistible” [49], but went on to opine that it would have been double counting for the sentencing judge to have found that the offence was more serious due to the actual or threatened use of violence (as was suggested by sub-grounds a. and b. of ground 1) [50]-[51].
As to the second ground of appeal (manifest inadequacy), the Court held that the starting point sentence of 2 years and 8 months was not plainly unjust or wholly unreasonable [53]. Further, the respondent was entitled to the statutory reduction of 25 percent for his early guilty plea [60]. This reduced the term of imprisonment to 1 of 2 years, bringing into question whether an ICO should be imposed as an appropriate means of serving the sentence. There was no suggestion that the sentencing judge did not properly consider the question of whether an ICO should be imposed, having regard to the mandatory considerations stipulated by the provisions of s 66 SPA [61]. In the Court’s assessment, the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons for deciding, in the exercise of her discretion, that an ICO was the appropriate means of serving the sentence to be imposed [63].
R v Stephens [2024] NSWCCA 170 (11 September 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘sustained period of regular offending’ – ‘sexual jealousy and possessiveness’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Double counting’ – ‘Special circumstances involving psychiatric intervention’ -‘strangulation’ –‘damaging property’- ‘children present’- ‘uncharged acts’
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Charges: assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 7, armed with intent to commit an indictable offence x2, intentionally choking without consent x5 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 4, intentionally choking without consent x1, destruction or damage to property x2)
Facts: The respondent and the complainant were in a domestic relationship for three years. The offending, and the uncharged/Form 1 acts, occurred between 3 November 2018 and 17 October 2020. The full facts of each count are too extensive to set out here. In summary, the defendant would assault (both verbally and physically) the complainant on a regular basis when he lost his temper, causing her actual bodily harm. There was often an element of jealousy and paranoia that the complainant was seeing other men.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown advanced several bases for an inference that the sentencing discretion miscarried, producing a manifestly inadequate sentence [158]:
1.
First, the aggregate sentence and the non-parole period both manifestly failed to reflect the respondent’s objective criminality and the totality of the offending.
2.
Second, the sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to specific and general deterrence as well as community protection.
3.
Third, the sentencing judge allowed subjective considerations to, in effect, overwhelm the sentencing exercise.
4.
Fourth, the sentencing judge gave undue prominence to the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation and impermissibly engaged in a form of “double counting”, and thereby erroneously reduced the aggregate sentence imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence was quashed and the respondent was resentenced.
The Court held that:
1.
A conclusion that a sentence is manifestly inadequate does not depend upon the attribution of an identified specific error in the reasoning of the sentencing judge [28].
2.
The indicative sentences for two of the counts were lenient given the objective seriousness of the offending, and the fact that nothing in the respondent’s subjective case demanded such leniency [170].
3.
The findings of the sentencing judge paid insufficient regard to the importance that specific deterrence and community protection play in sentencing for domestic violence offending [182]. Where there is a lack of remorse or significant insight into the offending by the offender, specific deterrence should be a significant consideration [188].
4.
The respondent’s lack of remorse was not appropriately factored into the sentencing judge’s assessment of rehabilitative potential [188].
5.
The finding of special circumstances based on the need for supervision (upon release to obtain psychiatric and psychological treatment) was excessively generous [192]. Also, there was a degree of double counting in the consideration of rehabilitation both when fixing the aggregate sentence, and as a basis for a finding of special circumstances [195].
6.
The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was “unreasonable or plainly unjust” [199].
The respondent’s sentence was quashed, and he was re-sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 6 years, with a non-parole period of 4 years [237].
Nathan Ayoub v R [2024] NSWCCA 168 (6 September 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘principles of totality’ – ‘offending on parole’ – ‘backdating sentence to achieve concurrency with balance of parole’ – ‘concurrence between indicative sentences’ – ‘Bugmy features’ – ‘depression and anxiety’ – ‘following, harassing and monitoring’- ‘sexual jealousy and possessiveness’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x3), stalk and intimidate (x1).
Facts: The stalk and intimidate offence comprised the applicant calling the complainant 113 times in the span of two days [11]; the applicant distributing pornographic photos which he claimed to be of the complainant [12]; and the applicant denigrating the complainant to the complainant’s children before running off with, and downloading the data from, the complainant’s phone [13].
The facts of the three assault offences were as follows (all separate occasions):
1.
While the complainant was sitting on a toilet, the applicant took hold of her mouth and hit her nose, causing it to bleed [14].
2.
The applicant dragged the victim by the hair to a bedroom. He threw her on the bed, punched her to the head (causing a split in her skin) [15], forcibly removed her pants and pulled at her underwear with great force, causing pain and bleeding. The applicant then kicked the victim, insulted her, and pushed her head down [16].
3.
The applicant took hold of the complainant’s hair and shook her around before punching her in the head and headbutting her. The applicant punched the complainant again before striking her on the chin. He dragged her to a bedroom by the hair and put her on the bed, pushing her head into the bed. He told her to go to sleep [17].
The Court noted that the applicant had been sentenced in May 2016 for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (x1), sexual intercourse without consent (x2), and detaining for advantage (x1).
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentencing judged had erred in applying the principles of totality.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was dismissed [44].
The Court began by observing that the principle of totality is well-established [29]. The degree of concurrency in the structure of two or more sentences depends on what would be just and appropriate with reference to the totality of the offending. The offences in question do not need to be connected [31].
At the time he was arrested for the current offending, the applicant had been on parole in relation to earlier offending. His parole was revoked with the result that between 29 November 2022 and December 2023 the applicant was simultaneously serving the balance of his parole and being held in custody with respect to the current offending [32].
The earlier sentence of 9 years with a non-parole period of 6 years commenced on 20 November 2014. The applicant had been released on parole on 24 December 2022 and was arrested for the current offences on 29 November 2022 – meaning he was on parole for 23 months and 6 days [33]. In sentencing the applicant, the sentencing judge had backdated the sentence to begin on 1 October 2023, meaning there was an overlap of about 2 months between the end of the earlier sentence (he was serving the balance of the parole period in custody given that parole had been revoked) and the start of the new sentence [35].
The Court noted that the sentencing judge had provided for a degree of notional concurrence between the indicative sentences for the current offences, and had backdated the aggregate sentence to achieve a degree of concurrency with the applicant’s balance of parole [39]. The sentencing judge had therefore applied the principles of totality both as between the individual offences the applicant was currently being sentenced for, and with respect to the earlier sentence.
The applicant had argued that, taken together, the sentences imposed totalled imprisonment for a total period of 13 years, 7 months and 11 days before parole was available. He was therefore subject to an effective non-parole period that comprised 86% of the total effective sentence. The Court pointed out that this assumed the applicant was imprisoned for the entirety of the earlier sentence, when in fact the applicant had been released on parole for approximately 23 months. Therefore, the effective non-parole period was actually only 71% of the total effective sentence [41].
Wilson J stated (Ward P concurring) ‘Victims of domestic violence and other serious violent crimes are as entitled to the protection of the courts as violent offenders are to proper consideration by the courts of their subjective cases. The latter does not obviate the former…’ [62]
Ridgeway v R [2024] NSWCCA 152 (21 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Bugmy features’ – ‘Application for extension of time’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Disadvantaged background as mitigating factor’ – ‘Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Psychologist report’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Planning or premeditation’
Proceedings: Application for (1) extension of time in which to bring an application for leave to appeal, and (2) leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x1, robbery x1, contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) x2.
Facts: The applicant had previously been in a relationship with the complainant. The complainant had ended the relationship, and obtained apprehended domestic violence orders against the applicant. On the day of the offending, the complainant had driven to the beach with a friend; both had arrived separately in their own cars. After they had parked, the applicant drove into the carpark and stopped his car behind the complainant and her friend’s cars, blocking them from leaving. The applicant and the complainant got out of their cars. The complainant told him he was breaching the apprehended domestic violence order, and asked him to leave. The complainant asked her friend to call the police. The applicant went to his car and got a hunting knife, which he used to stab the complainant in the head and twice in the upper back. The applicant then demanded the friend give him her phone and, when she refused, he wrestled it from her and drove off at speed.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant’s ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his application of the principles enunciated in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 [3].
Decision and reasoning: The application to extend the time to bring an application for leave to appeal was granted, and leave to appeal was granted. The appeal was dismissed.
On appeal, evidence was adduced to support the applicant’s application. This included correspondence from a law firm acting for the applicant in an institutional child sexual abuse claim [27], letters from the applicant expressing remorse for his offending [28], and a letter from the applicant’s general practitioner, who observed that the applicant suffered from poor mental health and had a difficult childhood [29]. In addition, the applicant relied on a psychological report prepared for the sentencing hearing, which affirmed that the applicant had had a difficult life involving childhood sexual abuse, intellectual difficulties, antisocial role modelling and polysubstance abuse [30].
The sentencing judge had, in line with the principles from Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37, considered the applicant’s deprived upbringing. The sentencing judge observed that the sentence imposed reflected this upbringing but, at the same time, upbringing “can never overcome and should never outweigh the significance of the objective seriousness of this offence” [45].
On appeal, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred by reducing the extent to which the applicant’s disadvantaged background (the “Bugmy features”) ameliorated the sentence imposed on him [48]. The Court found that the sentencing judge had not treated the Bugmy features as having lesser relevance on account of the seriousness of the offence. Instead, the sentencing judge had given appropriate weight to these features, however, the seriousness of the offence was such that the sentence imposed was still significant [62].
As a side point, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred by characterising the offence as “planned” [50]. The Court did not agree that the sentencing judge had characterised the offending as “planned”. The sentencing judge had observed that the use of a tracking device to determine the complainant’s location indicated a level of premeditation [52]. The Court found this observation to have been correct [53].
The sentence imposed has to be viewed in the light that, leaving aside the firearms offence, the other offences showed significant disregard for the victim, her physical and mental health, her integrity and the safety of her home, and then, finally, the attempt to persuade her to break the law for the benefit of the applicant. In my view, the aggregate sentence was within the range of sentences which were available, and the applicant has not established that the sentence is manifestly excessive or plainly unjust. [59]
Astill v R [2024] NSWCCA 118 (8 July 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘multiple complainants’ – ‘use of tendency evidence in respect of same complainant’ – ‘standard of proof for tendency evidence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against convictions and sentence.
Charges: The applicant was a senior correctional officer. He was charged with 51 offences involving interactions with some 13 female inmates at the correctional centre where he worked, including:
(1) 13 counts of aggravated sexual assault;
(2) 22 counts of aggravated indecent assault;
(3) three counts of aggravated act of indecency; and
(4) 13 counts of misconduct in a public office, contrary to the common law.
The applicant pleaded guilty to seven of the 13 counts of misconduct in public office and not guilty to all other counts. At trial the applicant was found guilty of 27 counts relating to nine complainants.
Facts: At trial, the Crown relied on a detailed tendency notice which identified the tendency sought to be proved by the tendency evidence as the applicant’s “tendency to act in a particular way towards female inmates at Dillwynia Correctional Centre while he was on duty as a Senior Correctional Officer ” [7].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal: that a miscarriage of justice had resulted from the absence of directions to the jury regarding the relationship evidence adduced by the Crown. The applicant argued that the jury may have impermissibly used the relationship evidence as tendency evidence. The applicant put particular emphasis on Ms Baker’s email that referred to the applicant “caving her head in” [32].
(1) A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the directions given to the jury concerning the Crown case on tendency.
(2) A miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to direct the jury that the complaint evidence could not be used or its “truth” purpose.
The third ground of appeal related to the application for leave to appeal against sentence:
(3) The aggregate sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal against convictions was refused, and the appeal was otherwise dismissed in relation to sentence.
Appeal against convictions
In relation to the first ground of appeal relied on, the Court began its consideration of this ground by observing that the criticism made by the applicant was not of the tendency directions per se but as to their completeness [23]. The applicant made three distinct complaints about the directions, namely [24]:
(1) The directions did not make plain that, insofar as the tendency evidence was (i) for the very same count or (ii) for any of the complainant’s own counts in the indictment, it could not be used as tendency evidence (i) for the very same count or (ii) for any of the complainant’s own counts in the indictment.
(2) The jury were not told that, insofar as the tendency evidence included the very same allegations in the indictment, lack of satisfaction at the tendency stage would mean a verdict of not guilty would need to be returned in relation to those count(s).
(3) The circumstances of this case warranted a direction pursuant to s 161A(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (Act) that, insofar as the Crown case on tendency relied upon the allegations in the indictment, the jury had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of those acts before engaging in tendency reasoning.
In relation to the first complaint, the Court found that it was not necessary for the trial judge to have given a supplementary direction of the kind sought. In fact, it would have probably been wrong of the trial judge to have done so [47]. The Court opined that to have given such a direction would have unduly increased the complexity of the jury’s task, encouraged a revisiting of the underlying body of evidence supporting the alleged tendency on the occasion of the jury’s consideration of each charge, amongst other vices [47].
The Court held that the same observation could be made in relation to the second complaint under ground 1. The giving of a further direction would detract from the simple elegance of the approach mandated by Director of Public Prosecutions v Roder [2023] VSCA 262 at [17]-[18] and encourage the conflation of standards of proof [48].
In relation to the third complaint, the Court found that s161A(3) of the Act has been interpreted by the High Court in Roder as relaxing the prohibition in s 161A(1). Section 161A recognises that tendency evidence will not usually form an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning to guilt but is a form of circumstantial evidence which, generally speaking, only needs to be proved on the balance of probabilities [55]. In this case, the terms of s 161A(3) (which creates an exception to the rule that tendency evidence need only be proved on the balance of probabilities) were not engaged as there was direct evidence of the offending from each of the relevant complainants as well as documentary evidence, evidence of other correctional officers. and admissions by the applicant [56]. The tendency evidence was not “indispensable” within the meaning of Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; [1990] HCA 56 in the sense that failure to prove the existence of the tendency would mean there was no case to go to the jury [56].
Ground 2
Ground 2 was that a miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to direct the jury that the complaint evidence could not be used for its ‘truth’ purpose given the jury were directed that the complaint evidence could only be used in relation to the ‘credit’ purpose [65]. The Court observed that the complaint evidence was admitted as evidence that was relevant and within the exception to the hearsay rule. It was made clear at the time of its admission that it was not being tendered for the purposes of re-establishing witness credibility within s 108 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and no limitation was placed on its use [66]. As no limitation on the evidence’s use was made out, the ground of appeal failed [68].
Appeal against sentence
The sole ground of appeal relating to the applicant’s sentence was to the effect that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was “ manifestly excessive both with respect to the maximum and minimum terms ” [76]. For reference, the trial judge had imposed an aggregate sentence of 23 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years and 4 months.
The Court began its assessment by observing that the principles in relation to challenges to an aggregate sentence on the basis of manifest excessiveness are well-established. Appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result arrived at in the court below is markedly different from sentences in other cases; intervention is only warranted where the difference is such that it may be concluded that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the reasons of the sentencing judge [77]. There is no single correct sentence and judges at first instance should be afforded as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and application of principle [77]. The Court further observed that even if indicative sentences are assessed as being excessive, that does not necessarily mean that the aggregate sentence is excessive [78].
In assessing the indicative sentences, the Court observed that the multiplicity of charges spanned a wide range of victims, all of whom were extremely vulnerable given the extreme power disparity between the applicant and them [81]-[82]. The Court ultimately concluded that although the sentence was a ‘stern’ one, it was appropriately so and it was certainly not so far outside the range of sentences available that there must have been an error, nor was it unreasonable or plainly unjust [99].
Mitchell Brown v R [2024] NSWCCA 143 (5 August 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Crushing effect on respondent’ – ‘use of a weapon’ – ‘sustained offending’ – ‘contravention of Apprehended Domestic Violence Order’ – ‘attempt to influence witness’ – ‘lack of remorse’ – ‘high likelihood of reoffending’- ‘following, harassing, monitoring’ –‘strangulation’ -‘threats’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x2, use of offensive weapon to commit indictable offence x1, acquire pistol subject to firearms prohibition order x1, contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO) x1, attempt to influence witness with intent to procure acquittal of serious indictable offence x1 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: stalk or intimidate with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm x2, possess unauthorised pistol x1).
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were in a relationship. One day, the complainant returned home from hospital [15]. When she arrived home, the applicant became agitated. The applicant locked the door of the house, and told the complainant he was going to kill her [16]. The applicant choked her; the complainant managed to push the applicant away. The applicant walked away and returned with a hunting knife. He pinned the complainant down, waved the knife, and said he was going to stab her with it [16]. The complainant freed herself and ran for the door, but the applicant caught her before she reached the door. He began hitting her head, causing her to fall and hit the lounge as she fell. He then kicked her torso [17].
Some time later, the complainant was sitting in a car with their child. The applicant told the complainant that he was going to kill her. The applicant went inside the house and returned with a knife. He walked up to the car the complainant was in and told her to come inside the house. The victim contacted the Police, and they attended the premises. These facts comprised sequence 3, which was the form 1 offence [19].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant submitted that the aggregate sentence was of such length that it would have a crushing effect upon the applicant, especially given that at the time of sentence he had already spent over 8 ½ years in custody and was only 30 years old [2]. The applicant further submitted the offending had largely occurred in short episodes, only two of which were violent. It was therefore submitted that error was to be inferred in the application of the totality principle, and that such error had resulting in a manifestly excessive sentence.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted, appeal was dismissed [69].
The Court began by observing that sentencing judges are afforded flexibility in sentencing and appellate intervention in sentencing is only warranted where it must be concluded there was some misapplication of principle [59]. The Court went on to say that the sentence imposed had to reflect that the offences showed significant disregard for the victim, her physical and mental health, her integrity, the presence of her young child, and the safety of her home [65]-[67]. Taken together, the Court considered they showed a serious course of domestic violence in which each episode was quite sustained [65].
The findings of the sentencing judge, which were not challenged, about the high likelihood of reoffending and the lack of remorse, meant that sentencing considerations such as denunciation and community protection were entitled to significant weight [66].
Moore v R [2024] NSWCCA 115 (8 July 2024) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Extension of time’ – ‘appeal against sentence’ – ‘unconscious complainant’ – ‘degrading sexual violence’ – ‘detention’ – ‘strangling’ –‘consent’ - ‘Bugmy features’ – ‘specific and general deterrence’ – ‘comparator cases’ – ‘previous agreement to sadomasochistic acts’
Proceedings: Application for extension of time to bring application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Two sets of charges. Charge set 1 included assault occasioning actual bodily harm x2, sexual intercourse without consent x2 (further offences considered on a “Form 1” basis: intentionally record an intimate image without consent x 2). Charge set 2 included act with intent to influence a witness x3, aggravated detention for advantage x1, intentional choking x1 (further offence considered on a “Form 1” basis: intimidation x1).
Facts: The offending took place over a 6-month period when the applicant and the complainant were in a sexual relationship. On multiple occasions, the complainant was taken to hospital with injuries inflicted upon her by the applicant (these were included within charge set 1 – for example, the applicant slammed the complainant’s head against the wall, punched her to the head, bit her and grabbed her around the throat. In August 2021, the applicant filmed himself having sexual intercourse with the complainant whilst she was unconscious on two occasions. On both occasions, the offences were accompanied by a number of degrading acts, including slapping and spitting [10], [13].
The second charge set involved the applicant interrogating the complainant about her going to the police; physically abusing her (punching, hair pulling, slapping across the head); accusing her of lying; injecting her with methylamphetamine; and refusing to let the complainant out of the car for approximately 90 minutes. At one point, the applicant choked the complainant to the point where she could not breathe [24].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on three grounds [31]:
1.
the sentencing judge erred in failing to have regard to relevant principles applicable to offenders with mental health issues and to whom “Bugmy features” apply (see Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37), including that less weight be placed on general and specific deterrence;
2.
the sentencing judge erred in the finding of objective seriousness in relation to the sexual assault offences; and
3.
the overall term of imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Elaborating on ground 2 above, the applicant argued that the sentencing judge had erred in assessing the applicant as having commenced sexual intercourse with the complainant without consent (the proper point in time for assessment beginning when the complainant became unconscious) [79]. The applicant further argued that the degrading nature of the acts should not increase their objective seriousness given such acts were previously consented to [81].
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
The Court expressed its findings as follows.
1.
As to ground 1 of appeal:
(a)
Where no submission was made about a causal connection between the applicant’s background, mental health and the offending, the sentencing judge was not obliged to refer to every part of the psychological report and to make separate links that had not been put to his Honour [73].
(b)
The sentencing judge had accepted that the presence of the Bugmy features reduced the applicant’s moral culpability. Notwithstanding that, having regard to the applicant’s criminal record and the violence in the current offending, the sentencing judge was entitled to give weight to general and specific deterrence [74].
2.
As to ground 2 of appeal:
(a)
The objective seriousness of sexual offences is not reduced by reason of what the parties had previously agreed to participate in [85]. In circumstances where the offending was degrading, violent and took advantage of the complainant whilst she was unconscious, the sentencing judge’s findings of objective seriousness were entirely open to his Honour [87].
3.
As to ground 3 of appeal:
(a)
Consideration of the “comparable” cases put forward by the applicant revealed that the indicative sentences for the sexual intercourse offences and the aggregate sentence were not excessive or plainly unjust. Comparisons were of limited utility given the number of offences and seriousness of the offending which revealed a serious course of domestic violence over a six-month period [95], [97], [99], [102].
R v VR [2024] NSWCCA 91 (7 June 2024) — New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ - ‘Extensive history of domestic violence’ - ‘Coercive control’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Economic and financial abuse’ - ‘jealousy’ - ‘intimate images’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: Rape x 12; inciting the commission of an act of indecency x 1.
Facts: In June 2023, the male respondent was found guilty by a jury of offences committed over 17 years against three victims, two of whom were the respondent’s ex-wives and the other an intimate partner. The offending was extremely violent, characterised by a high degree of degradation and humiliation that was partly demonstrative of the respondent’s jealousy and coercive control. [9]–[34]
Grounds of Appeal: The prosecution appeal on the sole ground that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. Sentence quashed. Respondent re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 14 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
Hamill J (with whom Mitchelmore JA and Wright J agreed) emphasised that prosecution appeals against inadequate sentencing ‘should be rare’ and only upheld where there is an identifiable error. [63]–[64]
For Justice Hamill, the identifiable error was the unreasonable and manifestly inadequate sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. It fell below the level of sentence necessary to or capable of reflecting the objective gravity of the ‘particularly egregious facts of the case’: [72]
The sentence fails to vindicate the dignity of the three separate victims, or to reflect the grave objective seriousness of offences spanning over a period of 17 years, or to capture the overall criminality involved [73]
In determining sentence, Hamill J noted the respondent’s lack of remorse and insight into the harm he has perpetrated. [82]
Habambo v R [2023] NSWCCA 328 (15 December 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Factual error’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Intimidation’ - Strangulation/choking’ - Property Damage’ - ‘Evidence’ - ‘Admissibility’ - ‘Objective seriousness’ - ‘History of domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Charges: 15x common assault, 15x intimidation, 1x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 1x malicious damage, 2x intentionally choke with recklessness
Facts: The male applicant was convicted for 28 counts of domestic violence offences against his former wife (the complainant). The applicant’s conduct including strangling the complainant with a plastic bag [20], slapping her across the face [29], intimidation [40] and pushing the complainant while pregnant [55] on several distinct occasions across multiple years. The applicant was sentenced to a total aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment and a 2 year conditional release order. [2]–[3]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds. With respect to conviction, the applicant appealed the admissibility of two forms of evidence (ie, a record of text messages and a record of WhatsApp messages). With respect to sentence, the applicant argued that the aggregate sentence was manifestly and that the sentencing judge erred in their determination of certain counts as serious offending.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal conviction refused and leave to appeal sentence granted and dismissed.
With respect to the conviction appeal, the Court (Ward P, Rothman J and Davies J) first regarded the text messages as both ‘admissible and relevant’. The messages were specifically relevant ‘to the circumstance where there was a dispute raised as to the complaint made by the complainant to the applicant’s sister, Ms Harb’. [222] These messages were not relied upon as opinion evidence, but rather to demonstrate Ms Harb’s credibility. [223] Accordingly, the admission of the text messages did not ‘cause manifest or unfair prejudice to the applicant’. [226]
Second, the Court held that the WhatsApp messages to equally be admissible. The Court dismissed the applicant’s argument that these messages were inadmissible: they formed a substantial component of the applicant’s evidence/cross-examination: ‘[I]t cannot be said that there was not a rational forensic decision open to defence counsel not to seek an earlier ruling as to the admissibility of the text messages; and complaint cannot now be made at the fact that defence counsel did not do so’. [296]
With respect to the sentencing appeal, the Court held first that the sentencing judge’s assessment of counts 3 and 11 (intimidation by strangulation/choking) as objectively high in gravity was appropriate. [322]; [324] In each instance, the applicant intimidated the complainant by effectively depriving her of oxygen, either manually (using his hands to cover her mouth and nose) or with a plastic bag. Accordingly, the behaviour ‘could be said to amount to suffocation’. [322]
Similarly, with respect to a count of common assault, the Court upheld the sentencing judge’s treatment of the conduct as falling at the ‘mid-range’ of objective seriousness:
The offence constituting count 34 was not the first time the applicant had assaulted the complainant. It was, in fact, part of the final episode of intimidation and violence inflicted upon the complainant by the applicant, following nine years of domestic violence. The fact that it occurred at the complainant’s home and in front of the children were both aggravating factors. The assault was far more serious than some of the previous assaults including the two others committed in this final episode. The assault involved the applicant jamming the complainant in the door, having just threatened to throw her off the balcony he was preventing her from leaving. The extent of the complainant’s distress from the episode including count 34 can be seen in the police BWV which was Exhibit P [334]
Lastly, the Court held that the aggregate sentence of 10 years, though ‘stern’, was not manifestly excessive:
The offending involved domestic violence over a nine year period. Two of the offences were suffocating or choking offences contrary to s 37 of the Crimes Act, 15 of the offences were intimidation offences contrary to the CDPV Act, two of which involved acts of suffocation, and a number of other offences of common assault. The applicant received a generous adjustment to the statutory ratio from 75% to 60%. The aggregate sentence is not plainly unjust [377]
Elwood v R [2023] NSWCCA 200 (17 August 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘threats to police’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment for domestic and personal violence offences, property offences and offences against police. The applicant and the female complainant (the applicant’s estranged partner) were in a ‘volatile’ relationship over six years. [4] In December 2021, the applicant contravened a prevention order, recklessly wounding the complainant with a jagged edge of a broken bottle while intoxicated. The applicant threatened the complainant’s sister, doing so in the presence of his children. The applicant subsequently threatened police that arrived at the scene. [1]; [5]–[14]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on the sole ground that the aggregate sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. [2]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed.
The Court (Adamson JA, Wright and Fagan JJ) acknowledged the ‘salient features’ of the case; notably, the ‘applicant’s past domestic violence against [the complainant]’, the ‘renewed violence of the applicant’ in the presence of children and towards both the complainant and her sister, the ‘wanton damage’ done to the complainant’s property and the violence towards the police. [19]–[24] In lieu of these features, the Court held the head sentence of 5 years was not manifestly excessive.
DS v R [2023] NSWCCA 151 (23 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Factual error’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Prevention order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘motor vehicle’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm, 2x use of an offensive weapon with intent to commit an assault, 1x aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, 1x attempted sexual intercourse without consent, 2x sexual intercourse without consent in circumstances of aggravation (recklessly inflict actual bodily harm), 1x sexual intercourse without consent
Facts: The male applicant was found guilty of domestic violence offences, committed against his female former partner (the complainant), and sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. [4] The male applicant punched the complainant multiple times in the face, dragged her in front of a vehicle and started the engine, before dragging her to a dog kennel and having non-consensual sexual intercourse. Finally, the applicant dragged and assaulted the complainant while in the presence of children. [11]–[32]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on two grounds, both of which turn on whether a miscarriage of justice was occasioned:
1.
Miscarriage of justice — error in refusing the application to severe counts 4 and 5 (aggravated sexual intercourse and attempted sexual intercourse without consent with the family dog’s penis) from the indictment prior to the commencement of a trial;
2.
Miscarriage of justice — error in refusing the application to discharge the jury once the Crown had elected to “no bill” count 5 [5]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal against conviction granted and appeal dismissed.
With respect to ground one, Yehia Y (with whom Beech-Jones CJ and Weinstein J agree) held that the refusal of the trial judge to sever the indictment or discharge the jury was neither an error or irregularity in the trial. The conduct informing counts 4 and 5 was bestiality. The applicant submitted that the evidence relating to these counts was so ‘depravingly different’ rendering their linkage to other counts on the indictment unfair. [70]–[71] Justice Yehia dismissed this ground, holding the ‘whole of the applicant’s alleged conduct’ to be ‘unpleasant and of a violent and humiliating character’ [89]:
I am not persuaded that the applicant has demonstrated error on the part of the trial judge in refusing to sever counts 4 and 5 on the indictment. The trial judge, when considering the application for severance, observed that there is always a consideration of some prejudice in a trial where there are a number of counts in the indictment. In determining whether the applicant would be prejudiced or embarrassed in his defence by reason of the evidence constituting counts 4 and 5, her Honour identified, correctly in my view, that the other allegations on the indictment were of an extremely violent nature [88]
With respect to ground two, Yehia J accepted the force of the applicant’s submission that ‘the jury should have been discharged after count 5 was no billed and in circumstances where only some of the evidence relating to the dog was to be relied on by the Crown to prove count 4’. [110] However, the verdicts of the jury demonstrated careful and conscientious consideration of the evidence such that there was clearly no prejudice against the applicant. [121] Accordingly, Yehia J held that the applicant ‘failed to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice was occasioned either as a result of the refusal to sever counts 4 and 5 and/or as a result of the refusal to discharge the jury after count 5 was no billed’. [121]
Giacometti v R [2023] NSWCCA 150 (23 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Inconsistent evidence’ – ‘Intentional choking without consent’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Paraphilic disorder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Psychiatric evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’ – ‘Wounding’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Attempted sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Intentional choking so as to render unconscious x 2; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; Reckless wounding x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years and 9 months, after entering a late plea of guilty to seven offences against his then female partner.
The sentencing judge found that the applicant’s personal history and mental health diagnoses cited in psychiatric reports were inconsistent. The sentencing judge was not satisfied of the accuracy or reliability of the history provided by the applicant and disregarded most of the applicant’s subjective circumstances [51].
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in declining to consider evidence of his subjective circumstances; and
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Hamil J (Mitchelmore JA and Davies agreeing) found error in ground 1 but dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: The court held that the sentencing judge erred in declining to consider evidence of the applicant’s subjective circumstances. The sentencing judge was correct to find the applicant’s alcohol abuse did not explain his conduct [97] and the judge was entitled to be suspect in accepting the accuracy of his history [102].
However, the sentencing judge was not justified in rejecting almost all of the applicant’s subjective circumstances. The applicant was entitled to have his relative youth, lack of prior convictions, sexual abuse, neglect, and diagnosis of a paraphilic disorder considered. These factors were largely consistent and should not have been rejected [107].
Ground 2: This ground was rejected. The court held the applicant’s course of conduct represented sexual and violent offending of an extreme and depraved kind [111]. The applicant’s childhood experiences, and mental health conditions only had a modest impact on his moral culpability [119]. The Court found that the aggregate sentence and non-parole period would have been of at least the same magnitude as the sentence imposed in the District Court [139].
R v Sharrouf [2023] NSWCCA 137 (16 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Lack of planning and mitigation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Spiritual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Sexual assault without consent x 8; aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 1; indecent assault x 1; attempted choke with intent to commit an indictable offence (intimidation) x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 2; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5; common assault x 6.
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 10 years with a non-parole period of 5 years after a judge alone trial after pleading not guilty to 40 offences and was found guilty of 24 charges. All offences were committed against his then-wife (they were “married” in an Islamic ceremony which was not officially recorded) between 2007-2008 shortly after their marriage. The victim made a statement to police in 2009 but did not proceed to make a formal statement until July 2019. Expert evidence was led of the respondent’s schizophrenia and melancholic depression. The respondent had been exposed to family violence as a child. The offending included multiple counts of penile-vaginal and penile-anal rape. The respondent demanded that the complainant behave in a manner contrary to her religious beliefs, he assaulted the complainant as punishment for “hiding” things from him or seeking advice in relation to his financially controlling behaviour, he punched the complainant to the face breaking her nose and rendering her unconscious and deliberately caused injuries to the complainant’s legs and feet such that she had difficulty walking as punishment for perceived misdeeds on her part.
The respondent conceded grounds 2 and 3 but argued that the court should exercise its residual discretion to decline to intervene.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of counts 9, 16 and 26;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing convictions with no further penalty pursuant to s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (‘CSP Act’) in relation to counts 2, 10, 36 and 38; and
3.
The aggregate sentence is manifestly inadequate.
Decision: Sentence quashed (Price, Wilson and Dhanji JJ), resentenced to an aggregate term of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years (Price and Wilson JJ).
Ground 1: The sentencing judge understated the objective seriousness of 9, 16 and 26 [171]. Re counts 16 and 26 (sexual assault without consent), the sentencing judge emphasised the spontaneity and lack of planning of these offences in assessing their objective seriousness. Price J (Wilson J agreeing) observed:
[167] How in these circumstances could the lack of planning reduce the objective gravity of the offending? As Adamson J (as her Honour then was) observed in Kennedy v R [2022] NSWCCA 215 at [51]:
“... it is typical of offences of domestic violence committed by persons such as the applicant that they are not “premeditated”. Thus, the lack of planning in this context is of negligible, if any significance.”
[168] This Court has observed that the short duration of a sexual assault would not ordinarily be considered as a factor which mitigates the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Daley [2010] NSWCCA 233 at [48]; Cowling v R [2015] NSWCCA 213 at [16]. In the present case, where the respondent’s sexual offending was a repetitive feature in a violent domestic relationship, the short duration of an offence could not amount to a mitigating factor.
[169] In the passage quoted at [151] above, the judge said that the offending in count 16 “was not associated with particular additional violence of the kind that characterised some of the offending.” It is unclear to which offences his Honour was referring, however, the infliction of actual bodily harm at the time of, or immediately before or after the sexual assault would have amounted to an offence of aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Re count 9, neither the spontaneity or its short duration could reduce the objective seriousness of the offence, which involved chasing the victim, punching her to the face with a closed fist, causing her to fall to the ground, unconscious with a broken nose [170].
Ground 2: In finding that the sentencing judge erred in applying s10A CSP Act to impose no conviction for counts 2, 10, 36 and 38 Price J (Wilson and Dhanji JJ agreeing) observed:
[188] I recognise that the recording of a conviction may have serious consequences for an offender. However, general sentencing principles apply to the operation of the section. Where an offence is objectively serious and general deterrence, denunciation, and the protection of the community are of importance, the scope for the use of the section must necessarily be substantially diminished. I acknowledge that current sentencing legislation does not prohibit the application of s 10A to a domestic violence offence. Nevertheless, the appropriate use of s 10A in a domestic violence offence must be rare.
In addition no reasons were given for departing from a sentence of full-time detention or a supervised order as required by s4A(2) CSP Act.
Ground 3: Price J (Wilson and Dhanji JJ agreeing) held the aggregate sentence of 10 years imprisonment and non-parole period of 5 years is “so manifestly inadequate that it does not reflect the totality of the criminality involved in the respondent’s offending.”
Residual discretion to decline to intervene:
In agreeing with Price J’s refusal to exercise the residual discretion, Wilson J noted:
[269] This is not a matter in which the residual discretion should be exercised. The courts must ensure that those who seek to brutally dominate a domestic partner, and violently impose a claimed gender superiority on another, are held to account. The aggregate sentence proposed by Price J is one that achieves that aim, whilst giving proper ameliorative weight to the respondent’s subjective case.
Waldron v R [2023] NSWCCA 128 (9 June 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accused case not glaringly improbable’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence directions’ – ‘Directions apt to reverse onus of proof’ – ‘Error in jury direction’ – ‘Female alleged perpetrator’ – ‘Intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Jury direction’ – ‘Male complainant’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Misdirection’ – ‘No rational inference direction’ – ‘No substantial miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Onus of proof’ – ‘Perpetrator misidentification’ – ‘Proper directions’ – ‘Proviso’ – ‘Re-trial’ – ‘Rebutting self-defence’ – ‘Self defence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uniform evidence law’ – ‘Use of tendency evidence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Wounding’
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The female accused was charged with wounding her male former domestic partner. At trial she claimed she acted in self-defence in wounding the complainant when he arrived at her home angry and in the company of a companion and initiated a physical altercation between them. The female accused is physically much smaller than the male complainant. Her case included evidence of the complainant’s past offending against a former female domestic partner:
[29] A tendency notice served pursuant to s 97(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) identified the tendencies of the complainant the applicant sought to establish:
(a)
To make threats to kill to ex-partners;
(b)
To threaten or to bash them in front of friends/family;
(c)
To call ex-partners ‘slut’ or ‘dog’ ‘cunt’; and
(d)
To threaten to or actually visit ex-partner’s homes with the intention to commit violence.
[30] The notice identified a variety of evidentiary sources that were said to be capable of establishing these tendencies. The Prosecutor objected to the evidence, but Judge English accepted that the evidence had significant probative value and was admissible.
In relation to the adduced tendency evidence, which included a statement of agreed facts (s 191 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) that the complainant had admitted and been convicted of the offences of Use carriage service to menace/harass/offend and stalk/intimidate intend fear physical or mental harm against [the victim] in relation to a former partner. The statement included text messages and telephone calls heard by police containing threats to kill and bash the victim and calling the victim a “slut” and “cunt”, and that the accused was apprehended while actually causing damage to the victim’s home.
In directing the jury, the trial judge identified the nature of the evidence and tendency the applicant sought to establish:
Part of the defence case is that the complainant has a tendency to have a particular state of mind, namely, to become angry to an extreme towards ex-partners. It is also part of the defence case that the complainant has a tendency to act on that state of mind by making threats to kill ex-partners, threatening to bash them in front of family and/or friends, calling ex-partners words such as a ‘slut’, or a ‘dog’, or a ‘cunt’, or threaten to – or actually – visit ex-partner’s homes with the intention to commit violence. [34]
The applicant submitted and the respondent conceded that parts of the following direction were erroneous:
Whether you reason in the way argued by the defence, or the Crown is entirely a matter for you. You will need to be very careful about drawing the inference asked of you by the defence, and I will direct you to consider whether there be any alternative explanations for that evidence, and I direct you that you should not draw any inference from the direct evidence unless it is a rational inference in the circumstances. Very shortly I will give you a general direction about drawing inferences when you are considering this part of the defence case. But if you find the complainant did have the tendency alleged by the defence, then you can use that fact in considering whether it is more likely than not that he acted in the way alleged by the accused on 19 July 2020. That is, that he was the aggressor on this occasion. [Emphasis added.] [36]
Grounds:
1.
Her Honour erred in directing the jury that it should not draw the inference that the complainant had a tendency to act in a particular way unless it was the only rational inference in the circumstances.
2.
Her Honour erred in directing the jury that it could take into account a tendency of the complainant to act in a particular way in considering whether it is more likely than not that he acted in the way alleged by the applicant.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
Leave to appeal granted.
2.
Appeal upheld.
3.
Quash the applicant’s conviction.
4.
Order that there be a new trial.
5.
List the matter for call-over on 8 June 2023 at the District Court sitting at Newcastle.
6.
The Court directs that, pursuant to s 59(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), that the commencement date of the aggregate sentence for H82562810 (court file 2021/00297170) imposed on the applicant at Toronto Local Court on 28 March 2022 be varied from 14 March 2024 to 14 March 2022.
Hamill J (Button and Sweeney JJ agreeing) observed:
[38] The applicant was correct to submit, and the respondent was correct to concede, that parts of that direction were erroneous. There were at least three flaws in the direction.
[39] First, the jury should not have been directed that it should be “very careful about drawing the inference asked of you by the defence”. There was nothing wrong with directing the jury that the process of drawing an inference should be a rational one, but it will rarely be appropriate for a jury to be warned that it needs to be “very careful” about drawing an inference favourable to an accused in a criminal trial. That is because the accused, except in unusual cases, bears no onus.
[40] Secondly, the direction introduced a standard of proof – “whether it is more likely than not” – that the alleged victim acted in accordance with the tendency on the day of the offence. This cast an onus on the applicant to establish that the complainant acted “in the way alleged by the accused on 19 July 2020”. The direction had the capacity to, and perhaps did, reverse the onus of proof. Other directions made it clear that the prosecution bore the onus and emphasised the high standard it was required to meet. Even considered in that context, the direction represented a significant legal error in the summing up.
And:
[43] Her Honour drew no distinction between drawing an inference of guilt against an accused person – where all other reasonable inferences must be excluded – and drawing an inference favourable to the applicant as part of her circumstantial case based on the tendency evidence.
[44] It is, by now, well established that tendency evidence is a species of circumstantial evidence and there is no requirement that it be proved to any particular standard, let alone (as these directions were want to suggest) that it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
In rejecting the respondent’s arguments that the despite the misdirection no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred, and that the applicant’s account was “glaringly improbable”, Hamill J (Button and Sweeney JJ agreeing) was not persuaded that self-defence was eliminated beyond reasonable doubt.
Lawrence v R [2023] NSWCCA 110(24 May 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Driving’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Intimidation x 1; Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 6.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male offender accosted and detained his former de facto wife, contravening a protection order which protected her. For 9 hours, the offender drove the victim at a high speed and in an erratic manner, while abusing, threatening, and assaulting her. The period of detention ended when the victim ran from the car, despite the offender’s threats that he would kill her if she escaped.
The offender was sentenced by the District Court to 6 years and 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years, affording a 10% discount for late pleas.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred by aggravating the offending by reason of the applicant’s criminal history;
2.
the sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending without reference to the applicant’s reduced moral culpability and mental health conditions;
3.
the sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s drug use from an early age did not amount to a mitigating factor;
4.
the sentencing judge erred in double counting the presence of the knife in Count 1, both in determining where on the scale of seriousness the offending sat and also by counting it as an aggravating factor; and
5.
the sentencing judge erred in imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Wilson J (Gleeson JA and Davies J agreeing) dismissed the appeal.
Ground 1: It was held there was no error in the conclusion that the offender’s criminal history was an aggravating factor. It was a feature relevant to the overall determination, but not used to elevate the objective gravity of the offences [58].
Ground 2: The sentencing judge was correct to treat the offender’s moral culpability distinct from the objective gravity of the offences. The offender’s deprived background or mental health impairment are features that affect the weight to be given to considerations of moral blameworthiness and general deterrence [79].
Ground 3: The sentencing judge appropriately gave weight to the offender’s drug addiction as a manifestation of his deprived background. There was no need to have further regard to it [85]; Wilson J stated ‘it will be a rare case in which a drug addiction, of itself and standing alone, can be treated as a mitigating factor, no matter what age an offender was when the addiction commenced’ [85].
Ground 4: The sentencing judge did not err by double counting. Double counting is not established by the number of times a feature is mentioned, but the use of the feature [90].
Ground 5: The sentence was not excessive, if anything, it was lenient [101].
Liu v R [2023] NSWCCA 30 (24 February 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder’ – ‘Failure to properly consider the offender's advanced age in sentencing’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Principles in gulyas v western australia’ – ‘S27 crimes act 1900 (nsw)’ – ‘Severity’ – ‘Weapon’
Charge: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder.
Proceeding: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Ground: The sentencing judge had failed to apply the principle regarding advance aged in determining the sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim were married in 2014 and living with the widower of a woman the victim had cared for. The appellant had become jealous of the attention the victim gave to the widower.
The applicant attacked his wife with a meat tenderising mallet and stabbed her before cutting his own wrists and hers, leaving her with very serious injuries. At the time of the attack the appellant was 81 years and 6 months old and was 82 years and 8 months old at the time of sentencing.
The appellant pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder (s 27 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) and was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years and 3 months.
Reasoning and decision: Leave to appeal, appeal dismissed.
Campbell J (Adamson JA [1]and McNaughton J [50] agreeing) emphasised that the general principles regarding advanced aged and sentencing expressed by Steytler P in Gulyas v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263 are nuanced and not to be mechanically applied or seen as automatically leading to a lesser sentence than the objective circumstances require [40].
The appellant had no age-related mental impairment. Similarly, imprisonment would not necessarily be more arduous for him as he was found to enjoy generally good health and was not struggling with age-related frailty. The impact of advanced age on sentencing is subject to proportionality: the punishment must fit the crime.
The sentencing judge’s regard to age as a special circumstance had a real and direct effect in reducing the minimum time that the appellant was to serve. No error in the previous judgement was found, as the appellant’s advanced age had not been treated as peripheral.
Latu v R [2023] NSWCCA 19 (17 February 2023) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘appeal against conviction’ – ‘relationship evidence’ – ‘tendency evidence’ – ‘tendency to use violence to the head region’ - 'anti-tendency directions' - 'real chance or significant risk of impermissible reasoning' - 'threats' - 'physical violence and harm'
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Charges: Murder x1 (applicant was convicted at trial).
Facts: The applicant and the deceased, Ms Baker, were living together in an intimate domestic relationship [8]. During the relationship, the applicant threatened and used violence against Ms Baker. There was an escalation in the violence in the months leading up to the offence [10], resulting in an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO). Despite this, the applicant continued to be violent towards Ms Baker [11]. He made threats to hurt her family if she tried to leave the relationship or disclosed the violence, and he severely assaulted her [12]-[13]. One night, the applicant and Ms Baker were at their apartment. A neighbour heard a man and a woman arguing in the early hours of the morning [19]. The Crown case was that sometime during the night, the applicant viciously attacked Ms Baker, inflicting multiple blunt force blows to her head. The autopsy showed the violence consisted of the applicant using his fists against her; him moving her head against a surface like a wall or flooring; and/or by him kicking and stomping on her [20]. The mechanism of death was a subdural haematoma [22].
During the trial, the Crown relied on tendency and relationship evidence.
To establish the alleged tendency, the Crown relied on evidence of the applicant being violent against Ms Baker and against Hayley Bingley, the applicant’s former partner. The tendency was that the applicant acted in a particular way in relation to women with whom he was in an intimate domestic relationship – namely, when angry, he would engage in violence towards such women by the use of physical force to the head region [24].
In terms of the relationship evidence, there was evidence of controlling behaviour by the applicant, evidence of jealousy, and evidence of violent behaviour [26]. Part of the relationship evidence sought to be tendered by the Crown was a series of emails, called the “Dial-a-Dump” emails [29]. These were mostly between the applicant and Ms Baker. One email from Ms Baker referred to her fear that the applicant was going to “cave [her] head in” [32]. The forensic pathologist’s report described Ms Baker’s injuries, including a bone that had been “caved in” [38].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal: that a miscarriage of justice had resulted from the absence of directions to the jury regarding the relationship evidence adduced by the Crown. The applicant argued that the jury may have impermissibly used the relationship evidence as tendency evidence. The applicant put particular emphasis on Ms Baker’s email that referred to the applicant “caving her head in” [32].
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed. The Court considered each ground of appeal as follows:
The Court began its consideration of the appeal by observing that an anti-tendency direction or warning is not required in every case where relationship evidence is led, only where there is a real chance or significant risk that the jury may reason impermissibly [64]. The fact that experienced defence counsel does not seek such a direction will be a significant factor in determining whether one was necessary [65]. The Court concluded that there was no real chance or significant risk that the jury might use the relationship evidence in an impermissible way to reason that the applicant had a tendency to have a particular state of mind and, therefore, the requisite intention to murder or inflict really serious injury on the deceased [65]. This was so for several reasons:
(1) The Crown prosecutor had clearly distinguished between the matters relied on for tendency purposes and the remainder of the relationship evidence [66].
(2) The trial judge had repeatedly given a tendency direction in relation to the eight incidents relied upon by the Crown to establish tendency [67]-[68].
(3) The Court found it was difficult to see how the relationship evidence could be employed for impermissible tendency purposes [70]. The only tendency the Court found to be evidenced by the relationship evidence was a tendency to threaten Ms Baker [71]. In response to the applicant’s submission that the impugned tendency was a state of mind (a willingness to cause grievous bodily harm), the Court cited Elomar v R; Hasan v R; Cheikho v R; Cheikho v R; Jamal v R [2014] NSWCCA 303, a case that affirmed that “proof of the state of a person’s mind is not tendency evidence” [72].
(4) At the time of the pre-trial determination concerning the relationship evidence, there was no objection to it on the basis of the danger of impermissible reasoning, nor was a direction suggested [73].
(5) When the “Dial-a-Dump” emails were tendered, there was neither an objection on the ground that they contained second-hand hearsay, nor any suggestion that an anti-tendency direction would be needed because of their content [74].
(6) No complaint was made about the terms of the Crown’s closing address [75].
(7) The judge sought directions from counsel, but no anti-tendency direction was sought [76].
The Court further observed that there are reasonable explanations for defence counsel having not sought an anti-tendency direction in this case [79]. There was no miscarriage of justice demonstrated; accordingly, leave to appeal was refused [81].
Thorp v R [2022] NSWCCA 180 (31 August 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Applicant pleaded guilty to aggravated detain and breach of apprehended domestic violence order (advo)’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Whether both charges arose from same incident’ – ‘Whether sentencing judge erred in imposing wholly consecutive sentences’
Matter: application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of:
1.
Aggravated detain for advantage contrary to s 86(2)(b) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); and
2.
Breach of an ADVO contrary to 14(1) Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)
The applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months imprisonment on the first charge; and 2 months on the second charge, to be served wholly concurrently.
The applicant had prior convictions for domestic violence and other offences.
The applicant and the victim had been in an on-off relationship for three years. At the time of the offences, the applicant was subject to an ADVO which included a requirement not to come within 200 m of the victim. The Victim and applicant were in the applicant’s car and both knew there was an electric stock prod in the car. The victim was driving while the applicant read through her phone messages. He became angry that she had texted a friend, yelled at her and threatened to break her legs so she couldn’t run away. The victim drove to the carpark of a restaurant, got out of the car, and started running away from the applicant, screaming for help. The applicant caught up to the victim and started dragging her back to the car, injuring her knees, arms and hands. An employee appeared from the restaurant, saw what was happening, and returned shortly with three other men. They yelled at the applicant who dropped the victim. One of the men helped the victim and the applicant drove out of the carpark, nearly hitting the other two men.
Grounds:
1.
[The sentencing judge] erred by doubly punishing the applicant for his breach of the [ADVO], such double punishment manifesting in:
(a)
the assessment of the objective seriousness of the detain offence including the fact that it constituted a contravention of the ADVO; and
(b)
an entirely consecutive sentence being imposed for the contravene ADVO offence.
2.
The sentence imposed for the detain offence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave granted; appeal against sentence dismissed.
Ierace J, with whom Bell CJ and Bellew J agreed, dismissed the appeal on the first ground, holding at [71]:
the sentencing judge clearly explained that the contravention of the ADVO contributed to the seriousness of the detain offence but also warranted discrete punishment for contravening the court order by an act of violence. The relatively short sentence of 2 months fixed term imprisonment is consistent with it reflecting primarily the criminality of the breach of a court order.
His Honour also dismissed the appeal on the ground of manifestly excessive sentence. While the second case cited by the applicant in support of his manifest excess argument was similar, the difference in sentence imposed (three months more in the case at hand) was ‘not so much as to reflect a misapplication of principle’ [89]. Moreover, the ‘protection of society and the safety of the victim were of particular importance’ so a ‘significant total sentence and a ratio of the overall non-parole period to the balance of term of 56 per cent was the means of achieving that result’ [90].
GS v R; DPP v GS [2022] NSWCCA 65 (1 April 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Choking, suffocation or strangulation’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Intentionally chokes’ – ‘Meaning of 'intentionally chokes'’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Residual discretion not to remit for trial’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: intentional choking x 1; assault occasionally actual bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against directed acquittal; appeal against conviction; appeal against sentence.
Facts: The DPP appealed against a directed acquittal on the charge of intentionally choking contrary to s 37(1A) Crime Act 1900 (NSW).
The defendant GS appealed against a conviction on a charge of occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) of the Crimes Act.
GS also appealed against his sentence for the above conviction. He was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months. However, he had served 29 months’ imprisonment by the time the sentence was imposed.
GS and the victim JC were in a relationship. The charges arose from GS’ conduct over 24 hours. According to JC, GS returned home at 5am, work up JC and began punching her. The punching continued in different parts of her body throughout the day. JC also threw three objects at her, causing bruising. At around 8 or 9am he armed himself with a knife which he kept with him throughout the day in case she tried to run away and threatened to cut her throat if she didn’t stop lying to him. JC said that GS jumped on her while she was on the bed, kept his hands around her neck for about one minute, after which she managed to slide her head out of his hands. This caused bruising to her neck, which was ‘really sore’ for a couple of days, but she did not specifically mention that her breathing or blood flow was affected. The next day, GS forced JC to accompany him to the fruit shop and then home again. After GS said he was going to have a shower, JC ran to the train station. GS followed her and put her in a headlock. A witness called police. GS said he did not commit any of the offences alleged and was trying to restrain JC from jumping in front of a train. JC had a mental illness. GS was found not guilty of three related charges and two ‘backup’ charges.
Decision and Reasoning:
DPP v GS:
1.
Set aside the order for the acquittal of GS on the charge of intentionally choking contrary to s 37(1A) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW);
2.
Declare that “intentionally chokes” within the meaning of s 37(1A) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) means “intentionally apply pressure to the neck so as to be capable of affecting the breath or the flow of blood to or from the head”;
3.
In the exercise of the residual discretion, decline to remit GS to the District Court for a re-trial.
GS v R:
1.
Dismiss the appeal against conviction and sentence.
Payne JA, with whom Rothman and Harrison JJ agreed, declared that ‘intentionally chokes’ means ‘intentionally apply pressure to the neck so as to be capable of affecting the breath or the flow of blood to and from the head.’
His Honour reached this conclusion by undertaking statutory interpretation of s 37(1A) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). He referred to the context and structure of s 37 as a whole [49]. He said at [50]:
Section 37(1A) was designed to facilitate the prosecution of choking, suffocation and strangulation offences in the context of a “zero tolerance” approach to domestic violence. The section was expressly intended to fill a gap in the legislation for the choking, suffocation or strangulation of a victim of domestic violence where the victim was not rendered unconscious, insensible or incapable of resistance. The purpose of including s37(1A) was to create an offence which responded to issues raised in the NSW Domestic Violence Death Review Team report to Parliament for the period 2015-2017.
DS v R [2022] NSWCCA 55 (21 March 2022) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Agreement to punishment’ – ‘Application to extend time to appeal’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse people’ – ‘Delay in reporting’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x 21.
Proceedings: Application to extend time to appeal.
Facts: The appellant and victim were married for 17 years and had two children. The appellant was convicted of 21 charges of sexual intercourse without consent, which the appellant used to ‘punish’ the victim whom he falsely believed was having an affair [4]. The offending included ‘fellatio, fellatio with urination in the complainant’s mouth, digital/vaginal penetration, vaginal penetration with a “sex toy”, and attempted anal penetration with that toy’ [4].
The defendant sought leave to appeal on the following grounds:
1.
Unreasonable, or cannot be supported by the evidence.
2.
His Honour misdirected himself on the elements of the offences (negation of consent).
3.
Relationship evidence had no probative force on the question of consent.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed.
The trial judge found that ‘the complainant’s agreement to sexual intercourse was not freely and voluntarily given in circumstances where she was “subjecting herself to the punishment he had imposed”’. Furthermore, ‘consent was negated under s 61HA(4)(c) where the complainant had been “assaulted multiple times and was scared that this would occur again”’ [58]. In response to these findings and in support of his second ground of appeal, the appellant submitted that ‘the complainant agreed to participate in the various sexual acts to “manipulate” him so that he would stay in the relationship against his wishes’ and ‘that she participated because she was prepared to do whatever was necessary to remain in the relationship with him’ [60]. The Court affirmed the trial judge’s finding that the victim did not give free and voluntary consent and rejected the appellant’s submission on the probative value of the relationship evidence. The Court explained that ‘the complainant did not regard herself as having any choice, because of her situation and her need to protect her children, but to accept and “agree” to’ the appellant’s ‘punishments’. Furthermore, ‘the complainant’s evidence… describes her as being “scared” and the sexual activity variously as “dangerous”, “aggressive”, “unbearable”, “brutal”, “painful”, “rough”, “hurting” and “bruising”. The evidence suggests no sensible explanation for why the complainant would have freely and voluntarily subjected herself to that conduct. Finally, the sequence of events leading to the complainant jumping off the carport roof… is consistent with the sexual activity which preceded it not being consensual’ [88]-[92]. The trial judge’s findings ‘demonstrate the probative value of the evidence in relation to the issues of consent and delay in making any complaint’ and ‘do not involve or include any tendency reasoning’ [67]. Finally, the Court found that evidence of the victim’s fear, both generally and in response to threats made by the appellant, provided a ‘reasonable justification for her’ delay in reporting the offending [90].
Nguyen v R [2021] NSWCCA 118 (18 June 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Kidnapping threat’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated entry with intent to steal; Steal property in dwelling house; Intimidation; Form 1 offences attached to sequence 6 (Damage property, contravene Apprehended Violence Order); Section 166 Certificate (Dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against aggregate sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant had been in a relationship, which had ended prior to the offending. While the complainant was at the hospital giving birth to their child, the applicant entered her home, damaged her car, ransacked her room, and stole her laptop. He sent her many threatening messages via text, WhatsApp and email (threats to kill, violent sexual assault, stalking, removal of child, suicide etc), including breach of a provisional Apprehended Violence Order (AVO). He also used the complainant’s laptop to access her personal MyGov account and make two fraudulent tax returns in the complainant’s name causing payments to be made to the applicant’s own bank account. The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years 11 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper practical effect to the finding of special circumstances.
2.
The sentencing judge erred by taking into account the incorrect offence when dealing with the second offence on Form 1.
3.
The aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: It was evident from the sentencing judge’s remarks that he gave proper effect to his finding of the basis for special circumstances by varying the statutory ratio downwards to 70%.
Ground 2: It was clear that the sentencing judge nominated the incorrect offence at a point in his reasons. However, while the Crown’s submissions focused on whether the error vitiated the sentencing discretion, the true question in the circumstances here was whether the error was an inadvertent misstatement that did not affect the sentence imposed. The slip that occurred could not properly be characterised as a material error capable of vitiating the sentence imposed.
Ground 3: The aggregate sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the fact that the applicant’s criminality encompassed offences of a different nature and varying degrees of seriousness with multiple complainants. Relevant matters in relation to the sequence 6 offence (aggravated entry with intent to steal and the Form 1 offence) included at [107]:
•
The offences were committed in the context of a relationship marred by domestic violence. The applicant twice threatened to kill the applicant and had also threatened her with violent sexual assault and removal of her newborn baby.
•
It was significant that the applicant purposefully chose the complainant’s home and attended at a time he thought she would be asleep and near to her giving birth.
•
The offence was not less serious because the duration of the entry was short.
•
The objective seriousness of the sequence 6 offence was at the middle of the range, noting the persons present were inherently vulnerable and the offence was not impulsive.
•
The offences involved an abuse of trust.
•
The applicant was a young man who had a prior record including offences of domestic violence perpetrated against the same complainant, which disentitled him to leniency, pointed to an increased need for specific deterrence and contributed to a finding that his prospects of rehabilitation were poor or guarded.
•
The need for general deterrence and the protection of the community.
•
The statistics did not point to the indicative sentence for sequence 6 being manifestly excessive.
The aggregate sentence was also appropriate in light of the circumstances of the other offending including at [108]:
•
The stealing offence was assessed as “falling slightly below the middle range of objective seriousness but not by much”, due to the non-monetary value of the laptop which could be expected to contain personal information.
•
The intimidation offence was assessed as at the middle end of the range of objective gravity noting the conduct was premeditated and designed to instil further mental harm on the complainant, when the applicant was aware she had just given birth.
•
The sentencing judge found the dishonesty offences fell slightly below the middle range of offending given the multiple victims (the ATO and the complainant), and the applicant having exploited his possession of the complainant’s laptop (subject of the stealing offence) to perpetrate the fraud.
•
No challenge was made with respect to accumulation.
•
The two offences on the Form 1, particularly contravene AVO, required an increase to the penalty for the principal offence (sequence 6), to ensure personal deterrence and extract retribution.
•
The applicant showed little or no insight into the complainant’s perspective and was not genuinely remorseful.
•
The applicant represented a medium risk of re-offending.
•
The challenge to a limited adjustment to the sentencing ratio for special circumstances was rejected.
•
There was no double counting.
McFarland v R [2021] NSWCCA 79 (23 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Factors relevant to sentencing’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated take and detain a person with intent to obtain advantage (aggravation being actual bodily harm, advantage being psychological gratification) plus a Form 1 for common assault x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Driving with a high range content of alcohol in blood x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in a de facto relationship. The intoxicated applicant assaulted the victim, punching and strangling her. He forced her partially into the car and drove 2.9 km, leaving her legs dragging along the gravel. The victim’s injuries were described by sentencing judge as “horrific” and representing the most serious form of actual bodily harm. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 4 months.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted. Appeal dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the following factors:
•
Aggravated take and detain offence was assessed at above the mid-range of objective seriousness. The maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment is an important legislative guidepost.
•
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm offence was assessed at the mid-range of objective seriousness. It carried a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment.
•
Applicant’s subjective case was not powerful, even taking account of his genuine remorse.
•
No evidence to support a finding that the applicant’s moral culpability was anything but high or that he was not an appropriate vehicle for general or specific deterrence.
•
Self-induced intoxication is not a mitigating factor.
•
Applicant’s prior conviction for domestic violence offending against his previous female domestic partner disentitled him to leniency.
•
Although the offending was unplanned, it was not fleeting. The totality of the offending involved relatively sustained violence.
•
Harm suffered by the victim was described by the sentencing judge as “horrific”.
•
It was necessary the sentence reflected specific deterrence, general deterrence, recognition of the human dignity of the victim and the community’s legitimate interest in the denunciation of alcohol fuelled domestic violence.
Cooper v R [2021] NSWCCA 65 (14 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mercy killing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Substance misuse’
Charges: Murder x 1; Form 1 offences (stalking/intimidating with intent and contravening an apprehended domestic violence order, ADVO).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant injected the deceased, his partner, with a lethal dose of heroin intending to cause her death. The sentencing judge accepted that this was a “mercy killing” at the deceased’s request. After a 25% reduction for his guilty plea, the applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 13 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 10 years. There was a history of domestic violence (including an ADVO in place) and substance abuse.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The Court did not take into account the applicant’s deprived background and early introduction to substance abuse in determining his moral culpability for the offending.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no dispute that the applicant’s deprived background and early introduction to alcohol and substance abuse was a highly relevant factor in considering the applicant’s moral culpability: Bugmy v The Queen; R v Millwood. However, the sentencing judge did take these principles into account, setting out in detail the applicant’s troubled background and early association with drugs and alcohol and referring with approval to the forensic psychiatrist’s assessment of the applicant’s mental condition. These conclusions formed part of the context for a finding of the applicant’s low moral culpability ([68]-[72]).
Ground 2: Notwithstanding the tragic circumstances surrounding the killing and the applicant’s low moral culpability, it could not be said the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. It had to be remembered that: (1) This was a deliberate killing of another human being by the injection of an illegal drug; (2) It took place whilst the applicant was on conditional liberty and in direct breach of his bail conditions and the ADVO; (3) Although not a significant issue in sentencing, offences on a Form 1 needed to be taken into account; and (4) Despite the applicant’s mental illness reducing the need for the sentence to reflect denunciation and general deterrence, specific deterrence remained of importance ([82]-[86]).
Rogers v R [2021] NSWCCA 61 (9 April 2021) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Defence relied upon at trial’ – ‘Extreme provocation’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant suffocated his wife during a physical altercation and attempted to commit suicide. The appellant had discovered his wife had formed a relationship with another man. There was evidence that the deceased kicked the appellant during the struggle. At trials in 2018 and 2019, the appellant relied upon the partial defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind under s 23A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The jury rejected the partial defence and convicted the appellant of murder. No application was made at trial for the partial defence of extreme provocation to be left to the jury.
Grounds of appeal/Issues: Application for leave to rely upon the ground of appeal pursuant to Rule 4 Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW).
Ground: A miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to leave the partial defence of extreme provocation under s 23 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) to the jury.
Held: Leave to rely on the ground of appeal refused; leave to appeal against conviction refused.
Issue 1: As Bathurst CJ observed in ARS v R, the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) does not exist to enable an accused who has been convicted on one set of issues to have a new trial under a new set of issues which could or should have been raised at the first trial. In any event, the appellant had not lost a real chance of a verdict of not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter, because extreme provocation was not left to the jury: ([166]-[167]).
Issue 2: Properly constructed, s 23 provides that the conduct of the deceased to which the accused person responded (s 23(2)(a)), and which caused the accused person to lose self-control (s 23(2)(c)), and which was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control (s 23(2)(d)) must be conduct which constituted a serious indictable offence (s 23(2)(b)). Omitting the words “in the position of the accused” in the 2014 amendment means s 23(2)(d) now significantly departs from the common law. “[T]he ordinary person test now contained in s 23(2)(d) assumes a calm ordinary person and that it is not relevant that the accused person was particularly sensitive to the situation or was experiencing a depressive disorder” (see [92]-[104]).
The critical and determining aspect of the appeal concerned the objective element in s 23(2)(d). It was accepted that the notional ordinary person may act in unreasonable ways but “the reaction must still be within the range of possible reactions of an ordinary person as assessed by the Court when considering the threshold question of law involved.” In the context and factual circumstances of the case, the reaction of the appellant was “not within the range of possible reactions of an ordinary person. The partial defence of extreme provocation ought not to have been left to the jury” ([141]-[163]).
Taylor v R [2020] NSWCCA 355 (20 December 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Significant probative value’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Breaking and entering into dwelling and committing serious indictable offence, namely, intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm, knowing that persons were inside x 1 (Count 4); Intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm x 1 (Count 6); Possession of an implement of housebreaking without lawful excuse x 1 (Count 8); Entering dwelling with intent to commit serious indictable offence, namely, intimidation with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm, knowing that persons were inside x 1 (Count 9).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man and the complainant woman were in an on-off relationship for about two years prior to the alleged offences. Following a trial by jury in the District Court of New South Wales, the applicant was found not guilty on Counts 1-3, but guilty on Counts 4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12.
In relation to Count 9, the Crown’s case required the applicant to have gained external access to the complainant’s fourth floor apartment of a five storey building, despite there being no means for the applicant to access the balcony externally.
In relation to Counts 1-10, the Crown relied on tendency evidence, namely, a signed statement of agreed facts from 2010 used in sentencing the applicant for a charge of recklessly occasioning grievous bodily harm to his former wife on 25 October 2008. The facts concerned acts of violence and threats towards his former wife of 30 years, and their pet, during the breakdown of the relationship. The signed statement of agreed facts also included a statement that there was a history of domestic violence in the relationship.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The verdict on Count 9 was unreasonable as there was no direct evidence, or no proper inference from direct evidence, that there were persons in the premises at the time of entry, and that element of the offence was not capable of proof; and
2.
Evidence in relation to conduct committed in 2008 ought not to have been admitted as tendency evidence.
Held: Ground 1 upheld, ground 2 dismissed; applicant re-sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 14 months, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Ground 1: It was not reasonably open to the jury to have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had accessed the balcony externally. There was no evidence how the applicant could have gained external access.
Ground 2: The appeal on ground 2 was dismissed by majority (Beech-Jones J, with Walton J agreeing). First, the tendency evidence relied upon had “significant probative value”. The evidence strongly supported proof that the applicant possessed the alleged tendency (to be violent/threatening towards women with whom he was in/had an intimate relationship) as at the time of the alleged charges (March 2018). There was no relevant difference in this context between the violent breakdown of the 30-year relationship and the 2-year relationship (Beech-Jones J at [140]-[155], Walton J agreeing at [136]).
Further, the probative value of the tendency evidence substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. The submission that the admission of the tendency evidence would lead to the jury having an “adverse emotional response” was rejected. The trial judge’s direction specifically warned the jury in that regard (Beech-Jones J at [156]-[157], Walton J agreeing at [136]).
Droudis v R [2020] NSWCCA 322 (10 December 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family court matters’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Victim as perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant was the partner of Man Haron Monis (who was the perpetrator of, and died during, the Lindt Café siege in December 2014) ([6]). Prior to meeting Monis, the applicant had not been involved in any criminal conduct ([5]). It was accepted that Monis exercised a significant degree of influence/psychological persuasion and a measure of control over the applicant, fortified by a level of physical abuse, and she was prepared to act at his behest ([9], [37], [38], [39]).
Man Haron Monis planned the murder of his former wife (the victim, with whom he had two children). But he was not prepared to carry out the killing himself, planning with the applicant that instead she would carry out the murder. Part of the applicant’s motive included the desire to form a “single family unit” with Man Haron Monis and the children ([29(h)]; [69]).
The applicant stabbed the victim 18 times before dousing her with petrol and setting her alight. The applicant was convicted of the murder of the victim following a judge alone trial. She was sentenced to 44 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 33 years.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the significance of the death of Man Haron Monis to the applicant’s risk of re-offending and prospects of rehabilitation.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his application of s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which deals with the power of the court to reduce penalties for facilitating the administration of justice.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave to appeal granted, ground 1 upheld. The applicant was re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 35 years with a non-parole period of 26 years and 3 months. Grounds 2 and 3 dismissed.
Ground 1: The sentencing judge failed to take into account the death of Monis, and the removal of his ongoing influence on the applicant, as relevant factors in determining future dangerousness, the need for personal deterrence, and the prospects of rehabilitation ([68]-[72]).
Ground 2: The sentencing judge gave proper consideration to the nature of the assistance given ([99]). Section 22A did not require a two-stage approach to sentencing (as opposed to taking the matter into account as part of the “instinctive synthesis approach”), nor impose a legal requirement to quantify the extent to which the sentence was reduced ([100]-[104]). While it would provide further transparency to the sentencing process if the court specifies the penalty that would be imposed but for the assistance provided, a failure to quantify the discount does not by itself establish error ([105]).
Ground 3: The sentencing judge did not err in his conclusion that the psychological persuasion of Monis, and physical abuse, did not give rise to “a form of non-exculpatory duress such as to reduce the applicant’s moral culpability”. The sentencing judge was also correct in his finding of the objective gravity of the offence, and in concluding there was no evidence of contrition or remorse (but there was limited evidence of remorse/ rehabilitation on appeal) ([118]-[119]).
In re-sentencing, despite the relevance of the death of Monis to the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation and re-offending, the Court noted that the offence was serious and retribution/general deterrence were significant ([120]-[129]).
Bussey v R [2020] NSWCCA 280 (16 November 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Rape where parties formerly in intimate relationship’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Indecent assault x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Aggravated sexual assault without consent (deprivation of liberty) x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant man and female victim had remained in contact following the end of their relationship as they were in a music band together. The victim refused the applicant’s request to revive the relationship. The applicant strangled her until she passed out. When he then asked whether she “was going to fight him”, she said “no and reluctantly gave in to intercourse”.
The victim reported the incident to her friends and the police. The victim identified prior sexual practices between the applicant and herself, including regular consensual choking, physical restraint, being thrown onto a bed, role playing and “rough sex”. The defence case was that all sexual contact between the applicant and the victim was consensual. The applicant was found not guilty on Counts 1, 2 and 4, and guilty on one charge of aggravated sexual assault without consent (Count 3).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The verdict was unreasonable, as it was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on the other three counts.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by not having sufficient regard, or giving weight, to the historical extent and nature of the prior sexual experience between the applicant and the victim.
Held: Appeal dismissed (per Harrison J, Hoeben CJ and Bellew J agreeing).
Ground 1: In a case where there are mixed verdicts of guilty and not guilty, and the complainant’s evidence is the only evidence of an accused’s guilt, a court may (but not must) conclude the verdicts are factually inconsistent: citing MFA v The Queen, R v Markuleski, and Mackenzie v The Queen. The court held that the verdicts of not guilty on Counts 1, 2 and 4 were explicable without leading to the conclusion that the jury formed an adverse impression about the victim’s credibility. As such, the guilty verdict on Count 3, dependent on the jury’s acceptance of the victim’s credibility, was not inconsistent and unreasonable ([62]-[70]).
Grounds 2 and 3: The seriousness of the offending was not mitigated by the prior sexual relationship between the applicant and the victim. Harrison J (Hoeben CJ and Bellew J agreeing) held at [87]-[88]:
“Mr Bussey maintained that, but for his Honour’s failure to have sufficient regard to the fact that he and RM had, until only a relatively short time before the commission of the offence, been in a close and enthusiastic personal relationship, he would have concluded that Mr Bussey’s objective criminality was reduced and would have imposed a less severe sentence. In this sense, it is said that his Honour allegedly failed to have regard to a relevant consideration:
In my opinion, that submission falls foul of the principle that just because it may be possible to contemplate more serious examples of the same offence does not mean that the particular offence being considered is for that reason less serious.”
And at [95]-[97], with Hoeben CJ and Bellew J particularly noting their agreement with these remarks:
“The cases reveal a consistent and commendable emphasis upon the need to consider each offence of sexual assault upon a woman by her partner or former partner with special and particular regard to the circumstances of the case. However, there has in my view been a regrettable tendency in some cases to refer to the fact that the assault occurred within, or following the breakdown of, a relationship as something that might “mitigate” the seriousness of the particular offence. This type of language has the unfortunate potential erroneously to dilute the significance of the offence under consideration. Put simply, the objective seriousness of sexual intercourse without consent cannot be reduced because of factors such as a prior sexual history between an offender and his victim without making unjustified and impermissible assumptions about the effect upon the victim. It depreciates the notion that no means no, whatever other factors may be involved. To accept that a prior relationship can ever operate to mitigate the seriousness of the offending completely abandons that uncontroversial wisdom and reverts to the type of attitude that once saw domestic violence treated as less culpable than other assaults. It also proceeds upon the implicit and unsafe adoption of non-consensual sexual intercourse with a stranger as the default position.
I cannot accept that a statement such as “the violation of the person and the defilement that are inevitable features where a stranger rapes a woman are not always present to the same degree when the offender and the victim had previously had a longstanding sexual relationship” is now or could ever have been an acceptable, far less correct, summary of the law or that it should continue to influence this Court in the determination of cases such as the present. Violation and defilement of the victim are quintessential aspects of the offence and the victim’s familiarity with an assailant can have no bearing upon that fundamental circumstance. Indeed, such an assault, committed by a person with whom the victim may have had a formerly close and respectful relationship, is potentially more likely to exacerbate the seriousness of the offence than otherwise. I cannot accept the proposition that there can be varying degrees of violation and defilement. Such a concept appears to derive from the offensive notion that a man should in certain circumstances be entitled to raise his prior relationship with the victim as some kind of limited excuse for disregarding the absence of consent to an act of intercourse with him to which activity the victim had historically consented.”
As I have indicated, Mr Bussey’s submissions implicitly rely upon the proposition that the offence of which he was found guilty could have been more serious. The fact that one can imagine the commission of more serious offences of this type is not controversial. It does not, however, mean that the sentence imposed by his Honour for the offence committed by Mr Bussey should somehow be assessed by reference to that fact. It certainly does not mean that the objective seriousness of Count 3 is diminished or reduced because Mr Bussey and RM had previously been in a consensual sexual relationship. Once it is accepted that no means no, that should be the end of the matter.”
Yaman v R [2020] NSWCCA 239 (25 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Aggravated break and enter, commit assault occasioning actual bodily harm, breach ADVO.
Facts: The male applicant was in a domestic relationship with the female victim which ended due to ongoing domestic violence. The offender breached a protection order by calling the victim 48 times and attending the victim’s residence. As the victim unlocked her front door the applicant ‘collided’ with her, and they fell into her apartment. He put his foot on her head to hold her down screaming ‘how dare you ignore me’ and ‘who are you to tell me it’s over’ [23]. The applicant took a knife from the kitchen, pushed the victim onto a couch. The victim told the applicant ‘If you’re gunna pull a knife on me do it’ which caused him to back off and leave the premises. The victim had several small lacerations to the backs of her hands [27].
Grounds of Appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge was in error in finding that the aggravated break and enter involved ‘some significant planning’;
2.
(2A) The sentencing judge erred in finding the applicant’s criminal history was ‘aggravating on sentence’; (2B) The sentencing judge failed to give reasons as to how the applicant’s history ‘aggravated’ the sentences imposed’
3.
The sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the aggravated break and enter offence as ‘mid-range offence’
4.
The sentence imposed for the aggravated break and enter offence is manifestly excessive
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted on grounds 1,2 and 4 and refused leave to appeal on ground 3. The appeals were dismissed.
Fullerton J held there was ‘more than sufficient factual foundation’ to support a finding that the offence involved significant planning. He found the phone calls indicated the applicant’s determination to confront the victim [5].
Wilson J regarded the phone calls, the offender’s presence in the stairwell and the speed he ran to the victim as evidence that it was open to the court to find the only reasonable conclusion was that there was some planning [96].
Wilson J held that the applicant’s characterisation of the offence “significantly minimised the gravity of his crime” [117]. He found that because of the telephone calls the victim had already received, she was already in a state of fear before the confrontation. His Honour found that just because applicant did not use the knife to inflict injury, did not make the incident less serious. That the applicant waited for the victim to be home before charging at her and propelling them both through the doorway heightened the gravity of the crime [119].
Le v R [2020] NSWCCA 238 (23 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unreasonableness’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: 2x counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, with a third alternative charge that was not pressed.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction on 1 count of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm.
Facts: The female victim and male offender were in an intimate relationship for 15 months. On the relevant night, the offender and the victim had consumed cocaine. The offender hit the victim multiple times after the victim had continued talking after sex. Critically, the offender stomped or kicked the victim’s hip, which fractured her femur and required a hip replacement. The victim did not go to the hospital or report the incident immediately. About two weeks after the injury, she called the police, following an argument where the offender did not hit her but she feared that he would hit her again. Over the next few weeks, she subsequently went to hospital, discovered the seriousness of her injury and gave a recorded statement to police.
Issue: Whether appeal against conviction should be allowed on the ground that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal against conviction was granted. However, the appeal was dismissed by a majority of 2:1.
Hoeben CJ would have allowed the appeal. He considered that there were objective deficiencies in the account of the victim: [30]. She was inconsistent in her account of how she sustained the injury: [53]. This also extended to the circumstances of the injury and the nature of the fight: [45]–[47]. She told a series of lies, admittedly in relation to trivial factors like drug use or the injuries of the accused: [96]–[98]. Further, there was little evidence to support that there had been months of physical abuse prior: [102]. These inconsistencies were so significant that the jury ought to have had a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the offender: [24].
Adamson and Davies JJ, writing separately but agreeing with each other, did not consider that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable. Adamson J, providing primary reasons, accepted that the victim was at times inconsistent but noted that juries can accept parts of what witnesses say, while rejecting other parts: [202]. Recapping the evidence, Adamson J reiterated that the question is whether it was open to a reasonable jury to find that the Crown had established its case beyond reasonable doubt: [205]. In this case, the jury only needed to be satisfied that the offender had stomped or kicked the victim in the left hip and this caused her hip to fracture: [205]. Given the evidence, Adamson J did not have a doubt and, further, any such doubt would be the kind of doubt that was resolved by the jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence: [226].
Davies J, providing additional reasons, added that, even though this was primarily a single-witness case, the fact the victim sustained a fractured femur was significant objective evidence: [112]. The expert evidence suggested that a fall was an unlikely cause of an isolated injury to the hip: [117], [121]. This was so despite aspects of the victim’s evidence being unreliable: [124]. The defence case that the victim may have fabricated charges following the break up was inconsistent with the victim’s reluctance to provide statements to the police: [128]–[130]. It was open to the jury to reject the applicant’s case but it was also open to accept that the hip fracture occurred in the way that the victim said: [132]. Therefore, the appeal ground was not made out.
Ebsworth v R [2020] NSWCCA 229 (11 September 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘De Simoni issue’ – ‘Intent to kill’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Breaking, entering and committing a serious indictable offence in circumstances of aggravation x 1; Using an offensive weapon with intent to assault x 2; Intimidation x 5; Recklessly damaging property x 1; Contravening a DFV protection order x 5.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man and female victim were in a domestic relationship. After an argument, the applicant was told to leave the victim’s premises and did so. Later, he returned when the victim was absent and cut up most of her clothes. As a consequence of that incident, an protection order was issued. Following this the applicant committed a number of offences including threatening to kill the victim, sending abusive and threatening messages, breaking into the victim’s house and assaulting the victim, including strangling her and threatening to kill her while holding a knife. The victim was able to run from the house, but the applicant chased her with the knife, grabbed her hair and punched her repetitively in the face. In response to the victim’s cousin intervening to protect the victim, the applicant threatened to stab both the victim and her cousin. Afterwards, the applicant continued to send abusive and threatening messages to the victim, including threatening to shoot her and her family. The applicant is of Aboriginal heritage.
Grounds: (2) Whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into consideration a more serious offence contrary to the principles in De Simoni.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge considered that the applicant had a state of mind to kill or inflict serious injury upon the victim at the time of committing charge 1. As such, the applicant submits that the sentencing judge was sentencing the applicant in relation to a more serious, uncharged offence (i.e., strangulation with intent of committing murder under s 29 of the Crimes Act). The difficulty with this submission is that the strangling of the victim would have to have been done for the purpose of killing the victim to fall under s 29 of the Crimes Act.
[58] If a choking occurs, which choking does not kill the victim, the offender does not commit an offence under s 29, unless there was an intention to kill. The sentencing judge referred to threats to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm for which the choking was an act following through on those threats. But the sentencing judge did not conclude that the “following through” by choking was done with an intent to kill. It could have been done to inflict really serious injury. The requirement in s 29 of the Crimes Act to commit an act of strangling “with intent … to commit murder”, requires the offender to have an intention to kill; not one that may be to inflict really serious injury. On the other hand, if a strangulation occurs which does, in fact, cause death, then an intention to cause really serious injury is sufficient to give rise to the crime of murder.
…
[63] The prohibition based upon the principles established by the High Court in De Simoni should not be overstated. The principles disentitle a sentencing court from inflicting punishment or aggravating an offence for which a sentence is to be imposed, because conduct has occurred which otherwise would be a more serious offence.
Nothing in the circumstances of this case give rise to the principles described in De Simoni.
Romeo v R [2020] NSWCCA 221 (31 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Administration of justice’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Family law dispute’ – ‘Soliciting to murder’
Charges: Soliciting to murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant contravened a protection order protecting his former wife. The applicant arranged a third party to murder the victim before his next appearance in court, paying the third party $30,000. The third party planned to defraud the applicant and informed police of the applicant’s intention to murder his former wife. An undercover police operative posing as the person who would carry out the murder met with the applicant and was instructed to get the victim to write a letter to her son to explain the victim’s disappearance. The original sentence was 9 years and 9 months commencing on 18 November 2016 and expiring on 17 August 2026 with a non-parole period of 6 years expiring on 17 November 2022.
Grounds: (1) The sentencing judge erred in finding that the offending fell within the middle of the range of seriousness; (2) the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
(1) The assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence as falling within the middle range was open to the judge.
[88] In the present case, the offence was motivated at least partially by the applicant’s wish to have his former wife murdered before he was due to attend court on 29 November 2016 for the AVO. As this Court has emphasised, an offence of solicit to murder is seriously aggravated where the motive is to interfere with the administration of justice.
Citing Efthimiadis v R (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 9 (9 February 2016) at [85]-[86] of that decision:
[85] Personal and general deterrence are important considerations in the sentencing exercise for the reasons previously given and as the offence of soliciting a person to murder another is a heinous crime …
[86] In my mind, there is another reason that general deterrence has significance in the present case. All too often partners in a domestic relationship resort to violence. The community cannot tolerate violence in any domestic setting, but the community’s abhorrence of a crime intended to secure the custody of a young child by the murder of the mother needs to be expressed in the sentence to deter persons who might be like-minded to commit such a crime.
(2) The sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Samandi v R [2020] NSWCCA 217 (27 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Application to withdraw guilty plea’ – ‘Guilty pleas after commencement of trial’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 6; Assault x 3; Intentionally damaging property x 1; Making a false accusation knowing that persons are innocent of an alleged offence x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: When the applicant was originally committed for trial the Crown also alleged four counts of sexual intercourse without consent (also domestic violence offences). The Crown accepted a plea arrangement where the applicant pled guilty to all other counts and the Crown would not proceed further on the four counts of having sexual intercourse without consent. The applicant signed instructions agreeing to the plea deal. The trial judge set out the scale of the offending, namely that between December 2015 and February 2017, the male applicant repeatedly assaulted his female partner. The trial judge highlighted that ‘A common feature of the assaults upon the victim was the quite unnecessary use of force in response to minor matters’, as well as the applicant giving ‘false explanation[s] to the police’ to cover up his conduct [71]. The trial judge noted that domestic violence offences are ‘serious matters … worthy of exemplary sentences in the context of giving proper weight to the purposes of sentencing that reflect the need to send a message to the wider community’ [96]. The trial judge took into account mitigating factors such as the guilty plea.
Issues: (1) Whether a miscarriage of justice will occur if the applicant is not permitted to withdraw their guilty plea; … (4) Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal against conviction refused. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal against sentence dismissed.
(1) The applicant has not established that a miscarriage of justice will result from him being held to the pleas of guilty that he entered.
The Applicant’s pleas of guilty were entered freely and voluntarily, and were the subject of written instructions from the Applicant to his lawyers. There was no intimidation, improper inducement or fraud which led to the Applicant’s pleas of guilty. This was an informed decision by the Applicant to plead guilty to the charges for which sentence was passed [123].
(4) The aggregate sentence was not manifestly excessive. The Court endorsed the judgment in Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 that:
[155]: ‘[78] … current sentencing practices of ‘offences involving domestic violence’ [may] depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. It is undoubtedly the case that the criminal law, in the area of domestic violence, requires rigorous and demanding consequences for perpetrators for the purpose of protecting partners, family members and the wider community. [79] In the context of domestic violence offences, the High Court has observed that it is a longstanding obligation of the State to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’.
[156]: The applicant’s offences reflected his exercise of control and domination over the victim with these being common features of domestic violence offences [76]-[77]… Specific and general deterrence were important factors on sentence in this case together with the requirement for powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and recognition of the harm done to the victim as a result of these offences: Cherry v R [76].
[157]: It is important to keep in mind, as well, the serious public justice offence committed by the applicant contrary to s 314Crimes Act 1900 … the applicant’s s 314 offence involved the making of false allegations against police officers designed to protect the applicant himself from prosecution for domestic violence offences against his partner. The applicant caused injuries to himself which he falsely attributed to police. As his Honour [the sentencing judge] observed, the applicant did not carry through with further reports. However, this was a serious public justice offence which warranted the indicative sentence of imprisonment for two years which was itself a significant component of the aggregate sentence imposed upon the applicant.
[158]: There is a continuing and deep-seated lack of insight on the part of the applicant concerning his domestic violence offences.
AK v Regina [2020] NSWCCA 194 (5 August 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘People affected by mental illness’ – ‘Sexual violence’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threat to kill child’
Charges: Detained wife with the intent to obtain an advantage (psychological gratification) x 1; Detained stepchild with the intent to obtain an advantage (psychological gratification) x 1; Doing an act intending to influence a witness to withhold evidence/procure an acquittal x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Contravention of a protection order x 1; Common assault x 2; Intimidation/Stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant entered his wife’s home premises in contravention of a protection order, intending to intimidate her. The wife returned home with her child, PC, and was scared when she saw the appellant. She yelled to PC to open the door and the appellant told PC that if she opened the door of the room, he would kill PC. Over a number of hours, the applicant spoke with his wife about an impending court case and threatened to kill himself if she called the police. The wife told the applicant she would ‘say whatever the offender wanted her to say in court’. The applicant detained his wife locked in a bedroom for approximately two hours during which time the applicant said, ‘I’m sorry I hit you, I love you’ and then had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. The applicant told the victim he had sent his brother $3000, so that if anything happened to the offender, his brother would kill her and he re-iterated his threat that if she called the police he would commit suicide.
Ground: (1) The sentencing judge erred by failing to properly consider the mental health of the applicant.
Decision and reasoning: Application for leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
No error has been demonstrated. Ground 1 dismissed.
The sentencing judge made specific reference to the context of domestic violence citing the High Court in Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38 at [54]-[55]:
‘the longstanding obligation of the of the state to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the state to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’.
Reference was also made to The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, recognising the:
‘societal shift in relation to domestic violence and that current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence depart from past sentencing practices for this category offence, because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’ [15].
Aggravating factors included the actual or threatened use of violence, the presence of children, the commission of offences in the home of the victim, ‘a place where they are entitled to expect to be safe and free from this type of conduct’, and the breach of bail and a protection order [16]. The sentencing judge took into account medical reports that indicated that the offender’s mental condition may have ‘contributed to the commission of the offending in a material way’. The sentencing judge weighed up the relevant factors on the evidence before him, including:
[40] …a background of repeated, violent offending, where an AVO and bail conditions in place seem to have made no difference to this offender’s willingness to attack, detain, humiliate, terrorise and rape his partner in the presence of her children.
Samandi v DPP (NSW) [2020] NSWCCA 102 (9 June 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for bail pending appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Reasonable prospects of success’
Charges: Assault x 3; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 6; Intentionally damaging property x 1; Contravening a DFV protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail pending application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The male applicant plead guilty to offences committed against his wife and has now lodged an application for leave to appeal against convictions and sentences, contending his instructions to withdraw his pleas were not followed. The Crown case against the applicant was ‘very strong’. The applicant also contends that his lawyers failed to inform the sentencing judge about issues related to his health.
Issues: Whether special exceptional circumstances justify the grant of bail.
Decision and reasoning: Special or exceptional circumstances established. Application for bail granted subject to conditions.
The applicant has not established that he has reasonable prospects of success on his conviction appeal. However, the applicant’s contention that the consideration of additional medical evidence could result in him being resentenced is ‘reasonably arguable or … at least [has] some reasonable prospects of success’ on appeal [34]. Further, although the applicant’s submission that being in custody prevents him from properly preparing for appeal as an unrepresented litigant does not ‘qualify as special or exceptional circumstances standing alone’ [33], it can be considered as part of a combination of factors.
Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3 (6 February 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for extension of time for leave to appeal’ – ‘Controlling and obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Motor vehicle’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Visa’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder; Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
Case type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against aggregate sentence
Ground of appeal: His honour erred in the notional accumulation of indicative sentences in determining the aggregate sentence
Facts: The applicant man and female first victim met shortly after she moved from Columbia in 2011 and they married in 201. They had separated having had ‘relationship difficulties’ at the time of the offences. After a series of arguments, the first victim moved out of the marital home at his demand. A few days later, the applicant began texting her and her friend, then when asked not to text her emailed the first victim’s sister (copied to the victim) and accused the first victim of fraudulently obtaining a visa and of trying to steal money from him and his family. He also stated that he "hope[d] [the victim] were to die in a car accident and that she has to fly home the body" [20]. The first victim subsequently made several statements to police leading up to the offending "in case something happened to [her]" and that she felt vulnerable and ‘unsafe to go outside’ and she was worried about what the applicant would do "because he is very controlling" [21-2]. The Applicant was also found to have searched for the first victim online, her place of work and the phrase ‘carotid artery neck’ [26]. This search history was relied upon by the Crown to contend that the offences were premediated and that the "Applicant armed himself with a knife intending to cut the victim’s carotid artery in her neck with an intention to kill" [26].
On the day of the offence, the Applicant had waited for the first victim to arrive at work. When she arrived, he approached her, produced a knife from his pocket and "lunged at the victim’s head and neck area, stabbing her in the forehead, the left-chest area and the left arm which she had raised to protect herself" [32]. One of her colleagues approached the Applicant and told him to stop. The Applicant then stabbed the colleague in the skull, causing immediate bleeding and a bone fracture. The Applicant then ran to his vehicle and accelerated quickly towards the first victim, who had collapsed on the ground, and crushed her between the bumper bar of his vehicle and another parked vehicle before driving away.
The first victim suffered abrasions and bruising, multiple fractured ribs, fractures to the left scapula, several vertebrae and pelvis. She had stab wounds to her chest and arm and a laceration to her left forehead. She was hospitalised for two weeks, a number of days in intensive care and required surgery for several injuries. The second victim required sutures for a laceration as a result of the stab wound to the top of her head and the injury caused a mildly displaced fracture of the skull.
The Applicant admitted that he brought the knife with him "intending to cut [his] throat in front of [the victim]" but instead "completely lost it" during a police interview. He had a major depressive illness but no evidence of psychosis or hallucinations and there was expert evidence he was capable of forming and intention to kill, wound and/or do grievous bodily harm.
The applicant had no prior criminal history. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 21 years comprising a non-parole period of 14 years commencing on 19 August 2015 and expiring on 18 August 2029, with a balance of term of seven years commencing on 19 August 2029 and expiring on 18 August 2036 [4]. The sentencing Judge gave the following sentence indications:
(a)
Count 1 - the offence under s.27 Crimes Act 1900 of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to murder - imprisonment for 17 years and six months with a non-parole period of 12 years;
(b)
Count 3 - the offence under s.33(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900 of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm - imprisonment for 11 years and three months with a non-parole period of eight years.
The applicant lodged his Notice of Intention to Seek Leave to appeal in time on 1 May 2019 and it was extended until 1 February 2019. Notice of Application for leave to Appeal was not lodged until 30 August 2019. The Crown submitted that the extension of time should not be granted as there was not merit in the ground of appeal.
Held: The ground of appeal lacked sufficient merit to warrant and extension of time to bring an application for leave to appeal against sentence [114]. Johnson J (Macfarlan JA concurring) provided that "the Applicant’s submission in support of [the] ground of appeal are based upon a misconception concerning the operation of the statutory provisions providing for aggregative sentencing in this State" [87]. "The principles of sentencing concerning accumulation and concurrency at general law, as explained in Pearce v The Queen, have no application where an aggregate sentence is used by the sentencing Court."[91] The sentencing judge was found to have correctly complied with the statutory provisions as well as to have taken a "detailed, careful and balanced approach in reaching sentence in this case" [113].
Field v R [2020] NSWCCA 105 (1 May 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge’s assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence as "just below midrange" was not open to her.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in her approach to general deterrence by failing to have regard to the individual circumstances of the offence and offender.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give effect to his findings of special circumstances in relation to the overall effective sentence.
4.
The sentence is manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male victim was in a relationship with Ms Crowther (‘C’), who was also in a relationship with the appellant, an Aboriginal man. After staying at C’s house overnight, the victim sent C text messages (which were consistent with someone who was in an intimate relationship) but C did not reply so the victim waited for C at her house while consuming alcohol. The victim fell asleep on the front veranda and was awoken by the appellant opening the front door. The victim punched the appellant in the face, causing him to stagger backwards. The victim then went inside and remonstrated with C. He then felt a blow to his stomach and realised he had been stabbed, so he went to the kitchen to escape. He applied paper towel to his stomach and the appellant said, "Come out and I’ll finish ya". C left to collect her daughter from school and the appellant also subsequently left. The victim was left by himself and called 000. He underwent a number of surgical procedures over the following months.
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years. In sentencing the appellant, the judge found that the appellant was raised in an extremely violent and dysfunctional environment [18]. Furthermore, he left school in year eight, was illiterate [19], had been using drugs since he was 16 [20] and suffered from longstanding mental illnesses [21].
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal. Regarding Ground 1, the court held that the assessment of objective seriousness was open to the sentencing judge, taking into account the serious injuries and harm suffered by the victim, that the appellant used a knife capable of inflicting serious injury or worse, and that the offence was committed spontaneously as part of an excessive and disproportionate mode of self-defence [54].
The court also held that Ground 2 had not been made out. The court found that the comments made by the sentencing judge regarding general deterrence had direct application to the facts of the case and did not constitute some generalised "motherhood statement", from their context and content [74]. The sentencing judge did not downplay or ignore the appellant’s mental illness [74] because the mental illness aspect of the appellant’s claims "appear[ed] to be unrelated to his criminality generally and this offence in particular" [70].
In holding that Ground 3 had not been made out, the court stated that the "fact that the applicant was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the offences operates as an aggravating factor by virtue of its existence at the operative time and not because of its capacity to rationally affect the criminality of the offence" [86].
The court held that Ground 4 had not been made out and therefore that the sentence was not manifestly excessive because:
1.
The sentence has to be considered against a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment and a standard non-parole period of 7 years. These are significant guidelines.
2.
The applicant received the benefit of a finding of special circumstances such that the non-parole period is 67 per cent of the total sentence.
3.
Having been found guilty by a jury after trial, the applicant was not entitled to any utilitarian discount.
4.
The offence properly fell just below the midrange of objective seriousness for the reasons advanced in relation to appeal ground 1. Although the applicant’s offence was found to involve a spontaneous act of excessive self-defence, those actions also involved a significantly disproportionate response to the perceived threat. This response involved the use of a knife which caused severe ongoing physical and emotional harm to the victim.
5.
The applicant’s criminal history disentitled him to the leniency to which a person with no criminal history may have been entitled.
6.
The applicant was subject to conditional liberty at the time of the commission of the offence.
7.
The applicant’s sentence was backdated in a manner favourable to the applicant to 18 April 2018. This backdating subsumed the entirety of his time in custody for six other unrelated offences for which he had received sentences of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 6 months.
Goodbun v R [2020] NSWCCA 77 (23 April 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of advo’ – ‘Guilty plea - history of domestic violence - lack of remorse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Whether aggregate sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust’ – ‘Whether unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances’
Charges: Murder x 1; Contravening an apprehended domestic violence order x 1; Using an unregistered firearm x 1; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife (the victim), and to three related offences, namely, contravening an apprehended domestic violence order, using an unregistered firearm, and assault occasioning actually bodily harm. The victim was shot dead by the applicant. They had been married for 40 years and had 2 adult children. The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 41 years 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 31 years and 1 month. He was born in 1956 and, if alive, would be 91 at the time of eligibility for parole.
The sentencing judge described the murder as a "chilling and deeply shocking crime which, without hyperbole, could be described as an execution" ([46]). Her Honour stated that while the applicant did not have a lengthy criminal history for domestic violence, the incident occurred in the context of a history of significant domestic violence ([63]). It was against this background that the sentencing judge found the applicant to be motivated by hatred to kill the victim as she was instrumental in the issue of an ADVO and the bringing of associated criminal charges. She also highlighted the need for specific and general deterrence, "describing domestic violence as a profoundly serious problem in the community, extending not infrequently to the murder of a spouse or partner" ([64]). Her Honour did not make a finding of special circumstances and emphasised that the "principle consideration is to ensure that the minimum period of incarceration reflects the crime and the subjective case".
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence on two grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in determining that it was unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances because of the length of the sentence that she proposed to impose and the ordinary statutory ratio that applied;
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal Ground 1: It was submitted that the sentencing judge erred in determining that it was unnecessary to make a finding of special circumstances, having regard to the applicant’s age, health, lack of experience in prison and risk of institutionalisation ([70]). All judges dismissed the first ground of appeal. Bathurst CJ held that the sentencing judge did not err in reaching her conclusion that the non-parole period was the minimum period of incarceration appropriate, as she took into account the applicant’s age, the nature of the case and the applicant’s subjective circumstances ([77]). Fullerton J added that the sentencing judge was justified in declining to make a finding of special circumstances, as she gave "extensive consideration" to matters relevant to determining the minimum period of incarceration, including, but not limited to, the objective gravity of the totality of the offending, and the lack of evidence of genuine remorse or prospects of rehabilitation ([125]). Similarly, Bellew J found that just because a sentence may have the practical effect of amounting to a sentence of life imprisonment, it does not mean that a sentencing judge has erred. The objective seriousness of an offence is a fundamental principle that should be reflected in a sentence, even where adherence to such a principle may impose a life sentence on an offender of middle to advanced age ([215]).
Appeal Ground 2: Bathurst CJ dissented on the second ground of appeal. His Honour found that the indicative sentence of 40 years and 6 months imposed after a discount for the guilty plea was extremely high. He noted that the sentence appeared to be inconsistent with legal principle in sentencing for this type of offence ([112]). Further, he found that the aggregate sentence was substantially imposed for the murder offence, and as a consequence, it was manifestly excessive and should be set aside ([114]-[115]). As this was a dissenting judgment, it was not necessary for his Honour to re-sentence the applicant ([116]).
Fullerton and Bellew JJ, on the other hand, dismissed the second ground of appeal. After taking into account the sentencing judge’s sentencing remarks and giving due weight to "the applicant’s calculated and brazen determination to kill his wife in an act of callous and unbridled revenge", Fullerton J was not satisfied that the aggregate sentence was "unreasonably or plainly unjust" ([132]-[133]). Before concluding that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable or unjust, Bellew J set out the circumstances of the offending which indicated that it was towards the very top of the range:
•
The commission of the offences in the context of domestic violence, and in the context of a breach of an ADVO, were circumstances which called for the need for specific and general deterrence, and denunciation ([261]);
•
Another important part of the background to the offending was the fact that the applicant made a number of statements prior to the offending in which he expressed an intention to kill the deceased ([262]);
•
The applicant’s planning of the murder was significant - he travelled a considerable distance to the victim’s home, and arrived in the early morning at a time when he knew that she would likely be asleep ([263]-]264]);
•
The offending was in the nature of an execution and involved gratuitous cruelty towards the victim ([265]).
•
The offending was in breach of the ADVO and the applicant’s conditions of bail ([266]).
Amante v R [2020] NSWCCA 34 (11 March 2020) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Photographic evidence’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Destroying or damaging property x 1 (domestic violence offence).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: This is an application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed by Colefax DCJ in R v Amante [2019] NSWDC 222. The applicant, whilst under the influence of ice, threatened his estranged partner and subsequently set fire to her Department of Housing unit causing significant damage, potential danger and hardship to other residents ([11]). The applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on two grounds. Firstly, he contended that the sentencing judge erred in taking "judicial notice" of the fact that the fire in the roof cavity "posed a serious structural risk to the integrity of the building". Secondly, he alleged error in the way in which the sentencing judge dealt with the applicant’s mental health issues, specifically in finding that they were "largely untreated and largely unresolved".
Held: The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.
Beech-Jones J acknowledged the sentencing judge’s remarks at [46]-[48]. The applicant had a dysfunctional upbringing, which reduced his moral culpability. Moreover, he was genuinely remorseful and his rehabilitation prospects were found to be reasonable provided that he "receive appropriate treatment". The sentencing judge also found special circumstances and varied the statutory ratio accordingly.
The first ground was a challenge to the factual finding of the sentencing judge. The applicant contended that the sentencing judge erred in taking judicial notice of the fact that the spread of the fire to the roof cavity "posed a serious structural risk to the integrity of the building". The applicant argued that he had found this fact to be an aggravating factor, and as such was required to be satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant warned of the dangers of relying on photographic evidence, and contended that it was "somewhat remarkable" that the sentencing judge purported to take judicial notice of the structural integrity of the building, whilst also noting the lack of expert evidence in relation to the fire ([52]). N Adams J (Payne JA concurring) found that Ground 1 had not been established. She treated Ground 1 as a challenge to the factual conclusion of the sentencing judge and in submissions counsel for the applicant accepted that the relevant test was whether the conclusion was open to His Honour (R v O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397) [55]. Beech-Jones J agreed the matter should be considered by reference to evidence available to support His Honour’s conclusion. Her Honour found that the sentencing judge drew an inference that was open to him based on both the agreed facts that the fire went into the roof void, as well as the photographic evidence which showed that the wooden beams in the roof were burnt ([62]). She was also not satisfied that the sentencing judge found the fact as an aggravating factor, as he had not stated anything to this effect ([64]).
In relation to the second ground, it was submitted that his Honour denied the applicant procedural fairness by finding that considerations of specific deterrence and the need to protect the community were "fully engaged" in the applicant’s case because of his "largely untreated and largely unresolved" mental health issues. The applicant submitted that his mental health issues were being treated with medication and that his major depressive disorder was in remission. Ground 2 was also not established. N Adams J (Payne JA and Beech-Jones J concurring) found that it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the applicant’s mental health issues were unresolved, given his poor history ([82]-[83]). This case is a "classic example" of how sentencing judges may be required to make "individualised discretionary decisions" based on the available material. The sentencing judge "ameliorated the sentence on the basis that no rational person would react to a break-up by setting fire to their ex partner’s house threatening the lives of other people", however, specific deterrence became a relevant consideration as the applicant’s mental health and drug issues was found to have led him to commit the offence ([85]).
Consequently, the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
Elwood v R [2019] NSWCCA 315 (20 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of jealous, obsessive and stalking behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People with intellectual disability’
Offences: Sexual intercourse without consent; Contravene Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (‘ADVO’)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the sexual offence.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his approach to the applicant’s intellectual disability.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by failing to give effect to his findings of special circumstances in relation to the overall effective sentence.
4.
The sentence is manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim had been in a relationship for six years and lived with the applicant’s parents (as they were only 18 and 20 years old respectively). At the time of the offending, the applicant was subject to an ADVO not to assault, molest, harass, threaten or otherwise interfere with his partner. The order did not prohibit contact or cohabitation with her. The applicant and victim were having consensual intercourse when the applicant started touching the victim’s bottom without her consent. He then inserted his finger into her anus with force, causing the victim to scream so loudly that the applicant’s mother called out to them. The applicant responded by pushing the victim away from him with both fists. The victim immediately complained to the applicant’s mother and asked her to notify the police.
The applicant plead guilty and was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years, after the sentencing judge took into account an offence of common assault on a Form 1.
Judgment: The court granted leave and allowed the appeal, upholding Ground 3, and resentenced the applicant to three years and two months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and eight months. The court found that the sentencing judge was satisfied that a number of circumstances, both personal to the applicant (such as his compromised level of cognitive functioning) and features of the sentencing process itself, supported a finding of special circumstances [50]. Having made such a finding, the sentencing judge was required to determine the extent or the degree to which the statutory ratio should be reduced, both in the appointment of the aggregate sentence and after accumulation in the ultimate sentencing order [54]. Where a finding of special circumstances is not based solely on the fact of accumulation (as occurred in this case), the sentencing judge is required to carry that finding into effect on accumulation or give an explanation for why it was not done [61]. The court accepted the applicant’s contention that the judge’s discretion miscarried because the sentencing judge did not indicate that he intended that the effective non-parole period would not reflect the finding of special circumstances that had been given effect to in the appointment of the aggregate sentence [55].
While the court endorsed the sentencing judge’s finding that there was an attenuation of the applicant’s moral culpability for the sexual offending by reason of his compromised level of intellectual functioning, the court also found that the applicant was, for that reason, an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence [67]. Furthermore, the court accepted that the applicant had been convicted of multiple charges of assault and offences of stalk and intimidate in a domestic context, both as a juvenile and as an adult, none of which attracted a sentence of imprisonment [28].
The court rejected Ground 1, finding that the sentencing judge made the correct assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence (in the low and middle range) [40], [41]. The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that no sentencing error was committed because the sentencing judge failed to make mention of the impact of the applicant’s intellectual or cognitive functioning on the question of either general or specific deterrence [48]. Based on its finding in regards to Ground 3, the court found it unnecessary to consider Ground 4.
Ross, Christopher v R [2019] NSWCCA 314 (20 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercion’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Specific considerations’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear or physical or mental harm x 2; aggravated detain for advantage x 1; common assault x 1; influence witness x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man was sentenced with respect to 5 offences involving domestic violence against his female de facto partner (complainant), including one offence of seeking to dissuade her from giving truthful evidence. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 6 years’ 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years 8 months. The applicant and complainant had known each other since childhood, and their relationship commenced in 2016. At that stage, the complainant had 5 children living with her. The Department of Community Services took the children into care as both parties were using drugs. The relationship soon became dysfunctional with constant arguments and pushing and shoving by each party.
The applicant had intimidated the complainant on several occasions by making threats to kill. One incident involved the use of a syringe to intimidate, and another involved the complainant threatening to take her own life ([5]-[7]). The applicant also detained the complainant without her consent with an intention to obtain an advantage, namely psychological satisfaction, and caused actual bodily harm ([10]]-[11]). On another occasion, the applicant pushed the complainant, causing her to fell particularly frightened ([13]). Whilst the applicant was shopping, the complainant ran to a nearby police station, claiming to have been kept hostage by him and fearful for her life. He was later arrested, charged and refused bail. The police also gave an ADVO for the complainant’s protection, prohibiting the applicant from contacting her. While in custody, the applicant contacted the complainant and pressured her to give false evidence by making a statutory declaration which described her allegations as false and misleading ([17]). She did so, and the applicant was released on bail. He continued to commit further offences against the complainant. He was arrested again and charged with contravening the ADVO, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault, intentionally choking a person with recklessness, and escaping police custody ([18]-[19]).
Grounds: The aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive
Held: The application for leave to appeal against the aggregate sentence was granted; the appeal was dismissed. The Appeal Court was unable to conclude that the sentencing judge failed to apply the relevant principles such that there was an error in the sentence imposed ([42]-[45]). The sentence was not manifestly excessive ([56]).
It was submitted inter alia that the sentence did not reflect the factual findings made by the judge as to his disadvantaged background and the genesis of his drug dependency ([2]).
The sentencing judge emphasised the need for the court to provide full protection to domestic violence victims, because such conduct involves a violation of trust and the use of physical strength to control and subordinate the other party to an intimate relationship ([28]). The sentencing judge found that the offence of influencing a witness involved overtones of domestic violence in that the applicant, although in custody, continued "to exert the power, influence and control that he had established over the complainant, as a result of her dependency upon him" ([34]).
The applicant’s subjective circumstances included that: his father was murdered, he grew up in a household which involved alcohol and drug use, and violence, and he began using drugs and alcohol himself at an early age ([40]). The sentencing judge noted that although his deprived upbringing and early onset of drug and alcohol abuse served to ameliorate his level of moral culpability, he nevertheless had a substantial level of moral culpability ([41]). The Appeal Court considered cases like R v Fernando and Bugmy v The Queen, which discussed the role of alcohol abuse and alcohol-fuelled violence in Aboriginal communities. Wood J in Fernando recognised that both of these problems are endemic in some Aboriginal communities, and considered that where an offender's abuse of alcohol is a reflection of the environment in which he or she was raised, it should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. In Munda, the Court addressed the tension between accepting a reduction in moral culpability due to the offender’s disadvantaged background, and the need to provide the victim of violence with "such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide."
Wood v R [2019] NSWCCA 94 (19 December 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Absence of planning’ – ‘Apprehended violence order’ – ‘Gratuitous cruelty’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1; Contravention of an Apprehended Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought leave on the following grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in having regard to the applicant’s record of previous convictions as a matter that aggravated the offence;
•
The judge erred in taking into account the fact that the applicant was on conditional liberty as a factor that aggravated the offence;
•
The judge erred in failing to have regard to the lack of planning in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence;
•
The judge erred in failing to take into account the applicant’s disadvantaged background as a factor relevant to his moral culpability;
•
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s intoxication aggravated the applicant’s offending;
•
The judge erred in find that the Crown had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s offending involved gratuitous cruelty; and
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive. [5]
The applicant and the deceased had been in an ‘on again/off again relationship’ characterised by domestic violence for three years [9]. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a non-parole period of 19 years 1 month with a balance of term of 6 years and 5 months. The applicant violently killed the deceased, stabbing her with a knife, when both were intoxicated, the applicant having come home an hour earlier than the deceased. At the time of the murder he was subject to a s 20(1)(b) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) recognisance for 18 months, commencing 17 May 2017 and expiring 16 November 2018 and a s 9 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act bond for 18 months, commencing 17 May 2017 and expiring 16 November 2018.
Decision and reasoning: The application for leave to appeal was granted in respect of grounds 3 and 6, the appeal allowed substituting a sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
Regarding the third ground, the court found that the absence of planning is a ‘consideration which goes to the objective seriousness of the offending and was wrongly taken into account by the sentencing judge when considering the applicant’s subjective case’ [108]. This ground of appeal was made out.
Hoeben CJ held that the sixth ground was made out as on the evidence available to the sentencing judge it was not possible to conclude that the injuries were inflicted at a time other than of the killing.
Moore v R [2019] NSWCCA 264 (4 November 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical harm and violence -threats to kill’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm with intent x 1; Detain with intent to obtain an advantage and immediately beforehand occasion actual bodily harm x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought leave to appeal on grounds that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the counts, failed to accurately assess the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending and the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive (12 years imprisonment, non-parole period 9 years). The accused ‘ambushed his ex-partner outside her house, beating her around the head and body with an improvised metal pole. He then forced the victim into her own car, which he proceeded to drive around to [surrounding suburbs], all the while making threats to kill himself, or to kill them both’. When the victim tried to escape the applicant pulled her back into the car by her hair. The victim was trapped in the car for four hours before the applicant crashed into a telephone pole.
Grounds of appeal:
•
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the objective seriousness of the counts;
•
The judge failed to accurately assess the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation and likelihood of reoffending;
•
The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Held:
Ground 1: The sentencing judge did not err in his assessment of the objective seriousness of Count 1 because the seriousness of the offence was increased by factors including planning, duration, brutality, infliction of pain, lack of provocation, and that it occurred in a context of a domestic relationship. In relation to Count 2, it was found that the magistrate did not err in his assessment as the offence occurred spontaneously.
Ground 2: The court found that it was open on the evidence for the judge to approach the issues relating to the establishment of mitigating factors in the way he did.
Ground 3: ‘Given the gravity of the applicant’s offending and the findings of the judge as to objective seriousness, with full recognition of the mitigating factors that stood in the applicant’s favour’, Hulme J was of the view that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive
Majzoub v Regina [2019] NSWCCA 94 (8 May 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accumulation of sentence’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Obstruct justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: The applicant was arraigned on an indictment containing 17 counts. Counts 1 to 11 charged various offences of violence and of detaining for advantage (including common assault); while counts 12 to 15 alleged that the applicant attempted to influence the complainant not to give evidence against him.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: Norton DCJ sentenced the accused to an aggregate term of imprisonment for 12 years with a non-parole period of 9 years. That sentence was partly accumulated upon an aggregate sentence for other offences imposed on him by Bennett DCJ. The applicant pleaded guilty to offences, such as common assault and attempting to influence the complainant not to give evidence made directly by him and through one of his sisters. He was found guilty of possession of an offensive weapon with intent, reckless wounding, two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and two counts of detaining for advantage.
The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. He sought a lesser non-parole period, and argued that there should be greater measure of concurrency in the indicative sentences ([14]). Although the application was outside the limitation period, there was no objection by the Crown that an extension of time should be granted ([6]).
Issue: Whether, in any event, the aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but would dismiss the appeal.
Personal circumstances:
The applicant was born in Lebanon, his father used to assault his mother under the influence of alcohol, he left school in year 8 and had very little employment since. He began to use drugs at the age of 14. At the time of his arrest, he was using ice on a daily basis ([11]). Notably, the applicant had an extensive criminal history, including drug offences, stalking and intimidating and contravening apprehended violence orders. The present offences were committed while he was on some kind of conditional liberty ([10]).
Non-parole period:
The Court noted that Norton DCJ needed to find special circumstances before departing from the 9 year non-parole period that was the statutory norm in accordance with section 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). It was open her Honour to decline to make a finding of special circumstances ([16]-[18]).
Accumulation/concurrence:
The Crown noted that the total of the indicative sentences for the present offences was 29 years and 10 months, so that the aggregate sentence of 12 years would demonstrate a substantial measure of concurrence. The Court held that Norton DCJ’s determination in that respect, and her decision as to the measure of the accumulation of the aggregate sentence upon the sentence imposed by Bennett DCJ, demonstrated an exercise of discretion consistent with established principle ([23]).
Manifestly excessive:
A sentence will only be manifestly excessive if it is ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’ ([25]). The Court stated that the offences constituted a pattern of domestic violence of considerable gravity, and noted the seriousness of domestic violence and the need for denunciatory and deterrent sentences. Their Honours found that Norton DCJ fairly described the applicant’s subjective case as ‘far from compelling’, and held that the aggregate sentence, including the non-parole period, were well within the legitimate bounds of the exercise of her discretion. Therefore, the sentence was not shown to be unreasonable or plainly unjust ([28]-[29]).
SC v R [2019] NSWCCA 25 (15 February 2019) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of trust’ – ‘Children’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Nine counts, including assault occasioning actual bodily harm, sexual intercourse without consent and armed with intent to intimidate.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were married with three children. The applicant was tried by a jury on nine counts, which included various sex offences and assaults. The complainant alleged that the applicant had punched her in the face and mouth, forcibly held her down and raped her, forced anal intercourse on two instances, pushed her head against a laundry wall, threw her out of a door, and grabbed a knife and threatened physical harm. The jury found the applicant guilty on Counts 6, 7 and 8 and not guilty on Counts 1-5 and 9. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months ([92]).
Issues: The appellant sought leave to appeal against the conviction on the grounds that (1) there was a miscarriage of justice as the trial judge failed to discharge the jury following the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence (ground 1); and (2) the verdict in respect of Count 6 was inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on Counts 1-5 and 9, and could not otherwise be supported by the evidence at trial (ground 2). The appellant further sought leave to appeal against the sentence on the grounds that (1) there was an error by the sentencing judge in the assessment of the gravity of Count 6 (ground 3); and (2) the indicative sentences for Counts 6, 7 and 8 were excessive and that the level of accumulation was too great (ground 4).
Decision and reasoning: The Court granted leave to appeal against the conviction and sentence. Ground 1 related to an application to discharge the jury on the basis that the jury may have heard the word ‘pistol’. The trial judge refused to discharge the jury and directed them at [78]. The Court held that the trial judge was entitled to assume that the jury understood and complied with his direction. Their Honours were not satisfied that there was any miscarriage of justice ([85]). As to ground 2, the Court held that there was no inconsistency between the jury’s verdicts of not guilty and guilty ([69]). With respect to ground 3, their Honours held that the sentencing judge did not err in finding the offending in Count 6 to be ‘above the mid-range’, and that the indicative sentence for Count 6 was not excessive ([109]). In order to establish ground 4, the applicant was required to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust ([111]). The Court did not regard any of the indicative sentences as excessive, having regard to the sentencing judge’s findings and assessment of their seriousness. All three counts involved a grave breach of trust and were aggravated by having occurred in the complainant’s home. Count 7 was further aggravated by having been committed in the presence of their eldest child ([112]).
Viavattene v R [2018] NSWCCA 197 (5 September 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Bail’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm x 9; Knowingly contravene an apprehended violence order x 1; Using a carriage service in a manner that was menacing, harassing or offensive x 4.
Appeal type: An application pursuant to s 49 of the Bail Act 2013 NSW for release on bail pending the hearing of an appeal to the District Court against convictions recorded in, and sentences imposed by, the Local Court.
Facts: The applicant applied for release on bail pending the hearing of an appeal to the District Court against convictions recorded in, and sentences imposed by, the Local Court. The applicant was charged with nine offences of stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm, one charge of knowingly contravening an apprehended violence order and four charges of using a carriage service in a manner that was menacing, harassing or offensive.
Issues: Whether bail should be ordered.
Decision and reasoning: Bail was refused as the Court was not satisfied that cause was established by the applicant. At the time of sentencing, the applicant was 49 years old. He also had health difficulties and family responsibilities. However, the Court noted that the evidence led by the prosecution, his prior criminal record and the Presiding Magistrate’s comments suggested that he was a substantial menace to the community. Evidence of the difficulties that the applicant was experiencing in custody was inadequate ([27]). His Honour nevertheless accepted that the applicant’s family was experiencing hardship as a result of his absence, and that he was experiencing some problems in custody. To the extent that the matters relevant to unacceptable risks can inform whether a show cause was established, the Court noted that there was not any proper bail proposal put forward to the Court which would alleviate the risks to the various persons who experienced the applicant’s behaviour in previous years.
Suksa-Ngacharoen v Regina [2018] NSWCCA 142 (10 August 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Concurrent sentences’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm by the explosion of a substance x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim were in a relationship. In 2013, the applicant was charged with common assault and an apprehended domestic violence order (‘ADVO’) was imposed upon him. In 2014, the applicant doused the victim with methylated spirits and set her alight.
District Judge Syme imposed a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years and 3 months. The applicant was also sentenced to: 18 months’ imprisonment for the charge of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order; seven months’ imprisonment for breach of bond in relation to the charge of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order; and three months’ imprisonment for breach of bond in relation to the charge of common assault.
Issues: Appeal against sentence on 7 grounds.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Leeming JA and Bellew J agreed with Wilson J’s reasoning with respect to grounds 1-6. However, their Honours held that ground 7 (the sentence was manifestly excessive) was established. The applicant had participated in courses, had expressed remorse, had not used drugs in custody, had no other criminal records, and experienced language and cultural difficulties in custody owing to his Thai heritage. Whilst these factors did not detract from the objective seriousness of the offending, they suggested that there was an unarticulated error of principle on the part of the sentencing judge. Their Honours quashed the sentence and imposed a total sentence of 17 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years.
Wilson J held that the appeal should be dismissed. Her Honour dismissed ground 4 (failure to properly assess the applicant’s evidence of remorse) on the basis that the applicant had not made reparation and blamed his drug use for the commission of the crime. Accordingly, Wilson J considered that the applicant’s expression of remorse was no more than ‘the often ritual incantation’, easily uttered, whether sincerely or otherwise ([116]).
Her Honour dismissed ground 6 (error by partly accumulating the sentence for the substantive offence on the related offence of contravene ADVO) on the basis that offences committed in breach of an ADVO and the offence of breaching an ADVO, involved separate and distinct criminality which warranted the imposition of distinct sentences for each offence ([131]). Wilson J said at [132]:
‘The criminality of breaching an ADVO rests in the complete disregard for an order of a court, conduct which has the practical effect of undermining the authority of the courts, and preventing the courts from extending effective protection to persons at risk of harm from another. The legislative intent of the scheme for apprehended domestic violence orders is to permit a court to restrain the conduct of an individual who poses a risk to a person with whom he or she is or was in a domestic relationship… Conduct which involves deliberate disobedience of a court order must be treated as serious, and should ordinarily be separately punished from any offence that occurs at the same time, always having regard to the requirements of the totality principle as set out in Pearce v The Queen (1989) 194 CLR 610.’
Her Honour disagreed with the majority with respect to appeal ground 7. The applicant's crime was extremely serious, and the consequences for the victim were devastating and long-term. The gravity of the crime warranted a stern sentence representing condign punishment. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive ([145]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Al-Zuhairi [2018] NSWCCA 151 (27 July 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victims and witnesses’ – ‘Victim experiences of court processes’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1
Appeal type: Appeal on the case stated; Appeal against acquittal
Facts: The respondent was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for assaulting the brother of his ex-partner (the complainant). The complainant’s evidence-in-chief was a recorded statement pursuant to s 289F(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (NSW). The recording was not tendered in evidence. The transcript did not set out the content of the recorded statement.
On appeal, Colefax SC DCJ held that the recorded statement was required to be tendered as an exhibit. He set aside the respondent’s conviction.
Issues: Whether, in a proceeding for a ‘domestic violence offence’, a recorded statement by a complainant must be formally tendered in the Local Court for the contents of the recorded statement to be put into evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court of Appeal (Payne JA, Hulme and Fagan JJ) quashed the orders made by the District Court, and remitted the matter to the District Court for re-hearing. The Court held that the playing of the recording in the Local Court was sufficient to render it evidence for the purpose of an appeal to the District Court.
The significance of the decision is that recorded statements given by complainants in domestic violence offences can be accepted as evidence as if the contents were given by the complainant in person, notwithstanding that the contents were not recorded on the Local Court transcript or admitted formally as an exhibit.
R v Patsan [2018] NSWCCA 129 (29 June 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Dynamics of domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Recklessly causing grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant sought an extension of time for leave to appeal against a sentence of 2 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 4 months, for recklessly causing grievous bodily harm to which he pleaded guilty. A further charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm was taken into account in the sentence.
Issue: The applicant sought to appeal against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court was not persuaded that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust, and consequently, refused leave to appeal against the sentence ([47]-[48]). Importantly, the Court acknowledged the special dynamics of domestic violence. Their Honours rejected the applicant’s submission that the sentencing judge used him as a scapegoat for the prevalence of domestic violence offences. ‘While every sentence imposed must have regard to all the circumstances particular to the specific case, individualised justice does not require sentencing judges to ignore patterns of behaviour which are repeated all too frequently before them’. In most cases, the conduct will involve an attack by a male who is in a position to inflict considerable harm to his victim because of his superior physical strength, and where there is no real prospect of spontaneous physical retaliation because of the disparity between their respective strengths ([39]-[40]).
Glynn Kaderavek v R [2018] NSWCCA 92 (11 May 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault x 1; Recklessly causing grievous bodily harm x 1; Perverting the course of justice x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant lived together and had two children. The assault charge occurred when the applicant choked the victim and chased her around the backyard with a wooden stick. The grievous bodily harm charge occurred when the applicant punched the victim, breaking her jaw. The offender then smashed walls with a tow bar and broke belongings in the house. The offender gave a false statement to police alleging that there was a home invasion ([8]).
The chronology of sentencing was ‘unusual’ ([7]). The present offences were committed in August 2013, but the complainant did not report them to the police until July 2014 because of emotional abuse from the applicant ([8]). In March 2014, the applicant committed further offences against the complainant and was sentenced for those offences. At the time of sentencing for the present offences, the applicant was still in custody for the March 2014 offences ([7]). The judge made a finding of special circumstances to recognise the applicant’s mental health issues. The sentencing judge stated that he would reduce the non-parole period so that the offender could be appropriately supervised when released into the community ([27]).
The applicant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years. The sentence was ordered to commence on 7 July 2015 ([5]), the date of expiry of the total sentence (non-parole period and the balance of the term) for the March 2014 offences ([7]).
Issues: The applicant argued that the sentencing judge erred in wholly accumulating the sentence on earlier sentences because the judge failed to take into account:
•
a period of pre-sentence custody;
•
the effect of the earlier sentences on the total ratio between the non-parole period and total sentence; and
•
the principle of totality ([6]).
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground was upheld because Hamill J (Beazley P and Schmidt J agreeing) found that the sentence should have commenced on 7 April 2015, the expiry date of the non-parole period for the March 2014 offences. Hamill J dismissed the second and third grounds of appeal because there was no error in wholly accumulating the sentences or the judge’s application of the principle of totality ([23]-[24]).
Hamill J held that the total impact of the sentence negated the judge’s finding of special circumstances. This was because the when the entire period of imprisonment was taken into account, there was no decrease in the non-parole period ([28]).
Hamill J considered that he needed to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, in accordance with Kentwell v The Queen [2014] HCA 37 ([30]). Hamill J imposed the same head sentence. His Honour commenced the sentence on 7 April 2015 and reduced the non-parole period to 4 years and 6 months to reflect the finding of special circumstances ([31]).
Ussher-Clarke v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 61 (13 April 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Impact on consent and disclosure’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Recklessly cause grievous bodily harm x 1; Intending to procure a witness to give false evidence x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant kicked his partner, the complainant, in the abdomen. The complainant was 12 weeks pregnant, and she miscarried the following morning ([10]). There were conflicting opinions given by experts as to the likelihood that the kick could have caused the miscarriage (see [17]-[44]).
The complainant gave statements to the police immediately after the incident indicating that the appellant had kicked her. In the weeks after the incident, the appellant made a number of phone calls to the complainant to encourage her to lie to the police. In a subsequent statement and in her evidence at trial, the complainant claimed that the appellant had not assaulted her ([8]).
The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge in relation to influencing a witness. The applicant was convicted of the recklessly cause grievous bodily harm charge and was sentenced to a head sentence of 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years.
Issues: Whether the conviction was unreasonable and unable to be supported by the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The Court discussed the principles governing granting leave to appeal against conviction ([59]-[60]). The Court noted that the Crown had to prove that the kick was a significant cause of the miscarriage, not that that it was the sole cause ([60]-[61]). The Court concluded that it was open to the jury to accept the experts’ evidence, while conflicting, as supporting the conclusion that the kick caused the miscarriage ([89]).
Diaz v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 33 (14 March 2018) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated kidnapping’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Sexual intercourse without consent x 1; Destroying or damaging property x 4; Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and victim had been in a relationship for approximately 5 months. The assault and destroying property charges were in relation to arguments where the applicant pulled out some of the victim’s hair, and smashed her phone, a vase and a television set ([13]-[15]). The aggravated kidnapping and sexual intercourse without consent charges occurred when the applicant pinned the victim onto a bed ([17]). He digitally penetrated her, became angry about the contents of her Facebook and text messages ([18]) and punched her approximately 20 to 30 times ([19]-[20]). This continued for about 5 hours ([21]). The applicant had a ‘disturbing’ criminal history including two similar domestic violence offences where the applicant detained the victim in her apartment ([28]-[31]). The applicant was on parole for those sentences at the time of this offence ([33]).
The applicant was sentenced to a head sentence of 7 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months ([10]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Acting Justice Hidden at [47] endorsed the trial judge’s characterisation of the manner in which the applicant detained the victim “by instilling fear and control over her… by his conduct, demeanour, words and assault” (at [39]).
It was significant that the offences were committed while the applicant was on parole. The domestic violence context of these offences was also important, with Hidden AJ quoting from Johnson J’s judgement in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 at [86]:
In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important.
Justice Garling added: ‘[in] R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, Wood CJ at CL (with whom Studdert and Bell JJ agreed) said at [41] of violent attacks in domestic settings this:
Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically or otherwise to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth, such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.
Armstrong v R [2017] NSWCCA 323 (15 December 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Conviction’ – ‘Exposing children to violence’ – ‘Humiliation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Assault x 1; Sexual assault x 2; Aggravated sexual assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence in relation to the two counts of aggravated sexual assault.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship. In the presence of the complainant’s son, the appellant punched and bit the complainant, held her down while she was screaming and pushed his fingers into her vagina and anus ([15]).
The prosecution sought to adduce tendency evidence ([8]). CCTV footage showed the appellant dragging the complainant by her hair ([13]). The Crown relied upon the CCTV evidence to argue that the appellant had a tendency to be violent towards the complainant ([8]). The tendency evidence was admitted, and the appellant was found guilty of the two counts of aggravated sexual assault and was sentenced to a head sentence of 8 years and 9 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the tendency evidence) should have been admitted; and whether the sentencing judge erred in determining the objective seriousness of the offences by not taking into account the fact that they were not committed for sexual gratification.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal against sentence was refused. In relation to the appeal against conviction, the Court (Meagher JA, Rothman and Button JJ) stated that tendency evidence need not directly establish the elements of an offence charged, but should make one or more of the facts in issue significantly more likely ([20]). The Court at [19] quoted the majority of the High Court in Hughes v The Queen [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017) at [40]:
The test posed by s 97(1)(b) [of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)] is as stated in Ford [(2009) 201 A Crim R 451 at [125]]: ‘the disputed evidence should make more likely, to a significant extent, the facts that make up the elements of the offence charged’. The only qualification to this is that it is not necessary that the disputed evidence has this effect by itself. It is sufficient if the disputed evidence together with other evidence makes significantly more likely any facts making up the elements of the offence charged. [emphasis in original]
Since the appellant’s case was that he was acting in self-defence, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the CCTV footage. The footage was sufficiently probative of the appellant’s propensity to act violently towards the complainant ([21]).
In relation to the appeal against sentence, the Court held that the trial judge did not err, Meagher JA stated that: ‘there is nothing to commend the proposition that engaging in sexual intercourse without consent to gratify oneself is in any sense more objectionable than doing so to humiliate and physically dominate another’ ([35]). Thus, the trial judge did not err in measuring the objective seriousness of the offence.
R v Evans [2017] NSWCCA 281 (21 November 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating circumstances: breach of bail and protection order’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Fair hearing’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Power and control’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Text messages’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Indecent assault x 1; Common assault x 2; intentionally destroy property x 1; Contravene apprehended domestic violence order x 1; Do act with intent to influence witness x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a relationship and had three children ([10]). The common assault charges occurred when the applicant grabbed the complainant’s throat and forced her against the wall, onto the bed and onto the ground ([11]-[14], [22]-[24]). The indecent assault charge occurred when the applicant forced her onto the bed and placed his fingers in her vagina ([15]-[18]). The ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge occurred when the applicant asked the complainant over text message to drop the charges on at least 16 occasions ([33]). For example, one of the text messages said, ‘you will be left with the kids full time with no break so I couldn’t handily [sic] going away so that’s why I want you to drop the charges’ ([33]).
After a plea of guilty, the applicant received a head sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months ([3]). For the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, the applicant was sentenced to 3 years and 2 months’ imprisonment ([4]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Adamson J, with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Davies J agreed, held that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, Adamson J at [38] quoted the sentencing judge:
[the charge] reveals a course of conduct that I regard as being particularly serious. It was repetitive and was clearly designed to emotionally manipulate and blackmail the complainant to discontinue the charges against him. It was also conduct that was in breach of his bail conditions as well as another court order, namely an interim ADVO. These are aggravating features.
Adamson J similarly commented at [46] on the importance of the charge (s 323(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)) in the context of domestic violence offences:
It is within the common experience of courts that many charges of domestic violence cannot be prosecuted because the defendant manages to persuade the complainant, including by threatening violence, not to give evidence against him. Conduct of this nature against complainants is inimical to the interests of justice and the administration of justice. The perpetrators of domestic violence may, by committing offences under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, effectively immunise themselves from prosecution.
However, his Honour considered that the text messages were not as serious compared to other possible offences under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, such as bribing a witness or threatening violence (see [48]-[51]). Therefore, the sentence of 3 years and 2 months was manifestly excessive, and led to the head sentence being manifestly excessive ([51]).
The applicant was re-sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 3 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years ([61]). On the ‘do act with intent to influence witness’ charge, the applicant was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment (after applying the 20% reduction for his plea of guilty) ([59]).
DPP v Darcy-Shillingsworth [2017] NSWCCA 224 (13 September 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggregate sentence’ – ‘Community interest’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Suspending an aggregate sentence’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Reckless wounding x 1; kidnapping x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; reckless grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was sentenced to 150 hours of community service for reckless wounding, and an aggregate sentence of 21 months imprisonment, which was suspended upon the offender entering into an 18 month good behaviour bond for assault occasioning actual bodily harm and recklessly causing grievous bodily harm. The assaults were committed against the respondent’s partner, with whom he had 3 children, and her father. The respondent, his partner and their children lived in a small town with a largely Aboriginal population.
The respondent struck his partner, causing her to fall to the ground (Count 1). Later that evening, he drove her around the neighbourhood doing burnouts in his vehicle (Count 2). The respondent also hit her in the face while she was still in the car, pulled her from the car and hit her again, knocking her to the ground (Count 3). He also punched his partner’s father a few times (Count 4).
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether to allow the appeal against the sentences.
Held: The Court held that the sentences imposed did not adequately reflect the community interest in general deterrence ([85]). Their Honours allowed the appeal against the sentences, and resentenced the respondent to an aggregate sentence comprising a non-parole period of 15 months, with a balance of term of 15 months, giving a sentence of 2 years and 6 months.
General deterrence is a matter of some importance in cases of domestic violence ([82]-[85]). Citing The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, the Court noted that ‘…current sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. This statement has been understood by the Court as reflecting the current response of the criminal law in relation to domestic violence as requiring ‘rigorous and demanding consequences for perpetrators for the purpose of protecting partners, family members and the wider community’ ([83]-[84], see also Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 at [78]).
Further, it did not appear on the evidence that the respondent expressed any remorse in relation to his attack on his de facto partner. In the absence of any finding of remorse or significant insight into the behaviour which led to the offending, specific deterrence should have been a key sentencing consideration ([82]). The violence to his partner occurred in a remote community which was not close to any police presence. Importantly, Count 3 took place in the presence of his partner’s father, who tried to stop the attack. The Court held that her father did not escalate the violence or take the law into his own hands. He simply warned that he was calling the police. This act ought to have caused the respondent to come to his senses and cease the violent behaviour, but instead he started to attack the victim’s father, causing grievous bodily harm. Therefore, in light of the statutory purposes of sentencing and the role of criminal law in redressing violence of this nature, the Court held that offences of such gravity cannot be dealt with as leniently as was done in this case ([107]-[108]).
Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 (28 June 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Escalation of violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 3; Assault x 4; Breaking and entering x 1; Contravening domestic violence order x 4.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a relationship since 2013 ([12]). The applicant committed a series of assaults, including striking the complainant with his hands ([16]) and car keys ([13]), touching her with a hot pipe used to smoke ice ([27]), and choking her, once until she was nearly unconscious ([14], [20], [25]). The applicant also entered the home of the complainant’s friend, assaulted her and stole her mobile phone ([34]). The applicant pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years ([6]).
Issues: The applicant appealed on three grounds: first, that the judge erred in finding that the offending was in the mid-range of objective seriousness; second, that the sentence accorded insufficient weight to the prospects of rehabilitation; and third, that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([9]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Justice Johnson briefly dismissed the first and second grounds of appeal ([60, [68]). On the third ground, His Honour discussed the importance of general and specific deterrence and denunciation in domestic violence cases (see [74]-[80]).
His Honour observed: “It is correct to characterise the Applicant’s course of conduct towards NR as one involving escalating violence. His act of choking NR in Count 4 had the potential for very grave consequences. Although not applicable to the Applicant in this case, it is noteworthy that in the second reading speech in support of the Crimes Amendment (Strangulation) Act 2014, which amended s.37 Crimes Act 1900, the Attorney General, Mr Hazzard, observed that strangulation “is prevalent in domestic violence incidents” (Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014)” [75].
He further noted: “In the context of domestic violence offences, the High Court has observed that it is a longstanding obligation of the State to vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community’s disapproval of that offending and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence: Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at 620 [54].” [79]
The applicant’s regular use of the drug Ice was a relevant factor but not a of itself a mitigating circumstance.[81]
This case concerned repeated offences of escalating violence, in breach of a domestic violence order ([80]). Having regard to these considerations, the sentence was not manifestly excessive ([83]).
Xue v R [2017] NSWCCA 137 (21 June 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Cultural considerations’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Starting point’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to one count of wound with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. The applicant received a discount of 25% for his guilty plea.
The applicant and victim were husband and wife and had been married for 30 years. The witnesses to the incident were the applicant’s son and daughter-in-law. There had been some history of domestic violence. The applicant started accusing the victim of having an affair, and began to violently threaten and assault her with a knife. Their son intervened and drove his mother to the hospital where she was admitted for her injuries. The applicant said that he had argued with his wife and had accused her of having an affair. He also said that it was very shameful for a man if his wife had an affair in Chinese culture.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The applicant submitted that allowing for the 25% discount for an early plea of guilty, the starting point for the sentence must have been 8 years, which in the circumstances was excessive. The applicant also argued that the 4 year non-parole period was above the majority of sentences imposed for this offence.
Held: The appeal against sentence was refused. The applicant’s circumstances at the time of the offending and his genuine belief that the victim may have been having an affair could not justify or ameliorate the seriousness of the offending. The catalyst of domestic violence is often a genuine, albeit irrational, belief of being wronged in some way by the victim. A resort to violence in such circumstances is unjustifiable, even if the offender’s belief is correct. The court regarded the sentencing judge’s remarks about the courts’ and the community’s concern at the level of domestic violence in the community as ‘timely and appropriate’ ([53]).
Further, the Court found that the notional starting point was not manifestly excessive as no evidence was put before the Court to establish that such a starting point was excessive in the circumstances. In considering whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, approaching the case from a hypothetical starting point diverts attention from the question as to whether the sentence actually imposed was unreasonable ([50]). However, where there is no dispute over whether the discount was excessive, justice demands that the focus be on the starting point ([4], see also TYN v R [2009] NSWCCA 146 [33]-[34]).
Hurst v R [2017] NSWCCA 114 (31 May 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Delay’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual violence’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Assault x 2; aggravated detain for advantage x 1; incite another to commit an act of indecency x 1; maliciously inflict grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm x 1; use offensive weapon with intent to commit the indictable offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 1; assault occasioning bodily harm x 1;
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to 9 offences, relating to physical and sexual violence against his then girlfriend (the complainant), with whom he commenced an intimate domestic relationship in 2005. The sentencing judge imposed a total effective sentence of 18 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years. His Honour had regard to the delay in prosecution and noted that the delay was largely due to the complainant’s decision not to proceed against the applicant at the time that the offences occurred.
Issue: The applicant appealed against the sentence on various grounds, including that the sentencing judge erred by failing to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence of aggravated detention for advantage (Ground 1), and that he did not take into account the delay in prosecution and the prejudice suffered by the applicant on sentence (Ground 3).
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal against the sentence, but dismissed the appeal.
Objective seriousness:
The Court was not satisfied that Ground 1 was established on the evidence ([105]-[110]). When a sentencing judge has made it clear from his or her findings that they regard the offence as serious, little more is required ([105]). While he did not expressly determine the objective criminality of the offence of aggravated detain for advantage, he gave due consideration to the nature of the conduct and the circumstances in which it occurred ([109]). Further, the evidence of the applicant’s conduct made a conclusion of significant seriousness self-evident ([109]).
Delay:
Hoeben CJ at CL (with Price and Longergan JJ agreeing) noted that a common aspect of domestic violence related offences is that there may be a considerable delay between the occurrence of the offence and the complaint being made. However such delay should not be held against the victim. It is a direct product of the nature of the offending itself, and it would be incongruous if an offender could gain a benefit from such delay ([132]). Where there is unexplained considerable delay during which there has been steps taken towards rehabilitation, and/or a change of circumstances that increases the hardship brought about by a custodial sentence, it may be appropriate to impose a sentence that would otherwise be considered to fall below the range of an appropriate sentence ([133], see also Hughes v R [2013] NSWCCA 129 at [58]).
The Court noted the significant difference between delay that can be attributed to a police failure to charge and what occurred with the complainant. She was a victim of ongoing domestic violence which involved extremely controlling behaviour, and she chose not to proceed with those charges at the time. It appeared that she did not feel ready and able to address these matters for many years ([138]). The applicant did not make any attempt to rehabilitate in the lengthy period between offending and sentencing. It was open to the sentencing judge to take into account the lack of evidence that the applicant suffered any anxiety as a consequence of concern that he would be prosecuted in connection with any of these matters. His Honour’s further finding that there was no evidence that the applicant had contributed to any delay was ‘somewhat generous’ since the applicant could have brought these matters to the attention of the authorities at any time after they occurred ([140]).
Further, there was no evidence that the delay in the proceedings caused the applicant increased hardship. Even if there were, this ground of appeal was founded entirely upon the apportionment of weight to a particular sentencing factor in the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion. In those circumstances, it is well established that matters of weight will only rarely justify the intervention of the Court. Circumstances warranting the Court’s intervention have not been demonstrated in this case ([141]).
Vaiusu v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 71 (5 April 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Ex tempore judgement’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Perpetrator victim of domestic violence’ – ‘Subjective circumstances’
Charges: Wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the appellant’s brother in law. The victim had hit the appellant’s sister, apparently accidentally, in a scuffle outside a nightclub. The appellant’s sister told her that the victim had hit her, but she did not tell her that it was an accident. The appellant followed the victim to a train station and stabbed him in the neck with a broken bottle ([7]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years and 3 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 1 year and 2 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to take sufficient account of her background as a victim of domestic violence by her stepfather growing up ([23]). It was also submitted that the appellant was subject to domestic violence by her husband, whose death she was still mourning at the time of the offending ([24]). Further, the trial judge made no mention of the fact that her daughter would be left without a parent if the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment ([26]).
The Court of Appeal (Bathurst CJ, R A Hulme and Beech-Jones JJ) emphasised that a trial judge cannot carefully consider their remarks while delivering an ex tempore judgement. If a trial judge does not mention a particular factor, that does not mean that they have not had regard to it ([31]). Even though the trial judge did not specifically mention the factors raised by the appellant, it was evident that the trial judge adopted a sympathetic approach to sentencing while having regard to the maximum sentence and current sentencing practices ([36]-[38]).
McIlwraith v R [2017] NSWCCA 13 (22 February 2017) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Intimidation’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Specific intent’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Numerous charges, including aggravated breaking etc into any house etc and committing serious indictable offence under section 112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Case type Appeal against conviction.
Facts: On 18 June 2014, the applicant entered 3 properties, and was arrested and charged with a number of offences alleging breaking and entering, and stealing property. The applicant pleaded guilty to one (Count 5) of 8 counts, and elected to be tried by judge alone. The trial judge acquitted the applicant on Counts 1, 2, 3 and 8, and convicted him on Count 7 (an offence of aggravated break, enter and commit serious indictable offence under section 112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)). The serious indictable offence was one of intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm under section 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
The applicant was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months with respect to Count 5. He was also sentenced to 4 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years with respect to Count 7. The first sentence was wholly concurrent with, and consumed within, the longer second sentence.
The applicant appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in finding that the offence of intimidation under section 13 is not an offence of ‘specific intent’.
Issue: A key question for the Court was whether the offence of intimidation under section 13 is one of ‘specific intent’, and whether the applicant’s intoxication at the time of the offending can be taken into account in determining his guilt.
Held: The Court refused to grant leave to appeal with respect to the challenge to the findings of fact, and otherwise dismissed the appeal against the conviction. It also refused leave to appeal against the sentence imposed in the District Court.
The provisions of Part 11A dealing with intoxication are concerned with circumstances in which a particular state of mind is required and can be viewed as wrongful. A particular state of mind can involve a specific intent to achieve an identified consequence (as in section 13(1) or section 13(3)), matters of which the accused is aware and consequences which he or she knows to be likely ([39]). The question for the Court was whether the offence of intimidation is an offence of specific intent and whether the provisions under Part 11A of Crimes Act regarding intoxication apply to it.
Basten J found that the offence of intimidation under section 13(1) is one of specific intent, and thus subject to the provisions of Part 11A ([39]). Therefore an offender’s intoxication can be taken into account in determining criminal liability. His Honour reached this conclusion by considering the decisions of R v Grant (2002) 55 NSWLR 80 and Harkins v R [2015] NSWCCA 263 ([39]-[42]).
Morgan v R [2016] NSWCCA 298 (16 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Specially aggravated break, enter and commit an indictable offence, namely reckless wounding x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant (both women) lived together with the victim’s two children and had been in an intimate relationship ([4]). The victim and applicant argued, which escalated into a physical confrontation. The victim barricaded herself in a bedroom and picked up her infant child. The applicant broke into the room and stabbed the victim in the back. The applicant continued to chase, hit and choke the victim, and the victim sustained stab wounds to her buttock, arms, wrist and neck ([5]-[8]). The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 6 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal (Ward JA, Bellew J and Hidden AJ) had regard to the applicant’s subjective circumstances, such as the fact that she had experienced domestic violence and sexual abuse as a child, and had been diagnosed with anxiety, depression and borderline personality disorder ([10]-[12]). The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had adequate regard to the subjective circumstances proffered by the applicant ([27]). The victim did not sustain any serious injuries ([16]).
The Court of Appeal remarked that the charge of break and enter was unusual in this case, given that the applicant broke an internal door. This fact made it impossible to find comparable cases ([22], [26]).
Drew v R [2016] NSWCCA 310 (16 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Aggravation’ – ‘Culture considerations’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Vulnerability’ – ‘Worst category’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Initially charged with wound with intent to murder. He entered into a plea of guilty to a charge of wound with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, as well as one count of contravening an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO).
Case type Appeal against decision.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, as well as one count of contravening an ADVO. He was sentenced to 12 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years and 4 months. The sentencing judge made a number of observations, including a statement that the victim was a vulnerable person due to the culture of silence and ostracism of those who complain in relation to acts of violence in the Indigenous community. Her Honour also stated that the offence fell within the worst category of offences of its kind.
The appellant was in a domestic relationship with the victim at the time of the offending. There was a history of domestic violence in the relationship to the extent that an ADVO had been taken out against the appellant. He has a long and varied criminal history which included numerous violent offences against 13 separate victims. 3 of those victims were his domestic partners at the time of the offence, and one was his own son. 9 of those instances involved a weapon.
Issue: The appellant relied on the following grounds of appeal:
•
The judge erred by finding the offending was aggravated due to the victim being Aboriginal and thereby a vulnerable person.
•
The judge erred in the characterisation of the offence as falling within the ‘worst category’.
•
The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal. It made remarks on the need to take special care when making findings of fact about vulnerable victims.
Vulnerability:
A question arose as to whether the sentencing judge was entitled to take into account the serious problem of under-reporting of domestic violence in Indigenous communities due to a culture of ‘silence and ostracism’, and aggravate the offence on that basis ([83]). Her Honour was entitled to note both the high rates of domestic violence, and the vulnerability of women and children in Indigenous communities, but she erred in finding the offence to be aggravated on account of the victim being classified ‘vulnerable’ due to this under-reporting problem ([85], [90]). ‘A Court may not aggravate an offence by taking judicial notice of the fact that some Aboriginal women might be less likely to complain of domestic violence because of a culture of silence and ostracism in their communities’ ([84], see also [1], [8]). No evidence was capable of establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a member of a particular class bearing those characteristics ([90]).
Further, the aggravating factor of vulnerability under section 21A(2)(l) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is only engaged where the victim belongs to a class that is vulnerable because of a common characteristic ([8], [75]-[78]). An ultimate finding of vulnerability of the victim in the more general sense of being under an impaired ability to avoid physical conflict with the appellant or to defend herself in the event of conflict was open as an inference from primary facts ([5]).
Fagan J noted that it was a circumstance of the offence, relevant to determining an appropriate sentence, that because of the victim’s emotional and intimate attachment to the appellant, she was less likely than any other potential victim to avoid him or to put herself out of harm’s way ([7]). The individual vulnerability of the victim was an ‘inescapable conclusion from the evidence’ and had, in practical terms, the same consequence for assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence ([8]).
‘Worst category’:
The use of the phrase ‘worst category’ should be avoided by judges unless it is in the context of imposing the maximum penalty available for that offence ([105]). However, when taking into account the features of the offence, such as the seriousness of the victim’s injuries, the appellant’s earlier threat to the victim, the fact that the offence occurred without regard to the ADVO, the prolonged nature of the attack, the location of the offence (the victim’s home), and the appellant’s intoxication at the time of the offence, it was open to the sentencing judge to classify the objective seriousness of the offence as her Honour did ([106]-[114]). It is not necessary for the injuries to be of the ‘worst type’ for an offence to fall into the ‘worst case’ category. The nature of the offence can bring a case within that category ([107]).
Manifestly excessive:
The sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had a history of violent offending, which included offending during parole periods. The sentencing factors of specific deterrence and community protection meant that no shorter sentence could be warranted in law.
Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284 (7 December 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reasonableness’ – ‘Relevance of past violent conduct’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The female appellant was in a relationship with the deceased, James Polkinghorne, and they had a child together. Evidence was led at trial that the deceased had physically and verbally abused the appellant throughout their relationship. She was unable to leave the relationship and saw seeking help from the police as impossible.
On the 13 May 2012, the appellant went to her parents’ place, against the deceased’s wishes. During the course of the day, there were 80 calls and SMS messages between the appellant and the deceased. These messages and calls were tendered as evidence at trial (recordings were available because the police had been tapping the deceased’s phone in light of his suspected involvement in a previous murder). These messages, while not phrased in terms of ‘killing’ the appellant, were extremely threatening and abusive. The deceased was affected by methylamphetamine.
That night, the deceased went to the home of the appellant’s parents. He was ‘going crazy, screaming and kicking items’. The appellant’s brother called 000. From here, there were some inconsistencies in the accounts of the appellant’s father, brother and the record of interview from the appellant produced after the killing. There was no contention that the appellant was punched and thrown around by the deceased. Both the appellant in her record of interview and her brother at trial said that the deceased yelled, “I’m going to fucking kill her’ and ‘I’ll get youse cunts’. The appellant’s father and brother started fighting with the deceased. The appellant retrieved a knife from inside and stabbed the deceased. After trial by a jury, she was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment wholly suspended.
Issue/s: Whether it was open for the jury to conclude, to the criminal standard of proof, that the fatal stab wound inflicted by the appellant was not a reasonable response to the circumstances as she saw them?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed (McCallum J and RS Hulme AJ in majority, Leeming JA in dissent). In the majority judgment, RS Hulme AJ first held that there was no rational reason for the jury to reject the substance of the evidence before them. This evidence included the terms and tone of what the deceased had said in the phone calls and messages that day. As per His Honour at [163]:
‘Certainly he had not in terms threatened to “kill” the Appellant. However he was powerful, had been violent in the past, had previously attacked the Appellant and on the day in question he was very angry, irrational, and had threatened to seriously hurt her and to come to where the Appellant was, thus providing some opportunity to carry out his threats’.
Further, notwithstanding the inconsistencies, much of the evidence suggested that the appellant and her brother had been in serious danger. Accordingly, RS Hulme AJ concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the appellant believed her act was necessary to defend herself or some other person (see [170]).
Second, His Honour held that the appellant’s response was reasonable. This was in circumstances where the police would have taken time to arrive, the appellant saw substantial disadvantages in calling the police, and it was not obvious that they would be able to overwhelm the deceased. Therefore, it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant had not acted in defence of herself or her brother and father (see [171]-[173]). The appeal was allowed.
McCallum J largely agreed with RS Hulme AJ but provided some additional comments. Her Honour was also unable to accept that the jury could, acting reasonably, have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s conduct was not reasonable in the circumstances as she perceived them at the time of the stabbing (see [93]). Her Honour noted that Leeming JA in dissent had placed emphasis on the objective medical evidence and the evidence of eye witnesses at the confrontation. Acknowledging that it is important to have regard to the whole of the evidence, McCallum J continued:
‘Ultimately, however, the critical issue in this case is the reasonableness of inflicting mortal injury judging that issue by reference to an assessment of the circumstances in that instant as perceived by Ms Silva. While the evidence directly relating to the time of the stabbing is important, that assessment is also critically informed by a close analysis of the circumstances leading up to the fatal confrontation’ (see [94]).
McCallum J’s own assessment was that the appellant could only have seen the deceased’s attack on her that evening as ‘urgent, life-threatening and inescapable’ and that the events in the street could not be divorced from the ‘irrational, menacing rage exhibited by the deceased in his calls to Ms Silva in the period leading up to the time when he confronted her physically’ (see especially [95]-[109]). Her Honour concluded at [110]:
‘The circumstances described in the evidence in this case are the kind in which, more commonly, it is the woman who is killed. In my assessment of the record of the trial, the evidence was not capable of proving beyond reasonable doubt…that Ms Silva’s conduct in fatally stabbing the deceased was not reasonable in the circumstances as she perceived them at the time of the stabbing’.
In dissent, Leeming J was not persuaded that a deep penetrating stab into the deceased’s chest cavity, while he was struggling with two other men, was a reasonable response to the circumstances as the appellant saw them at 9.09pm and it was therefore open to the jury to reach this conclusion (see discussion at [83]). His Honour also noted that the jury had the advantage of seeing the evidence first hand and therefore declined to interfere with the verdict.
See also R v Silva [2015] NSWSC 148 (6 March 2015).
Ngatamariki v R [2016] NSWCCA 155 (9 August 2016) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Note: On 25 September 2018 Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 2.
Case type Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to his partner (the victim), with whom he resided with their 2 children. He was intoxicated at the time of the offending and had a prior conviction for domestic violence towards the victim. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred by having regard to his prior conviction in determining the objective seriousness of the offence, and that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal. The applicant’s offending was extremely serious, and constituted a ‘brutal and violent attack…on an innocent, and largely defenceless, victim’. The Court noted that the sentence imposed required a strong measure of general deterrence ([71]). The trial judge correctly took into account the fact that the offending occurred in the context of a domestic relationship ([72]). Denunciation of, and punishment for, ‘brutal’ and ‘alcohol-fuelled’ conduct in such circumstances is particularly apt ([73]).
Further, the trial judge was found not to have improperly used the applicant’s prior convictions as a factor which aggravated the seriousness of his offending. The domestic relationship between the applicant and victim was relevant to determining the objective seriousness of the offending ([45]). In order to make a complaint of manifest excessiveness, the applicant must demonstrate that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or plainly unjust. The submissions and evidence did not establish that the sentence imposed fell into such a category. In light of the circumstances, the sentence was one that might be regarded as modest ([75]).
Browning v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 147 (17 June 2015) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of an apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditional liberty’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Repeated breaches’ – ‘Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc with intent to burn, maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc with intent to burn, maim, disfigure, disable or do grievous bodily harm, breach of an apprehended domestic violence order x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been married for 30 years but separated in August 2012. The complainant obtained an Apprehended Domestic Violence order (ADVO) against the applicant for 12 months. Notwithstanding this, the applicant breached the order on two occasions. On a subsequent occasion, the applicant doused the complainant in petrol and made a sustained attempt to light her on fire. He was stopped by three teenage boys. The applicant was sentenced to 7.5 years imprisonment for the offence of using an explosive substance or corrosive fluid with intent, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the Court’s finding that the offence of using an explosive substance or corrosive fluid with intent was in the mid-range of seriousness failed to adequately account for the Court’s findings that:
1.
the offence was not pre-meditated but spontaneous;
2.
no significant harm was occasioned to the victim;
3.
the applicant’s attempts to carry out his intended actions were less determined than in other examples of this offence; and
4.
other matters bore on the assessment of the seriousness of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: This ground of appeal was dismissed. Garling J held (Gleeson JA and Johnson J agreeing) that the finding of the sentencing judge that this offence was in the mid-range was, if anything, unduly favourable to the applicant. This was a sustained attempt to set the complainant alight after the applicant had doused her in petrol. The only impediment to his success was the repeated intervention of the teenage men (See [96]-[100] and [3]).
Johnson J made some additional observations at [5]-[8]. His Honour cited with approval Spigelman CJ’s observations regarding apprehended domestic violence orders in John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited v Ryde Local Court [2005] NSWCA 101 at [20]:
‘The legislative scheme is directed to the protection of the community in a direct and immediate sense, rather than through mechanisms such as deterrence. Individuals can obtain protection against actual or threatened acts of personal violence, stalking intimidation and harassment. Apprehended Violence Orders constitute the primary means in this State of asserting the fundamental right to freedom from fear. The objects served by such orders are quite distinct from those that are served by civil adversarial proceedings or proceedings in which an arm of the State seeks to enforce the criminal law’.
His Honour further noted that the applicant was a repeat domestic violence offender. Accordingly, in sentencing for these offences, it was appropriate to have in mind the statement of the Court in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) at [86]:
‘In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important’.
Finally, Johnson J stated:
‘Where a court has made an apprehended domestic violence order to protect a person, and then further orders are made by way of conditional liberty for criminal offences arising from breaches of that order, the commission of another offence, in breach of that conditional liberty, will constitute significant aggravating circumstances: s 21A(2)(j) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. This is especially so where the offence against the protected person is of the very grave character of the s 47 offence in this case, with the offence being committed so soon after the applicant had been given the benefit of conditional liberty by order of the District Court’.
Note: Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced on 25 September 2018 imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
Ahmu v The Queen; DPP v Ahmu [2014] NSWCCA 312 (15 December 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Offender often believes violence is justified’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Vindication of the victim’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Rape x 15, indecent assault x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship and had a two year old son at the time of the offences. At trial, it was alleged by the prosecution that the appellant was sexually predatory, violent and abusive in his relationship with the complainant and that he was a child molester with a sexual interest in children, including his two year old son. The complainant obtained an apprehended violence order against the applicant in 2009 but the relationship resumed in 2010 because she was concerned about the appellant having unsupervised access with the child. The rape and indecent assault offences occurred throughout one night in 2010, in the presence of their two year old son. The complainant, who was pregnant at the time, pleaded with the appellant to stop, but the appellant threatened to kill her and continued regardless. A number of the sexual acts were accompanied by humiliating and degrading conduct. The appellant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed but the Crown appeal against sentence was allowed. The overall sentence demonstrated that the sentencing judge either misapprehended the significance of the standard non-parole period or underestimated the objective seriousness of the offences. Here, the gross, repeated attacks on the complainant occurred over an extended period and were committed by the appellant who understood what he was doing despite his (limited) mental issues and possible intoxication. This, combined with deliberate additional humiliation and a callous indifference to the presence of their son, meant that the objective seriousness of the offence fell within the middle of the range and brought the standard non-parole period into sharp focus as a yardstick: Muldrock v The Queen (See [78]-[79]).
Even in light of the residual discretion of the Court to decline to interfere with the sentence, re-sentencing the appellant to nine years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months was appropriate in the interests of justice. As per Adams J at [83]:
‘In considering the exercise of the residual discretion, it is appropriate in my view to bear in mind - in terms not usually used but implicit in sentencing for offences such as the present - the need to do justice to the victim, so appallingly dealt with, whose vindication is part of the function of the administration of criminal justice. This applies with particular force in cases of so-called domestic violence, where there seems to often be present in offenders a degree of self-justification as if, in some way, the victim (to use the vernacular) had it coming. I do not say that this was specifically the offender's state of mind in the present case but the facts strongly suggest that he thought he had some kind of right to do what he did. This aspect of domestic violence emphasises the importance, to my mind, of general deterrence, as well as the protection of the community, especially women, who are far too often the victims of this attitude. These considerations also underline the importance of denunciation’.
Pasoski v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 309 (15 December 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Context evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2, sexual assault x 5.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant lived together with their daughters and were in a relationship since 2003. In November 2010, the applicant physically assaulted the complainant in their home on two occasions, by kicking her in the legs, and slapping her face, causing her to fall (see [13]). The sexual assault charges were alleged to have occurred on one night, where the applicant had vaginal penile intercourse five times without her consent (see [13]).
At a voir dire during trial, the applicant’s trial counsel successfully objected to the admission of other evidence of previous penile vaginal penetration without consent (see [27]). That evidence was not admitted because the trial judge found that the ‘evidence is more in the nature of tendency evidence than contextual evidence’ (see [31]). However, evidence of the applicant’s controlling behaviour was admitted, and was relied upon at trial (see [12]).
In summing up, the trial judge gave directions as to the use of the evidence of controlling behaviour, stating that ‘the Crown relies upon this evidence only for one purpose… to put the complainant's allegations concerning the offences in November 2010 into a realistic context’ (see [42]). Her Honour also stated: ‘if that evidence was not there, you would be asking yourselves, well, why would the accused throw his weight around in this horrible manner with the complainant completely out of the blue, when they had been in an apparently normal relationship for the previous six years?’ (see [42]).
Issues: Two of the grounds of appeal concerned ‘context evidence’ (see [6], [44]):
1.
‘A miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the admission of the so-called context evidence’ because it was not relevant and was prejudicial, and
2.
The trial judge erred by failing to identify the precise issues to which the evidence was directed.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused on both the ‘context evidence’ grounds.
In relation to the first ground, Meagher JA referred to the use of context evidence as being admissible if it is used to ‘remove implausibility that might attach to a complainant’s account of what otherwise would be seen as isolated incidents’ (see [24]). His Honour referred to HML v The Queen [2008] HCA 16; 235 CLR 334 [6] to observe that ‘by doing so, it bears upon the assessment of the probability of the existence of facts directly in issue (Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 55) … Similar observations were made in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12; 242 CLR 610 at [42] and BBH v The Queen [2012] HCA 9; 245 CLR 499 at [146]-[150].’
Meagher JA held that the evidence was properly admitted (see [45]). His Honour found that from the conduct of the trial, ‘it was apparent that the Crown was relying upon it only as showing that the relationship was an unhappy one from the complainant's perspective so as to make more plausible her evidence that she did not consent to having sexual intercourse with the applicant on the five occasions in question’ (see [33]). Furthermore, the fact that trial counsel had not objected to the evidence at the voir dire, despite having objected to the evidence of the other sexual assaults on the grounds that it might invite propensity reasoning, indicated that ‘the parties and the Court were conscious that evidence tendered to explain the context in which the alleged offences occurred might, depending on its content, be relied on or used for a tendency purpose’ (see [30]).
In relation to the second ground, regarding the directions given by the trial judge to the jury, Meagher JA held that the directions did not give rise to a real risk that the jury might employ propensity reasoning, and thus did not occasion a miscarriage of justice (see [49]). His Honour found that the direction regarding the applicant ‘throwing his weight around’ did verge on an invitation to the jury to employ propensity reasoning (see [47]). However, his Honour held that, assessed in context, the other directions made clear to the jury that the evidence of controlling behaviour was not being relied upon to suggest a ‘propensity of the applicant physically or sexually to impose his will on the complainant’ (see [48]).
The other issues concerned two failures of the trial judge. First, the trial judge failed to properly comply with s 55F(2)(b) of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW), and therefore two counts of sexual assault were quashed (see [8]-[11]). Second, the trial judge erred in taking into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing that the offences were committed in the complainant's home: EK v R [2010] NSWCCA 199; 79 NSWLR 740 at [79] (see [54]). Accordingly, the aggregate sentence of imprisonment was reduced from five years and six months with a non-parole period of two years and nine months to four years and eleven months with a non-parole period of two years and five and a half months.
Monteiro v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 277 (26 November 2014) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated rape namely, immediately before sexual intercourse the appellant inflicted actual bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant was physically and verbally abusive towards the female complainant throughout their relationship. At the time of the offence, the relationship had ended and the appellant started yelling at the complainant that they should resume this relationship. He slapped the complainant in the face and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her without her consent. The appellant was sentenced to 11 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months for the principal offence of aggravated rape.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The manifest excess argument was dismissed. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the prior relationship between the appellant and the complainant was a factor that should have mitigated the sentence imposed. Bellew J noted that while the existence of a relationship between offender and victim can be a relevant consideration in determining the objective seriousness of sexual offending, each case must turn on its own facts. Here, the relationship was over and it therefore followed that the existence of a prior relationship was not a factor that warranted mitigation of sentence. In particular, this was not a case where the complainant had invited the appellant to engage in sexual intercourse with her or had indicated that she was prepared to do so (cf NM v R [2012] NSWCCA 215 and Norman v R [2012] NSWCCA 230.) His Honour continued at [131]-[132]:
‘What remains important is that even though the relationship had ended, the offending occurred in what might be loosely described as a domestic setting. In R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, Wood CJ at CL (with whom Studdert and Bell JJ agreed) said at [41]:
"As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell [2000] NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.”
These principles were confirmed, after a review of the relevant authorities, by Johnson J (with whom Hunt AJA and Latham J agreed) in R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302at [65] and following. Leaving aside the question of general deterrence, the observations of Wood CJ at CL are directly apposite to the present case’.
R v Eckermann [2013] NSWCCA 188 (15 August 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentences’ – ‘Where the offender is known to the victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence (assault occasioning actual bodily harm).
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: After being in a domestic relationship for nine years and having two children together, the respondent and the complainant separated due to domestic violence perpetrated by the respondent. The complainant was asleep when she was woken by the respondent breaking into the property. He was shouting and looking for the complainant’s new partner. This woke and scared the children. He started throttling the complainant and then punched her in the face. The complainant managed to call the police. In sentencing, the judge characterised the offending as being towards the lower end of the spectrum. This was in light of a number of factors including that the respondent was not a stranger to the complainant (and therefore the offence would have been less frightening than a home invasion by a stranger) and that the respondent’s primary motivation was to protect his children from danger from the complainant’s new partner. The respondent was sentenced to two years imprisonment, suspended conditional upon entering into a good behaviour bond.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the offending as being ‘towards the lower end of the spectrum’.
2.
The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 months and a balance term of 10 months. First, Price J held that the sentencing judge erred in characterising the objective seriousness of the offence as at the lower end. Home invasion offences do not become less serious by virtue of a prior domestic relationship between an offender and the victim. Rather, the objective gravity of the crime is to be assessed on the facts of the case and here it was not open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the offence would have been less frightening than a home invasion by a stranger (See [35]-[36]). Further, very little weight could be given to the respondent’s motivation to protect his children. His actions terrified the complainant and the children. The offending was aggravated by the fact that it was committed in the presence of the children (See [37]-[45]). Accordingly, the offending was towards the middle of the range for such offences (See [46]).
Second, notwithstanding the respondent’s subjective circumstances including his love for his children, his employment, and good prospects of rehabilitation, a suspended sentence was manifestly inadequate. As per Price J at [54]-[55]:
‘This was a serious offence of violence by the respondent. When women (and men) enter into a new domestic relationship, they are entitled to do so without the threat of violence from a former partner. This is particularly so when there are children of the prior relationship as acts of violence towards a parent particularly when committed in the children's presence have the potential to impact severely upon their well-being and future development.
This Court has emphasised the seriousness with which violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated: Hiron v R [2007] NSWCCA 336.Specific and general deterrence, denunciation of the offending conduct and the protection of the community are important factors in sentencing a domestic violence offender: R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41; R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436; R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302.In my view, the respondent's subjective circumstances could not justify the suspension of the sentence. A full-time sentence of imprisonment was called for’.
McLaughlin v R [2013] NSWCCA 152 (3 July 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2, common assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and her young son moved from Tasmania to Victoria to live with the male applicant, her then de facto partner. At the time of offence, the complainant was vulnerable and isolated in that she was unemployed, cut off from friends and family, and suffered from a physical disability to her leg. Count 1 occurred when the applicant and complainant were arguing and the applicant dragged her off the bed, causing her to hit her jaw and bite her lip. Count 2 occurred when the applicant and complainant were again arguing and the applicant hit her to the side of her head near her eye. Count 3 occurred when they were arguing about an apprehended violence order (AVO) that had been made for the protection of the complainant and, as the complainant walked into her son’s room, the applicant grabbed her by the hair and throat. The applicant was sentenced to a total head sentence of two years and four months imprisonment with a non-parole period of four months.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred when she found that the offences were aggravated by the fact that they took place in the generalised presence of a child under the age of 18 years.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Error was demonstrated with ground one of the appeal. While there was evidence for Count 3 on which it might have been open to the sentencing judge to find that the child must have realised what was happening (even though he did not see the events), Her Honour did not make such a finding. Accordingly, the sentencing judge erred in taking into account that the offence was committed in the presence of the child (See [31]). Further, for Counts 1 and 2 there was no direct evidence of the presence of a child (See [32]). However, Button J declined to intervene with the sentence on appeal (See [54]-[55]).
The second ground of appeal was dismissed. At [48]-[49] Button J noted that:
‘The approach of this Court to men who assault vulnerable women is well established and need not be elaborated upon by me: see R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436, R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41, and R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302’.
‘If an offender sees fit repeatedly to visit violence upon a woman in breach of a bond and an apprehended violence order imposed months before with regard to the same behaviour and the same victim, he should expect to be imprisoned, and not for an insubstantial period’.
R v Cortese [2013] NSWCCA 148 (26 June 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault, rape.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim told the male respondent that she wanted to end their relationship. They argued, during which the respondent tried to make sexual advances towards the victim, including trying to kiss her and rubbing her vagina. Despite protestations from the victim, the respondent stayed over the night. The next morning the respondent forced himself on top of the victim, forced at least two fingers into her vagina, and then forced his penis into her vagina and had penile/vaginal intercourse with the victim without her consent. The respondent was sentenced to a good behaviour bond for twelve months for the indecent assault and two years imprisonment, wholly suspended, for the rape offence. In assessing the seriousness of the offending, the sentencing judge stated that the ‘prior sexual relationship [between the respondent and the victim] is an important mitigating factor’ and held the offending was at the bottom of the range (See [36]-[39]).
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in her assessment of the objective seriousness of each offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to three years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. The sentencing judge erred in her characterisation of the seriousness of the offending. In reaching this conclusion, Beech-Jones J stated at [55] that:
‘…cases confirm that the mere fact that there was a pre-existing relationship between an offender and a victim does not mitigate the criminality involved. Needless to say, each case will depend upon facts, but one common circumstance in which a pre-existing relationship has been found to diminish the seriousness of the offence is where it suggests some prevarication or at least initial consent on the part of the victim. Thus, if sexual contact is initiated by the victim or initially consented to by the victim, then the ensuing offence may be considered less serious’: See NM v R [2012] NSWCCA 215; Bellchambers v R [2011] NSWCCA 131; R v Hendricks [2011] NSWCCA 203; Stewart v R [2012] NSWCCA 183.
Here, the pre-existing relationship had no relevance as the victim repeatedly expressed her lack of consent (See [55]). Following from this, it was clear that the sentencing judge’s assessment of the culpability of the respondent was clearly erroneous. This was a case involving the rape of a young woman which occurred in the context of threats of violence, as well as aggressive and humiliating language. It came after she was detained overnight. The offending would likely fall below the mid-range of offences of this character but was not ‘bottom of the range’ (See [56]-[58]).
ZZ v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 83 (19 April 2013) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated rape (recklessly inflicting actual bodily harm), rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The sexual offences were committed in the context of a sexual relationship between the male applicant and the female complainant. The applicant and complainant had been drinking, taking drugs and engaging in consensual sexual relations. The applicant then asked the complainant to drink his urine and, after urging the uncertain complainant to try it, the applicant urinated into her mouth. The complainant, gagging and nearly vomiting, tried to pull away but the applicant forced her head back towards his penis (count 1 — rape). After further sexual activity, the complainant became increasingly distressed and uncomfortable. She attempted to leave but was pushed into the bathroom wall by the applicant. He penetrated her anus with his penis so forcefully that she smashed her head against the tiles and suffered a deep four-centimetre laceration to her forehead. He continued penetrating her and smashed her head against the wall again (count 2 — aggravated rape). The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years and six months with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal were that –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the objective seriousness of count 1.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in the way the applicable standard non-parole periods in respect of the sexual assault offences were taken into account.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, while the sentencing judge accepted the offence as ‘being in the mid range of seriousness’, His Honour later incorrectly referred to count 1 as ‘being at the top of the mid range’ and erroneously sentenced the applicant on this basis. Second, the standard non-parole period played a greater role in the sentencing judge’s decision than as a guidepost, to be taken into account with other factors on sentence, contrary to the principle articulated in Muldrock v The Queen.
In re-sentencing the applicant, Johnson J took into account the objective gravity of the applicant’s offences, his subjective circumstances and other aspects bearing upon the question of sentence, including the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period for counts 1 and 2. Johnson J noted that the objective gravity of the applicant’s offences needed to be assessed in the context of the relationship between the applicant and the victim. It was true that the complainant was not sexually assaulted by a stranger, where, if she had been, a further element of fear and terror would have been expected. However, the fact that the victim knew the offender and trusted him provided her with ‘little comfort’ here (See [103]). In a case such as this, involving significant violence and infliction of injury, the context of this relationship offered no real assistance to the offender on sentence (See [107]).
Norman v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 230 (9 November 2012) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape x 3.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of the complainant’s 13 year marriage to the appellant, the complainant and the appellant had anal intercourse five times but only twice with her consent. At trial, the Crown sought to tender evidence of non-sexual domestic violence (see [22]). They argued that the evidence was not being admitted as evidence indicating a propensity on the part of the appellant which rendered it more likely that he had committed the crimes with which he was charged (therefore ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act and the test in Pfennig v R [1995] HCA 7; 182 CLR 461 did not apply). The trial judge accepted this argument and ruled that evidence of non-sexual domestic violence could be admitted for the purpose of showing the relationship between the appellant and the complainant. The appellant was found guilty.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that 'relationship' evidence should not have been admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. MacFarlane J noted the relevant law, stating that: ‘As pointed out in Roach v R [2011] HCA 12; 242 CLR 610, evidence which incidentally shows propensity but which is otherwise relevant will not be excluded provided that the jury is properly warned against its use as propensity evidence (see also BBH v R [2012] HCA 9at [146]- [149])’.
Relationship evidence may be relevant if it assists in the evaluation of other evidence such as that of a complainant. His Honour continued at [26]: ‘In other words, relationship evidence may be admitted on the basis that, without it, the jury would be faced with a seemingly inexplicable or fanciful isolated incident. To enable complainants to give their account of events comprehensively, they must be permitted to place the incidents of which they complain in a meaningful context’.
However, the Courts have emphasised that it is necessary to consider carefully the basis upon which ‘relationship’ evidence is relevant in a particular case (see Qualtieri v R [2006] NSWCCA 95; 171 A Crim R 463 at [112]; DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272; 200 A Crim R 206 at [28] - [30] and RG v R [2010] NSWCCA 173 at [36] - [37]) (at [29]).
Here, MacFarlane J held that evidence of two isolated incidents of non-sexual domestic violence was irrelevant and should have been excluded. While the Crown submitted that the evidence was relevant to demonstrate ‘the nature of the relationship,’ MacFarlane J noted:
‘[C]onsistently with the approach taken by this Court in Qualtieriand DJV, it is insufficient to rely solely upon such a proposition. Evidence "is not relevant merely because it discloses aspects of the relationship between an accused and a complainant. There must be an issue which the evidence may explain or resolve by placing the alleged events in their true context": DJVper McClellan CJ at CL at [29]. Particularly because of its potentially prejudicial character, the precise basis upon which the evidence is relevant must be closely analysed’.
The evidence was also not relevant to demonstrate why the alleged sexual assaults were not reported earlier, and nor could it be said that the evidence would have assisted the jury, in any permissible way, in evaluating the complainant’s evidence (see [32]-[34]).
Therefore, His Honour concluded at [35]-[36]:
‘[E]vidence of the two isolated incidents of non-sexual domestic violence was not necessary to place the sexual assaults within a meaningful context… [I]t is difficult to see what, if any, use the jury could have made of the evidence other than to engage in impermissible propensity reasoning that the appellant was the type of man who might have sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent. Whilst the trial judge directed the jury not to reason in that way, there was unfairness to the appellant in the evidence being before the jury when it was not relevant on any basis’.
Despite this, on the facts, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. The Crown case against the appellant was so overwhelming there was no significant possibility that a jury would have acquitted the appellant (See [38]).
Stewart v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 183 (29 August 2012) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Dominance’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Psychological consequences’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a somewhat disrupted and non-continuous relationship for some years. On the day of the offence, the complainant informed the applicant that their relationship was over and she was communicating with other men on Facebook. Jealous, the applicant smashed the complainant’s mobile phone. Later that evening, the intoxicated applicant lay on top of the complainant and, while she was struggling, placed his fingers into her vagina for about 30 seconds. The applicant was sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and eight months. In his remarks, the sentencing judge noted that:
‘I just want to make it clear, as I have to do unfortunately in cases of this nature, as far as I am concerned, cases of sexual assault have significant effects on the victim. There are two particular ways, they result in significant distrust as far as the victim is concerned in forming relationships, particularly with males if the assailant was a male. The other very broad area that is affected is the confidence or self-confidence of the victim is significantly damaged, they have concerns about their own self-worth, sometimes that is demonstrated by self-harm but there are other ways in which it is demonstrated. There is no satisfactory material yet available to indicate how long those matters may last, I always proceed on the basis that they will continue to be present for a very long time’ at [58].
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in his consideration of the impact of the offence on the victim.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The first ground of appeal was dismissed. It would have been preferable for the sentencing judge not to state that he ‘always’ proceeded on the basis that the psychological effects of sexual assaults would last for a long time. This ground of appeal may have had some force if there had been evidence that the complainant had not suffered psychological injury. However, here, the victim impact statement contained clear evidence of the significant psychological injuries the complainant had suffered (See [62]-[64]).
The second ground of appeal was also dismissed. This was a serious example of an offence against the section. Button J noted at [69] that:
‘The matter can be sharply contrasted with a case where two persons are engaged in intimate contact by consent, and one of them fleetingly goes too far. The digital penetration in this case was not fleeting, and it was preceded by a physical assault upon the victim. Throughout the sexual offence the victim was making her lack of consent abundantly clear and struggling to put an end to the invasion of her body. Most importantly, His Honour found that the offence was an attempt to demonstrate dominance over a young woman who was in truth free to engage in Facebook contact, or any other kind of contact, with whomever she wished. An offence of sexual penetration that is motivated by a desire to dominate the victim, because he or she has failed to comply with the expectations of the offender, will very rarely be anything other than a serious offence’.
Further, while this was a stern sentence in light of the applicant’s subjective circumstances, it was not manifestly excessive (See [71]).
Bellchambers v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 131 (10 June 2011) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship in sexual assault offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape x 4.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant and the male applicant were in a relationship. Counts 1 and 2 took place after the complainant refused to have sex with the applicant but he had sexual intercourse with her regardless. The complainant reported these incidents to her general practitioner and the applicant was charged. Despite these charges, a sexual relationship continued between the applicant and the complainant. Counts 3 and 4 took place again after the complainant said she did not want to have sexual intercourse with the applicant. The applicant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred by failing to impose a non-parole period for the first two counts.
•
The sentencing judge failed to determine the objective seriousness of the offences.
•
The sentencing judge did not properly assess the totality of the criminal offending by determining the individual sentences and then assessing the totality but rather did the reverse.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentencing judge’s decision was replete with errors and the appeal was allowed. First, the sentencing judge failed to set a non-parole period for the first two counts (See [30]-[31]). Second, the sentencing judge erred by stating that the objective seriousness of the offences were ‘at least’ in the mid-range of gravity. The sentencing judge must make apparent and define the extent to which the offence is above the mid-range (See [32]-[36]). Third, the sentencing judge did not follow the approach set out in R v Pearce.
Finally, the sentence was manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge failed to fix individual sentences and review these provisional sentences to ensure they were appropriate for the offences at hand. Further, the sentencing judge erred in his characterisation of the objective seriousness of the offences. While the offences were serious, they occurred in the context of a domestic relationship ‘which involved considerable ambivalence on the part of the complainant’ (See [47]). The sentencing judge also failed to review the subjective circumstances of the applicant. The applicant was resentenced to seven years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years.
Sudath v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 207 (9 September 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Evidence via cctv’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant had become violent and abusive towards the female complainant throughout their relationship. On the night of the offences, the complainant was breast feeding their child when the appellant started pulling up her night dress. The complainant said no. She then put her son down and tried to get something from under the bed. While she was kneeling, the appellant forced his penis into her anus. She screamed no but the appellant continued. The next day the appellant yelled at the complainant and physically assaulted her. The appellant was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with an aggregate balance of term of two years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge erred in law by holding that he was ‘satisfied’ within the meaning of s 294B(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 that the complainant was “entitled” to give her evidence pursuant to the provisions of s 294B(3) of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The trial judge was correct in ruling that evidence could be given by alternative means. For complaints in sexual offence proceedings, it is generally not a sufficient reason to deny the use of CCTV or other technology merely because the jury might form the impression that the accused is/was violent. As per McClellan CJ at [29]:
‘The submission which the appellant made could of course be made in any case where there is an allegation of sexual intercourse without consent in a relationship of ongoing violence. There are many cases of this character. It was because of the personal trauma likely to be experienced by a complainant when giving evidence that s 294B was enacted. If the submission was accepted a substantial purpose of the legislative provision would be defeated. It may be that in an unusual case a submission in these terms may be accepted by a trial judge. However, the discretion is to be exercised in the individual circumstances of each case’.
Raczkowski v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 152 (4 July 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Attempted rape’ – ‘Breach of apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘Detain with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Using a prohibited pistol without a licence or permit’
Charge/s: Using a prohibited pistol without a licence or permit, detain with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm, attempted rape, indecent assault, breach of apprehended domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the applicant’s wife of over 40 years. Their relationship had deteriorated and an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO) had been issued for the protection of the complainant. The applicant breached this order on a number of occasions and was charged. He was bailed on conditions which included that he not approach or contact the complainant. However, again, the applicant breached these conditions. He wrote to the complainant. Further, one night the applicant, who was intoxicated, entered the property of the complainant without her consent and engaged in serious misconduct throughout the night including physically assaulting the complainant, typing her up, attempting to rape her, pulling out a pistol and threatening the complainant with it, and sexual assaults.
Issue/s:
•
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the fact that the applicant was suffering from severe depression at the time of the offences.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the applicant’s depression and that they occurred in the context of a domestic relationship.
Decision and Reasoning: These grounds of appeal were dismissed but the appeal was allowed on other grounds. First, the sentencing judge was not obliged to find that the applicant’s judgment was impaired by his illness. To the extent that the depression may have contributed to the applicant’s poor judgement, its significance was diminished by the applicant’s voluntary consumption of large amounts of alcohol. Additionally, there was evidence of advance planning by the applicant. In these circumstances, specific and general deterrence were particularly important. This approach of the sentencing judge was amply endorsed by authority, particularly when offences have been committed in a domestic context: R v Hamid and when such offences occur in breach of extant restraining orders such as an ADVO: Hiron v The Queen(See [33]-[37]).
Second, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The relevance of depression was considered in the above ground of appeal. Additionally, in terms of the relevance of a (broken down) domestic relationship, as per Grove J at [46]:
‘That a violent and pre planned attack occurred in what might be classified as a domestic setting is not a matter of mitigation. This Court has repeatedly stressed that it is a circumstance of significant seriousness: R v Edigarov; R v Dunn; and R v Burton’.
Here, the applicant detained and abused his wife verbally, physically and sexually. He did so in defiance of the conditions imposed by the ADVO and by bail. The production and use of the pistol, particularly where the applicant was ingesting significance quantities of alcohol, magnified the fear in the complainant (See [47]).
Jeffries v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 144 (26 June 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated kidnapping’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Detain for advantage and cause actual bodily harm, detain for advantage.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim of the aggravated kidnapping was the male applicant’s domestic partner (AW) and the victim of the kidnapping offence was AW’s 15 year old daughter, KW. The relationship between the applicant and AW had been marked by incidents of physical violence. At the time of the offence, AW had obtained an apprehended domestic violence order (ADVO) against the applicant. The applicant physically assaulted and verbally abused AW and KW, including partially ripping AW’s tongue. There was a knock on the door during the incident and someone called out, ‘It’s the police’. The applicant told AW and KW not to say anything. AW and KW were unable to leave the house that night. The applicant was sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the objective seriousness of the offences and the absence of any subjective factors operating in the applicant’s favour (at [99]). The offences involved the protracted detention of AW and KW for the advantage of fending off police intervention with respect to the applicant’s violence against both victims. They were committed in the context of the applicant’s controlling and violent relationship with the victim, and he inflicted actual bodily harm of a serious (and bizarre) type on AW. Great fear was instilled in both victims (See [90]).
Significant aggravating factors existed on the facts namely, that the offences were committed whilst the Applicant was on bail for an offence of violence committed against AW and was subject to an apprehended domestic violence order intended to control his conduct towards his domestic partner. These were flagrant violations of both forms of conditional liberty intended to protect AW (See [91]). It was also a significant aggravating factor that the offender’s ‘recidivist conduct demonstrated a propensity to act violently towards his partners’ (See [92]).
R v Burton [2008] NSWCCA 128 (20 June 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Detain for advantage’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Influencing witness’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Common assault x 3, assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 2, detain for advantage, influencing witness.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was released on parole as part of a sentence of imprisonment for break, enter and steal. He subsequently commenced a relationship with the female complainant, who was eight years older than him, and moved into her home with her two children. The respondent committed a series of offences against the complainant involving violent assaults and threats, including an offence of influencing a witness by convincing the complainant to withdraw the charges against him. The total effective sentence included a non-parole period of one year and nine months with a balance of term of one year. The sentencing judge backdated sentences for Counts 1, 2 and 3 so that they operated concurrently with the balance of parole. Even at sentence, the victim provided a measure of support to the respondent.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentences imposed failed to reflect the objective seriousness of the offences and were so inadequate as to be plainly unjust. Several aspects of the sentence imposed supported this conclusion. First, the approach of making the sentences concurrent meant that no effective sentence was imposed for three separate and serious offences of violence (See [92]-[93]). Second, the sentence for the detain for advantage offence did not reflect its objective seriousness, which was aggravated by the use of a knife. It was committed in the context of a ‘controlling and violent relationship’, extended over some hours, and involved actual threats of violence towards the victim (See [94]-[95]). It was additionally noted at [97] domestic violence offences involve the exercise of ‘power, dominance and control’ over the victim.
Third, the use of a bond for the offence of influencing a witness diluted significantly, and erroneously, the objective criminality in this case and a custodial sentence should have instead been imposed. Johnson J then made some observations regarding the role of victim’s attitude towards the respondent in sentencing, noting that it ought to play ‘no part on sentence’ at [102]. His Honour quoted (at [104]) the remarks of Simpson J in R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) which deal directly with this issue:
‘There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.’
Fourth, the sentencing judge’s remarks made no reference to specific deterrence, general deterrence nor the need for denunciation of the respondent’s conduct (See [106]-[107]). Finally, the final count of assault was a significant and unusual feature, committed after the respondent had been in custody for over two months. It was a further incident of control or dominance by the respondent over the victim, this time in a prison setting (See [108]-[110]).
In resentencing, the Court emphasised the importance of general and personal deterrence, denunciation and community protection, and noted that the offending took different forms and occurred at different times against the same victim and often in the presence of his children. The respondent had a substantial criminal history and showed little prospects for rehabilitation. The total effective sentenced was increased to four years and six months, with a non-parole period of three years (See [115]-[130]).
Shaw v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 58 (14 March 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated break and enter (with actual bodily harm)’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Malicious damage’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Aggravated break and enter with actual bodily harm, malicious damage to property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant had been in a domestic relationship for approximately five years and lived together with their three children. Following a domestic dispute, the complainant went with the three children to stay at a friend’s place. Over the next five days, the applicant made a number of threats to the complainant’s physical safety by telephone before he, intoxicated, broke into the friend’s place. He demanded to see his son before grabbing the complainant by her hair and striking her a number of times. The applicant had a long criminal history of offending in the domestic context and while those incidents did not involve actual violence, they evidenced a propensity to harassment in domestic situations and a failure to manage his anger. The complainant submitted a statutory declaration taking some responsibility for what she considered to be her part in provoking the applicant to act as he did. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Fullerton J found that the fact the offence was a domestic violence offence and that the victim was in a vulnerable position, did not elevate the offending to an ‘objectively high’ level. (See at [36]). The offending was not planned or premeditated, and the applicant did not arm himself with a weapon to inflict injury. As such, the offending was better characterised as in the middle of the range. In relation to the victim’s strong expression of support for the applicant, His Honour acknowledged the caution that must be exercised in attaching weight to such sentiments. In R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) Simpson J said:
‘In my opinion, exceptional caution should be exercised in the receipt, and the use, of evidence of that kind [general evidence of forgiveness and desire that the assailant/ partner not be imprisoned] in cases that fall within the general description of domestic violence offences, of which this case is one. It is a fact known to the courts and to the community that victims of domestic violence frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attackers. It is said, and has been said so often and for so long as to be almost notorious, that it was this pattern of post offence forgiveness, accompanied by apparent remorse or contrition on the part of the offender, that prevented the prosecution of such offenders. In turn, it appeared that the victim of domestic violence was in a class different to the rest of the community insofar as the protection of the law was concerned. Domestic violence was not seen as a crime which attracted the sanction of the law in the same way or to the same extent as other crimes, whether or not of violence. The perpetrator of domestic violence was relatively safe to commit crimes with impunity, at least provided he or she (and, in the cases that have to date come before the courts, it has almost invariably been he) could attain the victim's forgiveness.
There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
For too long the community in general and the agencies of law enforcement in particular, have turned their backs upon the helpless victims of domestic violence. Acceptance of the victim's word that he/she forgives the offender, casts too great a burden of responsibility upon one individual already in a vulnerable position. Neither the community, the law enforcement agencies, nor the courts can be permitted to abdicate their responsibility in this fashion. Protection of the particular victim in the particular case is a step towards protection of other victims in other cases…’
Notwithstanding this, Fullerton J was persuaded to give the victim’s support significant weight in this case. The victim’s view that the offending was ‘totally out of character’ was also supported in evidence from the applicant’s work supervisor. The sentence was reduced accordingly (See at [48]).
Kennedy v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 21 (22 February 2008) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male Aboriginal applicant had been in a de facto relationship with the female Aboriginal victim of the assault. Their relationship had been volatile and the police had taken out an interim apprehended violence order (AVO) on behalf of the victim. Three weeks prior to the offence, the victim had ended the relationship and taken the applicant’s medication for schizophrenia with her in her handbag. The applicant began experiencing auditory hallucinations and attacked the victim. She suffered severe physical injuries including facial fractures, fractures to her nasal bones and fractures of the mandible.
At sentence, the applicant explained that he did not obtain replacement medicine because there was no doctor and he did not want to leave his sick father. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge found that the applicant’s state of mind was induced by his failure to take his medication, such that his psychological status was of his own default. The applicant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment consisting of a non-parole period of four years, with a balance of term of three years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the applicant’s psychological status was his own fault.
•
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment that the offence was in the ‘upper level of seriousness’.
•
The sentencing judge failed to appropriately take into account the applicant’s mental disorder when imposing sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, the sentencing judge failed to give reasons for his finding that the applicant’s psychological status was his own fault. In particular, the sentencing judge failed to examine the circumstances which led to the applicant ceasing to take his medication. Such failure means that the sentencing judge could not arrived at such a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt (See [25]-[27]). Second, the sentencing judge erred in determining the objective seriousness of the offence by only having regard to the physical aspects of the assault and failing to consider the applicant’s psychological condition (See [38]-[40]). Third, the sentencing judge failed to take into account the applicant’s mental disorder as being relevant to the applicant’s moral culpability (See [46]-[49]). Relevant to domestic violence, an aggravating factor of this offending was that at the time of the offence, the applicant was subject to an AVO, taken out to protect the victim (at [8]).
Hiron v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 336 (7 December 2007) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 4, false imprisonment, resist arrest x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim of the assaults and false imprisonment was the applicant’s de facto partner, who was pregnant at the time. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of imprisonment comprising of a non-parole period of four years with a balance of term of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge erred in not having proper regard to the totality principle.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Price J noted at [32] that:
‘Offences for violent attacks in domestic settings, this Court has emphasised, must be treated with real seriousness. Important factors in sentencing a domestic violence offender are specific and general deterrence, denunciation of the offending conduct and protection of the community: see for example R v Edigarov; R v Dunn; and R v Hamid’.
Price J then quoted from Wood CJ in Edigarov at [41] where it was said that:
‘…such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.’
Here, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive or that the sentencing judge erred in his application of the totality principle. Each of the four offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm involved separate episodes of violence towards the victim. After each occasion, the applicant had the opportunity to stop. The false imprisonment was serious and distressing to the victim. Some offences involved the use of a weapon and the offences involved gratuitous cruelty. The offences were committed while the applicant was on conditional liberty. The offender abused a position of trust, as the partner of the victim and the father of their children. The victim was vulnerable in that she was a pregnant female of much smaller build than the applicant (See [34]-[39]).
Vragovic v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 46 (27 February 2007) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Characterisation of seriousness’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim had been married for some years before they divorced in mid-2003. The victim then commenced a relationship with another man and an apprehended domestic violence order was obtained protecting both the victim and her new partner. One evening, the victim was at home alone speaking on the telephone when the line went dead. The applicant then broke into the house and beat her with a piece of exhaust pipe and a shortened firearm. The applicant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years. This sentence was partially accumulated upon an earlier imposed sentence for grievous bodily harm with intent against the victim’s new partner. Accordingly, the effective overall sentence for both offences was 14 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 10 years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his description that the offence ‘must be near the top of the range of seriousness’.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Adams J stated at [33]:
‘It was once thought in some circles that domestic violence was somehow less serious than criminal violence inflicted in other circumstances. I do not agree. In many cases of domestic violence a distinguishing characteristic is the notion of the offender that he (and it is almost invariably a male) is entitled to act as he did pursuant to some perverted view of the rights of a male over a female with whom he is or was intimately connected. It is this characteristic of self-justification which requires particular emphasis to be given, in cases of this kind, to the elements of general and personal deterrence. In this case, the appellant had already been arrested for another extremely vicious attack on [his ex-wife’s new partner] for motives which were plainly related to those for which he attacked his ex-wife. The notion that this was some kind of temporary aberration is, I think, disproved by this concatenation of events. There was no a sudden loss of control arising out of circumstances beyond his capacity to deal with. It was a cold, calculating and brutal attack upon a helpless woman at night in her own home’.
Here, the characterisation of the offence by the sentencing judge as ‘near the top of the range of seriousness’ related not to the actual physical injuries or to the overall seriousness of the offence but to the circumstances in which the injuries were inflicted. This characterisation was correct (See [34]).
Walker v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 347 (1 November 2006) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Distress at the breakdown of a relationship is no excuse for violence’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offence arose out of the breakdown of the fifteen year marriage between the applicant and the victim. The victim told the applicant that she was seeing another man and that their marriage was over. Some days later, the applicant beat the victim and attacked her with a 32 cm long kitchen knife. The applicant was sentenced to a head sentence of three years with a non-parole period of eighteen months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge correctly characterised the objective criminality of the offending as very serious. The sentencing judge emphasised, as many on the bench had done so previously, that however sad and distressing a matrimonial breakdown might be, violence of any kind is not to be accepted as a more or less natural incident of such a breakdown (See [7]). The sentencing judge further gave appropriate weight to the relevant subjective matters (See [8]-[9]).
R v Hamid [2006] NSWCCA 302 (20 September 2006) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Multiple victims’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Repeat domestic violence offenders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Vulnerability of the victim’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Assault x 2, assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 5, detaining without consent and with intent to obtain an advantage (to avoid detection for assaulting her), malicious wounding.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The total effective sentence included a non-parole period of two years and six months, with the balance of the term lasting two years. The offending involved prolonged and serious violence committed against three women with whom the respondent was either married or in a relationship over an eight year period.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Johnson J at [65] - [88] provided a very useful summary of the relevant principles, particularly of relevant Court of Criminal Appeal authority. This authority has placed great emphasis on general deterrence, due to the prevalence of domestic violence, as well as the vulnerability of victims and breaches of trust involved. Specific deterrence and denunciation is also important.
Johnson J also quoted Wood CJ in R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436 who stated –
‘As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell (2000) NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence.’
Her Honour went on at [77] –
‘These judicial statements are complemented by criminological research concerning domestic violence. An adequate account of domestic violence should recognise that it typically involves the exercise of power and control over the victim, is commonly recurrent, may escalate over time, may affect a number of people beyond the primary target (including children, other family members and supporters of the victim) and that it contributes to the subordination of women; domestic violence typically involves the violation of trust by someone with whom the victim shares, or has shared, an intimate relationship; the offender may no longer need to resort to violence in order to instil fear and control: J Stubbs, “Restorative Justice, Domestic Violence and Family Violence”, Australian Domestic and Family Violence Clearing House, Issues Paper 9, 2004, pp 6-7.
Her Honour then commented specifically on the relevant considerations when sentencing — ‘In sentencing a domestic violence offender, and in particular a repeat domestic violence offender, specific and general deterrence are important factors, together with the requirement of powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for protection of the community. Recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community as a result of crimes of domestic violence is important’ at [86].
‘This is not to say that promotion of rehabilitation of the offender is not an important factor. It remains necessary to provide individualised justice in the circumstances of the particular sentencing decision. Nevertheless, the factors to which reference has been made above assume particular significance in the case of a domestic violence offender who has committed a series of offences over an extended period of time against different victims’ at [88].
While the respondent did have a mental illness, Her Honour found that it was not such as to reduce his moral culpability, or reduce the need for general deterrence, as he was aware of the gravity of the offending. In applying these principles to the facts, Johnson J found that the sentences imposed at trial were manifestly inadequate and did not reflect the ‘objective criminality’ that was involved. The respondent showed minimal remorse, was seeking to ‘justify his crimes’ and had a criminal record of assaults and breaches of apprehended domestic violence orders. The respondent was re-sentenced accordingly (See at [152]).
R v Kershaw [2005] NSWCCA 56 (1 March 2005) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of apprehended violence order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of victim's expression of forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Rape, breach of an apprehended violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been married for 16 years and lived with their eight year old daughter. They had been arguing when the applicant pushed the complainant forcefully. She rang the police and obtained an apprehended violence order (AVO) restraining intimidating conduct and restraining the applicant from being at their premises under the influence of alcohol, liquor or drugs. The applicant arrived back at their premises and complained about the AVO. He then stripped naked. The complainant told the applicant that she was not willing to have sex with him and was not going to change her mind about the AVO. He then raped the complainant. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. A 10 percent reduction in sentence was made to take into account this guilty plea.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that the discount for the guilty plea was appropriate, was not ‘meagre’ and was actually quite significant. Further, the applicant contended that the trial judge erred by taking a ‘harsh view’ in finding that the applicant and the complainant continuing their relationship is an issue with regards to the applicant’s rehabilitation. The complainant maintained a ‘favourable’ view of the applicant and the relationship (See at [21]). Bryson JA held that the complainant’s ‘forgiving and optimistic attitude’ should not play a large part in the sentencing decision. The trial judge was correct to conclude that the fact that the offence was committed against his wife was an aggravating factor. As per the trial judge, at [24] ‘The sentencing process is not and of course should not be in the hands of complainants, and the merciful or relenting attitude of a complainant does not reduce the gravity of the offence and does not have much effect on the interest of justice in imposing an appropriate sentence’.
The trial judge’s view that the gravity of the offence was severe was correct. Other aggravating factors included his previous conviction for assaulting his wife, the fact that offence was committed after ongoing supervision and a good behaviour bond was completed, and it was in breach of an AVO. This justified a correspondingly high sentence.
R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41 (23 February 2004) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of an apprehended violence order’ – ‘Break and entering a dwelling armed with an offensive weapon’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Purposes of sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breaking and entering a dwelling armed with an offensive weapon, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, breach of an apprehended domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The de facto relationship between the male respondent and the female complainant had ended in mid-2000. In 2001, the respondent was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and placed on a bond for two years. Six months later, the poorly disguised respondent crashed his car into the complainant’s car, which she was driving with her two children. The respondent then tried to force the complainant out of her car and punched her in the nose, eye and head. In 2002, the respondent broke into the complainant’s house and attacked her with a Stanley knife. The complainant’s new partner intervened. The respondent was sentenced to three years and nine months imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and nine months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Adams J stated at [47]:
‘Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. Unlike the casual robbery, where the victim is often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, the victim of a domestic violence offence is personally targeted. To my mind these considerations emphasise not only the need for general and personal deterrence but also of denunciation in cases of this kind’.
He found that the sentencing judge did not give adequate weight to the need for deterrence and denunciation. Further, the extent of injury committed by the offender is an important factor in assessing the appropriate measure of punishment and the sentence here did not adequately reflect the pain and suffering the respondent caused. Finally, the sentencing judge erred in imposing wholly concurrent sentences because there were two distinct and separate instances of violence against the complainant and her new partner. The respondent was re-sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment.
R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 (6 May 2003) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Defences’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Forensic psychiatrist’s evidence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of the manslaughter of her daughter, who died of malnutrition at the age of 14 months. The appellant refused to take the child to the hospital, against the advice of medical practitioners and friends. In a record of interview, the appellant said that she did not take the deceased to the hospital because her husband believed that children should not be infused with fluids or have any artificial substances injected into their bodies. At trial, the appellant gave evidence that her husband was controlling, verbally abusive and violent, and she was afraid to contravene his wishes. Defence counsel also called evidence from a forensic psychiatrist, Dr Nielssen. Dr Nielssen did not find that the appellant suffered from any kind of psychiatric disorder but that her situation fitted ‘battered wife syndrome’. As a result of this, the appellant accepted the decisions made by her husband, despite having reservations about them (See [31]). The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The trial judge erred in summarising Dr Nielssen’s evidence altogether, as it related to the defence of duress. Rather, His Honour ought to have summarised the parts of Dr Nielssen’s evidence that were relevant to the subjective test, and then after describing the objective test, directed the jury’s attention to those parts of Dr Nielssen’s evidence that were relevant to that test and how a hypothetical person in the same circumstances, i.e. a battered wife, would have acted as to withdrawing from the relationship etc.
•
The trial judge’s summing-up on the evidence of battered wives syndrome from Dr Nielssen was inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, as per Durford J at [43], ‘although it is undoubtedly the duty of a trial judge in summing up to relate the different pieces of evidence to the different issues in the trial: R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 105, this was a "single issue" trial and that single issue was duress. The evidence of Dr Nielssen about the battered wife syndrome was relevant to both the subjective and objective tests and there was no need to divide it up in a way which had not been suggested by either counsel in their addresses: Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 75at [59]-[60]’.
Second, a trial judge is not required to read or summarise the whole of the relevant evidence to the jury which has already been heard from witnesses, but merely to present a balanced summary of the salient parts which is fair to both sides. The evidence of Dr Nielssen was sufficiently and fairly summarised by the trial judge. Some of the questions and answers not repeated in the summing-up were merely elaboration of general propositions of the doctor which had been summarised, and one answer in particular which it was claimed should not have been omitted had been substantially paraphrased by the appellant's trial counsel in his final address (See [47]-[48]).
R v Palu [2002] NSWCCA 381 (17 September 2002) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Malicious grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Relevance of the attitude of the victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent and the male victim were drinking partners and got into a fight. The victim suffered a skull fracture. The sentencing judge adjourned proceedings and granted bail to the respondent on certain conditions, under s 11 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
Issue/s: In light of the seriousness of the offence and because it was inevitable that a full-time custodial sentence had to be imposed, it was outside the exercise of His Honour’s discretion to make an order adjourning proceedings.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. This was not a case involving domestic violence but Howie J’s comments regarding the relevance of a victim’s attitude to sentence have been cited in subsequent domestic violence cases. Here, the sentencing judge was unduly influenced by the fact that the victim and the respondent were still friends. At [37] His Honour provided:
‘The attitude of the victim cannot be allowed to interfere with a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. This is so whether the attitude expressed is one of vengeance or of forgiveness: R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994). Sentencing proceedings are not a private matter between the victim and the offender, not even to the extent that the determination of the appropriate punishment may involve meting out retribution for the wrong suffered by the victim. A serious crime is a wrong committed against the community at large and the community is itself entitled to retribution. In particular, crimes of violence committed in public are an affront to the peace and good order of the community and require deterrent sentences: Henderson (NSWCCA, unreported, 5 November 1997). Matters of general public importance are at the heart of the policies and principles that direct the proper assessment of punishment, the purpose of which is to protect the public, not to mollify the victim’.
Howie J also noted that a sentencing judge should only give very limited weight to statements made by an offender to a psychiatrist or psychologist reproduced in reports, including expressions of remorse (See [39]-[41]).
Note: Sections 4A and 4B of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act were introduced on 25 September 2018 imposing additional requirements in sentencing for domestic violence offences in NSW.
R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173 (15 May 2002) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Contrition’ – ‘Forgiveness by the victim’ – ‘Good character’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent to murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent to murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant began to suspect that his wife, the victim, was having an affair (an allegation without basis). One morning, while the children were at school, the victim was lying in bed and was struck several times, mainly on the head, with a bottle wielded by the applicant. The applicant said to the victim that he wanted to kill her because she did not respect him. He then tied the victim up and gagged her whilst continuing to threaten to kill her and then himself. The victim was not released until her children returned home from school and the victim lost a lot of blood. The applicant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years. In imposing this sentence, the sentencing judge made reference to the former good character of the accused and stated:
‘We must all accept the fact that differences in marriages do occur and it is expected that people will try and resolve any differences without violence. However to go to the stage of wanting to end the marriage by killing someone is quite unacceptable of course and quite frightening to the wider community. There can be no mitigating factors in such an act with that intention. We do accept the realities of marriages breaking up and people separating but we can never accept or tolerate any person killing someone as the solution. And so it is difficult with reference to a person being a man of good character up until now. It is difficult to know what relevance that has where a person has considered the final solution’ at [16].
The fact is that at the start of the assault that morning the prisoner did state and evidence an intention to kill. Such an expression and intention must immediately negate any consideration of mitigating factors because of good character, then to extend the trauma and terror of the assault all day until the late afternoon takes the actions of the prisoner into a further level of callousness’ at [17].
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
•
The sentencing judge did not take into account the previous good character of the applicant when fixing the sentence.
•
The sentencing judge failed to consider the contrition of the applicant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, O’Keefe J noted that there is nothing wrong with a judge discussing the weight which should be given to the previous good character of an offender. While the sentencing judge’s remarks at [16] were unexceptional, the sentencing judge erred at [17] when he completely excluded the applicant’s previous good character as a mitigating factor and therefore did not take it into consideration in mitigation of the penalty (see [19]). However, the sentence imposed by the judge and the non-parole period were very lenient given the objective gravity of the offence and taking into account the subjective features of the applicant, and a lesser sentence would not have been appropriate in the circumstances. This ground of appeal was therefore dismissed.
Second, on the facts, it was arguable that the applicant showed contrition and further, the absence of an affirmative finding in relation to contrition by the sentencing judge was not to be regarded as a matter overlooked by His Honour (See [27]). Additionally, O’Keefe J commented on forgiveness of the victim at [28] and stated:
‘The fact that he expressed contrition to his wife and that she said that she forgave him did not detract from the duty of the judge to impose a proper sentence. Her views in relation to the contrition of the Applicant, as opposed to what he said to her, do not seem to have been tested. Furthermore, even the stated acceptance by the victim of her acceptance of her attacker's contrition does not bind the court, nor does it detract from the need to give proper weight to the principle of general deterrence, R v Kanj [2000] NSWCCA 408, a principle that is important in cases of domestic violence (R v Green [2001] NSWCCA 258; R v Glen [1994] [1994] NSWCCA 1). Furthermore, the fact that a victim may forgive her attacker is not determinative. Indeed, its weight in relation to general deterrence will be a variable depending on the offence and the circumstances. It is a matter for judgment by the sentencing judge’.
R v Edigarov [2001] NSWCCA 436 (5 October 2001) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Common assault, assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm, kidnapping.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 3 August 1999, the respondent assaulted his wife (the victim) in the presence of their three year old daughter by pushing her against a refrigerator, pursuing her into the bedroom and pushing her to the floor. After throwing and kicking items, he left the unit and the victim went to a friend’s unit for safety. The respondent arrived there an hour later and threatened to kill her if she did not return home. Police were called and the respondent assaulted these officers. The respondent was released on bail and became subject to an apprehended domestic violence order. On 7 October 2000, the respondent kidnapped the victim while she was walking along the street with her daughter. He drove her to his parents’ home and repeatedly punched and kicked her. The victim managed to escape and called the police. The sentencing judge imposed the following sentences:
•
Common assault: six months imprisonment.
•
Assault police officer occasioning actual bodily harm: 18 months imprisonment, suspended upon the condition that he enter into a good behaviour bond.
•
Kidnapping: two years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six months and 12 days.
In imposing the sentence for kidnapping, His Honour found that there were special circumstances in that all of the offences of the respondent were ‘by-products of (his) anger and frustration and disappointment at the failure of (his) marriage and at the imposition of the apprehended violence order against (him)’.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the objective seriousness of the combination of the offences involved.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Wood CJ held that the sentence imposed failed to give sufficient weight to the objective seriousness of the offences and too much significance was attached to the emotional reaction of the respondent to being thwarted in the marriage, a circumstance that provided no excuse whatsoever for his behaviour (See [39], [52]). In relation to the assault of his wife, Wood CJ found that the offence involved the sustained use of physical violence causing fear in the presence of an equally terrified child. It could not be characterised as a momentary or uncharacteristic loss of self-control, as the aggression continued into the evening. Further, at [41]:
‘As this Court has confirmed in Glen NSWCCA 19 December 1994, Ross NSWCCA 20 November 1996, Rowe (1996) 89 A Crim R 467, Fahda (1999) NSWCCA 267and Powell (2000) NSWCCA 108, violent attacks in domestic settings must be treated with real seriousness. Regrettably, that form of conduct involves aggression by men who are physically stronger than their victims and who are often in a position economically, or otherwise, to enforce their silence and their acceptance of such conduct. In truth such conduct is brutal, cowardly and inexcusable, and the Courts have a duty to ensure that it is adequately punished, and that sentences are handed out which have a strong element of personal and general deterrence’.
Additionally, the kidnapping offence involved sustained violence by the respondent who caused substantial injury to his wife and again threatened to kill her. It was again committed in the presence of their young daughter and caused significant fear. Further, the sentencing judge failed to reflect three aggravating factors in the sentence namely, this was not an isolated act of violence, and the offence was committed while the offender was on bail and while the offender was subject to an apprehended violence order in relation to the same victim (See [47]-[51]). In re-sentencing the respondent, the court took into account the principle of double jeopardy (See [55]-[65]).
R v MacAdam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 (9 May 2001) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of an apprehended domestic violence order’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim had been married for 21 years before the victim left the family home and obtained an apprehended violence order. On the day of the offence, the victim was arriving at the Family Court accompanied by their four year old son when the applicant approached her and produced a knife, approximately 30 cm in length with a serrated edge blade. The victim fled but was chased by the applicant and almost fatally stabbed in the arm, back and stomach. The applicant was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 years. A psychiatric report tendered from Dr Nielssen diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a major depressive illness and a personality disorder.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in failing to accept the findings of Dr Nielssen and in concluding that there was no evidence which established a link between the major depressive illness the applicant was suffering and the commission of the offence (See [51]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. In light of the opinion of Dr Nielssen and fresh evidence adduced, there was a link between the illness suffered by the applicant and the offence (See [58]). James J also noted that the sentencing judge’s conclusions regarding the severity of the attack (particularly in light of the apprehended violence order) were entirely open to him. The attack was very severe and showed a degree of viciousness. The offence was committed in breach of an apprehended domestic violence order and this was a significant aggravating factor (See [37]-[38]).
R v Grech [1999] NSWCCA 268 (6 September 1999) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Person in authority having sexual intercourse with person with intellectual disability’ – ‘Position of trust’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Person in authority having sexual intercourse with a person with intellectual disability x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male complainant, who had an intellectual disability, lived in a group home where the male applicant worked as a team leader. They formed a sexual relationship. The complainant gave evidence at trial that the sexual contact commenced when he turned 18 and that they loved each other. The applicant was found guilty after a trial of two counts of a person in authority having sexual intercourse with a person who has an intellectual disability under Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66F. The applicant was sentenced to a minimum term of three years imprisonment with an additional term of two years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentencing judge failed to adequately take into account the evidence of the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the complainant together with the lack of evidence of psychological or other injury suffered by the complainant and his borderline degree of intellectual disability.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Carruthers AJ held that even if one were to accept that there was a genuine mutual loving relationship on the facts (of which there was some doubt), this did not reduce the criminality of the applicant as assessed by the trial judge. His Honour noted that the legislature did not encumber s 66F(2) with qualifications and it was clearly intended to prohibit absolutely, persons with authority (as defined) having sexual intercourse with intellectually disabled persons over whom they have authority (See [32]). Deterrence looms large for offences under s 66F(2) as ‘it is the mark of a civilised society that those who are incapable fully of protecting their own interests, should be protected from exploitation by those in whom society vests the responsibility of caring for them. Carers who breach this trust must expect condign punishment’ (See [37]). The seriousness of the offence was explained by Carruthers AJ at [33]-[34]:
‘strong emotional relationships are quite capable of developing between carer and intellectually disabled person, whether they are of the same gender or not. It is essential, therefore, that persons in authority exercise the utmost care to avoid such situations developing, and immediately there are indications of such a situation arising, the obligation is on the person in authority to remove himself or herself from the relationship or, at the very least, immediately to seek expert counselling.
‘Neither of these courses was adopted in the subject case and, intolerably, the relationship developed into one of a continuing and prolonged violation of the provisions of s 66F(2). The applicant knew not only that he was in breach of his position of trust, but that he was in breach of the criminal law, and he was also aware that the complainant had previously been the victim of sexual exploitation and as a consequence a prior carer was serving a lengthy custodial sentence. The fact that the relationship may have developed, as the applicant contends, into a mutual loving relationship could fairly be described as an aggravating feature of the case rather than a mitigating factor’.
R v Kotevski [1998] NSWCCA 1 (3 April 1998) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing judge should not enter into a determination of the merits of matrimonial disputes’
Charge/s: Malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s estranged wife. Despite living apart and having commenced Family Court proceedings, they continued to work together in a takeaway food business. One day at work, they were arguing and the applicant ‘snapped’. He repeatedly stabbed the victim with a scraper and a trowel before picking up a long bladed knife and lunging at the victim. Someone heard the victim’s screams and managed to intervene. The applicant was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a minimum term of two years and three months.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in not taking into account, or in not sufficiently taking into account, the belief by the applicant that he had been unfairly treated by his wife and the applicant's consequential feelings of anger and frustration.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in declining to enter into a determination of the merits of the matrimonial disputes between the applicant and his wife.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by James J (Simpson J agreeing). First, the sentencing judge did not proceed on the basis that the applicant’s belief and feelings about his wife were irrelevant in the sentencing of the applicant. On the contrary, the sentencing judge appropriately took into account these feelings expressly when he noted that the attack by the applicant on his wife was not pre-meditated and that the applicant while subject to stress had ‘snapped’ and had ‘on the spur of the moment’ engaged in a ‘heated’ attack. His Honour was not required to take the applicant’s belief and feelings about his wife any further into account (10-11). Second, the sentencing judge was justified in adopting the position that he would not enter into a determination of the merits of the matrimonial disputes (i.e. who was right and who was wrong) and this was irrelevant to sentencing, except insofar as determining the attack was not pre-meditated (11-14).
R v O’Grady [1997] NSWCCA 1 (13 May 1997) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Detention against will with intent to carnally know the victim’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Factors not mitigating at sentence’ – ‘Public confidence in the criminal system’ – ‘Relevance of a prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, detention against will with intent to carnally know the victim.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim and the male respondent had previously been in a consenting sexual relationship but at the time of the offence the relationship had ended and they were merely seeing each other as friends. The respondent asked the victim for another chance at the relationship but the victim refused. He then threatened the victim with a knife and tied her up. The respondent fondled the victim and had penile intercourse with her without her consent. The respondent was sentenced to three years imprisonment, to be served by way of periodic detention for the aggravated sexual intercourse without consent and deferred sentence for the detention offence on the condition that the respondent enter into a recognisance to be of good behaviour for a period of five years. In imposing this sentence, the judge found that these offences were ‘foreign’ to the respondent’s normal character, had their roots in compulsive gambling, and were an ‘aberration committed by a young man who loved a young girl’.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Sully J held that while there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the offences were ‘foreign’ to the respondent’s normal character, the offending did not have its roots in ‘compulsive gambling’ and nor could the objective seriousness of the offences be broken down as being no more than ‘an aberration committed by a young man who loved a young girl’. These were extremely serious offences which resulted from the breakdown of the relationship between respondent and the victim and the victim’s rejection of the respondent’s request to resume the relationship (See 8). As per Sully J at p. 9 that where a relationship breaks down:
‘ the woman who is involved in the relationship is entitled to feel that, whatever other consequences ensue, her personal safety will not be threatened at all, let alone threatened by the commission of criminal offences of the gravity of those with which we are now called upon to deal’.
In sum, the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate. They were wholly inadequate to denounce the violent rape, at knife point, of a defenceless young woman in what ought to have been the safety and security of her own home. They were wholly inadequate to properly denounce the victim’s violent and prolonged detention for that purpose. They were also wholly inadequate to deter both the respondent and other young men from similar behaviour. Further, very importantly, the sentences imposed were hopelessly inadequate to ensure that there is maintained public respect for and confidence in current standards of criminal justice (See 11). The respondent was resentenced to five years imprisonment for the sexual intercourse with consent offence with a minimum term of three years and three years imprisonment on the detention offence.
R v Rowe [1996] NSWCCA 1 (3 October 1996) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Family hardship’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Kidnapping, rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant lived in an ‘off and on’ de facto relationship over a period of five years and had two children together. Immediately prior to the offences, the relationship had broken down again. The applicant became jealous because he believed the complainant was seeing a new man. He then forced the complainant into his car, drove her to his premises, threatened to kill her family and this new man, and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her without consent. He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with an effective minimum term of four years. The complainant wrote to the sentencing judge stating that she had resumed a relationship with the applicant, she did not want him to go to prison (particularly because of the trauma that would result to their children), and she had forgiven the applicant.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to his subjective features including his age, background, disrupted and violent upbringing, education and employment.
2.
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the wishes of the complainant
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing judge did not err when he rejected the claim that these subjective circumstances had a relationship to the commission of these offences and therefore ought to have mitigated the sentence (See 472). Second, Hunt CJ dismissed the contention that the sentencing judge ought to have given greater weight to the wishes of the complainant. As at 472-473:
‘This Court has said more than once that the attitude of complainants cannot govern the approach to be taken in sentencing. In Glen, Simpson J pointed out that, whilst forgiveness by the victim may be relevant in some cases, exceptional caution is required in allowing such evidence to be given in relation to domestic violence type offences. The present offences fell within the same category, where the nature of the relationship between the offender and the victim is such that the victim will frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attacker. The importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
‘This Court has also said more than once that the hardship upon the family of an offender will not be relevant in mitigation unless it goes beyond that which inevitably results in any case of incarceration and unless it is sufficiently extreme as to demand that the judge draw back. That has not been established in this case. It may be ironic, as has been suggested, that the victim and her children are going to suffer the punishment imposed upon the offender, but the fact remains that the law requires such a punishment to be imposed’.
R v Glen [1994] NSWCCA 1 (19 December 1994) – New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim’s forgiveness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual intercourse with consent’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Sexual intercourse without consent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim had been in an intermittent relationship for two years and had a daughter together. The appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent in the front yard of his premises. At the time of offence, he was upset about his possible denial of access to his daughter.
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant did not appreciate when he pleaded guilty that he was acknowledging the absence of consent of the victim to sexual intercourse.
2.
The admission of guilt involved in the plea should be regarded as tainted and not a free and voluntary confession.
3.
The sentencing judge fell into error by failing to give adequate weight to the lack of any relevant prior record, the emotional background to the incident - including the appellant’s fears concerning future contact with his daughter, the remorse expressed and the attitude of the complainant.
Decision and Reasoning: As per Grove J (Loveday AJ and Simpson J agreeing) the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence was dismissed. First, counsel for the appellant at trial obtained adequate written instructions prior to the arraignment that the appellant wished to plead guilty. These evidenced that the appellant knew the consequences of pleading guilty (See 5-6). Second, the terms of the written instructions, the evidence of the solicitor and the lack of credibility attaching to the appellant’s assertion combine to made this ground of appeal untenable (See 7). Finally, none of the above matters were overlooked by the sentencing judge and no error was accordingly demonstrated. In particular, the sentencing judge made express reference to the attitude of the complainant, which cannot govern the duty of the court when proceeding to sentence (See 8).
After agreeing with the reasons of Grove J, Simpson J made further comments on the relevance of the victim’s attitude of the offences to the sentence which should be imposed. Her Honour provided:
‘In my opinion, exceptional caution should be exercised in the receipt, and the use, of evidence of that kind in cases that fall within the general description of domestic violence offences, of which this case is one. It is a fact known to the courts and to the community that victims of domestic violence frequently, and clearly contrary to their own interests and welfare, forgive their attackers. It is said, and has been said so often and for so long as to be almost notorious, that it was this pattern of post offence forgiveness, accompanied by apparent remorse or contrition on the part of the offender, that prevented the prosecution of such offenders. In turn, it appeared that the victim of domestic violence was in a class different to the rest of the community insofar as the protection of the law was concerned. Domestic violence was not seen as a crime which attracted the sanction of the law in the same way or to the same extent as other crimes, whether or not of violence. The perpetrator of domestic violence was relatively safe to commit crimes with impunity, at least provided he or she (and, in the cases that have to date come before the courts, it has almost invariably been be) could attain the victim's forgiveness.
There are two main arguments of principle against the proposition that this Court should give any weight to the expressed wish of the victim in this case that the applicant not be incarcerated. The first concerns the importance, especially great in cases of domestic violence, given the history that I have alluded to, of general deterrence. This Court must send a signal to domestic violence offenders that, regardless of self interest denying forgiveness on the part of victims, those victims will nevertheless receive the full protection of the law, insofar as the courts are able to afford it to them. It must not be forgotten, that, if it is to be accorded weight by the courts, forgiveness by the victim also operates contrary to the interests of other victims. Until it is recognised that domestic violence will be treated with severe penalties regardless of a later softening of attitude by the victim, no progress is likely to be made in its abolition or reduction. Put simply, the importance of general deterrence in such cases overrides any minor relevance that evidence of forgiveness might have.
For too long the community in general and the agencies of law enforcement in particular, have turned their backs upon the helpless victims of domestic violence. Acceptance of the victim's word that he/she forgives the offender, casts too great a burden of responsibility upon one individual already in a vulnerable position. Neither the community, the law enforcement agencies, nor the courts can be permitted to abdicate their responsibility in this fashion. Protection of the particular victim in the particular case is a step towards protection of other victims in other cases.
The second reason of principle for treating with extreme caution the evidence of the forgiveness of the victim in the circumstances of this case is that the legislature has, since 1982, made clear its intention that special considerations apply to offences of domestic violence’.
Supreme Court
R v He [2024] NSWSC 417 (31 May 2024) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Drug-induced psychosis’ – ‘Suicide attempt’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: In June 2020, the male offender murdered his 19 year-old girlfriend of two years, using a hammer and two knives to stab her at least 75 times with the intention to kill her. [1] The murder took place in the apartment they shared. [3] Shortly after, the offender attempted suicide by jumping off the fourth floor of the apartment building. [3] He sustained extremely severe traumatic brain and spinal cord injuries. [3] In October 2022, the offender entered a plea of guilty to murder. [9]
Issue: Whether the offender was operating under a mental illness, condition or impairment at the time of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was operating under self-inflicted psychosis. The offender was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years. [111]
The offender asserts that, at the time of the offence, he was suffering from a drug-induced psychosis caused by long term nitrous oxide use. [13] Having regard to expert evidence, Lonergan J concluded on the balance of probabilities that the offender was suffering from a self-inflicted transient drug-induced psychosis. [89] It was in that state that the offender ‘directed his rage’ to the deceased, killing her in a ‘frenzied and merciless attack’. [89] The objective seriousness of offending was subsequently ‘marginally reduced’: [90]
His moral culpability is also mildly reduced, noting however that it is appallingly self-indulgent to deliberately use and abuse an intoxicating inhalant to remove oneself from reality and responsibility for one’s own actions. This is what the offender did. I cannot exclude entirely the indicators that the attack was directed at [the deceased] as part of the offender’s own unjustified dissatisfaction with her, and that he was taking out on her his rage at his own failures and inadequacies, like so many men who murder their domestic partners, but I cannot make a finding beyond reasonable doubt that this was the, or a precipitant or motivating factor for this particular attack during which he murdered his domestic partner [91]
Justice Lonergan held the offending to be ‘extremely violent’, ‘above the mid-range of seriousness for offences of this type’. [94]
R v Dowling [2023] NSWSC 1620 (20 December 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation/choking’ – ‘Vulnerable group’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘History of domestic violence’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The male offender and male deceased had been in an ‘on and off’ relationship since at least 2004. Throughout, the offender had been physically violent towards the deceased, and was even sentenced to imprisonment for assaulting the deceased and damaging property. [6]
In the two weeks leading to the murder, neighbours reported the offender’s abusive behaviour towards the deceased, encouraging the deceased to separate from the offender. [9]
One night, the offender forced the deceased’s dentures backwards into his throat, causing the deceased to asphyxiate. [21] Four to five days later, police officers attending the house discovered the deceased’s body on the floor next to the bed. [37]
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 22 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years and 10 months. [121] Despite no evidence of premeditation, the offending was not ‘an isolated incident of violence’. Rather, it was part of a ‘history of violence conduct[ed] by the offender towards’ his intimate partner: [58]
There is an inherent degree of trust in a domestic relationship. Such trust is betrayed when one partner perpetrates violence upon the other, particularly in private. [61]
R A Hulme AJ observed the offender’s history of substance abuse, [74] significant criminal history (including violent offences), [90]; [110] and lack of remorse. [79] Further, Hulme AJ took into account the fact the offender was on parole at the time of committing the offence (‘for a very serious offence’). [104]
R v Knight [2023] NSWSC 321 (31 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Bugmy principles’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The Aboriginal male offender and Aboriginal female deceased were in a domestic relationship for 30 years. [1] Throughout, there were instances of domestic violence. Yet, it was observed that they ‘loved each other and were devoted’ to their eight children. [2]
In March 2021, the offender killed the deceased, stabbing her once with a knife in their home in the presence of one of their children. [22]–[23] At the time, the offender was subject to a protection order, preventing him from threatening or assaulting the deceased for a period of 12 hours after consuming alcohol. [12] The offender breached this order, being intoxicated when he stabbed the deceased. [38]–[41]
Decision and Reasoning: Offender sentenced to a non-parole period of 12 years and 5 months, with a balance of term of 5 years. [132]
Justice Yehia took note of the following aggravating features that increased the objective seriousness of the offence: the deceased was killed in her own home, with a knife and in the presence of her children. [46] That the offence was not intentional, deliberate or premeditated, but rather, an ‘impulsive and spontaneous act’ conversely lessened the gravity of the offence. [47] Accordingly, the offence fell below the middle of the range of objective seriousness. [50]
Justice Yehia was satisfied that the offender was ‘deeply remorseful’ of his actions, pleading guilty at the first opportunity and giving evidence in the sentencing proceedings. [75]–[77] Further, the offender’s moral culpability was significantly reduced, having regard to the offender’s background of disadvantage and deprivation. [88]
R v Dempsey [2023] NSWSC 205 (17 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Coercive Control’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charges: Murder x 1.
Facts: The male offender brutally murdered his former de facto partner, and mother of his two young children, in her home. [1]; [15] The offender struck the deceased multiple times with a wooden plank, before placing her body in a filled bath tub.
The relationship was ‘volatile’, with the offender particularly ‘possessive, regularly intoxicated and often verbally abusive’ towards the deceased. [12] Until the murder, the offender had not been physically violent towards the deceased.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to 19 years and 9 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 ½ years. [72]
Justice Haim held the offending to constitute ‘criminality of an extremely high order’: [33]
The fact that the murder represented an extreme case of domestic violence gives rise to the need to impose a sentence that will deter others from thinking they have some right to control the conduct of their former domestic partners [34]
Though not part of ‘an ongoing pattern of domestic violence’, the offence was ‘a manifestation of the offender’s controlling and possessive behaviour’. [34] It was spurred by the deceased’s desire to leave the relationship and move her children to another town.
The offence occurred in the deceased’s own home — an aggravating feature of the offence — and was carried out with a weapon. [37] In determining the sentence, Justice Hamil noted the offender’s lack of relevant criminal convictions (most of which concerned drug offences), [61] and delayed expression of remorse and acknowledgment of responsibility. [64]
R v Songcuan (No 3) [2023] NSWSC 183 (3 March 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Advanced age’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Common law’ – ‘Covid19’ – ‘Extreme provocation’ – ‘Female primary perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Homicide’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Male primary victim’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Otherwise exemplary character’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Proceeding: Sentencing hearing for manslaughter conviction.
Charge(s): Manslaughter.
Facts: The male accused and female deceased were married in the Philippines before immigrating to Australia. Their relationship had deteriorated over the decade prior to the wife’s death. Tension had escalated significantly during COVID lockdowns and the deceased wife was increasingly aggressive, controlling and violent towards the accused, believing him to be unfaithful to her.
The deceased had found a birthday card sent by a co-worker to the accused and an argument had ensued, during which the deceased wife struck the accused with a rolled-up canvas-photograph and threw a remote control. The accused went into the garage and was followed by the deceased, where she threatened the accused with pliers. The accused disarmed her, put his arm around her throat and hand over her mouth and applied pressure until she stopped breathing.
Decision and Reasoning: The accused was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 7 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 5 years.
Campbell J accepted the accused’s account of the deterioration of the couple’s relationship and the deceased’s aggressive, controlling and violent behaviour towards him. It was significant that were no allegations of previous domestic violence by the accused and there was evidence he had sought reconcile the relationship by seeking the intervention of their daughter and the local pastor.
Campbell J found that the manslaughter had been an isolated incident in which the accused had uncharacteristically lost self-control. The intensification of the deceased’s ongoing threatening, controlling and violent behaviour towards him was found to constitute intimidation (s13 Crimes Act (NSW)) and HH found that the manslaughter was one of extreme provocation, both cumulative and immediate.
The starting point were the principles of retribution and denunciation, particularly important in the context of an instance of serious domestic violence where the accused had clear moral culpability. However, the accused was found to have lived an ‘exemplary’ and ‘completely blameless’ pro-social life and his conduct was an ‘aberration.’ These factors in conjunction with his old age gave him strong prospects of rehabilitation and made him extremely unlikely to reoffend, reducing the relevance of deterrence. The accused’s early plea of guilty and the additional hardships imposed upon him by COVID-related delays were also taken into account.
R v Ahmed (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 105 (17 February 2023) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Murder.
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and female victim were married and had immigrated from Bangladesh together. The relationship began to deteriorate, and the victim developed a romantic attachment with a mutual friend.
The offender became suspicious of their relationship, confronting the parties and expressing mental health concerns to his GP. He began to act aggressively and controllingly towards the victim, losing his temper, threatening to kill himself, tracking her location, calling her frequently at work and insisting she go to bed at the same time as him.
The victim began to express her desire to separate but agreed to take a break and travel to Bangladesh. During this time, the offender monitored the victim’s Facebook, messaged her requesting details of the minutiae of her life and searched on the internet for how to punish an unfaithful wife in Islam. Upon returning to Australia, the victim made it known that there was no future in their relationship.
On the day of the murder, the offender confronted the victim in her home about the affair and threatened her with a knife, demanding her phone. Upon seeing that the victim remained romantically involved with the friend, the offender stabbed her 14 times. As she died, he uploaded a photo and status on Facebook before calling triple-zero 20 minutes later and admitting to killing his wife.
Sentence: 24 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
While the offender was suffering an adjustment order, N Adams J was not satisfied that he was substantially impaired and found that the murder was one of a jealous and humiliated husband flying into a rage about his wife leaving.
The offence was a grave example of murder. While not premeditated, the evidence established that the victim was in fear of her life within the relationship. Her defencelessness and pleas for forgiveness, the brutality of the attack, the offender’s deliberate delay in calling 000 and failure to render any assistance, and his internet search of punishment prior to the killing all increased the seriousness.
The adjustment disorder slightly reduced the offender’s moral culpability and regard was had to his good prospects of rehabilitation and unlikeliness of reoffending, as he had demonstrated remorse, made admissions and had no criminal history.
R v Gina Kennedy (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWSC 1499 (4 November 2022) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Axe’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Killing of estranged husband’ – ‘Motivation of jealousy and revenge’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Planning’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charge: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to killing her estranged husband with an axe. She then handed herself into police the next day. Their relationship had been marred by domestic violence. Police had been called numerous times and their four children had been removed by Child Protection due to the offender’s assault on her eldest child. The deceased had assaulted the offender three times [101]. The offender had behaved in a jealous and controlling way towards her husband, did not like him talking to his mother, was jealous of him being with other women and conducted multiple online searches into methods of killing someone [102]. The offender killed the deceased in his home while he was asleep and while she was subject to an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order.
Issues: Appropriate sentence: had the offender killed her husband in self-defence or for motives of jealousy and revenge for him leaving the relationship?
Decision and Reasoning: Sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 19 years.
At [111] Adams J found that it was ‘a planned killing committed out of revenge and jealousy’ not due to the history of domestic violence. Her Honour reduced the sentence by 25% due to the offender’s early offer to plead guilty [172].
State of NSW v Monteiro (Final) [2020] NSWSC 881 (8 July 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault in the context of an intimate relationship’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assessment of whether defendant poses an unacceptable risk’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Extended supervision order’ – ‘False report’ – ‘High risk offender’ – ‘High/unacceptable risk of re-offending’ – ‘History of offending in the context of intimate relationships’
Charges: Aggravated sexual assault without consent x 1; Malicious damage x 1; Larceny x 1.
Proceedings: Extended Supervision Order (ESO) application.
Facts: The defendant had previously been found guilty of aggravated sexual assault without consent. The defendant never accepted responsibility for the offence and contested the charges at trial. At the time of the offence, the male defendant was in an intimate relationship with the female victim. The defendant was possessive, erratic, physically and verbally abusive and ‘intimidating and demanding’ towards the victim. The victim asked the defendant to move out of the parties’ shared accommodation and when they met to ‘hand over his keys’, the defendant physically assaulted and raped the victim. Later, when the victim went to report the assault to the police, it transpired that ‘the defendant had earlier made a false report that he had been assaulted by the victim and that she had threatened to invent a charge of rape’ as an attempt to pre-empt the victim’s report. While she was at the police station the defendant had returned to her flat and ‘destroyed the interior’ [14] of it, he overturned the fish tank killing her fish and damaged photographs and other personal items. The trial judge’s assessment of a high risk of re-offending is supported by the statements of two forensic psychiatrists. The defendant has been subject to a number of allegations of and charges relating to verbal and physical abuse and sexual assault in the context of historical intimate relationships (spanning from 1997-present).
Issues: Whether the Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.
Decision and reasoning: Extended Supervision Order made for a five-years including the requirement of electronic monitoring and reporting and restrictions on changing personal details (including the defendant’s name).
Allegations (not charged or prosecuted), withdrawn charges and/or dropped prosecutions are able to be relied upon by psychiatrists in assessing risk of re-offending. There is a high degree of probability that the defendant poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision.
Note: The offender in this matter lodged an appeal against imposition of the Extended Supervision order, which he has not pursued, and has also sought an order revoking the imposition of the Extended Supervision Order imposed in this matter. Orders were made in respect of that matter on 24 February 2022 including an order that the self-represented applicant regularise the proceedings by filing a summons as initiating process in accordance with Rule 6.4(1)(h) UCPR stating the grounds upon which the revocation of the extended supervision order is sought. (Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 148 (24 February 2022)).
Transport Accident Commission v Haimour [2020] NSWSC 868 (8 July 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Legal error’ – ‘Motor Accidents Compensation (MAC) ACT 1999’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Permanent impairment guidelines for pre-existing or subsequent condition’
Proceedings: Judicial review of the Medical Assessment Review Panel assessment that the female first defendant’s whole person impairment (WPI) for psychiatric and/or psychological injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident was 21%.
Facts: The plaintiff argued that the assessment of the first defendant’s pre-existing and/or subsequent impairment for injuries unrelated to the motor vehicle accident was flawed because the domestic violence she was exposed to before and after the accident contributed significantly to the exacerbation of her symptomology. Based on collateral materials, the Review Panel found the first defendant was ‘subjected to a pattern of both physical and emotional abuse in a dysfunctional marriage which both pre-dated and post-dated the accident’. The first defendant ‘maintain[ed] that she was not the victim of any domestic violence before or after the accident’.
The Review Panel did not determine what percentage of the WPI was attributable to the motor vehicle accident and what percentage to domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Medical Assessment Review Panel decision set aside. Matter to be returned to the Review Panel. There was an error of law in:
the Panel’s failure to undertake for themselves an assessment of the degree to which one episode of trauma versus an unrelated episode of trauma or, in this case episodic trauma, contributed to the first defendant’s WPI for the purposes of the MAC Act.
Rakielbakhour v DPP [2020] NSWSC 323 (31 March 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Bail application - covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm - relevance of covid-19 pandemic to application for bail’
Offences: Common assault x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x1.
Proceedings: Application for bail
Issues: Whether to grant bail; Relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic
Facts: The female victim was married to the accused man and it is alleged that he believed she was conducting an affair with another man (his mother told him she exchanged telephone numbers with a real estate agent) at the time of the alleged offending. It is alleged that the accused became jealous and "punched the victim repeatedly to the face and body, before tackling her to the ground and continuing to punch her." [3] The accused then allegedly hit the victim in the head and face with a hair dryer. The victim had significant bruising and swelling as well as a laceration across the forehead and scratches to her neck.
The victim told police "she fell in the shower and hit her head on the step" [8] while the offender claimed to have not been home at the victim sustained the injuries and refused to give evidence. The offender pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Judgment: Bail granted subject to conditions. The judge noted that in some domestic violence cases, a victim’s refusal to provide evidence may be "a reason for hesitating before granting bail" due to the concern "that the psychology of the victim of domestic abuse is such that they do not want to implicate their intimate partner out of fear or out of love or loyalty. The release of the alleged perpetrator may heighten those emotions" [7].
The judge found that the applicant had a relatively minor criminal history and enjoyed significant family and community support. He accepted evidence demonstrating that the applicant and his father suffer from various illnesses, and that the applicant’s business was experiencing a significant downturn due to his incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic. Justice Hamill acknowledged that the pandemic and its associated risks were "matters properly to be taken into account" when considering a release application under s 18 of the Bail Act [15]. "Without attempting to be exhaustive, the pandemic may be relevant to the following paragraphs within s 18(1):
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Section 18(1)(m) says it is relevant to consider "the need for an accused person to be free for any other lawful reason". That might (or must) include the need for an applicant to protect themselves from infection and to support their family if there is evidence to support such a finding. It is relevant to the present application because of the applicant’s father’s ill-health.
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Section 18(1)(h) is also relevant. The length of time a person will remain in custody will often be affected by the measures courts are taking to ensure that participants in litigation are safe. As has been seen, many cases have been, and will be, adjourned or delayed.
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Section 18(1)(l) relates to the need for the accused to prepare for their appearance in court or obtain legal advice. At present, all legal visits in NSW prisons are being conducted by video-link. While the same is probably true of most conferences between lawyers and their clients, the facilities within the prison system must be under great strain because so many court cases are being conducted by video link and the number of available audio-visual suites is finite.
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Section 18(1)(k) refers to any "special vulnerability the accused person has". While not relevant to present application, the literature published by the Health authorities suggest Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are particularly susceptible to the spread of the virus."[15]
R v Edwards (No 3) [2019] NSWSC 1815 (18 December 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Controlling, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Lack of evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Sentencing -separation -following, harrassing, monitoring’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused was found to have killed his estranged wife in an unknown manner after she ended their relationship and rekindled a relationship with a man she had an affair with early in the marriage. The accused frequently monitored his estranged wife’s life.
Issues: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 24 years imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 18 years. At [67] Hulme J said: "Punishment, denunciation, and deterrence are particularly important aspects of the assessment of sentence in a case such as this. I endorse the following observations recently made by Wilson J: [in R v Keith Owen Goodbun [2018] NSWSC 1025 at [202]-[204]]
"[D]omestic violence is a profoundly serious problem in this community, extending, not infrequently, to the murder of a spouse or partner …
Too often, these are crimes committed by men against women who have chosen to live a separate life – a decision the male partner is not prepared to accept …
… The courts must ensure that those who commit offences like those now before this Court pay a heavy price for their crimes, to punish them, to denounce the crime, and to deter others. The victims of domestic violence must be protected insofar as the courts are able to afford them protection."
R v June Oh Seo [2019] NSWSC 639 (31 May 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor literacy skills’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim were in a ‘romantic’ relationship and lived together at the victim’s apartment. The victim found the offender to be possessive and controlling. The victim tried to end the relationship, but the offender threatened to commit suicide if she did. The offender eventually moved out of the victim’s apartment, but continued to contact her. On 7 October 2017, the offender went to the victim’s apartment. He punched her in the face, and then threw her body over the balcony railing. He did not call for help. The precise cause of death is not entirely clear. The offender had two prior convictions for common assault and contravention of an apprehended domestic violence order for which he was placed on bonds ([43]-[44]). The bond imposed on the offender for the assault was current at the time of the offending, and thus was breached ([45]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Wilson J convicted the offender of murder. Taking into account a further offence of assaulting and occasioning actual bodily harm to the victim, and his guilty plea, the offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 22 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 16 years and 10 months. Wilson J took into account the objective gravity of the crimes, the personal circumstances of the offender, and the relevant principles of sentencing.
The murder was found to be serious ([51]) and brutal ([57]). The victim was physically smaller than the offender, and was unable to sufficiently defend herself. An aggravating circumstance was that she was attacked in her own home – a place of peace and safety ([53]). The offender’s moral culpability was found to be high, as his conduct demonstrated a violent disregard for the victim’s right to autonomy, that is, to choose to end their relationship if she wishes ([59]). He acted from a profound sense of entitlement ([79]). Her Honour noted the ‘distressing frequency’ of the offender’s crime, and the significant role of general and specific deterrence in determining his sentence [79]-[84].
The offender’s background and the breach of his bond suggested that he had relatively poor prospects of rehabilitation ([85]-[86]). Further, the offender was a Korean national with limited English skills and no family locally. Although Wilson J took this into account when fixing the sentence, she was not persuaded that the offender’s circumstances were special or that the statutory ratio of the sentence should be varied ([87]-[88]).
R v Ahmed (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 517 (8 May 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Abnormality of mind’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Judge alone trial.
Facts: Mr Ahmed allegedly murdered his wife (the victim) by inflicting 14 stab wounds. He called 000, and told the operator that he had stabbed and killed his wife. He told police that he assaulted and threatened to kill her if she did not give him access to her phone, and that it was only after he read her recent text messages, which confirmed the continuation of an affair she had with Mr Khan, that he lost control and stabbed her. He also said that he did not intend to kill her. When Mr Ahmed killed the victim, he was suffering a mental illness, which the experts agreed was likely to have been an adjustment disorder, that being a form of depressive illness ([13]). He later offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, but this was not accepted by the Crown. At his trial, Mr Ahmed advanced a partial defence of substantial impairment under section 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which would, if established, reduce the conviction of murder to manslaughter ([1]-[5]).
Section 23A requires that Mr Ahmed establish, on the balance of probabilities, that at the time that he killed the victim:
•
He suffered an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition;
•
That abnormality substantially impaired his capacity to control himself; and
•
That his impairment was so substantial as to warrant his liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter.
Issues: The issue before the Court was whether the partial defence of substantial impairment could be established. There were also issues as to what should be made of Mr Ahmed’s various accounts and which expert’s opinion should be preferred.
Decision and reasoning: Mr Ahmed was convicted of murder and did not discharge his onus of establishing the partial defence of substantial impairment by abnormality of mind. In coming to this conclusion, Schmidt J considered the facts, as well as the issues about Mr Ahmed’s accounts and the experts’ competing opinions ([35]). His Honour noted that it was difficult to determine whether the stabbing was a result of Mr Ahmed’s ‘abnormality of mind’ or his deliberately acting on his feelings of humiliation and fury ([221]). This was explained by the diverging expert opinions ([222]).
Schmidt J agreed that Mr Ahmed suffered from an ‘abnormality of mind’ when he killed the victim ([25]), but held that this did not ‘substantially impair’ his capacity to control himself ([200]-[253]). He was satisfied that it had been established on the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that he deliberately acted on an intention, formed when he read the text messages, to kill the victim, instead of having an impaired capacity to control himself ([253]). Not only was Mr Ahmed well aware that the victim was intent on divorce, but he also suspected that it was the continuation of her relationship with Mr Khan which was driving her desire for a divorce. This led him to assault and threaten her in order to gain access to her phone, and then kill her when he read the text messages which confirmed his suspicions ([246]).
His Honour held that his sentence could not, in any event, be reduced to manslaughter, particularly in light of community standards. Mr Ahmed neither had a criminal record, nor any history of domestic violence, apart from one occasion in 2016 when he admitted to punching a wall in an argument. However, despite his prior good character, Mr Ahmed was found to have deliberately acted on his intention to kill his wife, evidenced by his deliberate delay in calling 000 until he was certain she had stopped breathing ([255]).
R v Ahmed [2019] NSWSC 55 (8 February 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Adverse media’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prejudice’ – ‘Social media’ – ‘Trial by jury’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for trial by judge alone.
Facts: Mr Ahmed allegedly murdered his wife (the victim) by inflicting 14 stab wounds. He called 000, and told the operator that he had stabbed and killed his wife. He told police that he assaulted and threatened to kill her if she did not give him access to her phone, and that it was only after he read her recent text messages, which confirmed the continuation of an affair she had with Mr Khan, that he lost control and stabbed her. He also said that he did not intend to kill her. When Mr Ahmed killed the victim, he was suffering a mental illness, which the experts agreed was likely to have been an adjustment disorder, that being a form of depressive illness. He pleaded not guilty to murder, but later offered to plead guilty to manslaughter, which was not accepted by the Crown. At his trial, Mr Ahmed advanced a partial defence of substantial impairment under section 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which would, if established, reduce the conviction of murder to manslaughter.
Issue: A key issue was that a fair trial was unlikely before a jury because of the significant general and social media posts about the accused and the homicide. There was a risk of prejudice from the adverse media and social media commentary about his racial background and faith.
Held: Schmidt J dismissed the application for a trial by judge alone.
The killing attracted substantial social media coverage, with such coverage being shared on Facebook pages of media organisations and ‘professed anti-Islamic’ groups. Many Facebook users shared ‘negatively biased views against Mr Ahmed’ ([26]), and the majority of comments were either directly or indirectly racist ([27]). Some of this adverse coverage focused on his background as a Bangladeshi immigrant and presumed membership of the Muslim faith ([32]). However, as per the Court in Hughes v R [2015] NSWCCA 330, an offender who is subject to intense community interest may still be able to receive a fair trial ([33]). The Court in Hughes v R stated that the modern world is one of instant, largely unregulated communication of opinions, ranging from mild to extreme, which can be accessed and responded to by others. However, there is good reason to continue in the expectation that, notwithstanding advances in technology and what they permit, jurors will decide cases on the basis of evidence, the judge’s directions, and the submissions advanced at trial.
Schmidt J held that a jury would be required to be directed at trial to impartially approach the issue as to whether he has a partial defence, and to make its decision only on the evidence, the parties’ submissions and the judge’s directions, rather than on the basis of their own enquires on the internet ([35]). His Honour held that ‘there is no question that there is a risk, which exists at every trial, that a member of the jury will not adhere to such directions, but will access prejudicial material of the kind on which Mr Ahmed relies, to advance this application’ ([36]). Nevertheless, as observed in Hughes v R, it has been long settled that jurors will ‘approach their tasks conscientiously’. In Schmidt J’s view, the stereotypical opinions expressed on social media about Mr Ahmed would not necessarily deprive him of a fair trial before the jury, even though it may have to consider some distressing photographs of the victim’s injuries ([38]). The issues for determination in relation to the domestic violence killing had nothing to do with his racial background or religion, but on his mental state and whether that entitles him to a partial defence ([37]).
Note: Schmidt J refused Mr Ahmed’s application for a judge alone trial. However, only days before the trial was due to commence, a large volume of documents was served, which included internet searches by Mr Ahmed about punishing adulterous wives. The Crown consented to the offender being tried by a judge alone. Therefore, a trial by judge alone order was made under section 132(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). See R v Ahmed (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 517 (8 May 2019).
R v Raquel Hutchinson [2019] NSWSC 25 (31 January 2019) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender, with the help of her new fiancé, murdered her ex-husband after luring him to his townhouse, where she was lying in wait for him. When he returned home, he was struck and punched many times, resulting in a broken nose. There was also evidence that an electrical prod or Taser was used during the assault. He later died of asphyxia. The major perpetrator of the violence was found to be the offender due to the anger and hatred she had for the victim as he had custody of their two children. One of those children, their son, was present in the house at the time of the offence and witnessed many of the events leading to his father’s death ([4]-[11]).
Issues: The issue was the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. In Hamill J’s opinion, this was a serious example of manslaughter because of the planning and premeditation involved in the assault. Even though there was no intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, the fact that the intention was formed whilst the offender was in a rage adds to the gravity of the manslaughter. There were various aggravating features, the most serious being the fact that the offence was committed in the presence of a child ([26]). She exposed her son to the extreme brutality of the assault and killing of his father, which resulted in emotional and psychological damage. Another powerful aggravating feature was the fact that the offence was committed inside the victim’s home – a place where people are entitled to feel protected and safe ([27]). The psychiatric incapacity of the offender also played an important role in reducing her liability from murder to manslaughter, and was relevant to the subjective component of self-defence and to her defence of substantial impairment. The offender’s personal circumstances were considered. She was a victim of child sexual abuse, had a long-standing substance abuse disorder and a history of psychiatric problems ([36]). Although it was found that she tried to be a good mother, Hamill J was not satisfied that she was a person of good character due to her bad associations, erratic behaviour and chronic drug dependence ([38]). However, given her lack of significant prior offences and the efforts she made in custody, his Honour was satisfied that she had good prospects of rehabilitation and was unlikely to reoffend. She also made an early plea of guilty to manslaughter.
R v AKB [2018] NSWSC 1628 (2 November 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender and deceased married in Iran. The offender started a fire in his wife’s bedroom in the family home. She died in the fire. Their relationship prior to the fire had ‘deteriorated’ [5]. Davies J accepted that the offender became aware of the deceased’s intention to leave him. This was confirmed by the offender’s visit to the Department of Human services the day before the fire where he made a claim for a benefit, on the basis that he was separated. His Honour also accepted beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was responsible for the fire in the presence of their two young children.
Issues: Davies J determined the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Decision and reasoning: The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 36 years with a non-parole period of 27 years. His Honour remarked that ‘[t]he murder of any person is intolerable and unacceptable, but the circumstances of this murder can only be described as confronting, shocking and gruesome to a marked degree’ ([24]). The murder was aggravated by the fact that it was carried out in the presence of their two young children, in circumstances where the offender actively prevented one of their children from trying to save his mother, and at the deceased’s home where she was entitled to feel safe. It also involved gratuitous cruelty and planning and preparation (albeit minimal, [32]). However, his level of culpability was not so extreme so as to attract a life sentence. Whilst specific and general deterrence are important factors in sentencing for murder in a domestic setting (see Hiron v R [2007] NSWCCA 336), specific deterrence was not significant because of the offender’s low risk of reoffending. This was consolidated by the fact that the offender had no prior criminal record, the offence was committed against a person known to the offender (rather than the public at large) and his older age. His Honour concluded at [37] –
‘This was a very bad murder, but the limited planning, the absence of the need to give significant weight to community protection, and the fact that a lengthy sentence will meet the need for specific deterrence, mean that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can be met by other than the imposition of life sentence.’
Although his Honour noted that the offender had no prior convictions, he was not able to mitigate the enormity of the crime against the deceased ([46]). Further, his Honour found it difficult to see how the offender could be fully rehabilitated without acknowledging the shocking act against his wife and the impact that it continued to have on their children and the deceased’s family. Accordingly, his prospects of rehabilitation were only average.
R v Cahill (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 2025 (12 October 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Trial.
Facts: The accused and the victim were in a relationship, characterised by incidents of violence by both sides. They immigrated to Australia from Ireland and shared accommodation with different people over a period of time. The accused stabbed the victim in the neck, resulting in his death. This matter relates to the additional evidence that Johnson J demanded from the Crown in R v Cahill (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1531. This evidence related to things said by the victim to other persons with respect to events concerning the accused ([2]). Firstly, the Crown sought to tender a statement by a man who claimed that the victim told him that the accused hit him when he was sleep ([3]). He also stated that the victim told him that the accused had sent him a text that she would kill him ([25]). Secondly, the Crown sought to tender evidence arising from another man’s statement that the victim told him that he was attacked by the accused with a screwdriver ([16]).
Issues: Whether certain evidence is admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The decision involved rulings made on admissibility of evidence (see [12], [14], [24] and [28]). With respect to the first statement, the Court held that the passage of time and the lack of precision as to the incident to which the statement related affected the question as to whether or not it ought to be admitted as evidence of truth of the fact ([10]). However, the Court held that this evidence will be admitted at the trial, but the jury will be directed that it cannot be used as evidence of the truth of the facts of the matters asserted in the representation ([11]-[12]). The Court did not allow the Crown to adduce the additional statement about the text message as there was no indication as to when it was sent. The absence of any time when it was said to have occurred significantly reduced the evidentiary use of the material ([25]-[28]). With respect to the second statement, the Court considered s 65 of the Evidence Act 1995 and admitted it as evidence of the truth of the fact ([21]-[24]).
R v Cahill (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1531 (11 October 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Trial.
Facts: The accused and the victim were in a relationship, characterised by incidents of violence by both sides. They immigrated to Australia from Ireland and shared accommodation with different people over a period of time. The accused stabbed the victim in the neck, resulting in his death. The defence adduced evidence from various people, such as an ex-partner of the victim and the father of another ex-partner. Both provided supporting evidence of incidents of violence during the relationships ([92]-[93]). The Crown submitted that the material lacked significant probative value as it was expressed vaguely and was remote in time from the events in the trial ([94]). The Crown also sought to have admitted as relationship evidence the totality of the evidence sought to be tendered for tendency purposes together with additional evidence of the accused’s various roommates ([96]-[98]).
Issues: Whether certain evidence of the Crown and defence was able to be adduced.
Decision and reasoning: The judgment by Johnson J deals with a number of evidentiary issues, involving tendency and relationship evidence ([99]-[123]). With respect to the statements by an ex-partner and the father of another ex-partner, the events to which they referred were significantly remote in time from those relevant to the trial and did not involve the accused. Consequently, his Honour did not allow the accused to rely upon this evidence for tendency purposes ([114]-[119]). Further, Johnson J was satisfied that the evidence tendered by the Crown should be admitted as relationship evidence ([99]-[103]). At [120]-[122], Johnson J sought further submissions about particular areas of the tendered material. These areas related to the Crown’s intention to adduce evidence of things said by the victim to other persons with respect to events concerning the accused.
R v Jenkin (No 10) [2018] NSWSC 705 (18 May 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Audio visual link’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of witnesses’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Applications to adduce evidence from former partner of accused and to give evidence via video link.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for murder of an associate. The prosecution sought to adduce evidence from the defendant’s former partner describing assaults he committed against her while he was on drugs ([5]). The prosecution sought to establish a tendency to ‘detain persons and to intimidate and physically assault them’ ([3]).
Issues: Whether the evidence should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: Most of the evidence was not admitted because it did not show that the accused had a tendency to detain persons ([8]). One paragraph of the evidence was admitted because it evidenced the defendant locking her in a room and making sure she couldn’t leave ([14]). While the evidence concerned uncharged acts of violence, the judge considered that there was little risk of prejudice given that the trial is a judge-alone trial ([14]).
The former partner applied to give evidence via videolink after evidence from psychologists stated that giving evidence would be an extremely stressful situation. The judge accepted that using the videolink facility would reduce her trauma. The defence’s ability to assess her credibility was not significantly compromised ([18]).
R v TP [2018] NSWSC 369 (23 March 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Negligent manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender’s partner, JK, committed serious acts of physical and psychological violence against the defendant and her two daughters for years ([4]), including striking them with sticks, tying one of them (CN) to a bed and hitting her with wooden slats ([13]-19], [36]-[38]). The worst of the violence was directed towards CN, which eventually resulted in her death. By her plea of guilty, the offender acknowledged that her failure to remove CN from the violence and obtain medical treatment for her serious injuries was the cause of her death ([3], [25]). Expert evidence established that the offender suffered from ‘battered wife syndrome’ - a syndrome likely to exhibit symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression caused by repeated exposure to violence ([5], [40]-[41]).
Issues: The issue was the appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: Hamill J remarked that ‘[the] criminal law is a blunt tool in circumstances such as these’ ([8]). The offender’s psychological conditions substantially impacted the application of the principles of sentencing, the purpose of punishment and reduced the ultimate sentence. The impact was significant for various reasons. Firstly, there was a clear and direct link between the violence suffered by the offender and her criminal neglect of CN ([55]). Secondly, the weight afforded to general deterrence was greatly reduced ([56]-[57]). Thirdly, the offender’s rehabilitation through regular visits to psychologists and psychiatrists would be interrupted if a full-time custodial sentence was imposed ([58]). Fourthly, a custodial sentence would weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person who does not suffer from the severe depression, grief and post-traumatic stress disorder ([59]). Fifthly, the offender was unlikely to re-offend ([60]). The offending was aggravated by CN’s young age and fragility after her long-term exposure to abuse ([62]). Having considered all possible alternatives, including a fine, bond or community service order, Hamill J concluded that only a period of imprisonment was appropriate ([78]). His Honour sentenced the offender to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months ([79]-[80]). Annexed to the judgement, at [82], is a useful summary of comparable cases. However, there are no cases in the annexure that had precisely the same features as this one.
Franklin v Commissioner of Police [2018] NSWSC 310 (14 March 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Scope of subpoenas’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Assault x 1.
Case type: Application
Facts: The Plaintiff was charged with assaulting his wife ([2]). The Plaintiff issued a number of subpoenas to the Commissioner of Police and a hospital, seeking material including all police records for the immediate proceeding, the victim, all attendances at their home, all records of complaints proceedings instigated by the Plaintiff against the police, copies of notebooks of certain officers, and copies of all internal police communications in relation to the proceedings ([3], [28]).
At a hearing on 5 April 2017 in a Local Court, the police objected to the subpoenas on the basis that they were too wide ([29]). The Plaintiff then issued two more subpoenas to prosecution witnesses, which were also objected to on the grounds of absence of legitimate forensic purpose and public interest immunity ([34]). At a hearing on 18 and 19 July 2017, the magistrate allowed access to some documents but refused access to others ([36]).
Issues: The Plaintiff appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on 5 April 2017 on 5 grounds outlined at [37]. The Plaintiff appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on 19 July 2017 on 8 grounds outlined at [51].
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed because there was no error of law and no basis for a grant of leave for the Plaintiff to rely upon the grounds of appeal ([46], [81]).
Justice Johnson appeared to refer to the Plaintiff being self-represented at [80]:
I provided the Plaintiff with ample opportunity at the hearing on 2 and 10 November 2017 to advance arguments in support of his claim for relief. I have considered those arguments in this judgment, perhaps in greater detail than is called for by the limited statutory avenue of appeal which is available. One reason for taking this approach was to resolve what appeared to be a heavily litigated issue by the Plaintiff at the interlocutory level ahead of the summary hearing in the Local Court. It is appropriate that the way be cleared for the hearing and determination of the charge against him.
R v Fesus (No 9) [2018] NSWSC 176 (23 February 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Factors effecting risk’ – ‘Historical offence’ – ‘Historical sentencing practice’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant was convicted of the 1997 murder of his 18-year-old wife. The judge found that the defendant strangled his wife after she proposed to leave him and take the children with her ([50]). The defendant denied the allegations and attempted to cover up the murder, but later made admissions to an undercover police officer in 2013 ([23]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Johnson had regard to sentences imposed for similar cases in 1997 ([88]-[93]) and imposed a head sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years and 6 months ([98)). At [50]-[51] Johnson J explained:
The Offender murdered his young wife in the course of a domestic dispute arising from her declaration that she proposed to leave him and take the children with her. Although the Offender and Jodie had lived together for about two years, they had only been married for three months at the time of her death. Jodie was a young mother who, despite her considerable life experience at that time, was barely an adult. The Offender was 26 years old at the time of the offence.
The fact that the marriage was breaking down (after only three months) does not assist the Offender. It has been observed that killings within a domestic situation occur very often when there has been a build-up of tension between the killer and victim over a period of years: R v Whitmore [1998] NSWCCA 75 at [16]. That is not the position in this case. Here, the Offender murdered his very young wife at a time of marital strain after just three months of marriage.
Justice Johnson also noted the lack of previous domestic violence, and the prevalence of choking in domestic violence:
The evidence does not suggest a prior history of domestic violence on the part of the Offender towards Jodie. That said, their relationship was not a particularly long one and his response to Jodie’s desire to leave was a savage and homicidal one.
The use of choking in the course of domestic violence is now well recognised as a gross form of control with a capacity (as occurred here) to cause death: Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150 at [75].
R v Stephen (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 167 (6 February 2018) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Abused person’ – ‘Court processes’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Application by the accused to sit outside the dock.
Facts: The accused was on trial for murder for stabbing the victim, who was her husband. It was undisputed that at the time of stabbing, she had been subjected to severe violence at the time of the offence, and for over a year prior to the stabbing (see R v Stephen (No. 3) [2018] NSWSC 168 (20 February 2018) ). The accused made an application to sit outside the dock, next to her legal team. The Crown supported the application ([1]-[2]).
Issues: Whether the judge should exercise his discretion to grant the request pursuant to s 34 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused.
Justice Button weighed up the countervailing factors. Factors in favour of granting the application were that the accused had been on bail for many months, she was not a security risk, she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, and she argued that sitting in the dock will be prejudicial for the jury ([3]-[6], [9]). Factors weighing against granting the application were that the accused is not a child or a person suffering from a disability, that the dock is a traditional symbol of the gravity of the proceedings, that there is no inconvenience for the accused being in the dock, and she is charged with a very serious offence ([8], [10]-[14]).
Justice Button concluded that there was nothing exceptional about the matter to justify the request being granted. The next day, his Honour received further submissions with more detailed evidence about the accused’s mental health issues but declined to alter the ruling ([18]).
R v McMaster [2017] NSWSC 1063 (16 August 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Co-operation with police’ – ‘Drug abuse’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Firearms’
Charges: Possession of unauthorised firearm x 1; Intimidation x 1; Handling firearm while intoxicated x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: While under the influence of alcohol and cocaine, the defendant repeatedly called and texted the complainant, his ex-partner ([5]). He drove to her house with the gun in the passenger seat (of which she took photographs). He aimed the gun at her with his finger on the trigger. He ultimately returned to his vehicle ([3]). The defendant refused to co-operate with the police or disclose the location of the firearm ([5]). The defendant had been in custody for four months ([6]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted. The application was opposed by police.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Harrison refused bail. The decisive matter was that the complainant had not revealed the location of the firearm, so there was a real possibility that he would have unrestricted access to it if he was released. But for this matter, Harrison J would have granted bail with appropriate conditions.
R v Walker (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 1049 (10 August 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Not unfairly prejudicial’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Voir dire.
Facts: The accused was on trial for murdering his de facto partner. During the relationship, neither the victim nor the police had obtained an AVO against the accused, despite evidence of injuries caused by the accused ([3]). The Crown sought to adduce hearsay evidence of statements the victim had made to her doctor. In a discussion about the victim taking out an AVO, the victim had said ‘I don’t deserve it’ and ‘don’t want to cause trouble’ ([1]).
Issues: Whether the evidence was admissible.
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence was admitted.
The statements fell within an exception to the hearsay rule because they were evidence of the victim’s state of mind (s 66A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) ([5]). Nevertheless, the accused argued that the statements should not be admitted for three reasons:
•
the statements were not relevant because they could not affect an assessment of the probability of the existence of a disputed fact ([5]);
•
the statements would result in unfair prejudice, because the victim had made contradictory statements that were not admitted ([6]); and
•
the statements were simply likely to invoke sympathy for the deceased ([7]).
However, Schmidt J held that the statements should be admitted for three reasons:
•
the statements allowed the jury to consider why the victim never sought an AVO despite complaints of violence ([9]);
•
the statements allowed the jury to consider the reliability of other hearsay representations to establish the tendency evidence led by the Crown ([9]); and
•
the doctor to whom the representations were made was available to be cross-examined (citing R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494, per Heydon JA at [12]).
Therefore, the statements were not unfairly prejudicial ([11]).
Romero v DPP [2017] NSWSC 1190 (17 July 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Error of law’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Orders’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Procedure’ – ‘Remitted to local court’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of common assault against his former partner ([1]). The police applied for an apprehended domestic violence order ([3]). The Magistrate conducted the summary trial on the basis that the Magistrates Court had jurisdiction to hear the criminal proceedings and civil proceedings for apprehended violence orders concurrently, which was incorrect ([5], [15]).
Issues: Orders to be made.
Decision and Reasoning: The DPP conceded that the Magistrate erred in law, so the only contentious point was in relation to the orders to be made. First, McCallum J ordered the DPP to pay half of the plaintiff’s costs, since the plaintiff had been denied a hearing according to law ([22]). Second, the parties sought an order remitting the matter to a ‘differently constituted Local Court’ ([23]). Judge McCallum considered that there was no need for an order to a ‘differently constituted’ Court in the absence of apprehended bias or prejudgement ([24]). Judge McCallum remitted the matter of the assault charge to the Local Court to be heard and determined according to law.
R v De Beyer [2017] NSWSC 752 (13 June 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Children's evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Judgement on the admissibility of relationship evidence.
Facts: The accused and deceased were married. The accused was on trial for her murder. It was the Crown case that the accused had stabbed his wife. He gave evidence that she stabbed herself. The prosecution case was circumstantial ([1]).
Issues: Whether evidence of the accused and deceased’s relationship was admissible ([2]).
Decision and Reasoning:
Evidence that was admitted without objection:
•
Eyewitness evidence from the accused and deceased’s son and daughter, including witnessing the accused punching and kicking the deceased, throwing things at the deceased and threatening to kill her ([3], [17]).
•
Statements made to the police by one child, the deceased and police officers after police attendance at a violent incident ([9]-[10], [15]).
•
Parts of recordings made by the deceased of arguments between her and the deceased ([13], [25]).
Evidence that was objected to, and admitted:
•
A conversation between the deceased and her sister, including statements that the accused would not let the deceased out of the house or have a phone “because he was scared she would call the police”, and that she would not leave him “because if he found her he would kill her” [23]. The statements were objected to on the basis that they were representations of the accused state of mind ([23]). The Court held that they were expressions of fear, and were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule ([24]).
•
Notes and diary entries made by the deceased, which included assertions of fact about episodes of abuse, and statements about the deceased’s state of mind about the relationship ([31]). Only general statements of fact were admitted, because they were not hearsay evidence ([30]).
Evidence that was not admitted:
•
Statements made by the deceased to her daughter that the accused attempted to drown her. The daughter only recollected these statements once she was shown the deceased’s diary. The daughter’s recollection did not appear to be firm. Therefore, Hidden AJ held that evidence was not highly probable to be reliable ([20]-[22]-[22]).
R v Biles (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 525 (3 May 2017) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Pattern of behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender was found guilty at trial of murdering the victim, his 18-year-old girlfriend and mother of his child ([2]). Both were of Aboriginal descent ([32]). He had frequently been violent towards her over their relationship of two years ([8]). The murder occurred after both had consumed alcohol throughout the day ([13]). Six other women were in the house ([4]). The offender dragged her from the kitchen into the bedroom ([15]). There were no witnesses to the attack in the bedroom, but witnesses gave evidence that the deceased screamed for approximately twenty minutes before falling silent ([17]). When the police arrived, the bedroom was covered in blood, and she was declared dead at the scene ([21]). She had injuries consistent with multiple blows to the head ([24]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Fagan J sentenced the offender to 24 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years.
His Honour considered that the murder was in the middle of the range of objective seriousness ([31]). He considered that the deceased’s young age, vulnerability, and the fact that the offender lied to other women who tried to intervene, all contributed to the seriousness of the offence ([31]).
His Honour examined the offender’s personal circumstances ([32]-[38]). His verbal comprehension was in the lowest 1% of the general population, a circumstance which contributes to a higher propensity to violence ([34]). He had a criminal history since 15 years old ([39]), but he proved unresponsive to good behaviour bonds and community service orders ([42]-[47]).
His Honour considered that these offences were the culmination of a course of domestic violence (see from [52]). His Honour remarked at [52]:
‘The experience of courts in this State has shown that men who perpetrate violence against their female partners do not stop after one occurrence. Often they become accustomed to inflicting violence of escalating severity.’
On the failure of the other women in the house to call the police, his Honour said [55]:
‘The apparent lack of a sense of urgency amongst the other women in the house … may have been due to resignation amongst them; a feeling that to some extent domestic violence is inevitable and must be endured and, perhaps, that it is a matter private to the couple, in which others should not interfere. None of that is so.’
R v Adams (No 6) [2016] NSWSC 1565 (4 November 2016) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Judge-alone trial’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Tendency’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Judge-alone trial judgment.
Facts: On 27 September 2016, the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder of Mary Wallace (the deceased) on 24 September 1983. A significant part of the Crown’s circumstantial case was that the accused possessed a tendency at the time of the alleged murder to choke or strangle women in order to force them to submit to having penile/vaginal sexual intercourse with him. The Crown led evidence of three women who had alleged that they had been sexually assaulted by the accused.
Issue/s: Whether the accused was guilty of the charge of murder.
Decision and Reasoning: In reaching this decision, His Honour first listed the legal matters he took into account in reaching the verdict (see [320]-[359]). Most relevantly, Justice Button noted that it would have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt that at the time of offence the accused possessed a tendency to strangle women to cause them to submit to intercourse with him. This was for at least two reasons: (1) there was authority that tendency must be proven to the criminal standard in order to be taken into account (see the discussion of HML v The Queen in DJV v R at [30], and R v Matonwal & Amood at [92]). (2) In the circumstances of this case, it was agreed between parties that the alleged tendency was an indispensible intermediate fact with regard to the guilt of the accused (Shepherd v The Queen)(see [337]-[339]).
Justice Button then stepped through his sequential reasoning for reaching the verdict of guilty (see [360]-[493]). One of the steps in this reasoning was that His Honour found that the accused possessed a tendency to rape women and to strangle them ancillary to that crime. This was after considering the evidence of three women (see [419]-[420]).
In light of the following evidence, at [491]-[492], Justice Button held that the accused’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt:
‘the proven tendency of the accused to rape and strangle women; the marked similarities between his interaction with the deceased and his interactions with women whom, I am satisfied, he had raped and strangled; the fact that the deceased has never been seen again after she was in the company of the accused; the fact that, within 48 hours of his interaction with the deceased, the accused undertook an activity relating to his boot that featured the use of a hose; the fact that hairs (which shared a reasonably rare profile with those of the deceased) were seized from the boot of his vehicle, and not disputed at trial to be from the deceased; and the fact that, on any analysis, the accused had ample time to dispose of the body’.
Justice Button concluded: ‘the accused treated the deceased very much as an object, just as he had treated three other young women’.
R v Silva [2015] NSWSC 148 (6 March 2015) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist’ – ‘Manslaughter by excessive self-defence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sentence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter by excessive self-defence.
Hearing: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender stabbed and killed her partner, James Polkinghorne. The relationship had been characterised by escalating physical and verbal abuse from the deceased towards the offender. On the 13 May 2012, the deceased made increasingly threatening and abusive telephone calls and messages to the offender. That night, he went to the home of the offender’s parents, where the offender was present. He was highly aggressive and high on methylamphetamine. The facts of what followed were confused and confusing (see [29]-[36]). In summary, the deceased threatened to kill the offender, he assaulted the offender, and the offender’s brother and father intervened. They began fighting with the deceased. The offender retrieved a knife from inside and, while the offender was on top of her brother, stabbed and killed the deceased. The offender was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 18 months imprisonment, wholly suspended was imposed. Hoeben CJ first made a number of factual findings. At [38] His Honour found that:
‘the offender stabbed the deceased with an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm because she believed her act was necessary to defend not only herself but her brother and father. However, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, the offender’s conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as she perceived them, thereby rendering her guilty of the crime of manslaughter by way of excessive self-defence’.
His Honour also had regard, with some qualifications, to the evidence of Associate Professor Quadrio, a consultant psychiatrist. In her report, Professor Quadrio concluded that during her relationship with the deceased, the offender developed chronic and complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with particular features which were described as ‘Battered Woman Syndrome’. She also concluded that the offender continued to suffer from PTSD. Hoeben CJ found at [40]:
‘In the absence of any psychiatric opinion to the contrary, I would normally accept such a diagnosis. In this case I am not prepared to do so. This is because the diagnosis is based upon significant pieces of history from the offender which are different to the evidence at trial and to what the offender said in her ERISP. I am prepared to accept that the offender currently suffers from PTSD. The events of the night of 13 May 2012 would of themselves be sufficient to bring about such a condition and there is no reason to doubt the existence of the symptoms which the offender described following the deceased’s death. What I am not prepared to accept is that the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was due to the offender’s relationship with the deceased and was in existence before the deceased’s death’.
However, His Honour did accept that the offender stabbed the deceased when she was in a highly emotional and hysterical state (see [41]-[43]).
In reaching an appropriate sentence, Hoeben CJ took into account a number of considerations. These included that specific deterrence were not relevant in light of the offender’s rehabilitation and the unlikelihood of re-offending (see [58]). General deterrence was not accorded substantial weight in light of exceptional factual circumstances (the deceased had made escalating threats of violence approaching the offender’s home and the offender’s state of mind was affected by being already brutally assaulted and witnessing the struggle between her family members and the deceased) (see [59]). The objective seriousness was at the lower end of the range as was the offender’s culpability (see [60]-[61]).
As against these matters, Hoeben CJ had regard to the sanctity of human life, the need to denounce the conduct of the offender and hold her accountable for her actions (see [62]).
The offender successfully appealed against her conviction to the Court of Appeal. See Silva v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 284 (7 December 2016).
DPP (NSW) v Lucas [2014] NSWSC 1441 (20 October 2014) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intentionally or recklessly damaging property’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Relationship/context evidence’
Charge/s: Intentionally or recklessly damaging property, intimidation.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against the dismissal of the charges.
Facts: The male defendant had been in a domestic relationship with the female complainant that had ended some years prior to the offence. Since that time, the complainant had taken steps to conceal where she was living with her children from the defendant. He found where they were living and was permitted to have contact and access to children. One evening, the defendant turned up to the complainant’s home uninvited and unannounced. She locked herself and the children inside the house while the defendant was yelling and screaming and making threats, including threatening to deflate the tyres on her car. It was alleged that he then deflated a tyre on her car. These charges were dismissed by a magistrate.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the magistrate erred in excluding evidence of a ‘pattern of violence’, such evidence being relevant to the intimidation charge under s 7(2) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act.
Decision and Reasoning: This ground of appeal was dismissed but the appeal was upheld on other grounds (failure to give reasons and error as to what constituted damage). Examination of the transcript indicated that the magistrate’s approach was that the prosecutor should lead evidence of the actual incident itself before leading any other evidence under s 7(2), if it was then considered necessary (See [24]-[30]).
R v Gittany (No 5) [2014] NSWSC 49 (11 February 2014) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Character evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: The offender was found guilty for the murder of his female de facto partner after a judge only trial. While the relationship was, at times, loving and happy it was also tumultuous as the offender was a jealous and possessive partner. The offender scrutinised the victim’s conduct openly and covertly, keeping track of her movements through surveillance cameras and secretly monitoring her mobile phone. On 30 July 2011, the victim had decided she was leaving the offender and attempted to leave their apartment. She was physically dragged back into the apartment by the offender and sixty-nine seconds later she fell to her death from the balcony. McCallum J was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, in a state of rage, the offender carried the unconscious complainant to the balcony and ‘unloaded’ her over the edge.
Decision and Reasoning: A sentence of 26 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years was appropriate in the circumstances. McCallum J took into account of a number of considerations in imposing this sentence. Her Honour assessed the objective seriousness of the offence. McCallum J was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the act of unloading the complainant’s body over the balcony was done with intent to kill and that, although unconscious, the complainant was undoubtedly in a state of complete terror in the last moments before her death (See [16]-[18]).
A further relevant issue in assessing objective seriousness was whether the killing was planned or premeditated. The Crown tried to adduce evidence establishing that the offender had long had in mind the possibility of committing such an act, and making it look like suicide, in the event of her leaving him. Although witness testimony substantiating this assertion was excluded for its prejudicial content, other evidence was relevant to assessing the offender’s state of mind. During the relationship, the offender engaged in an extraordinary degree of manipulative behaviour and while he was not to be punished for this conduct nor did this conduct aggravate the offence, it did inform the state of mind in which he committed the offence. McCallum J was not satisfied that the offence was planned or premeditated in the traditional sense; however, she was satisfied that the offender must have anticipated the prospect that he would fly into a rage if ever she were to leave him (See [19]-[39]). Her Honour concluded:
‘In my view, that history informs the degree of moral culpability of the offence. The arrogance and sense of entitlement with which Mr Gittany sought to control Lisa Harnum throughout their relationship deny the characterisation of his state of mind in killing her as one of complete and unexpected spontaneity. By an attritional process, he allowed possessiveness and insecurity to overwhelm the most basic respect for her right to live her life as she chose. Although I accept that the intention to kill was formed suddenly and in a state of rage, it was facilitated by a sense of ownership and a lack of any true respect for the autonomy of the woman he claimed to love’ at [40].
In sum, the objective seriousness of the offence committed was not above the middle of the notional range, having regard to the fact that the murder was not premeditated or planned. However, the offence was of sufficient seriousness that the standard non-parole period of twenty years was to be regarded as a strong guide in this case (See [43]).
McCallum J also noted the offender’s personal circumstances, including a troubling prior conviction for malicious wounding (See [44]-[59]) and noted that the complainant was vulnerable. She took into account good character references provided (noting though the contradiction posed by the way he treated the complainant) but was not persuaded that any prospect of rehabilitation existed in this case (See [65]-[74]).
This case was unsuccessfully appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal. See Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 (19 August 2016).
R v Yeoman [2003] NSWSC 194 (21 March 2003) – New South Wales Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Difficulty leaving an abusive relationship’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychosocial report - specific experience in drug and alcohol related domestic violence issues’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Hearing: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender had lived with her male de facto partner, the deceased, for 25 years (since she was 17 years old). The deceased had been violent towards the offender throughout their relationship, including hitting her in the eye with a baseball bat, but she did not have the means to leave the relationship. The deceased would often taunt the offender and dare her to stab him. They both suffered from alcoholism. One evening, the offender was heavily intoxicated and stabbed the deceased in the chest, killing him. At the time, she did not intend to kill him nor did she realise he was dead and she went to bed. The next morning she called the police and made full admissions. The offender’s recollection of events was imperfect because of her intoxication.
Decision and Reasoning: Buddin J had extensive regard to a psychological report prepared by Ms Danielle Castles, who had 17 years’ experience working in the social welfare field, with particular expertise about drug and alcohol issues and domestic violence (See [32]-[35]). Ms Castles commenced her report by explaining the nature of domestic violence and stated at [32] that:
‘domestic violence is the term used to describe the violence and abuse perpetrated upon a partner in a marriage or marriage like relationship. It is essentially the misuse of power and the exercise of control by one person, usually the man, over another, usually the woman. “Women experiencing domestic violence are often subjected to physical, sexual, emotional/psychological, social and economic abuse. Abuse may be overt (physical violence) or it might be deceptively subtle (emotional abuse). It is the interplay between making the woman fearful and reducing her self-esteem which results in the abuse having significant and prolonged effects on the woman.”
The effects of domestic violence are such that women in violent relationships are convinced they are hopeless, that they need to be dependent upon the abuser and could not possibly survive without him. The most significant aspect of prolonged abuse is the gradual breaking down of a woman’s autonomy’.
Ms Castles then set out the ways in which domestic violence impacted upon the offender here (See [33]-[34]).
Buddin J ultimately found that the offender’s criminality was at the lower end of the scale of culpability of an offence of this kind i.e. non-intentional homicide in circumstances of tragic misadventure. Her intention was no more and no less than to engage in a desperate and objectively dangerous gesture, without intending any real harm or worse to the deceased. This, in conjunction with the very powerful subjective case advanced on behalf of the offender, meant that an exceptional sentence of a good behaviour bond for four years was appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that a life was taken (See [50]). The subjective factors that mitigated sentence included that ‘the offence took place against the background of continuing domestic violence over a prolonged period of time, the impact upon her of which cannot, for the reasons advanced by Ms Castles and others, be underestimated’ (See [45]). Buddin J also derived assistance from cases involving ‘battered spouse or partner syndrome’ (See [48]).
District Court
R v Evatt (A Pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 113 (12 April 2024) – New South Wales District Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family Law’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Rape x 2; entering a building with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married but separated in 2020, 18 months prior to the offences. In 2021, the victim sought a protection order against the defendant, prohibiting the defendant from locating/attempting to locate her. However, following parenting orders in 2021, the offender and victim were required to communicate about parenting issues.
In October 2021, the offender located the victim’s home and entered it at 2AM. The offender grabbed the victim by throat, asking her questions about her new boyfriend and where he lived before threatening to kill him and rape his daughter. The offender proceeded to demand oral sex and used the victim’s phone to send messages portraying him in a good light (e.g., ‘you are a good dad’). [20] The offender then demanded sexual intercourse. [24]–[25]
The children were in the house when the offending occurred.
Decision and Reasoning: Aggregate sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 ½ years. [98]
District Court Judge Priestley SC assessed the objective seriousness of the offending to be ‘in the high mid-range’. [44] Though remorseful, the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation remain low. This is because the ‘violence occurs when he is in as he says such a state of “rage” that some earlier expressed remorse is unlikely … to temper his irrational uncontrolled rage’. [82]
R v Reid [2023] NSWDC 161 (17 May 2023) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Crimes (sentencing procedure) act 1999 (nsw), s 10(1)(b)’ – ‘Discharge without conviction’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘Intentionally distributing intimate image without consent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Predominant victim’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Psychologist report’ – ‘Revenge porn’ – ‘Severity appeal’ – ‘State and federal offences’ – ‘Using a carriage service to menace or harass’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Intentionally distributing intimate image without consent x 1, Using a carriage service to menace or harass.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and severity of sentence.
Facts: The female appellant was in a relationship with the male complainant for about a year from mid-2021 to mid-2022 and had one child together. During their relationship they consensually recorded intimate sexual acts performed individually or together. After the end of the relationship, despite obtaining a protection order protecting her and her two children, communication in relation to their child led to some episodes of intimacy, one of which was recorded by the complainant on the appellant’s phone. Recognising the complainant was commencing a relationship with another woman, the appellant texted the intimate video to her former partner with the message “Does she suck you like this?” He responded that he was not interested and she subsequently distributed the video by Facebook to her former partner’s new girlfriend with the message “Bet ya don’t make him cum like this lol”. She admitted she did this both in hopes it would encourage the breakdown of the complainant’s new relationship and in frustration with his lack of parental responsibility. The subsequent charge related to the appellant repeatedly messaging the complainant via Facebook messenger over two days, questioning his intention to be involved in his daughter’s life.
A psychologist report indicated that the appellant had an “emotionally defective upbringing”, likely had ADHD, and that the assessment conducted indicated that the best account for her symptomatology and offending was a Bipolar II Disorder. The psychologist presented a detailed treatment plan and proposed a referral to a psychiatrist to confirm his diagnoses and prescribe necessary medication. The psychologist and police both appeared impressed with the appellant’s insight into her actions and reasons.
Ground: The appellant should be diverted into the mental health system s 14 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) (the MHCIFP Act) and s 20BQ of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (the “Cth Crimes Act”).
Issues:
(a)
whether the appellant had, at the dates of offending, a mental health impairment or mental illness; and (if she did)
(b)
discretionary considerations as to whether she should be diverted (enumerated, especially, under s 15 of the MHCIFP Act).
Reasoning and decision:
1.
The severity appeal is allowed.
2.
In relation to sentence for sequence 1, I set aside the sentence and in lieu, impose a conditional release order for 7 months, commencing today, subject to an additional condition in being a rehabilitation or treatment condition that the appellant abide by the treatment plan identified in section 11 of the report of Mr George Dieter.
3.
In relation to the sentence for sequence 2, set aside the sentence and in lieu, order that the appellant be discharged, without proceeding to conviction, of the charge upon her giving security in the amount of $100 and complies with the condition that she be of good behaviour for a period of 7 months.
4.
Direct the appellant’s legal representative to explain to the appellant her obligations under the conditional release order imposed under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act(1999) (NSW).
In considering whether to allow the appeal, Abadee DCJ noted the appellant’s emotional dependence on the complainant in the context of his abuse of the complainant:
I acknowledge harm to the victim, Mr Pobje, who was disgusted by this offence, but that does not appear substantially manifested by his delayed report of it to police. But as I have indicated, due to the clear emotional dependence that she had upon the victim who, the evidence indicates, abused her, the considerations of general deterrence, denunciation and retribution are substantially moderated as to weight. There were some extenuating circumstances. The appellant is a single mother with two young children, from separate relationships, with certain unconfirmed mental conditions, who has applied herself to her studies and is doing well in her job, which involves looking after children. Although the Court has not received the victim, Mr Pobje’s, side of the story, as indicated, there is a consistent thread of a narrative in which the appellant was in an abusive relationship with that victim. Coupled with evidence from her psychologist of her sensitivity and anxiety towards slights and the fear of rejection, and a sliding scale of emotion, there are extenuating circumstances concerning sequence 1 [52].
Abadee DCJ also noted that a conviction could “severely prejudice” the appellant’s employment prospects and educational aspirations given her work with children [53] and that the second sequence of offending was “of a trivial kind” [55].
R v Grech (a pseudonym) [2022] NSWDC 721 (15 December 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Non-consensual sexual intercourse withing marriage’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Possession of child abuse material’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Threats to implicate victim's child’ – ‘Victim illness’ – ‘Vulnerable victim’
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Charges: 3 x sexual intercourse without consent, 1 x intentionally choke, 1 x possession of child abuse material.
Facts: The sexual assault and choking offences were committed by the offender against his wife. Several years into their relationship, the complaint’s behaviour changed significantly and he began making derogatory comments about and sexual demands of his wife which she could not meet due to her cancer and treatment.
The offender engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with his wife on four occasions over a number of years and attempted to do so on others. In December 2015 the offender held his wife against a wall and verbally abused her resulting in criminal charges. After his wife found pornography on his phone he threatened to implicate one of her sons, intimidated her by starting a chainsaw and said he could kill her by putting a spider in her bed. He was physically violent to her on three occasions, including placing his hands around her neck and strangling her.
After the victim went to the police, a police investigation found discs and video files including 30 video images that were classified as child abuse material.
Reasoning and decision: An aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with a 5 year minimum and 3 year parole period.
Haesler SC DCJ identified a level of violence, pain, humiliation and degradation involved in the sexual assaults that occurred in the victim’s own home, while she was vulnerable as a cancer survivor. HH considered the domestic relationship significant, noting that the victim was personally targeted and the offences occurred as part of a larger pattern of violence and control. Additionally, the evidence revealed that the offender felt justified in his conduct and his behaviour was therefore a continued threat.
His Honour emphasised the seriousness of possessing child pornography, which supports the industry of child abuse and encourages a distorted reality.
The offender’s depression and poor physical health condition were considered, His Honour determining that he would be more vulnerable in prison because of his illness as well as his lack of experience, demeanour and previous good character. While he showed some emotional response and his sister expressed remorse on his behalf, HH did not accept his remorse given the evidence that he continued to victim-blame his wife throughout their relationship. The duration and nature of the offending also weighed against his previously good character, as he put his own sexual needs above that of his wife and her autonomy.
Haesler SC DCJ observed:
[40] The offences, both the sexual offence and the choking offence, occurred in the context of a domestic relationship. They were domestic violence offences. Sexual assault is an offence of violence. In each matter the complainant was personally targeted, and it is clear from my brief recitation of the facts that the offences were part of a larger picture of physical and mental violence and the exercise of control. While the offender accused the complainant of controlling him, his behaviour demonstrated the lie of that statement.
[41] There is material before me which shows that he felt what he did he was justified or excused in doing what he did. In continued beliefs of this nature, beliefs that the person inflicting the violence is the person wronged, carries with it a continued threat. As a consequence, I accept, that the complainant in this matter would never have felt safe in his presence.
[42] Each of these matters is treated with real seriousness because of the exercise of coercive power and the other matters I have reviewed. Denunciation is also required. Men cannot behave as this offender did.
Day (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWDC 594 (24 November 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Magistrate's credibility findings’ – ‘Resolving 'oath on oath' domestic violence on appeal’ – ‘Reviewing credibility findings on appeal’ – ‘Self-serving evidence’
Charges: common assault x 1; sexually touch another without consent x 1; intimidate intending to cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against convictions.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of three offences against his partner: common assault s61 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); sexually touch another without consent s61KC(a) Crimes Act (NSW); intimidate intending to cause fear s13(1) Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). The magistrate preferred the complainant’s evidence, rejecting the appellant’s version of the sexual touching as ‘self-serving and lacking credibility’ [42].
The appellant was acquitted of three offences relating to assaulting, intimidating and intentionally choking their daughter with a pillow (‘the pillow incident’). The magistrate found the appellant’s evidence in relation to how the pillow came up over the child’s face ‘lacked credibility and was overall self-serving and implausible’ [36].
Grounds: The complainant’s evidence was inconsistent (police Fact Sheet and Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) notes [61]). The appellant argued that this led to a finding of not guilty on three charges related to the pillow incident. Further, the magistrate should have returned a verdict of not guilty in relation to the three charges being appealed as the magistrate had found the appellant not guilty in relation to the pillow incident.
Decision and Reasoning: appeal dismissed.
Haesler SC DCJ held in relation to the magistrate’s findings on credibility:
1.
I do not accept that his Honour rejected the complainant’s evidence in relation to the pillow incident. That is not what he said at [112]; nor did he make adverse findings in relation to her reliability and credibility as a witness. To the contrary, he correctly directed himself that different verdicts could be returned in relation to different counts. And early in his judgment he noted that a reasonable doubt about one part of the prosecution evidence on one charge had to be considered as to whether it caused him to have a reasonable doubt about another charge: at [16].
2.
His Honour’s approach to the acquittals indicated that he was aware of the need to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, even if his version did not impress him. Ultimately, his decision came down to the fundamental element that had to be proved - “intention.” He concluded, “I cannot be satisfied to the required standard that the appellant intentionally placed the pillow over the face of the child with an intention of suffocating her ….”
1.
… It would, with hindsight, have been prudent to mention the Markulevski [2001] NSWCCA 290 (1 August 2001) direction specifically when he made his credibility findings about the race day evidence, if only to forestall attack on appeal. Much time would have been saved had his Honour added a 10th issue - Given my findings in acquitting the appellant what impact do those findings have on the credibility of the complainant?
1.
Criticism was made of his Honour’s use on several occasions of the term “self-serving” to describe the appellant’s evidence. As I understand it “self-serving” refers to; a form of bias; being the tendency of witnesses to give evidence in ways that advance their self-interest but which the trier of fact, on review, regards as indefensible or unethical or a distortion of what really happened to suit their own ends.
2.
Having reviewed the judgment I reject the submission that his Honour simply concluded - that having seen and heard the witnesses he believed the evidence of the one over the other: O'Connell v DPP [2021] NSWSC 1519 (26 November 2021) at [37]. His credibility findings are of use to me.
3.
I too was unimpressed by his [the appellant’s] evidence and would reject it. I too was impressed by the response of the complainant under sustained and ardent cross-examination and the consistency of her accounts. I would accept her testimony. Having rejected the appellant’s account that evidence satisfied each element of the charges subject to appeal beyond reasonable doubt.
R v Lonergan [2022] NSWDC 423 (21 September 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘'revenge porn'’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Distribute intimate image’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Image abuse’ – ‘Image offence’ – ‘Intimidate’ – ‘Severity appeal’
Charges: distributing intimate image x 1; intimidate with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm x 1.
Proceedings: DPP appeal against sentence.
Facts: The perpetrator pleaded guilty to one charge of distributing an intimate image contrary to s 91Q(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The victim had sent her 3-4 pictures of his penis during their affair. After the perpetrator became aware that the victim was in an ongoing relationship, she forwarded one of these pictures to the victim’s partner, who had blocked the perpetrator so did not receive it. The perpetrator also pleaded guilty to intimidating with intent of causing fear of physical or mental harm under s13(1) of theCrimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW). This charge related to an excessive number of text messages the perpetrator had sent to the victim.
Grounds of appeal: the DPP argued the Magistrate erred in his assessment of the severity of the offences.
Held: appeal upheld.
Charge 1 (image offence): Abadee DCJ imposed a conditional release order for 18 months whilst proceeding to conviction (the Local Court had not ordered a conviction to be recorded).
His Honour said that the offence was not trivial, that it was ‘malicious’ and ‘unnecessary’ [45]. He acknowledged that a conviction might mean that the perpetrator could lose her mortgage broking licence and be unable to work. However, he cited R v Beissel [1996], stating that ‘[t]he Court should not attempt to minimise the seriousness of criminal conduct with a view to influencing third parties, such as licensing authorities…’.[47]
Charge 2 (intimidate offence): same terms as Local Court ie conditional release for 18 months, no conviction recorded.
His Honour also noted that charge 2 was a domestic violence offence under the Crimes (Personal and Domestic Violence) Act 2007 but was satisfied that the sentence imposed was appropriate.
R v SS [2022] NSWDC 399 (1 September 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘Child present’ – ‘Mental impairment’ – ‘Reduced moral capability’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sexual assault without consent’
Charges: aggravated sexual assault x 1; sexual assault without consent x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; intentionally choke x 1.
Proceedings: sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); sexual assault without consent contrary to s61I; assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 59(1) and intentionally choke a person without consent s 37(1A).
The victim wife and the offender husband had been in a relationship since 2015. In November 2018 the wife and her two children moved out of the family home. About three weeks later, she returned to collect her daughter who had stayed overnight with the offender. When the victim went upstairs to collect her belongings, the offender followed her and punched her in the face three times, knocking her to the ground. Their young daughter was standing nearby screaming, ‘Mummy, mummy…stop, mummy!’ The offender straddled the victim, grabbed her neck with both hands and squeezed. The victim was struggling to breathe and called for help. Their daughter was still screaming. The offender punched the victim in the face a fourth time, causing her to lose consciousness.
When the victim regained consciousness, the offender was on top of her, raping her. Their daughter was not there. The victim said, we need to check on her. They both got up and walked into the bedroom. Their daughter was hiding in the walk-in robe, crying. The victim sat down, feeling extreme pain, dizzy, and disoriented. The perpetrator pushed her onto her back on the bed and started to rape her again. When he finished, the victim tried to keep him calm, fearing for her life and that of her daughter, so she suggested they have a cigarette. She then ran out of the house into the street wearing only a singlet top and carrying her daughter. She flagged down a passing car and the driver called the police.
The offender was located almost 24 hours later. He was disoriented, had some deep cuts on his face and leg and claimed that he had been lost in the bush for four days. The offender suffered a stroke following the offending.
Held: Wilson SC DCJ sentenced the offender to 8 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. He said at [48]:
the offending occurred in the context of the breakdown of the marriage. In my opinion whilst this provides context it does not reduce the objective seriousness of the offending. In a sense, it heightens the objective seriousness as the offending took place in a domestic violence setting.
His Honour also found at [78] that, due to the offender’s diagnosis of an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression, the offender was impaired at the time of the offending so as to attract the moderation of the sentence considered by the court in De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 (17 September 2010) I find that the offender’s moral culpability is reduced and that he would be an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence. I also find the need for specific deterrence is reduced.
R v Pattinson [2022] NSWDC 475 (27 May 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Bdsm’ – ‘Choking, suffocation or strangulation’ – ‘Crime’ – ‘Home of victim’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Violent offence’
Charges: choking x 1; sexual intercourse without consent x 7; incite to sexually touch without consent x 1.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male perpetrator had been acquitted of 7 counts of sexual intercourse without consent and 1 count of incite to sexually touch without consent. He had offered to plead guilty only to choking contrary to s 37(1) Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
The perpetrator lived in Dubai. When he visited Sydney from time to time, he and the victim had a sexual relationship characterised by bondage, domination, sado-masochism (BDSM). The perpetrator took the dominant role and the victim the submissive role. The charges arose after the sexual conduct had ceased and after the victim had said the safe word. The perpetrator held the victim up against the wall, grabbed her throat and choked her until she lost consciousness. The victim had been saying, ‘stop’ ‘enough’ ‘I can’t breathe’ and using the safe word, ‘Leigh’. This occurred when the victim was bleeding and injured.
Decision and Reasoning: Sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months. Protection order imposed protecting the victim or person with whom she has a domestic relationship.
Buscombe DCJ held that the choking was ‘always serious’ because of its ‘life-threatening nature’ and this offence was ‘a serious example of such an offence.’ [14]
An offence of choking a person to the point of unconsciousness is a very serious offence because of the risk of death that accompanies such a violent act. To do that to a woman who is bleeding and injured in her own home, who does not consent to that conduct, knowing she did not consent, is a particularly serious form of the offence, in my opinion. The sentence that is to be imposed here needs to have a significant component of general deterrence reflected in it in order to send the message to the community that such offences will receive significant sentences, to deter not just this offender but others in our community who seek to engage in such conduct. The maximum penalty has been taken into account as a legislative guidepost. I have had some regard to the fact that if this offence stood on its own, the offender may have been sentenced in the Local Court, although the offence is a very serious one in my opinion. [27]
The submission was advanced that the offence did not call for a sentence of imprisonment. In my opinion, the offence is far too serious an offence to call for anything other than a sentence of imprisonment. There is nothing before me that in any way reduces the offender's moral culpability for the offence. The submission was advanced that if a sentence of imprisonment was to be imposed then the offender should be extended leniency and allowed to serve it in the community by way of an intensive correction order. It will shortly be seen that I do not consider that a sentence of two years or less is an appropriate sentence to impose, so that sentencing option is simply not available. [28]
R v Campbell-Buck [2022] NSWDC 60 (1 March 2022) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Image-based abuse’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threats’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Sexually touch another person without consent x 3, sexual intercourse without consent x 1, intentionally recording an intimate image without consent x 1, intentionally choke a person with recklessness x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Facts: The female complainant and male defendant were in an intimate relationship. The complainant experienced pain due to a shoulder injury and took pain medication to enable her to sleep soundly. The effects of this medication were exploited by the defendant. On several occasions the defendant filmed himself performing sexual acts, including sexual intercourse, on the complainant while she was asleep. The complainant usually awoke during these incidents and made it clear that she did not consent to what had occurred. On one occasion, when the parties were arguing, the defendant strangled the complainant until she lost consciousness. When the complainant regained consciousness, the defendant threatened to commit suicide if she reported the incidents [9]-[21]. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charges.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to four years and three months imprisonment, with a non‐parole period of two years and six months [78]. The defendant’s sentence was reduced to take into account the utilitarian value of his guilty pleas [4]. Justice Haesler noted the objective seriousness of the offending [22]-[32]. His Honour highlighted the complainant’s victim impact statement, which detailed her fears of ‘a lifetime of pain, suffering, anxiety and therapy’, a fear of going to sleep and ‘difficulty enjoying life’ [35]-[38]. His Honour noted that the defendant had a history of anxiety, depression and bipolar disorder, and was experiencing manic symptoms during all or part of his offending [42]. His Honour stated that the defendant’s ‘mental health condition, particularly his bipolar disorder… has a mitigatory effect’, and ‘to some modest degree’ ameliorates ‘his moral culpability’ but ‘does not mean that what he did cannot and should not be denounced’ [54].
In sentencing the defendant Haesler SC DCJ: ‘Any assault in a domestic context carries with it undertones, sometimes overtones, of control and targeting. All these offences are part of a larger picture of physical, sexual and mental violence. When someone is assaulted, as the complainant was, there is serious risk of significant harm can be caused. This is one reason why this is a separate offence and why it carries a maximum penalty of ten years.’ [29]
R v Trisic [2021] NSWDC 687 (14 December 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Interpreter’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: common assault x2; stalking, intimidating, or intending to cause fear of physical or mental harm x1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was convicted of domestic violence offences against his wife, who he was separated from, and adult son. Following an argument with his son the intoxicated appellant threatened to slit his wife’s throat (intimidation) and struck her right shoulder causing her to fall against the wall and bang her head (assault) [13]. The son interposed himself between his parents and the appellant struck the top of his son’s head with an open hand (assault) [14]. The wife struggled to understand trial questioning despite an interpreter [25] and the son gave conflicting statements as to the timeline of events [21].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. Abadee DCJ was satisfied the offending conduct occurred [94].
Justice Abadee found it was clear the Magistrate considered all the evidence [92]. The court granted leave for the appellant to adduce fresh evidence showing good character. His Honour held that assessing the dynamic of the relationships between the appellant and victims is “more probative than the absence of prior convictions” [81]. The appellant’s intoxication diminished the weight of his prior good character when evaluating his likelihood of offending [88].
Justice Abadee acknowledged the trauma of the incident compounded with the wife’s language difficulties meant the Magistrate was entitled to express misgivings in relation to her initial interview [67]. He did not regard this as fundamentally undermining her reliability or credibility [68]. The extent of discrepancies between the son’s account to police and evidence in Court over 4 months later was immaterial as the narrative of the mistreatment of the wife was consistent [73].
The Appellant submissions as to the possibility of collusion through the victims discussing their evidence was undercut due to his submissions that their testimonies had inconsistencies [72].
R v Mulquin [2021] NSWDC 662 (19 August 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Limited prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Common assault x 4, intentionally choke x 1, stalk and intimidate x 2, contravene prohibition in an apprehended violence order x 1, damage property x 1.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty of several domestic violence offences perpetrated in the context of his relationship with the female victim. On several occasions, the defendant made derogatory comments and threats during assaults that included pushing and punching the victim, slamming her head into a wall, strangling her with a vacuum cleaner pole by forcibly placing it on her throat until she vomited, and preventing the victim from leaving her home by making threats towards her and her pets that included threats to kill [5]-[16] in contravention of protection order.
Decision and Reasoning: 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Haesler SC DCJ noted the objective seriousness of the offending, referring to it as a serious and persistent course of domestic violence that included derogatory comments, threats to kill, attacks to the victim’s head, and choking which carried a risk of death [5]-[16]. The defendant’s breach of the apprehended violence order was an aggravating factor [33]. The defendant’s personal circumstances, which included a long history of alcohol abuse, failed attempts at rehabilitation, anxiety, and prior domestic violence offences [3], [30]. The defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation were limited [27] as while the defendant had shown remorse and an intention to engage in rehabilitation he had not acted in accordance with these aspirations [26]. His Honour considered the physical and emotional harm caused by the offending and found that there was a need for accumulation and the imposition of a significant sentence due to the course of conduct and objective seriousness of the offending [24], making a finding of special circumstances [36]. The sentence imposed should express community’s disapproval for reoffending in the context of domestic violence [33].
Perrin v R [2021] NSWDC 408 (17 August 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Age disparity’ – ‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Use of weapon’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Common assault (DV) x 9; Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (DV) x 6; Stalking and or Intimidating x 3; Destroying or damaging Property (DV) x 3; Reckless Grievous Bodily Harm (DV) x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant pleaded guilty to 19 offences committed against his female partner. He was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 2 months [2]. The offender appealed under s11 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 [5].
The appellant is an Aboriginal man who was 19 years old when he met the victim in 2015. The victim was 28 years old when they met and had a 4-year-old son. They had a child together in 2016. The victim was pregnant with another child in November 2017.
The appellant used drugs, was controlling and jealous [15]and suffered delusions including seeing “demons”, “receiving messages from the television” and feelings the victim was cheating on him [100]. On 19 February 2015, after the appellant placed his hands around the victim’s throat and squeezed until she became dizzy and could not breathe, police obtained a protection order for the victim [37]. The offending included repeated punching, kicking, and spitting on the victim, leaving bruises on her body. The violence was frequently accompanied by the appellant screaming derogatory comments at the victim, leaving her ears ringing and sore. On two occasions the victim’s son witnessed the offending and attempted to intervene on one occasion.
Decision & Reasoning: Haesler SC DCJ confirmed the convictions but varied the sentence. His Honour imposed an aggregate sentence of 4 years 6 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years 9 months.
Justice Haesler held that with few exceptions, each offence was a serious example of the type of offence charged [59]. The lack of long-term physical injuries recorded and Victim Impact Statement did not mean the offending had little or no impact on the victim [58]. The number and severity of offences meant that even making allowances for the appellant’s undiagnosed mental illness and background of deprivation, an aggregate sentence of 5 years was justifiable [116].
His Honour found the sentencing Magistrate erred in her application of s58 of Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 by exceeding the 5-year limit on any continuous series of sentences. The offences were not crimes that so offended the public interest that the maximum sentence, without any discount for any purpose, was appropriate [121]. He found that a guilty plea in the context of COVID-19 was “worthy of greater weight in mitigation and amelioration” [120].
Note: In re-sentencing, Haesler DCJ referred questions in this matter to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal [R v Perrin [2022] NSWCCA 170 (15 August 2022)] pursuant to s 5B(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). The questions posed concerned the operation of s 58 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (the “CSP Act”). Wright J (Ward P and Harris J agreeing) held Haesler SC DCJ was wrong to engage s 58 as there was no ‘existing sentence’ when either the Local Court or District Court imposed its sentence. Therefore, there was no requirement that Mr Perrin’s sentence expire 5 years from 22 September 2019 [87]. As the sentence was affected by an error of law, the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed Haesler SC DCJ’s sentence and remitted the matter back to the District Court for the appeal to be determined according to the proper construction of s 58 of the CSP Act (NSW) [89].
R v Argyle (a pseudonym) [2021] NSWDC 267 (18 June 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People who have experienced trauma’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent x 2.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender was in a relationship with the co-accused. The co-accused forced himself on the offender’s younger sister, aged 17. The younger sister was visiting the house of the offender and co-accused to assist with the offender’s pregnancy. The offender assisted the co-accused, or interacted with the victim in certain ways, such as holding the victim’s hands, at the co-accused’s request.
Issue: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The judge refused to impose a custodial sentence and instead imposed a community corrections order for a period of 2 years: [101]. The judge accepted that the objective gravity of the offending was low: [64]. This was so despite the fact that the offences occurred in the offender’s home and that the offending amounted to a breach of trust that the offender’s younger sister was owed: [63]. The offender acted spontaneously in response to the co-accused’s actions and was unable to control the situation: [65].
The offender had diminished moral culpability due to the untreated sexual abuse she faced as a child, her own cognitive impairment and the causal connection between her intellectual capacity and her offending: [67]–[70]. Further, she was operating under duress due to her own experiences of the ‘coercive controlling behaviour’ of the accused and her fear that he would harm her or her unborn child: [69]. This diminished moral culpability indicated that specific and general deterrence were not relevant sentencing factors: [75]. The judge considered that moral culpability was a more appropriate touchstone for sentencing, as opposed to objective gravity of the offending: [85].
In addition, the co-accused would have succeeded in the offending regardless of the complicity of the offender, the offender was in genuine fear of the co-accused and the offender, keeping in mind her cognitive impairment, was trying to make the situation better for her sister: [72]–[74]. Further factors tending towards a non-custodial sentence were that the offending was almost 15 years ago ([92]), hardship would be caused to the offender and her two young children ([96]), the offender’s physical and intellectual disabilities would make custody more onerous and treatment for her trauma was only readily available in the community ([99]).
Barber v DPP [2021] NSWDC 7 (3 February 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Victim experiences of court processes’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was convicted of assaulting his then female partner by strangulation. The appellant alleged that the complainant was the initial aggressor. He also gave evidence of past incidents, alleging that the complainant was “prone to act erratically or unpredictably.”
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The complainant was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her evidence and, accordingly, the prosecution did not prove that the assault occurred to the requisite standard.
2.
If an assault did occur, it was done in self-defence and the Crown did not negative that defence to the requisite standard.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: The appellant’s argument that the Crown did not prove that the elements of the offence of common assault beyond reasonable doubt was rejected, notwithstanding some differences in detail in the complainant’s evidence. “As to the suggested materiality of inconsistencies in detail in the complainant’s account, the Magistrate observed that the complainant had certain issues with her language, which she was entitled to take into account”: at [9].
Ground 2: In light of recent instances of the complainant throwing items at the accused and his laptop, “there was a reasonable possibility that the appellant subjectively perceived the prospect of further attack.” However, “a reasonable person would not have shared the same belief. There was, in truth, nothing to stop him from diffusing the situation simply by leaving the room”: at [30].
R v Corak Phan [2021] NSWDC 3 (28 January 2021) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Bugmy principles’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sibling abuse’
Charges: Common assault x 2; Knowingly contravene a prohibition or restriction in an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and the female first victim had previously been in a domestic relationship (they had a child together) and had separated. The offender breached a protection order by being in the vicinity of the victim, and subsequently punched her a number of times to the head and upper body. The second victim was the offender’s sister. The offender pulled his sister by her ankles off a couch. The offender had an extensive criminal history and was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. He had a dysfunctional childhood, and an extensive history of drug and alcohol misuse. A psychologist opined that he met the criteria for Substance Induced Psychotic Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
Decision and reasoning: An aggregate sentence of 20 months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 10 months.
The offences against the offender’s former partner fell in the mid-range of objective seriousness, as she was protected by an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order at the time and there was clear contravention of a court order ([43]-[44]). The assault of the offender’s sister fell in the lower range of objective seriousness ([45]).
Mahoney SC DCJ noted at [46]-[47], discussing the principles in Bugmy v R:
“That the offending occurred whilst the offender was in the grip of a drug addiction, does not mitigate the seriousness of the offending. Notwithstanding that the offender gave no evidence, and the court must approach self-serving reports to psychologists with some caution, I do take into account the subjective matters outlined in the report of Ms Minovski, namely, a dysfunctional childhood marred with neglect, physical and sexual abuse and exposure from an early age to drug and alcohol abuse, together with domestic violence, giving rise to the principles outlined by the High Court in Bugmy v R……
“I am therefore satisfied that the offender’s recourse to violence in the circumstances outlined above, albeit fuelled by his drug addiction, are such that the offender’s moral culpability for his inability to control his impulses must be somewhat reduced.”
R v French [2020] NSWDC 767 (17 December 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Step-children’
Charges: Animal cruelty x 1; Detain for advantage x 1; Intimidation x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated break and enter and commit serious indictable offence (and two related offences of stalking/intimidation and maliciously damaging property) x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and the female victim (who had two children) had been in an on-off relationship for 12 months. The offender killed the victim’s cat in a planned way (animal cruelty). Two weeks later, the offender, while affected by drugs and alcohol, forcibly took the victim from a neighbour’s home and detained her for 1-2 minutes (detain for advantage). Later, the offender’s behaviour caused the victim to hide in the toilet and wardrobe of her home (intimidation), and when the offender started punching a wall, another person present who tried to stop him and the offender struck the bystander on the head (common assault). The victim told the offender that the relationship was over, and to move out. One month later, the offender damaged his sister’s car while she was at the victim’s house, and later sent persistent calls/texts to the victim (malicious damage and stalk/intimidate). That same evening, the offender broke into the victim’s house and intimidated her and her children (aggravated break and enter). Sentence and reasoning: A non-parole period of 2 years, with a balance term of 15 months.
The animal cruelty offence was just below the mid-range of objective seriousness ([14]).
The objective seriousness of the other offences ranged from the lower-end to just below mid-range. Relevant factors included repeated attempts to control and intimidate the victim (a form of domestic violence) ([16]-[32]). The offender’s subjective circumstances were given some weight (including his family history, mental health issues, and drug and alcohol misuse at [35]-[50]), but did not result in any marked reduced need for both general and specific deterrence ([57]). Priestley SC DCJ took into account the totality principle ([51]-[53]), and special circumstances due to the need for rehabilitation with drug/alcohol issues and counselling ([54]).
James v James No 3 [2020] NSWDC 797 (16 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault and assault and battery’ – ‘Assessment of damages’ – ‘Civil matter’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Tort’
Proceedings: Assessment of damages for the torts of assault and assault and battery.
Facts: The plaintiff woman brought proceedings against her former husband, and obtained default judgment, which the court refused to set aside ([1]). The plaintiff and the defendant had two children, and previously lived on a farm (the subject of settlement proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court) ([4], [18]).
The first torts occurred on 26 September 2017. The defendant caused the plaintiff to fear that she would be battered by calling her names in an aggressive and violent manner, restrained the defendant by her shoulders and arms, and then ordered her to leave the property with her daughter ([2], [5]-[8]). The defendant was prosecuted but the charges were dropped by way of an apparent plea bargain ([7]).
The second torts occurred on 20 February 2018. There was an audio recording of these events, which the plaintiff was permitted to tender despite a ‘technical breach’ of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (see decision in James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020)) ([11]). The defendant physically assaulted and verbally assaulted the plaintiff ([10]-[17]). The defendant was also prosecuted for this offending, and sentenced to an Intensive Corrections Order for 16 months and an Apprehended Violence Order for two years ([19]).
Issues: Assessment of damages.
Decision and reasoning: Judgment for the plaintiff, damages of $358,520 plus costs.
For the torts on 26 September 2017, the court held at [9] that “[t]he tort of assault and the tort of assault and battery are actions which do not depend upon proof of damage. In any event there was actual bodily harm sustained by the plaintiff”. For the torts on 20 February 2018, the court again held that the torts were actionable per se without proof of damage but here there was “grave damage proven to the Court’s satisfaction”. This included evidence of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, a recurrent major depressive disorder, and recurrent panic attacks caused by the events of 20 February 2018 ([28]-[32]). The court noted that the plaintiff’s ongoing psychiatric problems would have a continuing impact on her (including her earning capacity) and that (at [29]):
“When this case is finished no doubt she can try to put the events of the past behind her and try to get on with her life. Not having to relive the events by coming to Court and telling the Court of them will no doubt assist in her recovery”.
The plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages ([9], [32]). The plaintiff was also awarded damages for past and future economic loss ([33]-[35]).
See also: James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court.
James v James No 2 [2020] NSWDC 796 (13 November 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Application to tender recordings’ – ‘Assessment of damages’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Tort’
Proceedings: Application to tender recordings.
Facts: The recordings were made of the interactions between the plaintiff and the defendant on 20 February 2018 at their former home. The recordings were of a private conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant made without the defendant’s consent, thereby in contravention of s 7(1)(b) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007.
Issues:
1.
Whether it was reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to make the recording for the protection of her lawful interests, per the exception in s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007.
2.
Whether the recording nonetheless admissible as the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighed the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in an unlawful manner, per the exception in s 138(3) of the Evidence Act 1995.
Decision and reasoning: The recording did not fall within the exception under s s 7(3)(b)(i) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007. The meaning of “lawful interest”, referring to the decisions in DW v R [2014] NSWCCA 28 and Corby v Corby [2015] FCCA 1099, did not extend to the plaintiff’s purpose which was to record the abuse to replay to the defendant later and change his behaviour: (at [3]-[4]). The recording was instead admitted into evidence in the exercise of the court’s discretion under s 138(3) of the Evidence Act 1995: at [7]-[9]. It had probative value of the extent of the plaintiff’s damages for her claim in tort. The impropriety of the contravention was not great. The recordings were referred to in the assessment of damages judgment: see James v James No 3 NSWDC 797 (16 November 2020).
R v Collins [2020] NSWDC 276 (5 June 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Separation’
Offences: Indecent assault; The appellant requested that the learned Magistrate take into account two additional offences on a Form 1, they being, that on the same date and in the same place, the appellant:
(a)
intimidated Kristy Rochester with the intention of causing her to fear physical or mental harm, contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW); and
(b)
assaulted Kristy Rochester, contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been married since 2003 and had a child together. They divorced in 2008 but recommenced a relationship in 2014 and started living together. In 2015, the appellant assaulted the victim, giving rise to an Apprehended Violence Order. In July 2017, their relationship began to deteriorate. In the lead up to the offending, the victim obtained alternative accommodation and was in the process of moving her belongings. One night, the appellant exchanged text messages with the victim, requesting they have sex (though acknowledging that the victim was moving on), but the victim refused. The appellant went to the lounge room where the victim was on the couch listening to music on her phone, took her phone and refused to give it back unless they talked. The couple began yelling and the victim felt scared so she picked up a knife and told the appellant that she would stab him if he came near her. The appellant left the home with the victim’s phone and refused to return it. The victim slashed two tyres on the appellant’s car then went back inside and locked all the windows and doors, except for a window in her bedroom. The appellant accessed the victim’s phone then returned to the house and demanded she speak to him outside. The victim complied as she was afraid of the appellant, the appellant throwing a beer over her when she got there.
After this, the victim drove to a nearby lookout and fell asleep. The appellant arrived in his truck and parked the victim in so she could not drive away. The appellant demanded that the victim open the doors. She complied as she was afraid. The appellant grabbed the victim’s hair and told her that she had to talk to him to get her phone back. They returned to the house separately and the appellant told the victim he wanted to talk to her in the bedroom. He told her to lie on the bed; she complied. He then started touching her, took her clothes off, pinned her wrists above her head, rubbed his groin all over her and ejaculated on her, despite her cries that she did not want to engage in sexual activity. The appellant told the victim to leave, which she did. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment with a 12-month non-parole period.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence could be regarded as "lenient" [65]. Her Honour rejected that the appellant’s conduct involved a low level of criminality [59] and further held that there was a greater need for personal deterrence and retribution in this case [61]. Her Honour held that, "whilst acknowledging the relevance of the appellant’s rehabilitation, that consideration is subordinate to the considerations of general deterrence, denunciation and the imposition of adequate punishment, which factor recognises the indignity inflicted upon the complainant" and that "the safety to the community is not seriously imperilled by the appellant if a penalty other than full-time incarceration is imposed. But that consideration is not, in my opinion, paramount in the circumstances of this case" [64].
Her Honour found that the appellant’s contention that the sex occurred as ‘make-up sex’ was a "rank distortion" of what objectively occurred, because the relationship had completely broken down [27]. The appellant did not wish for the relationship to have ended as it did, "So he resorted to the exertion of psychological and physical force against the complainant in order to get her to do what he wanted her to do" [28]. Her Honour found that the appellant knew his conduct was non-consensual and there was nothing to suggest the victim wanted to make up with the appellant [30], and that there was a "humiliating overtone" to the activity [31]. As such, her Honour held the conduct to be above the mid-range of objective gravity [32].
Her Honour rejected the contention that the appellant was sorry for his conduct and had acquired real insight into the wrongfulness of his conduct [47]. However, her Honour found that the likelihood of reoffending was low [55].
R v Shepherd [2020] NSWDC 273 (3 June 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection orders’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Significant criminal history’
Charges: Contravening a prohibition or restriction under an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) x 2
Case type: Appeal against severity of sentence
Facts: The appellant man was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 months. He pleaded guilty to 2 charges that he contravened a prohibition or restriction under an AVO. The appellant has remained in custody for a period of around 2 months. Although he lodged an appeal in May 2020, he was refused bail.
The appellant was in a relationship with his then female partner (the victim). As at 26 March 2020, there was an enforceable AVO for her protection which named the appellant as the defendant. A condition of the order was that the appellant not approach or be in her company for at least 12 hours after drinking alcohol or taking illicit drugs. At about 1:00 am on 26 March 2020, police attended the couple’s residence after a domestic dispute. The appellant admitted that he had breached the AVO and had consumed a large quantity of alcohol. There was no suggestion that the appellant was likely to inflict imminent violence or commit some other more serious contravention of the AVO at that time. He was arrested and released on conditional bail at 3:00 am. At about 4:00 am on the same day, police returned to the same address following another complaint of a domestic dispute, and found the appellant intoxicated again.
Grounds: Whether an Intensive Correction Order (ICO) is more appropriate than a period of full time custody; whether there are special circumstances to justify variation of non-parole period.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, but the Court varied the statutory ratio for the non-parole period on account of special circumstances in order to assist with rehabilitative efforts with respect to the appellant’s alcohol consumption issues. Consequently, the Court varied each sentence to 1 year imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 months, to be served concurrently ([43]-[47]).
Held: Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the offending conduct occurred not only in contravention of an AVO, but whilst the appellant was subject to an ICO. Further, the second offence occurred when he was on conditional bail after having committed the first offence ([12]-[15]). There was little evidence of the appellant’s circumstances that directly explained why he acted as he did. In May, the appellant acknowledged to a community corrections officer that he breached the condition of the AVO because he had "no choice". However, the Court accepted the characterisation of the community corrections officer that he "blatantly disregarded" the condition twice on the one night ([16]-[18]). The appellant also has a significant criminal history, and has been convicted of several domestic violence offences in the past. Most of these offences were the product of alcohol consumption ([22]). There was no evidence before the Court to indicate remorse or contrition: the appellant blamed the victim and was said to have showed no insight into his offending ([24]). The appellant had a long history of alcohol dependence, and had been diagnosed with depression, post-traumatic stress and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He made attempts to rehabilitate himself, but relapsed into consuming alcohol on a regular basis ([25]-[27]).
The ICO breach report noted that since the order had been imposed, the appellant had minimal engagement with community corrections, which impeded his attempts to treat his alcohol usage. The report also expressed concerns for the victim’s safety. The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were no more than reasonable. Despite his demonstrated ability to overcome illicit substance abuse, he has struggled to deal with his alcoholism. The Court also noted that the level of community service work that the appellant needs to undertake may be reduced or altered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic ([28]-[33]).
The ICO breach report noted that since the order had been imposed, the appellant had minimal engagement with community corrections, which impeded his attempts to treat his alcohol usage. The report also expressed concerns for the victim’s safety. The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were no more than reasonable. Despite his demonstrated ability to overcome illicit substance abuse, he has struggled to deal with his alcoholism. The Court also noted that the level of community service work that the appellant needs to undertake may be reduced or altered as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic ([28]-[33]).
R v Ragg [2020] NSWDC 210 (18 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aggravated sexual assault’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Step-children in home’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threat to set on fire’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Common assault; Reckless wounding; Intimidation; Using explosive fluid; Attempted cause grievous bodily harm to person with intent x 2; Aggravated sexual assault x 4; Contravene Apprehended Violence Order; Threaten witness to withhold true evidence; Aggravated detention with the intention of assaulting and intimidating the victim (at the time of the detention actual bodily harm was occasioned to the victim)
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male offender and female victim were in an on and off domestic relationship for 12 years. The victim had three children, one of which was the son of the offender. Throughout the relationship, the offender was physically and mentally abusive towards the victim and both parties used drugs. One night, the offender and victim stayed up smoking marijuana and ice. The next morning, the couple were in their car and the offender accused the victim of sleeping with up to 20 men at one time while the offender had been in custody for other charges. The victim denied this, but the offender got angry and cut the victim’s hair with scissors before punching her in the face multiple times, one of these being so hard that the victim’s head hit the windscreen (Common assault). The offender then ordered the victim into the back seat and told her that every time she lied, he would stab her with the scissors (which were small and blunt, not sharp). The offender stabbed the victim on her legs about 30 times (four of which punctured her skin – the others resulted in bruises only) whenever she gave an answer he did not like (Reckless wounding). He also stabbed her left ear and cut open her shirt, exposing her breasts and stomach (Reckless wounding).
The offender than threatened to cut off the victim’s nipples and vagina/clitoris (after removing her pants). The victim tried to deflect the offender and pleaded for him to stop (Intimidation). The offender locked the windows and doors of the vehicle to stop the victim from escaping. A while after a man walked past the vehicle and looked inside, the offender unlocked the car and the victim ran outside screaming for help, although the man could not be seen. The victim ran down the riverbank and saw the offender get out of the car with a jerry can. The offender tipped the can containing diesel over the victim’s head and body (Using explosive fluid). The victim ran down to the river and hid, but the offender chased the victim and told her she needed to wash the diesel out of her hair. The victim complied.
The offender told the victim to go back to the car and she complied. When there, the offender tried to light the victim’s hair on fire with a cigarette lighter (Attempted cause GBH with intent). The victim put it out with her hands, but the offender lit her hair another two times (Attempted cause GBH with intent). The offender and victim then travelled to the offender’s friend’s house, stopping at various places along the way. The offender threatened to harm or kill the victim if she drove off, so the victim complied and did not leave. After visiting the friend’s house, the offender and victim drove to a deserted scrub area where the offender continued to question the victim. The victim told the offender false stories to keep him happy, then the offender told the victim to get in the backseat because he was going to do what they did to her (implying that he would rape her but she would like it). The offender got some lubricant and put this in the victim’s vagina and anus. He then penetrated her vagina and anus, the victim crying the whole time (Aggravated sexual assault x 2). The offender then inserted his entire first into the victim’s vagina and then anus, while the victim screamed in pain and begged the offender to stop (Aggravated sexual assault x 2). The offender could see blood on the ground, running down her legs and on the offender’s hand. The offender then punched the victim in the throat and told her he would do it again to knock her out. He then left her in the bush and drove off. She made it to a road and was picked up by a man passing by in a ute who took her to the police station. When the victim was recovering in hospital later, the offender called her and threatened to shoot the victim’s mum and dad if she pressed charges (Threaten witness to withhold true evidence).
Medical reports showed that the victim may suffer long term issues as a result of her injuries and were potentially life threatening if they had not been treated.
Judgment: The judge convicted the offender of all charges and sentenced him to an aggregate of 24 years’ imprisonment, with an 18-year non-parole period. Although a discount was given for the utilitarian value of the offender’s early pleas, His Honour found that most offences were in the mid-range of objective seriousness, with the Aggravated sexual assault charges being in the highest range of seriousness, having been committed as "deliberate sadistic torture" [36]. His Honour further emphasised that the offender’s "warped and sadistic desire to gratuitously inflict pain, dominate and terrorise overcame any empathy or concern for the wellbeing of his long-time partner, the mother of his child" [7].
All of the offences were committed in the context of a long-term relationship, so were each domestic violence offences. His Honour held that "It has long been recognised that such offences, particularly where the offender is a repeat domestic violence offender, require emphasis in sentencing on specific and general deterrence, together with powerful denunciation by the community of such conduct and the need for the protection of the community" [54].
The judge accepted that the offender’s "long history of emotional and behavioural dysregulation, emanating from his early adolescence, and his complex trauma background, including a history of physical and sexual abuse, loss of family stability and structure from his childhood and a lack of positive and nurturing influences, his exposure to drug and alcohol abuse" had normalised his offending behaviour and desensitised him to the anti-sociality of his crimes, so the offender’s moral culpability should be reduced according to principle in Bugmy v R [2013] HCA 37 [77]. However, His Honour held that, due to the nature of the offending, the offender’s antecedents and his criminal history, there was a need in this case to give significant weight to retribution, specific deterrence and protection of the community, over and above diminution of the sentence by virtue of lessened weight to general deterrence and reduced moral culpability [79].
The judge specifically noted that the offender still blamed the victim for his violent offending, had no insight into his offending, had no compassion, and continued to hold negative attitudes towards interventions [80]. Furthermore, the offender lacked genuine remorse, with all representations on this point being entirely self-serving [91]. His Honour held that the offender had extremely poor prospects of rehabilitation and his risk of reoffending was medium to high [98], finding that he had "a significant history of hostility and aggression towards women, especially his female family members and intimate partners, including expressions of intention to kill" [82].
R v Barnett [2020] NSWDC 193 (12 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Alcohol abuse’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic to sentencing considerations- breach protection order.’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Aggravated detention of a person with intent to obtain advantage occasioning actual bodily harm x 2; Reckless wounding causing actual bodily harm x 1; Contravention of a prohibition/restriction under an AVO x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issues: The relevance of a pre-existing alcohol disorder to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending; relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic to sentencing considerations.
Facts: The female victim was married to the offender man, although they had not resided together for eight to nine years. The victim was the subject of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (AVO) that protected her from the offender. A condition of the order prohibited the offender from approaching the victim or being in her company for at least 12 hours after drinking alcohol or taking illicit drugs. The offender asked the victim to stay with him for a few days at a caravan park where he lived. The victim agreed. On one night, the victim and offender met with Mr Wallace at his caravan and drank alcohol. The offender left earlier than the victim, but later returned and accused Mr Wallace and the victim of being unfaithful together. The offender produced a knife and pressed it to Mr Wallace’s chest before placing it on Mr Wallace’s throat, creating a superficial laceration. The victim attempted to grab the offender’s arm but the offender pushed her backwards where she fell and hit furniture, losing consciousness. Every time the victim tried to get up, the offender hit her against the walls and furniture. He also cut her right leg, causing three wounds. Mr Wallace tried to remove the knife from the offender, but the offender lacerated Mr Wallace’s finger. He told the victim that if she screamed, he would kill Mr Wallace, and told them both that they could not leave.
During the period when the victim and Mr Wallace were detained, the victim also suffered a subdural haematoma, bruising under her right eye, a fractured rib and many abrasions. The offender was heavily intoxicated at the time, having suffered from an alcohol use disorder since he was nine years old.
Held: The offender was sentenced to seven years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. The sentencing judge found that the prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable to good [62] because the offender entered an early plea, his conduct was out of character (he had not previously engaged in violent conduct) [49], he was sincerely remorseful, he was suffering significant grief over the death of his wife [53], he behaved in an exemplary fashion whilst in custody [56], and he had agreed to avail himself of alcohol and drug treatment programs upon his release [58].
However, His Honour held that the offending was objectively very serious [70]. The Detention charges fell at the mid-range of objective seriousness for that kind of offence as the detention was relatively short and its purpose was to exert "psychological control" and "emotional ascendency" [21]-[22]. Furthermore, the offender made numerous threats to kill the victim and Mr Wallace when he was unstable. His Honour held that the Wounding charges fell above mid-range as the victim was conscious at the time the wounds were inflicted but was unable to resist [25]-[26]. Breach of the AVO was held to be an aggravating factor [27], as was the use of a weapon [28].
His Honour held that there was a causal connection between the Offender’s alcohol use disorder and the offending, because the disorder led him to misperceive the dealings between the victim and Mr Wallace [11]. As such, His Honour held that the disorder "mitigate[d] to some degree the level of the objective seriousness of the offending" and also had implications for the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation [11]. However, His Honour found that the offender was still culpable for his actions because he had not previously engaged in violent conduct and had stopped making efforts to manage his alcoholism six years earlier [33]. The judge further held that the offender’s culpability was not reduced because of a combination of intoxication and sexual jealousy because he had previously managed these conditions prior to the offending [38].
In relation to the relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic as a sentencing consideration, His Honour provided that "in the short term, the [offender] is likely to find custody generally more onerous to some degree as a result of the general restrictions imposed because of the pandemic" [70], however, "because of the objective gravity of his conduct, he will receive a very substantial period of incarceration" [71]. His Honour further stated that "It is realistic and not unfair to say that the incidence and effect of the pandemic may be more keenly felt for an offender who has a short non-parole period … in comparison to someone who will receive a significant head sentence" [71] and warned that "courts should not be too ready, in the absence of express legislative action, to be unduly influenced by the pandemic when weighting its significance in the sentencing exercise" [71].
R v Aumash [2020] NSWDC 168 (1 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 to sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Women’
Offences: Entering dwelling-house (aggravated offence) x 2; Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender had been in a relationship with the female victim (who had a child from a previous relationship). The victim ended the relationship after a year due to the offender’s controlling behaviour and anger, but the offender refused to accept that the relationship was over. He continued to contact the victim via telephone and text message (the messages were abusive, controlling and threatening) and attended her home uninvited. One night, the offender repeatedly called the victim and demanded to know who was in her home, threatening to kill anyone who was there. He then went to her house and entered it without her permission. The victim threatened to call police so the offender left the house, but remained outside yelling at her and knocking on doors and windows. He then climbed in through her bedroom window and confronted the victim, standing over her and frightening her (first entering dwelling house offence). The offender threatened to stab the victim’s male friend and searched the victim’s house. He then picked up a pocket-knife and accused the victim of trying to stab him with it. The victim tried to leave the house and the offender stopped her, but she was ultimately able to get away. The offender followed her into the street and continued to yell at her, despite the victim telling the offender that they were no longer together. The victim ran away and hid in a nearby park, and had a friend call 000. The offender searched for her using the victim’s car but when police arrived, they were unable to find him. An Interim Apprehend Violence Order was obtained by police.
The next day, the victim and her friend, Mick, were in the victim’s backyard when the offender came out of the garage carrying a piece of wood. He took the victim to her car (where he left it the night before) and she drove it home. The offender remained at the victim’s home but the victim would not let him inside. Later that day, the victim found the offender in her kitchen. The offender left after the victim threatened to call police, but he continued to send her text messages. That afternoon, the victim found the offender under her son’s bed (second entering dwelling house offence). She locked him in the room and ran to her car, but the offender jumped out the window and entered the car and would not leave. The victim continuously sounded the car horn and police arrived.
The offender continued to return to the victim’s house over the next few days, threatening to hurt her and her family, and yelling abuse at the victim and anyone she was with. He also continued to send her text messages and make phone calls to her. During the course of one day, the offender made 488 calls to the victim and sent 98 text messages. Many of these messages sought to cajole her into dropping the charges against him and excusing his criminal actions towards her. The police eventually found the offender at the victim’s home, served him with an Apprehended Violence Order and arrested him.
Sentence: The judge sentenced the offender to three years and three months’ imprisonment for the entering a dwelling-house offences, with a non-parole period of two years, and nine months’ imprisonment for the using a carriage service offence. The judge emphasised that the offender’s conduct constituted a "sustained attack on [the victim’s] physical and psychological integrity over a period of weeks" [54] and that "his crimes were so serious he must be removed from the community for a time" [62]. His Honour found that the offender had no concern for the victim’s emotional state and sought to exercise coercive control over her by putting her in fear [31].
When determining the appropriate sentence for each offence, His Honour also took into account other offences that the offender committed. Regarding the offender’s entry into the victim’s bedroom via the window when he knew the victim would be home, His Honour took into account the offender’s crime of intimidation, taking of the victim’s car, and two entries to the victim’s property without her consent [36]. Regarding the offender being found under the victim’s son’s bed, His Honour also took into account the offender’s three acts of intimidation, entry to the victim’s property without her consent and remaining on her property without her consent [37].
His Honour specifically noted that the number and content of the calls and text messages showed that the offender’s intention was to seek to control, threaten and demean the victim, and this was part of a pattern of behaviour [33]. His Honour stated that "the extent of [the offender’s] harassment and motivations for his actions make this a particularly serious example of this type of offence [the using a carriage service offence]" and therefore a custodial sentence was required [34].
His Honour found that the offender had committed previous domestic violence offences, so was not entitled to any leniency [43]. Although the offender had a history of drug use and mental illness, His Honour held that neither of these mitigated his offending [47]. However, each sentence was reduced to reflect the utilitarian value of the offender’s early pleas.
His Honour also commented on the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that "these concerns and considerations [regarding COVID-19 and its restrictions] apply to every prisoner sentenced" [52]. His Honour considered that "if/when COVID-19 enters gaols, early parole may be given to some but not all prisoners" and that the offender is in a category that can be considered for early release [53].
R v Misdale [2019] NSWDC 858 (16 December 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm x 1; assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1; reckless wounding x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The male offender pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and reckless wounding. Neilson DCJ also took into account 2 matters on a Form 1, namely, offences of common assault and intimidation. The female complainant (in respect of the charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, intimidation, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and common assault) was in an intimate relationship with the offender, which ended in October 2017 but recommenced a year later. The victim (in respect of the charge of reckless wounding) was a male friend of the offender and complainant. All but one offence (reckless wounding) were domestic violence offences. The offender’s relationship with the complainant was described as ‘toxic’.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Held: The offender’s extensive criminal history evidenced a pattern of alcohol-fueled violence and, more recently, offences committed against the current complainant ([28]-[38]). The offender’s personal circumstances were discussed at [39]-[48]: he had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse; he had a problematic pattern of gambling when under the influence of alcohol and cocaine; he only had intermittent and low paying employment; he struggled to maintain stable intimate relationships and his relationship with the complainant was marred by verbal and physical arguments; and he displayed insight into his need for treatment for his addictions and showed no impairment in cognition when he was free of alcohol and drugs. Further, the offender was assessed as being at a high risk of re-offending ([49]), and was considered as requiring ‘as much supervision…and assistance as he can obtain from Community Corrections…to stay free of drugs and alcohol and turn his life around’ ([53]). The Court noted the importance of denunciation, as well as deterrence ‘both of the offender and of others who might want to practise violence, in particular domestic violence’ ([56]). Consequently, the offender was convicted of the 3 charges to which he pleaded guilty, and sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months ([66]). Special circumstances were established because of the offender’s need for treatment and support for his drug and alcohol addiction ([64]).
R v Brisbane (a pseudonym) [2019] NSWDC 785 (12 December 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 1 x sexual intercourse without consent; 1 x general offence of perverting the course of justice; 1 x contravention of an apprehended violence order (AVO)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender was in a domestic relationship with the female victim for 3 years, during the course of which the victim had a child. The relationship was marred by domestic abuse, which eventually led to its termination ([7]-[10]). The offender attended the victim’s house in breach of his bail, told her that she would be raped, and proceeded to have non-consensual intercourse with her ([13]-[20]). The offender also attempted to get the victim to withdraw her cooperation with police, which constituted the breach of the AVO and the pervert course of justice offences ([25]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 7 years, with a non-parole period of 5 years and 3 months ([47]). The sexual assault offence was aggravated because it occurred in the victim’s home, was committed while the offender was on conditional liberty, and involved threats and the use of actual violence ([27]). The Court addressed the offender’s personal circumstances at [30]-[34]: he was 28 years old, had a criminal history, and used various drugs for a long period of time. His Honour described the offender as a ‘vicious’ sex offender ([32]). Although the offender pleaded guilty, he did not express remorse ([35]-[37]). The material before his Honour did not indicate that the offender was interested in rehabilitation, and thus his prospects were found to be poor ([38]). Further, specific and general deterrence, and the need for community protection were highly relevant ([39]).
R v Edwards [2019] NSWDC 825 (13 November 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of bond’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Breach of s12 bond by reason of offences of common assault, intimidation, and use of a carriage service to threaten to kill
Case type: Breach hearing and sentence
Facts: The male offender was called up in respect of alleged breaches of a s 12 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act bond that was imposed by Norrish QC DCJ in 2017 in relation to an offence contrary to s 25A Drug (Misuse and Trafficking) Act 1985 ([1]). The offences that constituted the breaches involved elements of domestic violence, and included offences of common assault, intimidation, and use of a carriage service to threaten to kill, to which the offender pleaded guilty ([4]). Material presented to the Court included an apology letter from the offender and a report from a psychiatrist working with the Aboriginal Legal Service ([3]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the breaches were proven and, if so, the appropriate sentence for the offender.
Held: The offences constituting the breach were the offender’s first domestic violence offences but were considered to be serious matters. Norrish QC DCJ noted that the offender’s mental health significantly deteriorated since 2017: he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, a form of schizophrenia or schizoid condition and a polysubstance abuse disorder ([3]). The offender was un-medicated at the time of the offending and exhibited a motivation to address his drug use and a willingness to comply with the requirements of supervision. While the offender’s deteriorating mental condition did not provide a basis for excusing the breaches, it assisted his Honour in determining the non-parole period. He was assessed as being a medium to high risk of reoffending ([10]). Consequently, the Court found the breaches to be proven, revoked the s 12 bond and fixed a term of imprisonment of 1 year 9 months, with a non-parole period of 6 months.
R v Cranston [2019] NSWDC 619 (1 November 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault police’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Step-child’
Charges: Common assault x 1; assaulting a police officer x 3; attempting to use an offensive weapon with intent to commit an indictable offence x 1; chocking a police officer and being reckless as to render the officer incapable of resistance x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused pushed his partner during an argument, causing her to stumble. Concerned by the accused’s actions, his partner instructed one of their children to call the police. The accused became further enraged when the police arrived, kicking one of the officers while being questioned. Two of the officers wrestled with the accused while he continued to physically lash out. The accused then grabbed the cord of one of the officer’s radio as she called for assistance and attempted to choke her. As the officers tried to handcuff him the accused attempted to obtain one of their firearms, threatening to use the gun on the police and then bit the officer. When other officers arrived another officer was also bitten by the accused. The accused was intoxicated at the time of offending. The accused pleaded guilty to all charges.
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 1 year and 9 months.
Objective Seriousness: Regarding the assault against the police officers, Abadee J thought that the assault occurring during a violent struggle and in the presence of children were aggravating factors [32]. Consequently, the conduct was assessed as falling within the mid-range of seriousness for the offence.
The presence of children when the accused threatened to use the firearm on the officers was considered to be an aggravating factor along with the context of escalating violence. Abadee J ‘characterise[d] the conduct as falling beyond the mid-range and toward the high range of objective seriousness’ [35]. The same circumstances were aggravating factors for the offence of chocking on of the officer, with the conduct also falling within the high range of objective seriousness.
Subjective Circumstances The accused was 50 at the time of offending and had a criminal history which included some offences of a violent character. The guilty pleas entered by the accused were not made at the earliest opportunity. As the accused was intoxicated, ‘his offending was impulsive or spontaneous; and not pre-planned’. ‘The most significant issue in the sentencing hearing concerned the offender’s background’ of a dysfunctional childhood marked with sexual abuse and moderate alcoholism.
In considering these circumstances, the objective seriousness of the offences and the general principles of deterrence, Abadee J ordered ‘an aggregate sentence to fit the totality of the criminal conduct overall’ discounted by 15% [76].
R v Bohun [2019] NSWDC 807 (25 October 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: 1x aggravated steal from a person; 2x assault occasioning actual bodily harm; 1x aggravated break, enter and commit serious offence; 1x dangerous driving; 1x assault; 1x drive while disqualified; 1x take and drive; 1x contravene apprehended violence order; 1x possess prohibited weapon.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender was convicted of ten charges, relating to two separate courses of conduct against his then girlfriend. At the time of the offending, he was affected by illicit non-prescription drugs and was also on a suspended sentence and subject to a protection order.
The offender and victim argued in a vehicle driven by the offender’s friend and the victim got out of the vehicle. The offender ran after her, pushed her to the ground, pushed her down a set of stairs, and punched her in the back, rib and head multiple times (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). Bystanders intervened. The victim suffered ‘bruising, swelling to her face, lips, head, shoulders, ribs, back and arms’: [9]. The offender walked away, and then returned to steal the victim’s handbag (aggravated steal from a person). When the offender went back to the car, the friend drove away in order to protect the victim from him and asked him to get out of the vehicle. He did so, leaving the handbag behind.
The remainder of charges related to an unrelated series of incidents.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning:
Haesler SC DCJ imposed an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment, with a three years and six months’ non-parole period [77].
The fact that the offender and victim were in a domestic relationship showed that there was a pattern of personally targeted violence that required denunciation: [33]. This was coercive power and control that should be denounced, regardless of whether the offender thought he was justified: [34]. Denunciation was necessary, despite recognition that jails are violent environments that can have a crime-producing effect: [35]. Stealing the handbag from the victim was spontaneous and not the most serious of the offences committed: [36].
Best v Rosamond [2019] NSWDC 344 (24 July 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Bipolar affective disorder’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Offences: recklessly causing grievous bodily harm; assault occasioning actual bodily harm (DV).
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male perpetrator and female victim were married at the time of offending and the male victim was a friend of theirs. The offender became angered after seeing the female and male victims sharing an ‘intimate’ kiss. He punched the male victim in the left eye before pushing the female victim to the ground. He continued to punch the male victim several times in the head and kick him on the left side of his torso until the female victim asked him to stop. The offender turned to the female victim, slapped her forcefully across the face and kicked her thigh while she lay on the ground. The offender left the scene after punching the male victim a few more times. Neither victim provided a statement to police until a year after the offending, despite the male victim being left with substantial injuries requiring surgical treatment.
The offender was heavily intoxicated at the time of offending.
Decision: The offender was sentenced to Intensive Corrections Order for 1 year and 10 months’ and to a Community Release Order or 1 year and 8 months’.
The Court noted that while the offence is a domestic violence offence, the offender’s violence was "primarily directed at the male victim" [53]. The assault occasioning actual bodily harm was at the lower end of the scale. The female victim suffered minor injuries and the forced used against her was considerably less than that used against the male victim. Furthermore, while the Court acknowledged her victim impact statement, they found its length and detail to be "disproportionate to the seriousness of the harm that could reasonably be considered to have been caused" [31].
In assessing the objective gravity of the offending and sentencing purposes, the Court considered the fact that the offence was unplanned and in response to some form of provocation, the offending was uncharacteristic of the offender, and that the offender’s bipolar affective disorder had some underlying relevance. A discount was given to recognise the utilitarian benefit of the offender’s guilty plea.
R v AK [2019] NSWDC 456 (19 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Detention’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 2 x detain a person with the intent of obtaining an advantage; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x influencing witness; 2 x common assault; 1 x stalking/intimidating with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm; 1 x contravening Apprehended Domestic Violence Order (ADVO)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The victim and offender were married and had a child who was 2 years old at the time of the offending. The victim had 2 children from a previous marriage, who were 20 and 15 years of age. The offender pleaded guilty to the charges of detaining his wife and his 15 year old stepdaughter without her consent, with the intention of obtaining an advantage (that is, psychological gratification), and the charge of sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent. He also pleaded guilty to the charge of communicating with his wife, who was to be called as a witness, to persuade her to withhold true evidence with the intent of procuring his acquittal of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm. In addition, the offender also requested that the Court sentence him in respect to the charges of common assault, stalking/intimidating with the intent to cause fear of physical harm, and contravening an ADVO.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years. In relation to the objective seriousness of the detention charges, it was submitted that the Court should consider a number of factors, such as the persons being detained, the period of detention, the circumstances of detention, and the purpose of the detention ([41]). The detainees included his wife, and her 15 year old daughter and 2 year old son. The detention lasted around 10 hours. As part of the detention, there were acts of violence perpetrated against his wife and step-daughter. His wife was also intimidated into changing her story before going to court. Additionally, the offender had sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent while she was being detained ([43]). The purpose of the detention was difficult to ascertain as the offender refused to give evidence on the question. Therefore, the Court could merely speculate ([45]).
Wilson SC DCJ analysed the offender’s medical history. In 2016, he had been diagnosed with a neurocognitive disorder with possibilities of a dementia type illness with psychotic symptoms. Another expert opined that the offender likely suffered from major depression at the time of the offending ([56]-60]).
Aggravating factors affecting the sentence included ([61]):
•
The actual or threatened use of violence;
•
The offences were committed in the presence of his wife’s children, aged 2 and 15 respectively. The 15 year old child was also assaulted, and that offending occurred in the presence of the 2 year old child;
•
The offending was committed in the victims’ home, a place where they are entitled to expect to be safe, particularly in light of the fact that an ADVO had been taken out which prevented the offender from attending the premises; and
•
The offences were committed while the offender was the subject of conditional liberty.
The offender’s prior criminal history did not aggravate the objective seriousness of the offences, however, it did disentitle him to any leniency resulting from a finding of good character ([65]). His Honour declined to find statutory remorse as a mitigating factor ([66]).
R v Wyatt [2019] NSWDC 490 (21 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 1 x wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm; 1 x reckless wounding
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender initially pleaded not guilty to the charges of reckless wounding and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. On the fifth and final day of trial, the offender pleaded guilty to the alternative Count 2. The victim was in an intimate relationship with a woman for about 13 years, with whom he had 2 children. On the day of the offending, the offender stabbed the victim around 3 times.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was sentenced to 3 years’ and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 2 months. The objective seriousness of the offending was deemed as being in the middle of the range, given the nature of the violence, the nature and extent of the injuries, the fact that the wounds were inflicted by the use of a knife, and the fact that the wounding was completely unprovoked by the victim ([23]-[24]). Aggravating features of the offending included: the use of a weapon, the offending occurred in the victim’s home, and the offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending. Although the offender had previous convictions for violent offences and the conduct was an act of gratuitous violence, the Court did not take these matters into account as aggravating features ([25]-[29]). The offender had a long-standing history of drug use ([50]), as well as an extensive criminal history ([30]). He identifies as Aboriginal, and reportedly witnessed domestic violence as a child and had been assaulted ([44]-[46]). There was no evidence of any mental disorder, although the offender reported symptoms of anxiety ([51]). Given his lengthy drug and criminal history, the Court was unable to find that he was unlikely to re-offend ([53]). The offender’s expression of remorse was given limited weight ([54]). Further, the Court was satisfied that special circumstances existed as it was clear that the offender would need extensive supervision on parole to ensure that he did not relapse into drug use ([55]-[56]).
R v Yee (a pseudonym) [2019] NSWDC 326 (19 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Domestic violence related offences’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with poor literacy skills’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Charges: 1 x causing grievous bodily harm to a person with intent; 1 x intentionally choking a person with recklessness
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender and victim, with whom he started communicating on a social media app, married in China. After relocating to Australia, the relationship deteriorated. The victim formed a romantic attachment to a customer while she was working as a sex worker. When she was asleep, the offender struck the victim 5 times to her head with a hammer and choked her. He suddenly stopped this attack and immediately assisted the victim. He also called his employer, told him that he had seriously injured his wife and asked him to call an ambulance as his English was poor. The victim was physically and psychologically injured. As a result of the incident, she could not work and was in ‘a state of confusion, helplessness, anxiety and panic’ ([35]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The grievous bodily harm was a mid-range offence, and the choking with recklessness was slightly below a mid-range offence. Each offence was aggravated by the fact that they occurred in the victim’s home. The offender had no issues with alcohol or drugs, expressed genuine remorse, and the offending was ‘completely out of…character’ and was a result of ‘a perfect storm of a mixture of conflicting emotions’ ([37]-[44]). A psychologist highlighted the need for the offender to continue psychological treatment for a persistent depressive disorder, which was in an acute state leading up to the offence ([45]). The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were found to be ‘very good’ ([46]). The sentence imposed on the offender sought to discourage others from committing similar offences, and encourage his rehabilitation ([47]). He pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity ([48]), and given his problems with English and his social isolation, the Court made a finding of ‘special circumstances’ ([52]). For the offence of causing grievous bodily harm, the offender was sentenced to 7 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years. For the offence of intentionally choking a person with recklessness, the offender was sentenced to a fixed term of 3 years’ imprisonment. Both sentences were ordered to be served totally concurrently.
R v Casini [2019] NSWDC 376 (18 June 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’
Charges: 1 x aggravated detention, causing actual bodily harm (kidnapping)
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated detention, causing actual bodily harm. The victim and offender had been in an intimate relationship for 5 months and were living together at the time of the offending. The offender was formerly married for 22 years and had 2 children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offender was convicted, and sentenced to 3 years and 9 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, Bright DCJ took into account the following factors ([27]):
•
The conduct was a serious instance of domestic violence;
•
The assault was vicious and sustained, involving multiple forceful blows and punches to the victim’s head and body. The offender would have known that the victim was unlikely to physically retaliate;
•
The offending involved significant emotional intimidation and verbal threats;
•
The nature of the victim’s injuries;
•
The length of the detention was for a period of 2 hours; and
•
The offender sought psychological gratification.
The objective seriousness of the offending was found to be at the higher end of the mid-range ([28]). An aggravating feature was that the offence occurred at the victim’s home ([29]). The offender began using drugs after separating from his former wife, but otherwise described no use of drugs in his adult life ([47]). While the offender’s self-induced intoxication was not a mitigating factor, his underlying Adjustment Disorder was found to have had an impact on his moral culpability ([60]). He was also remorseful, as evidenced by his letter to the Court ([61]-[63]). His Honour was satisfied that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation, having regard to his motivation to participate in counselling and rehabilitation, previous employment, insight into his offending behaviour and commitment to being a good father upon release ([64]).
R v Halacoglu [2019] NSWDC 384 (7 May 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Good character’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sentence’
Charges: 1 x use of a carriage service to menace
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to one count of using a carriage service to menace. The offender moved to Australia in 2010 on a student visa sponsored by the victim, with whom he was in a relationship. They lived together, with the victim’s 2 children from a previous relationship. ‘Troubles’ in their relationship emerged, and the victim entered into another relationship in the beginning of 2016. A few months later, the parties exchanged a series of text messages. The offender sent a text in Turkish, saying ‘If I’m not going to live, you are not going to live either’. The victim reported feeling threatened by the offender. Although he admitted to using those words, he claimed that they had a different meaning.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The offence was at the very low end of the scale of objective seriousness. The offender had no previous convictions ([5]). Given the fact that he was on bail with strict conditions and had the matter ‘hanging over his head for almost 3 years without any offending’, Williams SC DCJ dismissed the charges under s 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([7]).
R v Amante [2019] NSWDC 222 (1 May 2019) – New South Wales District Court
(This decision was the subject of an unsuccessful appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal Amante v R [2020] NSWCCA 34 (11 March 2020) – New South Wales Supreme Court)
‘Arson’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Charges: Destroying or damaging property x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: As at January 2018, the offender had been in a turbulent domestic relationship with the victim. The situation between them deteriorated to a point where the victim had obtained an apprehended violence order against the offender. The offender started a fire in the victim’s unit ([16]). As a consequence, the fire caused serious damage to the limited personal belongings of the victim, who was in a somewhat perilous financial situation so as to require Housing Commission accommodation ([25]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: An important consideration in sentencing the offender was the fact that it was a domestic violence offence ([45]). Colefax SC DCJ noted the offender’s long history of offending, and unresolved drug abuse and psychological issues. His Honour stated that the offender is a ‘man of intelligence’, who has been able to work hard and has the support of his immediate family ([51]). The offender’s father was a violent man and he was sexually abused by his brother ([32]-[33]). His mental health problems and excessive drug consumption contributed to the commission of the offence. No rational person would have reacted to a break-up by setting fire to another person’s house, threatening other people’s lives ([42]). Because of his mental health issues, he was not seen as an ‘appropriate vehicle for the full application of general deterrence’ ([44]). The offending was aggravated by the fact that the offender was on bail and that the property damaged was the victim’s home ([28]). He pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity, indicating an element of remorse ([46]). However, remorse is an important but not determinative factor. It was also important to note that the offender had not received effective treatment for his underlying mental health or drug addiction issues ([48]).
Taking into account his guilty plea, reasonable prospects of rehabilitation and the fact that he was in protection, the offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years and 9 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
R v Phillip Michael Summerfield [2019] NSWDC 126 (16 April 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: The offender pleaded guilty to 3 charges, namely, stalking or intimidation with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm (Count 1), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Count 2), and sexual intercourse without consent (Count 3). There was also a charge of driving while suspended.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The victim had been in an intimate domestic relationship with the offender for approximately 2 years, during which time the offender sometimes lived at the victim’s home. The relationship was characterised by violence. On 10 May 2017, the offender carried out the attack after picking the victim up from her home. He began shouting at the victim about a man named Adam. The victim tried to escape from the car. The offender stopped the car, opened the passenger’s door and punched the victim several times in the face, causing bleeding (Count 2). The victim moved to the back seat of the car and called 000 on 3 separate occasions in the hope that the operator would hear what was happening. The offender drove to an address in Young, where he committed Count 3. Count 1 related to the offender’s ongoing threatening and violent behaviour towards the victim. The offender later drove the victim to her home, and apologised to her. When he was arrested, he agreed to be interviewed and admitted to assaulting the victim.
The offender asked the Court to also deal with his appeal against sentence severity in relation to an aggregate sentence of 26 months with a non-parole period of 15 months which had been imposed at the Local Court in respect of two offences (one of which was contravention of a domestic violence order). That offending was committed while the offender was on bail for the other offences for which the offender appeared for sentence.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held:
Severity appeal from the Local Court:
His Honour dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the convictions and the aggregate sentence of 26 months with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Sentence matters:
Judge Lerve noted that the offending was committed in contravention of an apprehended domestic violence order, and highlighted the need for general deterrence in such cases ([35]-[42]). The circumstances in which Count 2 was committed were relevant to the assessment. It was particularly nasty and cowardly as it occurred on the side of the road; however the injuries were limited to bleeding ([19]). Count 1 was found to be serious, as it involved an ongoing course of violent and aggressive threats ([20]). In relation to Count 3, his Honour noted that, in light of the victim’s reaction and the violence which occurred that day, it must have been obvious to the offender that the victim was not consenting ([21]).
Further, the offender’s criminal history was extensive, and he had previously been convicted of offences including contraventions of domestic violence orders, intimidation of a police officer, damage to property, and a number of assault matters. However, the offender had not previously been charged with a sexual offence ([43]-[48]). He also regularly uses drugs, and self-reported that he was diagnosed with PTSD and experienced trauma as a child. He attended a rehabilitation facility while on bail in 2018, but was discharged because of non-compliance with the requirements of the facility ([54]). Judge Lerve could not be satisfied on balance that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation ([58]). The evidence before his Honour suggested that, given his lack of treatment, he is at an increased risk of violent re-offending in the future ([57]).
His Honour recorded a conviction for each of the matters to which the offender pleaded guilty, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 7 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 5 years. He also recommended that the offender participate in the Violent Offenders Treatment Programme while in custody. The total effective sentence was one of 8 years and 4 months with a period of 6 years in actual custody.
R v Lumsden [2019] NSWDC 149 (15 March 2019) – New South Wales District Court
‘Burden of proof’ – ‘Credible witness’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Intentionally or recklessly destroy/damage property x 1; common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant had separated and have a child together. They had ongoing issues regarding the complainant’s use of a phone and their separation in general. The appellant grabbed the complainant’s handbag, containing her phone. In cross-examination, he confirmed that he held the bag to taunt her about the phone because he was upset ([11]). The altercation resulted in the complainant suffering bruises and a scratch on her leg.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the conviction, pursuant to section 18 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001.
Held: Grant DCJ allowed the appeal. He quashed the conviction, set aside all other orders of the Local Court, found the appellant not guilty and dismissed the charges.
The appellant gave sworn evidence of his good character which was uncontested ([10]). The magistrate was faced with a single witness with no independent supportive evidence ([12]). The appellant had the presumption of innocence ([22]).
Grant DCJ found that, in determining the guilt of the appellant, the Magistrate engaged in ‘illogical, speculative, reverse reasoning’ that led him into error. The Magistrate’s reasoning in respect of the matters listed at para [14] was found to be flawed. He wrongly inferred that because the complainant had not been cross-examined about any inconsistency with a statement made to police, the evidence she gave must be consistent with that statement, therefore supporting her credibility. Such an inference was found to be entirely speculative as no one knew the contents of the statement. Further, Grant DCJ held that making a self-serving statement, or any statement to the police, and giving evidence in accordance with that statement, does not automatically add to a witness’ credibility ([15]-[16]).
The appellant was given the opportunity to conduct an electronic record of interview which he declined. Grant DCJ found that the Magistrate correctly set out the law in that the refusal to participate in a record of interview cannot be construed as an admission of guilt. However, the Magistrate went on to say that such a refusal was relevant in assessing the accuracy of memories in relation to a certain account noted in [19]. Grant DCJ found that this reasoning would lead to the proposition that ‘if a defendant engaged in a record of interview and it was consistent with his evidence, then a witness could be looked upon as a more credible witness.’ This finding would undermine the appellant’s right to silence and may shift the onus on the appellant to demonstrate his credibility by participating in a record of interview ([18]-[20]).
To find the appellant guilty, the magistrate would have to disbelieve his account beyond reasonable doubt ([23]). Grant DCJ was not persuaded that the Magistrate could have properly convicted the appellant ([23]).
R v Smethurst [2018] NSWDC 488 (9 November 2018) – New South Wales District Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Options’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Assault occasioning actual bodily harm x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The offender had known the complainant for a number of years. In the course of a dispute between the parties at the complainant’s residence, the offender put a pillow over her face (common assault). The complainant then ran out of the house, followed by the offender. The offender pushed her on the ground and started to drag her towards the house by the shirt which caused a graze to her back (assault occasioning actual bodily harm). The complainant ran onto the neighbour’s driveway and told the neighbour to ‘call the police’. The police attended the complainant’s residence soon after the incident and recorded her statement on camera.
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The Court sentenced the offender to an aggregate period of imprisonment of 22 months which, after a discount of 15% for his guilty plea, was a sentence of 18 months ([64]). A non-parole period of 12 months was imposed.
The Court assessed the objective seriousness of the offending, and found that aggravating factors included the offender’s five good behaviour bonds and a string of intensive corrections orders at the time of offending, the place of the offending (complainant’s home), and the brutality of the consecutive acts committed over a short period of time ([13]-[17]).
The Court must be satisfied that imprisonment is more appropriate than all other alternatives, such as non-custodial sentences ([54]). The benefits of rehabilitation in the community were found to be outweighed by the fact that the offender previously had the benefit of conditional liberty orders and failed to comply with them ([56]). General principles of sentencing, such as denunciation, accountability, punishment, deterrence and protection were considered at [46]-[52]. The offender had a number of prior convictions, including common assault, contravention of an AVO, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm ([21]). The matter before the Court was the fourth domestic violence type offence for which the offender had been charged ([30]). Although the number of previous offences was a relevant factor, they were of moderate application as there was no evidence of any present risk. Nevertheless, the court observed at [33] that the offender had a history of domestic violence and non-compliance with court-ordered community based sentencing options.
Although the offender pleaded guilty, the Court was reluctant to accept his expressions of remorse, particularly given his partial attribution of blame to the victim in the Sentencing Assessment Report. The Court referred Munda v Western Australia (2013) 649 CLR 600 at [54]-[55] which held that the State has an obligation to ‘vindicate the dignity of each victim of violence, to express the community's disapproval of that offending, and to afford such protection as can be afforded by the State to the vulnerable against repetition of violence’. The Court noted the offender’s history of drug abuse at [24]-[29], but did not accept that a piece of oral evidence at [29] was sufficient to establish a connection between his domestic violence offending and his substance abuse. The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were also seen to be ‘guarded’ ([45]).
Degampathi Jayasekra [2018] NSWDC 59 (23 March 2018) – New South Wales District Court
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Gifts’ – ‘Presumption of advancement’ – ‘Property ownership’ – ‘Trusts’
Charges: Destroy or damage property x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In the course of an argument with the complainant, his wife, the appellant damaged a laptop and mobile phone ([4]). The appellant’s case was that he was the sole owner of the items, and thus could not be convicted of the offence ([5]). The appellant had purchased the items and had given them to his wife and did not say they were gifts ([6]). The complainant had day to day use of both items ([7]).
Issues: Whether the items were the property of the appellant or another person.
Decision and reasoning: In reliance on the law of trusts, Scotting J inferred from the actions of the parties that the items were intended to be gifts ([21]-[26]). The presumption of advancement could not be rebutted. The Magistrate’s decision that the items belonged to both the appellant and complainant was affirmed ([28]). Therefore, the appellant’s conviction for property damage is upheld.
R v MJ [2016] NSWDC 272 (12 May 2016) – New South Wales District Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Myths and misunderstandings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual intercourse without consent’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 5, sexual intercourse without consent, common assault x 4, breach of AVO x 5.
Hearing: Sentencing hearing.
Facts: After being found guilty in a trial by jury, the offender was sentenced for 10 domestic violence offences committed against his former female partner. The offender was also sentenced for a number of other charges namely, driving disqualified and numerous breaches of an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO).
Decision and Reasoning: Berman J imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 and a half years. At the outset, His Honour noted that: ‘Women, and it is usually women, too often find themselves subjugated to the demands of their partners, who seem to regard it as entirely acceptable for them to control and manipulate someone with whom they are in a relationship through violent and degrading means’ (see [1]).
Berman J noted that the offender here felt a sense of entitlement and ownership over the victim and blamed her for his violent behaviour. His manipulation of the victim, using violence and protestations of love, was so effective that she did not leave the relationship (even after she had been repeatedly beaten and raped) until she received counselling (see [4]). She was left with significant physical and psychological injury (see [26]).
Moreover, there were a number of serious features of this offending. The victim was assaulted in her own home. Many of the offences occurred in context of offender’s demands that the victim withdraw a complaint she made to the police about him. There were similarities in the way he had treated a previous partner. Some offences were committed in the presence of the victim’s daughter. Many offences constituted breaches of an AVO and demonstrated contempt of these orders (see [28]-[30]).
In the context of mitigating factors, His Honour acknowledged that the offender grew up with domestic violence as a feature of his early life. However, this was not a case in which the offender thought that such behaviour was normal and acceptable because his stepfather was a good role model for him (see [33]-[40]). The offender had taken some steps towards rehabilitation and some references spoke positively of his character (showing how an offender can have a very different face in private life) but there was still need for the sentence to reflect an element of specific deterrence (see [42]-[43]). More importantly, the sentence needed to take into account general deterrence. As per Berman J:
‘Offences such as these cause enormous harm, both to the individual victims concerned and to the community generally. Offenders who commit crimes such as I have described, particularly after they have been subject to apprehended violence orders, put in place to protect their partners from precisely such conduct, need to be given in sentences which will deter others who may be tempted to act in a similar way. Most fundamentally in assessing the relevant sentence to impose upon the offender is, of course, the objective gravity of what he has done’ (see [42]).
Rich v The Queen [2015] NSWDC 71 (18 May 2015) – New South Wales District Court
‘Common assault’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Service’
Charge/s: Contravention of a protection order, common assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: A Provisional Apprehended Order was made nominating the appellant’s partner as the protected person and the appellant as the defendant. This was served on the appellant by the police. The appellant then appeared in court represented by counsel from the Aboriginal Legal Service and an interim Apprehended Violence Order (AVO) was made. The appellant assaulted the protected person and was charged. There was a hearing in the Local Court where a plea of guilty was entered with respect to the assault charge and the appellant defended the contravene AVO charge. The Local Court found the appellant guilty of the contravene AVO.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The prosecution was unable to prove service of the Provisional Apprehended Order on the appellant because the Statement of Service submitted breached the hearsay rule in s 59 of Evidence Act 1995.
2.
The magistrate in the Local Court should not have informed himself of the events of the appellant’s appearances in court for the interim AVO.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the Statement of Service complied with the Local Court Rules. It did not need to be signed as it was served by a police officer and it was sufficient that the officer wrote ‘Dubbo’ in the space for the address (r 5.12 Local Court Rules). Rule 5.12 exists to serve the purpose of facilitating proof of service of the process (See [29]-[36]). In any event, the appellant was present in court when the Interim Order was made (See [48]). Second, the magistrate informed himself of the course of events by reading the bench sheet. He was entitled to do so (See [49], [57]).
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
DUD v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2019] NSWCATAD 163 (15 August 2019) – New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative review’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Civil and administrative tribunal’ – ‘Eggshell psyche’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Psychological injury’
Charges: Act of domestic/family violence
Case type: Application for Administrative Review
Facts: The applicant sought administrative review of a decision in respect of an application for Victims Support. In 2015, the applicant’s solicitor lodged an Application for Victims Support which alleged that she was the primary victim of an act of domestic/family violence. She also alleged to have suffered a psychological injury as a result of the violent conduct, and she sought counselling, financial assistance for immediate needs or economic loss, and a recognition payment ([2]-[3]).
At first instance, the Assessor approved a Category D recognition payment in the sum of $1500 on the basis that the evidence indicated that the applicant was a victim of an assault that did not result in grievous bodily harm ([7]). Subsequently, the applicant’s lawyer signed an Internal Review request form, submitting that she had suffered grievous bodily harm as a result of the violence and that a Category C recognition payment should have been approved ([9]). The Senior Assessor, however, re-affirmed that the applicant was the primary victim of an act of violence, and was only eligible for a Category D recognition payment in the sum of $1500 ([12]).
Issue: The Tribunal was required to determine an application for an administrative review. Its powers derive from s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
Held: The applicant’s solicitor cited Helm v Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd and BWQ v Commissioner of Victims Rights in the Internal Review form, both of which relate to the characterisation of psychological injury as ‘bodily harm’. The Senior Assessor determined that ‘as [the applicant] relies on a psychological injury as evidence of grievous bodily harm in order to be eligible for a Category C recognition payment’, it is necessary to consider ‘whether the evidence establishes a “really serious” psychological injury’. The Senior Assessor was not satisfied that the applicant’s functioning had been impacted solely as a ‘direct result’ of the domestic violence, or that her psychological injury was sufficiently serious to justify the approval of a Category C recognition payment ([12]).
Ultimately, the decision of the Senior Assessor was set aside, and the Tribunal decided that the applicant was eligible for a Category C recognition payment in the sum of $5000. The Tribunal discussed CZU v Commissioner of Victims Rights and DEL v Commissioner of Victims Rights, which provide some guidance on the types of evidence which may assist in determining whether a psychological injury is sufficiently serious to be considered grievous bodily harm, in order to approve a Category C recognition payment ([11]-[13]). Although the applicant had experienced prior psychological issues, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not support a finding that she required any ongoing psychological treatment for these issues when the act of violence occurred ([32]). Further, the Tribunal was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant’s current psychological injury resulted from the act of violence ([37]), and that it could properly be considered as being ‘really serious’ ([44]). The applicant was found to have suffered grievous bodily harm, thereby satisfying the eligibility requirement for a Category C recognition payment. Even if the Tribunal had been incorrect in its finding as to the causation of her current psychological condition, it was satisfied that the ‘eggshell psyche’ principle applied and that her pre-existing ‘eggshell psyche’ was aggravated as a direct result of the violent act ([39]).
Northern Territory
Court of Appeal
SE v Masani [2024] NTCA 7 (3 December 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Young people’ – ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Aggravated assault x1.
Case type: Application for an extension of time to appeal sentence.
Facts: The appellant SE (aged 16) and the complainant GM (aged 17) were in a relationship. While GM was walking with relatives, SE approached and assaulted her by punching her twice to the body. He then kicked her legs, causing her to fall. While GM was on the ground, SE continued the assault by forcibly kicking her another three times. He then struck GM over the head and body with a steel [dish] rack, causing her to fall again when she tried to get up. SE then threatened further assault if GM did not follow him. Fearful, GM complied and followed SE to the Council lawns. Here, she washed blood from her face before police arrived. GM suffered pain all over her body and a 1 cm laceration to the back of her head.
Procedural history: The Youth Justice Court sentenced SE to 15 months’ detention (fully suspended) for aggravated assault, with no conviction recorded. SE appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal. In this application, SE applied for an extension of time to appeal the sentence in the Court of Appeal.
Ground of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the primary judge erred by finding that the sentence imposed by the Youth Justice Court was not manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances. This ground was supported by four specific particulars of error.
Reasoning and decision: In this application, the Court of Appeal dismissed SE’s application for an extension of time to appeal the sentence, concluding that neither the particulars of error nor the substance of SE’s sole ground of appeal demonstrated a valid basis for further consideration.
Particular 1: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred in finding that his offending was "adult-like." The Court rejected this, noting the finding was made by the sentencing judge, not the primary judge and this finding was not challenged previously by the applicant. Additionally, the primary judge correctly reasoned that the offending was adult-like, as violence within a domestic relationship inherently carries adult responsibilities [30].
Particular 2: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred by considering the prevalence of domestic violence among adults, despite both he and the complainant being youths. The Court found this argument unmeritorious, noting it erroneously assumed that the primary judge was the sentencing judge, and had not been raised before the primary judge. SE’s lawyer had conceded during submissions that the prevalence of domestic violence in Alice Springs justified general deterrence, even in the Youth Court context. The sentencing judge had relied on this concession, highlighting that general deterrence was necessary to protect young female victims and deter similar conduct by young male offenders [33]-[39].
Particular 3: The applicant argued that the primary judge erred by finding there was "no practical difference" between different sentencing options. The Court rejected this argument, finding the primary judge did not state there was no difference, but rather clarified that the practical difference was how the sentence would appear on SE’s record [45].
Particular 4: The applicant argued that the primary judge misapplied youth sentencing principles, suggesting they were less relevant when the sentence was fully suspended. However, the Court found this argument unmeritorious, noting that the primary judge correctly applied these principles [54].
Ground 1: The Court noted that an appeal for manifestly excessive sentences requires showing that the sentence was ‘clearly and obviously’ excessive, not just arguably so. Sentencing judges are allowed flexibility in applying consistent principles, and an appellate court should not substitute its judgment merely because it would have decided differently. The Court found no error in the primary judge’s decision, concluding that the sentence appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offence and the importance of rehabilitation. As a result, the Court found the sentence was not manifestly excessive and upheld the dismissal of the appeal [59-60].
Olsen v Sims [2010] NTCA 8 (30 November 2010) – Northern Territory Court of Appeal
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Repeal of statute’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of restraining order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted of breaching a restraining order. Some months later he was convicted of failing to comply with the terms of the order. Contrary to the order, the appellant visited the victim at her home and entered in a verbal argument with her after consuming alcohol. The restraining order was made and the offences were against the Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT) (the former Act). This Act was repealed on 1 July 2008 and replaced by the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the current Act). The appellant’s trial in respect to the second offence did not occur until after the current Act came into force. The magistrate found that sentencing provisions under the former Act applied to the appellant. Under s 10(1A) of the former Act, where a person is found guilty of a second offence the Court must impose a minimum sentence of at least seven days’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the magistrate imposed a sentence of seven days’ imprisonment. Section 121 of the current Act provides no mandatory minimum sentence for a second breach where no harm is caused and the court is satisfied it is not appropriate to record a conviction and sentence in the circumstances.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Riley J held the magistrate did not err in sentencing the appellant.
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in punishing the appellant to a greater extent than was authorised by the current Act by imposing the mandatory sentence of imprisonment of seven days under s 10(1A) of the former Act.
Decision and Reasoning: All three judges on the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The sentence was quashed and the matter was referred back to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction for the appellant to be resentenced.
Section 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT) provides that while the appellant could be sentenced under the former Act for his second breach of the restraining order, he could not be punished to any greater extent than was authorised by both the former Act and the current Act.
Mildren J concluded that the mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’ imprisonment under s 10(1A) of the former Act is a punishment ‘to any greater extent than is authorised by the current law’ pursuant to s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT). The Magistrate’s discretion to impose a lesser sentence than seven days under the current Act conferred a punishment to a greater extent than authorised by the current Act.
Southwood J, agreeing with Mildren J, held that the sentence of seven days imprisonment imposed on the appellant was a greater punishment than authorised by ss 121(1) and (3) of the current Act. Those provisions of the current Act decreased the severity of the penalty required to be imposed for a second breach of a restraining order for the purposes of s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT). The sentence imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending. Had the magistrate sentenced the appellant pursuant to s 121, he would not have imposed a sentence of seven days’ imprisonment. As a result, the Magistrate failed to sentence the appellant in accordance with s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT).
Blokland J held that s 121(3) of the current Act does not authorise a sentencing magistrate to sentence on the basis that its starting point is a conviction and seven days’ imprisonment unless that penalty is appropriate and just in all the circumstances. This was the approach of the magistrate in finding he was bound to apply the mandatory minimum term under s 10(1A) of the former Act. The sentence imposed by the magistrate was not authorised when considering the application of s 14(2) of the Criminal Code (NT).
Court of Criminal Appeal
The King v Wilson [2024] NTCCA 14 (18 December 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Damaging property’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ –‘threats’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent (counts 1 and 3) (x2), property damage (count 2) (x1), aggravated assault (count 4) (x1) and breach of domestic violence order (x1).
Case type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, Wilson, was the victim’s former domestic partner within a violent and coercive relationship spanning six years. A domestic violence order (DVO) was issued against Wilson on 21 December 2021 and served on 5 January 2022, but he repeatedly breached it through abusive messages and threats, pressuring the victim to withdraw the order.
•
Count 1 - Sexual intercourse without consent (17 January 2022): Wilson lured the victim to Ilparpa Camp, claiming he would repay $150 he had taken from her. Upon arrival, he forced her inside, injected her with methamphetamine ("ice") against her will, forced her to perform oral sex and then had penile-vaginal intercourse with her while she repeatedly protested and cried. When she resisted, he punched her in the head, told her to be quiet and threatened her life, warning she would end up like his ex-partner (whom he had killed in 2008). He did not wear a condom and ejaculated inside her.
•
Count 2 - Property damage (19 January 2022): Between 17-21 January 2022, Wilson held the victim captive. She tried to contact police but was prevented from doing so. On 19 January 2022, Wilson saw Detective Senior Constable Ship returning the victims calls. Enraged, he then smashed her phone, cracking its screen and rendering it unusable.
•
Count 3 - Sexual intercourse without consent (21 January 2022): Wilson woke the victim at 6 am demanding sexual intercourse. She refused, saying she was too tired. He threatened to rip off her underwear, hit her with a steel fan and kill her. Scared she complied out of fear. Wilson forced her to perform oral sex and then had penile-vaginal intercourse without consent. He did not wear a condom and he ejaculated inside her vagina. Later that day, he raped her again.
•
Count 4 - Aggravated assault (21 January 2022): Wilson forced the victim to smoke some marijuana that he had with him and, while she did not want to, she complied out of fear because the respondent was angry. Wilson tried to hit the victim. When she tried to escape Wilson threw a lighter and a pair of scissors at her, causing bruising to her back. Wilson then chased her into the lounge room, forced her to drink alcohol, poured Jim Beam over her, wrestled her to the ground and started stomping on her. As she struggled to defend herself, the victim grabbed his testicles, prompting him to slam her ankles into the ground multiple times, making her fear he was trying to break her arms and legs. A witness ran to a neighbour’s house and called police. Wilson left before officers arrived.
Grounds of Appeal:
1.
The individual sentences imposed for counts 1 and 3 are manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
2.
The total effective sentence and non-parole period imposed are manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
Notice of contention:
The respondent argued that the sentencing judge improperly relied on uncharged acts including:
1.
The forcible administration of methamphetamine to the victim before the conduct of count 1.
2.
Additional uncharged sexual assaults that occurred between 15-21 January 2022.
Decision and reasoning:
Respondent’s notice of contention:
The Court (Kelly, Huntingford and Burns JJ) dismissed the respondent’s argument holding that the sentencing judge made it clear that they were not imposing additional punishment for uncharged acts. Instead, those acts were used to establish the violent, controlling and coercive nature of Wilson’s relationship with the victim, a relevant factor in sentencing [59]. Given that the maximum penalty for rape is life imprisonment, there was no risk that the judge relied on uncharged acts to impose a more severe penalty than permitted.
Ground 1 (Count 1 and 3 (8 years imprisonment each, 1 year of accumulation, 9 years and 2 months total) manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that the sentencing judge failed to give proper regard to the maximum sentence of life imprisonment when determining the individual sentences. Wilson’s conduct was an example of the most serious type of offending. The Court in Forrest v The Queen established that serious rape offences typically warrant sentences of 10–13 years, demonstrating that Wilson’s 8-year sentences were inadequate. Similarly, McKay v The Queen confirmed that multiple rapes require significant accumulation, yet Wilson’s sentences were only accumulated by 1 year, failing to reflect the distinct criminality of each offence.
“Given the objective seriousness of the offences at the higher end of the range, the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the lack of any mitigating circumstances and the respondent’s age and prior criminal history, a sentence of 8 years each for counts 1 and 3 is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience and demonstrate error in principle” [72].
Ground 2 (total effective sentence (9 years, 2 months) and parole period (6 years, 5 months) (manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that an accumulation of only one year between the two rape sentences failed to reflect the total criminality of the respondents conduct and resulted in a total effective sentence that was manifestly inadequate [77]. The rapes occurred on different days, in different locations, with separate instances of coercion and violence. In McKay v The Queen, where two sexual offences were committed in a single incident, 6 years of accumulation was applied, yet Wilson’s crimes were separate and days apart. The failure to impose a higher cumulative sentence led to an inadequate total effective sentence.
Resentencing:
Count 1 (Rape – 17 Jan 2022): 12 years' imprisonment.
Count 3 (Rape – 21 Jan 2022): 12 years' imprisonment (4 years cumulative).
Total effective sentence: 16 years' imprisonment.
New non-parole period: 11 years and 3 months.
The King v Mamarika [2024] NTCCA 5 (16 April 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Arson x 1; reckless endangerment of life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for offences committed against his-then domestic female partner (the complainant). The offending occurred in December 2020: the respondent punched the complainant to the back her head. The complainant locked herself inside the bedroom and called police. The respondent dragged a nearby mattress to the door, lighting it on fire and stating, ‘I am going to make you suffocate and you will die’. [7] The primary judge accepted the respondent was serious. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The Crown appealed the sentence on one ground: namely, the sentence of arson, and the total effective sentence, were manifestly inadequate having regard to all circumstances. In particular, the complainant was pregnant at the time of the offending [22] and the respondent had significant prior criminal history of violence. [24]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The Court (Grant CJ., Brownhill and Burns JJ) held that the sentence imposed for the arson offence, ‘although low, was [not] so manifestly inadequate to bespeak error’. [50] The respondent’s profound disadvantage, including childhood deprivation and cognitive dysfunction reduced his moral culpability. [50] Further, the fire was confined to the mattress, bearing ‘little risk’ of spreading to the building. [50]
Further, the Court upheld the respondent’s submission that he was entitled to not be sentenced on the basis that he intended to kill the victim. [51] This is despite the respondent’s stating, at the time of offending, that he was going ‘make [the complainant] suffocate and [she] will die’. [7] To do otherwise would be to sentence the respondent on the basis of the elements of the crime of attempted murder. [51]
Ultimately, the Court held the total effective sentence of six years to not be manifestly inadequate. [53]
Joran v The King [2024] NTCCA 1 (24 January 2024) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 3; contravention of protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant assaulted his children and female partner (the complainant) on multiple occasions, doing so in breach of a protection order. The assaults were physical, verbal and threatening. [4]–[13]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appealed the sentence on three grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in his treatment of the onerousness of the applicant’s experience of custody;
•
The sentencing judge erred in applying the principle of totality; and
•
The sentencing judge erred in his treatment of the applicant’s profound childhood deprivation and associated complex PTSD. [56]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed. Justice Barr (with whom Hiley AJ agreed) held that ‘no other, less severe, sentence’ to that imposed by the sentencing judge was warranted. [77] The sentence imposed was ‘very lenient as to reflect moderation on account of reduced moral culpability’. [74]; [76].
Further, Barr J found no error in the sentencing judge’s consideration of the Bugmy principles, accepting the sentencing judge’s finding that the applicant’s moral culpability remained high even taking into account the applicant’s violent and dysfunctional upbringing. [71]
The Queen v Bonney [2022] NTCCA 3 (25 February 2022) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate history of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1, property damage x 1, unlawfully cause serious harm x 1.
Proceedings: Crown manifest inadequacy appeal against sentence.
Issue: Whether sentence manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a de-facto relationship and had three primary school aged children [24]. On 19 November 2020, while intoxicated, the respondent became angry and punched the victim in the face twice. The following day, the respondent punched, kicked, and repeatedly hit the victim with a cricket bat and frying pan. The victim sustained multiple injuries, including a hand fracture that amounted to serious physical harm [8]-[9]. The respondent had previous domestic violence convictions and a history of alcohol misuse [26]. The respondent pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 1 year and 8 months [2]-[3]. The Crown appealed the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The appellant emphasised ‘principles enunciated by… Courts in relation to domestic violence offending and the need… to impose sentences which serve to protect the victim and the community and… serve as a deterrent’, citing The Queen v Wurramara [2011] NTSC 89 (21 October 2011): ‘The courts have been concerned to send what has been described as ‘the correct message’ to all concerned, that is that Aboriginal women, children and the weak will be protected against personal violence insofar as it is within the power of the court to do so’ [32].
The appellant also cited Emitja v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 4 (21 October 2016): ‘As this Court has repeatedly observed before and since that statement was made, such conduct must be dealt with in a manner which reflects the serious nature of the offending and its corrosive effect on well-being in Aboriginal communities. While it may be accepted that some Aboriginal communities have an unusually high incidence of serious crimes of violence, and that the courts are powerless to alleviate the dysfunction and deprivation which underlies that violence, Aboriginal women and children living in those communities “are entitled to equality of treatment in the law’s responses to offences against them”. The protection which the law affords includes the imposition of sentences which include a component designed to deter other members of the community from committing crimes of that nature’ [33].
The Court concluded that ‘the sentence, while lenient, perhaps even very lenient, does not fall outside the legitimate limits of the sentencing discretion. The appellant has not identified any error of principle and the sentence is not so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending as to shock the public conscience and demonstrate error in principle. It is not unreasonable or plainly unjust’ [44].
Morton v The Queen [2020] NTCCA 2 (25 May 2020) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Judicial error’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Substance misuse’ – ‘Weapons’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction
Ground: The trial judge erred in directions that were given to the jury bearing on the burden and standard of proof.
Facts: The female victim and male applicant had been in a domestic relationship for a number of years and were staying together at the applicant’s mother’s home the night before the offending. On the morning of the offending, the applicant and victim were alone together at the house. The applicant beat the victim and caused at least 28 injuries, many of which required severe force, including impacts to the scalp and face, impacts to the trunk (corresponding to three fractured ribs), impacts to the arms (causing a complete break in one arm), and impacts to the legs (including stab wounds). Afterwards, the applicant went to a neighbouring house to get help, telling the neighbour that the applicant’s wife was in pain and had been hitting herself. The neighbour took the applicant to the nurse’s residence where the applicant told the nurse that his wife had been drinking, had a sore arm and felt sick. The nurse told the applicant to bring his wife to the clinic at 8:30am as it was not an emergency. The neighbour dropped the applicant back at the house before going back there himself where he saw that the victim was not moving. They fetched the nurse who confirmed that the victim had died.
When police arrived, the applicant told them that his wife "went crazy" after drinking alcohol and hit herself on the head with rocks. He also told them that she started to go a bit crazy and make him angry so he "picked up a knife and stabbed her in the bum and the leg and her hand" and "grabbed [his] axe and hit her on the arm, the leg and the top of the head" [7]-[8]. An axe and knife were found in the applicant’s bedroom. The applicant was found guilty of murder (but argued at trial that it should only have been manslaughter). He appealed this conviction on the ground that the trial judge erred in directions that were given to the jury bearing on the burden and standard of proof.
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific directions given by the trial judge were not attended by error nor did they give rise to any miscarriage of justice. The court found that at trial, defence counsel did not raise any query in relation to the first impugned direction and held that "The direction was not at that time considered inconsistent with or inimical to the legal and forensic basis of the defence case" [24]. Furthermore, while the court found that it may have been appropriate to remind the jury, at the point the direction was made, that the prosecution had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause the victim at least serious harm and in that context that the jury should take into account all of the evidence, the court considered that it was unnecessary to do so because of the directions given elsewhere [30].
The court further held that no error was made in relation to the second impugned direction. The court held that it was open to the jury to make no conclusive finding on the issue of whether the applicant thought he was hitting the victim with a stick and still nonetheless be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant meant to cause serious harm, simply because of the prolonged nature of the beating and the multiple impacts involved [36].
The court also held that no error was made in relation to the third impugned direction, finding that "the trial judge’s summing up adequately conveyed to the jury that the ultimate question was whether, in the light of the evidence of intoxication and all other relevant circumstances, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the intent necessary for the crime of murder" [47].
Deacon v The Queen [2019] NTCCA 21 (11 October 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility of admissions’ – ‘Mr big operation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Whether admissions made to undercover police influenced by "oppressive conduct"’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man pleaded not guilty to an ex officio indictment charging him with the murder of his female de facto partner (the deceased). Prior to the jury trial, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of admissions made to undercover police and in a police interview. The trial judge ruled these admissions admissible. The applicant was later found guilty of murder by majority verdict and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 21 year and 6 month non-parole period.
A key issue on appeal related to the evidence in relation to the undercover police operation. The Court detailed how undercover police established a fake criminal operation and used various tactics to gain the applicant’s trust. The applicant had participated in various tasks or scenarios, none of which were illegal. These scenarios were designed to make the applicant believe that the group had power, by virtue of its links, to corrupt law enforcement officers, and to destroy incriminating evidence. The applicant then met with a fictitious crime boss. The ‘boss’ utilised the interview technique of ‘minimization’, by which he sought to devalue the deceased and other women in order to create a bond of misogyny to gain the applicant’s trust. The applicant eventually admitted to killing the deceased by punching her to the head and then choking her, and led the operatives to the site of the remains. He subsequently gave evidence at trial that he had killed her under provocation.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to appeal against the conviction on the grounds that:
•
the trial judge erred in assessing the conduct of the undercover operatives only in terms of its bearing and effect on the applicant, rather than by reference to the fact that it was oppressive conduct because it involved deception, subverted the right to silence, and was directed solely to obtaining a confession;
•
the covert operatives were exercising the authority of the state during the time they placed pressure on and offered inducements to the applicant;
•
the trial judge misdirected himself as to the meaning of oppressive conduct.
Held: The application for leave to appeal was refused. The trial judge observed that there was no evidence that the scenarios in which the applicant participated involved violence and held that the undercover police did not engage in oppressive conduct. His Honour had contrasted that position with the scenarios in some of the Mr Big operations in Canada which employed violence to create an impression that the fictitious criminal organisation tolerated and was prepared to use violence. The Canadian approach did not assist the applicant as there was no issue that the applicant made a false or unreliable confession.
The Queen v Deacon [2019] NTCCA 22 (11 October 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Child - criminal history’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Grounds: The non-parole period fixed by the sentencing judge is manifestly inadequate:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to give primacy to the sentencing objectives of general deterrence and denunciation in the sentencing synthesis;
2.
The sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the respondent’s prospects for rehabilitation.
Facts: The respondent man was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a non-parole period of 21 years and six months for the murder of his de facto partner. While initially pleading not guilty, the respondent admitted to killing the deceased during the trial but ‘asserted that he had done so under provocation’ [3]. The trial judge found that a longer non-parole period was warranted because the respondent ‘killed the deceased specifically to ensure that she would have no role in their son’s upbringing…That the respondent engaged in detailed and calculated planning prior to the killing, and a complex cover-up after the event…The respondent positively obstructed and misled police investigating the disappearance of the deceased…[and] that the respondent demonstrated no remorse for killing the deceased’ [5].
Decision and reasoning:
The appeal was dismissed.
‘In our opinion, the sentencing judge was no doubt correct in determining that a longer non-parole period was warranted because the objective and subjective factors affecting the relative seriousness of the crime placed the offending above the middle of the range of objective seriousness even allowing for mitigating factors. The question is whether the non-parole period fixed as part of that assessment was manifestly inadequate.’ The court provided that because the crime committed ‘did not involve the use of a weapon; it was not committed in company; the attack upon the victim was relatively swift and did not involve a prolonged physical assault upon her; the victim was not mutilated; the victim was not psychologically tormented prior to being killed; and the victim was not made to suffer physically prior to being killed’ [56], the non-parole period was not manifestly inadequate. They also provided that ‘the respondent’s lack of remorse did not operate as a ground for increasing the length of the non-parole period’ [56], and that the respondent’s criminal history and personal circumstances were not aggravating factors.
Scrutton v The Queen [2019] NTCCA 9 (18 April 2019) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Extension of time’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for an extension of time and leave to appeal.
Facts: It was alleged that the applicant and the deceased were drinking with others and became heavily intoxicated. They began arguing over jealousy issues. They made their way to a shed in which the applicant was staying at the time. The following morning, the applicant told an officer at the police station that he had a fight with his wife the previous evening, but did not disclose the nature of the fight or the deceased’s condition. At that time the deceased was lying dead on a mattress in the shed. Forensic testing detected the deceased’s blood on the jeans and boots that the applicant was wearing at the time of his arrest. It is important to note that the Crown adduced evidence of 10 assaults between 2005 and 2013 by the applicant on the deceased to which the applicant had pleaded guilty before the Local Court. The trial judge ruled that the evidence of the assault was admissible as relationship evidence. The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal, as well as an application for an extension of time.
The applicant sought leave to appeal on the grounds that:
•
The forensic and expert evidence concerning the bloodstains on his boots and jeans was false, misleading, flawed and/or inconsistent with the prosecution case and guilt;
•
The trial judge’s direction to the jury concerning the bloodstains was inconsistent with the evidence;
•
The trial judge wrongly admitted evidence of the assaults previously committed by the applicant upon the deceased ([17]).
Issue: Whether extension of time should be granted; Whether forensic evidence concerning bloodstains were false, misleading, inconsistent, flawed and/or inconsistent with the prosecution case and guilt; Whether the trial judge’s direction to the jury concerning the bloodstains were inconsistent with the evidence; Whether the trial judge wrongly admitted relationship evidence.
Held: By reference to the principles in Green v The Queen [1989] NTCCA 5, the Court dismissed the application to extend time. The applicant did not provide any reason for the delay beyond the fact that he ‘could not find a lawyer’, and there were no exceptional circumstances or special reasons to warrant granting an extension ([31]). The Court also held that no viable grounds of appeal were established. Notably, their Honours upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the evidence of 10 prior domestic assaults as relationship evidence under Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act. They held that the relationship evidence provided insight into the nature of the applicant’s and deceased’s relationship. Such evidence would potentially assist the jury to determine if they were in a ‘harmonious and caring relationship or a relationship marred by anger and violence’, and whether the applicant killed the deceased and, if so, his intention at the time. The probative value of the relationship evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused. The trial judge’s directions in relation to the jury’s use of the relationship evidence were therefore correct in law ([46]).
Emitja v The Queen [2016] NTCCA 4 (21 October 2016) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Personal deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charge/s: Unlawfully causing serious harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim had been married in a traditional Aboriginal manner for 13 years before separating in 2013. The relationship had been blighted by domestic violence, one consequence of which was the issue of a domestic violence order in 2013 protecting the victim. In 2014, the applicant entered the victim’s house without permission. The applicant kicked the victim at the bottom of her left leg, causing her compound fractures. The applicant was sentenced to six years imprisonment without a non-parole period.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority (Grant CJ and Kelly J concurring, Barr J in dissent). The majority made relevant statements about domestic violence in Aboriginal communities. Grant CJ and Kelly J quoted from Amagula v White (unreported, Northern Territory Supreme Court, 7 January 1998): ‘The courts must do what they can to see that the pervasive violence against women in Aboriginal communities is reduced. There is a fairly widespread belief that it is acceptable for men to bash their wives in some circumstances; this belief must be erased’.
Their Honours continued:
‘As this Court has repeatedly observed before and since that statement was made, such conduct must be dealt with in a manner which reflects the serious nature of the offending and its corrosive effect on well-being in Aboriginal communities’ (at [32]).
They note that while ‘some Aboriginal communities have an unusually high incidence of serious crimes of violence and that the courts are powerless to alleviate the dysfunction and deprivation which underlies that violence. Aboriginal women and children living in those communities ‘are entitled to equality of treatment in the law’s responses to offences against them’. The protection which the law affords includes the imposition of sentences which include a component designed to deter other members of the community from committing crimes of that nature’ (see [33]-[34]). There are also practical societal reasons to consider personal and general deterrence. As in The Queen v Haji-Noor:
‘The offender’s crime against Mr Ellis was committed in a domestic context. Domestic violence is a leading contributor to death, disability and illness in the community. Such violence affects the whole community. Medical and hospital treatment for the victims of domestic violence is extremely costly and imposes a considerable strain on the health system and those who work in it’.
Finally, Their Honours described the offending as ‘a deliberate and violent pattern of behaviour engaged in… for the purposes of intimidating and controlling the victim’ and noted that due to the patterned nature of the appellant’s violence, the spontaneity of his conduct was ‘less relevant to the assessment of… objective seriousness’ [52].
R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2 (9 February 2015) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’ – ‘Victim’
Charge: Unlawfully causing serious harm
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and the victim were in a domestic relationship and had a young daughter. After drinking together near the remote community of Kalkarindji, the respondent and victim got in an argument. The respondent, who was intoxicated, threatened to stab the victim with a pen and subsequently stabbed him in the back with a knife.
Following an early guilty plea the respondent was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, suspended immediately. The respondent is an Aboriginal woman who attended school until the end of year 6. She had never been employed and lived with the victim, their child and family. She received parenting payments from Centrelink. The trial judge found the respondent’s remorse was genuine. She waited for emergency services to arrive, made immediate admissions to police and subsequent formal admissions. The respondent continued to look after her young child while living with the victim, who had forgiven her. Finally, the trial judge found she had reasonable to good prospects of rehabilitation having not consumed alcohol since she committed the offence.
Issues:
•
Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.
•
Whether the circumstances of the case were ‘exceptional’ pursuant to section 78DI of the Sentencing Act to displace the minimum mandatory term of 3 months imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent was resentenced.
•
The sentence imposed on the respondent was manifestly inadequate. The offending was objectively very serious, with the respondent’s violent response to the verbal argument being ‘utterly disproportionate’ ([18]). The Court noted that alcohol-related violent crimes are ‘a great drain on the medical resources of the Northern Territory and are an enormous cost to the community’ ([18]). In light of this and the objective seriousness of the offending, the sentence imposed was ‘so manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending that it shocks the public conscience’ ([19]). While the respondent’s subjective circumstances entitled her to considerable leniency, they could not justify a sentence disproportionate to the offending. As such, the sentence was increased to a term of three years imprisonment, to be suspended after six months with an operational period of two years and six months. In determining this sentence, the Court took into account the respondent’s age of 19, her responsibility for her child and other mitigating factors referred to by the trial judge.
•
As the Court upheld the sentence as manifestly inadequate and imposed a sentence that involved actual imprisonment for more than three months, it did not consider whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ for the purposes of section 78DI were present on the facts. However, the Court noted in obiter that what amounts to ‘exceptional circumstances’ will be a matter for the court in considering the facts of each individual case. The Court considered that whether the victim’s wishes with respect to sentencing should be taken into account as exceptional circumstances is for the discretion of the court in each case ([24]).
The Queen v Haji-Noor [2007] NTCCA 7 (18 May 2007) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘New partner’ – ‘Not manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code (NT)’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Intentionally causing grievous bodily harm x 1; Aggravated assault x 1; Possession of cannabis x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attacked his former girlfriend and her new partner with a baseball bat ([22]-[23]). The aggravated assault charge was in relation to the respondent attacking his former girlfriend, leaving her with bruises, and the grievous bodily harm charge was in relation to the attack on the former girlfriend’s new partner, leaving him with permanent disability ([25]). There had been a history of domestic violence in the relationship between the defendant and his former girlfriend ([9]-[18]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment ([4]). In relation to the aggravated assault charge, the respondent was sentenced to 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment ([34]).
Issues: One issue was whether the sentence for the aggravated assault charge was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court held that the sentence for the aggravated assault charge was within range.
Justice Angel at [31] quoted the sentencing judge:
The crimes of violence of the type you have committed are prevalent and too often occur against the background of a breakdown in a domestic relationship complicated by problems of access to children. Women in these situations are particularly vulnerable. They are entitled to such protection as the law can give them. Deterring you and other men who are minded to behave like you towards their female partners is an important factor in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
I need to add this. It is not uncommon for men in your position to harbour a belief that their former partner had been unreasonable. Nor is it uncommon for violent men in your position to harbour a belief that the former partner has brought the violence on themselves by being unreasonable. You and others like you must learn that only you are to blame for the situation in which you now find yourself.
Justice Southwood added at [183]:
Domestic violence is a leading contributor to death, disability and illness in the community. Such violence affects the whole community. Medical and hospital treatment for the victims of domestic violence is extremely costly and imposes a considerable strain on the health system and those who work in it.
The violence perpetrated by the respondent ‘was part of a pattern of fundamentally oppressive and coercive behaviour in which the respondent deliberately engaged to dominate and control Ms Hawksworth’ [185].
R v Secretary [1996] NTCCA 18 (2 April 1996) – Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation (s 28(f) Criminal Code Act 1986 (NT)) however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Substance abuse’
Charge: Murder
Appeal type: Question of law under s 408(1) Criminal Code (NT)
Facts: The accused was charged and pleaded not guilty to murdering her husband (the deceased). For eight years leading up to this incident, the deceased had verbally, mentally and physically abused the accused and their children. The violence and abuse increased substantially in the months prior to the killing. During this time, the deceased threatened to kill the accused, beat her with his hands and a belt and sexually assaulted her. The deceased was a chronic drug abuser. On a road trip the accused noticed a rifle in the back of the car. Upon returning home, the deceased threatened to beat the accused with a belt, punched her in the head, throttled her, and made further threats of abuse. Fearing for her life, the accused retrieved the gun and shot the deceased while he was asleep. At trial, the judge ruled that the issue of self-defence should not be left to the jury. Following this, the accused’s counsel made an application that the subject of the ruling be reserved for the consideration of the Court of Criminal Appeal. Subsequently, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder, but pleaded guilty to the charge of manslaughter by reason of provocation. The indictment was amended accordingly and the jury found the accused guilty of manslaughter. No conviction was recorded; the trial judge postponed judgment until the Court of Appeal returned an answer on the reserved question of law.
Issue: Whether the trial judge was correct in ruling that self-defence was not open for consideration by the jury in the circumstances of the case.
Decision and Reasoning: In a 2:1 majority, the question was answered in the negative. The conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.
The defence counsel contended that as the deceased was asleep at the time he was shot, the accused could not have been acting in self-defence. The trial judge had accepted this reasoning: that because the deceased was asleep he had no ability to implement earlier threats. Mildren J of the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal found that self-defence as provided under s 28(f) of the Criminal Code (NT) does not require a temporal connection between the assault and the force used to defend the assault: ‘The lack of any specific requirement for an apprehension of immediate personal violence, so far as the Code definition of assault is concerned, reinforces the view that an assault is a continuing one so long as the threat remains and the factors relevant to the apparent ability to carry out the threat in the sense explained have not changed’ ([16]-[17]). Accordingly, it was open to the jury to find the deceased’s threat was an assault that continued while he was asleep. Having regard to the history of the domestic violence, it could also be inferred that, upon waking, the deceased intended to kill or cause grievous harm to the accused, and he had the ability to do so. It was also open for the jury to consider that the force used was not unnecessary in the circumstances. Mildren J regarded the jury’s verdict as a conviction despite no conviction being formally recorded by the trial judge. Having found the trial judge was incorrect in ruling self-defence was not open, Mildren J quashed the conviction and ordered a re-trial.
Angel J, agreeing with Mildren J, held that self-defence extends to taking action to defend oneself from threatened assault even if this action is ‘a pre-emptive strike’. It was open to the jury to find the threat of the deceased constituted an assault and this assault continued to exist at the time of the shooting. Therefore, self-defence should have been left to the jury.
In his dissenting judgement, Martin CJ found the trial judge was correct in his ruling. He considered the word ‘being’ in s 28(f) of the Criminal Code (NT) to require a contemporaneous connection between the assault and the act of self-defence. As the accused was asleep at the time of the shooting, no such connection could exist.
Supreme Court
The King v Kopp [2024] NTSC 22 (5 April 2024) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly inadequate’ - ‘Arson and fire’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Vulnerable groups’ - ‘Pregnant people’ - ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 4; rape x 2; deprivation of liberty (over course of three days) x 1.
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant had been in ‘an intermittent and dysfunctional relationship since 2015’. [2] Both were recreational users of illicit substances. The accused is alleged to have sexually and physically assaulted the complainant, slapping, strangling and raping her on multiple occasions. [3]–[4] The offending culminated in the accused forcing the complainant into his car and detaining her as he travelled to various locations. [6]
The Crown intends to adduce evidence of the visible injuries sustained by the complainant when she presented at the Emergency Department. [7] In response, the defendant filed notice of its intention to adduce evidence of previous incidents involving the complainant to establish that she has a tendency to act in a particular way/to adopt a particular state of mind, such that the injuries she sustained were ‘self-inflicted’. [1]
Decision and Reasoning: Application dismissed. The evidence is inadmissible for tendency purposes. [35] Chief Justice Grant held the evidence did not ‘sustain the inference of the tendencies asserted’, lacking the requisite significant probative value to be admissible as tendency evidence. [33]
For Grant CJ, the incidents constituting the charged offending did ‘not involve any necessary element of self-harm or suicidal ideation’. [24] In this capacity, the proposed tendency bore ‘very little’, if any, commonality with the nature of the injuries sustained by the complainant. Further, incidents wherein the complainant threatened or actually committed self-harm did not involve the complainant ‘seeking falsely to blame some other person for that harm’: [26]
The fact that the complainant experienced suicidal ideation on 27 December 2022 during the course of the incidents the subject of these charges also has nothing to say, either by itself or in combination with the other evidence identified for tendency purposes, about whether she has a general tendency either to engage in self-harming behaviour or to consider suicide [28]
The King v Hennessy [2023] NTSC 67 (1 August 2023) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Tendency evidence’ - ‘Application to adduce tendency evidence’ - ‘Vulnerable group’ - ‘Multiple domestic partners’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Rape x 4; aggravated assault x 3.
Proceedings: Application to adduce tendency evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in a domestic relationship from 2013 to 2016. Throughout, the accused demonstrated ‘controlling and jealous’ behaviour toward the complainant which worsened with the birth of their first child. [4]–[5] The abuse transformed into physical and sexual violence, with the accused raping and strangling the complainant on numerous occasions. [7]–[12]
Following the breakdown of their relationship, the accused commenced a relationship with another woman (second complainant), towards who the accused was equally controlling, jealous and physically abusive. [13]–[8]
The Crown seeks to adduce evidence from both complainants to establish four tendencies; particularly, that the accused has a tendency to commit acts of physical and sexual violence against domestic partners. [20]
Decision and Reasoning: Application approved to prove tendency two and four. [21]
•
‘Suggested tendency two would allow the evidence to be used to show the accused “act[ed] in a particular way, namely, to commit acts of physical violence against females with whom the accused is in a relationship and with whom he resides, using physical strength and force”.’’ [22]
•
‘Suggested tendency four, seeks to show the accused acted in a particular way, namely, to have sexual intercourse with females with whom the accused is in a relationship and with whom he resides, despite the fact that the other person does not consent to the sexual activity’ [23]
Justice Blokland held the second and fourth tendencies readily possessed the requisite ‘significant probative value’ to be relevant and admissible: [30]
The evidence proposed in alleged tendencies two and four clearly fulfil this criteria. If an accused is shown to have a tendency to act in a very particular controlling or threatening or violent way as alleged in particular relationships, that is important evidence. The conduct forming the basis of the charges is denied. Here, the evidence is confined to two relationships. How the accused acted in one of those relationships is relevant circumstantially to how he acted, in accordance with the particulars in the Tendency Notice, in the other relationship [31]
Justice Blokland dismissed two other proposed tendencies, which rely ‘almost solely on proof of very charges from which the tendency is derived’. For example, ‘to commit acts of physical violence against [the first complainant]’. [38]
The establishment of the tendency cannot start from an assumption that unproven evidence as a whole gives rise to the tendency. This employs dangerously circular reasoning [40]
The Queen v Lyncha [2021] NTSC SCC22033629 (4 October 2021) (Sentence) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural, and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Sexual intercourse without consent x12; aggravated assault x3.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was found guilty of 12 counts of sexual intercourse without consent and 3 counts of aggravated assault committed against his female partner between 2017 and 2018. The relationship between the offender and the victim began in 2005 but after the birth of their first child in 2010 the relationship deteriorated.
The offender was controlling, demanding and repeatedly used threats to coerce compliance with his demands for unwanted sex acts, including threats to use a firearm pointed at the victim and also a cattle prod (which was actually used to shock her on the stomach). The offender blamed the victim for the couple’s financial troubles and the victim was forced to not only work full time but also financially manage the offender’s business and earn additional money repairing and selling second-hand items as well as attend to all of the domestic duties.
The Victim Impact Statement described the offender’s physical, emotional, and financial control over her and her ongoing fear of the offender; she lives in a motor home so she can leave in a hurry if the offender is released from prison as she is scared the offender will seek revenge.
Decision and Reasoning: the offender was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, with a fixed non-parole period of 12 years. The Domestic Violence Order was altered to forbid the offender from having any direct or indirect contact with the victim for 20 years.
Justice Mildren found there were no mitigating circumstances. His Honour considered the offender’s prior convictions for assaults against the victim and aggravated assault against his son. His Honour classified the offences as really serious, and a significant sentence of imprisonment was needed for both personal and general deterrence. He found the offender’s behaviour to be ‘callous, controlling and sadistic.’
The Queen v Lynch [2021] NTSC SCC22033629 (4 October 2021) (Sentence) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling and/or jealous behaviour’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Unlawful deprivation of liberty’
Charges: 1x unlawful deprivation of liberty; 1x assault; 1x driving disqualified; 2x breaching a protection order.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The victim was in a relationship with the offender which ended when the offender became controlling and jealous over the victim seeing her previous partner. She had a young daughter from a previous relationship and also had a child with the offender. A protection order was in place.
The offending occurred in Alice Springs. The offender, driven by his ex-wife, went to Tennant Creek where the victim was living. The offender asked the victim to go home with him with her children but she refused. He then asked her to go to the nearby petrol station to buy items for the children, which she agreed to, taking both her children, not taking any of her valuables or necessities. The offender again demanded that the victim come home with her and he refused. She suggested leaving the offender’s child with him and walking home with her daughter. The offender made threats.
The offender’s ex-wife began driving towards Alice Springs, away from the victim’s home. She asked to be taken home and the offender refused. The offender engaged the victim in a fight regarding her resuming her relationship with her ex-partner which culminated in the offender pushed the victim’s her head against the window and punching the victim in her ear while she was holding her son on her lap (aggravated assault).
Instead of driving to Alice Springs, the offender decided to have his ex-wife drive the victim and her two children to the outstation (where he was living) and the victim wanted to go home (deprivation of liberty). The charge ceased when the offender left the outstation in the morning.
Issues: Sentence
Decision and Reasoning: The overall sentence was 2 years, with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Aggravating factors included multiple prior convictions for breaches of protection order and aggravated assaults on a female, subject to current order. The fact the offender was not affected by alcohol at time of offending indicated possessive and controlling urges while sober.
The Queen v Lewis [2021] NTSC 40 (6 May 2021) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 1; Recklessly engaging in conduct giving rise to danger of serious harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application to adduce evidence.
Facts: The male accused and female complainant were in a relationship. The Crown’s case was that the accused “flipped her” to the ground twice, threatened to kill her, and stamped his foot on her head, dragged, kicked and punched her. The Crown applied to adduce evidence of two prior charged assaults by the accused against the complainant (aggravated assault and contravention of a domestic violence order relating to her) as tendency or context (relationship) evidence.
Issues:
1.
Whether the evidence ought to be adduced as tendency evidence.
2.
Whether the evidence ought to be adduced as relationship evidence.
Decision and reasoning: Application to admit the evidence as tendency evidence was dismissed. Application to admit the evidence as relationship evidence was upheld.
Tendency evidence: The evidence did not have significant probative value. Additionally, on prejudice, the only other substantial evidence supporting the Crown’s case was to be given by the complainant. There was consequently a risk that the jury might place too much reliance on the fact that the accused had tendencies and acted on them. This potential prejudice was virtually impossible to address by a direction to the jury as the concept of “not giving too much weight” would be very difficult for the jury to comprehend and follow.
Relationship evidence: The evidence was relevant to a fact in issue in the proceeding. While the defence argued that evidence of two physical assaults against the complainant in their 2.5 year relationship was more appropriately characterised as “transient flare-ups of anger or annoyance” not ongoing hostility, the court disagreed stating: “Physical assaults are not part of the ordinary incidents of a domestic relationship, and the second of those assaults occurred in the same month as the alleged offending.”
Additionally, unlike the risk of unfair prejudice with the tendency evidence, the jury could be directed that they must not use the relationship evidence to engage in propensity or tendency reasoning, and that it was only tendered to ensure that they had a true and proper context to understand what the complainant said happened, rather than thinking what she said was unlikely because it happened “out of the blue”. This would obviate any risk of unfair prejudice.
Arnott v Blitner [2020] NTSC 63 (1 October 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of bail conditions’ – ‘Contravention of protection order’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by the perpetrator’ – ‘No harm caused to protected person’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravening a Domestic Violence Order (DVO) x 1; Breach of bail x 1.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent breached a DVO protecting his female partner by being heavily intoxicated in her company. There was no harm to the protected person. The respondent later breached bail by consuming alcohol. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 4 days imprisonment for breach of the DVO and 3 days imprisonment for the breach of bail, to be served cumulatively.
Grounds of appeal: In relation to the sentence for breaching the DVO –
1.
The sentencing judge erred in applying s 121(2) and 121(3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT).
2.
The learned sentencing judge erred in imposing a sentence which was manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances.
Held: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: There was no error in applying s 121(2) and (3) of the Act. The words “in the particular circumstances of the offence” do not set a standard which the circumstances must meet or impose an additional test. The legislative purpose of s 121(3) is to ameliorate potential injustice arising from mandatory sentencing. It maintains the court’s discretion not to impose the mandatory minimum in circumstances where the breach of a DVO does not result in harm to the protected person and where the court is satisfied it is not appropriate to record a conviction and sentence the person “in the particular circumstances of the offence” (meaning the specific, individual circumstances of the offence).
Ground 2: The sentence was not manifestly inadequate. The respondent’s breach of the DVO did not display the kind of aggravating features that would merit the term “contemptuous”. The conduct occurred 3½ months after the DVO was served in circumstances where the respondent believed the order was finished, no harm was caused to the protected person (despite police being called to respond to a disturbance), and the respondent’s 2 previous convictions for breaching DVOs were 4 years previously.
Carter v Firth [2020] NTSC 62 (16 September 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Using a carriage service to make threat to kill x 1; Unlawfully entering a building with intent to commit assault x 1; Unlawful assault x 1; Threat to kill x 2; Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and KC had been in a domestic relationship for 18 months. KC ended the relationship. The offending escalated over a 2-hour period and included threats to kill, physical violence and use of weapons. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an overall effective sentence of 4 years imprisonment, suspended after 12 months.
Grounds of appeal: The overall sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed. The sentences could not be said to be manifestly excessive. While the appellant had compelling subjective circumstances, “the subjective circumstances of an offender can never justify a sentence that does not adequately reflect the objective seriousness of the offences. In the present case, the objective circumstances reveal[ed] serious criminal offending, including significant violence utilising weapons, in the context of threats having been made by the appellant to kill his former domestic partner”: at [60].
The Queen v Anzac [2020] NTSC 58 (7 August 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by the perpetrator’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Breach domestic violence order (DVO) x 1.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent contravened a DVO protecting his female partner by being intoxicated in her presence. As the respondent had previous convictions for breaching DVOs, he was required to be sentenced under s 121(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (“the Act”), unless the court was satisfied of the matters set out in s 121(3). The respondent was sentenced to a 6-month good behaviour bond on conditions.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in applying ss 121(2) and (3) of the Act.
2.
The sentencing judge failed to accord the complainant procedural fairness by not requesting submissions on proceeding without recording a conviction, where the sentencing judge had previously indicated he would impose a conviction.
3.
The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Held: Appeal allowed on ground 2 and the appellant re-sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour bond on conditions. Section 121(3) applied in this case. The offence did not result in harm being caused to the protected person, and, in the particular circumstances of the offence, it was not appropriate to record a conviction and impose a sentence of 7 days or more on the respondent under s 121(2) of the Act. The particular circumstances of the offence (which lowered the respondent’s moral culpability) included his deprived background, chronic misuse of alcohol (including early exposure, inability to control drinking in town, mutual misuse in the relationship, and lack of treatment). The respondent was also genuinely remorseful.
Hardy v Rigby [2020] NTSC 42 (10 July 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting his wife. The offending involved threats to kill, squeezing his wife’s throat with both hands and dragging her by the throat, removing access to telephones, and exposing their child to the offending. The appellant was sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour bond and a conviction was recorded.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive because it included the recording of the conviction. Specifically –
1.
Too much weight was given to “denunciation”.
2.
Insufficient weight was given to evidence of positive good character including contrition and remorse.
3.
The sentencing judge failed to take into account the views of the victim.
4.
The sentencing judge erred by choosing to record a conviction.
5.
Insufficient weight was given to evidence concerning the appellant’s mental health, and the sentence failed to include appropriate conditions to address his mental health.
6.
The sentencing judge took into account the irrelevant consideration of prospective legislation increasing the penalty for assaults by strangulation.
Held: The appeal was dismissed. While the court acknowledged that the appellant did not have a prior criminal history of domestic violence offending and no evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence, the offending was still appropriately characterised as an instance of domestic violence: “It involved the use and threats of violence to control and dominate the appellant’s wife so she would ‘tell [him] the answer’” (at [50]). The offending was very serious including the fact that the appellant “grabbed SH by the throat and squeezed her throat was a significant factor in the sentencing calculus.” As per the Court in DPP v Foster [2019] TASCCA 15:
“Lest it be thought that grabbing the complainant by the throat and applying pressure is somehow less insidious than punching or kicking, it has been noted in an article by Heather Douglas and Robin Fitzgerald entitled “Strangulation, Domestic Violence and the Legal Response”, published in the [2014] SydLawRw 11; (2014) 36 (2) Sydney Law Review 231, that strangulation is a form of power and control that can have devastating psychological long-term effects on its victims in addition to a potentially fatal outcome.
“[Strangulation] can cause loss of consciousness and can cause death quickly. It has been suggested that death can occur within seven to fourteen seconds. Additionally, underlying internal injuries caused by the pressure applied to the throat can cause swelling which may develop gradually over days and airways obstruction causing death may be delayed.”
It was also significant that the appellant removed the victim’s access to telephones and outside help before strangling her, and that their child was exposed to domestic violence.
Williams v Firth & Anor [2020] NTSC 9 (24 February 2020) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault x2; Breach of bail x1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds:
1.
That the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive; and
2.
That the learned sentencing Judge erred in finding that the circumstances of the case were not exceptional pursuant to s 78DI of the Sentencing Act.
Facts: The appellant woman, a 28 year old Wurrumiyanga woman and the male second victim of aggravated assault (Elton Limbiari) had been in a domestic relationship for three years and had two children together. Their relationship ended in 2015, and Limbiari later commenced a 2-week relationship with the first aggravated assault victim (Raggett). On the night of offending, the appellant went to Raggett’s property where she found both victims asleep on the veranda. She approached Raggett, grabbed her by the hair and dragged her down from the bed before punching her numerous times in the face, causing immediate pain and minor bruising. Limbiari was woken by the noise and, upon seeing Raggett being assaulted, tried to walk away but was stopped by the appellant punching him from behind. The punch caused minor swelling and bruising to his jaw.
The appellant was arrested and charged the next day. She pleaded guilty to both charges of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. While on bail to appear, the appellant did not appear and a warrant issued, thus breaching one of her bail conditions. The appellant also pleaded guilty to breach of bail and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 1 month to be served cumulatively with the other sentences. The sentencing judge gave consideration to some matters put in mitigation on the appellant’s behalf, but very little consideration to the fact that she was the mother of four children.
Judgment:
The Appellant’s circumstances were truly exceptional when all relevant circumstances were considered, "including the relatively minor offending, the lack of any serious injuries to the victims, the fact that the appellant has apologised to both victims and the apologies have been accepted, her limited criminal history, the previous assault conviction was a long time ago and only resulted in a good behaviour bond, the extraordinary efforts she has made voluntarily to give up alcohol and attend family violence courses, the fact that she has left Tennant Creek with her children to start a new life away from influences which have got her into trouble in the past and the fact that she is a sole parent of four young children" [30]. His Honour rejected counsel for the respondent’s submission that "to establish one of the exceptions in R v Nagas, it is necessary to produce cogent evidence that imprisonment would effectively deprive the children of parental care", holding that "where the parent is a sole parent, particularly where the children are young and the appellant is the mother and sole carer of the children… different considerations arise. It is relevant that the children have someone close to them to look after them if the appellant is imprisoned, but a term of imprisonment which separates a mother from her young children can have a devastating effect on a child’s welfare and upbringing."[29]
His honour rejected the submissions that the sentence in relation to the breach of bail was manifestly excessive, finding that the offender’s "criminality was properly reflected in the sentences imposed" [31].
Queen v Pamkal [2019] NTSC 80 (15 October 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive violence’ – ‘Tendency purposes’
Proceedings: Voir dire on admissibility of evidence of past violent conduct by the accused against the complainant
Issues: Admissibility of tendency evidence; whether probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any potential prejudicial effect on the accused
Facts: One of the facts in issue is whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse with the accused. The complainant alleged that the accused demanded she have sex with him and threatened her when she refused. The complainant complied by removing her shorts and underwear and lying down on the cement.
The Crown intended to lead evidence of past violent conduct by the accused towards to complainant [2]. The accused would resort "to violence against the [complainant] whenever she displeased him…or he had a state of mind in which he believed he was permitted to discipline her for any perceived failing – and that he was prepared to and did act on that state of mind." [3]. The Defence counsel conceded that the "evidence of past assaults is relevant for this ‘relationship’ or ‘context’ purpose but contends that it should be excluded under Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) ('UEA') s 137 because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Judgment:
The evidence was admitted both as relationship or context evidence and as tendency evidence and will not be excluded under UEA s 137.
The Judge disagreed with the Defence’s contention that the evidence of past violence by the accused against the complainant should be limited to mere references of past assaults without revealing any details. Kelly J provided that restricting the evidence in this way would conceal the nature of the relationship rather than explain why the complainant submitted in the way she did. His Honour also rejected the claim that the evidence should be excluded under the UAE s 137 as it had high probative value. Namely, it "explains something that may otherwise be inexplicable" [5]. While the risks of rank propensity reasoning and the jury being emotionally repelled by the accused were acknowledged, Justice Kelly believed that the probative value of the evidence outweighed them and thus admitted the evidence of prior assaults as relationship evidence.
Justice Kelly then turned to the Prosecution’s request to use the evidence of prior assaults as tendency evidence. The Prosecution sought to Sought to use the tendency evidence to demonstrate the accused’s tendency to engage in violent conduct against the complainant; to have a violent and controlling disposition towards his domestic partner; to believe that he is permitted to discipline his domestic partner for any of her perceived ‘failings’ [13]. Court noted that under UEA s 97, tendency evidence is not admissible unless ‘appropriate notice has been given and the court thinks that the evidence will…have significant probative value’ [14]. Applying the principles established in Hughes v The Queen, Kelly J concluded that the evidence of prior assaults satisfied the threshold test in UEA s 97, in that it supported "proof of a tendency to engage in violent behaviour, especially after consuming alcohol, for the purpose of controlling his partner’s behaviour and/or punishing her for perceived failings"[18] and "if the jury accepts that the accused had this tendency (or tendencies) that "strongly supports proof of a fact that makes up the offence charged"… It explains what might otherwise be inexplicable and strongly supports proof of a fact in issue – namely whether the complainant consented to have sex with the accused and also, to perhaps a slightly lesser extent, proof that he knew of or was reckless as to her lack of consent."[19]. His Honour also concluded that the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect (as required by s 101 UEA) as the risks were "largely mitigated" by appropriate directions and warning to the jury. The tendency evidence was therefore admitted.
Douglas v Dole & Ors [2019] NTSC 80 (15 October 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Evidence of domestic violence history’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm sentence’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 2; Criminal damage x 1; Breach of bail x 3
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the first victim were in a domestic relationship for six years (since the appellant was 13), during which the appellant had allegedly been subjected to significant domestic violence at the hands of the victim. On the night of the incident, the appellant started verbally abusing the victim while intoxicated. The victim left the room, but shortly returned to get his wallet. The appellant had found the victim’s wallet and started to cut up his licence. As the victim took and wallet back and tried to leave again the appellant stabbed him behind the knee with the scissors, preventing the victim from being able to walk. During the sentencing hearing, the appellant submitted ‘that on the night the appellant attacked [the first victim] her emotions which had been built up over an extended period of time overflowed and she could not control herself’, claiming the violence to be an exceptional circumstance.
The appellant (and her co-offender) assaulted the second victim a week later. The two offenders were intoxicated and engaged in a verbal argument with the victim. The co-offender then punched the victim in the side of her face with the appellant then punching the victim’s forehead, causing a large haematoma. The two offenders threw rocks at the glass door of the building the victim escaped to, causing the glass panel to break.
Issues:Two grounds of appeal – whether the sentencing Judge failed to properly exercise his discretion to find exceptional circumstances; and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Descision and reasoning: The appeal on the first ground was allowed and the three months actual imprisonment set aside. The appeals on the other grounds were dismissed.
Ground 1:
The appellant had submitted that the violence characterising her relationship with the first appellant amounted to exceptional circumstances. While the sentencing judge had accepted that the appellant had been exposed to domestic violence, he concluded that ‘the material placed before him was not sufficiently specific to allow a firm conclusion to be drawn that the appellant’s background of domestic violence was operative on the appellant at, or generally around the time of offending’ [42]. Southwood J agreed with the sentencing judge, providing that ‘the difficulty with [the appellant’s] submission was that ‘there was no evidence before the Local Court or [the Supreme Court] that violence had become normalised for the appellant. To the contrary, the facts of the offending and the appellant’s criminal record established that the violence was out of character for the appellant and the main criminogenic factors in her offending were the consumption of alcohol and jealousy’ [46]. However, Southwood J still found that the sentencing judge had failed to consider the appellant’s other ‘exceptional’ personal circumstances such as her young age and no prior convictions for criminal offences. As such, the sentence imposed was unjust.
Ground 2:
The sentence of one-month imprisonment is appropriate as it does not crush the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation and gives necessary and appropriate consideration to the principles of deterrence and denunciation.
Anderson v Nicholas [2019] NTSC 55 (5 July 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence against former partners’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, committing aggravated assault against his female ex-partner with a knife, and threatening to kill another person who tried to assist his ex-partner with her injury. The appellant had 14 prior convictions, including 12 for aggravated assault, most on women and some of whom were his previous partners, as well as numerous breaches of domestic violence orders and orders suspending sentences. The offending occurred whilst he was intoxicated and angry. The sentencing judge found the conduct to be intentional, and imposed a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue:
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the appellant’s moral culpability and in finding intoxication to be an aggravating circumstance;
•
The sentencing judge failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, as neither the head sentence nor the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The appellant’s extensive criminal history of violent conduct, particularly drunken violence, was relevant as it demonstrated a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law and the need to impose condign punishment for specific or general deterrence. It also indicated that the appellant had poor prospects of rehabilitation, and that community protection was a paramount consideration. Further, the Court noted that the offences, although taking place around the same time, involved two different victims and two different violent acts. It was therefore appropriate for the sentencing judge to reflect those differences in the way she did by fixing a total sentence and allowing for some concurrency ([60]-[61]). In relation to the non-parole period, the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his age, criminal record and the protection of the community were particularly relevant. The non-parole period was justified, given his very poor prospects of rehabilitation and his "dreadful criminal history" ([67]). Further, the sentencing judge did not err in finding that intoxication was an aggravating circumstance of the appellant’s "brazen, excessive and egregious" conduct ([43]-[44]).
O’Neill v Roy [2019] NTSC 23 (12 April 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Past domestic violence against former partners’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, committing aggravated assault against his female ex-partner with a knife, and threatening to kill another person who tried to assist his ex-partner with her injury. The appellant had 14 prior convictions, including 12 for aggravated assault, most on women and some of whom were his previous partners, as well as numerous breaches of domestic violence orders and orders suspending sentences. The offending occurred whilst he was intoxicated and angry. The sentencing judge found the conduct to be intentional, and imposed a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
Issue: The appellant appealed his sentence on the grounds that:
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The sentencing judge erred in the assessment of the appellant’s moral culpability and in finding intoxication to be an aggravating circumstance;
•
The sentencing judge failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness.
Held: The appeal was dismissed, as neither the head sentence nor the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The appellant’s extensive criminal history of violent conduct, particularly drunken violence, was relevant as it demonstrated a continuing attitude of disobedience to the law and the need to impose condign punishment for specific or general deterrence. It also indicated that the appellant had poor prospects of rehabilitation, and that community protection was a paramount consideration. Further, the Court noted that the offences, although taking place around the same time, involved two different victims and two different violent acts. It was therefore appropriate for the sentencing judge to reflect those differences in the way she did by fixing a total sentence and allowing for some concurrency ([60]-[61]). In relation to the non-parole period, the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his age, criminal record and the protection of the community were particularly relevant. The non-parole period was justified, given his very poor prospects of rehabilitation and his "dreadful criminal history" ([67]). Further, the sentencing judge did not err in finding that intoxication was an aggravating circumstance of the appellant’s "brazen, excessive and egregious" conduct ([43]-[44]).
AB v Hayes & Anor [2019] NTSC 13 (6 March 2019) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Conditions’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexually explicit images’
Case type: Appeal about domestic violence orders.
Facts: The appellant is an NT police officer stationed in Alice Springs. In 2016, the NT police applied to the Local Court for 2 domestic violence orders. The two applications were heard together.
The two protected persons named in the applications were the appellant’s wife and her daughter from a previous relationship. Both persons immigrated from South East Asia, and started living with the appellant in 2011. The appellant and his wife also had a child together, but separated in 2016. The Local Court in Alice Springs ordered that the appellant be restrained from contacting or approaching the protected persons, either directly or indirectly (‘first order’). In a different proceeding on the same day, the Local Court ordered that the appellant delete and destroy all sexually explicit images of the protected person in his possession or control, and not deal with or publish those images in any other way for a period of 2 months (‘second order’) ([3]-[4]).
The appellant filed 2 appeals in the Supreme Court, one for each of the Local Court proceedings. On 22 June 2017, Southwood J set aside the first order on the basis that the Local Court Judge could not reasonably infer from the facts that the appellant’s wife’s daughter feared the commission of domestic violence from the appellant, and there was no evidence that the appellant harassed her by engaging in regular and unwanted contact ([13]).
His Honour considered the appeal against the second order. The grounds of appeal included that:
•
The order was ultra vires as the Local Court did not have power to compel the appellant to destroy his property;
•
There was no proper evidential basis for the Local Court to conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear the commission of domestic violence arising out of the appellant’s possession of the images ([6])
Issue: Whether Local Court acted ultra vires in making an order to compel the destruction of sexually explicit images; whether there was a proper evidential basis for the Local Court to conclude there were reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear the commission of domestic violence arising out of the possession of the images.
Held: Southwood J allowed the appeals and set aside both domestic violence orders. His Honour held that the Local Court did not have the power to make the second order. Section 21 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act (the Act) does not grant the Local Court power to order a defendant to destroy his or her personal property. Rather, it enables the Local Court to impose conditions on a defendant’s behaviour with the aim of ensuring that the defendant does not engage in domestic violence. Further, the Act makes specific provision for circumstances in which property rights may be interfered with by the Local Court, none of which applied in this case ([46]-[48]). His Honour was satisfied that the appellant was the owner of the sexually explicit images and that his wife consented to him taking them ([45]).
His Honour also held that the Local Court erred in concluding that there was a reasonable fear that the appellant may use, or threaten to use, the sexually explicit images to continue to control his wife. This conclusion was ‘unreasonable and irrational’ ([54]). Further, the evidence showed that the appellant and his wife took sexually explicit images over a number of years for their own enjoyment ([50]).
Bush v Lyons [2018] NTSC 20 (28 April 2018) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1; Contravention of alcohol prevention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was subject to an alcohol prevention order and a domestic violence order which named his wife and daughter as protected persons. The appellant attended the house at which his wife and daughter were residing, under the influence of alcohol, and caused a disturbance ([2]). The Local Court restored a previously suspended sentence and imposed cumulative terms of imprisonment of 4 months for the breach of domestic violence order and 5 days for the breach of alcohol protection order ([3]). The appellant had a history of breaching the same domestic violence and alcohol prevention orders ([5]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on the grounds that the sentencing judge erred by:
•
misusing the appellant’s previous convictions in the sentencing process;
•
failing to include a rehabilitative component in the sentence;
•
failing to partially suspend the sentence; and
•
imposing a manifestly excessive sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The first, second and third grounds were dismissed (see [11], [19] and [25] respectively). The fourth ground, manifest excess, was upheld. Grant CJ outlined the following mitigating factors:
•
the low objective seriousness of the offending;
•
the maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment;
•
the fact that the appellant has no record of violent offending against the protected persons; and
•
his early plea of guilty ([27], [35]).
His Honour characterised the appellant’s repeated breaches as spontaneous and triggered by alcohol abuse, rather than premeditated ([32]). Quoting from Manakgu v Russell [2013] NTSC 48, his Honour agreed that penalties of more than 3 months’ imprisonment are properly reserved for conduct which constitutes physical assault or serious intimidation and threats ([31], [34]). His Honour reduced the sentence for breach of domestic violence order from 4 months to 2 months’ imprisonment ([37]).
Andalong v O’Neill [2017] NTSC 77 (19 October 2017)– Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Autrefois acquit’ – ‘Autrefois convict’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Driving unregistered vehicle x 1; driving uninsured or improperly insured vehicle x 1; driving whilst disqualified x 1; driving with a high range breath alcohol content x 1.
Case type: Appeal
Facts: On 25 November 2015, the appellant was apprehended while driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The appellant was charged with a range of offences under the Traffic Act (NT) (the Act), including driving an unregistered vehicle on a public street (section 33(1)), and driving a vehicle in relation to which a current compensation contribution had not been paid (section 34(1)). The appellant indicated that he would plead guilty to the offence of driving an unregistered motor vehicle, but contended that the offence of driving an uninsured vehicle was a ‘similar offence’ and thus entitled him to the defence under section 18(b) of the Criminal Code (NT). The Local Court found the appellant guilty of these offences.
Issue: The issue for determination is whether the offence under section 33(1) of the Act is a ‘similar offence’, within the meaning of section 18 of the Criminal Code (NT), to the offence under section 34(1).
Held: The Court held that the offence under section 33(1) was not a ‘similar offence’ to the offence under section 34(1). While it may be accepted that the 2 offences shared common features, they nevertheless remained distinct and addressed separate obligations imposed under traffic laws for the protection of the community ([53]-[54]).
The fundamental principle is that a person cannot be prosecuted twice for the same criminal conduct ([16]). The double jeopardy doctrine has a number of different aspects with different operation, including the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict and the rule against double punishment ([17]). The availability of the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict will depend on a comparison between the elements of the two offences under consideration. It is insufficient that the two offences arise out of the same conduct, or out of a single event or connected series of events ([21]). The question is whether the elements of the offences charged are identical, or substantially the same in the sense that all the elements of one offence are wholly included in the other ([23]). The Court considered Ashley v Marinov [2007] NTCA 1, and adopted the principles expressed by the High Court in Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57 where it was held that no double prosecution arises if the offences with which the accused was charged required proof of a fact which the other did not ([33]).
Note: This case is relevant in terms of domestic and family violence matters in the NT as it considers the law surrounding double punishment.
Fernando v Firth [2017] NTSC 67 (25 August 2017) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Particularise breach’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1; aggravated unlawful assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship for approximately 15 years. The offences occurred after the relationship ended ([10]). The appellant allegedly threatened to kill the complainant if she found another partner ([11]). At trial, the prosecutor did not particularise the words spoken by the appellant ([7]). The appellant denied threatening to kill her, but admitted to threatening to punch the complainant if she came near him, and telling her to stay away from him. The Magistrate accepted the defendant’s evidence, and convicted him of the charge on that basis ([32]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Magistrate convicted the defendant based on his admissions, which evinced less serious conduct than the threats alleged by the prosecution ([49]). The charge required the complainant to have a ‘reasonable apprehension of violence’ ([50]). Since the prosecution did not specify the particular words used, held that the Magistrate did not accord the defendant procedural fairness by going outside the prosecution case ([49]).
R v Grant [2016] NTSC 54 (31 October 2016) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Unlawfully causing harm’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charge/s: Unlawfully causing serious harm or unlawfully causing harm.
Hearing: Voir dire hearing.
Facts: The accused was charged with the offence of unlawfully causing serious harm to his female partner, the complainant, or, in the alternative, unlawfully causing harm to the complainant. The Crown sought the admission of tendency evidence related to the following fact in issue: whether the accused applied physical violence to the complainant in the early morning of 26 January 2016 and/or caused injuries to the complainant. The tendency sought to be proved was the tendency of the accused:
(a)
To act in a particular way, namely engaging in verbal abuse and physically violent behaviour towards the complainant; and/or
(b)
To have a particular state of mind, namely a violent and controlling disposition towards the complainant which he sometimes acted upon when he had been consuming alcohol.
If the evidence (detailed at [5]) was not admissible as tendency evidence, the Crown sought to have it admitted as relationship evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The rulings on the voir dire hearing were –
1.
Evidence of incidents on 25 May 2013, 7-8 June 2013, 12 July 2013, 10 December 2013 and 18 June 2015 were admissible in the trial as tendency evidence (see [61]-[72]).
In order to be admitted for tendency purposes, the evidence had to satisfy the requirements in ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) (‘ENULA’). Two questions arose in determining the admissibility of the evidence: (1) did the evidence have significant probative value? The relevant test is whether ‘the features of commonality or peculiarity which are relied upon are significant enough logically to imply that because the offender committed previous acts or committed them in particular circumstances, he or she is likely to have committed the act or acts in question’: CEG v The Queen [2012] VSCA 55 (see [30]-[60]); (2) did the probative value of that evidence substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have on the accused? As per the Court, ‘[t]he test of a danger of unfair prejudice is not satisfied by the mere possibility of such prejudice. There must be a real risk of unfair prejudice by reason of the admission of the evidence’ R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364.
2.
Evidence of incidents on 25 May 2013, 7-8 June 2013, 12 July 2013, 10 December 2013 and 18 June 2015 were admissible as ‘relationship’ or ‘context evidence’ (see [73]-[82]).
Evidence may also be admitted for non-tendency purposes. One example of non-tendency purpose is ‘relationship’ or ‘context’ evidence that is not relied on for a tendency inference. The High Court in HML v The Queen is authority for the proposition that evidence of other conduct by an accused may, depending upon the circumstances, be admissible for non-tendency purposes, including the following purposes (see [75]):
(a)
as affecting the plausibility of other evidence or to assess the credibility and coherence of the complainant’s evidence (at [6], [155]–[156]);
(b)
as essential background against which the evidence of the complainant and the accused necessarily falls to be evaluated, to show the continuing nature of the conduct and to explain the offences charged (at [425], [431]);
(c)
to overcome a false impression that the event was an isolated one, that the offence happened “out of the blue”, where the acts are closely and inextricably mixed up with the history of the offence (at [500], [513]);
(d)
to ensure that the jury are not required to decide issues in a vacuum (at [428], [498]); and
(e)
as negativing issues raised such as accident or mistake (at [430]).
Although HML was a case involving sexual offences, relationship evidence may also be admissible in cases involving violence, including assault-type offences (see examples at [76]).
The admissibility of relationship evidence is governed by the general test of relevance in s 55 of the ENULA and the directions and obligations contained in Part 3.11 (especially ss 135 and 137). The Crown contended that the evidence was relevant and admissible as relationship or context evidence because it was necessary to:
(a)
Avoid the circumstances of the alleged offence appearing inexplicable or being misunderstood in isolation; see Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 at [45]
(b)
Negative the defence case of self-inflicted injury; R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519; (2002) 137 A Crim R 345 at [15], [22]-[45]; Bryant v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 26 at [92]; McDonald v The Queen [2014] VSCA 80 at [28]- [29]
(c)
Show the state of mind of the accused at the time of the alleged offence. R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 at [33], [45], [47]; Boney v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 165 at [29]
The relationship evidence here was both relevant ([79]-[80]) and not excluded (its probative value was neither outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused nor substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the accused) ([81]-[82]).
Houseman v Higgins [2015] NTSC 88 (7 December 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Formalities in making domestic violence order’ – ‘Service’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against acquittal, validity of domestic violence order
Facts: The respondent was served with a police domestic violence order under s 41 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the Act). The order set out the reasons for making the order and conditions of full non-contact. However, it did not provide a specified period for which the order was in force. The Court of Summary Jurisdiction confirmed and varied the order to be in force for 12 months.
After being in contact with the protected person, the respondent was subsequently arrested for breaching the domestic violence order. However, at the time of arrest the respondent had not been served with the court confirmed and varied domestic violence order. The magistrate found the respondent was not guilty on the basis that the domestic violence order made by the police ceased to be in force once confirmed by the court and the respondent had not been served with the court order.
Issues:
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Whether the domestic violence order was invalid because it did not state the period the order was to be in force.
•
If the order was valid, whether the magistrate erred in finding the respondent not guilty in failing to apply s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
•
Southwood J found it is not necessary for police to state the duration of a domestic violence order for it to be valid. A police domestic violence order continues in force until it is revoked. Under s 27 of the Act a domestic violence order is in force for the period stated in it. This section does not state that an order cannot be made for an unspecified or unlimited period, nor does any other provision in the Act. Further, s 42 contained in Part 2.6 of the Act, provides the police must record the reasons for making the order and the time and place for its return. Again, this provision does not require police to specify the period for which the order is to be in force. The purpose of Part 2.6 is to protect the protected person until a court can consider the matter. Consistent with this purpose, a police domestic violence order is to remain in force until further order or until the order is revoked. This is made clear by s 82 of the Act which states that at a show cause hearing the court may either confirm the order with or without variations or revoke it.
•
Given the order was valid, the respondent’s conduct in contacting the protected person constituted a breach of both the domestic violence order made by the police and the confirmed and varied order made by the court under s 120(1) of the Act. The fact the respondent had not received a copy of the court order at the time of arrest was not a defence under s 120(2)(a) of the Act, as the police domestic violence order was still in force: s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the charge should not have been dismissed and the magistrate erred in dismissing the charge and in failing to consider s 120(2)(b)(ii) of the Act.
Gorey v O’Neill [2015] NTSC 66 (1 October 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Purpose of domestic violence order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Situational breach’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order restraining him from, among other conditions, approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of his wife (the victim) when consuming or under the influence of alcohol. On the day of offending, the appellant had been drinking and travelled in the car with the victim. His blood alcohol level was 0.05 per cent. The appellant claimed he was in the car with the victim to attend to matters in the administration of the estate of the victim’s father-in-law. He also denied knowing that the domestic violence order was still in force. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of breaching the domestic violence order.
The appellant had an extensive offending history, including 16 convictions for aggravated assault, one conviction for causing grievous bodily harm and eight convictions for breaching domestic violence orders. Of these, 22 of the offences were committed against the victim. The magistrate considered this history of domestic violence offending and the need for specific deterrence together with the mitigating factor that the victim suffered no harm. The appellant was sentenced to three months imprisonment, taking into account a discount of 25 per cent for the early guilty plea.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
While a starting point of four months imprisonment seemed high for a ‘situational breach’ in which no harm was caused, it was necessary to consider the preventative and protective role of domestic violence orders. Barr J noted that ‘Given the preventative purpose of DVO, the fact that the parties may have been drinking while sitting down ‘in a good way’, or that the offender has on the particular occasion not been aggressive or threatening or violent to the protected person, does not necessarily result in a lenient sentencing outcome for a recidivist offender’ ([28]). The appellant’s criminal history demonstrated that while no harm resulted from the breach, there was a real risk that physical or emotional injury could occur and protection was needed to prevent such harm. Further, it established that he had a ‘continuing attitude of disobedience of the law’ ([33]). Therefore, the magistrate’s starting point of four months imprisonment, while on the high end of the range for the nature of the breach, was not outside the bounds of sentencing discretion.
R v Stevenson [2015] NTSC – Sentencing Remarks 21353266 (Kelly J) (14 September 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Murder (sentenced for manslaughter)
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: The defendant was charged with the murder of his wife (the victim) after hitting her with a crate twice, kicking her in the back, and subsequently bashing her for three hours then leaving her on the sidewalk. The next morning the defendant went to find the victim to discover she was dead. This occurred after the defendant and the victim had a fight over his drinking habits. He was intoxicated at the time the assaults occurred. A domestic violence order was previously made against the defendant in order to prevent him from being with, assaulting or threatening the victim. The Crown accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to manslaughter on the basis that intention to kill or cause serious harm could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt due to the defendant’s intoxication at the time of the violent assaults.
Issue: What sentence should the defendant receive?
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years.
The defendant had a history of domestic violence assaults against his wife. He had previously been convicted of three aggravated assault offences and one breach of a domestic violence order offence. Kelly J noted that each assault followed a similar pattern, with an argument resulting in the defendant ‘savagely’ bashing his wife. These attacks always involved alcohol and usually involved a weapon. These convictions meant the defendant was not a person of good character and was not entitled to a lighter sentence for being a first offender.
The defendant is a Walpiri man who speaks Walpiri and some Gurindji. He left school in year 9 and speaks English but cannot read or write. The defendant has not worked since his first wife committed suicide in 2002. He began drinking as a teenager and was drinking heavily at the time of the offence.
In providing her reasoning for sentencing, Kelly J highlighted the prominence of alcohol related violence in the Northern Territory: ‘Drunken violence is far too common in our community. It is particularly common, unfortunately, in Aboriginal communities and vulnerable Aboriginal women, vulnerable people of all kinds, deserve the fullest protection that the law can give them.’ The need to punish and for specific deterrence to prevent the defendant from reoffending, as well as the need to protect the community and other women from being hurt by the defendant, were emphasised. There were also a number of aggravating factors that made the offending more serious. The defendant used several weapons when attacking his wife, rather than just losing his temper and lashing out. He also went looking for his wife, having pre-planned the attack, and did not stop bashing her even when she begged him to.
In the factually similar case of R v Wheeler [2005] NTSC – Sentencing Remarks 20505473 (Southwood J), the defendant (Mr Wheeler) received a sentence of 10 years and 6 months imprisonment. However, Kelly J found the defendant’s conduct in the present case was more serious. Unlike Mr Wheeler, he was not provoked by his wife, showed no remorse after he finished bashing her, and did nothing to help her. He also only pleaded guilty after a preliminary hearing had already occurred with 36 witnesses, whereas Mr Wheeler pleaded guilty immediately. These circumstances taken together resulted in Kelly J finding a proper sentence of 16 years imprisonment. A reduction of about 12 percent was given as a result of the guilty plea.
Mamarika v Rourke [2015] NTSC 42 (23 July 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant victim’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, who was intoxicated at the time, pushed and punched his pregnant wife (the victim) in the stomach and head. After handing himself into police, he pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting the victim with the aggravation of male-on-female assault (under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT)). When asked why he assaulted the victim he said it was because his wife told him to stop drinking. The appellant was initially convicted and sentenced to a term of 10 months imprisonment, to be served cumulatively upon a restored sentence of seven months for previous offending including assaulting the same victim. This earlier assault involved the appellant striking the victim with a sword, then punching and kicking her.
In sentencing, the magistrate emphasised that the victim was pregnant at the time the assault occurred: ‘Women of course deserve to be safe whether they are in Darwin, whether they are at home, and they do not deserve to be treated in this way, particularly – and it is an aggravating factor – when she was 28 weeks pregnant.’ (at [7]). A reduction to the sentence was given when considering the principle of totality and the presence of the appellant’s guilty plea.
Issues:
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Whether the magistrate erred in failing to properly give effect to the principle of totality.
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Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
The appellant argued that the magistrate did not assess the overall sentence and consider whether any further adjustment was warranted, as required by Mill v R [1988] HCA 70. That is, she did not make the sentence concurrent or partially concurrent with the restored sentence. Rather, the magistrate applied the principle of totality by reducing the sentence for the fresh offending. Barr J rejected this argument in finding the magistrate clearly stated she had applied the principle of totality and whilst the method was not preferable, it was nonetheless appropriate.
•
In determining whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, Barr J considered the previous offending of the appellant. In addition to a significant number of property offences, he had been convicted five times for aggravated assault and once for a breach of a domestic violence order. When considering this history of offending and the present assault, the objectives of denunciation, punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence were relevant to the sentencing of the appellant. Barr J found when taking all these factors into consideration and characterising the offending as ‘mid range’ (at [16]), the appropriate starting point was 18 months. A discount of one third for the guilty plea, as given by the Magistrate, was justified in the circumstances, resulting in a sentence of 12 months. When applying the principle of totality to this sentence, there was some basis for concurrency of three months. This hypothetical sentencing exercise resulted in a total effective sentence of 16 months. Therefore, the sentence of 10 months imprisonment was not manifestly excessive in its own right or when fully accumulated with the restored sentence of seven months imprisonment.
Namundja v Schaefe-Lee [2015] NTSC 36 (12 June 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of alcohol protection order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Repeat offender’
Charges: Aggravated assault, breach of alcohol protection order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant, who was intoxicated at the time, had an argument with his wife (the victim). He subsequently dragged the victim outside, punched her in the face multiple times, shoved her into a shelf and punched her twice in the stomach. He was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) (victim suffered harm and male-on-female assault) and one count of breaching a police issued Alcohol Protection Order. The appellant had a number of previous convictions, including three counts of aggravated assault against the victim, four counts of breach of a domestic violence order and nine counts of breaching an Alcohol Protection Order. He resided in Oenpelli and had been an artist member of Injalak Arts for around 20 years. This job would continue on the appellant’s release. His counsel argued his prospects of rehabilitation would be improved if he participated in the Family Violence Program. At trial, the magistrate relied on the seriousness of the offending and his past history to conclude the appellant needed to be specifically deterred, despite any positive attributes, and the community needed to know such conduct is unacceptable. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment after a reduction of four months for pleading guilty. A non-parole period was not fixed due to the seriousness of the offending and continued ongoing breaches of court orders.
Issues: Some issues on appeal were whether the magistrate:
•
Failed to adequately consider the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation;
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Failed to adequately consider the principles outlined in Dinsdale v R [2000] HCA 54 that all relevant sentencing considerations must be reconsidered in determining whether to suspend a sentence; and
•
Failed to adequately consider the sentencing disposition of parole.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground 3. Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed.
Blokland J began by noting that ‘Offending of this kind, men assaulting their wives or partners, is an intractable problem in the Northern Territory. With few exceptions, imprisonment is often the appropriate punishment… In most cases, particularly with respect to repeat offenders, positive subjective features generally need to be very carefully balanced as rarely will they outweigh the significance of the gravity of offending of this kind.’ ([19])
•
The fact the magistrate did not specifically refer to the appellant’s job history and prospective employment did not mean that he failed to adequately consider these factors. Given the severity of the offending, previous convictions, the need to protect the victim and the prevalence of domestic violence in the particular case, such factors would not have resulted in a lesser sentence.
•
While the magistrate did not explain every consideration taken, he was entitled to refuse a suspended sentence due to the appellant’s poor history of complying with orders.
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There was no sufficient basis to decline to set a non-parole period in accordance with s 54(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT). Under s 53(1), a court must set a non-parole period in cases of imprisonment for 12 months or more ‘unless it considers the nature of the offence, the past history of the offender or the circumstances of the particular case make the fixing of such period inappropriate’. The magistrate failed to consider these factors, basing his decision primarily on the previous breaches of orders. Therefore, this ground of appeal succeeded and a non-parole period of 8 months was ordered.
Orsto v Grotherr [2015] NTSC 18 (31 March 2015) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Mandatory minimum sentence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained her from harming the victim. On the day of offending, the appellant and the victim got in an argument after the victim returned home from work for lunch against the appellant’s wishes. The appellant was upset that the victim woke up their daughter. She then forcefully struck the victim’s head. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of aggravated assault, with the circumstance of aggravation that the victim suffered harm. The victim had a prior conviction for aggravated assault (weapon-harm) in respect to the same victim. In his victim impact statement, the victim said he did not wish the appellant serve gaol time, as she was pregnant. A character reference was also provided by aboriginal community members that outlined the appellant’s positive characteristics as a mother who had suffered hardship throughout her life. The magistrate heard the appellant had previously been the victim of domestic violence in the relationship and grew up in a household with her parents who had domestic violence issues.
Section 78D of the Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) requires a mandatory minimum sentence of three months actual imprisonment for aggravated assault, unless exceptional circumstances exist under s 78DI. The appellant’s counsel submitted exceptional circumstances existed on the facts. These circumstances were constituted by a combination of factors including that the victim did not wish the victim to go to gaol; the appellant had sought counselling; she was suffering hardship having attempted suicide the previous year and losing a child two months prior to sentencing; she had previously been the victim of domestic violence herself; and she had ongoing employment within the community. After determining these factors did not amount to exceptional circumstances, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to three months imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in finding the circumstances of the case were not exceptional for the purposes of s 78DI.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
Referring to the obiter comments made in R v Duncan [2015] NTCCA 2, Blokland J stated that exceptional circumstances do not exist unless the minimum term is greater than the term that would ordinarily be imposed ([37]). This was the case on the facts, as the magistrate noted he would have suspended the sentence but for the mandatory prescribed minimum. In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the court must consider the whole of the circumstances in the case. The individual factors do not need to be exceptional. Rather, the factors considered together must amount to exceptional circumstances.
The magistrate erred in his consideration of whether exceptional circumstances existed. The remarks were ‘unnecessarily constrained’ and the magistrate failed to consider a number of mitigating factors. In support of the magistrate’s reasoning, Blokland J emphasised the need for general and specific deterrence given the offence occurred in the vicinity of a young child. Further, the victim’s wish that the appellant not be imprisoned has little weight in domestic violence cases. The fact the victim was previously a victim of domestic violence herself without additional information about the duration and extent of the abuse also carried little weight towards exceptional circumstances existing. However, Blokland J concluded that the appellant’s personal circumstances of having just lost a child at the time of sentencing and attempting suicide the year prior made the case exceptional. These personal circumstances were such that being away from family and community support whilst grieving meant imprisonment would be more burdensome on the appellant than other offenders. The sentence was quashed, and the appellant was resentenced to three months imprisonment wholly suspended with an operational period of six months.
Kassman v Dwyer & Anor [2014] NTSC 60 (10 December 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Procedure: Making of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against imposition of domestic violence order
Facts: The plaintiff, an Aboriginal Community Police Officer, was in a relationship with the victim. The victim made a number of allegations of domestic violence. As a result, a police domestic violence order was imposed against the plaintiff pursuant to s 41 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). In relation to this order, the plaintiff received a notice ordering him to appear before the court on 8 August 2014 to show cause as to why the order should not be confirmed. After the victim expressed an intention to leave Darwin, the plaintiff was informed that the order would stay in force to ‘keep the peace’ and would be revoked once the victim moved. The victim informed the plaintiff she would be leaving Darwin on 13 August 2014. As a result of this and advice given by the officer who made the police order, the plaintiff did not attend court on 8 August 2014 as required. The magistrate refused a short adjournment to enable the legal counsel to obtain further information to explain the absence of the plaintiff and confirmed the order for 12 months.
Issue: Was the plaintiff denied natural justice?
Decision and reasoning: Through the ‘unfortunate combination of events’ the plaintiff was denied natural justice. His superiors in the Police Force left him with the understanding that he was not required to attend court on 8 August 2014. As a result, the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to show cause as to why the order should not be confirmed. The magistrate confirmed the order without providing reasons for refusing the adjournment or confirming the order for 12 months. Additionally, the magistrate failed to provide the plaintiff the opportunity to make submissions, contrary to s 82(2) Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). The decision was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Court of Summary Jurisdiction for determination.
R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 26 (15 July 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Jury’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Presumption of innocence’
Charge: Murder
Proceeding: Reasons for rulings given during trial as to admissibility of evidence, discharge of jury member
Facts: The accused was charged with murdering his ex-partner. He denied any involvement with her death and told police he believed another man or bikies associated with him likely murdered the victim. During the course of the trial, several witnesses were asked what they knew of the other man and his association with the victim and the accused. The prosecution sought to partially exclude evidence of three witnesses about what the accused had told them about people, including the other man, behaving suspiciously around him.
During the trial Blokland J received a note from a juror that alleged three of the other jurors considered the accused guilty until convinced otherwise (Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2, [10]). The accused’s Counsel requested the jury be discharged.
Issues:
•
Was the evidence of the three witnesses admissible?
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Should the jury be discharged because of the juror’s note?
Decision and reasoning:
•
The evidence of the three witnesses was hearsay. However, it was admissible as the exception in s 66 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) applied. While an accused is not competent to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution, they are ‘available’ for the purposes of s 66 to give evidence in their own case. However, subsequent to this ruling during the trial the accused’s Counsel advised the court that the accused would not give evidence. Therefore, the jury were directed to disregard the evidence initially admitted under s 66.
•
Blokland J refused to discharge the jury and rather provided directions to the jury reminding them of the presumption of innocence, the need to remain impartial and the duty to keep an open mind when hearing the evidence.
NB: The ruling not to discharge the jury was held to be an error on appeal in Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2. The conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.
R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 15 (10 July 2014) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Murder’
Charge: Murder
Proceeding: Pre-trial rulings on evidence
Facts: The accused was charged with murdering his ex-partner with whom he had two children. The prosecution sought to adduce evidence relating to the state of the accused and victim’s relationship from the time of separation until the victim’s death. The prosecution was attempting to argue that motive could be inferred from the nature of the relationship between the parties contained within such evidence. Some of this evidence comprised hearsay representations made by the victim to other witnesses.
Issue: Whether the evidence relating to the accused and victim’s relationship was admissible.
Decision and reasoning: Evidence as to the state of the relationship is admissible if it is relevant to the accused’s anger towards the victim by the use of controlling behaviours and frustration directed towards the victim. This kind of evidence is relevant at common law and within the meaning of s 55 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) as evidence that could rationally affect the assessment of a fact in issue. However, hearsay evidence can only be admitted under s 67 if the representations made by the deceased occurred when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred in circumstances where it was unlikely to be fabricated (s 65(2)(b)), or if it is highly probable the representations were reliable (s 65(2)(c)).
Blokland J considered whether 31 pieces of hearsay evidence were admissible. The evidence included representations made by the victim to police officers prior to her murder, to the practitioner for the Department of Children and Families who was managing the case, and to her daughter. The representations related to the accused’s physical or emotional control over the victim and his history of assaulting her.
One item considered was a statement the victim made to the police describing an assault by the accused. Representations contained within this statement regarding the assault and the accused taking the victim’s car keys were admitted. Text messages and statements regarding the accused’s threat to kill himself were also admitted. However, a statement made by their son was not admitted, as it was not a representation made by the victim as required by s 65. The statement also contained representations about the accused visiting the victim’s brother’s house and allegations that the accused was violent towards his daughter. These representations were also not admitted as evidence as their probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice against the accused.
Some other representations that were not admitted included those made to the case management practitioner that the victim attempted to leave the accused but he would not let her; that the accused was not physically but emotionally abusive towards the victim; and that the accused was harassing the victim at her brother’s house.
Note: Subsequent to this ruling, the accused stood trial and was found guilty of murder. Blokland J provided additional reasoning on two procedural matters that arose during the trial in R v Ashley [2014] NTSC 26. The accused subsequently successfully appealed the conviction in Ashley v R [2016] NTCCA 2 on procedural grounds amounting to a miscarriage of justice. The conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
Manakgu v Russell [2013] NTSC 48 (14 August 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Situational breach’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order in favour of his wife (the protected person) that restrained him from ‘approaching, entering or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol… or when under the influence of alcohol’. After attending the Gunbalunya Sports and Social Club and drinking 13 cans of beer, the appellant went to the protected person’s home. He was arrested and pleaded guilty to breaching the domestic violence order, which had been in force for nine months. The order had been complied with for the previous nine months, but the appellant had been in prison for five of them. The appellant had two prior convictions for breach of domestic violence orders. In considering this repeat offending and history of failing to comply with orders, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to 3 months imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Barr J observed: ‘Generally speaking, a breach where harm or fear of harm is caused to the protected person is worse than a merely ‘situational’ breach. The appellant’s breach was a low order ‘situational’ breach. No harm or fear of harm was caused’ ([16]). Barr J noted that in general, ‘the more egregious the conduct in terms of causing harm or fear of harm to the protected person, the greater the probable degree of contempt for the court’s order or orders’ ([17]). On the facts, the magistrate erred in assessing the appellant’s conduct as more than a ‘minor case’. While some actual imprisonment was justified for reasons of specific and general deterrence, the offending was at the low end of the scale of seriousness at [23]. The sentence of three months’ imprisonment was quashed, and a sentence of 15 days’ imprisonment was imposed.
JCM v LJN [2013] NTSC 50 (13 August 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Both parties in vulnerable situation’ – ‘Domestic violence order conditions’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Myths and misunderstanding - not leaving violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Variation of domestic violence order’ – ‘Victim’
Appeal type: Variation of domestic violence order
Facts: A domestic violence order was taken out by police in favour of the appellant and her daughter (the protected persons). The order restrained the respondent from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the appellant or any place she was living, working, staying, visiting or is located. All parties consented to vary this non-contact order to a non-violence order restraining the respondent from ‘causing harm or attempting or threatening to cause harm to the protected persons; causing or attempting to cause damage to the property of the protected persons; and intimidating or harassing or verbally abusing the protected persons’ ([3]). At hearing, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction refused to grant the variation.
The respondent subsequently presented fresh evidence in support of the variation from a non-contact to a non-violence domestic violence order. The appellant and her daughter briefly moved to a shelter after the domestic violence order was originally taken out. They then moved back into their home, leaving the respondent to move out in order to comply with the non-contact order. This was against the wishes of the appellant and their child, who wanted to continue living with the respondent. With nowhere else to stay, the respondent slept in his car while continuing to support the appellant and their child financially. He was unable to access tools needed for his work that were left in the house. The respondent suffered from a mental illness and had commenced treatment with the support of the appellant. In the circumstances, the police were satisfied a non-violence order was appropriate.
Issues: One relevant issue concerned whether the Court of Summary Jurisdiction failed to properly consider and give due weight to the matters to be considered in making a domestic violence order under s 19(2)(e) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
The appellant’s wish to remain in a relationship with the respondent is not in itself enough to grant a variation of the domestic violence order. Blokland J noted that ‘the desire to stay in the relationship may be an indication of ongoing dependence, violence or intimation’ ([9]). However, this factor had to be considered in combination with the fact the original order was made on incomplete information, the respondent had not been in breach of a domestic violence order for five years, and the fresh evidence established that the non-contact order placed the appellant, the respondent and their child in vulnerable situations. While this was a situation where there was a need for a domestic violence order, a non-violence order would be more effective than a non-contact order and would continue to provide protection for the appellant and their daughter. The non-violence order would likely result in the respondent continuing treatment for his mental illness and taking further responsibility, thereby supporting protection in the context of an ongoing family relationship.
Watson v Chambers [2013] NTSC 7 (12 February 2013) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Cumulative sentences’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (two counts), aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a relationship and resided together in the remote town of Maningrida. A domestic violence order was in place to protect the victim from the appellant harassing, threatening or verbally abusing her or assaulting or threatening to assault her. One afternoon the victim left their house when the appellant became angry and demanded she stay, saying ‘Don’t you move, I’m going to get a hammer and smash you in the arm’ (count 2). Several days later the appellant accused the victim of having an affair. He subsequently struck her in the arm with a metal cup, grabbed her hair and dragged her to their room where he threw her on the ground, punched her twice in the face and struck her with a steel mop handle (counts 4 and 6). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of contravening a domestic violence order (counts 2 and 4) and one count of aggravated assault with the circumstances of aggravation under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT) that the victim suffered harm, it was a male-on-female offence and the victim was threatened with a weapon (count 6). The effective head sentence imposed by the magistrate was 11 months’ imprisonment to be suspended after the service of 6 months’ imprisonment, subject to the appellant completing the Indigenous Family Violence Offender Program (IFVOP). This head sentence comprised of:
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Count 2: two months’ imprisonment
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Count 6: six months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 2
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Count 4: three months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 6
The magistrate initially made the sentence on count 4 concurrent with count 6, making the effective sentence 8 months imprisonment. However, this was adjusted as a result of s 121(7) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) and the effective sentence was increased to 11 months.
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were whether the magistrate:
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Erred by finding the appellant guilty on count 4 and count 6 on the same facts; and
•
Erred in her application of the totality principle.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on both grounds and the appellant was resentenced.
•
Counts 4 and 6 referred to the same incident. Citing Ashley v Marinov [2007] NTCA 1, Blokland J noted that where the facts of the breach of the domestic violence order were the same or similar to the facts constituting the assault, the two findings cannot stand. To do so would violate the principle against double jeopardy. The conduct of the appellant in accusing the victim of having an affair did not constitute ‘harassing, threatening or verbally abusing’ as provided in the domestic violence order. The conduct was not particularised at trial and the magistrate erred in convicting the appellant on count 4. Blokland J ordered the quashing of the conviction and sentence in respect to count 4.
•
Blokland J agreed with Barr J’s remarks in Idai v Malogorski [2011] NTSC 102 in finding that the mandatory accumulation of sentences does not displace the principle of totality. The conduct that constituted counts 4 and 6 was a continuation of the offending of count 2. Therefore, while the sentences had to be accumulated, there should have been an adjustment to the individual sentences when the magistrate made the correction.
The appellant was resentenced to 14 days’ imprisonment on count 2 and 6 months’ imprisonment on count 6. The total effective term of imprisonment of 6 months and 14 days was suspended after the service of five months and one week imprisonment. The condition of the appellant completing the IFVOP was upheld.
Palmer-Peckham v Westphal [2012] NTSC 74 (28 September 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and victim had previously been in a relationship. The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained him from harassing or harming the victim and approaching, entering or remaining in her company or in her place of residence or work when under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating substance. After consuming alcohol one day, the appellant went to the victim’s mother’s house where she was living at the time. The victim was not home. He returned later that afternoon after consuming more alcohol. When the victim arrived home, the appellant allegedly assaulted her. However, there was not enough evidence to conclude this beyond reasonable doubt. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and was convicted of breaching the domestic violence order. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to two months’ imprisonment, suspended immediately with an operation period of 12 months.
In sentencing, the magistrate noted that the appellant had breached the domestic violence order in three respects and considered the conduct as the upper end of offending. However, the appellant had no substantial offending history and entered his guilty plea early. The magistrate accepted that while the appellant had a problem with alcohol, he had work available and had good prospects of rehabilitation. He considered the starting point of six months’ imprisonment, reduced to two months’ imprisonment wholly suspended when considering the mitigating and aggravating factors.
Issues: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
Olsson AJ considered the general approach adopted by the magistrate in order to promote general deterrence was reasonable. However, the magistrate’s starting point of six months’ imprisonment was very high for a first conviction when considering the victim suffered no physical or lasting emotional harm. It is not clear from the magistrate’s sentencing remarks how he arrived at the ultimate reduction from six to two months’ imprisonment. A reduction of 30 per cent was given for the timely plea. Beyond this, the magistrate only noted the appellant’s character and prospects for rehabilitation for the further reduction. Accordingly, the sentence was so excessive as to manifest error on the part of the magistrate. Olsson AJ resentenced the appellant to 21 days’ imprisonment, suspended immediately with an operation period of 12 months.
Blitner v Vanzella [2012] NTSC 72 (26 September 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Lapse of domestic violence order’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a police domestic violence order that restrained him from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol or under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction made restraining orders against the appellant. These orders did not include any ‘non-intoxication conditions’. Four days after the restraining orders were made, the Court of Summary Jurisdiction allowed the police domestic violence order to lapse. The appellant was subsequently charged with breaching this order. He pleaded guilty to these offences and was convicted and fined.
Issue: Whether the police domestic violence order was in force and capable of being breached.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence was quashed.
Under s 82 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) the court must either confirm or revoke a police domestic violence order. The magistrate’s order to allow the police domestic violence order to lapse was an effective revocation under s 82. As a result, the appellant was not restrained by a domestic violence order from being or remaining in the company of the protected person when consuming alcohol or being under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, he could not be in breach of the revoked police domestic violence order.
Carne v Wride; Carne v Nicholas [2012] NTSC 33 (15 May 2012) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Cumulative sentences’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, aggravated assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in an ‘on again off again’ relationship for approximately 18 years and had four children together. One evening the appellant went to the victim’s house where all four children were residing. The appellant threw the television over the balcony and forcibly took a ring off the victim’s finger. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault and a domestic violence order was made restraining him from contacting, approaching, intimidating or harassing the victim and exposing the children to domestic violence. Nine days later the appellant phoned the victim and visited her at the house. When she refused to let him in, the appellant unsuccessfully attempted to hang himself from the veranda. This was witnessed by his 14 year old son. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and pleaded guilty to breaching the domestic violence order.
The two charges were sentenced together. After stating the need for general and specific deterrence in the circumstances, the magistrate sentenced the appellant to eight months’ imprisonment for breaching the domestic violence order and two months’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault. The sentences were to be served cumulatively, suspended after six months on conditions including supervision, counselling and abstinence from alcohol and drugs.
Issues: Some of the grounds of appeal included:
•
Whether the magistrate had regard to irrelevant facts and circumstances in accepting the attempted suicide was within the definition of domestic violence;
•
Whether the magistrate erred in cumulating the sentences; and
•
Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on grounds 1 and 3. The appellant was resentenced.
•
Under s 5 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) domestic violence includes causing harm and intimidation. Further, s 6 defines intimidation to include any conduct that has the effect of unreasonably controlling or causing mental harm. It is probable that the appellant’s son suffered psychological harm as a result of witnessing his father attempting to hang himself and having to cut him down. However, no evidence was adduced to establish mental harm was actually suffered. In the absence of such evidence, Kelly J found it was not open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the attempted suicide was conduct that caused mental harm to the son in order to amount to domestic violence under s 6(1)(c). It was also not open to the magistrate to conclude the appellant attempted to cause mental harm under s 5(f). There was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the attempted suicide was aimed at the victim and her children.
•
As a general rule, cumulative penalties should not be imposed when a number of offences arise from substantially the same conduct or a series of occurrences. The appellant’s two offences of aggravated assault and breach of the domestic violence orders did not arise out of such a closely related series of events. Rather, the conduct constituting the separate offences occurred on different days and were totally different acts. Therefore, the magistrate did not err in ordering the sentences to be served cumulatively rather than concurrently.
•
As ground 1 of the appeal was successful, the only actions by the appellant that constituted the breach of the domestic violence order were the conduct of phoning the victim and visiting her home. In these circumstances, the sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. Kelly J set aside the sentence and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for one month for the breach of the domestic violence order. The sentence was to be served cumulatively on the aggravated assault sentence, suspended after one month.
Idai v Malogorski [2011] NTSC 102 (14 December 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent sentences’ – ‘Drugs’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (two counts), aggravated assault (two counts), administration of a dangerous drug (cannabis)
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim had been in a relationship for three to four years. After self-administering cannabis one afternoon (count 2), the appellant became abusive and called the victim a slut (count 4). Early the next morning the victim locked herself in the bathroom to get away from the appellant. In response, the appellant banged and kicked the door, demanding the victim come out (count 5). When she did the appellant threw the contents of a bong and a flour tin over her (count 1). Later that day the appellant shouted at the victim, grabbed her chin and squeezed her cheeks to force her to face him (count 3). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of contravening a domestic violence order (counts 4 and 5), two counts of aggravated male-on-female assault (counts 1 and 3) and one count of administering a dangerous drug (count 2). The effective head sentence imposed by the magistrate was 15 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months. This head sentence comprised of:
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Count 4: five months’ imprisonment
•
Count 5: five months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 4
•
Count 1: five months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 5
•
Count 3: five months’ imprisonment concurrent with the sentence imposed on count 1
•
Count 2: $200 fine
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate erred in the application of the totality principle.
•
Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in relation to counts 4 and 5.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2 and the appellant was resentenced.
•
The conduct that constituted the breaches of the domestic violence order (counts 4 and 5) occurred very closely together in time. They could be seen as facets of the one course of conduct leading up to the aggravated assaults that occurred later that day (counts 1 and 3). Therefore, the sentences imposed for counts 4 and 5 would ordinarily have been made concurrent or substantially so under the general principle of totality. However, in a process of statutory interpretation, Barr J found s 121(7) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) requires the court to order the term of imprisonment for a domestic violence order offence to be served cumulatively on any other sentence. Therefore, the magistrate did not err in ordering that the sentences on both the domestic violence order offences (counts 4 and 5) had to be cumulative on one another and on the sentences on the aggravated assault offences (counts 1 and 3).
•
The magistrate allowed a discount of 25 per cent for the appellant’s guilty pleas, suggesting a point for each offence of approximately seven months imprisonment. Considering the offending was at the lower end of the scale, the individual sentences were manifestly excessive. Barr J found an appropriate starting point for each domestic violence offence (counts 4 and 5) was a sentence of four months, reduced to three months allowing for a 25 per cent discount for the guilty pleas. Each domestic violence order sentence (counts 4 and 5) should further be reduced to two months’ imprisonment, applying the principle of totality. Barr J ordered the appellant be resentenced on counts 4 and 5 to:
•
Count 4: two months’ imprisonment
•
Count 5: two months’ imprisonment cumulative on the sentence imposed on count 4
The effective head sentence for all counts was therefore nine months’ imprisonment.
Malogorski v Peart [2011] NTSC 86 (21 October 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘External orders’ – ‘Registration of interstate domestic violence order’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Proceeding: Question of law under s 96 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT)
Facts: The defendant was the subject of an interim violence restraining order made under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (the WA Act). The interim order was registered as an external order in the Northern Territory pursuant to the procedures in Chapter 3 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) (the NT Act). Subsequently the interim order was made into a final order in Western Australia, however this was never registered in the Northern Territory. The defendant came into contact with the protected person in the Northern Territory, in breach of the external order. At trial, it was argued that there was no case to answer because the interim order made in Western Australia had ceased to be in force once the final order was made. Therefore, the interim order was also no longer registered in the Northern Territory as an external order under s 96 and could not be enforced.
Issue: Whether an interim order under the WA Act continues to be ‘in force’ within the meaning of s 96 of the NT Act after the interim order is made final.
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J answered the question in the negative.
Under the WA Act, an interim order remains in force until one of the specified events in s 16(4) occurs, including when a final order comes into force. Section 96 of the NT Act provides that an external order is registered ‘for the period during which it is in force’. Therefore, on the date of the alleged offence the interim order was not ‘in force’ in WA; accordingly, there was no external order enforceable under the NT Act.
Bonney v Thompson [2011] NTSC 81 (7 October 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Extension of domestic violence order’ – ‘History of abuse’
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to extend domestic violence order
Facts: The respondent, the appellant’s ex-partner, was the subject of a non-contact domestic violence order. The order was initially to be in force for 12 months, but the appellant applied for the order to be extended for a further two years. This application was dismissed. In deciding whether to grant the extension, the magistrate refused to consider the past history of domestic violence. The magistrate did not consider that a history of domestic violence is sufficient for the court to continue an order.
The magistrate also refused to have regard to events that occurred after the making of the original order. The appellant alleged the respondent had approached her daughter, asked for money and threatened to hit her. The magistrate concluded this threat was not relevant because it related to ‘a different adult, not in the company of the complainant, not living with the complainant’ ([22]). The respondent also told his and the appellant’s children to tell the appellant that it was dangerous staying in town, and that she was ‘looking for trouble by living in town’.
Issue: Some of the grounds of appeal included whether the magistrate erred in:
•
Finding that previous evidence of violence is insufficient to extend an order; and
•
Failing to have regard to statement made to the appellant’s family members in considering the reasonable fear of the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the domestic violence order was extended.
•
The magistrate erred in failing to consider the history of domestic violence that led to making the original domestic violence order. In failing to do so, the magistrate made an error of law in failing to take into account relevant facts as required by s 53 and s 19(2)(d) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). The question is whether the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the protected person to fear domestic violence. This question may be satisfied based solely on past conduct of domestic violence: ‘To hold that an application to extend a DVO could never be granted solely on evidence of past domestic violence occurring before the date of the original order, would be tantamount to saying that a DVO can never be extended unless it has been breached.’ ([19)].
•
The magistrate also erred in failing to take into account the evidence of threats made by the respondent to the appellant’s daughter and their children. The threat to the appellant’s daughter was relevant to show the defendant had not reformed and was still prone to threats of violence. Further, the remarks to the children taken in context with the past history of domestic violence support that the appellant had reasonable grounds to fear the commission of domestic violence against her.
Parnell v Verity [2011] NTSC 47 (24 June 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Assaulting police’ – ‘Resisting arrest’
Charge: Resisting arrest, Assaulting police in the execution of duty
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: After speaking with the victim, two police officers decided there were grounds to order a police domestic violence order against the appellant. When driving to the station, they saw the appellant outside his mother’s house. After failed attempts to communicate with the appellant, one of the police officers drew his taser, but did not point it at the appellant. After the appellant was notified of his arrest for the purposes of making a domestic violence order against him, he was handcuffed. He then became aggressive, screaming to his mother for help and alleging the police were assaulting him. The appellant attempted to kick one of the police officers. As a result, the officer put his foot on the appellant’s leg. The appellant screamed out in pain and his family started to approach the officers aggressively. One officer again drew his taser and pointed it at the family and the other officer took out his pepper spray. The appellant then kicked one officer in the shin, who then pepper sprayed the appellant.
In relation to this conduct, the appellant was convicted of resisting arrest and unlawfully assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty with the circumstance of aggravation that the police officer suffered harm.
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate’s findings of guilt were unsafe and unsatisfactory;
•
Whether the magistrate made findings of fact that were not reasonably open on the evidence; and
•
Whether the magistrate erred in the interpretation of s 84(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act (2007) NT.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was acquitted of both charges. In order for the police to remove and detain a person under s 84 of the Act there must be a reasonable belief that there are grounds for making a domestic violence order and it is necessary to remove the person to prevent an imminent risk of harm to another. There was no evidence before the magistrate of ‘domestic violence’ defined by s 5 of the Act. Therefore, the magistrate erred in finding the police officers had a reasonable belief that grounds existed for making a domestic violence order against the appellant. Further, there was no evidence that the appellant was likely to harm anyone as required by s 84(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. Therefore, the police officers did not have the power to arrest the appellant in order to impose the domestic violence order. The arrest was unlawful and the appellant was justified in resisting arrest and acted in self-defence when kicking the police officer.
Semkin v Verity [2011] NTSC 12 (15 February 2011) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order to protect his former partner (the victim). While serving a sentence of imprisonment for previous offences committed against the victim, the appellant breached the domestic violence order by sending the victim a letter. The content of the letter included apologising for his actions and for harming the victim. When asked why he sent the letter, the appellant replied ‘Broken heart, saying sorry and all that’ and that he was not aware it was a contravention of the domestic violence order. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment to commence at the end of his prior sentence.
The full no-contact domestic violence order was initially ordered after the appellant entered the victim’s house, removed all her clothes and burned them in the garden while she was not home. Following this, the appellant breached the order by texting the victim 17 times. The messages included threatening the victim, threatening self-harm and declaring his ‘undying love’. As a result of this conduct, the appellant was fined $750 and placed on a good behaviour bond. Sometime after recommencing their relationship, the appellant went to the victim’s workplace with two knives and a hammer and subsequently chased, punched and kicked the victim and threatened to kill her. The appellant was charged and convicted of aggravated assault, for which he was serving a term of imprisonment at the time of the current offending.
Issues:
•
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
Whether the magistrate erred in applying the principle of totality.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Riley CJ rejected the argument that the appellant’s moral culpability was reduced because he claimed to be unaware that sending the letter was a breach of the domestic violence order. He had repeatedly breached the domestic violence order, on one occasion for sending text messages to the victim. Therefore, he should have known the conditions of the order and that sending a letter constituted a breach of it. The fact that his offending occurred while in custody for another offence against the victim was an aggravating factor. While the appellant had made efforts to rehabilitate whilst in prison, the need for personal deterrence was still a significant factor in sentencing considering his history of offending. When considering these circumstances as a whole, the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive.
•
The magistrate did not err in applying the principle of totality. The current offending was not part of a course of offending. Sending the letter in breach of the domestic violence order was a separate incident to the aggravated assault that the appellant was in custody for. Therefore, the current offending required a separate sentence and the magistrate did not err in ordering the sentence to be served cumulatively.
Atkinson v Eaton [2010] NTSC 72 (17 December 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of good behaviour bond’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, breach of good behaviour bond, resisting arrest
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a de facto relationship and resided together with their child and two children from the victim’s previous relationships. The appellant was the subject of a good behaviour bond with a condition that he not approach the victim when consuming or under the influence of alcohol. He was also the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained the appellant from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the victim or her three children (the protected persons) when consuming or under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating drug or substance.
On the day of offending, the appellant consumed alcohol whilst in the presence of all four of the protected persons. The appellant resisted arrest and attempted to escape custody. After he was arrested the police determined his blood alcohol level was 0.172 per cent. When asked his reasons for breaching the domestic violence order, the appellant replied ‘it was her choice’. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of one count of breaching the good behaviour bond, one count of breaching the domestic violence order and one count of resisting arrest. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to 21 days’ imprisonment, 21 days’ imprisonment and seven days’ imprisonment, respectively. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, with the total effective sentence of 21 days’ imprisonment.
The appellant had previously breached the good behaviour bond and received a warning. He had also been convicted of breaching the domestic violence order, assault and aggravated assault.
Issue: Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
The magistrate erred in imposing a term of imprisonment for the breach of the good behaviour bond. Although there had been two breaches of the bond, Blokland J held that without knowing additional information on the initial breach that received a warning, imprisonment could not be justified for the breach in question. The sentence of 21 days’ imprisonment was therefore manifestly excessive and ordered to be set aside.
The magistrate also erred in imposing a term of 21 days’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order. Blokland J recognised that this was the appellant’s second breach of the domestic violence order. However, although the protected persons were placed in fear, no harm resulted from the breach. Therefore, the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The appellant was re-sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment for the breach of the domestic violence order and seven days’ imprisonment for resisting arrest to be served concurrently. When considering the circumstances of the offence, a short term of imprisonment was justified under s 121 Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT). Blokland J emphasised the appellant’s blood alcohol reading was significant and whilst he pleaded guilty, it was not an immediate plea ([25]). Blokland J refused to suspend the sentence when considering the appellant’s history of offending and the need for personal deterrence. No further sentence was imposed for breach of the good behaviour bond, as the breach occurred out of the same conduct as the breach of domestic violence order.
Walker v Verity [2010] NTSC 68 (7 December 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Multiple breach charges’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Victim’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order (6 counts), threatening to kill with intent to cause fear, resisting arrest, unlawfully assault of a police officer in the execution of duty, behaving in a disorderly manner, unlawfully possessing cannabis
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order in force to protect his daughter (the victim). The order restricted the appellant, among other conditions, from approaching, contacting or remaining in the company of the victim or at any place where the victim resided, worked or stayed while consuming or under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating drug or substance. After consuming alcohol one day, the appellant sent a text to the victim (charge 1). He then resent this message four times before going to the victim’s home (charge 2). The victim was not home, but the appellant waited several hours for her to return (charge 3). After the victim left her home, the appellant rang the victim and swore at her (charge 4). The appellant eventually left the victim’s home after being asked several times only to return several hours later. The appellant then scratched the victim’s face (charge 5) and said ‘I love you, but I want to kill you’ (charge 6). He subsequently called her again and blamed the victim for his arrest (charge 8). Charge 7 was not referred to or specified.
In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and convicted of (inter alia) 6 counts of breaching a domestic violence order (charges 1-5, 8) and threatening to kill with intent to cause fear (charge 6), resisting arrest, unlawfully assaulting a police officer in the execution of duty, behaving in a disorderly manner, and unlawfully possessing cannabis. The appellant was sentenced on charges 1 to 4, to a fine of $1000; on charges 5 and 8, to 12 weeks’ imprisonment; and on charge 6, to 12 weeks’ imprisonment, each to be served concurrently with the aggregate sentence on charges 5 and 8.
In the victim impact statement, the victim explained the physical and emotional injuries she suffered as a result of her father’s domestic violence ([27]). However, the victim expressed her wish that the appellant be ordered into rehabilitation rather than sentenced to imprisonment. The magistrate did not mention this wish of the victim in his sentencing remarks.
Issues:
•
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to take into account the victim’s wishes as expressed in the victim impact statement; and
•
Whether the sentences imposed for charges 5, 6 and 8 were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
The magistrate did not err by merely failing to expressly refer to the victim impact statement. The magistrate was informed that the appellant had previously unsuccessfully attempted rehabilitation in the only two rehabilitation programs available to non-Indigenous males in the Northern Territory. Further, the victim’s wishes for the appellant not to be imprisoned should not have carried great weight when considering the aggravating factor of the appellant’s extensive offending history, and the need for specific and general deterrence. Barr J concluded that in domestic violence cases, the importance of general deterrence likely overrides any forgiveness on the part of the victim ([40-41]).
•
The effective sentence of 12 weeks’ imprisonment for charges 5, 6 and 8 was not manifestly excessive in the circumstances. The magistrate was entitled to regard charges 5, 6 and 8 as serious. Further, the magistrate gave due consideration to the appellant’s previous history of offending, including a previous threat to kill, offences of physical violence, and numerous breaches of domestic violence orders. The appellant established no error by the magistrate in sentencing, nor that theeffective sentence was manifestly excessive. Therefore, both grounds failed and the appeal was dismissed.
AB v Northern Territory of Australia [2010] NTSC 8 (18 March 2010) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Compensation to victim’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Unlawfully causing serious harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault, unlawfully causing serious harm, rape
Appeal type: Appeal against amount of compensation ordered for victim
Facts: The appellant and the offender were living together in a domestic relationship. On the first occasion, the offender assaulted the appellant with a curtain rod, causing severe lacerations to her head, arms and body, substantial blood loss, broken teeth, and swelling and bruising to her face and lower back. In relation to this conduct, the offender was charged with aggravated assault. The appellant was again assaulted by the offender several weeks later, resulting in a fractured clavicle. The pattern of assaults continued when approximately three months later the offender followed the victim home, dragged her outside, bashed her with a stick and fists, verbally abused her and raped her twice. As a result, the victim suffered extensive injuries to her face and scalp, a fractured jaw and bruises all over her body. The offender was found guilty of unlawfully causing serious harm to the victim and two counts of sexual intercourse without consent.
The victim made an application for compensation under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) (the Act) and was awarded $35,000 for the compensable violent act, as determined by an assessor. She subsequently appealed to the Local Court on the basis that the compensation awarded was inadequate when considering the injuries suffered. It was argued that the respondent erred in considering the three incidents constituted a single violent act and in failing to assess her psychological injuries. Alternatively, it was argued that the respondent erred in determining the award quantum under Schedule 3, Part 1(c) of the Act.
Issue: Several questions of law were reserved for the Supreme Court including:
•
Were the criminal acts committed against the appellant on the three separate days a single violent act for the purposes of s 5 of the Act?
•
Does s 25 of the Act prevent the appellant from obtaining an assessment for psychological injury?
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J first detailed the operation of the Act and its application to victims of domestic violence ([9]-[44]).
•
Kelly J answered this question in the negative. Section 5(4) of the Act provides that a series of related criminal acts constitutes a single violent act. Whether the three assaults constituted a series of related criminal acts depended on whether they could be said to ‘occur over a period of time’ under s 5(3)(b(ii). For this to be the case, the criminal acts must have been continuing in the sense of forming a single episode of offending. The assaults committed by Mr Barnes occurred months apart and each resulted in separate injuries. Therefore, the three sets of criminal acts were not committed ‘over a period of time’ within the meaning of s 5(3)(b)(ii).
•
Nothing in s 25 prevents the appellant from obtaining compensation for psychological or psychiatric injury suffered as a result of the assaults. The first two assaults are not ‘compensable violent acts’ within the Act however the appellant is entitled to claim an award for the ‘compensable injuries’ suffered as a result of those acts. As these offences are not included in Schedule 2 to the Regulations, she could only include a psychological or psychiatric injury as one of the three compensable injuries under Regulation 18 Victims of Crime Assistance Regulations (NT) if the recognisable psychological or psychiatric disorder was severely disabling (Reg 15(2)). The third incident involving raping the appellant is a compensable violent act and therefore she could apply for an award for the assault per se (s 10(4)(a)(i)) or an award for compensable injuries suffered as a result of the violent act. The appellant chose to do the latter, and therefore the assessor was obliged to take into account all of her injuries including any psychological or psychiatric disorders that resulted from the attack as part of the common law assessment of damages.
Midjumbani v Moore [2009] NTSC 27 (26 June 2009) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Gender of offender’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order that restrained her from contacting or approaching her former partner (the victim) directly or indirectly while intoxicated, among other restrictions. On the day of offending, the appellant went to the victim’s home while intoxicated, verbally abused him and threatened to arrange for the victim to be harmed and killed. Approximately two hours later, the appellant returned and threatened that her family would kill the victim. She then picked up a large rock causing the victim to retreat back inside his home. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged, pleaded guilty and convicted of two counts of breaching a domestic violence order. She was sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment on each charge, to be served concurrently.
The appellant had previously been convicted of breaching a domestic violence order, possession of cannabis, and two offences involving being armed with an offensive weapon. In support of the appellant, it was submitted she occasionally cared for the victim who was suffering from cancer, she entered an early plea of guilty and she had shown remorse.
Issues: The grounds of appeal were:
•
The magistrate erred in interpreting s 121(3) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) and failed to consider whether ‘particular circumstances’ existed under s 121(3)(b);
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive; and
•
The magistrate failed to properly consider the gender of the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Section 121 of the Act must be read altogether. Subject to s 121(3), a court must record a conviction and sentence a person to at least seven days’ imprisonment if that person has previously been found guilty of breaching a domestic violence order. This mandatory minimum sentence will always apply unless no harm has been caused to the victim: s 121(3)(a). If harm is not caused, the court must consider the particular circumstances of the offence to determine if it is appropriate to record a conviction and sentence the person to at least seven days’ imprisonment: s 121(3)(b). The magistrate did not err in its interpretation or application of this provision.
•
The magistrate did not err in sentencing the appellant in accordance with s 121 of the Act. However, Riley J noted that even if he did find error he would not have interfered with the sentence imposed. The sentence of seven days to be served concurrently for each breach of the domestic violence order was appropriate. The appellant failed to establish that the magistrate erred in sentencing or that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive.
•
The appellant submitted that the magistrate failed to properly consider her gender as a female. Riley J did not accept that the gender of the offender is a relevant matter that should have been taken into consideration by the magistrate.
Norris v Sanderson [2007] NTSC 1 (12 January 2007) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle in relation to sentencing.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Offending while on bail’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful damage’
Charges: Unlawful damage, breach of domestic violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order to protect his girlfriend (the victim) made under the repealed Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT). He had a history of repeatedly breaching domestic violence orders both in relation to the victim and a previous girlfriend. The offending subject to the appeal was constituted by a series of events. On the first occasion the appellant went to visit the victim. In an attempt to prevent him from entering, the victim locked the door. As a result, the appellant punched the front window causing it to shatter and kicked the security door (count 1). A few days later the appellant telephoned the victim and then approached her at a nightclub (counts 2 and 3). He was subsequently arrested and granted bail. While on bail he again breached the domestic violence order by driving with the victim (count 4). He was arrested and remanded in custody only to be released on bail again. One month later he drove to the victim’s house, entered her front yard and yelled and swore at the victim (count 5). In relation to this conduct, the appellant was charged and convicted of one count of unlawful damage (count 1) and four counts of breaching a domestic violence order (counts 2-5). The effective sentence imposed by the magistrate was 140 days’ imprisonment, of which 70 days’ were suspended upon conditions providing for supervision. This comprised of:
•
Count 1: 60 days’ imprisonment
•
Counts 2 and 3: 30 days’ imprisonment, 20 days to be concurrent on the sentenced imposed on count 1
•
Count 4: 30 days’ imprisonment cumulative upon counts 1-3, wholly suspended on commencement
•
Count 5: 40 days’ imprisonment cumulative upon counts 1-3, wholly suspended on commencement
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The magistrate did not err in his considerations and the sentence imposed was open to him to make.
The offending in relation to count 1 was made more serious when considering the surrounding circumstances of the offending. The appellant’s response to being locked out by the victim was an ‘immediate, frightening and explosive outburst of violence’ ([19]). While the appellant did not have any prior convictions for unlawful damage, he had several convictions for offences of violence and it was the violent nature of this conduct that made the offending so serious in the circumstances.
In relation to the breaches of the domestic violence order, the submission that the magistrate placed too much weight on the appellant’s criminal history was rejected. The prior convictions provided context for the offending and highlighted the culpability of the appellant. The appellant’s counsel also submitted the appellant had good prospects of rehabilitating when considering, amongst other factors, his youth, willingness to undertake counselling, good employment record and the ongoing support of the victim. While the magistrate regarded the appellant’s chances of rehabilitation with caution, he nonetheless considered these relevant factors and did not err in doing so.
The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had a total of 11 prior convictions for failing to comply with a domestic violence order and one prior conviction of aggravated assault. Despite this history, he continued to act in defiance of the orders with full awareness of the consequences. This conflicts with the objective that victims ‘have confidence that restraining orders made are backed by penalties that will be applied in the event of a breach’ ([33]). In the circumstances of this prior offending, a period of imprisonment was reasonable to deter the appellant and others from committing such offences.
Hales v Stevens [2000] NTSC 97 (14 December 2000) – Northern Territory Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intermediate sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Appeal type: Crown appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and the victim had previously been in a relationship. After the relationship ended, the respondent visited the victim’s home where he punched her in the head 10 times, kicked her in the ribs and chest several times and pushed her head into the floor. After the victim temporarily escaped to another room, the respondent struck her again several times and subsequently attempted to strangle her, placing one hand around her throat and the other over her mouth and nose. The attack lasted for approximately 20 minutes and involved about 30 punches. At the time of the offending, the respondent was on bail. In relation to this conduct the respondent was convicted of aggravated assault under s 188(2)(b) Criminal Code 1983 (NT), with the circumstances of aggravation that the victim suffered harm, the assault was of male-on-female, and the victim was under the age of 16 years old.
The magistrate, in taking a ‘rehabilitative course’ ([5]), sentenced the respondent to 12 months’ imprisonment suspended the day after imprisonment commenced for 3 years. The release of the respondent was subject to conditions including that he obey the directions of the Director of Correctional Services for 12 months, that he reside at the Council for Aboriginal Alcohol Program Services and complete the Indigenous Family Violence Program, that he then live with the Salvation Army in Darwin and complete the Bridge program, and that for a period of 12 months he supply urine or blood samples to be tested for drugs.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the appellant was resentenced.
The circumstances of the offence were very serious and resulted in severe physical and psychological harm to the victim. This was further aggravated by the fact the offending occurred while the respondent was on bail in relation to another assault.
The magistrate’s consideration of the respondent’s chances of rehabilitation and personal hardships was appropriate in the circumstances. The respondent had been attending alcohol and drug education programs and had enrolled in the Indigenous Family Violence Program. According to the magistrate, this was the first step along the road to rehabilitation.
However, the magistrate did not expressly address the issue of deterrence that ought to have been afforded significant weight in sentencing. Despite the guilty plea, there was no indication of remorse with the respondent telling his psychologist he believed he ‘had a degree of legitimacy’ ([22]) for his actions. Therefore, Riley J considered there was a need for specific deterrence. In addition there was a need for general deterrence: ‘Men in the position of the respondent should be aware that if they resort to violence upon another… in all but the most exceptional case that will be met with a period of actual imprisonment ([24]).’ While the magistrate impliedly considered specific deterrence with rehabilitation, there was no consideration of general deterrence during sentencing. The magistrate’s main focus was to provide the respondent every opportunity to be rehabilitated. Riley J concluded that the magistrate erred in neglecting to consider the need for general deterrence and the respondent’s lack of remorse.
The sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was not in itself manifestly inadequate. However, it was manifestly inadequate to suspend the sentence from one day after commencing imprisonment. In the circumstance, a term of actual imprisonment was required. Riley J resentenced the respondent to 12 months’ imprisonment to be suspended after 3 months. The respondent’s release was subject to several conditions, including accepting supervision and obeying reasonable directions of the Director of Correctional Services as to reporting, residence, employment and counselling for a period of 12 months and completing the Bridge program with the Salvation Army.
Coroners Court
Inquest into the Death of HD (Name Suppressed) [2021] NTLC 029 – Northern Territory Coroners Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling and/or jealous behaviour’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours by the perpetrator’ – ‘Coroner's inquest’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Proceedings: Coroner’s Inquest.
Facts: An inquest was conducted into the death of a 38-year-old woman, whose partner was a police officer. NT Police did not declare a crime scene in relation to the victim’s death as they believed the cause of her death to be an overdose: [92]. However, there was a significant history of domestic violence, which justified further investigation. The coroner concluded that the cause of death was not substance abuse but a subdural haemorrhage that had begun bleeding three to five days prior to her death, which requires some form of trauma, likely a hit to the head: [66]–[67]. In the five years prior, seventeen complaints had been made to the police of domestic disturbances and violence in her relationship: [8].
The victim had previously been a police officer: [3]. During her relationship with another police officer, she went into labour at 21.5 weeks gestation and her baby passed away, leading to post-traumatic stress-disorder that was never resolved: [5]. After she conceived again, she became dependent on alcohol due to this PTSD: [6]. Due to her alcohol dependence, she was subsequently dismissed as a police officer: [7].
The seventeen reported instances of domestic violence demonstrate a pattern of coercive control by the police officer: [70]. His abuse of the victim was both psychological and physical. Physical violence and domestic disturbances were reported by doctors ([9], [39]), neighbours ([14]–[15], [21], [31]), the victim herself ([16],[36]), rehabilitation providers and services ([18], [37]), bystanders ([23]) and police officers ([32]), as well as the victim’s cousin ([11]), friend ([13]) and coworkers ([48], [53]). These reports included explicit reports of physical violence against the victim: [13], [14], [18], [29], [31], [32], [40], [49]. Co-workers reported to police that the partner had threatened to kill the victim with a knife: [49].
In one of the earliest instances of reported abuse, a protection order was issued against the victim for the protection of her partner and children. No protection order was taken out to protect the victim: [11]. The victim repeatedly refused to give statements or pursue action against her partner: [10], [18], [2]. She repeatedly went back and forth in relation to statements, downplaying previous reports of violence or reneging on them: [19], [22], [36]. She would refuse to explain injuries or would explain them using a fall: [29], [30], [32], [36]. She sought a protection order application but decided not to proceed within a month of initiating that request: [16]–[17]. One aspect of this was that she thought police would do nothing because her partner is a police officer: [51].
The victim’s partner used the victim’s alcoholism as a reason for justifying coercion. He provided stories to the police that focused on her intoxication and that explained his violence using narratives that put the blame on the victim such as using a narrative of self-defence: [14], [19], [42]. He tracked the victim’s social media accounts and sought to control her through constant messaging: [70]–[71]. He repeatedly stalked her and tried to follow her when she attempted to leave him, for example, when she was visiting her father and also when she was at work: [51]. The victim’s partner also used systems abuse against her. For example, he took her to the police station and demanded that she be breached for being intoxicated. At this time she had a wound to the left side of her forehead that was not noted as a potential domestic violence risk: [28].
Decision and Reasoning: The Coroner found that the cause of the victim’s death was ‘subdural haemmorhage in the context of chronic alcoholism due to post traumatic stress disorder after the death of her first-born child’: [94]. He referred his belief that offences may have been committed in connection with the death: [99].
The Coroner also made four recommendations to improve the handling of domestic violence involving police officers: that the Assistant Commissioner responsible for the Domestic and Family Violence Unit oversee all complaints of domestic violence involving police officers ([95]), that processes and procedures be implemented to allow investigating officers to have access to all relevant history and prior matters in relation to investigation of domestic violence ([96]), that all police officers have training and information available to them allowing in the identification of ‘red flags’ for coercive control’ ([97]) and that a risk assessment tool be developed to identify physical and non-physical aspects of domestic and family violence ([98]).
The following extract provides an example of the way in which the deceased’s vulnerabilities were used by the partner to justify his controlling behaviour:
[70] HD’s partner was from time to time said to be manipulative and controlling. When questioned about his controlling ways he generally indicated that HD was an alcoholic and he needed to know where she was to either stop her drinking or so as to assist her when she was intoxicated. It appeared to explain his tracking her phone. Her alcoholism was provided as the reason he removed her from the house or used force to keep her there. The same might be said when he escorted her to the police station and asked that her bail be breached for drinking. Perhaps it might be seen in his insistence that he pick her up from work or when he intercepted her at the bus stop.
[71] It is difficult however to see her alcoholism as the reason for him reading her texts and having access to her social media accounts. There are instances where he attempted to warn off a person he thought she was having an affair with using her own Messenger account. It also doesn’t explain the constant messaging and telephone calls when she was with her father in Queensland. It appears they were more to do with his belief that she may be talking to another male.
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Inkamala v An Assessor under s 24 of the Victims of Crime Act [2022] NTCAT 20 (8 December 2022) – Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Complex post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Consultant psychiatrist evidence’ – ‘Contributory negligence’ – ‘Financial assistance’ – ‘Learned helplessness’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Victims of crime’
Matter: Application for review of a decision to award the applicant financial assistance of $13,170.99 under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2006 (NT) arising from injuries sustained by the applicant as a result of violent acts committed by her sometime domestic partner.
Facts: The applicant is a Western Arrarnta woman who is a “deeply traumatised survivor of sustained, repeated and brutal intimate partner violence” which resulted in two children (now teenagers) and numerous incidents of violence resulting in medical or hospital treatment, numerous protection orders to protect the applicant from the offender and numerous sentences of imprisonment imposed on the offender. Many of the documented offences occurred when either or both of the offender and applicant were intoxicated. In 2010 the applicant was awarded $18,750 for physical injuries (partial loss of vision, fractured forearm, scarring to the right arm) caused by the offender between 2006 and 2009.
A second application was received on 18 December 2014 in relation to physical injuries from assaults by the offender on about 3 occasions, which was amended on 15 January 2015 to include a claim for psychological or psychiatric injuries. The claim took seven years to process, and the offender continued to assault the applicant causing the claim to continue to increase. A consultant psychiatrist provided reports and it was not in dispute that the applicant has sustained a Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (CPTSD) and a Major Depressive Disorder “as a direct result of domestic violence perpetrated buy the offender between 2006 and 2020”, attributing 30 per cent of the CPTSD to the assaults between 2006 and 2009 and 70 per cent to the assaults between 2009 and 2020 [12]. The initial assessment awarded the applicant $13,170.99, with the amount awarded for her physical and psychological injuries reduced by 50 per cent due to the applicant’s contribution to the injuries.
Grounds:
1.
The initial assessment of $35,000 for psychiatric or psychological disorder is inadequate;
2.
the award of $110.99 for financial loss is inadequate; and
3.
the reduction of 50% of the compensation for injuries is excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
The decision of the respondent to award the applicant $13,170.99 be set aside.
2.
An award of $21,006.99 to the applicant be substituted.
[63] The Victorian Court of Appeal has recently described battered wife syndrome as “a learned helplessness process in which women who have been abused repeatedly within a relationship they believe they cannot escape from, learn ‘good coping skills as a trade-off for escape.’
Battered woman syndrome is a subset of PTSD. The label “battered wife syndrome” has not been applied to the applicant in this case. However, in my view the evidence supports a finding that the applicant, who has sustained CPTSD as a result of violence perpetrated against her by a coercively controlling partner over many years, is likely a person whose behaviour in repeatedly returning to live with the offender is in large part due to learned helplessness. Accordingly, this case is to be distinguished on its facts from Lankin v Northern Territory of Australia [(Local Court of the Northern Territory, unreported case number 21337307, 1 September 2015].
[64] In her written submissions on behalf of the respondent and the intervener, Ms Thompson submits that the applicant “willingly recommenced her relationship with the offender at various times”. I reject that submission. I am satisfied that the applicant recommenced her relationship with the offender reluctantly and unwillingly, and that her decisions to do so were to a significant extent a consequence of the psychological injury the offender had inflicted on her.
[65] In my opinion, a reduction of 50% of the award to which the applicant is entitled would be unfair and inequitable. The offender and the applicant are not equally culpable or responsible for the injuries she sustained. I consider that the applicant’s behaviour in resuming her relationship with the victim and engaging in the harmful consumption of liquor contributed indirectly to her injuries. In my view, a fair and equitable apportionment of responsibility for the applicant’s injuries is to attribute the offender’s responsibility as being 80%, and the applicant’s as 20%. I find accordingly.”
Queensland
Court of Appeal
R v CDO [2025] QCA 56 (17 April 2025) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Stalking’ - ‘breach of domestic violence order (DVO)’ - ‘contravention of police protection notice’ - ‘application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘double punishment’ - ‘whether conduct constituted the same act or omission’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: Unlawful stalking with a circumstance of aggravation (x1)
Facts: The applicant had pleaded guilty to the stalking offence in the District Court. Prior to this, the applicant pleaded guilty (and was sentenced) to 3 offences of contravening a domestic violence order and one offence of contravening a police protection notice (the Orders) in the Ipswich Magistrates Court. On appeal, the applicant alleged that because the Magistrates Court offences constituted the same factual basis for the District Court stalking offence, punishing him for the stalking offence would constitute double punishment.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant relied on a sole ground of appeal:
•
That the learned sentencing judge erred in ruling that the sentence would not doubly punish the defendant contrary to s 16 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (the Code) [4].
Chronology : There were multiple applications under s 590AA of the Code (pre-trial directions and rulings). The first application was to narrow the prosecution’s particulars of the stalking offence, on the basis that the particulars for that offence coincided with the particulars of the other offences applicant previously pleaded guilty to in the Ipswich Magistrates Court [17]. The first application was refused [22]. The applicant reagitated the issue in a subsequent application [24]. The second application was partly successful in the sense that while the conducting constituting the stalking offence was found to be distinct from the conduct at issue earlier in the Magistrates Court, punishment for the circumstance of aggravation (i.e. being in breach of the Orders) would be double punishment prohibited by s 16 of the Code [31].
Decision and reasoning : The Court held that s 16 of the Code does not apply to the offence of unlawful stalking in this instance [75]. The Court held that s 16 did apply to the circumstance of aggravation (which was the fact that the conduct constituting the stalking had breached the Orders) [70], so that the applicant could not be punished again for those breaches. The application for leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed [76].
The reason that s 16 did not apply was because, in relation to the stalking offence, the punishable acts constituted a connected series of acts [61]. This was contrasted with the individual acts upon which the breaches of the Orders were established. In the Court’s words, “[t]he stalking offence did not depend on the individual conduct alone, constituting each of the Magistrate Court offences, but on the connection and accumulation of acts along with a specific outcome” [62].
R v JAL [2025] QCA 17 (28 February 2025) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Choking’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘inconsistent verdicts’ - ‘credibility’ - ‘appeal against conviction’ - ‘delay in reporting’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: Choking in a domestic relationship (x1).
Facts: The complainant and the appellant had known each other for about 20 years and were married in 2005. They divorced in 2019. The complainant recalled an incident that occurred shortly after she had informed the appellant that she wanted to separate. She was sleeping, and woke up to the feeling of a hand on her throat and a little pulling of her hair. She then felt her throat being squeezed and pressure being applied for 3 to 4 seconds, during which time she struggled to breathe. She woke up to find it was the appellant. He immediately let go, and she sat up and asked why he had done that. She did not give an account of an answer. She told the appellant she had not given him permission to do that.
When asked about her delay in reporting choking (one year) the complainant stated the change was due to years of counselling and that she now “felt safe”. [50]
Grounds of Appeal : The appellant was convicted at trial by a jury of choking in a domestic setting. The appellant relied on two grounds of appeal:
(a)
That the verdict was unreasonable because it was not supported by evidence [21].
1.
In respect of this ground of appeal, the appellant pointed to specific parts of the complainant’s evidence such as the inconsistencies as to the dates on which the choking incident occurred; the cheery tone of a text message she sent on the same day as the choking; the failure to complain of the incident to a doctor or during Family Court proceedings [117].
(b)
The guilty verdict was consistent with the not guilty verdicts on two other counts (wilful damage and assault occasioning bodily harm, while armed) [21].
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed.
The Court was not persuaded that it was not open to the jury on the whole of the evidence to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt on count 1, nor that it was not open to the jury to acquit the appellant on counts 2 and 4 [128]. The Court found it reasonable that the jury could have not been satisfied that the elements of counts 2 and 4 were established beyond reasonable doubt, without completely rejecting the complainant’s evidence [111], [103]. The Court pointed out that in relation to both counts 2 and 4, the jury had to be satisfied that the appellant had the relevant intent, which may have been the stumbling block for those counts [108], [109].
The Court noted that the jury had had the benefit of seeing and hearing the complainant who was the subject of skilled and intense cross-examination [127]. The jury also had the benefit of judicial instructions to consider whether the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence affected the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s evidence [127].
R v MEJ [2024] QCA 249 (10 December 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘People with children’
Charges:
•
Count 1: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm, whilst armed with a dangerous weapon (knife).
•
Count 2: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with an offensive instrument (bottle).
•
Count 3: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with a dangerous instrument (pliers).
•
Count 4: held a loaded rifle under her chin, with the act likely to cause her to fear bodily harm.
•
Count 5: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (stomped on her throat).
•
Count 6: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (twisted ankle).
•
Count 7: unlawfully assaulted the complainant (punched and kicked her when she refused to participate in sexual interactions).
•
Count 8: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm, whilst armed with an offensive instrument (plastic chair).
•
Count 9: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm (pushed from behind).
•
Count 10: unlawfully assaulted the complainant and did her bodily harm whilst armed with a dangerous weapon (sword).
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The case involves allegations of domestic violence by the appellant (MEJ) against the complainant, his de-facto partner (with whom he had three children), spanning nearly a decade (2004-2013). The complainant alleged repeated assaults, often involving weapons and household objects, leading to bodily harm.
The key incidents included:
•
Count 1: The appellant allegedly cut the complainants left jawbone with a knife.
•
Count 2: The appellant allegedly threw a bottle, at her, striking her head and causing it to bleed.
•
Count 3: The appellant allegedly accused the complainant of infidelity and then gripped the flesh of her left upper arm in the jaws of a pair of pliers, twisting them to cause bruising and grazing.
•
Count 4 (Acquitted): The appellant allegedly held a loaded rifle under her chin, with the intention of making her fear bodily harm.
•
Count 5 (Acquitted): After the complainant allegedly refused to give the appellant her phone PIN, he threw her to the floor and stomped on her throat, restricting her breathing and leaving footprints on her neck.
•
Count 6: While the complainant was putting their children to bed, the appellant allegedly yelled at her, pushed her onto the bed, grabbed her ankle and twisted it until it cracked.
•
Count 7: The appellant allegedly punched and kicked the complainant, leaving welts on her legs, after she refused to participate in sexual interactions with a female friend.
•
Count 8: The appellant allegedly threw a plastic chair at the complainant’s face, damaging her front teeth, breaking one and causing pain and bleeding.
•
Count 9: The appellant allegedly pushed the complainant from behind, causing her head to strike a shelf and resulting in a forehead cut.
•
Count 10: The appellant allegedly knocked the complainant into a wall and held a sword to her throat, causing a graze.
The jury found the appellant guilty of counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 10, acquitting him on counts 4, 5 and 9.
Grounds of appeal :
1.
The verdicts are unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the whole of the evidence.
2.
The verdicts of guilty are unreasonable due to their inconsistency with the acquittals.
3.
The verdicts on one of the counts of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed and one of the counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, cannot be supported by the evidence, as they were not proven to have occurred on or within the dates charged.
4.
The trial judge’s written directions to the jury erred at law in respect of the offences involving the use of a weapon.
5.
The trial judge failed to give a direction to the jury as to how to use the complainant’s prior consistent and inconsistent statements.
6.
The trial judge failed to give any or an adequate warning against propensity reasoning, to guard against a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and reasoning : The Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ and Boddice JA and Doyle AJA) allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10, and ordered a new trial.
Grounds upheld:
•
Ground 4 (erroneous jury directions): The appellant argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the element of being “armed with a dangerous or offensive weapon” in Counts 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10. The written jury directions incorrectly stated that this element was “not in dispute,” implying that the appellant was armed, rather than only acknowledging that the specified objects were capable of being classified as weapons. This error was reinforced in the oral summing up, particularly for Count 1, where the judge explicitly stated that the appellant was armed with a knife, misrepresenting the defence argument, which denied both the assault and the weapon’s use. While similar wording was used for Counts 2, 3, 8, and 10, it may have led the jury to wrongly assume the only issue in dispute was whether the appellant inflicted harm, not whether he was actually armed. The Court found this misdirection prejudicial, as it created a real chance of affecting the verdicts. The error constituted a miscarriage of justice, warranting the appeal’s success on this ground [77].
Grounds not considered:
•
Ground 5 and 6: As Ground 4 was upheld, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on Grounds 5 and 6. However, in a new trial, the judge may need to consider directions on consistent and inconsistent statements, as well as a warning against propensity reasoning [79].
Ground dismissed:
•
Ground 1 (unreasonable verdicts): The appellant contended that the guilty verdicts were unsupported by evidence, as the complainant’s testimony was the only direct evidence of the offences. While inconsistencies existed, the Court found the complainant’s core allegations remained consistent across Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10, allowing the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt [56].
•
Ground 2 (inconsistent verdicts): The appellant argued the mixed verdicts were illogical, given his acquittal on some counts and conviction on others. The Court rejected this, finding a rational basis for the differing outcomes [59]. The acquittals on Counts 4 and 5 were justified, police found no rifle (Count 4) and the complainant’s delayed recall of steel-capped boots (Count 5) may have raised doubt [60]. For Count 9, the complainant’s account was consistent, but the jury may have questioned whether photos showed a scar [61]. In contrast, the guilty verdicts on Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 10 reflected the jury’s confidence in the core allegations. Since each charge was considered separately, the verdicts were neither illogical nor unreasonable.
•
Ground 3 (date of offending not proven): The appellant claimed the evidence did not establish Count 3 (pliers incident) within the specified date range. However, the complainant's chronological testimony, supported by formal admissions regarding residence dates, aligned with the charge period. The Court concluded it was open to the jury to find the offence occurred within the alleged timeframe, dismissing the ground [67].
CDL v Commissioner of Police [2024] QCA 245 (6 December 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’– ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (x5).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The applicant, CDL, was in a two-and-a-half-year relationship with the complainant. On 24 March 2022, a domestic violence protection order (‘DVO’) was imposed against him. This order required CDL to be of good behaviour towards the complainant and not commit domestic violence. The DVO was subsequently varied twice to prohibit contact and impose a 100-metre distance restriction. The order remained in force until 24 March 2027. Before the offences in this case, CDL had breached the DVO 13 times between March 2022 and February 2024, leading to multiple convictions. For these breaches, CDL was fined and sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment, including a six-month sentence on 12 February 2024, with parole granted on 9 April 2024.
In the current case, CDL The case concerned five additional breaches of the same DVO:
1.
15 December 2023 – Visited the complainant’s home after she initially invited him but revoked the invitation
2.
5-12 January 2024 – Called the complainant 55 times, leaving abusive voice messages.
3.
5-12 January 2024 – Called the complainant 55 times, leaving abusive voice messages.
4.
11 January 2024 – Sent five abusive text messages.
5.
10 April 2024 – One day after release on parole, called the complainant three times, threatening her by stating “you are f***ed and I am coming to get you” and “you know who this is” (before hanging up).
6.
22-25 April 2024 – Visited the complainant’s home, engaged in sexual intercourse, and recorded it. The complainant later sent recordings to a third party, who reported it to police.
CDL was arrested on 27 April 2024 and remained in custody for 70 days before being sentenced on 5 July 2024.
Procedural history :
•
Magistrate Court: Imposed a two-year head sentence (on the final charge) to reflect the combined criminality of all five breaches, given CDL’s persistent non-compliance and the fact he offended while on parole.
•
District Court Appeal: CDL argued manifest excess and factual errors. Judge Clare SC upheld the sentence, emphasizing CDL’s “sustained contempt” for DVOs and the need for deterrence [8].
Grounds of appeal : CDL sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on two grounds:
1.
The applicant contended that the District Court judge (Judge Clare SC) erred in failing to find that two years’ imprisonment was not excessive, having regard to the totality of the applicant’s offending.
2.
The applicant argued that her Honour erred by failing to find that the sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending conduct, due to the sentencing Magistrate placing too much emphasis on the applicant’s criminal history.
Decision and reasoning : The Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ and Boddice and Brown JJA) refused the application for leave to appeal.
Ground 1 (manifestly excessive sentence):
The Court reiterated that an appellate court will not intervene merely because a more lenient sentence could have been imposed. It must be shown the sentence was so unreasonable as to suggest an error in principle (Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584 at 605 [58]) [53]. Referring to R v Wood [1994] QCA 297 and R v Fairbrother; Ex parte A-G [2005] QCA 105, the Court emphasised DVOs must be enforced with “appropriate severity” to maintain their protective function and to protect victims. [24]
CDL argued there was no physical violence occurred in the breaches. The Court, however, emphasised that the seriousness of threats, particularly a menacing phone call one day after parole, the four prior, shorter sentences which had failed to deter CDL and the escalating non-compliance justified the sentence. [21]
The Court examined similar District Court cases with like offending, the Court distinguished CDL’s history as more persistent and escalatory than those cases. Given his repeated disregard for the DVO, a two-year term was within the appropriate range [23-25].
The Court concluded the overall sentence was not manifestly excessive and was “open” on the facts and was justified given the statutory maximum of five years. [26
Ground 2 (sentence disproportionate to gravity of offending):
The Court cited Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477, affirming that while sentencing must reflect the gravity of the current offences, a court can properly increase the penalty if an offender’s record shows “a continuing attitude of disobedience”.
CDL’s 18 total breaches (13 prior + 5 new) indicated an “entrenched disregard” for the DVO, justifying a longer sentence when lesser penalties had proven inadequate [62]. The Court found CDL’s repeated breaches demonstrated ongoing contempt for court orders, reinforcing the need for retribution, deterrence, and community protection [65]. The two-year sentence was not a fresh penalty for past offences but a measured response to CDL’s escalating recidivism. The Court rejected the argument that too much weight was placed on past offending. Deterrence and public protection justified the sentence imposed.
The Court of Appeal found no error on either ground. Leave to appeal was refused.
R v RBO [2024] QCA 214 (8 November 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’
Charges: The appellant stood trial for seven alleged offences of domestic violence upon his wife. The verdicts and charges were:
•
Count 1: rape (not guilty)
•
Count 2: assault occasioning bodily harm (guilty)
•
Count 3: common assault (guilty)
•
Count 4: assault occasioning bodily harm (guilty)
•
Count 5: common assault (guilty)
•
Count 6: assault occasioning bodily harm (not guilty)
•
Count 7:: common assault (not guilty)
Case type: Appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The appellant, RBO, was convicted of four assaults against his wife and was acquitted of three other charges.
The complainant and the appellant were married in 2011 and had three children. Their relationship was marked by a history of domestic violence, including verbal degradation, physical violence, controlling behaviour, financial restriction and sexual aggression. They separated in 2019
The charged assaults occurred in a single episode on 1 August 2019. The appellant discovered the complainant had withdrawn $160 from a bank account without telling him. After the complainant went to bed that night, the appellant discovered she had the money and became enraged. In a sequence of four physical assaults, the appellant:
•
Count 2: Forced open a barricaded bedroom door and pushed the complainant, causing her to fall into and break a chest of drawers.
•
Count 3: Pushed her forcefully in the back as she tried to leave, causing her to hit a bookcase.
•
Count 4: Pushed her again, causing her to step on broken glass, cutting her foot.
•
Count 5: Pushed her out the sliding door, making her fall onto the concrete patio.
These events were partly witnessed by their daughter (aged 7). Injuries were medically verified the next day. The police were called by a neighbour and took photographs at the scene.
The other allegations on which the appellant was acquitted included:
•
Count 1: The complainant alleged she awoke during an incident in July 2018 to find the appellant having sex with her while unconscious. The jury acquitted, likely due to uncertainty about the date and lack of corroboration.
•
Count 6 & 7: The complainant alleged that the appellant stomped on her ankle and later slammed her head into a wall during the 1 August 2019 episode. The jury acquitted, possibly due to inconsistencies, lack of corroboration and an absence of physical evidence.
Grounds of appeal :
1.
Appeal against conviction: on the ground that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
2.
Appeal against sentence: Sought leave to appeal against sentence: on the ground the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning :
1.Appeal against conviction dismissed.
The appellant argued the guilty verdicts (counts 2–5) were unreasonable, given the reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence. The Court (Mullins P and Brown JA and Henry J) conducted an independent assessment of the evidence and found the convictions were reasonably open to the jury (M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 493 [7].
The jury had been properly instructed they had to consider each count separately and that their verdicts could be different [8]. The mixed verdicts (acquittals on counts 1, 6, and 7; convictions on 2–5) were not inconsistent, but instead reflected a careful evaluation of the varying reliability of the evidence across the charges [9-10].
The appellant raised on several credibility issues, including inconsistencies in the timing of the rape allegation, discrepancies between the complainants and her daughters account of the assaults and video evidence that suggested the complainant was not fearful.
The Court held that these matters had been fully explored at trial, were known to the jury, and did not undermine the core reliability of the complainant’s evidence regarding the four assaults for which the appellant was convicted. The medical evidence confirmed her injuries and her daughter’s testimony, despite some inconsistencies, generally supported the assaults.
None of the reliability issues, individually or cumulatively, rendered the verdicts unreasonable. It was reasonably open to the jury to convict. The appeal was dismissed.
2.Application for leave to appeal sentence granted.
The appellant was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 8 months, for four domestic violence offences involving pushes causing minor injuries. He sought leave to appeal on the ground the sentence was manifestly excessive. The Court granted leave and upheld the appeal, finding that the sentence was disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the offending and did not properly account for key mitigating factors [78-80].
The offending arose from a single episode of domestic violence involving four consecutive assaults in the family home, partially witnessed by the parties’ children. The complainant was pushed into furniture, onto broken glass and out onto a patio. Her injuries were limited to bruises and a minor foot laceration. The Court acknowledged the domestic context and presence of children as aggravating features under s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) but emphasised that the violence and resulting harm were at the lower end of the scale for assault occasioning bodily harm [108-109].
While the sentencing judge appropriately treated the domestic violence context as aggravating, the Court reiterated that s 9(10A) does not displace other sentencing considerations (R v Pham (2009) 197 A Crim R 246 [7]. [121] The Court confirmed the sentencing discretion must be exercised by reference to all relevant factors including proportionality, delay and rehabilitation by reference to the totality of the circumstances.
The appellant was a first-time offender, with no relevant prior history and a longstanding employment record. He had maintained steady employment, complied with bail conditions for nearly four years and had no contact with the complainant or children since early 2020. These circumstances supported rehabilitation and did not suggest a risk of recidivism [87].
The Court found the 16-month sentence was unsupported by comparable decisions. Additionally, that the extraordinary delay in prosecution had substantial mitigating value. The offences occurred in 2019, but trial and sentencing did not occur until May 2024. It allowed the Court to observe the appellant’s rehabilitative progress, acknowledged the stress and uncertainty the delay imposed, reduced the need for personal deterrence and justified less weight on general deterrence.
The Court concluded the 16-month sentence was manifestly excessive. A sentence of 12. months’ imprisonment, suspended after six months for an operational period of 12 months, was more appropriate in light of the nature of the offending, the delay, the appellant’s personal circumstances, and relevant precedent. Orders were made accordingly.
R v LBG [2024] QCA 205 (17 October 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim fear’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with children’ - ‘Misdirection’
Charges:
•
Count 1: unlawfully choked the complainant without consent in a domestic setting.
•
Count 2: unlawfully choked the complainant without consent in a domestic setting.
•
Count 3: raped the complainant.
•
Count 4: procured the complainant without her consent, to commit an act of gross indecency, the indecent assault included bringing into contact part of the anus of the appellant with the mouth of the complainant (this occurred in a domestic setting).
Case Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant were married and had two children. The offences allegedly occurred in July 2022 in the course of that domestic relationship.
•
Counts 1 & 2: The complainant alleged that during a domestic argument, the appellant first choked her by lifting her off the ground by the throat for 15–20 seconds (Count 1). He then allegedly threw her onto the bed and choked her again with one hand while leaning over her (Count 2). Both acts were said to have occurred in close succession.
•
Counts 3 & 4: On a separate occasion, the complainant alleged that during another argument, the appellant said he was going to “fuck her in the arse.” Despite her refusal, he allegedly forced his penis into her mouth without consent (Count 3) and then forced her to lick his anus (Count 4).
Grounds of Appeal :
(a)
Miscarriage of justice: The jury was misdirected regarding text messages. The jury was not properly told that only the fact of the messages was admitted, not the truth of the complainant’s allegations in them.
(b)
Inconsistent verdicts: The verdict of guilty on count two was unreasonable due to inconsistency with the acquittal on count one, which related to the same incident.
Decision and Reasoning : The Court (Bond JA and Vaughan AJA and Davis J) allowed the appeal. Convictions on counts 2-4 were set aside and a retrial was ordered on counts 2-4.
1. Miscarriage of justice (upheld)
The appellant argued that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to misdirection relating to the use of text messages contained in a joint admissions document (Exhibit 2).
The admissions recorded that certain text messages had been sent and received between the complainant and the appellant [14]. However, there was no admission by the appellant as to the truth of the assertions made in those messages, many of which alleged serious emotional and physical abuse [15].
Despite this, the trial judge directed the jury that “everything in the admissions document is true” and “proved beyond reasonable doubt” [18];[20]. These directions failed to distinguish between what was admitted (the sending of messages) and what was alleged (the content of those messages).
This created a serious risk of misuse of the evidence. The messages were not tendered as confessions, and in the absence of clear judicial directions limiting their use, the jury may have improperly treated the assertions in the messages as proven facts [32]-[33].
Given that the case turned entirely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the appellant and that the jury had already rejected part of the complainant’s evidence by acquitting on Count 1, this misdirection was a serious defect that resulted in a miscarriage of justice [33]. Accordingly, the convictions on Counts 2–4 were set aside.
2. Inconsistent verdicts (dismissed)
The appellant submitted that the verdict of guilty on Count 2 was unreasonable given the acquittal on Count 1, and therefore pressed for an acquittal rather than a retrial on that count [35].
The Court reaffirmed that a jury is required to return a verdict on each count in an indictment and is entitled to return different verdicts on different counts. It is obliged to do so if it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on some counts and not others [36].
A guilty verdict will only be unreasonable due to inconsistency with a not guilty verdict where there is no logical basis upon which the jury could have delivered different verdicts on the two counts in question (R v Brown [2020] QCA 159 at [53]; and R v Bond [2018] QCA 130) [37].
It was easy to see why the jury may have acquitted on Count 1, the complainant’s account of being lifted off the ground for 15–20 seconds may have seemed unlikely, raising a reasonable doubt [38].
While a jury may consider a doubt on one count when assessing another, it does not follow that disbelieving a witness on one count means their evidence must be rejected on all counts (R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82) [39].
Given both acts occurred during the same argument, the jury could have found the complainant misdescribed the first act but accepted her evidence about the second [40].
The verdict on Count 2 was not inconsistent with the acquittal on Count 1. Ground (e) failed and a retrial on Count 2 was appropriate [41].
R v MEB [2024] QCA 188 (11 October 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
’Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Misdirection’
Charges:
•
Count 1: common assault
•
Count 2: assault occasioning bodily harm
•
Count 3: deprivation of liberty
All offences were classified as domestic violence offences.
Case type: appeal against conviction and seeking leave to appeal sentence
Facts:
•
The appellant and the complainant were in a new relationship, having met in March 2022 and moved in together on 14 June 2022.
•
On the night of 17 June 2022, they spent the evening drinking at various venues before returning home.
◦
Count 1: At the Federal Hotel, the complainant said something to the appellant, who appeared to be in a "really bad mood" and responded by telling her to “fuck off.” As she walked away, the appellant followed and punched in the arm three times.
◦
Count 2: At home, the complainant packed her bags to leave. The appellant said, “you’re not leaving. I don’t want you to go. You’re not going anywhere,” and blocked the only exit.
The complainant asked, “what are you going to do? Are you going to hit me again?”
He replied, “come and have a drink, you’re not going, it’s all right.” She used significant force to push him, causing him to stumble over a recliner. She alleged the appellant then grabbed her, threw her onto another recliner, and punched her at least eight times to the head over 40–50 seconds. She suffered a 2–3 cm eyebrow laceration (requiring sutures) and bruising/swelling to both eyes and the left side of her head. She recalled blacking out. In a police interview, the appellant denied hitting her, claimed she was the aggressor, and suggested she may have injured herself in the bathroom.
◦
Count 3: Following the alleged assault, the complainant opened a window and called for help. She claimed the appellant stood and mocked her. She said that she tried to leave but the appellant would not let her and he stood in front of the door blocking her exit.
Procedural history: The appellant was convicted in the District Court of Queensland of assault occasioning bodily harm (count 2) and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 4 months. The appellant was found not guilty of common assault (count 1) and deprivation of liberty (count 3).
Grounds of appeal: The appellant appealed against the conviction and sought leave to appeal against his sentence.
With regards to the conviction, the appellant contended:
•
Miscarriage of justice: on the grounds that the trial judge failed to leave the defence of provocation for the jury’s consideration.
•
Misdirection/non-direction: in relation to evidence of uncharged injuries (ie, bruising and black eyes).
With regards to the sentence, the appellant contended:
•
Sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision: The Queensland Court of Appeal (Bond, Brown JJA and Kelly J) allowed the appeal against conviction. The conviction on count 2 (assault occasioning bodily harm) was quashed and a new trial was ordered. As a result, the sentence no longer stood and the issue of leave to appeal against sentence became moot.
Reasoning:
Ground 1 – Failure to leave provocation for the jury (upheld)
Principles:
•
Under s 269(1) Criminal Code (Qld), a person is not criminally responsible for an assault if they were in fact deprived of self-control by provocation, acted on the sudden before there was time for passion to cool, and the force used was not disproportionate and not intended or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm [25].
•
Provocation includes any wrongful act or insult likely to deprive an ordinary person of self-control and induce assault in response (s 268(1)) [26].
•
Whether the conduct was provocative, whether self-control was lost, and whether the response was proportionate are questions of fact for the jury, to be assessed in context and from the accused’s viewpoint [28]. However, whether the defence should be left to the jury is a question for the trial judge [29].
•
The test (from Masciantonio v R) is whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [31]. The test (from Masciantonio v R) is whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused, a jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [31].
•
If this threshold is met, the trial judge must leave provocation to the jury. The prosecution bears the onus of disproving provocation beyond reasonable doubt. The defence need only point to evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt [30]-[31]. Courts have emphasised a cautious approach, where there is any real doubt, provocation should be left to the jury (Stingel; R v DCE) [32]-[33].
Application:
•
At trial, the defence did not ask the judge to leave provocation to the jury. In his police interview, the appellant denied hitting the complainant. The trial judge stated in summing up told the jury that there was “nothing suggested in relation to [the alleged] assault … that would otherwise make it authorised, justified or excused by law. That is just not an issue” [34].
•
The correct test, however, was whether, on the version of events most favourable to the appellant, a jury might have failed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the assault was unprovoked [34].
•
There was a significant body of evidence relevant to provocation:
◦
The appellant said the complainant belted, punched, slapped, and pushed him.
◦
The complainant denied punching him, but accepted they had sworn, yelled, pushed each other, and that she had used significant force to push him over [35].
◦
Additionally, the complainant described the appellant’s response as immediate [35].
•
The Court held that the truth of the competing accounts was for the jury. It was open to the jury to accept parts of the appellant’s account despite his denial of the assault. The provocative conduct may have consisted of the complainant’s use of significant force or a combination of belting, slapping, punching and pushing [36].
•
The real issues for the jury were whether that conduct was likely to deprive an ordinary person of self-control and whether the response was proportionate. These were questions of fact to be resolved from the appellant’s perspective [37].
•
On the version most favourable to the appellant, an escalating scuffle involving heightened emotions and significant force by the complainant, the jury might reasonably have failed to be satisfied that the assault was unprovoked.
•
There was thus material in the evidence capable of giving rise to a defence of provocation and the trial judge was under a duty to leave it to the jury. The failure to do so constituted a miscarriage of justice [38].
Ground 2 – Alleged failure to properly direct in respect of uncharged injuries (dismissed)
•
The particulars for count two were that the appellant punched the complainant multiple times to the head causing a laceration to her left eyebrow. There was evidence of other injuries comprising bruising to the left side of the complainant’s head and two black eyes [39].
•
The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to direct the jury as to “how to have regard to” the evidence of bruising, which was not part of the particularised bodily harm (which was a laceration to the left eyebrow) [39].
•
Two main points were raised:
(a)
The judge should have made it clear that the bruising was not to be substituted for the laceration as the harm relied on for count 2.
(b)
While the bruising was admissible as narrative evidence, it was not part of the Crown’s particulars and should not have been used to prove bodily harm [39].
•
The Court rejected this argument. It held that the suggested risk the jury misused the bruising evidence had to be assessed by reference to the realities of how the trial was conducted [40].
◦
The Crown's case was clearly opened on the basis that the laceration (2–3 cm above the left eyebrow requiring sutures) was the bodily harm [40]–[41].
◦
Medical evidence from Drs Jeffrey and Dr Holyoak supported this. Dr Holyoak noted other bruising consistent with multiple blunt force trauma, but this was not part of the Crown's particulars [40]–[42].
◦
In closing, the prosecutor linked the bruising to support the complainant’s version of repeated punches, but confirmed the laceration was the harm relied on. Defence counsel also clearly highlighted that only the laceration was the subject of the charge [43]–[44].
◦
In summing up, the trial judge referred to the laceration as the bodily harm relied on [45], provided a question trial to the jury that directed them to assess whether the assault caused bodily harm [46] and clarified, in response to the jury’s questions, that only the laceration was the relevant harm for count 2, though the jury could still have regard to the bruising as part of assessing what happened [49]–[50].
•
The Court held the trial judge made it abundantly clear that bruising was not the bodily harm charged and only the laceration was to be considered in question 2 of the question trail [50]–[51].
•
There was no real risk the jury considered the bruising impermissibly and this ground of appeal failed [51].
R v TBD [2024] QCA 182 (1 October 2024) – Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘People with children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Totality principle’
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Charges:
Indictment 1: choking in a domestic setting (x2), assault occasioning bodily harm (x1)
Indictment 2: contravention of a domestic violence order (x5), misuse of prison phone call (x1)
Facts:
The applicant was the subject of a domestic and family violence protection order issued in 2017, protecting his former wife (the complainant) and their five-year-old daughter.
In February 2021, while staying in a hotel with the complainant and child, the applicant committed serious domestic violence offences in breach of this order (Indictment 1).
•
Following an argument, he twice choked the complainant and assaulted her by punching her in the abdomen, torso and jaw. These acts occurred in front of the child, who screamed, “please don’t kill my mummy, I want my mummy.”
•
As a result, the complainant sustained a contusion to her neck, bruising to her right shoulder, right upper arm and left upper arm, bruising and swelling to her left cheek and tenderness to her spine and abdomen. After the assaults, the applicant mocked her, stating, “look at you, nothing is wrong with you. Stop pretending you can’t breathe and you’re dying.” He fled the scene after being informed police had been called.
In addition to this episode of physical violence, the applicant committed five breaches of a domestic violence order (indictment 2).
•
On 23 February 2021, police located the applicant hiding in the complainant’s home.
•
On 27 February 2021, the hotel incident itself breached multiple conditions of the protection order, including good behaviour, not domestic violence, no contact and that the child not be exposed to domestic violence.
•
After being remanded in custody from 28 February 2021, the applicant continued to breach the no-contact condition. Between April and June 2021, he made 14 phone calls instructing his brothers to pressure the complainant not to cooperate with police. In August 2021, he orchestrated further contact through another inmate (Prisoner A), who facilitated illegal conference calls with the complainant and contacted her on the applicant’s behalf. During this time, the applicant used degrading language and expressed a desire to manipulate and silence the complainant.
Procedural history: At first instance, the applicant was sentenced to four years and three months’ imprisonment, cumulative on his existing sentence. This resulted in a total effective sentence of nine years and nine months, with parole eligibility after approximately 3.8 years. The 218 days of pre-sentence custody were not declared as time served.
Grounds of appeal:
(a)
Guilty pleas: the sentencing judge failed to take into account the guilty pleas (s 13 Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld))
(b)
Failure to apply the totality principle
(c)
Sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision: The Court (Dalton, Brown JJA and Kelly J) granted leave to appeal the sentence, allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence and re-sentence the applicant.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: Guilty pleas (dismissed):
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge failed to treat the guilty pleas as timely and failed to state that they were taken into account [35]. The Court rejected both claims.
Under s 13 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld), a sentencing judge a court must take a guilty plea into account and may reduce the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed. The court is not required to specify the extent of the reduction, only to acknowledge the plea in open court [36].
At common law, a guilty plea is a mitigating factor in sentencing because it is usually evidence of some remorse, spares the community the expense of a contested trial and it is sometimes relevant to the aspect of remorse that a victim has been spared the necessity of the pain of giving evidence (Signato v R) [37]. However, it is not the expense saving alone, but depends on a willingness to facilitate the course of justice [38].
In this case, the pleas were entered on the first day of trial, after the child complainant had already given evidence. There was no explanation as to why the plea was not entered earlier. The judge found no evidence of remorse or acceptance of responsibility and correctly treated the pleas as late. Nonetheless, the pleas were acknowledged to have spared other witnesses from giving evidence and the sentencing remarks treated them as a mitigating factor [39].
The Court was satisfied that the judge complied with s 13(3). The sentencing remarks expressly referenced the pleas and their timing, and parole eligibility was set earlier than it otherwise would have been. These factors confirmed that the pleas were taken into account in sentencing. The first ground of appeal therefore failed [45].
Ground 2: Totality principle (upheld):
The Court held that the sentencing judge erred by failing to properly apply the totality principle. As established in Mill v R and Postiglione v R, the principle requires a sentencing judge to “step back” and evaluate whether the total sentence is just and proportionate to the overall criminality, having regard to the overall criminality and the offender’s personal circumstances [46-48].
The judge did not specifically identify how the sentence addressed totality considerations [51]. The sentencing remarks in this case contained no evaluation of the overall criminality involved in the 2016, 2020 and subject offending, nor any consideration of whether the total effective sentence of nine years and nine months bore proper relativity to that criminality. There was no explanation as to how the sentence imposed achieved appropriate relativity between the criminality and the total sentence, no consideration of what the effective head sentence would have been had all offences been sentenced at once, and no assessment of whether the sentence imposed a “crushing” burden inconsistent with the applicant’s record and prospects [50].
On appeal, the Crown properly conceded that the judge had not specifically addressed totality. Totality could not be inferred from the leniency of the sentences imposed for the offending in custody. The fact that offending occurred at different times does not preclude concurrent sentences being imposed where appropriate. The 15-month sentence was lenient but not inappropriate for the in-custody offending viewed in isolation. It was tolerably clear from the sentencing remarks and the sentence structure that the judge had not addressed the substantive aspects of the totality principle [51].
The 2016 and 2020 offending was distinct from the subject offending and involved different criminal conduct. The 2021 offending, while serious, was the applicant’s first conviction for violent offending. A proper application of the totality principle would have resulted in significant concurrency between the subject offending and earlier offences. The sentence structure imposed was disproportionate to the totality of the criminality involved [52].
The sentencing task also required consideration of whether the sentence imposed a “crushing” burden. The applicant had been exposed to significant domestic violence in childhood, had undertaken relevant programs in custody and had family support and an offer of employment. He hoped to maintain and develop a relationship with his other children. The sentence left him serving just shy of a decade, with parole eligibility deferred by approximately 3.8 years. He had already been eligible for parole for 218 days but was being held on remand for the subject charges. In a real and practical sense, that time related to the subject offending. Avoiding a crushing sentence required a shorter total sentence, an earlier parole eligibility date, and a declaration under s 159A(3)(c) for the 218 days of pre-sentence custody [53].
Accordingly, the second ground of appeal was established [54].
Ground 3: Manifestly excessive (upheld):
A sentence is manifestly excessive where it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, such that it might be inferred that in some way there has been a failure to properly exercise the discretion which the law reposed in the sentencing court [55].
The Court accepted the applicant’s submission that the manifest excess flowed from the failure to apply the totality principle [57]. Accordingly, the third ground was established [58].
R v RBM [2024] QCA 163 (6 September 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘People with children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Strbak ground’ –‘motor vehicle’
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant pleaded guilty to the following three charges:
1.
Assault occasioning bodily harm (‘AOBH’)
2.
Deprivation of liberty
3.
Unlawful use of a motor vehicle
Facts: On 17 September 2022, the applicant, RBM, assaulted his former partner after she attempted to end their relationship. Following an argument in her vehicle, RBM punched her repeatedly in the face and kneed her in the head, causing her to lose consciousness. When the complainant regained consciousness, she found herself shirtless in the boot of her hatchback, alongside a shovel and duct tape, while RBM drove at speeds of up to 170 kilometres per hour.
During the drive, RBM made a threatening statement to the complainant, saying, “You’ve been asleep for a long time sleeping beauty. We’re gonna go out and dig a little hole.” The complainant feared for her life. After fading in and out of consciousness, the complainant was placed in the passenger seat. RBM then stopped the vehicle in a remote forested area and began digging, claiming to be looking for a gun. When the vehicle became stuck in the sand, he yelled at the complainant to help move it, but she was unable to assist due to her injuries. RBM eventually drove her back to the place where the incident had begun and she drove herself to her mother’s house.
Procedural history : On 19 February 2024, in the District Court at Bundaberg, the applicant pleaded guilty to these offences and was sentenced to:
(a)
six years imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm;
(b)
three years imprisonment for the deprivation of liberty; and
(c)
six years imprisonment for the unlawful use of a motor vehicle.
All terms of imprisonment were concurrent and 384 days of pre-sentence custody were declared time already served under the sentence. A parole eligibility date was set after two years.
Pursuant to s 42 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld), the sentencing judge varied the domestic violence order protecting the complainant by extending its operation for another five years.
Grounds of appeal : The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on two bases:
(a)
Strbak ground: The sentencing judge impermissibly made findings of fact which infringed the principles in Strbak v R.
(b)
Manifestly excessive ground: the sentences imposed, in all the circumstances, were manifestly excessive.
Decision : The Queensland Court of Appeal (Bowskill CJ, Flanagan JA and Wilson J) dismissed the application for leave to appeal the sentence. Leave to appeal was refused on both grounds.
Reasoning :
Ground 1 – Strbak ground (dismissed)
The applicant argued that the sentencing judge impermissibly inferred a highly aggravating intent “just short of torture”, a finding that was not charged, alleged by the prosecution, or proven, thereby breaching the principles in Strbak v R and s 132C of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) [62]-[63]. He further submitted that this inference contravened the principle in De Simoni, which prohibits sentencing an offender on the basis of an offence more serious than that of which they were convicted [65].
The Court rejected this claim. Under s 132C, a judge may only act on facts that are admitted, unchallenged, or proven on the balance of probabilities, with the standard increasing with the seriousness of the consequence [63].
Here, the sentencing judge relied on the objective circumstances of the offending and on submissions made by the applicant’s own counsel, including acceptance that the infliction of suffering was relevant to sentence [78]; [94]. The Court found that the inference of intent to cause fear was open on the agreed narrative. The applicant’s drug use, while mentioned, was not relied on to dispute intent or mitigate culpability [87]-[90].
As such, the judge’s reasoning complied with the principles in Strbak, De Simoni, and s 132C. The ground was dismissed [95].
Ground 2 – Manifestly excessive (dismissed)
The Court reaffirmed that a sentence will only be set aside as manifestly excessive where it is plainly unjust or involves a misapplication of principle (R v Abdullah), mere disparity with other sentences is insufficient [10u006A0].
The applicant relied on R v West [102]-[104], which suggested that AOBH simpliciter rarely attracts sentences above 18 months. However, the Court distinguished West, noting it predated the legislative recognition of domestic violence as an aggravating factor and involved less serious conduct [105]. In contrast, RBM’s offending involved vicious, prolonged, and degrading violence, including placing the complainant, unconscious and shirtless, in the boot of her car with a shovel and duct tape and threatening to bury her [106]-[112]. The AOBH offence could not be viewed in isolation and the applicant’s prior conviction for similar violence against a former partner, as well as his lack of remorse, further aggravated the offending [107–108]. While the complainant’s injuries did not require surgery or involve a weapon [111], the offending created a terrifying experience, justifying a sentence above the typical range [112]-[115].
The Court held that the sentence could have been validly structured either through elevated concurrent sentences (Nagy methodology) or through cumulative sentencing and under either approach, a total effective sentence of six years was not excessive [116]-[117]. Applying the totality principle, the Court also considered the applicant’s existing 15-month sentence for related offending, including ramming a police car. The final outcome, six years and four months imprisonment, with parole eligibility after slightly more than one-third, was held to be proportionate to the overall criminality [118]-[122]. The sentence was not manifestly excessive and the application was dismissed [123].
The Court made relevant general comments:
‘In this case, the applicant’s offending involved significant, unprovoked violence, aggravated by a serious deprivation of liberty which was objectively terrifying. Further, this was the applicant’s second occasion of violently lashing out when faced with the end of a relationship. He was previously sentenced to three years imprisonment for viciously attacking an ex-partner.’ [106]
‘It is the applicant’s concerning criminal history, along with his protracted conduct (involving a violent assault and a very serious example of depriving the complainant of her liberty) that distinguishes his sentence from other assault cases upon complainants in a domestic violence setting.’ [107]
R v MDU [2024] QCA 113 (14 June 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ - ‘Choking’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘Belief that the victim had died’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘use of motor vehicle’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: The applicant had pleaded guilty to attempted murder (x1).
Facts: The applicant had resolved to kill the complainant, his ex-wife of 40 years. He went to her house armed with a chainsaw, knives and some line. He tried to cut his way into the house using the chainsaw, both through the front and rear doors. Realising that the complainant had escaped through the front door while he was at the rear, he chased her in a car. He caught her, punched her in the face several times, then choked her. She could not breathe or speak. Both ended up on the ground, the applicant still choking her.
The applicant briefly relented his grasp, then redoubled his efforts to the point of choking her while her head was off the ground, pulling her towards him. He saw that her eyes had started bulging in the manner he had seen on television before, which scared the applicant. At this point, he stopped choking her and he slapped her face a few times. She regained consciousness. He then let her go, telling her, “I won’t kill you this time”. He drove away, eventually going to a police station to confess what he had done. The complainant’s injuries included bruising to her jaw, bruising to the face and eyes.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant relied on three grounds of appeal [8]:
1.
The sentence is manifestly excessive in all circumstances.
2.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding these was no special leniency to be applied to his sentence as a result of his admissions.
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding these was no special leniency to be applied to his sentence as a result of his admissions.
Ground 3 was not the subject of any submissions in the applicant’s outline. Ground 1 was not advanced except in the context of ground 2.
Decision and Reasoning : Application for leave to appeal against sentence dismissed.
Section 538 of the Criminal Code (Qld) states that, in respect of “a person convicted of attempting to an commit offence, if it is proved that the person desisted of the person’s own motion from the further prosecution of the person’s intention, without its fulfilment being prevented by circumstances independent of the person’s will, the person is liable to one-half only of the punishment to which the person would otherwise be liable”.
Therefore, a key issue at sentencing and on appeal was the factual issue of whether the applicant’s desisting from choking the complainant occurred before or after he had formed the view that she had perished. The sentencing judge had found that at the time the applicant desisted from his plan to kill, he believed the complainant was dead. Therefore, s 538 was not engaged.
On appeal, Morison JA agreed with the sentencing judge that s 538 was, on the facts, not engaged [30], [39]. Dalton JA and Davis J disagreed, finding as a matter of fact that the applicant had at no point believed he had killed the victim [108]. Rather, they found that he got scared when he saw the victim’s eyes bulging and stopped when she was “close to death” [108]. They found no reasonable basis on which the sentencing judge could have concluded that the applicant thought the victim was already dead before he desisted from choking her [108].
Their Honours therefore found that the appeal should succeed on ground 2. However, their Honours ultimately did not grant leave to appeal, nor did they propose imposing any lesser sentence [110]. Their reasons for this also dealt with ground 1 of the proposed appeal [110]. Their Honours found that the acts committed by the applicant and the circumstances in which he committed them were extremely serious [120]. There was significant premeditation, a violent attempted home invasion, pursuit after the victim had left her home, and the catching, severe assault and choking of the victim with the intent to kill her [121]-[123]. He came close to killing her [124]. The sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment with no serious violent offence declaration and an order for parole eligibility six months before the statutorily prescribed period could, in their Honours’ view, draw no proper complaint from the applicant [135].
R v OAC [2024] QCA 52 (9 April 2024) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Torture' - ‘Threat to kill’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ - ‘Economic and financial abuse’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Prevention order’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘Mental health’
Charges: 5x common assault; 2x strangulation in a domestic setting, 3x assault occasioning bodily harm, 3x deprivation of liberty, 1x torture, 1x contravention of protection order, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm while armed, 1x wilful damage, 1 x threats, 2x rape, 1x using a carriage service to make a threat to kill
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 32 counts on three separate indictments. The majority of the offences concerned physical domestic violence against the applicant’s female partner between January and August 2019. [16]–[65]; [72] During this period, the applicant was served with and subsequently breached a protection order. [36]–[38] The most serious offending occurred within 16 hours, across two days: the applicant tortured his partner, assaulting, choking and raping her. [2]; [44]–[65]
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
the sentencing judge erred by having regard to uncharged acts; and
2.
the sentence is manifestly excessive. [12]
Decision and Reasoning : Application for leave refused. Morrison JA (with whom Mullins P and Brown J agree) dismissed the applicant’s first ground of appeal. The uncharged acts were expressly confined as forming part of the background, and at no time were framed as relevant to the offending conduct. That the uncharged acts merely provided relevant context to the domestic violence offences was appreciated by the sentencing judge. [99]–[107]
Morrison JA further dismissed the applicant’s second ground of appeal that the imposition of a serious violent offence declaration is inappropriate as the applicant suffered from serious psychological issues at the time of offending. [114] Available medical assessments did not disclose a diagnosis of ‘mental illness or abnormality’. [120]
The absence of such a diagnosis is relevant to the submission that general deterrence did not have such a call on the sentencing process that it meant a serious violent offence declaration should not be made; put another way, that making such a declaration would render the sentence manifestly excessive [121]
As is apparent from Neumann, there must be an assessment of two relevant factors present in order that the consideration of mitigating factors or that of general deterrence are affected. The first is the mental abnormality. The second is a causal link between that abnormality and the offending conduct.
Neither is present in the applicant’s case. What the report reveals is that drug-induced psychosis was a likely operative factor. That is not, in my view, sufficient to call into question the making of the serious violent offence declarations [123]–[124]
R v WBZ [2023] QCA 256 (15 December 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ - ‘inconsistent verdicts’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 2x common assault, 2x strangulation in a domestic setting, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x wilful damage.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a domestic relationship from October 2016 to January 2021. On two separate occasions, the applicant physically assaulted the complainant, backhanding, kicking, strangling and throwing her on the floor. On both occasions, the offending took place in the presence of the couple’s baby. [11]–[35]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appeals against his conviction for one count of strangulation on the basis that it was unreasonable, irreconcilable with the verdicts of acquittal.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Flanagan JA (with whom Buss AJA and Kelly J agree) held the inconsistency across the verdicts of guilty and not guilty was reconcilable. According to Flanagan JA, each count was ‘readily explicable by reference’ to different sets of considerations, both factual and legal [67]; notably, the inconsistencies in the evidence provided by the complainant and applicant, and differences in jury directions.
R v MDS [2023] QCA 228 (21 November 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: 4x wilful damage, 2x common assault, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x strangulation in a domestic setting.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been in a long-term de facto relationship, having five children together, prior to separation in 2015. The applicant and the complainant, both intoxicated, had a verbal argument which turned into a physical altercation. The applicant physically assaulted the complainant, including smashing her headphones with a golf club [4], assaulting the complainant with ‘cane knives’ and strangling her with a wicker basket. [3]–[13] The incident occurred in front of the couple’s 16 year old son, who called the police. [12]
The applicant was found guilty of the offences and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for each count of wilful damage, 18 months imprisonment for each count of common assault, 2 years imprisonment for the count of assault occasioning bodily harm and 3 years imprisonment for the count of strangulation in a domestic setting – where all sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
the sentence was manifestly excessive; and
2.
the sentencing judge made a specific error (ie, the judge’s statement that ‘someone in the victim’s position could have been dead within a short space of time’ was ‘factually inapposite’) [26]
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Justice of Appeal Dalton (with whom Morrison and Boddice JJA agree) found the sentence to neither be manifestly excessive or erroneous with respect to the sentencing judge’s treatment of the offence of strangulation:
The sentencing judge obviously regarded strangulation as the most serious of these offences, although it must be noted that the common assault with the cane knives was also a very serious offence [14]
That the primary judge took a balanced view of the strangulation is plain from the remarks which I have extracted above. In particular her Honour recognised that the period of strangulation was short; that bare hands were not used, and that the force used was not such as to cause loss of consciousness or control of the bladder. Her Honour expressly recognised that this choking was not of the most serious kind. [28]
R v LBB [2023] QCA 162 (11 August 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Threat’ - ‘Medical evidence’ - ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 1x strangulation in a domestic setting, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x threatening violence. The offending occurred in one episode of domestic violence, against the applicant’s wife.
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on four counts of domestic violence offences; all of which occurred on 16 January 2019 against the applicant’s wife (the complainant). The complainant’s evidence was that the applicant strangled her, after she refused to allow him access to her mobile phone. As the complainant attempted to leave, the applicant grabbed her and threw her onto the floor and threatened to kill her and their child. [4]–[6] The complainant attended the doctor later that day.
Grounds of Appeal : Applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The wrongful admission of medical evidence concerning the complainant’s injuries; and
2.
The false prosecutorial claims concerning the medical evidence.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and retrial ordered. Judge Dalton (with whom Boddice JA and Bradley J agree) held ‘almost all’ of the evidence led from the doctor’s consultation notes with the complainant to be inadmissible and highly prejudicial to the applicant. [21] Such evidence led from the notes included (and were not limited to):
•
A detailed narrative amounting a complaint against the appellant and a description of his physically assaulting her …
•
sympathetically recorded details as to the complainant’s general domestic circumstances …
•
a hearsay history of the appellant’s having been angry and having pushed and shoved the complainant in the past …. [21]
Judge Dalton equally regarded the prosecution’s address to the jury concerning this evidence improper, as too the prosecution’s reliance upon the existence of a fracture (suffered by the complainant) which was not established [55]–[56]:
It was improper for the prosecutor to seek to use the inadmissible narrative evidence she had led from the doctor to attempt to bolster the complainant’s credit as if the narrative given to the doctor on 7 October 2021 was a fresh complaint in a sexual assault case. The prosecutor expressly used this evidence to try to bolster the credit of the complainant and urged the jury not to have a reasonable doubt because of what the appellant had told police [27]
R v WBX [2023] QCA 151 (28 July 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Prevention order’ - ‘Breach of protection order’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Strangulation/choking’ - ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 7x contravention of prevention order
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on domestic violence offences and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and an order for compensatory payment ($10,000 to the complainant).
The applicant and female complainant had been in a ‘toxic’ domestic relationship for two years.[9] A temporary protection order was placed against the applicant in May 2021: interaction between the complainant and applicant was conditional on it being agreed upon in writing. [15] The offending took place on June 2021, when the complainant and applicant were together at the applicant’s residence: an argument turned into a physical altercation, with the applicant physically assaulting and strangling/choking the complainant. Following the incident, the applicant proceeded to contact the complainant for the next six days, contrary to the protection order. [13]–[16]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, having regard to the applicant’s: previously undiagnosed medical condition; plea of guilty; lack of prior criminal history; and ‘new and functioning domestic relationship’. [21]
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed. Justice of Appeal Boddice (with whom Dalton and Flanagan JJA agree) found the sentencing judge to have made no error:
The protracted nature of the applicant’s criminal conduct, including the repeated contraventions of the domestic violence order in the following days, was of a nature where the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment fell well within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion, notwithstanding the early pleas of guilty, lack of criminal history, psychological conditions, prospects of rehabilitation and the payment of compensation. Such a conclusion is supported by a consideration of the relevant authorities [35]–[36]
R v RBJ [2023] QCA 162 (13 June 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Inconsistent verdict’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 3 x rape.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with three counts of rape; all of which were domestic violence offences. Following a trial before a jury, the applicant was only convicted of one count (and acquitted of two counts).
At the time of offending, the male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship. On 10 October 2022, the applicant attended the complainant’s mother’s house and entered the complainant’s bedroom uninvited while she was asleep. Despite the complainant’s protest, the applicant forcibly removed her clothes and raped her three times. Between the first and second time (ie, count 1 and 2), the complainant went to the bathroom to have a shower.
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
The verdict on count 1 is unreasonable and inconsistent with the verdicts of acquittal on counts 2 and 3; and
2.
Miscarriage of justice (ie, trial judge did not provide jury directions on the use of text-message evidence).
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and new trial ordered on count 1. Drawing on the principles of inconsistent verdicts set out in MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348, 365–8, the Court (Mullins P and Morrison and Flanagan JJA) regarded the jury’s treatment of count 1 as distinct from counts 2 and 3 to not be unreasonable:
It could not be said to be unreasonable that the jury treated the circumstances in which count 1 was committed when the appellant arrived in the complainant’s bedroom uninvited as different from the circumstances of counts 2 and 3 when the complainant returned to the bedroom without wearing clothes while the appellant was still there [39]
It was open for the jury to regard the complainant’s evidence, relating to the text messages sent following the offending, as only constituting count 1:
The text exchange immediately after the complainant arrived at work, in which she confirmed that it was not acceptable for the appellant to show up in her house unannounced and to have sexual intercourse with her after she said “no” 100 times was more referable to count 1 than the other counts. When the appellant then sent a message reminding the complainant that she said she did not want him to go, the complainant’s response was “that was way after” which could also be taken as referable to “way after” the act of sexual intercourse when he first arrived that constituted count 1 [38]
R v Kynuna [2023] QCA 112 (30 May 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Miscarriage of Justice’ - ‘Unreasonable’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ - ‘Choking/strangulation’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Threat to kill’ - ‘Evidence’ - ‘Expert opinion’ - ‘Jury directions’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 3 x rape, 1 x attempted rape
Facts: The male applicant was convicted of one count of attempted rape. The applicant and complainant were in a sexual relationship, which after some time the complainant did not wish to continue. Despite the relationship ending, the applicant continued to pursue the complainant via text messages and loitering at her place of work throughout May 2020. On 3 June 2020, the applicant physically grabbed the complainant by the neck at her place of work and threatened to ‘kill’ her if she continued to ignore him. [16]–[17] Following the applicant’s demands, the complainant drove her vehicle to a deserted place and was physically forced to perform oral and anal sex. [18]–[25]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed the conviction on two grounds:
1.
The trial judge failed to discharge a jury following the admission of inadmissible and/or highly prejudicial evidence;
2.
The trial judge failed to provide adequate jury directions on opinion evidence; and
3.
The verdict is unreasonable.
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal allowed. Verdict set aside and retrial ordered.
Morrison JA (with whom Mullins P and Boddice JA agree) held the trial judge’s treatment of opinion evidence — specifically the opinion of a forensic nurse that ‘it was unusual to find multiple lacerations to the fourchette in consensual sex’ [48] — to be inadequate.
The Crown prosecutor failed to make reference to the evidence in their opening address [54] and to confine the use of the evidence to the relevant charge (ie, attempted anal rape). [56]–[57] The trial judge failed to correct any misuse of the evidence by the jury through an appropriate direction: ‘The only direction given was one concerned with how to deal with expert evidence. In itself, that was a misdirection because the forensic nurse examiner’s evidence was not expert evidence.’ [58] Consequently, the evidence should have been excluded as both ‘inadmissible’ and ‘prejudicial’ to the applicant. [60]
However, Morrison JA did not find the verdict to be unreasonable. [69] The ‘identified weaknesses in the evidence’ did not reduce the ‘probative value’ of the evidence so as to create ‘a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted’. [76]
R v WBV [2023] QCA 79 (26 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Choking/strangulation’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘Parole’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charges: 1x assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed; 1x wilful damage; 2x choking in a domestic setting; 1x assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) 1x wilful damage (domestic violence setting); 1x assault occasioning bodily harm; 1x suppling a dangerous drug with a circumstance of aggravation.
Facts: The male applicant entered early pleas to four indictments and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The offending was perpetrated against the applicant’s female partner in their home. On 6 August 2020, the applicant verbally assaulted the complainant, threatening her with a knife. [30] On 19 November 2021, the applicant physically and verbally assaulted the complainant, punching her in the face, and strangling her twice, causing her to lose consciousness multiple times. [19]–[23] On 19 May 2022, the applicant assaulted a male co-worker. [33]–[34]
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. Particularly, the applicant contended that the primary judge:
1.
started ‘too high’ in calculating the appropriate global sentence for the most serious offending — the two counts of choking in a domestic setting;
2.
departed from the ‘rule of thumb of one-third in imposing a parole eligibility date at the 40% mark of the head sentence’; and
3.
did not accede to the submission of defence counsel in respect of certainty of release [11]
Decision and Reasoning : Application to leave dismissed. Crow J (with whom Dalton and Boddice JJA agree) dismissed the applicant’s submission that the head sentence was ‘too high’, having regard to the applicant’s ‘antecedents, the serious nature of the offending of 19 November 2021, and the accumulation of the criminality of the offending of 6 August 2020 and 19 May 2022’. [36]
With respect to the non-parole date, Crow J (with whom Dalton and Boddice JJA agree) held that the ‘common practice of a one third reduction is not a rule’. [39] Rather, the determination of a non-parole period is made with regard to ‘the specific circumstances of the offender including his antecedents, character, and any prior criminal history’. [40]
Applying these factors to the present case, Crow J held the date to be appropriate:
The applicant’s prior criminal history of serious violence, his lack of anger control, his serious difficulty with alcohol and drugs, his poor prison record, his offence of supplying dangerous drugs in a correctional facility are each a circumstance supporting the parole eligibility date being set at two years [51]
R v BEA [2023] QCA 78 (26 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ - ‘Appeal against conviction’ - ‘Manifestly excessive’ - ‘Unsafe/unreasonable jury verdict’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive harm’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Protection order’ - ‘History of domestic violence and family violence’ - ‘victim’s mental health’
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Charges: 13x rape, 2x assault occasioning bodily harm, 3x common assault.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male applicant was found guilty of thirteen counts of rape, two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm and three counts of common assaults. Each count involved the aggravating circumstance of being a domestic violence offence [3]: the applicant and female complainant were in a de facto relationship between 2013 and 2015. In this period, the complainant had received a protection order against the applicant. In 2014, the applicant contravened the protection order thrice and was imprisoned for nine months. [74] The female complainant reported the applicant’s offending in 2018. [29] The applicant was sentenced to (11 years head sentence for two counts of rape).
Grounds of Appeal : The applicant appealed against his conviction on several grounds.
1.
Unsafe and unsatisfactory jury verdicts (ie, complainant’s evidence was uncorroborated, ‘inconsistent [and] improbable’ and the complainant suffered from a mental illness). [6]
2.
Manifestly excessive head sentence for two counts of rape (11 years’ imprisonment).
Decision and Reasoning : Appeal dismissed.
With respect to the first ground of appeal, Bradley J (with whom Dalton JA and Gotterson AJA agree) held the evidence of the complainant (on which the verdict rested) to not be ‘improbable or incredible’ [10]. Further, the applicant’s evidence concerning the complainant’s mental health was erroneous and misleading. [22] Contrary to the applicant’s submission, the complainant suffered from depression (not bipolar disorder) which ‘does not raise a reasonable doubt about her credit or the reliability of her evidence’. [26]
Bradley J further held that the complainant’s two year delay in reporting the offences did not constitute a ‘significant forensic disadvantage’ to the applicant [34]–[35]:
The statute excludes the mere fact of delay as sufficient to show such a disadvantage and requires the nature of the disadvantage to be identified.7 The accused bears the onus of establishing there is a significant forensic disadvantage and that it is a consequence of the delay. The disadvantage must be forensic, so it must be a disadvantage in challenging, producing, or giving evidence in the conduct of the case
In the present case, no evidence likely to assist the appellant, which earlier existed, had been lost, gone missing, or become unavailable to him. No witness had died or become unlocatable. No one’s memory had been lost. The medical tests and photographs adverted to by the appellant were never within his power to obtain without the complainant’s consent. There was no evidence before the trial judge that the appellant had suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the delay in reporting the offences.
R v FBC [2023] QCA 74 (24 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threats to children’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: 3x common assault, 2x wilful damage, 1x strangulation in domestic setting, 2 x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x rape, 3x dangerous conduct using a weapon (all domestic violence offences except 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for rape and lesser concurrent periods of imprisonment for the remaining charges, being eligible for parole after serving 6 years. The applicant contended that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The majority of the offending was committed against the applicant’s former partner over a 2.5-year period. During the relationship, the complainant had taken out protection orders against the applicant and he had been physically abusive, including incidents where he placed her in a headlock, choked her and punched her in the face.
The complainant left the family home after discovering that the applicant had been unfaithful. Following this, there was an incident where the applicant came to the complainant’s home and violently anally raped her, causing injury. Several months later the complainant asked the police to conduct a welfare check on the applicant. He then came to her house with a gun, aiming it at their two young children and threatening to shoot her, the children and himself.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal dismissed.
Boddice JA (Mullins P and Flanagan JA agreeing) held that the sentence was not unreasonable or unjust given the ‘depravity and persistence’ of the offending [31], which occurred over a significant period and included serious violence, protracted rape and aiming a loaded weapon at very young children. The authorities supported the sentencing judge’s observation that protracted rape would in itself attract a 10-year head sentence, using the case of R v TAQ [2020] QCA 200 as the most helpful yardstick but noting its distinguishing features. Boddice JA concluded that the period of actual custody reflected the criminality of the applicant, particularly the need for deterrence and denunciation in relation to the threats to the children [30].
R v SDI [2023] QCA 67 (18 April 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of monitoring’ – ‘Evidence of stalking’ – ‘Evidence of technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘False complaints’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Inference drawn from nature of searches’ – ‘Judicial notice’ – ‘Judicial notice that mobile phones and laptops are prima facie accurate’ – ‘Rebuttable presumption of the accuracy of 'notorious' technical instruments’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Proceedings: Application to adduce further evidence, appeal against conviction for stalking.
Charges: 1x stalking, 1x attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
Verdicts unreasonable or unsupported by evidence
2.
Error in law in admitting documents
3.
Error in law in directing that it was open to find that the appellant caused ‘detriment’
4.
Error in fact in finding without evidence that the appellant and complainant had been married, renewed their lease and other matters
5.
Error in law by failing to rule on admissibility of two exhibits
6.
Denial of fair trial in refusal to adduce evidence
Facts: The complainant woman and defendant man were married but after the relationship deteriorated the complainant left the family home with their son and her daughter from a previous relationship. The defendant was alleged to have made intimidating phone-calls to the complainant, followed her, made false complaints and accusations, and the complainant also alleged the defendant planted drugs in her car.
(The attempt to pervert the course of justice conviction was not in question on appeal. Whilst in custody the defendant had made a number of phone calls to his brother and a friend (“Arunta calls”) asking them to contact a number of people and request those people provide false statements/statutory declarations admitting responsibility for the Crime Stoppers and PoliceLink submissions in order to assist him get bail and to support his acquittal [5].)
The admissibility of Exhibits 5 and 42 were central to the appeal. Exhibit 5 was a screenshot of the daughter’s computer screen showing that the respondent’s iPhone was synched with her Gmail account. Exhibit 42 was a series of printouts from the search history on the daughter’s Gmail account, including ‘how to pay to find someone,’ ‘what will happen if I take my children against a court order?’ and ‘mobile phone locater.’
Decision: The application to adduce further evidence refused; appeal dismissed.
Morrison JA (Mullins P and Flanagan JA agreeing), held that while neither of exhibits 5 and 42 could establish that it was the appellant who synchronised the phone or conducted the searches, this did not make them inadmissible [43]. The exhibits were at least admissible as visual records of what the complainant said she saw on the screen (R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284) [44]. Additionally, Exhibit 5 was admissible for the purposes of showing that one device was synchronised with another [45].
The trial judge’s use of Exhibit 42 was restricted to the searches where the only reasonable inference was that the appellant had conducted them [62] and that even had it been wrongly admitted there was no basis for finding a miscarriage of justice as it only affected one act of stalking [63]. While the appellant submitted that the complainant had fabricated the screenshot, this was not put to the complainant during cross-examination and in the circumstances there was a strong inference to be drawn from the nature of the searches that they were conducted by the appellant [116].
Consideration was also given to the rebuttable presumption of the accuracy of ‘notorious’ technical instruments, amounting to judicial notice of the fact that a device that is generally used and known to be trustworthy is prima facie accurate (Bevan v the State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 101) [30]. Mobile phones and laptops were said to fall into this category and there was no evidence suggesting the complainant’s computer or her daughter’s iPad were other than accurate and trustworthy. The exhibits were therefore admissible as circumstantial evidence going to the question of whether the appellant had synchronised the phone and Gmail, and whether the appellant had conducted the searches [48].
The submission that no ruling on Exhibit 5 was made was said to be a misstatement as the trial judge had proceeded on the basis that the exhibit was to be admitted as record of what the complainant had seen on the computer and noted a reservation that the defence might wish to argue what it proved [53]. The appellant was also found to be bound by the defence counsel’s agreement that the admissibility of Exhibit 42 be deferred to the end of trial.
The appellant’s attempts to adduce further evidence were refused as they could have sought to adduce the evidence at trial and the evidence amounted to no more than a general attack on the complainant’s credit and therefore would not have affected the outcome.
R v Robbins [2023] QCA 18 (17 February 2023) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Dated allegations of historical violence’ – ‘History of violence to third party’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Partial defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship’ – ‘S304b criminal code (qld)’ – ‘Siblings’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against murder conviction.
Grounds: The trial judge erred in not directing the jury in relation to the partial defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship (s304B Criminal Code (Qld)).
Facts: The male appellant and homicide victim were brothers. The victim, his partner and the appellant’s daughter had come to stay with the appellant and his fiancée prior to the appellant’s wedding. During the course of dinner at the appellant’s home, an aggressive verbal argument broke out between the appellant and victim. At one point, the victim asked the appellant’s fiancé if she was really marrying the appellant and she responded that she wouldn’t if he continued to behave this way.
The appellant told the victim and his partner to leave and made further abusive comments towards the victim, apparently angered by his comment to his fiancé. They broke into a physical confrontation and both parties threw punches. During the struggle, the appellant grabbed a knife and stabbed the victim seven times. He died of knife wounds the following day.
The appellant gave evidence that the victim had been an abusive family member, making allegations of witnessing 3 separate assaults against his father. He contended that the victim had been verbally abusive towards the appellant, his father and other brother throughout his life.
Reasoning and decision: The partial defence did not arise fairly on the evidence; appeal dismissed.
A history of domestic violence in the relationship was required, necessitating a previous tendency by either party to engage in acts of serious domestic violence repeatedly or habitually against the other ([30]). The appellant’s claims regarding the victim’s past behaviour lacked an evidentiary basis and any available evidence did not clarify the nature of his conduct.
The age of the alleged incidents involving violence towards their father (occurring over 40 years ago) and fact that the conduct was not targeted at the appellant meant they did not support a history of an abusive relationship between the brothers. While it was possible for actual or threatened violence to a third person to be domestic violence against the second person in certain narrow circumstances, these were clearly not made out.
A ‘bare statement’ that verbal abuse had occurred was not enough to find family violence [39]. Repeated, habitual oral statements in certain circumstances could constitute domestic violence but this would require detail and evidence of impact. Additionally, verbal abuse was not found meet the required threshold of ‘serious’ domestic violence.
R v KBB [2022] QCA 273 (23 December 2022) (23 December 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘S132b of the evidence act 1977 (qld)’ – ‘Similar fact evidence’
Proceeding: Appeal against conviction for 1x strangulation in domestic setting.
Facts: The male appellant was charged with 1x strangulation in domestic setting, 1x suffocation in a domestic setting and 1x assault occasioning bodily harm while armed against his female partner. He was convicted on the first charge and acquitted on charges 2 and 3.
The complainant gave evidence that the appellant accused the complainant of infidelity, and the complainant slapped the appellant. The appellant he grabbed the complainant by the hair and throat, threw her onto the bed and covered her nose and mouth. When the complainant tried to leave the house, the appellant grabbed her by the throat and hit her on the head with a glass, knocking her unconscious. Medical evidence of bruising around her neck and head was submitted and the complainant gave evidence of four previous instances of physical violence.
Grounds:
1.
The verdict of the jury was unreasonable in that it was inconsistent with the verdicts of acquittal.
2.
There was an error of law in the admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence to demonstrate his propensity to commit domestic violence (under s132B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)).
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: McMurdo JA held that it was open to the jury to accept the evidence supporting the complainant’s testimony for the first charge while determining that they required independent evidentiary support before being satisfied about her credibility in relation to counts 2 and 3.
Ground 2: McMurdo JA noted that s132B has a wide operation and that ‘[o]nce the evidence is relevant, it is admissible (under s132B) subject only to the discretion to exclude it on the ground of unfairness according to s130 (Qld).’ Propensity evidence was held to constitute a relevant use, there was no requirement to satisfy the Pfennig test (Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12 (4 May 2011)) and there was no argument as to unfairness under s 130 or a miscarriage of justice.
R v CCU [2022] QCA 92 (27 May 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Absence of remorse’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: 5 x assault occasioning bodily harm; 1 x common assault; 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm, while armed; 7 x common assault (a domestic violence offence); 4 x assault occasioning bodily harm (a domestic violence offence); 1 x torture (a domestic violence offence); 2 x strangulation in a domestic setting; 1 x suffocation in a domestic setting; 1 x attempting to pervert justice (a domestic violence offence).
Case type: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: On the second day of trial, the applicant was sentenced after pleading guilty to 20 counts of violence perpetrated over eight years towards his then-partner, K, and her son. As a result of a plea bargain, three counts were withdrawn. The learned sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of six years imprisonment, declaring 53 days as pre-sentence custody, and set a parole eligibility date at two years and four months from the date of sentence. The applicant’s offending was described by the learned sentencing judge as “violent, demeaning and an appalling attempt to exercise power over K” ([34]).
Issue: Whether the learned sentencing judge erred in taking into account the applicant’s uncharged acts? Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive?
Held: In sentencing the applicant, the learned sentencing judge considered his late guilty pleas, his absence of remorse and lack of relevant criminal history, his age at the time of offending, the nature of the offending, the significant effect that the conduct had on K, her son and daughter, his background, the fact that the offences were domestic violence offences and the character references. His Honour also had regard to the fact that domestic violence crimes demean society and are to be condemned and denounced ([34]).
The Court of Appeal (Mullins, Morrison and Fraser JJA) refused leave to appeal. The applicant argued that the learned sentencing judge erred in taking into account the applicant’s uncharged acts, because, inter alia, the Crown’s statement of facts included uncharged acts that were serious and should not have been included. The first ground of appeal was rejected on the basis that:
•
The statement of facts tendered on the sentencing hearing was an agreed statement.
•
Reference to the transcript and sentencing remarks revealed that His Honour only sentenced the applicant for the offences charged.
The second ground of appeal was rejected on the basis that:
•
The offending was “protracted, violent, demeaning and controlling”. It extended beyond the complainant and some of the offending was committed in view of her children. Importantly, “it involved an ultimate degradation, the threat of elimination of life itself”, and was committed with a lack of insight and remorse ([58]).
•
The conduct can be considered worse, given that it was broken by periods of time, because the threat was “always there” ([59]).
•
The applicant attempted to pervert the course of justice to protect himself from exposure to criminal charges ([61]).
R v GBI [2022] QCA 28 (7 March 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Accusations of infidelity’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Torture’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1 (count 1), torture x 1 (count 2).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in an intimate relationship. The charges arose out of two separate assaults. During the first, the applicant punched the victim in the face. During the second, the applicant subjected the victim to several violent assaults over a 48-hour period. The assaults included kicking and punching in the face and stomach, stabbing with scissors, verbal abuse that included threats against the victim’s life, and repeated strangulation. The victim sustained serious physical and psychological injuries. The assaults accompanied accusations of infidelity by the applicant, who expressed feelings of jealousy on both occasions. The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on count 1 and six and a half years imprisonment on count 2. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the ground that his sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was rejected.
Justice Morrison found that the matters raised by the applicant as demonstrating manifest excess had been considered by the sentencing judge. These matters included the applicant’s ‘remorse’, ‘good custodial behaviour’, ‘father’s poor health’, child support obligations, debts owed to his employer, ‘limited use of weapons’, the fact that the victim’s injuries did not require ongoing treatment, and the reduction in risk by a DVO and because the relationship had ceased. His Honour affirmed the sentencing judge’s conclusion that these matters did not warrant a further reduction in the sentence to be imposed, nor justify a finding that the risk of reoffending was reduced.
R v Lewis; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2022] QCA 14 (15 February 2022) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Burning threat’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Victim impact statement’ – ‘Weapon’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: The domestic violence charges were:
1.
Common assault,
2.
unlawful assault occasioning bodily harm
3.
causing grievous bodily harm with intent (malicious act with intent) x 1 and
4.
Causing grievous bodily harm (in the alternative to count 3).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence by Attorney-General.
Issues: Whether sentence manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a two-year relationship that was characterised as ‘troubled’ and involving physical violence [2]-[4]. Both parties were users of methylamphetamine and were aged 17 at the time of the offences. On one occasion, the respondent threw petrol on the victim and threatened to set her on fire. On another occasion, the respondent threw a screwdriver at the victim, which was embedded in her hip [3]-[4]. In May 2016, during verbal argument, the respondent used petrol to set the victim on fire [5]. The respondent fled when confronted by a neighbour [14]. The victim required surgery and was hospitalised for four weeks. She was left with ongoing pain and nerve damage [22]. In January 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty to common assault (count 1) and assault occasioning bodily harm (count 2) and was found guilty in relation to causing grievous bodily harm with intent (count 3). He successfully appealed against conviction regarding count 3 but was later resentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment [30]. The Attorney General of Queensland appealed on the basis that that sentence was manifestly inadequate [57].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justices Sofronoff, Morrison and Flanagan affirmed the decision and reasoning of the sentencing Judge. Their Honours endorsed the sentencing Judge’s consideration of the appellant’s plea of guilty, expressions of remorse, insight, youth and disadvantaged upbringing [67]-[70]. Their Honours agreed with the sentencing Judge’s characterisation of the offending ‘horrendous and disgraceful offending’ and ‘abominable behaviour’ [39]-[40], with ‘devastating consequences’ for the victim that included ‘significant and life-long physical, mental and emotional difficulties’ [72]. Their Honours continued that the sentencing Judge had correctly stated that ‘the sentence had to be “just having regard to all of the circumstances”, but in particular to punish, express community denunciation, meet general and specific deterrence, provide community protection, but also, in light of the offender’s youth, have regard to his prospects of rehabilitation’ [73]. Their Honours concluded that there was ‘no demonstrated error of principle… the sentence imposed was one derived by a careful balancing of competing requirements in an overall integrated sentencing approach’ [75]. This approach ‘was in accordance with what this Court said in R v Free; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2020] QCA 58 was one of the available approaches, namely to sentence towards the top of the bounds of appropriate discretion and not reduce the parole eligibility date, rather than sentence towards the bottom and impose a serious violent offence declaration’ [75].
R v EQ [2021] QCA 257 (30 November 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Bomb threat’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Limited criminal history’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Breach of protection order x 1, assault of police officer x 1, making a bomb hoax x 1, stalking x 1, common assault x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and resentence.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married for 17 years and had two school aged daughters. The family immigrated to Australia from Egypt in 2011. After the couple separated, a domestic violence order was served on the appellant that prevented him from contacting the victim. In February 2019, the appellant repeatedly texted the victim before confronting her and their daughters at an airport. The appellant argued with the victim, before threatening her and airport staff with a knife, fake bomb, and electric shock device [12]-[17]. The appellant later admitted to police that he had been tracking the victim’s movements [19]. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charges and received a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 6 months.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing Judge erred in law by wrongly limiting the use to be made of evidence of the applicant’s mental health;
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive; and
3.
In sentencing the applicant for count 2, the learned sentencing Judge mistook the offence to which he had pleaded guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: Application for leave to appeal allowed, charge 3 dismissed, resentenced for charge 2.
Due to an administrative error the appellant was sentenced for an offence with which he had not been charged and to which he had not pleaded guilty [52]. Therefore, the proceedings had miscarried, and the appeal was allowed. As ground three was made out, the court allowed the appeal and proceeded to resentence the applicant for count 2 to 5 years imprisonment with and non-parole period of 2 years 6 months. Justices Sofronoff, Davis and Williams noted that the offending was serious, with significant impact on the commercial operations of the airport, the distress experienced by witnesses, and ongoing psychological suffering of the victim and her daughters [57]. Their Honours noted that there were mitigating circumstances, such as the appellant’s limited prior convictions, cooperation with police, early guilty plea, expression of remorse and low risk of reoffending [58]. Their Honours summarised the appellant’s psychological report, which included details of the applicant’s diminishing symptoms of anxiety and depression, and noted the relevance of mental impairment under s 16A(2)(n) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) [59]-[61]. Their Honours found that there were no comparative sentences [64]. Their Honours considered the maximum sentence for the offence, the sentencing considerations in s 16A of the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991.
R v Hartas [2021] QCA 178 (27 August 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Jealous behaviours’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’
Charges: Arson x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 27-year-old male applicant and female victim were in a 6-week relationship. Shortly after the relationship ended, the intoxicated applicant used a petrol bomb to set fire to cars owned by the victim and her partner. The cars were parked directly in front of the victim’s house, where the victim, her partner, and her 6-year-old daughter were sleeping. In February 2021, the applicant was found guilty of one count of arson, constituting a domestic violence offence, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months [1]-[8]. The applicant’s psychological report detailed ‘a complex medical history’ and ‘significant psychological problems’, which included chronic pain due to a spinal condition, alcohol misuse and a ‘longstanding mood disorder’ [25].
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing Judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s personal circumstances, specifically those evidenced by his psychological report
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive [9].
Decision and Reasoning: Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Fraser, Morrison and Applegarth JJ held the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The sentencing Judge had given appropriate weight to the applicant’s personal circumstances and mitigated the sentence accordingly [42]. The contents of the psychological report had not shown that the applicant’s mental state at the time of the offence or at the time of sentence warranted substantial weight according to R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 (23 May 2007).The applicant’s mental state did not reduce his moral culpability, nor make imprisonment more burdensome such that it ‘became an inappropriate vehicle for’ general deterrence and specific deterrence [40], and his physical condition did not make imprisonment ‘unduly onerous’ [41]. The offence was serious, as indicated by its maximum penalty of life imprisonment with the aggravating factor that it was a domestic violence offence [50]. The victim impact statement indicated serious psychological harm caused to the victim and her daughter [51]. Their Honours accepted the sentencing Judge’s characterisation as ‘an extremely serious act of domestic violence’ due to ‘its grave potential’ impact on ‘life and property’, and the psychological harm that it has caused the victim and her six-year-old daughter [51].
R v RBE [2021] QCA 146 (20 July 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Arson threats’ – ‘Error of fact’ – ‘Inference as to motive’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Section 132c evidence act 1977’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Arson of a dwelling x 1 (domestic violence offence).
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: As the complainant woman and applicant man were separating the applicant threatened to burn down the former matrimonial home. A protection order was granted protecting the complainant. The applicant has a history of major depression and complex post-traumatic stress disorder. On the date of the offence the applicant sent text messages to his son saying “goodbye” and that the house was alight. He also attempted to call the complainant and sent messages to a friend who went to the house, observed smoke, spoke to the appellant who was inside and called emergency services, then unsuccessfully attempted entry. The appellant’s evidence was that his intention was to commit suicide, but he fled the burning home having changed his mind after an unsuccessful attempted suicide. The sentencing judge expressed the view that the appellant’s expressed motives of suicide were not credible, despite accepting evidence of ligature marks on his neck supporting the appellant’s evidence he had attempted to hang himself during the incident. The judge found the appellant was seeking attention and acted vindictively to hurt his wife. The prosecution made no positive submission on motive and had submitted that all three motivations were open on the facts, advancing suicide or attention-seeking but not vindictiveness.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal, appeal allowed, sentence varied by:
•
Substituting three (3) years imprisonment; and
•
Suspending the sentence forthwith for an operational period of three (3) years.
Burns J (Morrison and McMurdo JJA concurring):
[26] ….it was not for the sentencing judge to decide what inferences arose from the agreed facts and, having done so, her Honour erred (and in a critical way) by determining a fact that was not in issue between the parties. Indeed, the procedure for resolving disputed facts provided in s 132C of the Evidence Act was not even engaged, the prosecutor having made no positive allegation about motive.
R v FBA [2021] QCA 142 (16 July 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Adequacy of jury directions’ – ‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Attempt to withdraw allegations’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Robinson direction’ – ‘S132b(2) evidence act 1977 (qld)’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Non-fatal Strangulation x 4.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship but maintained separate residences. The complainant had been staying with the complainant for 3 days when the alleged incidents occurred. The appellant made allegations of infidelity against the complainant, and they argued about that and money, the appellant refusing to drive the complainant home despite her giving him money for fuel. The complainant gave evidence that the appellant accused the complainant of stealing from him and that in four discrete incidents of physical altercations he applied pressure to her throat so that she could not breathe. She also alleged he made multiple threats to kill her and members of her extended family, locked her in the house and that she escaped with assistance from others. She went to hospital and photographs were taken of marks on her neck which were not there prior to the incident. The complainant also gave evidence of two prior incidents of violence by the appellant towards her. The complainant admitted using methylamphetamine at the time of the incidents and to attempting to withdraw her complaints, stating the reasons given for the withdrawal were false.
Grounds:
1.
The learned trial judge erred, causing the trial to miscarry, in:
(a) failing to clearly direct the jury as to the identification, purpose, and use of relationship evidence;
(b) admitting the evidence of the complainant’s daughter that she had ‘seen bruises on mum’ (the year prior to the instant allegations) as relationship evidence.
2.
The complainant’s evidence required a ‘Robinson direction’ and the failure to direct in those terms caused a miscarriage of justice.
3.
The complainant’s evidence in chief was inaudible in parts, which in the circumstances of the trial, caused the trial to miscarry.
4.
When regard is had to all the evidence, the jury verdicts are unreasonable, unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1(a) – rejected - further direction on relationship evidence would not have assisted the defence case (Sofronoff P [11], McMurdo JA agreeing, Boddice JA dissenting – the second paragraph of directions on the use of relationship evidence gave rise to a real risk of impermissible propensity reasoning).
Ground 1(b) – dismissed –the evidence was plainly admissible and relevant (Sofronoff P [13], MdMurdo JA agreeing Boddice JA dissenting – the evidence was inconsistent with the complainant’s evidence the appellant was only violent towards her in 2019).
Ground 2 – dismissed – it was clear why a ‘Robinson direction’ (pursuant to Criminal Code, s632(3)) wasn’t given, firstly the defence did not request one, and secondly “There was nothing in the present case which would have suggested to the learned judge that the jury required specific assistance in order to assess the complainant’s credibility and/or to suggest that, in the absence of such assistance, there was a risk that the jury might be unable to appreciate some exculpatory factor.” (Sofronoff P [14], McMurdo JA agreeing).
Ground 3 – dismissed – in absence of complaint at the trial it is impossible to conclude based on the transcript that evidence was inaudible (Sofronoff P [16], McMurdo JA agreeing).
Ground 4 – dismissed – while there was good reason for the jury to carefully scrutinise the complainant’s evidence (her drug use and its affects on her mental health, inconsistencies in her evidence and her attempts to withdraw the charges) it does not follow that it was not open to the jury to find her evidence as to the allegations of choking to be credible and reliable, especially as it was supported by medical evidence of injuries consistent with the allegations and her timely complaint to police. (Boddice JA [89]-[91], Sofronoff P and McMurdo JA agreeing).
R v Blockey [2021] QCA 77 (21 April 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Parole eligibility’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter (domestic violence offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male deceased had committed acts of domestic violence against the female applicant during their relationship. He was the subject of a domestic violence order. The applicant stabbed the deceased with a hunting knife. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, with parole eligibility after 3 years and 9 months imprisonment.
Grounds of appeal: Whether refusal to give parole eligibility date at one third of the sentence rendered the sentence manifestly excessive.
Held: Leave to appeal against sentence granted. Appeal against sentence allowed. Parole eligibility date was set on 22 April 2021, rather than 22 January 2022.
The Court noted the sentencing judge’s remarks, including the relevance of the applicant’s history as a repeated victim of domestic violence in sentencing:
The sentencing Judge found that: “The fact that you were such a victim of domestic violence as well as a perpetrator of domestic violence is, to my mind, sufficient to enable me to reach the conclusion that it is not reasonable in the present circumstances to treat the fact that your offending was a domestic violence offence as an aggravating feature.
Nevertheless, the sentencing judge’s conclusion that “the applicant’s cooperation was tempered by her failure to provide any comprehensive, reliable detail concerning the stabbing” was inconsistent with the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to find that “the applicant ‘engaged in consciously-informed obfuscation or denial’ designed to minimise culpability.” The applicant was under no obligation to provide a comprehensive, detailed account of the sequence of events concerning the stabbing. She accepted unlawfully causing the victim’s death by stabbing him when she pleaded guilty to his manslaughter.
In these circumstances, finding that the applicant’s cooperation in entering a timely plea of guilty was to be tempered by her failure to provide such an account of the stabbing was a misapplication of sentencing principles, particularly where there was an acceptance that the applicant was sincerely remorseful for her conduct. It was therefore necessary to re-sentence the applicant. Parole eligibility was fixed after having served 3 years of the sentence.
MS v Commissioner of Police [2021] QCA 31 (2 March 2021) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: A protection order prevented the male applicant from contacting, attempting to contact, or asking someone else to contact his female former partner except under strict circumstances. A Family Court order was also in place granting the mother sole parental responsibility for their child and restricting contact between the parties. The applicant breached the protection order by sending an email addressed to a number of people including his former partner and solicitor titled, “[The child] need to know about my mental health diagnosis.” The applicant was sentenced in the Magistrates Court to 6 months imprisonment, suspended after 2 years. The applicant’s appeal to the District Court was dismissed.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The primary judge erred in not allowing the appeal based on the existence of parental responsibility in the applicant’s communications.
2.
The primary judge erred in not applying s 24 of the Criminal Code (Qld).
Held: Application for leave to appeal was refused. There was no inconsistency: condition 6 of the protection order did not preclude the application of the exception in paragraph 18 of the Family Court order. The email was appropriately characterised as not for the “sole purpose of communication regarding parental responsibility,” and did not fall within the condition/exception in the protection order and Family Court order. On that basis, there was no room for the operation of s 24 of the Code which could not apply to a mistake by the applicant in the interpretation of the Family Court order.
R v Luxford [2020] QCA 272 (4 December 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 2; Assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) x 8; Threat of actual bodily harm (domestic violence offence) x 1; Common assault (domestic violence offence) x 2; Wilful damage (domestic violence offence) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man spent 15 years in the army, with several overseas deployments. He left on medical grounds with a shoulder injury, chronic pain, tinnitus and post-traumatic stress disorder, and was awarded compensation. He had no prior criminal history (except for a failure to secure storage of weapons charge in 2017). He participated in a Men’s Behavioural Change Program, and was accepted into a program to treat PTSD. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a period of three years and six months imprisonment for the most serious offences on the indictment (choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 2, Counts 12 and 13), to be served concurrently with the remaining sentences. The date for parole was fixed at 29 September 2021. The expiry date for a protection order granted to the complainant in 2017 was extended to 7 October 2025.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive as the applicant was required to serve actual time in custody.
Held: The sentencing judge erred in the imposition of a sentence that required actual custody, and the applicant was re-sentenced.
The court held that the applicant’s offending could not be separated from his PTSD and also his PTSD caused custody to be a greater burden on him. While the sentencing judge applied the principles in R v Rix [2014] QCA 278 where the reduction in moral culpability due to an offender’s PTSD was taken into account, the sentencing judge failed to recognise in the sentence that a custodial sentence would have a hasher effect on him than a person not suffering PTSD. The sentence did not give sufficient weight to both factors relevant in the applicant’s case due to his PTSD (at [38]).
To reflect the gravity of the offending, the most serious offence was choking causing the complainant to lose consciousness (see R v MCW [2018] QCA 241) (Count 13), a higher head sentence of 4 years imprisonment was imposed to accommodate a sentence structure that provided for the applicant’s immediate release from actual custody. This reflected the totality of the offending, but adjusted in recognition of the effect of the PTSD as a cause of the offending. For the choking that lasted three seconds, a sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment was imposed (Count 12). The effect of the applicant’s PTSD was further accommodated by suspending the sentence on Count 13 after 60 days and releasing him at the same time on parole for other offences (parole for 2 years and 4 months to provide supervision in the community). Supervision on parole was to ensure the applicant continued to access counselling and other treatment for his PTSD (at [39]).
R v Thomas [2020] QCA 236 (30 October 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application to adduce further evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction; application to adduce further evidence.
Facts: The appellant man was found guilty of the murder of his female partner following a trial confined to the issue of intent. On 24 October 2015, the victim was found with injuries to her neck consistent with strangulation and rib fractures consistent with resuscitation or blunt trauma. Evidence at trial included: evidence from several of the victim’s former partners and her aunt; records of text messages/phone calls between the appellant and the victim commencing on 9 May 2015 (showing a volatile relationship); the appellant arranging to purchase a flight ticket overseas after the victim’s death; the appellant’s confession he killed the victim to a friend (that he had been humiliated and had “grabbed her and…squeezed”, accompanied demonstrating use of two hands); and evidence from a forensic pathologist of the victim’s injuries.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge erred in law by admitting exhibit 41, which contained six inadmissible photographs, causing a miscarriage of justice.
2.
The trial judge failed to direct the jury as to how exhibit 41 could be used, thus creating the danger of impermissible reasoning by the jury.
3.
The trial judge failed to direct in relation to motive.
4.
The verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported by the evidence.
5.
The trial judge failed to leave the partial defence of provocation.
6.
The trial judge’s failure to direct the jury in relation to opinion evidence may have caused a miscarriage of justice.
7.
A collation of faults caused the trial to miscarry.
Held: The appeal was dismissed.
Grounds 1 and 2: Exhibit 41 (photographs of bruising suffered by the victim in November 2014, identified by a former partner of the victim) was tendered by the prosecutor at the request of the appellant’s trial counsel for a forensic purpose. The fact that the appellant’s counsel abandoned the forensic purpose he had in mind for exhibit 41 did not mean that the evidence became prejudicial ([32]-[38]).
Ground 3: The trial judge did not fail to give a direction concerning motive which was requested by the appellant’s counsel, stating in summing up: “Any positive evidence that the defendant lacked a motive to cause [Jane’s] death or to do her grievous bodily harm is also relevant. It would be another circumstance to be taken into account in his favour in a case based on circumstantial evidence” ([39]-[42]).
Ground 5: The trial judge did not err in failing to leave open to the jury the partial defence of provocation (where the act was caused “in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation…before there is time for the person’s passion to cool”). First, the appellant’s trial counsel expressly disavowed reliance on provocation, making it clear that the only live issue was intention. Second, there was no evidence of acts of provocation which might have led to loss of self-control. The evidence did not show any particular link between the alleged humiliation and strangulation. Third, there was no evidence to suggest provocation would have caused a loss of control in a reasonable person ([43]-[48]).
Ground 6: There was no merit in the appellant’s contention that evidence from the victim’s aunt that “whether she was an alcoholic or not…she didn’t deserve…what she got” may have introduced factors of prejudice or emotion to the jury, or influenced their decision, and the trial judge should have directed the jury to disregard those claims. The jury would not have been concerned that the victim’s aunt made a personal comment, and no direction was sought by the appellant’s counsel ([49]-[53]).
Ground 7: None of the failures of defence counsel to object to the prosecution’s case demonstrated that defence counsel’s conduct denied the appellant a fair trial ([54]-[62]).
Ground 4: The principles relevant to the role of the appellate court, and pre-eminence of the jury were recently re-stated in Pell v The Queen and R v Baden-Clay. There was ample evidence (from the pathologist and the appellant’s friend) to support the jury’s conclusion that when the appellant squeezed the victim’s neck, he did so with the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. He applied pressure to her neck, and with two hands. In particular, “[t]he level of force necessary, the length of time it was applied for, the fact that the fingers moved around and the fractures to the neck all provide a foundation to infer the requisite intent”. It was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of murder ([63]-[71]).
The appellant’s application to adduce fresh evidence was refused. The evidence requested to be adduced would have been in the hands of the defence counsel at the time of the trial, or it was irrelevant ([72]-[76]).
R v TAQ [2020] QCA 200 (15 September 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Tendency/relationship evidence’
Charges: Common assault x 9; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm while armed x 4; Rape x 1 (Charge 15).
Proceedings: Appeal against rape conviction (Charge 15); Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant was the male appellant’s former de facto partner. From 2006 the appellant became increasingly violent and controlling and committed numerous charged and uncharged assaults between 2006 and 2011. In October 2011, the appellant said to the complainant, “If you love me, darling, you’ll do it [anal]. If you don’t do it, I am going to turn you over and rape you”. The appellant then anally raped the complainant, after which he demanded oral sex and then hit her in the head. In December 2012, the complainant left the appellant but did not report the rape and assault to police until December 2016. In 2012, the appellant said to Mr P (a witness) that “he’d raped [the complainant]” and “if he didn’t get what he wanted, he’d take it”.
Grounds: (1) Mr P’s evidence of the conversation with the appellant should not have been admitted.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal against conviction dismissed. Appeal against sentence allowed due to a calculation error.
The prosecutor at trial argued that Mr P’s evidence that the appellant had said he’d raped the complainant could amount to an admission. The trial judge expressed doubt as to whether the jury could infer that it was an admission to the specific incident (Charge 15). In the summing up, the trial judge explained to the jury that Mr P’s evidence related more generally to “other incidents in which the [appellant] has through his actions, demonstrated a sexual interest in the complainant even when she is not consenting and was prepared to act on that interest” [28]. The respondent relies on R v Sakail [1993] 1 Qd R 312 as making the evidence of Mr P admissible on the basis that an admission to a rape which is not charged can be used as evidence of the nature of the relationship relevant to the charged rape:
[32] Where the act in issue for [rape] count 15 was the act of anal intercourse without the consent of the complainant, evidence of other sexual acts between the appellant and the complainant as a result of the appellant’s threats or without the consent of the complainant was evidence that could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the occurrence of the anal rape, as described by the complainant. The direction given by the trial judge focused on the nature of the conduct to which the appellant admitted in his conversation with Mr P which was a willingness to act on his sexual interest in the complainant in the absence of her consent. The evidence of Mr P was admissible as relationship evidence that revealed a tendency of the appellant to engage in sexual acts with the complainant without her consent.
[33] The appellant does not succeed on the ground of appeal that Mr P’s evidence was inadmissible.
R v SDJ [2020] QCA 157 (24 July 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Section 93a evidence act statement’ – ‘Stepchild in the family’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unreasonable verdict’
Charges: Common assault x 1 (DFV offence); Choking in a domestic setting x 1 (DFV offence).
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant (10 years old) was the male appellant’s stepson. The appellant kicked the complainant and hit him on the side of the face two or three times with an open hand. The appellant then choked the complainant with ‘a neck lock’. The complainant’s mother and a friend of the family witnessed the assault. The appellant gave evidence that he did not assault the complainant.
Ground: Verdict was unreasonable.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed. There were inconsistencies between the child complainant’s s93A Evidence Act statement (taken in a timely way after the incident) and the cross-examination (conducted 16 months after the incident) as during the latter the ‘complainant had little recollection’ of the events. However, this did not preclude the jury from relying on the s 93A statement, especially considering that the complainant’s statement was supported by evidence given by his mother and the family friend, as well as consistent medical evidence. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the jury to find the appellant guilty.
R v Young [2020] QCA 140 (26 June 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Inconsistent verdicts’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reliability’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1; choking in a domestic setting x 1
Case type:Appeal against conviction, application to adduce evidence on appeal
Facts: The appellant man was charged on indictment with one count of assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed (Count 1), one count of common assault (Count 2) and one count of choking in a domestic setting (Count 3). The Crown entered a nolle prosequi in respect of Count 1. All counts were domestic violence offences against the appellant’s female domestic partner. The complainant’s evidence at trial was that it was a mutually abusive relationship against a background of excessive drinking. A temporary protection order was made against the appellant in favour of the complainant in 2017. In relation to Count 2, it was alleged that the appellant kicked the complainant on the legs, causing her to fall. With respect to Count 3, it was argued that he grabbed the complainant around the throat. A jury found the appellant not guilty of Count 2, but guilty of Count 3. He was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, with the conviction recorded as a domestic violence offence.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence and appealed his conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence. He also submitted that the evidence against him was unreliable, inconsistent and not capable of supporting a verdict of guilty on Count 3, and that there was no corroborative evidence in relation to the complainant’s allegations as to how the strangulation occurred. The Crown argued that whilst there were weaknesses in the complainant’s evidence in terms of her reliability, those factors were fairly outlined by the trial judge in the summing up, and that the complainant’s evidence was able to be supported by other evidence.
Held: The application for leave to adduce further evidence was refused, and the appeal against conviction was dismissed. The Court found that the jury was undoubtedly fully aware of the inconsistencies in the evidence ([99]). Taking into account all of the appellant’s arguments, there was nothing which led the Court to doubt the appellant’s guilt. It was open to the jury, on the whole of the evidence, to be satisfied of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant’s account of the choking after a sustained argument in the kitchen was compelling ([102]). That account of the attack and the pressure she felt was substantiated by the medical evidence, which also indicated that the injuries were consistent with choking ([103]). Further, the evidence of witnesses was substantially consistent with the complainant’s account. Whilst there is "no requirement that a complainant’s evidence be corroborated before a jury may return a verdict of guilty upon it" (Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12 (7 April 2020), there was in fact strong corroborative evidence here. Despite some inconsistencies, particularly in relation to the time of the choking, the Court was satisfied that the jury acting rationally would not have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of guilt. Given the complainant’s level of distress at the time and her acceptance during the course of her evidence that her memory of some events of that day were unclear, a mistake as to the time the choking event occurred was understandable ([104]-[105]).
R v Castel [2020] QCA 91 (6 May 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Manslaughter (domestic violence offence)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The woman applicant and her husband and victim had been married since 2010. Throughout this time, they argued occasionally, particularly about the husband arriving home from work after 6pm. On the day of the offending, the husband arrived home after 8pm and an argument developed while the couple were in the kitchen. The applicant threw the husband’s laptop at him, then picked up a 20.5cm long kitchen knife and threw it at him from 2-3m away. It landed in his chest region and either he pulled it out or it fell out. The applicant immediately said she was sorry, used a towel to cover the wound and called 000. Despite medical intervention, the husband died. The applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with no fixed date for parole eligibility. She appealed against her sentence.
Judgment: The majority (Sofronoff P and Mullins JA) held that the head sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was not inappropriate, but that failing to fix an eligibility date for parole was "unreasonable or plainly unjust" and was manifestly excessive [38]. They emphasised that the applicant had no criminal history, showed immediate remorse for her conduct, entered an early plea of guilty and was not at high risk of reoffending, and therefore ordered that her sentence be mitigated by including a date for eligibility for parole that was one-third of the sentence in custody [38].
Mullins JA (with whom Sofranoff P agreed) further provided that "section 9(10A) of the [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)] is a legislatively prescribed aggravating factor that must be taken into account in arriving at the appropriate sentence for the offence of manslaughter that is a domestic violence offence, unless the exception within the provision due to the exceptional circumstances of the case applies" [35]. Section 9(10A) refers to offenders convicted of domestic violence offences. In such cases, the fact that the offence is a domestic violence offence is an aggravating factor that is added to the other aggravating factors and balanced with any mitigating factors [35].
Boddice J (dissenting) dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant’s offending was "an extraordinary act of violence" and was a "very dangerous action" [42] that occurred in circumstances where the applicant was sober, sane, not provoked and not acting in self-defence [43]. He considered the applicant’s offending to be a very serious example of a domestic violence offence, making the circumstance of aggravation a very relevant factor in sentencing [44]. He contended that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating features [45] and that the sentence "fell within a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion" [46].
R v HBZ [2020] QCA 73(17 April 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Step-children’
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of choking the female complainant in a domestic setting (domestic violence offence) (count 1) and common assault (domestic violence offence) (count 2) after trial before a jury in the District Court. He was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months on count 1 to be suspended after serving 15 months’ imprisonment for an operational period of three years. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for count 2.
The appellant often stayed at the complainant’s home where she lived with her five children; the appellant was the father of the youngest child. The appellant and his dog were staying at the complainant’s home when the appellant’s dog urinated on the floor and the complainant asked her son to tell the appellant.
The complainant’s evidence in chief was that:
•
The appellant hit the dog on the floor, rubbed it’s face in the urine and told the complainant his abuse of the dog was her fault. She asked him to leave, locked him out and went into a bedroom. He let himself back in with a spare key.
Re Count 1:
•
She dialled 000 and then: "[The appellant] moved the camp beds and he grabbed me, and he grabbed the phone, and then he put his hands around my neck – his right hand, and then he pushed on my shoulder at the same time to knock me onto the bed, and then he pinned me to the bed with his hand to stop me from speaking. So when I first started speaking, I could ask for help, but then the words wouldn’t come out, and I struggled to breathe."
•
The appellant grabbed the phone and smashed it. The appellant’s right hand was almost in a "V" around her throat and "instead of squeezing, he just was on top of me and used his body weight as the force to stop me from speaking". She couldn’t speak, felt pains in her chest and had black spots in her vision. She asked him to stop 3 or 4 times before she ran out of breath. She could not breathe for probably 70 seconds. She asked him to call an ambulance because she couldn’t breathe. [5]
Re Count 2:
•
"He grabbed my shoulders. When I was having difficulty breathing before he left, he grabbed my shoulders and shaked me and…. he shook me so hard that I was just flicking back and forth, and I could feel my neck – like, the back of my head hitting the back of my shoulders…."
•
He gave her "a really, really tight hug" and grabbed her by the shoulders. She told him to leave and he left.
•
She made a video diary of the incident and her injuries.
In cross-examination:
•
"The complainant denied, when it was put to her, that after the incident she was having trouble breathing due to a panic attack."
•
When it was put to the complainant that the appellant did not have his hand on her neck or throat "that much" she disagreed; "He pushed the air out of me and I thought I was going to die." [10]
•
She recorded in her video diary: "I’m finding it hard to breathe. I think it’s just a panic attack. Because he didn’t have his hand around my neck and throat that much." [11]
•
She did not call the ambulance immediately: "I was still having trouble breathing, which is why, on the video, I said I felt like I was having a panic attack during the video. Because I couldn’t understand, after his hand had been removed, why I was still having difficulty breathing.""[11]
•
She denied moving the camp beds into the bedroom after he left. [12]
Medical records included a note: "the patient states her partner pushed her onto the bed and strangled her with both hand pushing downwards then made multiple blows with fists to the shoulder and head. Patient unsure if knocked out."
In the complainant’s video record of interview he said there was a struggle for the phone. "He then sat down, gave her a big hug and got her to calm down. He denied choking her or trying to do that. He thought his thumb may have made contact with her during the struggle for the phone."[20]
Against the objection of defence counsel [21] the jury were given both a handout and direction in the terms: "‘Choked’ is an English word that bears its ordinary, everyday meaning – that is – ‘to hinder or stop the breathing of a person’."[20] Defence counsel argued there was only one definition given to the jury whereas dictionaries gave various definitions. [23]
Grounds: The grounds of appeal against conviction were:
1.
the learned trial judge erred in the direction given to the jury on the definition of choking;
2.
the appellant was deprived of a fair trial, because of the manner in which the allegations of fact in count 1 were particularised;
3.
the verdicts on counts 1 and 2 were unreasonable and cannot be supported, having regarded to the evidence.
The sole ground of the application for leave to appeal against sentence was that the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Held:
1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.
Ground 1: Mullins JA considered the construction of s 315A Criminal Code (Qld) in light of s14A Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the purpose given for the introduction of the offence in the relevant Bill Explanatory Notes referring to recommendation 120 of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (Queensland) in its Report Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland.
"In order to amount to choking, there must be some pressure that results at least in the restriction of the victim’s breathing. As the evidence in this trial illustrated, there were overt signs in the consequences the complainant described of her struggle to breathe, her inability to speak, the black dots in her vision, the pain in her chest, and her feeling disoriented from which it could be inferred there was some restriction of her breathing, as a result of the appellant’s hand around her neck. The consequence of the restriction of the complainant’s breathing was not a separate element of the offence, but the evidence required to prove the act of choking."
The direction given by the trial judge on the meaning of "choked" was correct. It was a direction on the law. The meaning of the word "choked" for the purpose of count 1 was a matter of legal interpretation and it was appropriate that the judge directed the jury to apply the meaning "to hinder or stop the breathing of a person"." [58]-[59]
Ground 2: The appellant’s argument was that as the particulars specified alternative conduct for each count they failed to sufficiently inform him of the case against him (Count 1: "stopped and/or hindered [the complainant’s] breathing and, in doing so, choked her"; Count 2: "shook and/or applied force to [the complainant’s] shoulders and, in doing so, he unlawfully assaulted her" [60]). The complaint re Count 1 was resolved by the conclusion as to meaning of "choke" re ground 1; it was sufficient that the jury be satisfied the complainant putting his hand around her neck hindered her breathing [62]. There was no substance to the complaint re Count 2 [63].
Ground 3: The jury were given extensive and appropriate directions that they could not convict unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was "a reliable and truthful witness"… "that she was choked by the [appellant] by him placing his right hand around her throat and squeezed in the way that she described" and similar directions were given re Count 2 [65]. The jury’s verdicts were not unreasonable [66].
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted.
3. Appeal against sentence allowed.
The trial judge considered the sentencing decisions in R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 and R v MDB [2018] QCA 283. Mullins JA said: "Objectively, the appellant’s offending was less serious than the offending in MCW and MDB. The appellant also was younger than those offenders and without the relevant prior criminal history. It was therefore surprising that the prosecutor at the trial submitted to the trial judge that a sentence in the order of three years and six months or four years’ imprisonment was appropriate. It does not assist a sentencing judge, when the prosecutor’s submissions propose a sentence that is outside the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion for the offending committed by the particular offender." [71]
4. Set aside the sentence imposed at first instance for count 1 and, in lieu, the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years with the parole release date fixed at 5 June 2020.
5. The declaration as to pre-sentence custody and other orders made at first instance are confirmed.
R v Ridgeway [2020] QCA 38 (10 March 2020) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Alternative hypothesis’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Post-offence conduct as evidence of consciousness of guilt’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Verdict unreasonable or insupportable having regard to evidence’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1 (aggravating circumstance of being a domestic violence offence).
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of one count of attempted murder (domestic violence offence) and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years. The appellant, an electronics engineer, was alleged to have attempted to murder his wife (the victim) by connecting a garden hose to a nitrogen gas cylinder which was then attached to the inside of the caravan where the victim slept. There was evidence that the appellant had motive to kill the victim because she was taking preliminary steps to divorce him and had demanded that he leave the matrimonial home. She had also left a will making him her beneficiary. In his police interview, the appellant denied knowledge of the contraption. At trial, however, he admitted that he constructed the contraption as a drainage system ([74]). Further, the appellant acknowledged his relationship difficulties with the victim and told police that they had an argument concerning their daughter. According to the victim, that argument led to the appellant pushing her against a wall while threatening to punch her. As a result, she called the Domestic Violence Hotline.
In summary, the appellant’s case was that the Crown had failed to exclude the hypothesis that the victim had constructed the apparatus, because there was evidence that:
•
She had a motive to implicate her husband falsely in a murder attempt.
•
The appellant must have appreciated that the apparatus could not have killed his wife.
•
The contraption was ineffective to kill.
Issue: The appellant appealed against conviction. He submitted that the guilty verdict could not be supported by the evidence or was unreasonable ([52]) (Ground 1). He also claimed that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that an essential step in the chain of reasoning was that the appellant believed that introducing nitrogen into the caravan would kill his wife ([97]) (Ground 2), and complained about the trial judge directions as to the use of post-offence conduct as proof of his intention ([107]) (Ground 3). His appeal also included the claim that there was a failure to distinguish attempted murder from other offending based on the same physical acts, but with different mental elements, which might have explained the post-offence conduct ([114]) (Ground 4).
Held: All four grounds of appeal were dismissed. Sofronoff P (with Philippides JA and Flanagan J agreeing) noted that it was open to the jury to reject the appellant’s explanation for constructing the contraption. His credit was impaired by his failure to offer this explanation when first interviewed by police. Further, the verisimilitude of his explanation was reduced by the uselessness of the contraption as a drainage system, and the inconsistencies in his reasons for erecting the drainage system. The jury was therefore entitled to accept the victim’s evidence and be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant constructed the apparatus to deliver gas into the caravan in which his wife was sleeping ([81]-[82]). The evidence that the victim had informed the appellant that she wanted a divorce, together with the evidence of lies to police, supported a conclusion that the appellant believed that he had built a system that would be effective to kill ([88]). His Honour therefore held that the jury could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt.
As to the second ground of appeal, the appellant was unable to establish a miscarriage of justice by merely asserting that the trial judge miscarried through a lack of proper directions about proof of the appellant’s intention ([106]). A redirection was not sought ([101]). Whilst the trial judge did not identify the series of evidentiary steps that the jury could take to find guilty intent, doing so would have assisted the prosecution, not the defence ([106]).
Further, the appellant submitted that there was an alternative hypothesis that he had set up the apparatus to harass his wife, and therefore, his post-offence conduct was indicative of his sense of guilt for trying to harass her ([109]). This submission failed because harassment by the use of nitrogen, as an alternative hypothesis, did not arise as an issue in the case ([110]).
Ground 4 was also rejected. Citing R v Baden-Clay, the Court stated that "it is not necessary for a jury to consider a hypothesis which was not put to it for tactical reasons, which is directly contrary to the evidence that the accused gave at the trial and which is directly contrary to the way in which the accused’s counsel conducted the defence". Any intention on the appellant’s part to do anything other than kill his wife or drain water did not arise on the evidence and did not have to be considered ([120]).
R v Toweel [2019] QCA 303 (20 December 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prior acts of domestic violence’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1 x unlawful strangulation; 1 x unlawful assault
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was charged with 2 offences, committed on the same day against a woman (the complainant) with whom he was in a domestic relationship and had a child. Count 1 involved the appellant strangling the complainant ‘really tight’ for a period of about 15 seconds, stopping only when their son fell from a couch. Count 2 occurred shortly afterwards. The appellant grabbed the complainant’s hair and repeatedly said ‘bitch’ while she held their son. The appellant then destroyed her phone ([4]-[5]). The complainant also gave evidence of 5 previous incidents of domestic violence ([11]-[17]); however, the appellant did not give or call evidence ([18]). The jury convicted the appellant on both counts.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the appeal against the convictions should be allowed. The appellant appealed against each conviction on the ground that the trial judge wrongly admitted evidence of prior acts of domestic violence by him against the complainant. He also appealed against the conviction on the strangulation charge on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal. The evidence summarised at [4]-[18] was admitted under s 132B(2) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). The question for the Court was whether the admission of the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice ([34]). The Court held that the evidence of prior events was relevant to establish that the alleged offending did not occur randomly and to demonstrate the nature of the relationship between the appellant and complainant. To minimise any risk of the jury engaging in propensity reasoning, the trial judge warned them that they were not to use the evidence as demonstrating the appellant’s propensity to commit similar offences ([37]-[38]). Overall, the jury directions avoided the misuse of the evidence, and no miscarriage of justice was caused by its admission ([40]).
Vital v DPP (Qld) [2019] QCA 290 (6 December 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1; assault occasioning bodily harm while armed and in company x 1; burglary at night x 1; common assault x 1; and robbery with personal violence as a domestic violence offence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The accused was a 19-year-old male with no prior criminal history. He was in an abusive relationship with the daughter of a man he was charged with murdering at the time of offending.
On the day of the offending, the daughter told the accused their relationship was over. That night, the appellant was in the daughter’s bedroom when she came home but was asked to leave by her flatmate. After leaving the apartment he began to make a nuisance of himself, causing the flatmate to call the daughter’s father (the victim) who soon arrived with another man. The appellant fled by car with his companion and was followed by the victim and the other man. The appellant eventually stopped the car and his companion went onto the road and took out a pistol which he pointed at the victim’s car. The victim’s companion approached the appellant, who was still in the car, and began to punch the window.
The appellant’s companion hit the victim with his pistol and knocked him unconscious. This blow ultimately killed the victim. The appellant and his companion then took off, briefly returning to the daughter’s home and punching her two or three times in the face before fleeing again.
The appellant submitted that the judge who refused his bail application ‘must not have given consideration to the appellant’s youth, his lack of criminal history and, as the appellant asserts, the weakness of the Crown case against him, the weight that these matters deserved’. He submits that it should be inferred that Justice Davis made an error, and in oral argument, he has also submitted, that Justice Davis must have overlooked the extraordinary delay of about 18 months until there can be a trial in this matter. (per Soffronoff P at [7-8]).
Issue: Whether to grant leave to appeal.
Decision and reasoning: Sofronoff P stated that ‘in an appeal against a discretionary decision, it is not a valid ground of appeal to contend that the judge did not give sufficient weight to a relevant factor or gave too much weight to a factor. Weight is a matter for the decision-maker alone’ [7]. His Honour thus dismissed the appellant’s related claims.
The submission that the judge must have overlooked the delay was not accepted as a delay of that order was to be expected [12]. Furthermore, regarding the appellant’s claim of error, Sofronoff P concluded that ‘[i]n an application for bail, the appellant’s actions after he returned to Jane’s house could, on their own, justify a refusal of bail. When they are taken into account in a case in which the applicant is also awaiting trial for murder, refusal of bail can hardly be regarded as so unreasonable that an error of some kind in the judge’s reasoning has to be inferred. Yet that is what the appellant must show in order to persuade this Curt to disturb the decision of Justice Davis. In my view, he has failed to do so, and the appeal should be dismissed’ [13].
R v O'Malley [2019] QCA 130 (28 June 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Dysfunctional upbringing’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: 1 x manslaughter
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter by unlawfully killing the deceased, with whom he was in a domestic relationship for some 18 months. The applicant was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The conviction was declared to be a domestic violence offence and a serious violent offence.
The applicant told ambulance offices that the deceased fell off the toilet shortly before he had called them, and that she had also fallen in the shower the night before ([11]). However, a post-mortem of the deceased’s body revealed that the most likely cause of death was multiple injuries, including multiple rib fractures and liver lacerations. Such injuries were inconsistent with a fall in a shower, and were most likely to have resulted from a ‘focused and severe force, such as kicking or stomping’ ([14]). Although the applicant disagreed with the pathology report ([21]), his mobile phone records demonstrated that he knew the deceased had broken ribs ([22]). The agreed statement of facts recorded that the applicant was to be sentenced on the basis that he (1) unlawfully assaulted the deceased causing the injuries which led to her death; (2) kneed her to the stomach and to the back; (3) caused head and facial injuries; and (4) assaulted her in the past as evidenced by the facial bruising previously observed by witnesses and the healing fractures, which demonstrate that this was not an isolated violent incident ([24]).
Issue: The applicant filed an application for leave to appeal against his sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive, and wished to add an additional ground of appeal, namely, ‘that the learned sentencing judge erred in finding that his post-offence conduct demonstrated a complete disregard for the deceased and did not demonstrate remorse or concern for the deceased’ ([48]).
Held: The applicant’s antecedents and criminal history is discussed at [25]-[36]). The applicant has Aboriginal heritage. He also had a history of criminal offending, including convictions for breaking and entering, and property damage, and, most importantly, for offences against his former partner for property damage, common assault, contravention of a prohibition or restriction in an apprehended violence order, and use of a carriage service to menace, harass or offend. He claimed to have had a ‘socially deprived upbringing’ - his father was a ‘professional and serial criminal’ and his step-mother was emotionally abusive. His biological mother was not involved in his care due to very heavy alcohol dependency and abuse. He also claimed to have been sexually abused when he was 11 years old. Psychological testing suggested that the applicant’s intellectual level likely fell in the intellectually disabled range. A psychologist observed that his dysfunctional and abusive upbringing likely significantly influenced his offending behaviour.
The Court distinguished the present case from DeSalvo, Murray, West and Heazlewood where the courts did not consider a domestic violence offence ([89]). The applicant had a relevant prior criminal history, including convictions for prior domestic violence episodes, which distinguished him from the offenders in Sebo, Baggott, Pringle and Hutchinson ([91]). Given the ‘seriousness of the offending manifested by the brutality of the applicant’s assault and the relative defencelessness of the deceased, the applicant’s remorse after the assault, his timely plea of guilty, his antecedents, his deprived social upbringing, his intellectual disability and the state of his mental health, and bearing in mind the need for some personal deterrence due to his past domestic violence offences and his moderate risk of reoffending, the related need for community protection, and the importance of denunciation of domestic violence offences causing death’, the sentence imposed by the trial judge was just in all the circumstances, and thus stood as ‘the appropriate sentence for the offender and the offence’ ([95]-[96]). Consequently, leave to appeal against sentence was dismissed on both grounds.
R v Sprott; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2019] QCA 116 (14 June 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Leniency’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and his partner had an argument after the respondent came home from the pub. The respondent later walked to his mother’s house, where his mother lived with her partner, and violently assaulted them. The respondent’s mother suffered multiple injuries, including a fracture to her eye socket, while her partner suffered fractures, 2 broken ribs and an injured liver. The respondent pleaded guilty to 2 counts of attempted murder. Crow J, the sentencing judge, sentenced the respondent to 2 concurrent sentences of 9 and a half years imprisonment.
Issue: The Attorney-General appealed against the 2 sentences on the ground of manifest inadequacy. Key questions included whether Crow J gave appropriate weight to the mitigating and aggravating factors of the offence and the respondent’s personal circumstances, and whether a sentence below 10 years imprisonment for 2 counts of attempted murder was manifestly inadequate.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal. Appellate intervention is not justified simply because the result is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases ([15]). Rather, the Attorney-General was required to demonstrate actual error with Crow J’s reasoning.
The Attorney-General’s submissions included that the attacks were premeditated, that the respondent lacked remorse, that his guilty pleas were late, and that he carried out the offending while he was subject to a Domestic Violence Order ([20]). The respondent had previously assaulted his mother. It was submitted that the Crow J did not give these matters appropriate weight ([21]).
The Court noted that the case involved substantial mitigating factors that were personal to the respondent ([23]). The respondent’s current state of health was partly caused by his mother’s lifelong neglect of him, and was significantly exacerbated by both of his victims’ irresponsibility over the respondent’s son’s death, and by their callousness afterwards ([40]).
It was in these circumstances that Crow J viewed the respondent’s case as ‘far from general.’ The most relevant circumstance was the killing of the respondent’s son by the victims’ dog ([37]). The offending was motivated by the son’s death ‘in a most violent fashion’ ([35]). The Court held that it was open for Crow J to give substantial weight to the mitigating factors and, subsequently, impose a somewhat ‘lenient’ sentence. It was not for the Court of Appeal to substitute its own views about these matters ([41]).
R v Black [2019] QCA 114 (11 June 2019)– Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’
Charges: Assaults occasioning bodily harm x 3; Rape x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of 2 counts of assault occasioning bodily harm and one count of rape. He was acquitted of another charge of assault. For the offence of rape, the appellant was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 27 months with an operational period of 5 years. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 12 months’ imprisonment on the other counts.
The appellant and complainant were married and had 2 children when the offending allegedly occurred. They separated around one year later. The first count of assault occasioning bodily harm involved allegations that the appellant pushed the complainant against a staircase, verbally abused her, ripped off her clothes and grabbed her breasts. The complainant said that she suffered bruising as a result of this event. The second count involved allegations that the appellant unlawfully assaulted and caused bodily harm to the complainant by slamming a door closed, hitting her fingers. The appellant also allegedly raped the complainant. It was alleged that the appellant and complainant were on good terms for many years after the couple had divorced. The complaint was made to the police over 8 years after the alleged events occurred and at a time when the complainant and the appellant were in litigation about their children.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the convictions on the ground that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence.
Held: The appellant submitted that the complainant’s attitude towards the appellant after separation was not that which would be expected of someone who had suffered the conduct alleged ([24]). The Court held that the cordial relationship between the parties provided a substantial basis for challenging her testimony, and may have justified a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury in relation to the count of rape ([35]).
However the question for the Court was whether it was open, on the whole of the evidence, for the jury to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt, having regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over the Court, which had not seen or heard the complainant’s evidence being given ([36]).
Their Honours noted the importance of the timing of the complaint to police. While it strongly indicated that it was affected by the litigation between the couple about their children, it did not require the jury to have a doubt about the credibility of the complainant’s complaints. It was open to the jury to accept the complainant’s evidence, and the Court ordered the appeals against conviction to be dismissed ([37]-[38]).
R v ABE [2019] QCA 83 (14 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Primary carer’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: Stalking x 1 (Count 1); malicious act with intent x 1 (Count 2); grievous bodily harm x 1 (Count 3).
Case type: Sentence application and appeal.
Facts: The applicant experienced domestic violence from her husband (the complainant) from 2005. Cross-protection orders prohibited them from living together. The applicant arrived at the matrimonial residence with two children of the marriage. Her husband was residing at that residence. That night, the complainant sustained 4 stab wounds at the hands of the applicant. He also suffered 2 lacerations to the right hand that caused tendon and nerve damage. These events constituted Counts 2 and 3. The applicant and complainant were separated, and their severely disabled daughter, AA, was in hospital at the time of the offending. The applicant is her primary carer. The complainant for Count 1 was a family friend who was having an affair with the complainant.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges. She was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for Count 1, and six years’ imprisonment with a parole eligibility date fixed after serving 15 months in custody for each of the other counts.
As the sentence for the stalking was already served, the purpose of the application was to review the sentence imposed for the other counts. The applicant applied for leave to appeal against her sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge erred in failing to find that the circumstances of AA were exceptional and therefore justified a non-custodial sentence. The applicant also applied for leave to adduce further evidence, namely an affidavit from her adult daughter which detailed the care arrangements for AA since the applicant went into custody.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account the applicant’s disabled daughter’s needs.
Held: The appeal against the sentence was allowed, and the sentence was varied. Mullins J noted that the offences were committed in circumstances where the applicant was AA’s primary carer. When imposing an appropriate sentence, a balancing exercise needs to be undertaken which fulfils the purposes of ‘sentencing for serious offending involving premeditated use of a weapon to inflict injury in a domestic setting, but also [to] allow for the mitigating circumstances and particularly the applicant’s role in relation to the special needs of AA’. The period served in custody should be sufficiently long to reflect appropriate punishment for the crime, without separating the applicant from AA for any longer than is necessary ([47]). Her Honour held that, in light of AA’s needs, the custodial component of the sentence should have been reduced by a further period of 6 months. Therefore, the sentence was manifestly excessive to the extent of fixing the parole eligibility date after 15 months in custody rather than after a period of 9 months ([48]). Davis J and Sofronoff P agreed with the reasons of Mullins J. Citing R v Chong; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2008] QCA 22, Davis J noted that although hardship to an offender’s family resulting from the offender’s imprisonment cannot override all other sentencing considerations, there will be some cases where family hardship results in a substantial reduction either in the sentence, or the period to be served before parole eligibility even where the offending is serious ([52]).
The Court also refused the application for leave to adduce further evidence because it was neither necessary nor expedient, in the interests of justice, to receive further affidavits of the adult daughter ([37]).
R v Lan [2019] QCA 76 (7 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-serving statements’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1 x attempted murder
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was convicted on his plea of guilty of attempted murder (domestic violence offence) and sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment with no further order ([1]). The applicant and complainant were involved in a relationship for approximately one year prior to separating, but remained friends. The offending conduct took place when the applicant attended the complainant’s unit. He made unwanted advances towards her, punched her and threatened to kill her. The complainant lost consciousness for a period and, upon regaining consciousness, saw the applicant standing over her with his pants and underwear down. He also strangled the complainant. The applicant later provided self-serving statements to the police which sought to blame the complainant for violent behaviour towards him ([3]-[13]).
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.
Held: The applicant made a number of written submissions in support of his application ([22]). He maintained that she had burned his face with a lighter ([23]), which was not part of the agreed statement of facts. He also asserted that the complainant suffered from a mental illness ([24]), and sought to minimise the seriousness of his conduct, which demonstrated a lack of remorse or insight ([25]).
The application for leave to appeal against the sentence for attempted murder was refused. Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Mullins J found that the applicant’s assertions conflicted with the agreed facts and partly reiterated the self-serving statements he made to police ([26]). Their Honours agreed with the respondent’s submissions that the sentence imposed was within the sentencing discretion and supported by authorities such as R v Sauvao, R v Ali, R v Seijbel-Chocmingkwan and R v Kerwin. After analysing these authorities at [28]-[31], their Honours found that they demonstrated that the 9 year sentence was within the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion ([32]).
R v Kau [2019] QCA 73 (3 May 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Corroborative evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence offence’ – ‘Mistake direction’ – ‘Rape -sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 2 x rape (domestic violence offence)
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was charged with 4 counts of rape, and convicted on 2 counts as a domestic violence offence. He was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 2 and a half years in custody. The complainant was the appellant’s wife. Counts 1 and 3 (subjects of the guilty verdicts) were particularised as vaginal rapes, while Counts 2 and 4 (subjects of the not guilty verdicts) were alleged anal rapes ([4]).
Issue: The appellant appealed against his conviction on 2 grounds ([5]):
•
‘The convictions should be set aside as unreasonable because the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on the other counts’;
•
‘There was a miscarriage of justice because the…trial judge ought to have directed the jury to consider whether they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant did not act under a mistake of fact as to the complainant’s consent on the two counts the subject of the guilty verdicts’.
Held: To succeed on the first appeal ground, the appellant must prove the verdicts were inconsistent as a matter of logic and reasonableness. The test is that ‘no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion’ ([6]). There were 3 differences in the quality of the evidence considered by the jury ([9]), namely, the difference in what the complainant told her confidantes before she reported to the police ([10]), the difference in her report to the police ([11]), and a recording of a conversation between the complainant and appellant in which she made no mention to anal penetration ([12]). There was also evidence that might have corroborated Counts 1 and 3 ([15]), but there was no such evidence about Count 2 or 4 ([20]). The Court held that it was open for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt on Counts 1 and 3. The differences in the quality of the complainant’s evidence and appellant’s corroborative evidence provided a logical and reasonable basis for the jury to arrive at different conclusions and return different verdicts for Counts 1 and 3 and Counts 2 and 4 ([23]).
The second appeal ground argued that the jury ought to have been directed to consider whether the Crown had satisfied them beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had not acted under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief that the complainant had consented to the vaginal penetrations. To succeed on this proposed ground, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial judge should have given a mistake direction and that it is reasonably possible that the failure to do so may have affected the verdict ([24]). In light of the evidence, there was a negligible prospect of the jury, having accepted the occurrence of the vaginal penetrations, having a reasonable doubt whether the appellant acted under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief as to the complainant’s consent. In the circumstances, the trial judge was under no duty to give such a direction ([39]). The appellant was therefore not deprived of a real chance of an acquittal by the failure of the trial judge to give a mistake direction to the jury.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
R v Sollitt [2019] QCA 44 (19 February 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; contravention of a domestic violence order; rape.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for an extension of time.
Facts: The appellant was charged with a number of offences against the complainant, his then de facto partner. The complainant’s daughter and son gave evidence of the events ([33]-[40]). The complainant herself gave evidence asserting that she was in a ‘domestic violence cycle’ ([23]). After a trial, the appellant was convicted of two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence) and contravention of a domestic violence order. The jury acquitted the appellant of a charge of torture and was unable to reach a verdict in relation to a charge of rape. After a retrial on the charge of rape, the appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment ([1]-[4]). The appellant submitted that consent was given by the complainant and that sexual intercourse in the context of the violent circumstances was not a departure from the usual dynamics of the relationship. The Crown contended that if there was any ostensible consent by the complainant, it was induced by force and invalid at law, and that the appellant could not have held a mistake of fact as to consent ([46]). The appellant appealed against his conviction of rape on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable and unsafe, and there was a miscarriage of justice, resulting from the trial judge’s misdirection of the jury on the defence of mistake of fact ([5]).
Further, the appellant sought an extension of time in which to appeal his sentence ([6]). The applicant’s explanation for delay in filing the application for leave to appeal against sentence was that his lawyer did not provide him with any information about appealing his sentence and that he thought he would be able to get more time ([69]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unreasonable or insupportable. Whether the appeal should be allowed. The predominant issue at trial was the issue of consent, including a mistake of fact as to the complainant’s consent.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed and the application for an extension of time was refused.
Appeal against conviction:
In relation to the appellant’s contention that the jury’s verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, the Court considered whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty based on the whole of the evidence. In determining this question, the Court undertook its own independent assessment of the evidence, assessing its sufficiency and quality ([45]). As to the issue of consent, the Court held that it was entirely open to a jury to find that the complainant gave an honest and reliable account, and it was not surprising that the jury were satisfied that the prosecution had negatived any mistake of fact as to consent on the part of the appellant. There was no evidence from the appellant that he held an honest but mistaken belief as to voluntary consent. Moreover, the appellant’s conduct immediately following the offence and his admission to the complainant’s daughter undermined any assertion that the appellant honestly and reasonably believed that the complainant consented ([51]-[52]). It was also appropriate for the jury to have regard to the ‘ongoing domestic violence in the relationship’ and the complainant’s continuation of the relationship in considering the issues raised by the case ([53]).
The appellant also made a number of complaints about the trial judge’s directions, such as the fact that his Honour used a number of terms interchangeably regarding consent ([58]) and, in giving his final direction on mistake of fact, failed to give a repeat direction on the standard of proof required of the prosecution to negate the defence of mistake of fact beyond reasonable doubt ([64]). The trial judge’s use of the words other than ‘consent’ was not found to constitute a miscarriage of justice ([60]). Further, there was no error in failing to specifically mention the standard of proof in the final redirection, as it was given in conjunction with the aide memoire, which itself identified the requisite standard of proof ([66]).
Extension of time:
In considering whether an extension of time should be granted, the court examined whether there was any good reason to account for the delay and considered whether it was in the interests of justice to grant the extension ([68]). The Court was not persuaded that there was any good reason for the delay to grant an extension ([69]). Moreover, the applicant was 43 years old at the time of the sentence and had repeatedly been convicted of offences of violence, particularly in a domestic setting. These factors supported the sentence imposed and indicated that the sentence was not manifestly excessive ([70]).
R v ABB [2019] QCA 22 (19 February 2019) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Expert or opinion evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Charges: Assault, constituting a domestic offence x 4.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for extension of time.
Facts: The applicant was convicted on four counts of assault, each of which constituted a domestic offence. All four counts were committed against the applicant’s wife on the same day. The applicant grabbed the complainant’s hair and pulled her to the ground, put his hands around her throat and choked her, and punched her on the jaw with both fists, which resulted in a fracture and required her teeth to be wired together and the fracture closed with a plate and screws ([4]). At the trial, Dr Webster gave evidence, based on the complainant’s medical records, that the injury had been caused by a blunt force trauma to a significant extent ([30]). The applicant lodged a notice of appeal against his conviction when the time for lodging an appeal had expired over three weeks prior. As a result, the applicant also filed an application for extension of time within which to appeal.
The applicant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory ([32]). He also raised a number of specific grounds, including that
•
The prosecution led propensity evidence, the prejudicial effect of which outweighed any probative force, and created an unfair trial ([33]-[36]);
•
The evidence of Dr Webster was fabricated, causing a miscarriage of justice ([37]-[43]);
•
The complainant at trial had previously practiced her evidence and amended the part of the evidence that would have been harmful to the prosecution case ([44]-[45]);
•
A prejudicial answer was given by the complainant during the trial and there was no direction given to the jury to disregard it ([46]-[51]);
•
There was discrepancy in the complainant’s evidence as to how she was punched;
•
Dr Webster was not qualified to give an opinion that the injury constituted grievous bodily harm as he was merely a trainee as an oral and maxillofacial surgeon ([54]).
Issues: Whether the grounds of the applicant’s proposed appeal had reasonable prospects of success to justify granting an extension of time.
Decision and reasoning: When considering an application for extension of time, the court will examine whether there is good reason for the delay and whether it is in the interests of justice to grant the extension. Length of delay is also a relevant consideration ([7]). Although the length of the delay was not significant, the applicant was well aware of the time limit for filing and allowed the time to pass without taking steps to file a notice of appeal. The Court was inclined to grant the extension of time if the matter had been confined to these considerations; however as the merits of the proposed appeal could not be substantiated, the court refused the application ([22]-[23]).
The applicant’s grounds of appeal failed for several reasons. First, the jury was expressly directed that the evidence was not led as propensity evidence and therefore the trial did not miscarry on the basis that the prosecution led such evidence ([36]). Second, the applicant’s contention that Dr Webster’s alteration of his opinion constituted some sort of fabrication of his evidence, causing a miscarriage of justice, was misconceived ([37]). Third, any suggestion that the complainant was able to rehearse or practice her evidence at the first trial was simply the result of the fact that the first trial was aborted. Whatever benefit she got from giving evidence on that occasion was balanced by the fact that the defence counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine her more than once, and so no prejudice was caused ([45]). Fourth, the Court found that an answer by the complainant, which the applicant argued caused him prejudice as it revealed his infidelity, was unlikely to have carried much weight with the jury and did not deprive the applicant of a fair chance of acquittal ([51]). Fifth, the applicant contended that there were discrepancies in the complainant’s evidence because in her evidence in chief, she said that she was punched after she fell; however in cross-examination, she said she did not scream when she was punched, but when she fell. The Court held that there was no real inconsistency as the first piece of evidence related to when she was punched and the second to when she screamed ([52])-([53]). Sixth, it was admitted at the trial that the injury constituted grievous bodily harm. The fact that Dr Webster was a trainee did not mean that he was not a relevant expert ([54]-[58]).
In reviewing the evidence ([94]-[107]), the Court held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied of the applicant’s guilt. As all the grounds of the applicant’s appeal lacked merit, the appeal had no reasonable prospect of succeeding and the application for an extension of time was refused ([108]). The Court also took into account the fact that the applicant was self-represented ([59]).
R v MDB [2018] QCA 283 (19 October 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating feature’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence offences’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 1x common assault, 1x threatening violence, 1x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1x choking in a domestic setting, and 1x wilful damage.
Appeal type: application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the complainant from August 2016. On 22 December 2016, a protection order requiring that the applicant be of good behaviour and not commit acts of domestic violence against the complainant was issued pursuant to the Domestic and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). On 17 February 2017, the applicant attacked the complainant. Consequently, the applicant was charged with five offences (common assault, threatening violence, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, choking in a domestic setting, wilful damage) and three summary offences (deprivation of liberty, breach protection order, unlawful possession of a weapon). On 15 February 2018, the applicant was convicted and sentenced on the five indicted offences and convicted of the three summary offences without any further punishment.
Issues: there were four grounds of the applicant’s appeal:
•
Four-year sentence imposed for the offence of choking was manifestly excessive
•
The sentencing judge erred by relying upon the protection order as evidence that the offending was not isolated.
•
The sentencing judge erred by finding that the applicant had made a threat to kill.
•
The sentencing judge erred by finding that the applicant was generally not credible because he told police it wasn’t illegal to possess a “flick knife” in a private place in circumstances where he was previously convicted of possessing a knife in a public place.
Decision and reasoning: application for leave to appeal against the sentence refused.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive was determined by Gotterson JA through a consideration of relevant authority, the nature and purpose of the offence of choking, and the circumstances of the case at hand. Both R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 and Bennet were referred to by his Honour to illustrate the seriousness of the offence and the factors relevant to sentencing offenders under the offence (see [44]-[50]). His Honour then noted there were five material facts that warranted the severity of the punishment; these factors included, among others, the disturbing circumstances of the offending, the physical, emotional and financial impact it had on the complainant, and the applicant’s concerning criminal history (see [52]).
As to the second ground of appeal, his Honour initially notes that the order was part of the agreed facts which formed the basis of the sentence proceedings. Gotterson JA then refers to s 9(3)(g) and s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 in asserting that the existence and contravention of an order is a key consideration for the sentencing judge and forms an aggravating feature respectively. In doing so, his Honour dismisses the foundation of this contention that the order cannot be referred to as evidence. In addressing the applicant’s specific contention, his Honour observes that orders are only made on the basis of evidence of previous difficulties in a relationship and that accordingly, the sentencing judge’s inference that the order was a result of previous relationship difficulties was a reasonable one. Taking this into account, his Honour then affirms that it was correct for the sentencing judge to state that the offences committed on 17 February 2017 were not “an isolated and exceptional incident” (see [26]).
Gotterson JA rejected the third ground of appeal on the basis that the applicant’s contention mis-interpreted the sentencing judge’s remarks in coming to the finding that the applicant threatened to kill her (see [27]). Having regard to the seriousness and criminality of the applicant’s conduct, his Honour perceives the sentencing judge’s finding as reflecting no error at all (see [28]).
Similarly, his Honour also rejected the fourth ground of appeal on the basis that it was a misconstruction of the sentencing judge’s comments. Gotterson JA was of the view the judge made no error in his assessment of the reliability of the matters at hand on the basis of the applicant’s instructions (see [33]).
R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 (28 September 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection orders’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting x 1; Contravention of domestic violence order x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, one count of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting and one summary charge of contravention of domestic violence order ([4]). The prosecutor, relying on R v West [2006] QCA 252, R v King [2006] QCA 466 and R v RAP [2014] QCA 228, submitted to the sentencing judge that three years’ imprisonment was appropriate. A variation of the protection order was also sought so as to extend its operation and add a further ‘no contact’ condition.
The sentencing judge held that the offences were ‘cowardly, prolonged and particularly violent’ ([23]) and that the offender posed a genuine threat to the community and particularly, to the complainant ([25]). In respect of each of the assault occasioning bodily harm counts, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months. Sentences of imprisonment for three years and six months was imposed for the offence of choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting, and three months for the summary charge. All sentences were concurrent. No date for eligibility for parole was specified. The applicant was therefore ineligible to apply for parole prior to having served half of the effective sentence of imprisonment of three and a half years ([4]).
The applicant appealed on the basis that the sentencing judge had denied him procedural fairness by failing to forewarn the parties of his intention to reduce the head sentence slightly to reflect the guilty plea, and to provide him with an opportunity for a parole at earlier than half the sentence. He also appealed on the basis that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether there was a denial of procedural fairness.
Decision and reasoning: Application was refused on the basis that no procedural unfairness arose on the facts and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
•
Manifestly excessive sentence
The applicant submitted that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and that the notional starting point of four years’ imprisonment for the offence against s 315A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) (the ‘Code’) was too high ([33]). Conversely, the respondent contended that consideration must not only be given to the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, but also to the legislative intention for enacting s 315A to provide for specific liability, and a potentially increased maximum penalty, for offences involving choking (and similar conduct) committed in a domestic setting ([34]). Prior to the sentencing, the Code was amended to create a specific offence of strangulation in a domestic setting (see s 315A). That section prescribes a maximum penalty of seven years to deter the increasing frequency of such behaviour. The Court referred to the Explanatory Notes for the Criminal Law (Domestic Violence) Amendment Bill (No 2) 2015 at [39] –
‘The new strangulation offence and the significant penalty attached, reflect that this behaviour is not only inherently dangerous, but is a predictive indicator of escalation in domestic violence offending, including homicide…’
The Court was cautious to apply authorities for sentences for offences constituted by conduct comparable to choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting, prior to the enactment of s 315A. R v West [2006] QCA 252, R v King [2006] QCA 466 and R v RAP [2014] QCA 228 involved assaults occasioning bodily harm, the maximum penalty for which was seven years’ imprisonment. The Court found that it was not useful to consider the sentences in those cases as comparable authorities for an offence of strangulation in a domestic setting, having regard to the legislature’s intention for enacting s 315A and the seriousness of that offence.
The test of manifest excessiveness depends on whether the sentence is unreasonable or unjust, in light of all the factors relevant to the sentence (see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45). The fact that the complainant lost consciousness, and that the offending occurred only 18 days after his release from custody for breach of a previous domestic violence order, increased the severity of the offence. The applicant’s criminality was also increased by the fact that the choking incident was preceded, and then followed, by an assault occasioning bodily harm. Further, the applicant showed no remorse for the offending and refused to undergo counselling. Boddice J concluded that the circumstances indicated that the applicant’s offending amounted to ‘an episode of sustained violence undertaken by a recidivist who expressed no remorse’ ([47]). Therefore, the Court found that the sentencing judge did not err in sentencing the offender to three years and six months without any further mitigation, and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive in the circumstances ([44]).
R v Ellis [2018] QCA 70 (17 April 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Risk factors - controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Torture x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Malicious act with intent x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant and the applicant had been in a relationship for two months ([4]). The complainant ended the relationship. The next day, the applicant attended at her home and she let him inside. He accused her of being unfaithful to him ([4]). Over the next four hours, the applicant did the following acts to the complainant: slapped her; ripped an earring from her ear; punched her; struck her with a garden trowel; locked her in a cupboard; heated the trowel and a butter knife over the flame of a gas stove and struck her on the legs and near her vulva, causing burns; and forced her to shower, exacerbating the burns ([5]).
The applicant was sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment for the torture charge, 18 months’ imprisonment for the assault occasioning bodily harm charge, and 6 years’ imprisonment for the malicious act with intent charge. A serious violent offence declaration was made in respect of the torture charge.
Issues: Whether the sentence of six and a half years’ imprisonment for the torture charge was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused. It was within the trial judge’s discretion to sentence the applicant and also make a serious violent offence declaration ([19]). The trial judge appropriately balanced the applicant’s personal circumstances, including the fact that he was subject to domestic violence as a child, with the fact that he had a criminal history including domestic violence ([12]).
Harvey v Queensland Police Service [2018] QCA 64 (6 April 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Protection orders’ – ‘Related family law proceedings’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Contravention of temporary protection order x 9; Public nuisance x 1; Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence x 1; Failure to surrender into custody in accordance with an undertaking x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against refusal to grant extension of time to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant had been in a parenting dispute with the mother of his son. There were 5 proceedings in which the applicant sought extensions of time to appeal against his conviction:
1.
Six contraventions of temporary protection orders, involving sending threatening emails to the aggrieved.
2.
Public nuisance, involving swearing at police officers outside a police station.
3.
Two contraventions of domestic violence order, involving emailing the aggrieved.
4.
One contravention of domestic violence order and one charge of using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence, involving emailing and telephoning the aggrieved.
5.
Failure to surrender into custody in accordance with an undertaking.
The applicant sought to justify the breaches of domestic violence orders on the basis that they were justified under an order of the Family Court (which allowed the applicant to contact the aggrieved for the purpose of communicating in relation to contact with the child of the relationship) ([11]).
Issues: Whether the appeal should be allowed. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the basis that the District Court Judge erred in:
•
not having regard to exculpatory evidence of the applicant’s mental health issues;
•
not allowing exculpatory new evidence;
•
stating that the emails were not relevant to s 286 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld);
•
not following Supreme Court authority ([25]).
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave was dismissed. Sofronoff JA held that none of the grounds were supported by evidence or could justify granted leave to appeal ([26]-[29]).
R v Hutchinson [2018] QCA 29 (9 March 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Domestic violence as an aggravating factor’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Retrospective operation of sentencing considerations’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1; Fraud x 1;
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The deceased and the appellant had been married for a lengthy period. The fraud charge occurred when the appellant mortgaged the family home by using a third party to pretend to be the deceased ([5]). The deceased disappeared, and the appellant was charged with her murder. The appellant deceived the deceased’s family and friends in the days after she disappeared and never revealed how she died or the whereabouts of her body ([6]-[12]). At trial, the appellant was acquitted of murder, but convicted of manslaughter. He pleaded guilty to the fraud charge on the first day of the trial ([3]). The appellant was sentenced to 15 years and six months, and the manslaughter offence was declared a serious violence offence and a domestic violence offence under s 9(10A) of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (‘the Act’).
Issues: Whether the sentencing judge erred in retrospectively applying s 9(10A) of the Act or whether the sentence was otherwise manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appellant argued that s 9(10A) of the Act, which has the effect that a context of domestic violence is an aggravating factor in sentencing, should not apply because it should not have retrospective operation ([24]). The Court held that the section is a procedural provision and does not attract the common law presumption against retrospectivity. Therefore, the section applies to all sentencing from its commencement ([43]).
Justice Mullins, Fraser and Morrison JJA agreeing, stated that the sentence was not manifestly excessive, taking into account the context of domestic violence, the appellant’s deceit in impersonating the deceased and failing to disclose the whereabouts of the deceased’s body, his lack of plea of guilty, his lack of remorse and the unchallenged finding that the deceased died a violent death ([53]).
R v Maxwell [2018] QCA 17 (27 February 2018) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Revenge porn’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Stalking x 1; Attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 18 months. There were 2 instances of violence ([2]). After the relationship ended, the applicant followed the complainant and sent her a total of 77 text messages, 5 emails and phone calls by which the complainant felt threatened and harassed ([7]). After the complainant made a complaint to the police, the applicant sent further emails to her threatening to release recordings and videos of them having sex if she did not withdraw the charge ([9]).
The appellant was sentenced to a head sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, with a parole release date after 3 months ([12]).
Issues: Whether the conviction should be set aside and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
In relation to the appeal against conviction, the appellant had argued that he was not provided with proper legal advice ([30]). Justice Morrison (Sofronoff P and Phillip McMurdo JA agreeing) dismissed this argument as having ‘no merit’ ([44]).
In relation to the appeal against sentence, the appellant relied on the impact of the sentence on his ability to obtain licences to work in the financial services industry ([45]). Justice Morrison dismissed this argument because it could only be relevant to whether a conviction is recorded ([48]).
R v Stephens [2017] QCA 173 (15 August 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children present’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Firearms’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and complainant were separated ([6]). After they separated, the complainant obtained a domestic violence order against the applicant because he had sent her text messages threatening to kill her. On the date of the offence, the applicant followed the complainant and her children to a shopping centre, armed with a rifle and 13 rounds of ammunition ([7]). He shot her in the temple at close range, then attempted to strangle her. The four children in the car saw every detail of what had occurred ([8]-[9]). He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Justice Douglas, Holmes CJ and Gotterson J agreeing, found that the sentencing judge properly weighed the relevant factors. The applicant’s mental health disorders did not bear on his moral culpability ([43]). This was a ‘horrific example of the crime of attempted murder’. The victim continues to suffer severely. There was a strong need for protection and general and specific deterrence. The appropriate range would have been 13 to 17 years ([44]).
SCT v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2017] QCA 31 (13 June 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Bail’ – ‘Choke hold’ – ‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 2; Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic relationship x 1.
Case type: Renewed application for bail.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had been in a domestic relationship. A domestic violence order had been granted ([7]). The complainant made the following allegations: the applicant went to the complainant’s house and punched her in the leg ([7]); he threw a pillow at the complainant; and put her in a choke hold ([8]). Bail was originally refused ([9]). Since then, new evidence of a demonstrated that a trial in the District Court would be more than a year away ([10]).
Issues: Whether the evidence of a new trial date justified a grant of bail.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted with conditions that he not have contact with the complainant, that he reside at a specified address, and that he report to the police daily.
Under s 16(3)(g) Bail Act 1980 (Qld), for which the new offence of strangulation is a ‘relevant offence’, the onus was on the applicant to show cause why bail should be granted ([13]). The Court explained that on one hand, there was a real risk that he would reoffend because the applicant and complainant lived in the same town, and they may contact each other ([14]). On the other hand, he had accommodation with family members available, an offer of employment ([15]), and there was a real prospect that he would spend longer on remand than he would serve in custody ([16]). On balance, the risk of reoffending was not unacceptable (s 16).
Ackland v Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) [2017] QCA 75 (28 April 2017) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Risk of re-offending’
Charges: 1 x Assault occasioning bodily harm; 1 x Choking.
Appeal type: Defendant’s appeal against denial of bail application.
Facts: The victim alleged that, during an argument, the appellant: threatened to knock her out; grabbed her by the throat; punched her in the face; and, when she indicated that she was going to call the police, destroyed photographs in the house (see [8]-[10]).
The trial judge refused bail on the basis that:
•
12 months earlier, the appellant had committed a breach of a domestic violence order against a former girlfriend (see [12]);
•
the Crown case appeared to be strong, by evidence of photographs of cuts and abrasions (see [14]); and
•
there was a danger to female victims in such domestic violence situations (see [18]).
His Honour referred to, but did not place weight on, a handwritten note from the victim indicating that she wanted to withdraw the charges (see [15]-[16]).
Issues: Whether the trial judge erred in denying bail to the defendant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Atkinson J, with whom Morrison JA and Douglas J agreed, considered that the trial judge’s discretion had not been improperly exercised (see [27]). The appellant had submitted that the trial judge based the risk of re-offending on an irrelevant ground, namely a generalised risk to victims of repeated offences. However, Atkinson J considered that the trial judge properly considered the particular risk to the victim, evidenced by two assaults being committed 10 hours apart, the victim’s concern, and the previous breach of domestic violence order (see [28]-[29])
At the time of the bail application, amendments to the Bail Act which reversed the presumption of bail for domestic violence offences had not come into effect (see [30]). By the time of the appeal against bail, the amendments had come into effect. Giving effect to the reversed onus, Atkinson J considered that the appellant had not satisfied the court that he did not represent an unacceptable risk of re-offending (particularly against the victim) while on bail (see [35]).
R v KAP [2016] QCA 349 (23 December 2016) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Visible injury’
Charges: Rape x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The accused and the complainant were married, but separated. The accused went to the home of the deceased, and sexual intercourse took place. The complainant said that the accused had held her down and threatened her, but the accused said that the intercourse was consensual ([1]).
Issues: Whether the conviction should be overturned on the grounds that expert evidence about the frequency of visible injury in sexual assault cases should not have been adduced, and the jury should have been given directions as to how to use that evidence ([2]-[3]).
Decision and Reasoning: The expert witness gave evidence that, according to cohort studies and his own personal experience, the absence of visible injury to genitalia is not determinative of whether sexual assault has occurred ([22]-[29]). Morrison JA (with whom Philip McMurdo JA and Mullins J agreed) held that the evidence:
•
was relevant ([31]-[32]);
•
was based on admissible data ([33]-[34]);
•
fell within the scope of expert evidence because injury arising out of sexual assault is accepted as being part “of a body of knowledge or experience” which ordinary lay people would not have (citing Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 ([35]-[37]);
•
was necessary to dispel a common fallacy that physical injury normally follows rape ([41]).
ZXA v Commissioner of Police [2016] QCA 295 (15 November 2016) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Rights of appeal’
Appeal Type: Appeal against domestic violence protection order.
Facts: The applicant was named as the respondent in a domestic violence protection order under s 37 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld). He filed an appeal to the District Court under s 164 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed. The applicant then attended the Supreme Court registry to file an application for leave to appeal under s 118 of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld). Despite being told that there was no right of appeal, the applicant persisted until the registry acceded to his demands.
Issue/s: Whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under s 169(2) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) to hear the appeal?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Under s 169(2) of the Act, the decision from which the applicant seeks leave to appeal ‘shall be final and conclusive’. While s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act allows a party to appeal, it does not apply to a decision of the District Court in its appellate jurisdiction under s 169(1): see CAO v HAT & Ors [2014] QCA 61 [25] – [27]. The President concluded:
‘The scheme under the Act contemplates that domestic violence protection orders can be made by a wide variety of courts with a right of appeal from such orders…The scheme does, however, clearly contemplate only one level of appeal. The plain words of s 169(2) that such an appeal is “final and conclusive” indicate that the legislature intended that there be no further appeal. The applicant has exhausted his single right of appeal from the Magistrates Court to the District Court. He can, of course, apply to vary the domestic violence protection order under s 86 of the Act, including to vary the duration of the order: see s 86(3)(b) of the Act’.
R v Williams [2015] QCA 276 (18 December 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, burglary.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had separated from his wife, and had recently found out that she was in a new relationship. He broke into her home, stabbed her while she was sleeping on her back next to her two year old daughter and then ran off. She immediately awoke to find a knife sticking out of her chest, which she removed, at which point she collapsed. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and declared to be a serious violent offender.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted that the trend of sentences for attempted murder cases shows that the appropriate range is 10 to 17 years, and that 15 years is excessive compared with analogous cases. This argument was rejected. Bond J (with whom Jackson J and Philip McMurdo JA agreed) at [17]-[30] provided a useful summary of previous attempted murder cases involving domestic violence. The Court acknowledged that the offence of attempted murder attracts a wide variety of punishments. However, consistent with the approach articulated by the High Court in Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen [2014] HCA 2, where comparable sentences can provide assistance, but do not set a range of permissible sentences, the Court held that the original sentence was within the discretion open to the trial judge.
R v Johnson [2015] QCA 270 (11 December 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Consent’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant met the complainant on Facebook and was in a relationship with her for seven weeks. During sexual intercourse, the complainant withdrew her consent and alleged she was then raped by the appellant. The appellant was convicted of rape following a trial.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the verdict was unreasonable and unsupportable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Morrison JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Philippides JA agreed) held that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that by the complainant saying ‘no’ and ‘stop’ multiple times, he was not under any mistake as to whether she had consented to sex.
R v Leedie [2015] QCA 216 (6 November 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pre-recorded evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Torture’
Charge/s: Rape, deprivation of liberty, torture.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of eight offences including rape, deprivation of liberty and torture. The appellant had been in an ‘off and on’ romantic relationship with the complainant. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the complainant or other parties. There was no history of violence in the relationship. The offending arose after the appellant asked the complainant to visit his house to have sex. Consensual sex then occurred. However, following the appellant seeing a message from his brother on the complainant’s phone, he became angry, proceeded to become extremely violent, and raped the complainant multiple times across the night. He did not let her out of the house, and tortured her. The complainant was deemed a ‘special witness’, and gave pre-recorded evidence two days before trial, with her mother present as a support person (pursuant to s 21AK of the Evidence Act 1977). Her mother was made aware by the judge during the recording that she was not to have any participation in the proceedings other than as a support person. The mother then made comments to the complainant which reminded her about the details of one of the rape offences. It was accepted at [55] that her mother’s conduct was ‘inappropriate’. However, the trial judge, in response to defence counsel’s application for a mistrial, made detailed warnings to the jury about the caution they needed to apply when considering the complainant’s evidence.
Issue/s: One ground of appeal concerned whether the trial judge erred by failing to discharge the jury after the complainant’s mother suggested to the complainant what she might say in her evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held that these directions were sufficient to warn the jury that the reliability of the complainant’s evidence may have been undermined by her mother’s reminder of the details of the appellant’s offending. Furthermore, at trial, the judge offered to order a further pre-recording of the complainant’s evidence, which was declined by the appellant.
R v Andres [2015] QCA 167 (11 September 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Whether guilty verdict unreasonable’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of the murder of his wife. His version of events included, (among other things) the contention that the deceased had injured him with a fork and he was placed in fear of his life. (See at [4]-[113]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife.
Issue/s: The appellant admitted that he had caused his wife’s death, but maintained that he did not have the requisite intention to prove murder. As such, the question for the Court was whether on the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. More specifically, the issue was whether the accused had the requisite intention to prove murder. Also at issue was whether he had killed his wife by accident or in self-defence.
Decision and Reasoning:
The appeal was dismissed, with the Court finding that a guilty verdict was open to the jury on the evidence. Boddice J, (with whom Morrison JA and Carmody J agreed), found that the only evidence to support the conclusion that the death occurred by accident or in self-defence was the appellant’s own evidence, which lacked probative force. This was because, among other things, the appellant admitted he had deliberately lied and changed his story, and he had dissolved the deceased’s body in acid, which made it difficult to determine the cause of death. While the case was wholly circumstantial, it was noted that intent can be proved by inference, by considering the probative value of the evidence as a whole.
R v Jones [2015] QCA 161 (1 September 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Killing for preservation in an abusive relationship’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the murder of his mother. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the victim or other parties. The issues at trial related substantially to self-defence and provocation. Evidence of the history of the relationship was admitted in the context of the defence under s 304B of the Queensland Criminal Code of killing in an abusive domestic relationship (See further at [3]-[13]).
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred by not admitting expert psychiatric evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. North J (with whom Holmes JA and Henry J agreed) held firstly that this evidence was not admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. It was not relationship evidence. The Court also held that the matters that the psychiatrist spoke of were not complex in a scientific sense, and the jury, properly instructed, were able to understand them without needing to hear the expert evidence itself. The psychiatrist did not identify that the appellant was suffering from any recognised psychiatric illness. Rather, he only spoke generally that the appellant had developed coping strategies in response to his mother’s violent and difficult behaviour. The jury, in applying common sense, would have been able to reach this conclusion themselves. North J, comparing the ‘battered wife defence’, noted that there is no ‘battered child defence’ in law. That is, there is no defence where, ‘insults and abuse may be relied upon by a child by way of excuse for a fatal attack upon an abusive parent’ (See at [19]).
R v Pearson [2015] QCA 157 (28 August 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife (See further at [2]-[5]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife. The issues at trial concerned whether he had the requisite intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm, and whether the defence of provocation arose.
Issue/s: One issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misdirected the jury in regards to the relevance of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence and discreditable conduct. In particular, the appellant submitted that the jury were misdirected about how they could use the evidence when deciding whether the appellant had the requisite intent for murder.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. At trial, the jury was directed to the effect that the evidence was relevant to explain the nature and animosity of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased. They were specifically directed that if they were to use that evidence to assist in determining the appellant’s state of mind at the time of the offence, they must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the past acts occurred. Holmes JA (Morrison JA and Henry J agreeing) held that s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 can be used to show a particular propensity of the accused to commit acts of a similar nature, as well for specific issues like intent. Her Honour, applying the approach of the High Court in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12, noted that these two uses are distinct. In this case, the domestic violence evidence was only relevant as relationship evidence to prove intent. Propensity was not relevant because it was not in dispute that the appellant had caused the death of his wife. The jury were directed to this effect. A general propensity warning was not needed for the same reasons.
R v Piper [2015] QCA 129 (17 July 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant’s wife attended a hotel with a male friend. He falsely believed his wife to be in a romantic relationship with the friend. In an unprovoked attack, he stabbed the friend forcefully multiple times. The victim sustained six stab wounds, including one to his neck. The victim suffers lasting psychological difficulties as a result of the attack. There was a domestic violence order in place which prevented the applicant from coming within five metres of his wife. The attack breached this order, which became an aggravating feature in sentencing. He had no criminal history. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole after three years.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted. The offending was very serious. It was ‘a sustained, severe and premeditated attack, whilst armed with a knife, on a victim who had done nothing by way of provocation’ (See at [36]). It was committed in the context of a domestic violence order being in place. As such, the head sentence, whilst at the upper end of the scale, was within range, taking into account his lack of criminal history and plea of guilty. However, the Court concluded that the parole eligibility date should be brought forward. The applicant’s guilty plea, while late, ensured that witnesses did not have to give evidence, which was particularly important for the victim. The parole eligibility date was close to the ‘half-way mark’ in the sentence. This did not reflect the significance of his guilty plea, remorse and cooperation and lack of criminal history. As such, the parole eligibility date was changed and set at the one-third mark in the sentence.
R v Wallace [2015] QCA 62 (21 April 2015) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Fraud’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Six counts of fraud.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty at trial to six counts of fraud. See at [3]-[11]. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order in place against the applicant’s ex-husband in favour of the applicant or other parties.
Issue/s: Whether the applicant could adduce fresh evidence not led at the original sentencing hearing.
Decision and Reasoning: The fresh evidence involved long term domestic violence that the applicant suffered from her ex-husband, including controlling behaviour such as taking the applicant’s phone and keys to prevent her from seeking help, threatening her children, stealing money from her business, and severe physical violence. It also included evidence from a psychiatrist detailing the effect of the abuse on her, to the extent that she did not fully understand the repercussions of her offending. This was found to be consistent with what has come to be known as the ‘battered person’s syndrome’. The appeal was allowed and the evidence was admitted. The head sentence was reduced by one year.
McMurdo P, (with whom Gotterson JA and Douglas J agreed) noted that lawyers acting for clients charged with criminal offences who claim to be the victim of domestic violence should take such claims very seriously to determine the relevance to their client’s alleged offending. They should then put such evidence before the primary court either as a defence, or in sentence mitigation.
See in particular the following remarks of McMurdo P at [37] -
'… The further evidence led in this application established that at the time of the offending the applicant was in an abusive, exploitive relationship which impaired her capacity to realise the full repercussions of her fraudulent behaviour and her ability to formulate a mature response to her financial and personal difficulties as she continued to take more and more money from the nursing home in the impossible hope that she would eventually repay it. As Dr Schramm (a psychiatrist) explained, she was not acting completely rationally. She was exhibiting behavioural disturbances following her prolonged and significant physical and emotional abuse, commonly known as “battered persons syndrome.” This took her offending behaviour out of the worst category of fraudulent offending in which the sentencing judge placed it. The further evidence raises the possibility that some other sentence than that imposed may be warranted; if so, its exclusion would result in a miscarriage of justice. '
R v Davidson [2014] QCA 348 (19 December 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim credibility’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The offending involved an incident where the appellant asked the complainant to perform a sexual act on his male friend. The appellant also engaged in sexual activity with the friend. The case at trial was based on the complainant’s version of events, which included that the appellant kicked and punched the complainant (the appellant’s partner) for a long period. There was a history of domestic violence in the relationship. A domestic violence order was made some six years prior. The appellant had a long criminal history of similar offences, including a breach of a domestic violence order. However, there was no associated breach of a domestic violence order in this matter. The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 2.5 years.
Issue/s: Whether the failure to call new evidence from witnesses who challenged the complainant’s credibility established a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant contended specifically that the failure to call a particular witness established a miscarriage of justice and noted that his defence counsel did not explore the detail of the evidence in cross-examination. The Court rejected that argument – the failure of counsel to adduce this new evidence was justifiable as a strategic decision in the trial context to not risk other unfavourable evidence being admitted. The appeal against sentence was also dismissed.
R v Aplin [2014] QCA 332 (16 December 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Grievous Bodily Harm.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander man, caused catastrophic harm to the 21 year old complainant, with whom he had recently commenced a relationship. She was in a ‘vegetative state’ at the time of trial. He made full admissions to police. He sought to have evidence of these admissions excluded, which was refused. He then pleaded guilty. The applicant had a long history of domestic violence including multiple breaches of domestic violence orders. The sentencing judge mentioned the need to have regard to this history, as well as the extent of the injuries and the need for deterrence (see at [12]). He was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment and a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The applicant submitted that various mitigating factors applied including that no weapon was involved, there was no premeditation, he attempted to administer aid, requested that an ambulance be called and there was a degree of provocation. He also submitted that the sentencing judge was in error in using a 10 year head sentence as a starting point. Fraser JA (with whom McMurdo P and Morrison JA agreed) held that there was nothing to indicate the primary judge overlooked these factors or the applicant’s disadvantaged background. Indeed, given the ‘seriousness of the offence, the catastrophic consequences for the complainant, and the applicant’s bad history of violent offending in broadly similar circumstances’ (See at [16]), it was open to the primary judge to attach relatively light weight to the mitigating factors. Furthermore, the trial judge was correct in using a previous decision with a head sentence of 10 years for ‘guidance’. While the Court acknowledged that this sentence was severe given the maximum penalty, the guilty plea, the offender’s age and other mitigating circumstances, it was justified for this ‘extreme example of domestic violence by a repeat offender’,([26]) where general deterrence and community protection were very relevant.
R v Warradoo [2014] QCA 299 (25 November 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend. (See further at [3]-[7]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of the victim. At trial, evidence relating to conversations with the deceased’s niece and mother which detailed instances of prior violence committed by the appellant was admitted. No warning was given by the trial judge as to the potential unreliability of this evidence as hearsay.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge erred by not giving adequate warnings with respect to evidence admitted under section 93B of the Evidence Act 1977.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Holmes JA stated (at [8]) that section 93B operates to, ‘(render) the hearsay rule inapplicable to evidence of a representation of fact made by a person who is dead, if the representation was made shortly after the asserted fact happened and in circumstances making it unlikely to be a fabrication, or was made in circumstances making it highly probable it was reliable.’ It was held that a direction from the trial judge about the unreliability of the evidence as hearsay would not have been particularly helpful, and may have even been disadvantageous to the appellant. Also, the evidence was admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 as evidence of the history of a domestic relationship.
R v RAP [2014] QCA 228 (11 September 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charge/s: Unlawful assault causing bodily harm, unlawfully damaging property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to unlawfully assaulting his wife, causing her bodily harm and unlawfully damaging property. The appellant had a relevant criminal history involving a breach of a domestic violence order. However, this was effectively ignored by the sentencing judge. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife. In mitigation, the sentencing judge considered a psychiatrist’s report indicating that at the time of the incident, the appellant was likely suffering from, ‘a major depressive episode and, probably, a form of alcohol dependence’. There was also a report from a psychologist who had treated the appellant before the offences and diagnosed him with, ‘an acute, moderate to severe adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety depressed moods at that time.’ A later review by that psychologist indicated he suffered a ‘chronic and mild adjustment disorder with anxiety’ and a year later ‘a mild borderline adjustment disorder’ was diagnosed. He was sentenced for the assault charge to two years imprisonment, suspended after eight months with an operational period of 2.5 years. He was sentenced to two months imprisonment for the property damage charge to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The couple had previously separated, and the incident arose when the appellant returned to the matrimonial home. The complainant’s injuries were significant and she was in fear of her life during the attack. Wilson J (with whom McMurdo P and Fraser JA agreed) at [39] – [46] provided a useful summary of comparable cases. The Court held that a serious assault in the domestic context warrants imprisonment for two years or more. The suspension imposed was a correct application of the mitigating factors, and the serious nature of the violence.
R v Foster [2014] QCA 226 (9 September 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Preliminary complaint’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Victim disclosure and consent’
Charge/s: Rape, Assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted at trial of two counts of the rape of his partner, after he was found to have penetrated the complainant with a hairbrush, an aerosol can and a water bottle. He pleaded guilty to other charges including assault occasioning bodily harm and deprivation of liberty. There was no domestic violence order in place.
Issue/s: Whether evidence of the complainant’s response in a state of distress, to the question of ‘Had you been raped?’ amounted to an admissible preliminary complaint of rape. The complainant had not directly answered the question but ‘looked sad’ and ‘slumped her shoulders, to look as if she was about to burst into tears and to look beaten’. (See at [33]).
Decision and Reasoning: The Court found that this amounted to a complaint, within the meaning of Section 4A of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978. Importantly, Gotterson JA (with whom McMurdo P Morrison JA agreed) noted that an admissible complaint need not require a verbal response. In particular, ‘A meaningful response may be signalled by conduct other than speech. That conduct may include the absence of a verbal rejection of the proposition’. However, Gotterson JA noted that the acceptance could have been clearer, and this was a ‘borderline’ example of a complaint. Furthermore, it is not necessary for a preliminary complaint of rape to refer to any specific incidence of penetration. Simply stating, ‘I was raped’ is sufficient to amount to a preliminary complaint.
R v Reed [2014] QCA 207 (26 August 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Purpose of evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm, murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the assault occasioning bodily harm and murder of his partner’s 16 month old child. See further at [6]-[17].
Issue: Whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior facial grazing injuries suffered by the child.
Decision and Reasoning: Henry J (with whom Gotterson JA and McMurdo P agreed) firstly held that this evidence was not inadmissible purely because of a possible innocent explanation for the injuries. His Honour considered all the non-fatal injuries on the child in their totality, and found that the probability that they occurred accidentally became too remote. The evidence was capable of supporting an inference (in combination with the other evidence) that the non-fatal injuries were the result of deliberate violence by the appellant. This evidence, of itself, was not indispensable to a finding of guilt – it assisted as ‘strands of a cable rather than as indispensable links in a chain’ (See at [39]). The evidence was also relevant to the proof of the charges as relationship evidence pursuant to 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. The trial judge correctly found that injuries can be probative of the history of a domestic relationship. It also potentially showed a propensity of the appellant to commit similar violence. However, the trial judge did not rule on this and in fact gave a warning against propensity reasoning. Notwithstanding, the trial judge did make an error of law in failing to sufficiently instruct the jury about the purpose of the evidence of the uncharged injuries, applying the High Court decision in Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12. The trial judge did tell the jury that the evidence could be used to show that the nature of the relationship was violent, but he did not go further to explain that the purpose of putting this history of violence before the jury was to provide an ‘informed context’ (See at [69] – [70]) for the jury’s consideration of the charges. Notwithstanding, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso.
R v HBL [2014] QCA 270 (24 October 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Abduction’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Family law orders’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Abduction, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a long-term, intermittent relationship and had one child. His partner sought and obtained a domestic violence order (DVO) in 2011. In 2012, an order in the Federal Magistrates’ Court was made that the child was to live with the mother. Limited contact was allowed with the mother’s consent. The mother left the child at a friend’s house, whereupon the applicant arrived unannounced and took the child, drove away, and held the child for a period of time, in breach of the DVO. He made repeated calls stating he would not return the child if the child was to be handed back to the mother or her friend. The applicant had a long criminal history of over fourteen court appearances, including a previous breach of a child protection order (albeit towards the lower end of seriousness). The applicant pleaded guilty to the abduction and breach offences and was sentenced in the District Court to 4 years’ imprisonment for abduction. He was convicted but not further punished for the breach. The primary judge implicitly accepted the Crown’s submission that this conduct was in the worst category of offending.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. While the applicant had a long criminal history, Fraser JA (with whom Mullins J and Gotterson JA agreed), compared analogous decisions and highlighted factors which made them distinguishable. His Honour noted that the child was not unrelated or unknown, there was no sexual motivation and the taking was non-violent. As such, the Court held that this was not within the worst category of offending. Notwithstanding, the Court noted that such conduct (including the fact that the appellant was motivated to be with his son and breaching court orders) cannot be condoned and deterrence is important. As such, a custodial sentence was imposed but was reduced to 18 months’ imprisonment with immediate parole eligibility.
R v Francis [2014] QCA 258 (14 October 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Arson.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The arson was targeted at the appellant’s ex-wife’s new partner’s mother’s car. The offence constituted a breach of a domestic violence order (See further at [3]-[18]).
Issue/s: Appeal against conviction: Whether the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence, and whether the appellant could adduce further evidence not led at trial.
Appeal against sentence: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. McMurdo P noted that while the case was circumstantial, it was strong, and a guilty verdict was open to the jury. The application to adduce further evidence was also dismissed. The court held that while an affidavit from the appellant’s former partner was somewhat inconsistent with her evidence at trial, there was no significant possibility that the jury would have acquitted him on this basis. However, the appeal against sentence was allowed, reducing the head sentence from 4.5 to 4 years. Defence counsel submitted that the sentence was excessive for arson of a car rather than a house, while the prosecution submitted that it was a flagrant breach of a domestic violence order and general deterrence was necessary for an arson committed as a jealous rage due to a relationship breakdown. McMurdo P held that the sentence was manifestly excessive. The trial judge did not take into account pre-sentence custody, and the appellant only had a minor criminal history prior to this offending.
R v Murray [2014] QCA 160 (18 July 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recidivism’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’ – ‘Weapons’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Application for an extension of time to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant, an aboriginal man with a dysfunctional background, pleaded guilty to the grievous bodily harm of his girlfriend. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim. He ripped off a door handle with which he struck her on the head, then punched her and struck her with a frying pan, causing severe injuries.
Issue/s: Whether an extension of time should be granted on the basis that the applicant only pleaded guilty due to the strong urging of his lawyers, and that he was denied the right to present his defence.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused - the applicant was an adult, of sound mind who understood the charge and entered a guilty plea after obtaining legal advice. An application for leave to appeal against sentence was also refused. McMurdo P (Fraser JA and Morrison JA agreeing) held that notwithstanding that he told the complainant to go to hospital, he had failed to demonstrate compassion or insight into the injury that he had caused. He had a substantial history of domestic violence and this recidivism made the protection of future intimate partners important. This was a serious example of grievous bodily harm in the context of domestic violence. General deterrence and denunciation were key considerations. McMurdo P described his girlfriend as a ‘reluctant complainant’. However, this was not a mitigating factor. The only mitigating factors were his guilty plea and dysfunctional background.
R v Seijbel-Chocmingkwan [2014] QCA 119 (27 May 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Attempted strangulation’ – ‘Dangerous operation of motor vehicle’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offender’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: While on parole for assault offences committed against her daughter, the applicant drove into her former husband’s car twice. She then stabbed her husband’s new partner in the shoulder and attempted to strangle her. There was no domestic violence order in place. She pleaded guilty to attempted murder and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, for which she was sentenced to ten years’ and 12 months’ imprisonment respectively.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Morrison JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Martin J agreed) at [41] – [79] provided a useful summary of past Court of Appeal authority regarding sentencing of attempted murder offences which have an element of domestic violence. The Court considered factors such as premeditation, cooperation with authorities, remorse, the gravity of the attack and prior convictions. (See full list at [79]). The applicant was also suffering from a mental disorder, namely an ‘adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood’. While this was a mitigating factor, the Court held that the original sentence did adequately recognise this and other mitigating features such as her efforts at rehabilitation by enrolling in study and other courses, which were correctly balanced with the need for denunciation and general deterrence.
R v Martin [2014] QCA 80 (14 April 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Consistency of sentence with other orders’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Using carriage service’
Charge/s: 41 offences, including stalking, 26 counts of breaches of domestic violence orders, two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, five counts of using a carriage service to make a threat to kill and six counts of using a carriage service to menace or harass.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court to all offences. The stalking was committed against the applicant’s ex-partner. A head sentence of two years imprisonment was imposed in the Magistrates’ Court, with all sentences to be served concurrently. The applicant was also placed on a domestic violence order in favour of his ex-partner for 5 years. The Magistrate made adverse findings in relation to the applicant’s offending, his lack of remorse and the real risk of him re-offending. Mitigating factors included pleas of guilty and completion of a domestic abuse program while in custody. His parole release date was set after he had served one third of the head sentence, taking into account pre-sentence custody.
Issue/s: Whether the remaining period on parole should be substituted with a suspended sentence, due to the comparative administrative ease of a suspended sentence in obtaining permission to leave the state.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. A previous appeal to the District Court was struck out due to the applicant’s uncooperative nature, and the many opportunities that were given to him through adjournments to allow him to appear personally in Court, as well as the primary judge’s finding of fact that he had misled the Court. The Court found that the primary judge acted appropriately.
R v MBY [2014] QCA 17 (18 February 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, maintaining a sexual relationship with a child under 16.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant, an Aboriginal man committed the offences against his daughter. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim or other parties. (See further at [6]-[20]).
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge failed to give appropriate weight to circumstances of deprivation in his upbringing, including the social and economic disadvantage associated with his Aboriginality and the physical, sexual and emotional abuse that he had suffered as a child. Another issue was whether the primary judge failed to have regard to the applicant’s rehabilitative prospects.
Decision and Reasoning: In dismissing the appeal, Morrison JA (Muir JA and Daubney J agreeing) discussed the relevance of the applicant’s Aboriginality in sentencing. See in particular at [60]-[73] where his Honour provides a detailed summary of relevant authority including the High Court decision of Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38. Essentially, his Honour accepted that social, economic and other disadvantages (including alcohol and drug abuse) which may be related to an offender’s Aboriginality, should be taken into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Indeed, there is authority to suggest that when an Aboriginal offender is being sentenced, the Court should, ‘sentence (the offender) as leniently as the circumstances of his offence admitted’. (See R v Bell [1994] QCA 220). However, this cannot undermine individualised justice. That is, the deprived background of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offender may be given appropriate weight in sentence mitigation, but it cannot be given undue primacy. It cannot result in a punishment being imposed that does not reflect the gravity of the offending, or which does not pay sufficient regard to considerations such as specific and general deterrence, which are particularly important in domestic violence cases. The second ground of appeal, that the applicant’s rehabilitative prospects were not given enough weight was also dismissed.
R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent criminal proceeding’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Permanent stay’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against a permanent stay of proceedings.
Facts: This decision was not directly related to domestic violence. However, it is relevant to situations where the Court is dealing with a breach of a domestic violence order and another criminal offence concurrently. The respondent was originally charged with public nuisance, which was dealt with summarily. However, following a formal statement made by the complainant to police and a medical opinion received, he was charged with grievous bodily harm (GBH). At trial, an application was made for a permanent stay on the basis of Section 16 of the Queensland Criminal Code, which provides that a person cannot be punished twice for the same act or omission. The application was granted, with the primary judge holding that the act which formed the basis of the GBH charge was the same act which formed the basis of the public nuisance charge.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge was correct in granting the permanent stay based on the rule against double punishment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed, with the Court applying the approach previously articulated in R v Gordon where Hanger CJ stated - “Section 16, in saying that a person cannot be twice punished for the same act or omission, must be referring to punishable acts or omissions; and the prohibition applies though the acts or omission would constitute two different offences. It is to these cases that the section is directed.” Hanger CJ held that a punishable act of being in charge of a motor vehicle while under the influence of a substance was not the same as the punishable act of dangerous driving causing GBH with which the offender in that case was subsequently charged. In the present matter, the Court held that the punishable acts for which the respondent was convicted in the Magistrates Court included punches which landed on the complainant, causing harm. It therefore followed that s 16 would be violated if the respondent was to be punished a second time for those acts.
Prima facie, the same test would apply when considering whether a breach of a DVO constitutes the same act for which another criminal charge is based. However, it should be noted that there is uncertainty about the application of Section 138 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) in this context, particularly as to whether Section 138 allows double punishment. For further information, see pages 111-113 of the Queensland Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (2012) Bench Book, which considers various District and Magistrates’ Court decisions and the summary of R v MKW [2014] QDC 300 (18 June 2014).
R v Bartram [2013] QCA 361 (6 December 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Defence of dwelling’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Unlawful wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for unlawful wounding. The offence was committed in the following circumstances: the appellant had obtained a domestic violence order against the complainant; the complainant had previously been convicted for breaches of that order; according to evidence at trial, the complainant kicked down a door in breach of the DVO and, on the appellant’s evidence, the complainant had threatened violence towards her on the previous evening. The jury was directed about self-defence, but was not directed about the possibility of the ‘defence of a dwelling defence’ under s 267 of the Queensland Criminal Code.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant was denied the possibility of an acquittal under 267 of the Queensland Criminal Code.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld – Muir JA (with whom Gotterson JA and Daubney J agreed) held that there was ‘ample evidence’ that the complainant unlawfully entered and remained in the dwelling, which could support the elements of the defence. The offending occurred under the house, but his Honour held that the definition of ‘dwelling’ in s 1 of the Code was broad enough to encompass underneath the house. As such, a retrial was ordered.
R v Brennan [2013] QCA 316 (25 October 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder (two counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of murdering his estranged wife and her daughter in their home. Prior to the killings, the appellant made threats to his wife and to witnesses. These threats occurred in person and over the phone, resulting in a domestic violence order being served and two charges of using a carriage service to make threats. Several witnesses testified that the appellant made threatening remarks to his wife at the hearing for these charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on both counts of murder, with a 22 year non-parole period ordered, which was two years above the statutory minimum. The crime was also in breach of a domestic violence order in place to safeguard his wife.
Issue/s: Whether the circumstances of the killings warranted the non-parole period to be extended beyond the 20 year statutory minimum, so as to make the sentence manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. In the appellant’s favour, the killing was not drawn out, there was no prolonged suffering and there was minimal planning involved. On the other hand, he killed not only his estranged wife, but a defenceless 14 year old girl in defiance of a domestic violence order which was intended for his wife’s protection. Also, the appellant displayed no remorse and pleaded not guilty which had made the process agonising for those affected. These factors warranted a strong element of denunciation and vindication for the victims in the sentence. The appeal against conviction was also dismissed.
R v Postchild [2013] QCA 227 (20 August 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the rape of his girlfriend and was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the applicant in favour of the victim. The applicant had an extensive criminal history, consisting of street and property offences, as well as a previous conviction for carnal knowledge of a 13 year old girl. He had previously breached a reporting condition associated with this conviction. He committed the rape while on parole for unrelated offending. The primary judge described the rape as a ‘brutal act’, and that the applicant had treated his girlfriend as, ‘an object for his own sexual gratification and had had no regard for her feelings’ (See at [15]).
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority. The Chief Justice, (with whom Gotterson JA agreed) held that the sentence was appropriate, and upheld the trial judge’s findings in relation to the brutality of the act.
However, Holmes JA dissented and was of the view that the sentence should be reduced to 5 years with the non-parole period shortened. Her Honour’s judgment contains very useful summaries of all comparable cases, (see [17]-[32]). Holmes JA noted factors including that this was a single incident of a short duration, and was not a ‘protracted exercise in humiliation’ (at [33]). There was no forced entry or weapons used. Her Honour also noted that the, ‘offence did not occur in a context of fear or intimidation’, as the relationship was still on foot. Holmes JA was of the view that the nature of the relationship made these circumstances distinguishable from rapes performed by strangers (See at [34]). It was also noted that the victim was, ‘a strong minded young woman who was left humiliated and angry by what occurred, but not terrified’ and, ‘There was no evidence of lasting psychological harm’.
R v Susec [2013] QCA 77 (12 April 2013) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury for the murder of his wife, and sentenced to life imprisonment (see further at [5]-[25]). It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the appellant in favour of his wife.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge should have admitted evidence of a previous incident of the appellant sharpening a knife in the presence of the deceased and two witnesses.
2.
Whether evidence of the victim’s statement that she believed her husband was going to kill her was admissible.
3.
Whether evidence of a conversation between the deceased and a co-worker, which was initially held to be hearsay evidence because it was too vague and unreliable but later inadvertently admitted during the questioning of the co-worker at trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
4.
Whether a conclusion that the appellant’s post-offence conduct involved inflicting wounds on himself, putting pepper in his own eyes and exaggerating the seriousness of his condition was open on the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
Gotterson JA (with whom McMurdo P and Muir JA agreed) held that such evidence was admissible under s 132B of the Evidence Act 1977. Its probative force was not outweighed by its potential prejudice to the accused. It was relevant to the state of the relationship, as well as to self-defence and provocation. It did have subjective elements, (such as the witnesses’ descriptions of their emotions during the incident), but this was not such as to enliven the s 130 discretion to exclude it, and the trial judge gave a sufficiently clear warning against its use as propensity evidence.
2.
The Court held that this evidence was admissible. The deceased’s fear of the appellant was relevant to the jury’s consideration of whether the deceased initiated an assault or provoked the attack.
3.
While the Court held that this evidence should not have been admitted, it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice so this ground was dismissed.
4.
The Court held that this conclusion was clearly open on the evidence (see at [70]).
R v James [2012] QCA 256 (24 September2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant (the appellant’s de facto partner) was receiving treatment at a hospital necessitated by an earlier assault by the appellant. The appellant then waited outside a toilet door at the hospital and punched her in the face which caused pain, discomfort and swelling. He was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for contravening a domestic violence order. He had a long criminal history including six prior breaches of domestic violence orders and convictions for other offences.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused, with the Court upholding the 9 month sentence. The maximum penalty for breaching a domestic violence order applicable at the time was 12 months imprisonment. This was later increased to two years (three years if the accused has prior convictions). Also, Henry J observed that there ought not exist an expectation that a one third discount to the head sentence will be applied where there is a plea of guilty, although such an outcome may be common (Holmes JA and McMurdo P agreed). McMurdo P (Holmes JA agreed) found that a further exacerbating feature was that the offence occurred in a hospital where the victim and other patients should be entitled to freedom from exposure to such violence.
R v Murgha [2012] QCA 255 (24 September 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to doing grievous bodily harm (GBH) to his de facto partner and breaching a domestic violence order. The offending was committed during the operational period of six suspended sentences. It involved the applicant throwing a knife at his partner who was pregnant. The knife became embedded in her skull. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the GBH offence and was convicted but not further punished for the breach offence.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: McMurdo P (Holmes JA and Henry J agreeing) dismissed the appeal and held that the sentence was appropriate. Mitigating factors included his remorse and corporation with police, his lack of similar criminal history, good rehabilitation prospects and his good standing in the community. The complainant also tendered a letter stating that: she wanted their child to grow up knowing their father; they planned to reconcile and that she found it hard to cope as a single parent. Notwithstanding, the sentencing judge correctly imposed a deterrent sentence. The primary judge noted that ‘the use of knives in domestic disputes on Palm Island was all too common’, which required a deterrent sentence. Other relevant factors included the fact the offence constituted a breach of a DVO and occurred while the applicant was subject to suspended prison sentences.
R v Pringle; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2012] QCA 223 (24 August 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his partner. He was in a long term relationship with the deceased, with whom he had three young children. He was a heavy cannabis user. In the weeks leading up to the killing, the deceased had confided to others about problems in the relationship. The respondent believed the deceased was having an affair and was upset as the deceased’s sister owed him $15 000. He was concerned the deceased was preparing to leave him and take his children – he claimed that she was ‘messing with my head’ (See at [10]). On the day of the killing, the respondent spoke to his parents who both encouraged him to seek help from a counsellor or psychiatrist. He then strangled the deceased until she was unconscious in the presence of the children. After moving the children to another room, he stabbed the deceased twice in the chest, killing her. He also stabbed himself but the injuries were not life threatening. After being declared fit to stand trial, but of diminished responsibility (under section 304A of the Queensland Criminal Code) by the Mental Health Court, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The psychiatrist stated that the respondent, ‘suffered from a personality disorder with paranoid traits.’ This, as well as his drug abuse and the viciousness of the killing suggested that his condition was likely to endure after being released from custody (see at [29]). However, gradual improvement may be expected with regular treatment (See at [15]). He had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Parole release would depend on his illness and progress of rehabilitation while in prison.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate and whether the sentencing judge should have made a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. McMurdo P (with whom Muir JA and Gotterson JA agreed) held that as deterrence and denunciation were of less importance in this case due to the limited moral culpability of the respondent (because of his mental illness), the primary purposes of sentencing were the protection of the Queensland community and punishment of the offender. However, the Court found that a nine year sentence with no serious violent offence declaration and no parole eligibility date was within range for a spousal manslaughter based on diminished responsibility. There was a plea of guilty, no evidence of further danger to the community and evidence of remorse. A recovery was not certain, but the respondent was responding positively to medication and treatment. Also, the fact that he strangled the deceased in front of the children was an aggravating feature, but this had to be considered in the context of diminished responsibility which reduced his moral culpability for the crime.
R v Hughes [2012] QCA 208 (14 August 2012) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of murdering her de facto partner. There was a history of domestic violence between the appellant and the deceased and multiple domestic violence orders were taken out against each other on separate occasions. (See further at [5]-[49]).
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred by admitting evidence of statements made by the deceased to various witnesses that he suspected the appellant had drugged him and whether the verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: Both grounds of appeal were dismissed. The appellant submitted that the statements made by the deceased were not admissible because no relevant inference could be drawn from them, so they were hearsay statements and therefore inadmissible. This submission was rejected – the Court held that unlike in R v Lester [2008] QCA 354, the statements were not ‘reports of statements made to (the deceased) by others’. Instead, they were statements about the deceased’s own physical sensations after falling asleep in an unusual manner, and came after an episode of domestic violence between the appellant and the deceased. Such evidence was relevant to the ‘deceased’s relationship with the appellant, their mutual dealings and their attitudes for each other’, and to whether the appellant drugged the deceased (See at [64]). As such, it was admissible under section 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 as an exception to the hearsay rule. The other ground of appeal that the verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence was also dismissed.
R v Amery [2011] QCA 383 (23 December 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Malicious act with intent’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pre-sentence custody’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Malicious act with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In breach of a domestic violence order made that morning, the appellant returned to his de facto partner’s house and hit her head twice with a sledgehammer while she was sleeping, causing substantial injuries. The applicant pleaded guilty to a malicious act with intent and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, with no parole eligibility date set. No adjustment of the sentence was made for time already served in pre-sentence custody.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court noted that the head sentence was not outside the permissible range. The offending was very serious, was not a spontaneous response, and was committed in breach of the DVO. Also, he had a serious criminal history, including a similar breach of a domestic violence order. However, the trial judge erred in not adjusting the sentence for pre-sentence custody and not imposing a parole eligibility date. As such, also taking into account the (albeit late) plea of guilty, the sentence was reduced to seven years, seven months’ imprisonment, with the appellant becoming eligible for parole after three years.
R v Rowe [2011] QCA 372 (16 December 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Burglary with violence’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charge/s: Stalking with violence, burglary with violence, assault occasioning bodily harm, common assault and wilful damage.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the complainant for 6 years and had one child. The relationship ended, at which point the stalking began via telephone and text messages. There had been some conflict in the relationship about the care of the child. He broke into her home, demanded to see her phone and punched her on the head multiple times. He pushed a lighted cigarette on her leg, causing burns. He threatened to kill her. He tackled her to the ground to prevent her from seeking help and punched her again multiple times. He drove her to the hospital after she had cleaned up at his request. He yelled and threatened her while in the car, drove dangerously, and backhanded her to the side of her face. All of this occurred in front of their two year old child. Once the complainant was released from hospital he attended her workplace and caused significant damage to her car. He had a criminal history, including previous break and enter and assault occasioning bodily harm offences. The sentencing judge noted that the stalking was not prolonged, but it was very intense and violent. It was also noted that the child and the complainant must have been terrified.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the above offences, and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for stalking with violence, two years’ imprisonment for burglary with violence and assault occasioning bodily harm and 12 months’ imprisonment for common assault and wilful damage. The sentences were to be served concurrently. He was on parole at the time for a prior violent offence. This resulted in a head sentence of three years which was cumulative on an existing term of three years imprisonment, with parole eligibility set at one year after the cumulative term had been served.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted that as the head sentence was reduced for the totality principle, the sentencing judge must have used a starting point of over three years which was not consistent with the comparable authorities. This was rejected. While the offending was short, it was intense, and was accompanied by actual and threatened violence, in the presence of a terrified child. The applicant’s stalking was more serious than in any of the relevant comparable authorities, and a head sentence of three years was appropriate given the circumstances of the offending and the appellant’s history, including that he was on parole for prior offences. The parole eligibility date was also found to be appropriate, given the offender was already subject to an existing term of imprisonment.
R v. Major; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2011] QCA 210 (30 August 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Seven counts of assault occasioning bodily harm, threatening violence at night, wounding, assault occasioning bodily harm while armed and various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to the above charges. The offending included 8 episodes of domestic violence over a three year period, involving severe physical abuse such as punching, cutting off the tip of the victim’s finger, choking, wrestling, smashing objects on the victim’s head and verbal abuse. There were lasting physical impacts on the victim including nerve injuries, loss of sensation to her finger-tip and depression and anxiety. He was sentenced for the unlawful wounding offence to 3 years’ imprisonment, suspended after 741 days (the period already served) with an operational period of 5 years. He was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment for the remaining counts.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld, with the Court holding that the original sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court noted that when concurrent sentences are imposed, it is important to ensure that the primary term adequately reflects the nature of each individual feature of the offending. This was not reflected in the trial judge’s sentence. The mitigating factors were not particularly powerful. For example, the absence of any prior history of violence was outweighed by the prolonged duration of the offences. The fact that the respondent was not subject to a domestic violence order was not a mitigating factor but merely a distinguishing feature from analogous cases. The Court noted that the original sentence should have been in the range of six to eight years. However, given that the defendant had commenced rehabilitation, it was deemed that imposing such a sentence on appeal would be inappropriate. Also, the respondent had no prior history of violence, and was not subject to any court order at the time of the offending. Nevertheless, the sentence was increased to 5 years with the same suspension period. Probation was added for another count.
See in particular the useful remarks of McMurdo P at [53], regarding the considerations the courts should take into account for sentencing domestic violence offences – ‘The dreadful effects of prolonged episodes of domestic violence are notorious…Deterrence, both personal and general, is an important factor in sentencing in domestic violence cases. So too is denunciation. The community through the courts seeks sentences which show the public disapprobation of such conduct. The effects of domestic violence go beyond the trauma suffered by victims, survivors and their children to their extended families, and friends. Domestic violence also detrimentally affects the wider community, causing lost economic productivity and added financial strain to community funded social security and health systems.’
R v McMullen [2011] QCA 153 (1 July 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Threatening violence’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty, rape and threatening violence.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The offences were committed against the appellant’s de facto partner. There was a current domestic violence order in place. The complainant alleged the appellant breached that order the night before he raped her.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant’s previous history of domestic violence and drug use, as well as other discreditable conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: McMurdo P (with whom Cullinane J and Jones J agreed) held that the evidence of prior domestic violence was admissible to assist the jury in understanding the nature of their relationship, and was particularly relevant to the rape charges, where the lack of consent was the critical issue. However, her Honour noted that its admissibility remained ‘extraordinary and exceptional’ (at [83]) and warranted careful directions from the trial judge to warn the jury against propensity reasoning, applying the High Court decision of Roach v The Queen [2011] HCA 12. See in particular at [84], where her Honour referenced a model direction from the Queensland Supreme and District Court Bench Book. In this case, while the trial judge went ‘part way’ in warning the jury about the limits of the use of the evidence, he did not specifically give a warning against propensity reasoning. This amounted to an error of law. However, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso, with McMurdo P taking into account the ‘discerning’ verdicts of the jury on each count and the fact that defence counsel did not ask for a redirection during the trial.
R v Harold [2011] QCA 99 (17 May 2011) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Character’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Cumulation of sentence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Manslaughter, assault occasioning bodily harm, various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The circumstances of the offending included the applicant stabbing his de facto partner multiple times and striking her with a cricket bat (See further at [3]-[9]). The applicant had a substantial and relevant criminal history of violence against the deceased committed over a 10 year period. He was convicted a number of times for severe assaults (both common assaults and assaults occasioning bodily harm) on the deceased, including punching her and hitting her over the head with an iron bar. He had previously been the subject of multiple domestic violence orders in her favour, which he had often breached. The applicant was convicted for the manslaughter of the deceased and was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment, including 12 years for manslaughter. The extra two years took into account 9 summary offences and two counts of assault occasioning bodily harm to which he had pleaded guilty.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Martin J (with whom Chesterman JA and White JA agreed) held that the sentencing judge correctly made the 2 year sentence for the two charges of assault occasioning bodily harm cumulative because they were separate offences committed at different times, even though they were committed in a 10 year course of conduct. The total effective sentence was appropriate and within range. The sentencing judge observed this was a repetitive and prolonged attack with a knife making it a serious case of manslaughter.
R v Murray [2010] QCA 266 (8 October 2010) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’ – ‘Stealing’ – ‘Threatening to enter premises with intent to intimidate’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, stealing, grievous bodily harm with intent, breach of domestic violence order (two counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending involved continued harassment of the complainant (the former partner of the applicant), culminating in the charge of grievous bodily harm with intent. The applicant broke into the complainant’s home which she shared with her new partner and children. He hit her on the head with a frying pan, causing her to fall to the ground. He held a knife against her throat, tied her wrists and ankles and dragged her into the car. She then threw herself out of the car, at which point the applicant stabbed her in the left side then on her right side. He had a relevant criminal history, including prior offences of violence as well as a breach of a domestic violence order. Two of these offences involved violence against his mother as well as a former partner. Two psychiatric reports detailing the mental issues suffered by the applicant were put before the sentencing judge. The total effective sentence imposed at trial was 8 years’ imprisonment. A ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in not giving reasons for making a ‘serious violent offence’ declaration.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused.
1.
In relation to the serious violence offence declaration, the applicant’s counsel at trial conceded that it would be impossible to submit that the declaration should not be made. The sentencing judge referred to this concession, in applying the ‘integrated approach to sentencing’ which is required in cases where a serious violent offence declaration is appropriate (See at [22]-[23]).
2.
Counsel for the applicant contended that 8 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive, as it was outside of the range established by comparable authorities and it did not have regard to the psychiatric problems suffered by the applicant. This argument was dismissed, with Cullinane J (Fraser JA and Chesterman JA agreeing) finding that eight years was not outside the permissible range. The mental health issues were considered at trial, as the sentencing judge expressly referred to them.
R v Clark [2009] QCA 2 (6 February 2009) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Attempted Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the attempted murder of his former wife. There were cross domestic violence orders in place against each other. He was sentenced at trial to 16 years’ imprisonment. The case turned on purely circumstantial evidence. See further at [3]-[38].
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge made errors by -
1.
Not issuing a Shepherd v R [1990] HCA 56 direction which deals with the how the jury must use pieces of evidence individually.
2.
Allowing the jury to consider evidence of the history of the relationship between the parties.
The other issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The Court noted that in a case turning on circumstantial evidence alone, it is not necessary that every intermediate conclusion of fact made by the jury be proven beyond reasonable doubt. There may be some instances, as McMurdo P observed (at [40]) if it is necessary to ‘reach a conclusion of fact as an indispensable intermediate step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt, that conclusion must be established beyond reasonable doubt’. However, generally, only the offence as a whole needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In regards to the relationship evidence, the primary judge directed the jury to the effect that such evidence was not directly relevant to the alleged offence, but only to put the relationship between the parties in context. The Court held that this direction was adequate. The Court also refused leave to appeal against sentence, finding that the premediated nature of the offending and the lack of mitigating factors meant that this was at the highest end of the scale of attempted murders.
R v Chong; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2008] QCA 22 (22 February 2008) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breastfeeding mother’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Hardship on children’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Orders affecting children’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge/s: Unlawful wounding, breach of intensive correction order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the respondent’s mother. They lived on the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community of Mornington Island. Following an argument, the respondent stabbed the complainant three times, causing no lasting injuries. The respondent was sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment with immediate court ordered parole for the wounding offence.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate, particularly in relation to the order of immediate parole.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The respondent had a substantial and relevant criminal history. In mitigation, the respondent had performed well on the intensive correction order, had pleaded guilty and was committed to looking after her seven children, including breastfeeding a baby and ensuring that those of school age attend school. She was an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander woman who had suffered abuse as a child. Atkinson J (with whom Keane JA and Fraser JA agreed) held that the head sentence was not manifestly inadequate. In considering whether the immediate parole order was appropriate, her Honour considered various factors, including the respondent’s disadvantage associated with her Aboriginality. Her Honour observed that, ‘The fact that the respondent is an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander woman living on Mornington Island is relevant to the question of the effect on her family’. (See at [36]). While the Court noted that the effect on an offender’s children can only be one relevant circumstance in determining sentence, the Court considered that exceptional circumstances were present. The respondent was a breastfeeding mother. Imprisonment would necessitate moving to the mainland, which would remove any practical means of maintaining the breastfeeding of the baby and personal contact with her other children. Her Honour quoted various secondary sources which discuss the substantial effect of incarceration on families, particularly on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander families. (See at [37] – [42]). The original sentence sufficiently incorporated deterrent and punitive elements, while the immediate parole allowed for rehabilitation.
R v Sauvao [2006] QCA 331 (1 September 2006) – Queensland Court of Appeal
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Serious violent offence declaration’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his de facto wife and to a breach of a domestic violence order. The couple had separated. The complainant initially obtained an apprehended violence order in 2003 in New South Wales, which was then registered in Queensland upon moving to that state. In May 2005, at a railway station, the applicant attempted to stab the complainant with a small knife. The knife snapped on the complainant’s jacket, causing her no harm. He continued to punch and kick her, and hit her head into a chair and a pole. He was then stopped by bystanders. He admitted that if they had not intervened he would have persevered. He surrendered to police and made full admissions. He gave a full account and added details to his disadvantage. It is unlikely without his interview that anyone would have known about the use of the knife (the complainant herself was not aware of it), or about the applicant’s intention to kill as opposed to assault the complainant. The applicant’s only relevant criminal history was a breach of the domestic violence order in the preceding year, when he attended the house of the complainant. The applicant was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. A ‘serious violent offence’ (SVO) declaration was made.
Issue/s: Whether the ‘serious violent offence’ declaration should have been made.
Decision and Reasoning: Firstly, the Court held that the head sentence was ‘unremarkable’. However, Holmes JA (with whom McPherson JA and Douglas J agreed) upheld the appeal. The applicant showed profound and sincere remorse and the case involved ‘unusual’ mitigating factors. The Court found the SVO declaration should not have been made for two reasons. Firstly, there was nothing in the offence itself in terms of, ‘duration, its force or its consequences which took it out of the ordinary run of cases’. The offender had almost no criminal history. There was no element of community protection as the likelihood of repetition was remote. Secondly, he had cooperated utterly. However, the only sentence reduction he received for this cooperation and remorse was 9 and a half months (the difference between the nine year sentence with an SVO declaration, and a 10 year sentence). This was a minor reduction in the circumstances and made the SVO declaration manifestly excessive.
R v HAC [2006] QCA 291 (11 August 2006) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Torture’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Torture, assault occasioning bodily harm, rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant held a longstanding belief in his wife’s infidelity. The acts relied on to constitute the offence of torture included abusive and humiliating acts such as: insisting that the children refer to the complainant as a slut or a whore rather than Mum, not allowing the children to show physical or verbal affection to her; forcing her to chew and swallow chillies in the appellant’s presence and forcing her to lick her vomit up; insisting that she perform sexual acts on his friends for money; insisting that she sleep outside the house without amenities; demanding that she drink his urine and attempting to persuade her to engage in a sexual act with a dog. The assault occasioning bodily harm conviction occurred when the appellant broke the complainant’s arm after she denied having sexual dealings with a neighbour. The rape conviction involved the appellant inserting the wooden handle of a ‘gaff hook’ into the complainant’s vagina. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for torture, two years’ imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm and five years’ imprisonment for rape. A ‘serious violent offence’ declaration was made.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the directions given by the trial judge in respect of torture were inadequate.
2.
Whether the proviso should be applied.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed in respect of issue 2.
1.
It was accepted that the directions given by the trial judge were not consistent with McMurdo P’s judgment in R v LM [2004] QCA 192 which requires that when more than one act in a series is relied upon to prove the elements of torture, the jury must be unanimously satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed at least one of the particularised acts. In this case, the trial judge’s directions, ‘effectively permitted the jury to convict of torture even though the jury might not have been unanimously satisfied as to which act or series of acts were intentionally inflicted to cause severe pain or suffering’ (see at [2]).
2.
The Court held that notwithstanding this error, no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred and the proviso should be applied. Jerrard JA (Holmes JA agreeing) held that it was clear which acts amounted to torture and this evidence was substantiated by unchallenged evidence from the complainant’s daughters. Williams JA (Holmes JA agreeing) held (despite some initial concerns with applying the proviso) – ‘The offence of torture was clearly established beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence; the relevant particulars being the conduct sworn to by the complainant, supported by the evidence of her daughters, and admitted by the appellant’ (see at [11]).
R v Friday [2005] QCA 440 (30 November 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Wounding’
Charge/s: Wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant were in a de facto relationship. While intoxicated early in the morning, an argument started after the applicant alleged that she was seeing other men. The applicant got off the bed then stabbed her through the upper arm and side of the chest. The wound did not damage internal organs, but required deep and superficial stiches. He had a criminal history, consisting of various violent offences, and one offence of breaking and entering and committing an indictable offence. He pleaded guilty to wounding and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with no recommendation for post-prison community based released. This sentence was made cumulative upon an existing six month sentence that he was already serving. The sentencing judge referred to the need to deter others from obtaining a knife and stabbing someone just because of an argument. This conduct was prevalent on Palm Island, where the offence occurred. He was also sentenced for breaches of an intensive correction order and a domestic violence order.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The applicant submitted that if the sentencing judge had moderated the sentence for the mitigating factors (such as the guilty plea, the applicant’s age and an apology made to the complainant), then the starting point must have been four years, which is outside the permissible range of sentences for this type of offence. The Court agreed and suspended the three year sentence after nine months, with an operational period of three years.
R v Collins [2005] QCA 172 (27 May 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence and appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted by a jury for the grievous bodily harm of his then partner. The applicant beat his then partner so severely that she suffered a ‘life-threatening subdural haematoma’ (See further at [2]). He was severely intoxicated at the time of the offence. The offence was committed in breach of a domestic violence order. The appellant also pleaded guilty to several other violent offences. These offences demonstrated a history of domestic violence committed against his then partner. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, suspended after two years with an operational period of five years. This sentence for grievous bodily harm was ‘intended to reflect the applicant's criminality for all the offences to which he had pleaded guilty’ (See at [27]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the guilty verdict was unreasonable.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
The appeal against conviction was dismissed – see at [21]-[25].
Leave to appeal was refused. The applicant did not take his partner to hospital for treatment until one day after the injuries were sustained, which showed a complete disregard for her welfare. The fact that the offence was committed in breach of a domestic violence order was described as a ‘matter of concern’ (see at [31]). The applicant showed no remorse for the life-threatening injuries he inflicted on his partner, who is the mother of at least one of his children. Even though he had no memory of inflicting the injuries as a result of his intoxication, the Court stated that with ‘sober hindsight’ he ought to have been shocked at the injuries he caused (See at [31]). Deterrence was an important factor for the safety of the complainant as well as the interests of the community. The Court held at [37] that the applicant’s small prospects of rehabilitation were not such as to warrant a more lenient approach. The sentence for grievous bodily harm, when considered in isolation was not excessive. Therefore, considering the fact that it was a sentence intended to take into account all of the offending behaviour, it was actually at the lower end of the range of appropriate sentences.
R v Fairbrother; ex parte AG (Qld) [2005] QCA 105 (15 April 2005) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following being released from police custody subject to conditions imposed under the then Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act 1989 that the respondent not have contact with the complainant (his domestic partner) and that he not go to her residence, the respondent returned to her home and threw boiling water onto her twice. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the complainant. He pleaded guilty on the second day of trial and was sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm, wholly suspended with an operational period of four years.
Issue/s: Whether the full suspension of the sentence made it manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The injuries caused the complainant severe pain over a long period and also caused some mental health issues. The respondent had some history of domestic violence. This was a ‘reasonably bad’ (at [21]) example of the offence which occurred hours after the appellant had been removed from the complainant’s home by police. However, mitigating factors included his guilty plea, his good work history and his efforts at rehabilitation. Furthermore, the respondent was not sentenced at trial for deliberately pouring boiling water on the complainant. If it had been deliberate, he would have been sentenced to actual imprisonment of at least 12 months before suspension. This was nevertheless a ‘serious example of domestic violence’ with the sentence imposed at trial being a correspondingly ‘substantial penalty’ (See at [24]).
See in particular McMurdo P’s (Jerrard JA and Cullinane J agreeing) comments on the impacts of domestic violence and the approach to sentencing at [23] –
‘Domestic violence is an insidious, prevalent and serious problem in our society. Victims are often too ashamed to publicly complain, partly because of misguided feelings of guilt and responsibility for the perpetrator's actions. Members of the community are often reluctant to become involved in the personal relationships of others where domestic violence is concerned. Perpetrators of domestic violence often fail to have insight into the seriousness of their offending, claiming an entitlement to behave in that way or at least to be forgiven by the victim and to evade punishment by society. Domestic violence has a deleterious on-going impact not only on the immediate victim but on the victim's wider family and ultimately on the whole of society. It is not solely a domestic issue; it is a crime against the State warranting salutary punishment. The cost to the community in terms of lost income and productivity, medical and psychological treatment and on-going social problems is immense. Perpetrators of serious acts of domestic violence must know that society will not tolerate such behaviour. They can expect the courts to impose significant sentences of imprisonment involving actual custody to deter not only individual offenders but also others who might otherwise think they can commit such acts with near impunity.’
R v Gill; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland [2004] QCA 139 (30 April 2004) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Attempted rape’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Stalking’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, attempted rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated stalking and attempted rape and was sentenced to two years and three years’ imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently. There was no domestic violence order in place at the time of the offence. The Court recommended consideration of post-prison community based release after 12 months (See further at [2]-[3]).
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by majority. Holmes J (with whom Davies JA agreed) discussed R v Stephens [1994] QCA 507 and noted that it is not correct to approach rapes occurring in an existing relationship more leniently. However, this is not to say that that in the circumstances of a particular case, a sexual assault committed by a current or former partner will necessarily be equivalent to a sexual assault committed by a stranger. In comparing this case to R v McNamara, her Honour stated at [16], ‘I do not think that the traumatic effect of sexual assault in a case such as this, where the complainant had, albeit without enthusiasm, admitted the respondent to the house and gone to sleep with him present, is readily equated with the likely shock and fear of a woman sleeping in her home who without warning is assaulted by an intruder; as happened in McNamara.’ As such, also taking into account the respondent’s plea of guilty and comparable cases, her Honour held that the sentence, while ‘lenient’ ([21]), was adequate. However, de Jersey CJ dissented. His Honour also discussed Stephens. His view was that the statement in Stephens about an ‘honest but unreasonable’ mistake as to consent in the relationship context as a mitigating factor did not apply. The complainant had made her lack of consent clearly known and had previously shown reluctance to let the respondent into the house. His Honour stated, ‘This is a case where the circumstance of the prior relationship should in no degree have led to more lenient treatment than would otherwise be accorded’ (See at [5]). His Honour then went onto consider the respondent’s serious and relevant criminal history, including stalking offences as well as breaches of domestic violence orders (on four occasions over an eight year period with other partners). As such, having regard to this context, his view was that the sentence for attempted rape should be increased to four and a half years and that the order for community release should be removed. Nevertheless, he was in dissent and the appeal was dismissed.
R v AN [2003] QCA 349 (11 August 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Cumulative sentencing’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstances of aggravation.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant met the complainant while on remand and they lived together for a short period until the relationship broke down. The stalking occurred over the phone and included death threats and threats to the complainant’s children. There was a psychologist’s report before the trial judge, indicating that the applicant presented with a borderline personality disorder and would not be able to alter his behaviour without counselling. The applicant had a long criminal history of stalking, stealing, breaches of domestic violence orders and other offences. The applicant pleaded guilty to the stalking of the complainant with circumstances of aggravation and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the three year sentence offended the totality principle and was therefore manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years. The effect of the conviction was that an existing suspended sentence for other offences was activated. The applicant had also been sentenced previously for common assault and wilful damage charges. The effect of this was that the applicant was liable to four years and two months imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole at eighteen months. There was no error in the cumulative term being imposed. However, the Court did conclude that the three year term offended the totality principle. In citing comparable cases, the Court found that a three year sentence is at the top of the range for offending of this nature. Lesser sentences were imposed in comparable cases which involved more serious stalking in the domestic context, such as surveillance, letters and attempts to run the victim off the road. Such conduct was not present in this case.
R v Foodey [2003] QCA 310 (25 July 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstance of aggravation (violence), wilful damage.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant separated from his wife after an eight year marriage and fourteen year relationship. Temporary protection orders were in place against the applicant in favour of his ex-wife. In breach of those orders, he stalked her on a number of separate occasions by assaulting her, driving his car at her, making threats against her and their children and following her car. His criminal history involved drug offences committed a considerable time ago. He pleaded guilty. The sentencing judge noted that the applicant showed no remorse and his conduct was of such seriousness that a deterrent sentence was more important than is normally the case. He was sentenced to 12 and a half months imprisonment, suspended for five years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused. Jerrard JA (with whom Davies JA and Helman J agreed) stated at [11] that, ‘The applicant's behaviour towards Jennifer Foodey in the two and a half months between their separation and his incarceration was persistently cruel and aggressive. At different times he insulted, degraded, and terrified her. His conduct throughout was in breach of court orders intended to give her protection. Considered in isolation, the sentence imposed by the learned judge does not appear manifestly excessive, and indeed far from it. The same result occurs if regard is had to other sentences for unlawful stalking imposed or approved by this court.’ The sentence was upheld.
R v Layfield [2003] QCA 3 (29 January 2003) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’
Charge/s: Stalking with a circumstance of aggravation (threats of violence).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of stalking his former fiancee with the aggravating circumstance that he threatened to use violence against her. A previous domestic violence order was obtained by the complainant and the relationship deteriorated about a year after this. The stalking occurred over a period of less than one year. It occurred over the telephone, as well as by following and loitering outside of her place of employment. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge should have exercised the option of suspending the sentence after twelve months, on the basis of several factors including the applicant’s youth, lack of criminal history and a strong support network.
Decision and Reasoning: Davies JA (with whom McPherson JA and Mullins J agreed), refused the application, holding that while the trial judge could have imposed the lesser sentence, it was not argued for at trial, and the sentence that was imposed did not demonstrate any error. Davies JA also noted the applicant’s lack of remorse as a relevant factor.
R v Millar [2002] QCA 382 (25 September 2002) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Irrelevant considerations’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Stalking with circumstances of aggravation, common assault, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the complainant for nine months. They then lived together as a married couple for two weeks until the complainant moved out due to physical and verbal abuse by the applicant. The complainant indicated that she wished to cease all contact with the applicant. There was a domestic violence order in place, which was subsequently breached by the applicant. The stalking (committed when the order was in place) ‘involved menacing telephone calls, banging on her door, threats and letters and other items left at her residence culminating in the applicant's attempting to run the complainant off the road during the day’. This caused the complainant to veer to the wrong side of a busy rode. He then drove his car into hers and assaulted an off duty police officer who was trying to help the complainant. The applicant’s criminal history was comprised of dishonesty offences which had resulted in prison terms. Concurrent sentences of two years imprisonment (with the full activation of an unrelated nine month suspended sentence) were imposed. The complainant indicated that she was still in fear for her safety.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was refused. The applicant submitted, inter alia that his criminal history was confined to dishonesty offences, he was young and a psychological report indicated he was remorseful. He stressed that the comparable decisions before the Court concerned situations where there was no emotional relationship between the complainant and the offender, so that in his case, a more lenient penalty should have been imposed. This argument was rejected. de Jersey CJ (with whom Helman J and Jones J agreed) held – ‘I would say for my part that that (the presence of an emotional relationship between the offender and the victim) is not a feature which should necessarily lead to a lower penalty being imposed, where the stalking follows the break-up of an emotional relationship.’
R v M [2001] QCA 166 (1 May 2001) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Burglary, rape, assault occasioning bodily harm, deprivation of liberty, two counts of aggravated indecent assault and assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: One week prior to the offences the victim had removed her former partner’s name from their joint lease, terminating his right to enter. He (the appellant) then broke into the victim’s house, after cutting the telephone wires. He then pulled her into the bedroom, punched her, tied her up and forced her to perform oral sex on him at knife point on two separate occasions. He waved his knife at her and said that if the police were called, he would cut off her breasts and have anal sex with her. He then raped her. The appellant was the subject of a domestic violence order obtained by the complainant a month before the offences were committed. He was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred in allowing the jury to infer that it was the appellant who cut the telephone lines.
3.
Whether the trial judge erred by failing to direct the jury that they needed to be satisfied that the appellant cut the phone lines beyond reasonable doubt.
4.
Whether evidence of a domestic violence order being in place could be a relevant factor in determining whether the appellant had the requisite intent to commit an offence when he entered the house.
5.
Whether the appellant could rely on the defence of an honest and mistaken belief for the purposes of consent.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
McPherson JA noted that a sentence of less than seven years could not have been expected – the appellant had a substantial history of domestic violence (including against the complainant’s mother) and breaches of these orders.
2.
McPherson JA held that the judge was correct in allowing the jury to infer that the appellant had caused the damage. There was uncontradicted circumstantial evidence to this effect.
3.
This argument was dismissed. Only each element of the offence needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, not every piece of circumstantial evidence.
4.
The Court held that evidence of a domestic violence order being in place could be a relevant factor for the jury to determine intent for the purposes of the burglary charge.
5.
This argument was dismissed. In fact, the trial judge had omitted the requirement of a ‘reasonable’ belief, which was favourable to the appellant.
R v Matamua; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2000] QCA 400 (28 September 2000) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Going armed in public in such a manner as to cause fear’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm while armed’
Charge/s: Unlawful assault, unlawful assault causing bodily harm while armed, going armed in public in such a manner as to cause fear.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent became involved in an argument with the complainant, with whom he was in a de facto relationship. The respondent smashed a stubby of beer on his forehead which broke. He then pushed the complainant onto the bonnet of a car and held the broken bottle on her throat and threatened to slice her with it. Another argument ensued, at which point the respondent swung an axe at the complainant. He hit her on the back of the head with the handle while yelling abuse at her. She was knocked to the ground. Then, he swung the axe to the ground so that the axe head became stuck in the ground next to the complainant’s head. After a struggle, he winded the complainant and held the axe to her throat, while threatening to kill her. He was severely intoxicated. The relationship ended after the offences. The complainant experienced severe pain, but suffered no permanent physical injury. However, she suffered lasting psychological injuries. The respondent’s criminal history consisted of drug and traffic offences, as well as one offence of behaving in a threatening manner. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended with an operational period of two and a half years. A $1000 fine and $1000 compensation was also ordered.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate. In particular, whether a custodial sentence was required.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Pincus JA (with whom Thomas JA and de Jersey CJ agreed) held that the degree of violence was such as to warrant a term of actual imprisonment. A deterrent sentence was needed. His conduct was prolonged. The axe could quite easily have gone through someone’s head. It involved other people as well as his partner. The sentence was increased on the principal charge of assault occasioning bodily harm to 18 months’ imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after six months. It was recommended that the respondent receive counselling for his alcohol problems.
R v MacKenzie [2000] QCA 324 (11 August 2000) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Battered wife syndrome’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Negligent manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was married to her husband for 39 years and was subjected to severe domestic violence during that time. She pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband. She was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years. (See further at [26]-[30]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether a miscarriage of justice occurred because of advice the appellant was given to plead guilty to manslaughter, instead of pleading not guilty to murder and seeking an acquittal on the basis of self-defence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
This argument was dismissed – the applicant never claimed she was acting in self-defence, and there was minimal evidence to that effect. However, McPherson JA did note that evidence of ‘battered wife’s syndrome’, can be relevant as expert evidence for the purposes of self-defence (or provocation), as demonstrating the heightened awareness and arousal which may be experienced by ‘battered women’, which would be relevant to whether they had reasonable grounds to use the level of force they did.
2.
The appeal against sentence was upheld. McMurdo P (Dutney J concurring as to the orders made) held that notwithstanding that the applicant’s conduct was negligent and not a willed act, a substantial period of imprisonment was required to deter people from handling guns negligently, particularly in the context of domestic violence. Such conduct was not excused by the ‘grim history’ of domestic violence the appellant suffered. Nevertheless, this history did impact upon the appellant in that it contributed to (as a psychologist who interviewed her put it at [21]), ‘ineffective problem solving behaviour and a perception by [the applicant] of the narrowing of her options over time. A perception of narrowed options can often result in decisions made by the abused woman that from the outside look like poor judgment.’ This grave history of abuse was therefore an additional mitigating factor which partly explains how her behaviour came about. As such, taking into account all of the unusual circumstances, the sentence was reduced to 5 years, with a non-parole period of 1 year. McPherson JA agreed that the sentence should be reduced but proposed a slightly longer term.
R v Lane [1998] QCA 167 (8 May 1998) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against the recording of a conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm. She was released and placed on a good behaviour bond for two years. For a number of years, the applicant had been the subject of severe physical and emotional abuse by her de facto partner. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order in place between the applicant and her de facto partner. The incident involved the applicant hitting her de facto partner on the head with a heavy mortar bowl when he was sleeping. She later shot him, after a struggle for the gun. She was acquitted of the shooting charges on the basis that the jury found there was a reasonable doubt as to whether self-defence was available due to a reasonable fear of serious attack. However, she was convicted for the striking incident, with self-defence being excluded beyond reasonable doubt. The sentencing judge commented on the need for a ‘deterrent aspect in the element of sentencing in a case such as this’ (and noted) ‘Little point…would be served at this stage by not recording a conviction’ (See at page 6).
Issue/s: Whether the conviction should have been recorded.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. Derrington J noted at [4] that the ‘(trial judge) made full allowance for the applicant's suffering at the hands of the complainant and for all other features favourable to her. With this approach I agree unreservedly.’
R v Stephens & Attorney-General of Queensland [1994] QCA 507 (28 November 1994) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Consent’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, indecent assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of indecent assault of his de facto partner. It is unclear whether at the time of the offences, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the victim. He was sentenced to three years imprisonment with a recommendation for parole eligibility after six months. The context of the relationship was one of intimidation and fear.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court upheld the appeal, holding that while the trial judge was correct to take into account the respondent’s youth, irrelevant considerations were taken into account. The sentence was increased to five years imprisonment with a recommendation for parole eligibility after two years. The Court found that the primary judge erred by approaching rapes occurring within an existing relationship in a more lenient way. The Court stated that generally, it is not correct to approach rapes occurring in existing relationships more leniently. There may be circumstances where the existence of such a relationship may be relevant to the sentence imposed due to the offender’s state of mind, in that, ‘there may be greater scope for a genuine belief on the part of the man that the woman has or is likely to consent to sexual intercourse. And where that mistake is honest but unreasonable, it may be relevant to take it into account in sentencing the offender.’ (Note: This statement has been both distinguished and applied in subsequent Court of Appeal decisions - In R v Conway [2012] QCA 142, Henry J (with whom Muir JA and McMurdo P agreed) stated in obiter that Stephens is ‘of limited utility given its age'. However, the case has been discussed after Conway such as in R v Postchild [2013] QCA 227.) In Stephens itself, the Court of Appeal found that the circumstances of the relationship in that case did not give reason to distinguish it from a rape between strangers. There was a high degree of violence and the complainant made it clear through her protests and tears that she was not consenting.
R v Bell & Anor; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1994] QCA 220 (20 June 1994) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Unlawful Wounding.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was intoxicated and following an argument with the complainant (his de facto partner), stabbed her in the thigh, punched her in the mouth twice and continued to shout and threaten her. He pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding and was sentenced to two years’ probation and ordered to perform 120 hours of community service, with no conviction recorded. It is unclear whether at the time of the offence, there was a current or lapsed protection order against the respondent in favour of the complainant. The complainant was supportive of the respondent, but did not wish to see him in prison.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The respondent was re-sentenced to a suspended period of imprisonment for one year, with an operational period of two years. A conviction was recorded. The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 1 year despite the wishes of the complainant, the fact that the relationship had resumed and the fact the respondent had returned to his community and returned to work. However, the operational period of the sentence was suspended. Fitzgerald P (at 6) made the following comments relating to how social and economic disadvantage (both generally and in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities) is relevant when sentencing domestic violence offenders –
“It was right for (the trial judge) to have regard to the respondent’s disadvantages and open to him, as a result, to sentence the respondent as leniently as the circumstances of his offence admitted. However, such disadvantages do not justify or excuse violence against women or, to take another example, abuse of children. Women and children who live in deprived communities or circumstances should not also be deprived of the law’s protection. A proposition that such offences should not be adequately penalised because of disadvantages experienced by a group of which the offender is a member is not one which is acceptable to the general community or one which we would expect to be accepted by the particular community of which an offender and complainant are members.”
R v Kina [1993] QCA 480 (29 November 1993) – Queensland Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - social worker’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In September 1988, after a trial which lasted less than a day, the female appellant, an Aboriginal woman, was convicted of murder for killing her abusive male partner of three years and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appellant did not give or call evidence at her trial. It was only five years later, after the appellant had spent years speaking to a particular social worker (Mr Berry) in prison, that evidence of the abuse she suffered emerged. Kina applied to the Governor in Council for the exercise in her favour of the royal prerogative of mercy. Section 672A of the Criminal Code preserves the pardoning power of the Governor, adding in para. (a) ‘that the Crown Law Officer may refer the whole case to the Court of Appeal, to be heard and determined as in the case of an appeal by a person convicted.’ Under this provision on 24 May 1993 the Attorney General referred to the Court of Appeal ‘the whole case with respect to the conviction of … Robyn Bella Kina on the charge of murder …’ of Anthony David Black.
Issue/s:
1.
The appellant did not receive a fair trial and a miscarriage of justice occurred because of problems of communication between the appellant and her lawyers which led to fundamental errors at trial.
2.
There was fresh evidence of such a nature that, had it been placed before the jury who decided the case, there was a substantial possibility of acquittal.
3.
The fresh evidence was of such a nature that refusal of it would lead to a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, the conviction and verdict set aside and a new trial ordered. Evidence of Mr Berry, the social worker, was important in this case. Mr Berry first saw the appellant before her trial in April 1988. Over the following months, the appellant slowly disclosed her story to Mr Berry – that the deceased had continually beaten her up, forced her to have anal sex with him and that he tied her up. Mr Berry tried to communicate with the appellant’s lawyers before the trial but was advised that her legal representatives wished that he ‘would not interfere with proceedings’. After the trial, the social worker saw the appellant in a counselling capacity. The appellant’s self-esteem improved and in 1991 she was able to give evidence about the deceased’s threat to anally rape her 14 year old niece.
In finding there was a miscarriage of justice, Fitzgerald P and Davis JA held that:
“In this matter, there were, insufficiently recognised, a number of complex factors interacting which presented exceptional difficulties of communication between her legal representatives and the appellant because of: (i) her aboriginality; (ii) the battered woman syndrome; and (iii) the shameful (to her) nature of the events which characterised her relationship with the deceased. These cultural, psychological and personal factors bore upon the adequacy of the advice and legal representation which the appellant received and effectively denied her satisfactory representation or the capacity to make informed decisions on the basis of proper advice”.
Supreme Court
Gardiner v Doer [2022] QSC 188 (11 November 2022) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Civil claim for post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Defendant acquitted at criminal trial’ – ‘Interference with the person’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Tort law’ – ‘Trespass to the person’ – ‘What constitutes assault and/or battery’
Matter: civil claim for damages for assault/and or battery and post- traumatic stress disorder.
Facts: The defendant was found not guilty at a criminal trial. The plaintiff then sued him in tort.
The plaintiff and defendant had been married for 15 years and had two children together. The defendant had been verbally and physically abusive to the plaintiff. They had recently separated when the defendant told the plaintiff he would send someone to rape and sodomise her. That night, he broke into the house dressed in black including a black balaclava. He jumped on top of her, sat on her chest, covered her mouth, held her nose and started shoving the fingers of latex gloves into her mouth. She struggled and he forced her head off the couch and bumped her head on the tiled floor. He put cloth in her mouth and tape over it then did the same with her eyes. He started to tie her hands together with plastic bags. She struggled more and managed to pull off his mask. When he said that he would come for her family, he would burn down her mother’s house, he would come for her sister and that her family was evil, she recognised him as her husband the defendant. She called him by his name and after that the violence diminished.
Held: Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $967,113.40
Cooper J found the elements of the tort of battery made out [287]. Most of his judgment addressed the question of damages. His Honour included the following heads of damage in his assessment: General damages: $8,410; Past economic loss: $358,123; Interest on past economic loss: $58,302; Future economic loss: $343,081; Gratuitous services: $35,560; Special damages: $13,412.40; Interest on special damages: $1,899; Future special damages: $13,126, Aggravated damages: $50,000; Interest on aggravated damages: $17,600; Exemplary damages: $50,000: Interest on exemplary damages: $17,600 [389].
R v Peniamina (No 2) [2021] QSC 282 (25 October 2021) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘Partial defence of provocation’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Reasonable belief’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1, Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty of manslaughter following jury retrial (his conviction for murder having been set aside by the High Court in Peniamina v The Queen [2020] HCA 47 (9 December 2020)). The defendant was in a relationship with the female victim for 16 years and the couple shared four school aged children. In 2020, the defendant confronted the victim with allegations of infidelity. When the victim denied these allegations, the defendant struck her, before stabbing her 29 times and hitting her head with a cement bollard which resulted in her death [14], [11]. During the assault, the victim had armed herself with a kitchen knife and cut the defendant’s hand when he attempted to disarm her. The jury found that this act provoked the defendant’s murderous intention [10], accepting the partial defence of provocation. The jury had also found that the defendant’s belief about the victim’s infidelity was reasonable [7].
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment, becoming eligible for parole after serving 80% of the sentence. Justice Davis declared that the offence was a serious violence offence and a domestic violence offence]. In sentencing, His Honour was guided by s 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (‘the Act’) and comparative cases [35]-[39]. His Honour noted the defendant’s early plea of guilty and genuine remorse [23], [25]. Due to the defendant’s lack of prior convictions, His Honour placed less importance on personal deterrence as a sentencing purpose [26]. His Honour took evidence of the defendant’s intention to kill his wife into account as a relevant sentencing consideration [40]-[41] and emphasised that domestic violence was an aggravating factor under s 10A of the Act.
Attorney-General for the State of Qld v Sagiba [2020] QSC 254 (21 August 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Contravention of supervision order’ – ‘Sentencing orders’
Charges: Contravening supervision order x 5; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1 (DFV offence); Deprivation of liberty x 1 (DFV offence).
Proceedings: Contravention of supervision order.
Facts: The respondent was subject to a supervision order made under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act (DPSOA). The applicant alleged the respondent contravened a supervision order and sought to extend the period of the supervision order. In early 2020, the respondent was reported to police for allegedly committing domestic violence. The respondent put his female domestic partner in a headlock, strangled and punched her, attempted to prevent her leaving the house and threatened to rape her. The respondent claimed he ‘did not commit an offence of a sexual nature’ on the basis that there was a sexual element to the latest offences, but they were not sexual offences. The psychiatric evidence was that the risk factors that were present when the original supervision order was made remain present.
Issues: Whether adequate protection of the community can be ensured by the release of the respondent subject to a supervision order.
Decision and reasoning: Supervision order extended for a further five years.
The respondent has not demonstrated that the adequate protection of the community – specifically from the commission by the respondent of a ‘serious sexual offence’ – can be ensured by his release without him being subject to supervision.
Johnson v Parole Board of Queensland [2020] QSC 108 (11 May 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Application for judicial review’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Good behaviour’ – ‘Improper exercise of power’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Parole application’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Rehabilitation programs’ – ‘Stepchildren in the family’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Murder x 4; Attempted murder x 1; Rape x 1
Proceedings: Application for judicial review
Issue: Whether parole should be granted.
Facts: The male applicant plead guilty to murdering his female partner and three of her four children from her earlier marriage. He also plead guilty to the attempted murder and the rape of the fourth child of that marriage. The applicant had used a hammer to inflict head injuries on the victims, and scalded the fourth child with boiling water. The fourth child was not found for five days and suffered permanent injuries. The applicant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder charges and 14 years’ imprisonment for the rape charge.
After serving 13 years in custody, the applicant became eligible for parole. He made several applications for a parole order, but all were refused. The applicant applied for judicial review of the latest decision refusing parole, contending that the decision was affected by an improper exercise of power because: the refusal was unreasonable, the Parole Board failed to take relevant considerations into account, and the Board applied a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the case. The applicant also contended that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice.
Held: The judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision. His Honour held that the Board’s decision, as evidenced by its statement of reasons, did not lack an evident and intelligible justification when all the relevant matters were considered, and therefore the decision was not unreasonable [35]. His Honour noted that "the Board is not compelled to grant parole to a prisoner who has served any particular length of timer in custody or in residential accommodation, who has completed any particular number (or all) of the available recommended rehabilitation programs or who has been of good behaviour for any particular length of time" [32] – what is important is whether the offender shows "internal change, in the sense of the development of an understanding by the offender of the pathways to offending, the triggers that lead along that path and the steps the offender can take …" [33]. In this case, the applicant had not, and still posed a risk to the community.
His Honour also held that the Board did not fail to take a relevant consideration into account, namely a program completion report, as the Board expressly referred to extracts from this report in its statement of reasons [39]-[40]. Nor did the Board apply the policy asserted by the applicant (that the Board followed the commissioned psychiatric opinion without considering alternate views by other experts) inflexibly as the Board’s statement of reasons demonstrated that it considered alternate views of a range of other experts [42], [48].
The judge further held that the Board’s decision was not affected by any breach of the rules of natural justice [55]. The applicant was invited to make submissions to the Board on multiple occasions, and no complaint was made that the applicant had inadequate time to effectively prepare [54].
R v Coman [2020] QSC 60 (3 April 2020) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Dangerous operation of a vehicle’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘History of emotional abuse’ – ‘Judge only trial’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perceived position of danger’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Offences: Manslaughter x 1; Dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance x 1.
Case type: Judge only trial
Facts: The female accused pleaded not guilty to manslaughter and the dangerous operation of a vehicle causing death whilst adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. The victim, her male fiancè, died of traumatic asphyxiation after the accused drove her motor vehicle over him as he lay on the ground. It was uncontroversial that the incident was preceded by an alcohol-fueled argument between the two parties. The accused felt threatened and decided to remove herself from what she believed to be a position of danger by attempting to drive away to a place of safety ([11]). The Crown alleged that the accused knew that the deceased was on the ground and deliberately drove her motor vehicle over the deceased, albeit without any intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.
At the close of the Crown case, the accused’s counsel made a no case submission with respect to the count of manslaughter. In particular, it was submitted that there was no evidence from which an inference of knowledge or intention could be made. Given the fact that there had been an unexplained deviation of the accused’s car from the driveway to the position where the victim’s body was found, the no case submission was unsuccessful. The accused then elected to give evidence, and claimed that the victim ran into her car as she was driving away from the house. Two defences were raised, namely, unforeseen consequence and one of extraordinary emergency or compulsion.
Issue: Whether the accused was guilty of the offences charged.
Held: Burns J considered the significant body of evidence regarding the victim’s relationship with his former wife, his subsequent partner and the accused. The accused and victim lived in a semi-rural town and had been in a relationship for approximately 2 years. Like the victim’s prior relationships, his relationship with the accused was marred by frequent and excessive alcohol consumption. As a result of his "chronic drinking problem", there were regular outbursts of anger, emotional abuse (including belittling accusations, vile language and intimidation), and, on occasion, actual violence ([18]).
The accused was acquitted on the count of manslaughter. His Honour accepted the accused’s evidence as it was entirely consistent with the physical evidence found at the scene, as well as the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries ([36]), and found that she did not deliberately drive over the victim’s body ([52]). His Honour was also not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused substantially or significantly caused the victim’s death. The real and effective cause of his death was his decision to place himself in front of the accused’s moving car ([54]). The accused was also acquitted on the alternative count of dangerous operation of a vehicle ([65]).
R v Arumugam [2018] QSC 312 (14 December 2018) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder x 1
Facts: The offender met the victim, a Singaporean national living in Australia, through an arranged marriage website. The victim had reservations and formed another relationship. The offender threatened to kill himself if she did not marry him. The offender travelled to Australia from South Africa with the intention of killing the victim if she did not proceed with the arranged marriage. This was evidenced by a statement he made in South Africa to that effect. The offender stabbed the victim 32 times in a hotel room, and claimed that she asked him to kill her. The offender pleaded guilty to the charges. By doing so, he cooperated with the administration of justice because he saved the deceased’s family the trauma of a trial, as well as substantial court time and resources.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was convicted of one count of murder, being a domestic violence offence, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. His Honour found that his conduct was planned and persistent ([20]), and involved a high degree of brutality and ferocity. Following his arrest, medical examinations found that, during his incarceration, he experienced periods of active psychosis, auditory hallucinations and paranoid and grandiose beliefs. Although the offender was diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder and borderline personality disorder, his Honour held that he was neither deprived nor impaired of full capacity at the relevant time.
R v Storie [2018] QSC 298 (30 November 2018) – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Murder x 1; Burglary by breaking, in the night, whilst armed x 1; Entering premises, doing wilful damage x 1
Facts: In the early hours of the morning, the offender drove to his ex-partner’s house. No one was home. He broke into the garage, slashed the front tyres of her car, stole a child’s bicycle and returned home. He later returned, entered her house and sliced her throat with a knife.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was found guilty of ‘premeditated conduct of the very worst kind’ by taking the life of his former partner in a ‘brutal’ manner in circumstances where he was subject to a protection order ([4]). Eleven years prior he had been convicted of breaching a protection order that the victim had taken out. Premeditation was evidenced by numerous statements to the effect that his ex-partner would be ‘a dead woman’ and that the protection order would not stop him. The offender took active steps to dispose of the evidence of the murder, however later made admissions of his involvement in the victim’s death. Boddice J found that, by pleading guilty, he cooperated with the administration of justice because he saved the community the cost of a lengthy trial. He also facilitated the administration of justice by making extensive admissions to police after the discovery of the deceased’s body, which preserved police resources. He was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for entering the premises and doing wilful damage, and to 10 years’ imprisonment for burglary by breaking, in the night, whilst armed.
R v Ney a[2011] QSC Indictment No 597 of 2008 (8 March 2011)/a sentence - unreported – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Diminished responsibility’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist - psychologist’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’
Charge: Manslaughter
Proceeding: Sentencing
Facts: Ney killed her partner, Haynes, striking him in the head and face with an axe. Haynes was hospitalised and died two days later. Initially charged with murder she pleaded guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced to nine years imprisonment - eligible for release on parole after serving three years. In sentencing Ney, Dick AJ referred to the reports of a psychologist (Dr Sundin) and a psychiatrist (Associate Professor Carolyn Quadrio):
‘As you know, I have been given a number of psychiatric and psychological reports. The prosecution tendered the report of Dr Josephine Sundin. Dr Sundin has come to the opinion that as a result of the multiple traumas you have suffered in your life since your young teenage years and the series of violent intimate relationships that you have endured since that time, and the fact that you have suffered physical, sexual and psychological abuse over a long period of time, you suffer chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder.
The connection between those two matters is explained in her report and in other reports. Associate Professor Carolyn Quadrio, spells it out in her addendum report. She said, "Trauma and abuse have profound effects on mental processes and on psycho-social and psychological functions so that a disorganisation of personality occurs and leads to lasting disorder. Similarly, substance abuse which commonly develops in the context of adolescent trauma, also has a profound effect on mental and psycho-social processes and secondly, incapacitates the person so they are rendered highly vulnerable to further traumas and abuse thus creating a vicious cycle…
I have been assisted by the addendum report of Associate Professor Quadrio where she says that, "At times, however, she returned when she may have been able to escape because she experienced him as someone who loved her. This is explained as traumatic attachment relationship. Further it is also the case that in chronic or complex post-traumatic stress disorder there is both paralysis of initiative whereby the person is greatly compromised in her capacity to take action and there are alterations in perception so they have difficulty perceiving themselves accurately or others and thus in perceiving the true nature of the relationship with an abuser."
Later on she says, "If this psycho physiological disturbance is sustained over time and especially when it occurs in the crucial development years of childhood and adolescence, it eventually leads to disorganisation of personality, sustained hyper vigilance and hyper reactivity become chronic and irreversible."
Further on, "The inability to leave can be explained, partly, as a manifestation of personality disturbance but it is also the case that in domestic violence a woman feels trapped and unable to leave and knows it is not safe to leave so she remains captive and experiences more abuse and trauma and undergoes more personality disorganisation."
I have also noted from the report of Associate Professor Quadrio that those matters which are described as chronic or complex PTSD personality disorder with poly substance dependence or abuse, she says, "These disturbances reflected a lifetime of trauma, a highly chaotic and unsustainable lifestyle and both past and present intimate partner violence."
R v Falls, Coupe, Cummings-Creed & Hoare a[2010] QSC (3 June 2010)/a summing up - unreported – Queensland Supreme Court
‘Abused person’ – ‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychiatrist’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Self defence’
Charge: Murder.
Result: Acquitted.
Facts: In May 2006, the accused, Susan Falls, shot and killed her husband, Rodney Falls. Throughout their relationship, Susan Falls was subject to significant physical and emotional abuse. This included: numerous incidents of physical violence, beating one of the family’s dogs to death; numerous incidents of sexual violence and rape; threatening to kill her or harm the couple’s children. Susan Falls drugged the deceased and shot him twice as he dozed in a chair. She was charged with murder. Both self-defence, ss 271(2), 273 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) and the defence of killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship, s 304B Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) were raised at trial. Two forensic psychiatrists (Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio) were called by the defence and gave evidence about the history of violence and its effect on the offender. (Note Coupe, Cumming-Creed and Hoare were charged with being accessories to the murder but were also acquitted).
Applegarth J, summing up (3 June 2010):
‘Evidence of what, for want of a better expression, is referred to as "battered woman syndrome", is admitted, not because battered woman syndrome is a disorder, or because battered woman syndrome is a defence. Battered woman syndrome isn't a defence. The fact that someone is battered for years doesn't automatically give them a defence. Whether they have a defence depends on whether they acted as they did in circumstances that the law provides is a defence.
However, what is conveniently, and perhaps somewhat inaccurately, described as "battered woman syndrome" is relevant to legal defences.
It doesn't have to be a psychological disorder to be relevant to behaviour and to the defences in this case. It's relevant to the mental state of Ms Falls, and whether she exhibited hyperarousal and other symptoms that are recognised in such cases.
I won't repeat it. You will remember the evidence of Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio about the mental state of persons who are subjected to prolonged abuse, their vigilance and so on. Associate Professor Quadrio summed it up pretty simply in saying they're “revved up all the time”.
The behaviour of people, be they soldiers or civilians who are subjected to trauma, has been the subject of organised study. It's not every form of behaviour that is or needs to be the subject of expert evidence. Someone's grief reaction when a loved one dies, or the anxiety that most of us feel when we talk in public, or the anxiety that most people experience when they sit exams, these are things that are familiar to us because we might remember sitting exams or we've had children who sit exams. So we don't need expert evidence to tell us about how people become anxious in certain circumstances, when they're going for an exam or a driver's licence or something of that kind, that we all know about or most of us know about. But because battered wife syndrome is relatively rare it is a legitimate matter for expert evidence and it is the proper subject for expert evidence because, without the assistance of expert evidence, ordinary people who don't know or study these things, might find the behaviour perplexing, counterintuitive or unreasonable.
It might seem odd why there would be a bond between the abuser and the abused. Why there might be, what Dr Lawrence referred to as, an ambivalent relationship, or what Associate Professor Quadrio referred to as a traumatic attachment. The behaviour of someone with a vulnerability because of past abuse who remains with their abuser.
Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio, who are experts in their field, were able to address what was described as the "cycle of violence". How, over time the situation worsens. How often it's the case that the abuser isolates the partner. The common symptoms of a variation in mental state. The loss of self-esteem. The belief that the person who is being abused is somehow at fault. The shame they feel when they return, contrary to the advice of police. The belief that in those circumstances the police won't help them again. The reasons they don't leave: children; lack of support; lack of financial support; threats to the woman; threats to people they love; threats over the custody of children.
And apart from giving you evidence about those characteristics and observed behaviours, Dr Lawrence and Associate Professor Quadrio gave you evidence about the fact that victims of prolonged abuse can have quite correct perceptions as to the risks that are posed to them if they try to leave….
Battered wife syndrome isn't a psychological disorder. As Dr Lawrence and Dr Quadrio explained it's a pattern of behaviours. It's been the subject of research, and it's a field of study by practitioners and scholars whose research and reports are open to contest, as you'd expect scientific inquiry and research to be in a proper field of scientific study.
Dr Quadrio described how there is what she described as a "learned helplessness". How abused women are afraid to leave because they correctly assess that they're at risk. That there may have been past attempts to leave. She referred to the triggers that occur for a violent response. That the level of risk is perceived to increase or has in fact increased. Often there are threats to harm children, and the threats become specific in terms of how, when and where they will be carried out.
District Court
EJB v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 246 (30 January 2024) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ - ‘Breach of protection order’ - ‘Parole’
Charges: Contravention of protection order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was convicted on his own plea of guilty for contravening a protection order and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment (served cumulatively upon a nine months’ imprisonment imposed on other domestic violence offences). [2] The contraventions were committed whilst on parole after serving a sentence for other domestic violence related offences.
Appeal: The appellant contends that the three month sentence was manifestly excessive. [3]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. District Court Judge Farr SC had regard to the appellant’s ‘very lengthy criminal history’, and the fact that the offending occurred while the appellant was released on parole. [6]–[8] Accordingly, the sentence was not excessive in the circumstances. [18]
The King v ADP [2023] QDC 183 (5 October 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Judge alone trial’ - ‘Physical violence and harm’ - ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ - ‘Rape’ - ‘Honest and reasonable mistake’ - ‘separation’ - ‘Strangulation’ - ‘deprivation of liberty’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; deprivation of liberty x 2; strangulation x 1; common assault x 2; rape x 2.
Proceedings: Trial by judge alone.
Facts: The male defendant pleaded guilty to offences — excluding rape — committed against his former female partner, throughout their eight month relationship. [1]
The defendant was physically abusive, barricading her in a room after she had packed her bags to leave, biting and pushing her and strangling and rendering unconscious the complainant on multiple occasions. [4]–[7] The defendant often threatened to self-harm or commit suicide. [11] The complainant alleges the defendant raped her twice at his house one afternoon. [12]
Issue: Whether the prosecution can prove the complainant did not consent, and if so, whether the prosecution can exclude beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant did not honestly but mistakenly believe she consented. [10]
Decision and Reasoning: Not guilty of two counts of rape. The complainant was ‘an honest witness’. However, certain features of her evidence ‘reflect adversely on her reliability’; [35] namely, the complainant not challenging the defendant’s recollection of consent during a pretext call: [36]
For example, she did not challenge defendant’s recollection by suggesting to him that she had told him to stop a number of times, that she said no, that she pushed him away when he was trying to have sexual intercourse, that she was crying before he stopped having sex with her or that he had admitted to her later that day that he had raped her [36]
Accordingly McGinness DCJ was not satisfied that the complainant ‘reliably recalled when and how she communicated to the defendant that she was not consenting’. [38]
Further, McGinness DCJ was not satisfied that the prosecution that excluded beyond reasonable doubt the defence of honest and reasonable mistake: evidence of the defendant indicated his honest belief that he did not rape the complainant. [52]–[54]
SK (A Child) v Commissioner of Queensland Police & Anor [2023] QDC 65 (17 April 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and torres strait islander person’ – ‘Appeal against protection order made after childrens court sentencing’ – ‘Child perpetrator’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Choking’ – ‘Couple relationship’ – ‘Couple relationship between children’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevant relationship’ – ‘Section 37 domestic and family violence protection act 2012 (qld)’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Appeal against temporary protection order.
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate did not have jurisdiction to make a protection order.
2.
The appellant was not afforded procedural fairness in terms of representation and an opportunity to be heard.
3.
The learned magistrate did not provide adequate reasons for the decision.
4.
The children are not in a “relevant relationship” being a “couple relationship” within the meaning of the Act.
5.
A domestic violence protection order was not necessary or desirable.
Facts: The appellant was a 12-year-old boy who had been found to be in a ‘couple relationship’ with his 12-year-old ‘girlfriend.’
After sentencing the appellant in the Childrens Court in relation to a series of offences for assaulting the aggrieved, including choking her, striking her with a broom handle and threatening her the learned Magistrate heard and determined the protection order application on a final basis, when it had only been listed for mention.
The Commissioner conceded that the learned Magistrate failed to give proper reasoned consideration to the s 37 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) factors pre-requisite to the making of the order.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal allowed, application for protection order dismissed.
Morzone KC, DCJ observed:
[7] However, in my respectful opinion that hearing, and determination was premature and deeply flawed in several ways.
[8] Firstly, the proceeding was only set for “mention” on that day and was neither intended nor ready for a final hearing and orders. The material consisted of the initiating application with some narrative of the circumstances attested to by the investigating police. Nevertheless, the hearing morphed into final orders without adequate reasons.
[9] Secondly, the appellant child was not afforded procedural fairness due to inadequate representation absent a guardian and not being afforded any reasonable opportunity to be heard. I do not accept that the child can be said to have retained the duty lawyer, instead the representation was effectively appointed by the court ad hoc and in the nature of amicus curiae. After taking account of court procedures, I estimate that the child had barely 5 minutes with the duty lawyer via the video-link between the courtroom and the youth detention centre. The appellant child did not have the benefit of a guardian or parent. The learned magistrate proceeded as if the appellant consented to final orders, despite both parties urging the court to adjourn the hearing pending completion of the probation order. The duty lawyer’s submissions fell well short of informed consent, and any final orders were premature and ill-founded.
[10] Thirdly, the reasons for the decision below were inadequate.
[11] Fourthly, and in any event, there was and is insufficient and inadequate evidence to establish a requisite “couple relationship” between the two children. At best, the immature relationship between the children could be colloquially described as ‘puppy love’ and falling well short of the characteristic maturity of a ‘couple relationship’ caught by the Act.
[12] Fifthly, a domestic violence protection order is neither necessary nor desirable under the Act. Instead, “necessary or desirable” orders were, and remain, available under the Youth Justice Act1992, which provides appropriate safeguards and considerations pursuant to the youth justice principles. The Childrens Court sentence proceedings may be re-opened to amend the conditions of the appellant’s probation order, but that is beyond the remit of this appellate court.
[13] Sixthly, in the absence of any proper and sufficient evidentiary basis for the making of a protection order – neither the temporary nor final order (as amended) should have been made, nor should the application be entertained where the Youth Justice Act1992 caters for the circumstances. All orders should be set aside, and the application should be dismissed.
Queensland Police Service v KBH [2023] QDC 26 (16 February 2023) – Queensland District Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Use of children in abuse’
Charges: 4x breaches of protection order.
Proceedings: Sentencing appeal pursuant to section 222 Justices Act 1886.
Grounds: The penalty of $300 for the first two counts, and $200 for the remaining charges, was manifestly inadequate.
Facts: The respondent man and aggrieved woman had been in a relationship but had separated. The offending involved multiple breaches/contraventions of a protection order, where the aggrieved was the person protected. On the first occasion, the respondent approached the aggrieved at a football match and used derogatory language before later letting himself into her house and refusing to leave until police were called. On another occasion he called their child and asked to speak to the aggrieved, accusing her of drinking and seeing other men. The final incident was when he was invited to the aggrieved’s home on the condition he leave after dinner and then refused to do so until police were again called.
The respondent had previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for contravention of a protection order.
Decision: The original sentence was set aside as an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion and the respondent was resentenced to three months imprisonment.
Coker DJC found that the Magistrate had erroneously misconstrued the offending as minor breaches, evidencing a ‘total misunderstanding of the nature of domestic violence and the nature of control and dominion exercised in relation to a former intimate partner’ [25]. Where the respondent knew of his obligation not to approach the aggrieved and continued to do so, attending her home when he had been specifically directed not to, accusing her of seeing other men and refusing to leave her house when asked, the breaches were not inconsequential [25], [27], [29].
Coker DJC characterised the breaches as controlling and coercive, being ‘significant indications of a lack of appreciation or respect by the respondent of the orders previously made, and of the opportunities given to change the direction of his ways,’ particularly given the repetition of conduct for which he had previously been sentenced [28], [30].
The ‘lenient’ fine was manifestly inadequate and unreasonable in all of the circumstances [31]. Coker DJC emphasised the need to impose penalties reflecting the importance of ensuring that controlling domestic violence behaviours do not continue [32] and that while not a serious act of domestic violence, the repeated conduct of the respondent and 10 previous domestic violence convictions justified significant penalty [34].
Coker DJC stated: ‘Again, these are by no means minor matters that arise in relation to the breaches. They are controlling. They are coercive and, most importantly, they are significant indications of a lack of appreciation or respect by the respondent of the orders previously made, and of the opportunities given to change the direction of his ways.’ [28]
Wylie v AMN [2022] QDC 241 (26 October 2022) (26 October 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Civil’ – ‘Court's own motion’ – ‘Failure to give reasonable opportunity to consider and respond to summary dismissal’ – ‘Police officer alleged perpetrator’ – ‘Protection order sought against serving police officer’ – ‘Summary dismissal of application for protection order’ – ‘Whether magistrate has jurisdiction to hear protection order application by police protection notice if notice not filed in the district’
Proceedings: Appeal against summary dismissal of application for protection order.
Facts: Senior Constable Wylie filed an application for a Police Protection Order under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (DFVP Act). Notice was served at the Caboolture police station but filed in the Pine Rivers Magistrate’s Court. The DFVP Act s 111(1) states that Notice must be filed in the local Magistrate’s Court. The respondent argued that the case had been commenced in the wrong court so proceedings were a nullity.
The magistrate dismissed the proceedings summarily without either party raising this or having an opportunity to make submissions on this [14]. The Magistrate was concerned that the matter be decided quickly as the respondent was a serving police officer and referred repeatedly to the potential for the proceedings to waste the court’s time [17].
The aggrieved had been married to the respondent for 2.5 years and they had one son. The aggrieved applied for a protection order on the basis that the respondent had threatened to jump in front of a truck holding the child; had told her to remember that he carried a gun all day at work; and had said that no one would believe her over him, among other things.
Grounds
(a)
Jurisdiction: Whether the learned Magistrate had erred in assuming she had jurisdiction to hear the application where the Police Protection Notice initiating the proceeding was served at the Caboolture Police Station, but was filed in the Pine Rivers Magistrates Court; and
(b)
summary dismissal: Whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the application summarily, without giving the appellant/applicant the opportunity to cross examine witnesses for the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal upheld; order for summary dismissal set aside; matter remitted for rehearing by a different magistrate.
On jurisdiction, Porter KC DCJ held that jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly [40] and resolved a conflict between ss 136 and 111 of the DFVP Act by upholding the precedence of s136 which gives courts jurisdiction to ‘hear and decide any application made to the court under this Act’ (s136(1)(a)).
On summary dismissal, his Honour found that the Magistrate had erred in three ways:
1.
Her Honour should have declined to consider the application for summary dismissal until the evidence before her was tested at trial [76].
2.
She erred in placing weight on the fact that the respondent was a serving police officer when deciding to dismiss the application [78].
3.
She initiated the dismissal of the application of her own volition. The one day’s notice given failed to accord procedural fairness [79].
He referred to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Rules 2014, Rule 22, which gives plenary power to determine applications. This is subject to Rule 23, which sets out a list of conditions to which this power is subject. Relevant here are that ‘each party is entitled to a fair hearing’ (Rule 23 (2)(b)) and ‘each party must be given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and cross examine witnesses’ (Rule 23 (2)(i)). [60]
His Honour continued at [61]:
Turning to the Act itself, apart from s. 51, there does not appear to be any statutory provision which expressly, or by necessary implication, authorises hearing and determination of an application for a (final) protection order other than by “trial” of the application. It is to be noted of course that the Act does not expressly say that a protection order is to be determined by trial. However, where the Act creates a right and confers civil jurisdiction on a court to hear and decide an application to enforce that right, it must necessarily imply that the application be determined by procedurally fair process apposite to a hearing which results in a final order. At the least, that must include a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence, cross examine and otherwise test another party’s evidence and address the Court on the findings of fact that the Court should make on the evidentiary record and the law that applies to those facts.
He held that the Magistrate did not have an express statutory power summarily to dismiss the application [66]. While statutory courts do not have inherent jurisdiction, they have implied powers to do whatever is necessary to perform their function [67]. While a court would have jurisdiction summarily to dismiss frivolous or vexatious cases that amount to an abuse of process, this power does not extend to cases ‘where there is a real question of fact to be determined’ [72].
LJV v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 220 (13 September 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Appeal against conviction dismissed’ – ‘Appeal against sentence upheld’ – ‘Appellant convicted of contravening a domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Whether magistrate interfered with evidence of a witness’ – ‘Whether magistrate's involvement in conduct of trial went beyond their role as trial judge’ – ‘Whether the appellant received a fair trial’
Matter: appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was subject to a domestic violence order and due to attend court for a breach thereof when he sent the following text to the respondent:
You will need to pick up the kids from school today as I need to prepare for court tomorrow morning to contest the bogus claims you have laid against their father in yet another alienation attempt. I will pick up the children as normal from school on Friday depening [a typographical error, I infer] on the decision from the judge.
The prosecution argued that the text breached the requirement for the applicant to be of good behaviour and not commit domestic violence and the requirement not to contact the respondent except concerning parental or contact issues.
Grounds:
1.
The Magistrate’s examination of the aggrieved was a miscarriage of justice as it led evidence on her behalf on which the accused had no notice [15]. His Honour’s examination of the applicant relied on knowledge of previous actions before the court and risked his being identified with one of the parties [20]. The trial was unfair and the conviction should not stand.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal against conviction dismissed; appeal against sentence upheld; sentence set aside; order that the offender be convicted but that no conviction be recorded and the offender not be further punished.
Porter QC DCJ found that a portion of the text message breached the requirement in the domestic violence order not to contact the respondent except concerning parental or contact issues [22]. His Honour deliberately did not make a finding as to whether the requirement to be of good behaviour was breached due to the unfairness of the trial on that issue [21]. He agreed with the prosecution submission that the sentence of one month’s imprisonment suspended after serving 5 days was manifestly excessive [23].
HFL v PLL [2022] QDC 219 (5 August 2022)- Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against variation of protection order to include named persons’ – ‘Appeal and new trial’ – ‘Appeal pursuant to s222 of the justices act 1886 (qld)’ – ‘Appeal unopposed’ – ‘Application to vary domestic violence order’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Grounds for interference’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Whether the magistrate erred by varying a protection order to include two named persons where parties had agreed that aspect of the proceedings would not proceed’
Case type: Appeal pursuant to s222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld).
Facts: The applicant appealed against an order by a magistrate under s 52 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) including two named persons as protected persons in a domestic violence protection order where the respondent (to the current action) had withdrawn the issue. The respondent did not attend the appeal hearing in order to save costs.
Grounds:
1.
The learned magistrate erred by varying a 2019 domestic violence order to include two named persons where the respondent indicated she was no longer seeking to have the two named persons included; no evidence was given by them about a complaint about the appellant; the court proceedings were conducted without addressing the issue; and there was no other basis to vary the 2019 order to include them;
2.
The magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for including the two named persons; and
3.
The magistrate failed to afford procedural fairness, particularly to the appellant, by failing to allow opportunity to address his Honour about whether the order ought to have been varied.
Held: Appeal allowed.
Deardon DCJ held that the lack of reasons given and the failure to afford procedural fairness were legal errors [10]. The errors should be remedied in light of the consequences of the Magistrate varying the order: the appellant was at risk of being charged with a criminal offence if he tried to contact the named persons or approached within 100 m of where they live, work or are [13]-[14]. His Honour further ordered that the respondent pay a fixed amount of costs and granted her an indemnity certificate.
DLM v WER & The Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 79 (6 April 2022) – Queensland District Court
‘Child custody’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant man and first respondent woman separated after living together with their child for several years [9]. In September 2020, a Magistrate granted a protection order with non-contact conditions in the first respondent’s favour and dismissed a temporary protection order that had been granted in the appellant’s favour in July 2019. In October 2020, the appellant appealed the decision and applied to adduce ‘fresh’ evidence to establish that the first respondent had perpetrated acts of domestic violence [1]-[2].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justice Cash considered the evidence adduced at trial and affirmed the Magistrate’s findings that ‘there had been no acts of domestic violence by the first respondent’ and that ‘there had been acts of domestic violence by the appellant’ [80]. Accordingly, His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s decision to award a protection order in the first respondent’s favour and dismissed the appellants application to adduce evidence.
His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s findings as to the appellant’s lack of credibility. The Magistrate had not accepted the appellant’s evidence, having found that the appellant’s claim that the first respondent deliberately had nightmares to antagonise him ‘seriously undermined [his] credibility’, which did not improve during cross-examination [36], [70]. His Honour affirmed the Magistrate’s finding that the appellant had engaged in acts of domestic violence. Firstly, the appellant had limited the first respondent’s access to their child in a manner that was manipulative and controlling [42], [70]-[72]. Secondly, the appellant had taken sexually explicit photographs of the first respondent without her knowledge or consent [38]. His Honour stated that this was an act of domestic violence that was sexually abusive and done in an attempt to ‘dominate’, ‘control’ and ‘punish’ the first respondent by causing her to fear that the images would be released during court proceedings, as the appellant had previously done [38], [42]. His Honour continued: ‘The appellant had by his conduct demonstrated a pattern of domestic violence. There was the real prospect of future domestic violence, especially where the parties shared a child, and it was likely they would have to maintain some contact’ [72]. Therefore, ‘there was no error in the Magistrate’s conclusion that a protection order should be made in favour of the first respondent’ [72].
FLC v MRT [2021] QDC 264 (1 November 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Adverse inference’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Failure to provide adequate reasons’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Rule in jones v dunkel’
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The appellant man is the respondent man’s uncle. The 29 year-old respondent gave evidence he was diagnosed with autism in 2017. The respondent’s mother (the appellant’s sister) has a lengthy history of serious mental illness and alcoholism and the respondent resided with the appellant and his partner for a time when he was a child. In the circumstances the appellant has provided a degree of support to the respondent from time to time. There was vague evidence in relation to ongoing Supreme Court proceedings in relation to trusts and the estate of the appellant’s father/respondent’s grandfather between the respondent and his siblings.
The respondent gave evidence of what he said were multiple incidents over a number of years where the appellant was emotionally and psychologically abusive towards him. The appellant’s evidence disputed many of the respondent’s allegations. There were submissions made by the respondent’s counsel at trial that it would be inappropriate to draw Jones v Dunkel ((1959) 101 CLR 298) inferences in relation to the failure to call the respondent’s mother and sister and the magistrate did not indicate a decision in that respect. The trial magistrate seemed to make findings on the basis of the demeanour of the respondent’s sister in circumstances where she was not called as a witness.
Issue: Whether the learned Magistrate failed to give sufficient reasons for the decision to grant the application for a protection order; whether the learned Magistrate took into account extraneous matters including the demeanour of the respondent’s support person; whether the learned Magistrate failed to properly consider or direct himself in line with the principle from Jones v Dunkel; whether the learned Magistrate erred in failing to make sufficient findings of fact and in failing to explain how he concluded that the requirements for making a protection order had been established.
Decision and Reasoning: Orders set aside, matter remitted for rehearing by a different Magistrate.
The trial Magistrate’s reasons failed to sufficiently address any of the conflicting versions of the appellant and respondent, the legal issues as to whether domestic violence arose and if so what kind and whether an order was necessary.
Porter QC DCJ observed:
[58] ….[W]here there are contested facts, and the circumstances are such as to make both the identification of acts of domestic violence and the need for an order open to serious question, it is necessary for properly considered reasons to be given. Those reasons must, at a minimum, cover the following matters:
(a)
The Court must make findings of fact on the principal contested factual issues with some explanation of the basis for the finding by reference to the evidence;
(b)
The Court must identify expressly what acts are found to comprise acts of domestic violence and why;
(c)
The Court must explain the basis for concluding that an order is necessary and desirable in the light of the acts found and the other relevant circumstances;
(d)
The Court must explain why the principal submissions made by the unsuccessful party on these issues have been rejected.
[59] The reasons in this case failed to address any of those matters.
SHW v ABC [2021] QDC 151 (13 August 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Cross-applications’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Failure to report’ – ‘Police officer victim’ – ‘Protection order’
Matter: Appeal against dismissal of application for protection order.
Ground: The Magistrate erred in determining that no act of domestic violence had been committed by the respondent against the appellant.
Facts: The appellant police officer woman and respondent man were in a relationship which had broken down. The appellant usually had access to assets and records of the respondent’s company. The appellant’s evidence included several alleged incidents:
•
The respondent did not talk to the appellant after the appellant’s sister died;
•
The respondent had taken the appellant’s Mercedes Benz, which was company property;
•
The respondent did not allow the appellant access to the company finances;
•
The respondent attended a joint property in Paluma at a time they had agreed only she would access the property and disconnected solar panels and gas bottles;
•
The respondent refused to hand over the appellant’s furniture (despite police being present), and handed over the wrong keys to his solicitors so that when the appellant did attend Paluma, she would be unable to enter the cabin.
The appellant was a police officer. Her failure to report any abuse despite her occupation was considered by the Magistrate as evidence that the alleged domestic abuse had not occurred.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, protection order issued. The Magistrate erred in finding that it was not necessary or desirable to protect the appellant from future domestic violence, and the appeal was allowed.
While the respondent’s behaviour in relation to the appellant’s sister’s death, the company Mercedes Benz, and the company finances were all explicable by innocent reasons, his conduct in relation to the Paluma property, the furniture, and the keys were all evidence of ‘controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour that has the potential to be repeated during the course of the property settlement’, during which ‘contact [between the parties] is inevitable’. [37]
QKL v Queensland Police Service [2021] QDC 195 (18 June 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Denial of natural justice’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed x 1; common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The appellant (respondent) and aggrieved were sisters. The Magistrate hearing the application, pursued by police, did not allow the appellant sister a hearing or opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, in particular the aggrieved sister and both the appellant and aggrieved had submitted that they did not believe a protection order was necessary. The decision was made upon the papers and the appellant was not afforded the opportunity to give evidence as to her insight and the need for the orders. The appellant’s solicitor sought a listing for half-day hearing on counsel’s instructions, but the Magistrate proceeded to hear the matter on the papers. The Magistrate in his decision acknowledged that in the absence of evidence he was unable to make a determination as to whether the aggrieved was a particularly vulnerable person requiring extra consideration, or give weight to the aggrieved’s request an order not be made without explanation why the aggrieved did not see the order as necessary or desirable. The Magistrate made adverse findings against the appellant, finding the extensive differences between the appellant and aggrieved’s affidavit evidence indicated a lack of insight in the appellant, which suggestion the appellant was not given any opportunity to respond to. Adverse findings were made which seemed to have no basis in evidence, but if there was evidence of those matters they were not put to the appellant and she did not have an opportunity to respond to them.
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate erred in finding the matter without a hearing resulting in a denial of natural justice; and
2.
The magistrate erred in finding a domestic and family violence protection order was desirable in the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
Appeal allowed;
2.
Order of the Magistrate of 10 September 2020 set aside;
3.
Application remitted for hearing to the Brisbane Magistrates Court;
Burnett AM DCJ held that the ruling was made before the appellant’s solicitor was able to obtain instructions from counsel, and at the very least the matter ought to have been stood down to obtain instructions from counsel. The appellant has been denied natural justice as there were critical disputed matters going to the only issue in the matter, whether a protection order was necessary or desirable, which cross-examination of the parties could have resolved. The appellant was also denied the opportunity to put relevant evidence before the court.
Bailey (a pseudonym) v Bailey (a pseudonym) [2021] QDC 99 (9 June 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Orders made by consent’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection order appeal’ – ‘Solicitor party’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal pursuant to s 164 of the Domestic & Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (the Act) against the making of a protection order.
Facts: The respondent husband (a solicitor) appealed against the making of a protection order which the Magistrate purported to make by consent, arguing he had not consented to the making of the order. He was represented at the hearing by a barrister on a direct brief and it was apparent his counsel understood the nature of the proceedings and matters before the court. The appellant argued that nothing in the hearing transcript indicated the appellant’s personal consent to the orders, and he was silent throughout the hearing, although his counsel did engage in discussion in relation to what is understood to be a standard set of orders.
Issue: Whether the Magistrate complied with the requirement of s84(2) Domestic & Family Violence Protection Act 2012 that a Magistrate about to make an order where the respondent is present “must ensure” the respondent understands the listed matters.
Decision and Reasoning: Decision appealed from confirmed, appeal dismissed.
Dick SC DCJ was satisfied that the Magistrate ensured the appellant consented or did not object to the orders because he was present in court, the Magistrate engaged in discussion with counsel and Dick SC DCJ did not believe the appellant’s counsel would not have obtained instructions on the orders handed down from the bench to counsel.
Dick SC DCJ noted:
[41] In this case the following points must be recognised.
•
The Act does not require that the Magistrate engage personally with the respondent.
•
Sub-section 84(4) of the Act provides that a court can use services or help from other persons to assist the court in discharging its obligations under s 84. Some examples are provided and for the most part, if not all, the person giving the explanation is not a legally qualified person.
•
The Appellant is a qualified solicitor.
•
The Appellant was represented in court by competent counsel.
•
The Appellant was in court at the time the order was made.
•
There was a discussion between the bench and the two barristers concerning the order.
•
The order was made by consent or without objection.
•
Section 85 of the Act provides the court must include with a copy of the orders served on the respondent, a written explanation containing the relevant material that is referred to in s 85.
NJB v Commissioner of Police [2021] QDC 42 (4 March 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The critical issues that had to be determined by the magistrate below were whether the male appellant, as stated by the female respondent, punched her to the side of her head after a series of arguments or, whether because of her lengthy and serious history of seizures, the court could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the injury was not the consequence of the respondent having a seizure, falling and thereby injuring herself. The appellant was found guilty and sentenced to four months imprisonment, with a parole release date set after two months.
Grounds of appeal:
Appeal against conviction:
1.
The magistrate’s findings of the respondent’s credibility or reliability were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence (Grounds 1 and 2).
2.
The magistrate erred in permitting the appellant to be asked about bad character without leave being sought and granted, and against objection (Ground 3).
Appeal against sentence: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held:
Appeal against conviction dismissed.
Grounds 1 and 2 were dismissed. Contrary to the appellant’s submission that the respondent was intoxicated on the night of the offending, the evidence supported the fact that she was no more than ‘tipsy’. The argument that the respondent had a motive to lie about the assault was also unclear and implausible.
The appellant further submitted that the magistrate failed to give sufficient weight to the respondent’s evidence minimising the frequency of her seizures. In dismissing this argument, his Honour said:
“It can be accepted that at times, the respondent did tend to downplay the frequency of those seizures. That, of course, is not to her credit. That said, the nature and extent of the seizures were clearly distressing to her and, quite likely, a source of embarrassment. That the respondent might tend to downplay her condition does not, in my view, materially damage her credit. Further, the cross-examination of the respondent on this topic was not only distressing for the respondent, it was also, at times, quite confusing. That may also be another reason which goes some way to explaining the conflicting evidence on this issue.”
There was no room for a reasonable doubt that the injury suffered by the respondent was the result of the respondent having a seizure and falling or otherwise sustaining the injury as a result thereof. It followed that the court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of committing the offence charged.
Ground 3 was also dismissed. The cross-examination of the respondent and the evidence led from the appellant by his solicitor clearly left it open for the prosecutor to raise an alleged prior incident and put it to the appellant. In any event, the appellant denied the matter and the magistrate observed that that was as far as the matter could go.
Appeal against sentence allowed.
His Honour recognised that the cross-examination of the respondent about her medical history was prolonged and distressing, however this had to be seen in light of her somewhat confusing evidence. His Honour recognised that: “I have no doubt that the cross-examination could have been carried out much more efficiently and greatly shortened both the length of the cross-examination and the distress caused to the respondent.” That said, it was wrong to describe the cross-examination as largely unnecessary and irrelevant.
None of the appellant’s favourable antecedents were mentioned or given weight by the magistrate (appellant’s strong work ethic, employment, character references, and relationships with his mother and children). This was an error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and the appellant re-sentenced to 30 days imprisonment.
PRH v LPL [2021] QDC 17 (3 February 2021) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against orders made in a domestic violence proceeding’ – ‘Ouster condition’ – ‘Protection orders’
Proceedings: Appeal against orders made in a domestic violence proceeding.
Facts: The appellant was prohibited from entering, remaining, approaching etc within 500 metres of the first respondent’s (aggrieved) usual place of residence and from following or approaching within 500 metres of the aggrieved. The appellant was also prohibited from entering, remaining, approaching etc to within 200 metres of premises where the named person usually lived, worked or frequented. The magistrate further ordered that the first respondent have sole right of occupancy of the Buddina residence.
Grounds of appeal: 15 grounds of appeal centred around the court below denying procedural fairness to the appellant by refusing to permit evidence to be led and wrongfully accepting false and misleading evidence given by the first respondent.
Held: Appeal dismissed, subject to a number of variations.
In particular, the imposition of a seven-year ouster condition was neither necessary to protect the first respondent nor desirable. The first respondent did not want to move as the property “was her home, she felt safe there”. However, the appellant was the registered proprietor of the property. The first respondent had had the benefit of the ouster condition for two years and three months. She also had the financial capacity to purchase alternative premises/rent.
MB v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 325 (18 December 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach bail conditions’ – ‘Breach protection orders’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charges: Contravention of a police protection notice x 1; Wilful damage (domestic violence offence) x 1; Breach of bail condition x 7; Contravention of a domestic violence order x 4.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant repeatedly breached orders protecting his former female partner and her son. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2 years’ probation and ordered to pay $611.70. Convictions were recorded on all counts.
Grounds of appeal: Fresh evidence was sought to be admitted arguing that recording a conviction would have a significant effect on the appellant’s employment overseas, and the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application to admit fresh evidence was refused and the appeal dismissed.
It was appropriate to record convictions in light of the number of convictions and their serious nature (prolonged over 4 months, including more serious examples, continuation after release from custody). As at [57]: “When one considers s 12 of the Penalties and Sentences Act, the seriousness of the offences in combination outweighed any economic effect or wellbeing effect of the recording of convictions.”
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Despite being given many chances, the appellant had “continued to ‘thumb his nose’ at the bail conditions and the domestic violence order”. Aggravating features included that these were instances of domestic violence and “the emotional harm done to the victims and the damage, loss and injury caused.” Voluntary intoxication was no excuse. The guilty pleas were sufficiently taken into account (at [59]-[61]).
It was noted at [22], [26]-[28]:
“Charge 12 occurred on 27 August 2020 which was a contravention of domestic violence order. The appellant updated his profile status making threatening comments about the complainant, SH. The post named SH and contained threats and disclosed her sexual preferences to several friends. This had a significant emotional impact on the complainant SH. The appellant was interviewed on 29 August 2020 and said he didn’t remember posting the comment but went on to say it was true.
“A victim impact statement was tendered as Exhibit 4. The offending caused distress and inconvenience to the complainant SH. She had to move regularly as a result of the conduct of the appellant and suffered defamation to her character. She alleged that total out of pocket expenses was $16,748.84.”
GRP v ABQ [2020] QDC 272 (28 October 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against order not to grant a temporary protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against order not to grant a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
Facts: The appellant man and respondent woman were in a domestic relationship, and each had children from previous relationships. There was a prior history of protection orders ordered against the appellant, with the respondent as the aggrieved. In June 2019, a protection order was made against the appellant to protect the respondent with mandatory conditions and no contact conditions except with the respondent’s written consent. The parties continued to have contact. In August 2019, following a complaint by the respondent to police, the appellant was charged with breach of a domestic violence order, common assault and choking/suffocation/strangulation x 2 (domestic violence offences). He was released on bail. This appeal concerned the appellant’s cross-application for a TPO. In November 2019, the appellant filed a private application for a protection order against the respondent. Four incidents of emotional abuse and one incident of physical abuse (scratches from August 2019) were alleged. The Magistrate declined to make a TPO.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The Magistrate wrongly decided and erred in law by not granting a TPO.
2.
The Magistrate wrongly decided and erred in fact and law by determining that the appellant’s allegations of domestic violence against the respondent did not satisfy the definition under the Act.
3.
The Magistrate erred by failing to give adequate reasons for not granting the TPO.
4.
The Magistrate erred in fact and law in that he allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect his decision; mistook the facts; and did not take into account material considerations.
Held: An error of law occurred as the Magistrate did not provide adequate reasons namely, the Magistrate’s reasons only referred to the four incidents of alleged verbal abuse, but did not refer to the incident of physical violence alleged in the appellant’s application of November 2019 ([26], [30]). Further, the Magistrate erred when he stated he heard from both the appellant and the respondent in June 2019, as the appellant was not present ([31]). Her Honour set aside the Magistrate’s order.
There was sufficient evidence to warrant granting a TPO in favour of the appellant. Having regard to the temporary nature of the order, her Honour considered that the evidence of alleged physical violence was sufficient to be satisfied of the respondent committing domestic violence against the appellant (at [38]-[40]). A date for the hearing of whether a protection order should be made was already set in the Magistrates’ Court.
ARTE v Nugent & Anor [2020] QDC 268 (23 October 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against grant of protection order’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘No prior history of domestic or family violence’ – ‘Ouster condition’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Suicide threat’
Proceedings: Appeal against making of a protection order; whether the protection order was necessary or desirable; whether the Magistrate erred in imposing an ouster condition; whether the Magistrate’s conduct amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
Facts: A protection order was made on 3 February 2020 against the male appellant after a contested hearing, including an ouster condition in relation to his female former partner’s usual place of residence.
The first respondent (the police prosecutor applicant for the order at first instance) opposes the appeal but concedes (1) the Magistrate’s reasons for judgment disclose a House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 error and (2) it is appropriate for the order to be varied such that the ouster condition is removed.
The second respondent (protected person) is supportive of the appeal and the relief sought. The appellant and protected person were married for 32 years. Prior to 11 October 2019, there had been no previous incidences of domestic violence. The parties were in financial stress after the collapse of a business. On 11 October 2019 the protected person called 000, telling the operator: ‘My husband has gone to the gun cabinet to do a murder suicide…He’s got a gun to kill us.’ The second respondent locked herself in a bathroom. The operator heard the second respondent yell: ‘Get away, get away’. A Police Protection Notice was issued on 11 October 2019, with a condition that the appellant surrender his weapons licence and firearms. An application for a protection order to benefit the protected person was made by the first respondent on 11 October 2019. No ouster condition was sought in the application. On 15 October 2019, the application was adjourned; a temporary protection order was made in the favour of the protected person with the standard conditions.
A protection order was made on 3 February 2020 against the appellant after a contested hearing, including an ouster condition in relation to the protected person’s usual place of residence.
The appellant contended:-
•
The appellant’s conduct did not meet the definition of domestic violence - there was no threat of violence; rather the second respondent was intoxicated, stressed and emotional which resulted in her overacting to a bad joke made by the appellant; and
•
In the alternative, a protection order is not necessary or desirable (i) appellant and protected person lived in the same residence during the term of the TPO and no domestic violence had occurred; (ii) prior to 11 October 2019, there had never been any other act of domestic violence in 32 years of the relationship; (iii) the risk of future domestic violence was remote and not sufficient to establish a need for protection.
On 3 February 2020, the Magistrate heard the application and made the order, delivering ex tempore reasons revealing that each limb of section 37(1) was satisfied and it was appropriate to impose an ouster condition. Central to the Magistrate’s reasoning were three findings:-
1.
the appellant was engaging in victim shaming;
2.
the appellant had not taken any steps to address the underlying reasons for the incident on 11 October 2019; and
3.
the relationship between the appellant and second respondent involved a power imbalance such that the later would subjugate her wellbeing to that of the former.
Grounds of appeal
1.
Did the Magistrate err in holding that it was necessary or desirable to protect the second respondent from domestic violence? Error 1
2.
Did the Magistrate err in imposing an ouster condition under s.63? Error 2
3.
Whether there were irregularities in the conduct of the trial that occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice? Miscarriage of justice
Held: Order set aside; application remitted to the Magistrate’s Court for a new trial before a different Magistrate.
Error 1 – Did the Magistrate err in finding a protection order was necessary or desirable?
Observing Horneman-Wren SC DCJ in ACP v McAulliffe [2017] QDC 294, s.37(1)(c) invokes a very wide and general power and is to be construed liberally, having regard to s.37(2) and the s.4 principles of the Act. This required the Magistrate to have regard to the wishes and views of the people who fear or experience domestic violence to the extent appropriate and practicable (s.4(2)(b)) [at 27].
At [29], His Honour reflected on the reasons for judgment and stated that the Magistrate was satisfied s.37(1)(c) was engaged because the second respondent was not adversely affected by alcohol and the 11 October 2019 incident was a very distressing one. His Honour noted the reasons did not disclose if the considerations mandated by section 37(2) were taken into account. His Honour found this to be an error of law and warrants the order being set aside.
His Honour also found the Magistrate’s assertion of the existence of the power imbalance and reference to the Duluth model and the power and control wheel had no application to this case and amounted to an error of law.
The first respondent submitted, despite the errors in the reasons for judgment that there was in any event sufficient evidence to find the order was necessary or desirable in the circumstances. His Honour did not agree, finding, at [34], that the evidence going to this very issue is incomplete (see [65] to [85] – no sworn affidavit of the second respondent and there was no application to lead fresh evidence in this appeal).
Therefore, this should be determined in a new trial.
Error 2 – Did the Magistrate err in imposing an ouster condition?
In finding an error had been made by the Magistrate, His Honour noted that an ouster condition had not been sought by the first respondent in the initial application and that the views and wishes of the “aggrieved” had not been sought, as was required by s.64(1).
His Honour considered s.57(1)(a) and s.63 and the mandatory considerations in s.64(1)(a) and (b) regarding whether the aggrieved can safely live in the residence if the ouster is not made and any views or wishes of the aggrieved.
His Honour, at [40], did not accept the Magistrate correctly assessed the risk of future violence occurring and the need for an ouster condition because:
1.
The Magistrate’s earlier finding in relation to the significant power imbalance, in the absence of evidence (an irrelevant consideration); and
2.
The second respondent was not afforded the opportunity to express her wishes by way of sworn evidence (a mandatory consideration).
The exercise of discretion to impose an ouster order miscarried [at 41]. Both errors represent a proper basis for interfering with the exercise of discretion in the manner contemplated by House v The King (this was conceded by the first respondent in relation to (1) above).
Miscarriage of Justice
His Honour agreed there were five irregularities in the conduct of the trial at first instance such to establish a substantial miscarriage of justice:-
1.
The Magistrate spoke about, and directly to, the appellant in terms that were pejorative, and unnecessary, having regard to the evidence in proper context, (at [46] eg accusing the appellant of “bad manners”, calling him the respondent’s “gun-toting husband”);
2.
The Magistrate permitted unfair cross-examination of the appellant, (at [47] not allowing the recording to be replayed at the appellant’s request to clarify his understanding of the question and then describing this as being demonstrative of an uncooperative witness);
3.
The Magistrate was unnecessarily aggressive towards the appellant’s legal representative which adversely impacted upon the proper presentation of the appellant’s case, (at [54] accusing the appellant’s solicitor of professional discourtesy which was not borne out in the transcript);
4.
The Magistrate materially interfered with the conduct of the second respondent’s case, ( at [65] by refusing the second respondent leave to file an affidavit on the day of the hearing);
5.
An exchange between the solicitor for the first respondent and the Magistrate regarding a domestic violence stakeholders group meeting, taken with the other irregularities, is indicative of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the Magistrate.
Osborne v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 249 (30 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Appellant's belief that his girlfriend and her children were victims of domestic violence perpetrated by the complainant’ – ‘Effect of deportation / visa cancellation on sentencing’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Vigilantism’
Charges: Forcible entry x 1; Wilful damage x 1; Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction and sentence (appeal against conviction abandoned).
Facts: The appellant believed that Ms MB was his girlfriend. Ms MB was in fact in a relationship with the complainant. On the date of the offence the complainant telephoned the appellant and told him that he (the complainant) was in a relationship with Ms MB. The appellant then went to the complainant’s house. He banged on the front door and said, “I’m going to kill you, cunt”; “You want war, brother? You got war.” The complainant approached his front door holding a knife which he had been using to prepare food. A verbal argument ensued, the appellant became enraged and ripped the screen door off the hinges. He lunged at the complainant grabbing him around the shirt. Both the appellant and complainant were cut with the knife during the struggle. The appellant put his left elbow and forearm around the complainant’s neck and pressed it into the complainant’s neck, choking him. The appellant continued to threaten the complainant saying, “I will kill you, cunt”. He did not stop his attack until police arrived. Prior to the incident, Ms MB and her children had told the appellant that there had been episodes of domestic violence committed by the complainant towards her. The appellant said that he went to the complainant’s house to talk to him about his behaviour and to protect the children. The appellant made full admissions to the police. The appellant was admitting to a mental health unit following the incident.
Issues: (1) Whether the sentence was excessive; (2) Whether the magistrate failed to take into account the appellant’s guilty plea and mitigating factors.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed. Appellant resentenced.
The respondent concedes that the magistrate failed to take into account a number of relevant mitigating factors including: the appellant’s mental health condition, the appellant’s physical health, his mistaken belief and the likely consequence of the appellant’s conviction on his visa (see [39]-[41]). The respondent further concedes that the sentence imposed was excessive. There was no reference to any mitigating factors in the reasons of the magistrate, which tends to suggest that he failed to take those factors into account.
ATD v TBC [2020] QDC 236 (17 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Female partner respondent subject to protection order’ – ‘Male partner aggrieved party under protection order’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant (wife) filed a private application for a protection order against her husband. The respondent (husband) filed a cross application against his wife. In September 2018, a temporary protection order (TPO) was made naming the respondent (husband) as the aggrieved and the appellant (wife) as the respondent. In February 2019, the appellant was described as ‘paranoid, delusional, denigrating towards the respondent, and neglectful of the children’. The appellant also published a number of Facebook posts accusing the respondent of abducting the children and accusing him of being abusive and corrupt. In February 2019, the TPO was amended to prevent the appellant from attending the respondent’s home. In March 2019, the Federal Circuit Court made orders requiring the children live with the respondent, the appellant have two hours of supervised visitation per week, and the appellant commence therapeutic care with a Consultant Psychiatrist. In March 2019, the TPO was amended to prevent the appellant from contacting the respondent or publishing adverse comments about him online. In March 2019, the police referred the appellant to the Acute Care Team due to concerns they held regarding her mental health after she made over 100 unsubstantiated police complaints accusing the respondent of protection order breaches and other criminal behaviour. In May 2019, the appellant breached the TPO by publishing a post on Facebook which suggested the respondent broke into her house and placed a water pistol in her cupboard ‘as a threat that [she] will be killed’. In June 2019, the appellant pleaded guilty to breaches of the TPO. A full list of the appellant’s abusive communications and unsubstantiated allegations are set out in para [15]-[16] of the judgment.
Issues: Whether the magistrate’s decisions making a protection order naming the male former partner as the aggrieved and the female partner as the respondent and dismissing the appellant’s application for a protection order should be upheld.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
There was a proper basis for the Magistrate finding that a protection order was necessary and desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
[74] The appellant has committed numerous acts constituting domestic violence against the respondent over the relevant period. Section 8 of the Act defines domestic violence for the purposes of the Act. It includes behaviour by a person towards another person which is emotionally or psychologically abusive, and behaviour that torments, harasses or is offensive. During the relevant period, the appellant sent abusive and intimidating messages to the respondent, published abusive and malicious Facebook posts, and sent numerous messages denigrating the respondent to others. The email and text communications between the appellant and the respondent clearly show a pattern of the appellant harassing and denigrating the respondent. I have summarized some of examples of these earlier in this judgment. The appellant did not and could not challenge that she had sent the relevant material to the respondent and others. The appellant sent some of this material in breach of a Temporary Protection Order and after being convicted of earlier breaches of the Temporary Protection Order.
…
It is clear from reading the transcript of the original hearing that the appellant continued to express resentment and animosity towards the respondent. Under cross-examination, the appellant refused to accept that she was in any way at fault for sending or posting the abusive and false material. The appellant’s state of mind at the time of the original hearing was relevant as to whether it was necessary or desirable to make a protection order.
[75] At the appeal hearing, the appellant continued to have little if any insight into the fact her behaviour has been unacceptable. She made clear her intention was to pursue the respondent further through the courts. I am satisfied a protection order was and is clearly necessary and desirable to protect the respondent from further domestic violence.
[76] With respect to the appellant’s application for a protection order against the respondent, the appellant has failed to show the Magistrate erred by concluding she could not be satisfied that the respondent had committed any act of domestic violence … other than some verbal abuse during the incident of 29 January 2018. It was open on the evidence for the Magistrate to prefer the respondent’s evidence over the appellant’s evidence. The evidence supported her conclusion that the respondent’s behaviour on that one occasion was out of character. In my view, although the respondent’s verbal outburst on 29 January 2018 may well have constituted emotional or psychological abuse under section 8(1)(b) of the Act, there was no credible or reliable evidence that, prior to or since that date, the respondent behaved in any way which could satisfy a court that it was necessary or desirable to make a protection order against him. The uncontested evidence was that the respondent had made no contact, directly or indirectly, with the appellant except in compliance with Family Court orders.
SRV v Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service & Anor [2020] QDC 208 (1 September 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against making of protection order’ – ‘Appeal against refusal to grant protection order (cross application)’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Person most in need of protection’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘S. 4 of the domestic and family violence protection act 2012’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Proceedings: Appeal against making of protection order and refusal to grant protection order (cross application).
Facts: The appellant and the second respondent were in an intimate relationship for a period of three months between October 2018 and January 2019. Following an incident on 21 January 2019, a Police Protection Notice (PPN) was issued and on 23 January 2019 a temporary protection order (TPO) was made against the appellant. On 29 January 2019, the appellant pleaded guilty to two charges of contravening the PPN.
At the mention of the police application on 17 June 2019, the appellant made a number of serious allegations against the respondent to the effect that she has conspired to have him murdered. The appellant then made an application for a protection order and temporary protection orders were made in each application. At the hearing of the applications on 19 August 2019, the police commissioner was legally represented in relation to the application for the benefit of the second respondent; the appellant was self-represented; and the second respondent did not appear. The Magistrate made an order, pursuant to s.151(2) that the appellant may not cross-examine the second respondent and that this would be the rules of engagement for the resumed hearing on 2 December 2019.
At the resumed hearing on 2 December 2019, the appellant tendered affidavits containing screen shots of various Facebook messages as evidence of his allegations against the second respondent that she had conspired to have him murdered. The second respondent gave short oral evidence by phone, being questioned solely by the magistrate. The magistrate granted the protection order in favour of the second respondent and refused the appellant’s cross application. In making the decision, the magistrate was not satisfied the second respondent was responsible for the threats and accepted the second respondent’s version of events over the appellant’s version.
Issues: Whether the magistrate was correct in determining that, upon identification of the person most in need of protection, it followed that a protection order could not then also be made against that person; whether the cross-applications should be granted.
Held: Appeal against making of protection order dismissed; appeal against refusal to grant protection order (cross application allowed).
The case clarifies the interpretation of s. 4 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (the Act). The Act does not exclude orders being made in both cross applications. Cross applications require the consideration of the matters referred to in s.37 and should not be decided on the basis of the principle in s.4(2)(e) (the identification of the person most in need of protection).
Decision on cross applications:
Her Honour considered the evidence and found it clear there was an event of domestic violence perpetrated towards the second respondent by the appellant and was satisfied the circumstances justified a protection order was necessary against the appellant, even when accepting the second respondent was not a reliable witness and prone to exaggeration. This appeal against the making of the protection order was dismissed.
Her Honour then considered the appellant’s application for a protection order against the second respondent, namely the allegations of the threats contained in Facebook messages. Her Honour stated she had no reason to doubt that the messages alleged to have been sent by the second respondent were in fact sent by her. In any event, their authenticity was not challenged. Her Honour found the messages satisfied the requirements of the definition of domestic violence in s.8(1) and s.37(1)(b). In her view, the magistrate should have found it necessary or desirable to protect the appellant from domestic violence and should have made a protection order. The second respondent did not swear any affidavit in response to the appellant’s affidavit alleging serious matters.
EKL v Commissioner of Police & PEL [2020] QDC 194 (12 August 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Complainant a protected witness’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Trial proceeded without the appellant present’
Matter: Protection order appeal.
Facts: Discussion between the magistrate and the prosecutor about the protection order took place in the absence of the appellant and/or his legal representative. The prosecution made an application for the complainant to be a protected witness under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (DFVP Act). The appellant’s legal representative informed the court that they did not have instructions in relation to any matter other than to request an adjournment, which application was refused by the magistrate. The appellant’s representative sought leave to withdraw. The magistrate granted the protected witness application.
Issues: (1) The appellant was not afforded procedural fairness; (2) the Magistrate erred in failing to comply with the DFVP Act; (3) the Magistrate erred in finding that the protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed, protection order set aside. Application for protection order remitted to magistrate’s court before a different magistrate.
(1) The discussion of substantive matters by the magistrate in the absence of the appellant is a ‘clear breach of the obligation of procedural fairness’ [20]. (2) In prohibiting the appellant from cross-examining the complainant, the magistrate did not comply with the pre-conditions in s 151 of the DFVP Act which include ‘requiring the court to inform the respondent that he could not cross-examine the aggrieved’ [33]. (3) Unnecessary to consider.
R v RT (No 2) [2020] QDC 158 (13 July 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Judge-only trial’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Choking x 1.
Proceedings: Judge-only trial.
Facts: The defendant man was charged with unlawfully choking without consent while he and the female complainant were in a domestic relationship.
The complainant’s daughter’s partner intervened. Later, the complainant attempted to pursue a DFV protection order but ‘none of the police to whom she spoke did anything’. The complainant and defendant later reconciled. In December 2017, the defendant is alleged to have ‘put his right forearm across her neck and applied pressure’, pinning down the complainant so that she could not breathe. After the incident, the police attended the house.
1.
During the complainant’s initial conversation with police, she ‘did not describe being choked by the defendant’. The defendant stated that he did not choke her but had held her by her arms/shoulders to ‘settle her down’.
2.
When meeting with a doctor after the incident, the complainant told the doctor she felt safe at home. The doctor gave expert evidence that the complainant’s injuries were consistent with the alleged choking.
3.
The relevant Constable testified that it was not until May 2020 that they were made aware of any allegation of domestic violence prior to December 2017. When asked about allegations of earlier violence, the complainant said that she had raised this with police on numerous occasions. The police were not able to get in contact with the complainant’s daughter’s partner who witnessed the January 2015 incident.
Issues: Whether the evidence of the complainant can be accepted beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: Not guilty.
The defendant argued that there were:
[39] a constellation of features inconsistent with [the complainant’s] account being truthful. These included her demeanour when speaking to police that night, her failure to immediately mention being choked and her preparedness to remain living at the house and tell the Doctor she felt safe.
The judge held that:
[39] The first and last of these matters do not in my view undermine the credit of the complainant. We are far past the days where the law expected an immediate and uncontrolled emotional reaction to an assault, and adversely viewed the credit of those who did not behave as expected. And, as noted above, staying in the house is understandable for other reasons.
However, the judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant choked the complainant in December 2017 as alleged. The fact that the complainant did not mention choking at that time raised doubts about the accuracy of her evidence.
[41] … it seems to me to be very surprising that if the complaint had been choked she did not mention that in her first interactions with police on the night. This is especially so if she had been violently assaulted by the defendant in the past, including by being choked or strangled … it seems to me unlikely that a person in the position of the complainant would have failed to mention being choked to the extent and for the duration alleged when first asked to give an account of the events … There is no reason apparent to me why she could not have mentioned or demonstrated the alleged choking at this point.
[42] I do not mean by what I have written to imply there can be any universal judgement as to how alleged victims of domestic violence should behave.
[45] It is impossible to think that an experienced police officer investigating an allegation of choking in 2018 would ignore a claim that a similar event occurred, in front of witnesses, less than three years before … [It is] unlikely that the absence of reference to the earlier incidents was the product of deliberate choice by the police officer, rather than omission by the complainant. It is reasonable to conclude that, having realised failing to refer to the other incidents at an earlier time was to her disadvantage, the complainant sought to deflect this by suggesting it was the fault of the police. That she was prepared to do so substantially damages her credit.
MNT v MEE [2020] QDC 126 (20 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Ouster order’ – ‘Protection order’
Matter: Appeal against making of protection order.
Grounds:
1.
A finding of economic abuse was not open on the evidence.
2.
The learned Magistrate failed to properly consider whether it was necessary or desirable to make a domestic violence order.
3.
The learned Magistrate erred in law by making an ouster order.
4.
The learned Magistrate erred in law by failing to provide adequate reasons.
Facts: There was evidence that the respondent’s property had been misused and misappropriated by the appellant since she left the home to live with her son. Examples include removing the respondent’s go-cart from the home and placing it in the weather, telling the respondent which chairs she could sit on, moving the respondent’s clothing and other property from the residence to the garage and into the weather; and having work done on the house without approval from the respondent.
Further, the appellant got into a bed already occupied by the respondent at a time after they had commenced living apart on the one property. The appellant also unilaterally forgave a debt owed by the appellant’s son and the respondent alleged he applied unnecessary force to a horse.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed. The way in which the appellant dealt with the respondent’s property, including his failure to rectify damage to the respondent’s property, was considered controlling behaviour in the overall context of the relationship and contributed to the respondent’s fear for her own wellbeing and safety. The various behaviours were aspects of “controlling behaviour or emotional or psychological abuse”. [75-79] The respondent’s account of the incident with the horse was accepted but the court was not satisfied that it constituted violence directed at the respondent.
HBY v WBI and Anor [2020] QDC 81 (14 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Application to set aside interlocutory order’ – ‘Availability of documents at trial’ – ‘Judicial discretion’ – ‘Order that appeal be heard afresh in whole’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unjust order’
Proceedings: Second respondent’s application to set aside interlocutory order that the appellant’s appeal be heard afresh in whole.
Facts: The male appellant and female first respondent (LAP) were in a domestic relationship. The second respondent (WBI), a police officer, issued a protection notice to the appellant in favour of LAP and a protection order was subsequently issued by a Magistrate. The appellant filed a notice of appeal and also applied for an order that the appeal be heard afresh in whole, contending that certain documents were not available at trial that showed that statements made by LAP regarding her financial position were not true (a matter going to her credit). The appellate judge allowed the application. WBI subsequently applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal that order, contending that the documents were in the possession of the appellant at the time of the trial, could have been obtained with reasonable diligence or would not have had an important influence on the rest of the case. The Court of Appeal struck out the application for want of jurisdiction (WBI v HBY and Anor [2020] QCA 24). WBI then made an application for an order that the order that the appeal be heard afresh in whole be discharged and in substitution thereof it be ordered that the appeal be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the court that made the decision being appealed.
Held: Moynihan QC DCJ allowed the application, setting aside the interlocutory order that the appellant’s appeal be heard afresh in whole with the result that the appeal has to be decided on the evidence and proceedings before the court that made the decision. His Honour held that he had jurisdiction to review and set aside an interlocutory order concerning a procedural matter where there was a mistake or irregularity and it would be unjust not to set it aside [12]. In this case, the exercise of the Judge’s discretion (to issue the interlocutory order) miscarried because he took into account facts which were in part erroneous (that is, the Judge was mistaken as to the availability of the documents at trial and the appellant’s opportunity to obtain disclosure of them) [12]. It would be unjust not to set aside the order where the mistake was material and led to such an extraordinary order [12].
His Honour further held that there was "no good reason" (see R v A2 (2019) 373 ALR 214) to order that the appeal be heard afresh in part [21]. The documents would have been available to the appellant at the time of the trial with reasonable diligence, or he was in fact in possession of the documents at the time of the trial [22]-[23].
HDI v HJQ [2020] QDC 83 (14 May 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of Process’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Parenting proceedings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Variation of protection order’
Proceedings: Appeal of a decision to order a permanent stay of an application to vary a protection order.
Issues:
•
Does a Magistrate have power under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVP Act) to order a stay of an application under the Act as an abuse of process?
•
Should the application to vary the protection order be allowed, dismissed or referred back to the Magistrates Court for further hearing?
Facts: The male appellant respondent (appellant) and female respondent aggrieved (respondent) were married for 23 years and had two children together. They separated after an alleged incident of choking, the respondent applying for a Protection Order under the DFVP Act. A Temporary Protection Order, including the children as named persons, was granted and the matter was set down for a hearing. The respondent then applied to vary its terms, seeking an order ousting the appellant from the former matrimonial home (this was later dismissed). The appellant then filed a cross application seeking a Protection Order against the respondent, but this was later withdrawn. At the hearing, the Magistrate accepted the respondent’s evidence and rejected the applicant’s version of events regarding the choking incident, making a two-year Final Protection Order. Two applications were then made to vary the Final Order, one by the appellant (to set aside the Order) and one by the respondent after the appellant breached the Order, in response to which a Magistrate made a Second Temporary Order against the appellant. The appellant then made a second application for a Protection Order against the respondent.
At the hearing of these last three applications, the Magistrate ordered that: the appellant was guilty of breaching the Final Order, the appellant’s application to vary be dismissed, the Second Temporary Order be revoked and replaced with a Varied Order, and the appellant’s Second Application for a Protection Order be adjourned. The appellant appealed these orders. At the hearing for the appellant’s Second Application for a Protection Order, the respondent sought that the application be estopped or stayed for abuse of process. The Magistrate agreed that the application constituted an abuse of process and it was permanently stayed.
The appellant further applied to vary the Varied Order. The Magistrate granted a permanent stay of this application on the ground that it was an abuse of process. The appellant appealed this decision on numerous grounds, including that the Magistrate erred in: a) allowing an oral application to permanently stay the application to vary on the basis it was an abuse of process, and b) not allowing the application to vary to proceed to full hearing.
Judgment: The judge held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order a permanent stay and therefore that the order to stay had to be set aside as a nullity. Her Honour found that the DFVP Act and Rules provide expressly or by implication for applications that are an abuse of its process to be summarily dismissed by the Magistrates Court, but there is no express reference to a power to stay such proceedings on these bases [75], [77], [83]. After examining several pieces of legislation, Her Honour also found that there was no explicit power to order a stay of an application under the DFVP Act [91], and that such a power did not need to be implied for the effective exercise of the jurisdiction to summarily dismiss applications that are an abuse of court process [94].
However, Her Honour noted that, as an appellate court, it had the power to allow, dismiss or refer the application to vary back to the Magistrates Court [99]. Reviewing all the material before her, Her Honour held that, while there was no basis to allow the application in full, two variations ought to be made to the Varied Order, both minor [103].
Rathbone v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 76 (30 April 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factor’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats of suicide’
Offences: Contravention of DVO x 7; Wilful damage; Obstruct police officer; Serious assault; Attempted stealing
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the appellant’s sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The appellant man committed a series of offences in the course of an attempt to commit suicide by having police officers shoot him. The offences occurred in the context of the recent and highly distressing breakdown of his marriage. The appellant approached a police officer and assaulted her from behind, restraining her, pushing her against the police vehicle and attempting to remove her firearm from her holster (Attempted stealing). Other police officers intervened and restrained the appellant. He was arrested and later released on bail. After his release, he attended the police station and provided a personal apology and a gift, recognising the distress he caused to the officers.
While the appellant was in custody, his wife obtained a Temporary Protection Order which included a condition that he have no contact with her. He contravened this order and sent his wife short emails or text messages expressing affection for her and his desire to continue their relationship.
The appellant further applied to vary the Varied Order. The Magistrate granted a permanent stay of this application on the ground that it was an abuse of process. The appellant appealed this decision on numerous grounds, including that the Magistrate erred in: a) allowing an oThe appellant entered early pleas of guilty to all charges, was convicted and received the following sentences:
•
Contravention of a domestic violence order offences – fined $750 and no conviction was recorded
•
Wilful damage – convicted but no further penalty imposed
•
Obstruct police officer – fined $500 and no conviction was recorded
•
Serious assault – 2 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, for an operational period of 9 months and the conviction was recorded
•
Attempted stealing – 3 months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, for an operational period of 9 months and the conviction was recorded.
The appellant appealed the sentences for Serious Assault and Attempted stealing on grounds that they were manifestly excessive, and the sentencing judge erred by not giving sufficient weight to the sentencing principle of rehabilitation.
Held: The judge allowed the appeal and referred the matter back for re-sentencing, holding that the imposition of a period of imprisonment was manifestly excessive. His Honour accepted that rehabilitation was a significant consideration in this case and the sentencing judge did not appropriately include it in his determination of a proper sentence [68]. Rather, the sentencing judge, by imposing a custodial sentence, "negatived [the rehabilitation considerations], in that they were excluded specifically with regard to their value" [69] and therefore the judge did not "fully consider and balance the issue of rehabilitation, in relation to the penalty imposed" [70].
In considering whether the appeal should be allowed, His Honour accepted a psychiatrist’s report that confirmed a "causal relationship between the appellant’s acute adjustment disorder with suicidal ideation upon the sudden breakdown of his marriage which led to the commission of the offences" [12]. His Honour also accepted that the appellant had exemplary antecedents and there was a negligible need for deterrence and punishment. The appellant further had a reduced moral culpability (having regard to the principles in R v Yarwood [2011] QCA 367).
His Honour ultimately accepted that the appellant’s rehabilitation and employment were likely to be adversely affected by a sentence of imprisonment and the recording of a conviction due to his inability to travel internationally to complete his PhD studies, and his vulnerable psychological state would be adversely impacted by such a sentence [13]. His Honour further concluded that "It was significant that [his two step-daughters – ie: children of his former wife] constituted part of the appellant’s support network available to the appellant" [32].
DYN v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 47 (27 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Error of law’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Persistent menacing conduct’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 2.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to 2 charges of contravening a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) and was sentenced to 18 months and 12 months imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently with each other, but cumulative on a term of imprisonment that he was already serving. At the time of the offending, he was separated from the complainant, and was subject to a protection order which required him to be of good behaviour, not to approach the complainant woman within 50m and not to contact her. During their 8-year relationship, they had a child.
Issue: The issues on appeal were whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive because the learned magistrate erred by:
•
Placing too much weight on the appellant’s criminal history;
•
Failing to properly take into account the appellant’s plea of guilty by not setting a parole eligibility date at a point sooner than one half;
•
Miscalculating the setting of the parole eligibility date; and
•
Failing to take into account the principles of totality such that the sentence imposed was proportionate to his offending.
Held: Morzone QC DJC allowed the appeal and substituted the terms of imprisonment with 12 months for Charge 1 and 15 months for Charge 2. The appellant contravened the domestic violence order by texting and calling the complainant excessively, and by engaging in physically intimidatory and aggressive behaviour by going to the complainant’s home at night, rushing at her, bashing the window and later making a death threat over the telephone despite police interest. Whilst the offending did not involve physical violence, it was serious in that it involved "persistent menacing conduct in serious breach of the no contact and geographical limiting conditions" of the protection order. His Honour acknowledged the prevalence of domestic violence in the community, and was particularly concerned about the continuation of violence despite police or court intervention by protection orders ([22]-[23]). Further, the appellant’s previous convictions for like offences, especially against the complainant, were found to be an aggravating factor as it showed that his attitude of disobeying the law was not isolated ([26]). His Honour therefore held that imprisonment was the necessary punishment, and that 12 and 15 months imprisonment would provide "appropriate moderation according to the sentencing considerations and balancing aspects of specific deterrence, and further rehabilitative processes serving out the sentence within the community under the auspices of parole" ([31]).
R v Skey [2020] QDC 27 (9 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Choking’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence by video-link’ – ‘Pre-recording evidence’ – ‘Special witness declaration’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Support person’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Proceedings: Application for orders to permit the complainant to give evidence over video-link, for her to be supported by another person when she testified, and to have her evidence recorded before the commencement of the trial.
Issue: The correct interpretation of s21A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)
Facts: Defendant man was charged with choking his female partner without consent and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. A week before trial, the prosecution made an application for orders to permit the complainant to give evidence over video-link, for her to be supported by another person when she testified, and to have her evidence recorded before commencement of the trial. The defendant opposed the victim giving evidence over video-link and the pre-recording of her evidence.
Judgment: Cash DCJ made orders permitting the complainant to testify at the trial over video-link and with a support person.
The Court rejected the Prosecution’s submission that "by not enacting a requirement to show likely disadvantage or trauma in section 21A(1)(d), parliament intended there to be a presumption of disadvantage which is itself sufficient to warrant departure from normal procedures". This submission was rejected for two reasons. First, the common law principle "that the defendant in a criminal trial should be confronted by their accuser in order to challenge their evidence was not displaced by s12A". Second, "there is nothing in s21A which compels the conclusion that any of the measures permitted by section 21A(2) are to be adopted automatically for any special witness" [9].
Regarding the order to permit giving evidence via video-link, the judge was satisfied that the capacity of the complainant to give evidence would be improved if she did not give the evidence in the defendant’s presence. The Court rejected the defendant’s submission that the defendant would suffer ‘impermissible disadvantage’ if evidence was given over video-link and provided that there is research to suggest that an average person’s ability to detect lies based on ‘demeanour’ is little better than chance.
The judge rejected the Crown’s request to pre-record the evidence as His Honour "not prepared to assume that a retrial would be such a likely outcome as to justify the order sought" [20].
EPN v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 34 (4 March 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Contravening domestic violence order’ – ‘Female offender’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with poor literacy skills’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 1; dangerously operating a motor vehicle x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant wife offended by contravening a domestic violence order and dangerously operating a motor vehicle, whilst being adversely affected by an intoxicating substance. Both offences arose out of the same incident at the residence of the complainant, the appellant’s estranged husband. The appellant migrated from Thailand and could not read or write in English. On the date of the incident, the appellant attended the complainant’s residence in contravention of the protection order and caused extensive damage to the property by driving her car into the front wall of the house. The appellant pleaded guilty and was ultimately sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and 18 months driving disqualification.
Issue: The appellant appealed the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive because:
•
The learned Magistrate mischaracterised the nature and extent of the offending conduct;
•
The learned Magistrate misdirected himself by considering that appellant offending fell within in the same broad category of the comparative cases; and
•
Taking into account the period of pre-sentence custody, the period of time to be served in actual custody was excessive.
Held: Morzone QC DCJ found that the learned Magistrate mischaracterised the offending as falling in the most serious of categories. Although the appellant used the vehicle as a weapon, it did not fall within ‘the most serious of categories where an offender weaponises a vehicle in a direct personal attack with potential serious injury of an unprotected victim’. The offending occurred in the context of a volatile marriage breakdown, where she moved out of the matrimonial home and went on ‘a rage of wilful destruction of matrimonial assets whilst intoxicated’. The appellant willingly caused extensive damage, with the potential of indirectly causing injury to the complainant. Morzone QC DCJ held that the offending was aggravated by her intoxicated state, domestic violence and contravention of the protection order ([33]).
Further, the learned Magistrate referred to 5 cases in his decision as to the appropriate penalty. Morzone QC DCJ considered each case in light of the appellant’s offending ([40]-[50]. The cited cases were distinguishable from the appellant’s offending as they involved the serious feature of a direct personal attack with a vehicle being used as a weapon on an unprotected victim. As the applicant’s offending did not fall within the same serious category, such cases could not provide any comparative guidance ([50]).
Morzone QC DCJ also held that the learned Magistrate erred by failing to take into account some material considerations and the suitability of a suspended sentence ([64]). His Honour considered the nature and extent of the offending and mitigating factors, such as lack of criminal history, good character, guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, and cooperation with police. Whilst the appellant clearly ‘deserved’ a prison sentence, which would further the sentencing principles of punishment, and personal and general deterrence, the learned Magistrate ought to have considered the possibility of a suspended sentence. The appellant’s conduct was contextual and situational, she did not require close supervision upon release into the community, and she actively took steps to self-rehabilitate and refrain from alcohol ([63], [71]).
Consequently, Morzone QC DCJ allowed the appeal and varied the sentence by making the prison term partly suspended after the appellant serves 60 days imprisonment.
BKA v Commissioner of Police [2020] QDC 10 (19 February 2020) – Queensland District Court
‘Breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Lengthy criminal history’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’
Charges: 1 x contravention of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man was convicted, on his own plea of guilty, of one offence of contravention of a DVO, and was sentenced to a term of 6 months’ imprisonment, cumulative on the terms of imprisonment he was then serving relating to domestic violence offences against the same woman. The contravention in question was attending the home of his former partner (the protected person) when subject to a protection order. She was clearly scared, being found by attending police hiding in a manhole in the ceiling. The present offending occurred whilst on parole and very shortly after being granted parole ([16]).
The appellant had an ‘unenviable criminal history’ and had been imprisoned for drug and violent offences, and had been re-sentenced on numerous occasions for breaches of bail, suspended sentences and an intensive correction order ([8]).
Issue: The sentence was manifestly excessive. Three specific errors were alleged:
•
The learned Magistrate erred by not inviting submissions on a cumulative sentence
•
The learned Magistrate failed to take into account the totality when setting the parole eligibility date; and
•
The learned Magistrate erred by setting a parole eligibility date at the full-time date of the appellant’s current sentence.
Although the submissions largely focused on the parole eligibility date, it was also contended that the head sentence should have been ordered to be served concurrently ([2]-[4]).
Held:
Byrne DCJ allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the sentencing Magistrate insofar as it related to the appellant’s parole eligibility, and ordered that the appellant be eligible for parole on the date of the delivery of the judgment instead ([27]). Byrne DCJ accepted that it was an error to impose the cumulative sentence without first inviting submissions as to that possibility. It was noted at [18] that the Magistrate raised concerns about imposing another suspended sentence given the appellant’s past history of breaching such orders, but did not raise the possibility of ordering that the term be served cumulatively on the current period of imprisonment. According to Byrne DCJ, if the Magistrate did this, it would inevitably have elicited submissions as to the appropriate point for parole eligibility. It could not be said that this was an ‘error without consequence’.
The offending clearly affected the aggrieved’s safety and welfare, although the appellant did not inflict any actual physical violence on her on that occasion. Given that the offending occurred so soon after the appellant had been released on parole for offending involving the same woman, and in light of the need for specific deterrence given the appellant’s history for breaching court orders, Byrne DCJ held that a head sentence of 6 months cumulative on the period of imprisonment the appellant was already serving was appropriate ([19]). However, the extension of the parole release date was excessive, especially in light of the head sentence of 6 months. His Honour considered that this in itself would be sufficient grounds to allow the appeal ([21]). The lengthy deferral of the parole eligibility date failed to reflect the appellant’s guilty plea, that he did not inflict any physical violence and that he had served about 3 months of pre-sentence custody that could not be declared as time already served under the sentence ([24]).
Baker v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 258 (17 December 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘History of contravention’ – ‘Mitigating factors’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order (aggravated offence) x 1; Possessing dangerous drugs x 4; Failure to appear in accordance with an undertaking x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted and sentenced for contravening a domestic violence order during the operational period of a suspended sentence. He was also sentenced in relation to other drug and violence offences. The appellant hit the aggrieved (whom the order was made in favour of) during an argument. The strike caused a small cut to her lip. The appellant then left the address but shortly returned holding a crate and threatened to bash her dog. The couple had another argument later in the evening before the aggrieved escaped and called police. The appellant denied being at the address and hitting the aggrieved when later questioned.
The appellant filed his notice of appeal five weeks late. The delay was not significant and was caused by the appellant’s attempts to seek legal advice.
Issue: Whether the sentence imposed was excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The court found that the sentence was not excessive and dismissed the appeal.
The appellant relevantly argued that the contravention offence was his first breach of a domestic violence order against this particular complainant however, Fantin DCJ observed at [41] ‘The fact that this was the appellant’s first contravention against this particular woman is not a matter in his favour. What is relevant is that he had previously been convicted on earlier occasions of breaching domestic violence orders and of domestic violence offences, but continued to reoffend.’
CTC v Commissioner of Police [2019] QDC 250 (29 November 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The complainant and applicant were married but did not live together. The complainant was pregnant with their second child at the time of offending and there was a domestic violence order in place preventing the applicant from engaging with the complainant in any way without her consent. On the day of the offending, the applicant had become enraged and assaulted the complainant after finding communications between her and another male on her phone. The attack left the complainant with a swollen and cut lip.
The applicant pleaded guilty to the charge and was originally sentenced to three months imprisonment wholly suspended for two years with the conviction recorded.
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
The learned magistrate erred in failing to have proper regard to the principles of ‘parsimony’; and
•
The learned magistrate failed to give due weight to the appellant’s mitigating circumstances.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the magistrate erred in his reasoning.
Decision and reasoning: Jarro DCJ concluded that the sentence imposed was not excessive.
Ground 1: ‘The applicant came before the court with a relevant criminal history. He is a mature man. He used actual violence and a physical injury was sustained by the complainant, albeit of a limited nature. The offending was aggravated as the complainant was 23 weeks pregnant at the time and the violence was unprovoked’ (pg 5). In considering these aggravating features and the need for general deterrence to be reflected in the sentence given the prevalence of domestic violence in the community, Jarro DCJ considered the sentence imposed to be within the appropriate range.
Ground 2: Jarro DCJ provided that ‘the principle of "parsimony" is not a governing principle used in the exercise of discretion in sentencing and therefore the sentencing judge was not in error by not having regard to the principle.
Ground 3: Jarro DCJ found that the magistrate appropriately balanced the applicant’s mitigating circumstances against the applicant’s aggravating factors and the need for deterrence.
AMB v TMP & Anor [2019] QDC 100 (21 June 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Children’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Insults’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Domestic violence charges, resulting in a Domestic and Family Violence Protection Order
Case type: Appeal against making of order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)
Facts: The appellant challenged a decision made pursuant to s 37 Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012, granting the aggrieved a protection order for 5 years. The order was made after a contested hearing. The aggrieved claimed that she was not in a relationship with the appellant, but that they had a daughter. Her affidavit provided details about her contact with the appellant, which involved insults by him and several unpleasant interactions, including via text ([16]).
Issue: The appellant appealed the decision on the ground that the learned magistrate erred in finding that 1) the appellant committed domestic violence against the aggrieved within the meaning of Part 2, Division 2 of the Act; and 2) the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence pursuant to s 37 of the Act.
Held: The appellant submitted that the evidence did not support a finding of domestic violence, and that the magistrate erred in relying on the evidence as the credit of the aggrieved was fatally damaged ([23]-[24]), [35]).
Kent DCJ dismissed the appeal. The magistrate’s analysis relied on uncontentious matters. Given the fact that the appellant did not deny sending the various text messages and that they clearly showed insulting language, the credit of the aggrieved was not central to the analysis and result ([35]). It was somewhat difficult to assess whether the events constituted domestic violence in the form of emotional abuse because there appeared to be a mutual exchange of insults between the parties ([36]). Where the communication between the parties involves the ‘trading’ of insults, it is more difficult to conclude that mere insults amount to ‘emotional abuse’. In his Honour’s opinion, insults ‘fall on a continuum of seriousness, from completely trivial to very serious; and at a certain point on the continuum it becomes clear that emotional abuse is involved’ ([37]).
The Court held that there was no appealable error by the magistrate. There was no error demonstrated in any step set out in MBE v MLG in that: 1) there was a risk of future domestic violence, which was more than a mere possibility; 2) there was a need to protect the aggrieved from that risk; and 3) an order was necessary or desirable, particularly considering the factors in s 4(1) ([41]).
CSN v The Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 43 (3 April 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Obstruct police’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Obstruction of a police officer x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of obstructing a police officer, for which he was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment with immediate parole release. It was alleged that the appellant made previous threats to kill his ex-wife and daughter. When the police came to his house to serve him with a police protection notice, he became aggressive and verbally abusive. The police feared a risk of serious injury, even though the appellant was not armed. He fled the property, maintaining that ‘he was not going to be served with anything and was throwing his phone away’. When he returned to the property, he continued to be abusive towards the officers. He was restrained and arrested for obstructing police ([5]-[9]). The Magistrate regarded the offence to be ‘amongst the most serious of obstruct police charges, given the facts presented here and the escalation of the situation’, and sentenced the appellant to 4 months’ imprisonment with an immediate parole release ([20]-[21]). The appellant appealed against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate had overestimated the seriousness of his offending behaviour.
Issue: The issue is whether the sentence that the Magistrate imposed was excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offending, the appellant’s antecedents, his prior criminal history, his mental health issues, his endeavours to rehabilitate and other relevant sentencing principles and guidelines ([29]).
Held: McGinness DCJ noted the appellant’s extensive criminal history, which commenced when he was a child and included breaching domestic violence orders, common assault and stalking ([10]). The offence was found to have serious features, including the nature of the appellant’s verbal abuse, his actions of leaving the property and saying he would continue to refuse service of the protection order. However, the Magistrate’s finding that the offence was ‘amongst the most serious of obstruct police charges’ was an error which led to the sentence imposed being excessive ([31]). The appellant did not physically struggle with the police, and complied with police directions once he returned to the house. He also was not armed. His Honour noted that the offending must be viewed against the appellant’s mental health issues at the time of offending, and childhood histories of sexual abuse at the hands of authoritative figures in a custodial setting. Other relevant factors include his genuine efforts to receive treatment and rehabilitate ([32]). Therefore, because of his criminal history, financial circumstances and his continuing efforts to rehabilitate, a probation or community service order would have been within range. His Honour allowed the appeal, and varied the sentence to 2 months’ imprisonment suspended forthwith for operational period of 2 months. Even though, at first glance, this order could be mistaken for ‘tinkering’, his Honour maintained that reducing the sentence to 2 months was substantial ([33]).
JWD v The Commissioner of Police [2019] QDC 29 (8 March 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Four charges including stalking and using a listening device in breach of a domestic violence protection order, and breach of a bail condition.
Case type: Appeal against conviction. Application for extension of time.
Facts: The applicant and complainant had previously been in a relationship. The first charge related to the use of a listening device to record a private conversation, which the applicant installed in the complainant’s vehicle during the course of their relationship. The final three charges occurred when the relationship had apparently ended. As the complainant prepared to go to sleep one night, she noticed the applicant standing on her patio, peering through a bedroom window. The behaviour was in breach of a domestic violence protection order and constituted stalking. Further, it was aggravated by being in breach of court orders ([9]-[12]).
The Magistrate took into account the fact that the applicant was 47 years old, had no relevant criminal history and was a New Zealand native. He obtained a tertiary qualification and stable employment. He also had a number of positive references attesting to his good character and sought counselling while in custody. Her Honour placed the applicant on three years’ probation. No conviction was recorded, except for the offence of unlawful stalking, as it was the most serious charge ([14]-[16]).
The applicant sought an extension of time within which to appeal, arguing that the delay was attributable to administrative error and was relatively short ([5]). It was argued that the three concurrent probation orders in relation to the stalking, contravention of the domestic violence order and breach of bail, amounted to double punishment contrary to s 16 of the Criminal Code (Qld).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and offended the prohibition on double punishment for the same act.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal and granted the extension of time. The Court held that the Magistrate’s conclusion as to recording of a conviction was free from appealable error. The probation orders for the contravention of a domestic violence order and breach of bail condition were set aside as double punishment. The applicant was convicted and not further punished. Moreover, the sentencing discretion was found to have miscarried in relation to the offence of using a listening device – an offence with a maximum penalty of only two years’ imprisonment and which was relatively minor in the circumstances. The sentence imposed for that offence was reduced from three years’ probation to two years’ probation, with no conviction recorded ([22]-[25]).
CBC v Queensland Police Service [2019] QDC 3 (30 January 2019) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Parole eligibility date’ – ‘Parole release date’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: 1 x grievous bodily harm, 1 x assault occasioning bodily harm, 1 x contravention of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO), and a further contravention of a DVO (aggravated)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In 2016, the appellant, an Aboriginal woman, was convicted on her guilty plea to domestic violence related offences, namely, grievous bodily harm, assault occasioning bodily harm, contravention of a DVO and a further contravention of a DVO (aggravated offence). When the appellant was released from parole, she formed an intimate relationship with the aggrieved. Their relationship was characterised by alcohol-fuelled domestic violence, which led to its termination ([5]-[7]).
A protection order was issued in 2018, prohibiting the appellant from "following or approaching the aggrieved". The appellant breached this order by attending the aggrieved’s home while he was inside ([9]). The Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 1 month imprisonment to be served cumulatively upon a pre-existing 3 year sentence, with immediate release on parole. The prosecution applied to reopen the sentence on the basis that a parole eligibility date was required by s 160C Penalty and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld). The sentence was reopened in the appellant’s absence and without hearing further substantive submissions about the offending conduct and mitigating circumstances. The Magistrate amended the sentence by fixing a parole eligibility date in lieu of a parole release date ([12]). The appellant was arrested and returned to custody ([13]).
Issue: The appellant appealed the sentence on the grounds of manifest excessiveness. Other grounds were raised in her submissions, such as breach of natural justice and jurisdiction to reopen the sentence ([14]-[15]).
Held:
In Morzone DCJ’s view, the Magistrate ‘erred in exercising the sentencing discretion by initially mistaking the facts, then allowing erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him in re-opening the sentence without regard to matters of totality, and failing to take into account some material considerations as to the nature and extent of the offending’. The sentence was therefore unreasonable and plainly unjust ([37]). While the appellant had previous convictions for serious violent offences, and had reoffended while on parole for those offences, her offending was comparatively trivial and did not involve actual contact with, or any violence towards, the aggrieved ([42]). However, she has found herself in prison as a result of her ongoing alcohol mismanagement. The current offending was at the lowest end of the range, and imprisonment was found to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offending and ‘too crushing’ on the appellant ([44]). Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Magistrate’s orders were set aside. The appellant was convicted, but not further punished for the offence ([45]).
ODE v AME [2018] QDC 277 (13 December 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Application for a stay of judgment’ – ‘Principles as to grant or refusal’ – ‘Stay of proceedings’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal type: application for a stay of a judgment given in the Magistrates Court.
Facts: On 20 September 2018, Magistrate Strofield declined to grant a protection order for the benefit of the applicant (ODE) against the respondent (AME) on the basis that his Honour wasn’t satisfied that it was necessary or desirable to make one, as required under s 37(1)(c) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) (see [3]). ODE appealed that decision to the Queensland District Court; she filed a notice of appeal on 9 November 2018 and within it outlined seven grounds of her appeal (see [5]). On that same date, a stay application was brought in the form of an application for a temporary protection order pending hearing of the other appeal. Judge Richards stayed the decision of Magistrate Strofield on 9 November until 23 November 2018 at which time Judge Koppenol dissolved the stay order (see [6]-[7]). This was likely due to the fact he wasn’t satisfied the appeal was of any merit (see [6]-[7]). A further stay application was filed on 6 December 2018 with the aim of extending the temporary protection order until the appeal by staying Magistrate Strofield’s decision to refuse to make a final protection order ([8]).
Issues: The applicant sought a stay on two main grounds. First, her affidavit (filed on 6 December 2018) extended on the points raised in her notice of appeal concerning the merits of her appeal. Second, the respondent had perjured himself in the proceedings before the Magistrate.
Decision and reasoning: application dismissed, appellant restrained from making any application in relation to the proceeding without leave from the court, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
As to the first ground of appeal, Porter QC DCJ explained to the applicant that where a party has applied for a stay but failed and then applies again, it is usually required that the party establish some new matter that has emerged since the last refusal to “justify a second bite at the cherry” ([11]). The applicant accordingly pointed to two matters. The first was that since the judgment on 23 November 2018, the respondent had committed further acts of domestic violence by not returning certain belongings to her (see [8]). Porter QC DCJ dispensed with that matter in stating that the respondent’s conduct didn’t comprise acts of domestic violence and noting the respondent’s actual willingness to return the belongings (see [13]). The second point was that the emails relating to the couple’s daughter and her recent experience in hospital indicate the respondent was involved in acts of domestic violence. After examining the relevant extracts in the circumstances of the case, Porter QC DCJ could see no way in which they would amount to domestic violence on the respondent’s part as defined in the DFVPA.
Finally, his Honour couldn’t see a way in which it could be concluded there was perjury arising out of the proceedings before the Magistrate.
CPD v Ivamy & Anor [2018] QDC 244 (5 December 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against protection order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Necessary or desirable test’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: On 28 October 2015, in seeking parenting and property orders, the second respondent brought Family Court proceedings against the appellant. An incident on 1 November 2015 led to the making of a temporary protection order on 3 November 2015; the second respondent and the couple’s two children were named as the aggrieved. The order included the respective usual conditions: a “no contact” condition and an “ouster” condition under ss 56, 57 and 63 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) (see [21]). There was, however, an exception that allowed for communication via text between the appellant and second respondent with the appellant’s mother acting as the conduit between them (see [21]). The appellant soon applied to vary the order to remove the children’s names ([22]). The application was heard by the Magistrate on 9 December 2015; the second respondent consented to the variation but the police prosecutor denied ([24]). On 18 February 2016, following a mediation in the Family Court proceedings, a resolution as to the parenting and property orders was reached. 11 days later, final consent orders were made by the Family Court to the effect that the original exception to the order was removed and replaced with an allowance for direct communication via email. Both parties also agreed to try to remove the protection order. However, the police prosecution refused the second respondent’s application to remove the order. On 11 March 2016, the domestic violence hearing listed to commence on 14 March 2016 was adjourned so as to provide the appellant with the opportunity to make submissions for the discontinuance of the order. After a four-day summary trial, extending over March and April 2017, the Magistrate gave ex tempore reasons on 10 November 2017 and ultimately granted a five-year protection order against the appellant (see [34]-[47]).
Issues: the appellant’s grounds of appeal were two-fold. First, the Magistrate erred in finding that the emails sent by the appellant’s mother and the conduct of the trial by his counsel constituted further acts of domestic violence. Second, the protection order was not necessary or desirable to protect the second respondent and the children from the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: appeal allowed and the protection order was therefore set aside and the matter was remitted to another Magistrate for re-hearing.
His Honour, after reviewing the exchange of emails between the appellant’s mother and second respondent, concluded that the Magistrate’s finding that the appellant was behind the tone and wording of the emails was based on speculation and not open on the evidence (see [50]-[57]). As to the second part of this ground of appeal, his Honour expressed the view that counsel is entitled to exercise their discretion on how to handle a matter and the Magistrate’s characterisation of the appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of the second respondent as an act of domestic violence was erroneous. The first ground of appeal was therefore allowed.
The second ground of appeal was allowed. His Honour felt that the Magistrate, in coming to their finding on the necessary or desirable condition, failed to consider the material matters such as the fact that the tension between the Magistrate’s courts undertakings and the Family Court had resolved in April 2017 and the appellant’s mother was no longer acting as a conduit and thereby no longer “inflaming” the relationship (see [66]). Accordingly, his Honour concluded that the Magistrate erred in granting the protection order.
NVZ v Queensland Police Service [2018] QDC 216 (12 November 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order while in custody’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: Contravening a domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: During proceedings before the Magistrates Court in which a temporary protection order was made, the appellant threatened to kill the aggrieved and her children. The appellant pleaded guilty to one charge of contravening a domestic violence order. He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment with an immediate parole eligibility date and 36 days of pre-sentence custody declared as time served. The appellant appealed against the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.
Issues: The appellant submitted that the sentence was excessive having regard to his psychiatric condition, the principles of totality and the comparable case tendered by defence which, in combination with his personal circumstances, supported a shorter head sentence.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant relied on R v Goodger [2009] QCA 377 as justification for a reduction in sentence because of his reduced moral culpability. However, that case was not authority for the proposition that the sentence must be reduced by reason of a psychiatric condition [50]. Kefford DCJ held that there was no compelling evidence that the appellant’s condition at the date of sentencing meant that continued incarceration would have more of an impact on the offender than it would on a person of normal health. There was nothing to suggest that there was a serious risk that imprisonment would have adverse effects on the appellant’s mental health. Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not excessive in the circumstances, even though the offending occurred at a time when the appellant could not act on the threats made (as he was in custody) ([71]).
The appellant’s criminal history illustrated his general disregard for the law and court orders. An aggravating circumstance was the fact that he offended whilst in the confines of a court room, demonstrating disrespect not only for the complainant but also the Court ([72]). The sentencing principle of protection to the Queensland community from the offender was significant, given the appellant’s vulgar and bold threats to the aggrieved in the presence of the Court. No submissions were made that indicated that the appellant had taken steps towards rehabilitation. The Court made reference to Singh v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 037, but did not regard that the decision was evidence that the sentence in the present case was excessive. That case was distinguishable because there were no prior convictions for violence or contraventions of a domestic violence order. It also did not involve the aggravating feature of a threat to kill delivered to the aggrieved and her children in the presence of the court.
Caddies v Birchell [2018] QDC 180 (4 September 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Extra-curial punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm (domestic violence offence), following a two-day trial. Prior to sentencing, he lodged an appeal against conviction. Subsequently, the Magistrate sentenced the appellant to 18 months’ imprisonment on the basis that the appellant serve one half of that term in prison. The appellant appealed against this sentence and was granted bail pending the hearing. The grounds of appeal included that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the Magistrate failed to (1) identify whether he took into account the extra-curial punishment the appellant received during the offence, in particular the broken foot caused by the complainant; (2) indicate how that extra-curial punishment was taken into account in the sentencing process (if he did take it into account); and (3) consider the appellant’s offer of compensation.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; Whether the sentencing discretion should be re-exercised to take into account the appellant’s injuries; Whether the appellant’s injuries are capable of constituting extra-curial punishment; Whether the sentencing discretion should be re-exercised to take into account the offer of compensation.
Decision and reasoning: The Court was satisfied that the errors identified vitiated the sentence imposed by the Magistrate. There was no explanation as to the Magistrate’s consideration of extra-curial punishment and how it was taken into consideration with regard to the penalty that was imposed. There was also no explanation as to the basis upon which the Magistrate found that there was a complete lack of remorse. The Court concluded that the Magistrate fell into error when he determined that a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was the appropriate penalty. Having referred to comparable cases, such as R v RAP [2014] QCA 228, the Court held that the imprisonment term of 18 months was manifestly excessive. In R v RAP, Justice Wilson held that, in the case of a serious assault in a domestic setting, a sentence of imprisonment for two years or more is, ‘plainly within the proper sentencing range’ and ‘far from excessive’. Similarities between the two cases include the ages of the appellants, their prior criminal records and their otherwise good character ([47]). Although the complainants in both cases suffered physical and psychological injuries, the injuries sustained by the complainant in RAP were more significant. RAP also involved a plea of guilty, whilst this was a matter determined following two days of hearing. Reference was also made to a considerable number of cases with regard to the range that should be considered in relation to a penalty to be imposed, such as R v Pierpoint [2001] QCA 493, R v Johnson [2002] QCA 283, R v Von Pein [2001] QCA 385, R v Fairbrother; ex parte Attorney-General [2005] QCA 105, R v King [2006] QCA 466, R v George [2006] QCA 1 and R v Roach [2009] QCA 360. These cases clearly showed the considerable range of penalties and the need for an independent exercise of discretion. In light of the circumstances of this case, the appeal was allowed, the sentences set aside, the hearing adjourned for sentence on a date to be fixed and the bail enlarged.
RCK v MK [2018] QDC 181 (6 August 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Adjournment of application for protection order’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sufficient evidence to justify protection order’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: At the first hearing of the proceeding, on 9 November 2017, the Magistrate considered it unnecessary to grant a temporary protection order and therefore remanded the matter to 16 November 2017. On that later date, the matter was listed for further mention and management on 18 January 2018. At this hearing, neither the parties nor their representatives were present with the exception of the aggrieved’s representative. Ultimately, the magistrate made a protection order for a period of five years in identical terms to an order made for a separate but related family matter involving the aggrieved and her brother (see [27]).
Issues: the significant grounds of the appeal, which turned upon matters of procedure, were two-fold. First, the Magistrate erred in not adjourning the application under s 39(2)(b) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). Second, the Magistrate erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to justify that the appellant had committed domestic violence against the respondent or that a protection order was necessary or desirable under s 37(1)(c) of DFVPA.
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed. The protection order was set aside, the proceeding was remitted to the Domestic and Family Violence Court to be heard and determined according to law, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs in the appeal.
As to the first ground, the material question posed by Morzone QC DCJ was whether the respondent was denied the opportunity to be heard by the application proceedings in circumstances where it had been previously set for mention only. Applying the relevant authority on this particular issue of procedural fairness (see [37]), Morzone noted there was no adequate and reasonable explanation for the respondent’s absence. Furthermore, Morzone QC DCJ outlined six material elements of the case that his Honour believed the Magistrate ought to have considered in deciding whether to proceed to hearing or grant an adjournment (see [40]). In failing to consider these features of the case, the Magistrate was said to have misdirected herself in proceeding to hearing with the consequence that the orders ultimately made were unreasonable (see [41]).
Given the conclusion Morzone QC DCJ reached as to the above ground of appeal, his Honour considered it unnecessary to consider the second ground of appeal (see [43]).
Recognising that it would be inequitable for the respondent to bear the costs of the appellant’s success, Morzone QC DCJ ordered that each party ought to bear their own costs in the appeal (see [53]).
ECW v ECW [2018] QDC 166 (3 August 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Child welfare’ – ‘Family law issues’ – ‘Hearing of the variation application according to law’ – ‘Lack of preparation’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Variation of a temporary protection order’
Appeal type: appeal against variation to temporary protection order.
Facts: A temporary protection order was issued against the applicant (Mr ECW) for the benefit of the respondent (Ms ECW) and the couple’s three children. A protection order was later made before Mr ECW applied to remove two of the children as named persons protected under the order and vary, among others, orders 3 and 8. The acting Magistrate made variations to orders 3 and 8 while dismissing the variation to the persons named in the order. Mr ECW appealed against this decision.
Issues: did the acting Magistrate fail to hear and determine Mr ECW’s application for a variation to the protection order according to law?
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Magistrate’s Court, to be heard and determined, according to law.
Horneman-Wren SC DCJ revealed a number of issues with the way in which the acting Magistrate heard and determined Mr ECW’s application.
As observed by his Honour, s 91(2)(a) of DFVPA provides that before a Court can vary a protection order, the court must consider the grounds set out in the application for the protection order. However, his Honour recognises that the opening remark of the Magistrate – “Okay. So, whose application is this?” – demonstrates that the Magistrate hadn’t read the grounds for the application or the materials filed by each party prior to the hearing. His Honour further noted that a plain reading of the transcript would highlight that the Magistrate didn’t read the application or affidavit materials at any stage during the hearing.
Horneman-Wren SC DCJ also recognises that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the proposal to remove the two children from the order on the basis that they were matters for the Family Court and not for her Honour (see [32]). His Honour clarifies that the matter was not a matter for the Family Court but for her Honour (see [33]).
The matter was remitted to the Magistrate’s court, as opposed to Horneman-Wren SC DCJ conducting the appeal as a fresh hearing, since his Honour was of the opinion that Mr ECW was entitled to have his application heard and determined in the Magistrates Court and to have appeal rights. Conducting the appeal as a fresh hearing would mean, by virtue of s 169(2) of the DFVPA, that Mr ECW would not have any such appeal rights (see [38]-[39]).
His Honour did not set aside the Magistrate’s variation of orders 3 and 8 since the parties agreed that those variations ought to remain in the interim ([41]).
JMM v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 130 (6 July 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Breach of procedural fairness’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive sentence’
Appeal type: appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 4 August 2016, a protection order was made under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA) against the appellant for the benefit of the aggrieved, her de facto partner, and her three children. The order only contained the standard conditions pursuant to 56 of DFVPA including a condition that the appellant must be of good behaviour towards the child, must not commit associated domestic violence against the child and must not expose the child to domestic violence. On 8 November 2018, one of the appellant’s children verbally provoked the intoxicated appellant and pointed a knife at her. The aggrieved disarmed the child, kicked him in the bottom and chased him across the street. Two witnesses recount the aggrieved and appellant hurling verbal abuse at the child. The appellant’s conduct fell within the definition of “domestic violence” under s 8 of the DFVPA since it could be classified as “emotionally or psychologically abusive” (see [45]). Accordingly, the appellant was later charged and convicted of contravention of the protection order in the Magistrate’s court. She was sentenced to 3 months imprisonment. The appellant appealed against this sentence.
Issues: the grounds of the appeal were two-fold: sentence was manifestly excessive and there was a breach of procedural fairness in the magistrate not inviting submissions on imprisonment.
Decision and reasoning: appeal allowed and the sentence was therefore set aside.
The second ground of appeal was allowed. His Honour stated that the magistrate erred in denying the appellant’s solicitor the opportunity to address her on the appropriateness of the sentence of imprisonment. Denying this opportunity and imposing the sentence nonetheless constituted a breach of the rule of natural justice (see [50]). This error, amongst other errors in the Magistrate’s exercise of the sentencing discretion, lead his Honour to set aside the sentence. Accordingly, it was necessary for the appellate court to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, unless doing so lead to the conclusion that no different sentence should be passed (see [14]).
On the basis of the Court’s independent exercise of discretion and analysis of relevant cases, the sentence imposed was considered excessive. The respondent relied upon PFM v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 210 and TZL v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 171 in their submission that the sentence was appropriate since the offending in question was more serious than in each of those cases that yielded similar sentences (see [53]). In response, his Honour stated that the offending was not objectively more serious than in PFM and TZL and is not truly comparable and therefore of little assistance (see [54]-[58]). At the discretion of his Honour, two recent analogous cases were then considered. Taking into account those decisions and the material facts of the case, namely that the contravention involved no violence and was limited to a single instance of provoked verbal abuse, his Honour concluded that the sentence was outside the permissible sentencing range for the offender (see [64]-[65]) and ordered a sentence of probation for six months.
Queensland Police Service v JSB [2018] QDC 120 (28 June 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing options’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 1; Possession of a dangerous drug x 1; Breach of a bail condition x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence; Appeal by way of rehearing on the record
Facts: The respondent and appellant were in a relationship. The respondent pleaded guilty to three charges, one of which was contravention of a domestic violence order. He was fined $1,000.
Issues: Whether the fine of $1,000 was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Fantin DCJ dismissed the appeal. Her Honour considered the respondent’s personal circumstances and criminal history, which included 28 breaches of domestic violence orders, 18 breaches of bail conditions and other court orders ([20]). Whilst the respondent’s previous breaches of domestic violence orders were clearly relevant and increased the need for personal and general deterrence, her Honour found that it should not outweigh the low level of gravity of the offence. Taking into account the relationship between the respondent and appellant, the fact that the contravention of the domestic violence order did not involve violence and was limited to one instance of verbal abuse, that the respondent was not charged with any other offence arising from the contravention, the respondent’s early plea and cooperation with police, that the respondent had spent three days in pre-sentence custody, the activation in full of a suspended sentence of two months’ imprisonment, it was open to the Magistrate to impose the fine of $1,000 for the contravention offence ([73]). She did, however, consider that the sentence may be regarded as generous and another judicial officer may have structured the sentences differently.
ATJ v SLK [2018] QDC 191 (23 April 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Imposition of a domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against imposition of a domestic violence order.
Facts: The respondent applied for a domestic violence order based on the appellant’s alleged behaviours, dating back several years and including a time prior to which a previous order was made. The application was served on the appellant two days prior to the hearing and the appellant did not attend the hearing. The only material placed before the Magistrate was the application itself. No oral evidence was given. The order was made. The appellant appealed against the decision to make the domestic violence order.
Issues: Whether the decision to make a domestic violence order could be set aside.
Decision and reasoning: Farr SC DCJ allowed the appeal, set aside the decision, and remitted the matter to the Magistrates Court. Whilst it appeared unlikely that the behaviour that occurred since the cessation of the previous order could justify and satisfy the test of domestic violence, even if that was the case, the Magistrate would need to take account of that prior behaviour to determine whether that might constitute domestic violence of a continuing nature, such that it is appropriate to make a second order based upon the same evidence. This was a question for that court to determine after hearing all of the appropriate evidence and submissions, and his Honour found that the present court was not in the position to make that decision ([19]).
S v T [2018] QDC 49 (29 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Case type: Application for costs after an appeal against a domestic violence order.
Facts: A protection order was made naming the respondent (T) as the aggrieved and the appellant (S) as the respondent. S successfully appealed against the order. S sought an order for T to pay her costs of the original hearing and the appeal ([1]).
Issues:
1.
Whether s 157(2) Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (‘DFVPA’) applies to an award of costs after an appeal against a domestic violence order.
2.
Whether a costs order should be made in favour of S.
Decision and Reasoning: Richards DCJ made no order as to costs.
In relation to the first issue, the usual position is that each party to a proceeding for a domestic violence order bears their own costs unless the application for the protection order is ‘malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious’ (s 157(2) DFVPA). There is no equivalent section in the DVFPA in relation to appeals. However, r 142(2) DFVPA provides that the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (‘UCPR’) applies to appeals. Rule 681 UCPR states that costs follow the event unless the court orders otherwise. Richards DCJ held, applying GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248, that the discretion to award costs should be exercised in light of s 157(2) DVFPA ([5]).
In relation to the second issue, Richards DCJ noted that there was some suspicion that T made the application for a domestic violence order in retaliation for S complaining to the police about him or to have some sort of leverage over her. However, his Honour was unable to find that the application was malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious ([6]).
MKA v WKT [2018] QDC 73(28 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Change of venue’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Appeal type: Appeal against domestic violence order.
Facts: A domestic violence order was made naming the respondent (WKT) as the aggrieved and the appellant (MKA) as the respondent ([2]). MKA appealed against the decision to grant the protection order ([3]). WKT applied to change the venue of the appeal from Cairns to Southport.
Issues: Whether the application for change of venue should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was granted.
WKT applied to transfer the proceedings on the grounds that:
•
she ordinarily resides in Coolangatta;
•
the proceedings at first instance were heard at Coolangatta;
•
she has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood as a result of the domestic violence; and she has been unable to engage legal representation in Cairns ([12]); and
•
she cannot afford to pay her legal representation at the Gold Coast, but was hopeful of obtaining Legal Aid assistance ([13]).
MKA opposed the transfer on the basis that:
•
his legal representatives are based in Cairns;
•
he was put to the expense of flying and accommodating them at Coolangatta in the first instance proceeding;
•
there is no evidence that a timely hearing date would be available in Southport ([14]).
Morzone DCJ emphasised that the exercise of discretion to grant the transfer is governed by the objectives of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld), one of which is to ‘…maximise the … wellbeing of people who fear or experience domestic violence, and to minimise disruption to their lives’. His Honour placed emphasis on WKT’s mental health condition, which is likely to be aggravated by the appeal proceedings ([25]-[26]).
ETB v Commissioner of Police [2018] QDC 26 (6 March 2018) – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing - double jeopardy’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order (‘DVO’) x 2; Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship and raised 5 children together ([14]). The first contravention of DVO occurred when the appellant swore at the appellant and threatened to slice his own throat (‘June contravention of DVO’). The second contravention of DVO occurred when the appellant verbally abused the appellant (‘September contravention of DVO’). The aggrieved slapped the appellant and told him to leave. The common assault charge occurred when, in retaliation for the slap, the appellant punched the aggrieved in the head and ear (together, ‘September charges’) (see [10]).
The appellant was sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment for the June contravention of DVO, 9 months’ imprisonment for the September contravention of DVO, and 9 months’ imprisonment for the common assault ([2]). The magistrate declared 39 days’ pre-sentence custody and set a parole release date after 2 weeks ([4]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on 4 grounds in relation to the September charges (see [7]-[8]):
•
first, that the sentence was manifestly excessive;
•
second, that the sentencing magistrate erred by failing to have proper regard to principles of totality;
•
third, that the sentencing magistrate erred by incorrectly applying relevant case law; and
•
fourth, that the magistrate erred by contravening s 16 of the Criminal Code 1999 (Qld) by imposing imprisonment on each of the offences of contravention of a domestic violence order and common assault.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, the Dearden DCJ held that the September charges could be appropriately separated, because the contravention of DVO was in relation to the verbal abuse, and the common assault was in relation to the physical punch ([18]). However, this meant that the respondent conceded that sentence of 9 months for solely verbal conduct was manifestly excessive ([20]). District Judge Dearden considered that the appropriate sentence for the September contravention of DVO should be 3 months ([21]).
The remaining issue was whether the sentence of 9 months imprisonment for the common assault charge was manifestly excessive ([23]). Considering case law and mitigating circumstances (the fact that the verbal abuse did not involve threats to harm the aggrieved and the assault was precipitated by the aggrieved slapping the appellant), Dearden DCJ held that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([23]-[30]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment ([32]).
ACP v Queensland Police Service (No 2) [2017] QDC 293 (8 December 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’ – ‘Ouster order’ – ‘Particularise a charge’ – ‘Return condition’ – ‘Uncertain in its terms’
Charges: Breach of temporary protection order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: A temporary protection order was made naming ACP as the respondent and MP as the aggrieved. Condition 4 of the order provided that ACP must vacate the family property, and condition 5 allowed ACP to return to the property to collect belongings in the company of a police officer ([10]). The order did not specify the time by which ACP must vacate the property, but ACP gave evidence that the Magistrate said that ACP must vacate the property ‘straight away’ ([58]).
MP returned to the property 3 days later, to find ACP loading belongings onto a truck. ACP had not yet vacated the property ([20]-[21]). ACP gave evidence that he understood the order to mean that he could vacate the property himself, and only needed police attendance to return to the property ([60]).
The bench charge sheet did not set out the particulars of which condition of the order the defendant was alleged to have contravened ([8]), contrary to s 177(4) of the Domestic Violence and Family Protection Act 2012 (Qld) ([19]).
Issues: Whether the temporary protection order was uncertain in its terms.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside.
Judge Horneman-Wren SC concluded: first, that the charge was not adequately particularised; and second, that the order was uncertain in its terms. First, the charge sheet did not inform the defendant of the factual ingredients of the offence ([72]). Second, even though the order did not provide a timeframe within which ACP was to vacate the property, the Magistrate stated that ‘the order is quite clear on its face and I am satisfied that the appellant was aware that he was to get out straight away’ ([79]). This was an error because ‘straight away’ was not incorporated in the condition ([90]).
ACP v McAulliffe [2017] QDC 294 (8 December 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Family law issues’ – ‘Necessary or desirable test applied to conditions’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of future domestic violence’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: The male appellant and the female aggrieved person (MP) were in a relationship. Commencing in October 2012, there were a number of ‘instances’ of domestic violence (see [28]-[38]). A temporary protection order was made on 15 February 2016. A year later, on 7 March 2017, a Magistrate made a protection order against the appellant for the benefit of MP and her three sons under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)(DFVPA). There were five conditions stipulated under the order; the first and fourth were standard conditions under s 56 of DFVPA:
1.
Appellant be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against her.
2.
Appellant is prohibited from remaining at, entering or attempting to enter, premises or approaching the premises where the aggrieved lives or works.
3.
Subject to four exceptions, appellant is prohibited from contacting, attempting to contact or asking someone else to contact the aggrieved.
4.
Appellant be of good behaviour towards the named children and not commit associated domestic violence against them and not to expose them to domestic violence.
5.
Appellant is prohibited from contacting the named children subject to the same exceptions applicable under condition 3.
Issue: whether the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence?
Decision and reasoning: the appeal was allowed to the extent that a protection order was made but only with the standard conditions. Conditions 2, 3 and 5 were removed and condition 4 was renumbered as condition 2.
Before considering the issue on appeal, Horneman-Wren SC DC’s observed that the Magistrate did not expressly assess either of the first two steps of the three-step process considered by Morzone QC DCJ in MDE v MLG as the necessary approach to determining the requirement, under s 37(1)(c) of the DFVPA, that “the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence” (see [67]). His Honour then took the opportunity to emphasise the discretionary nature of this requirement and that Morzone QC DCJ’s view on how to determine whether an order is necessary or desirable shouldn’t be seen to mandate those three steps (see [68]-[69]). Indeed, his Honour later recognises that it was sufficiently clear from the Magistrate’s reasons that she answered the first question of the three-stage approach in the affirmative (see [76]-[78]).
In relation to the issue on appeal, his Honour considers the Magistrate’s finding that an order was necessary as unreasonable and reached in error. His Honour opined that evidence of risk of future domestic violence in the absence of a protection order (first step) is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the necessary condition is satisfied (see [80]). However, his Honour regarded the Magistrate’s finding that the protection order was desirable as one that ought to have been made (see [81]). In accordance with the requirement under s 37(1)(c) that the court must only be satisfied with one of the two conditions (see [88]), and as reflected in the orders of this appeal, his Honour therefore agreed with the Magistrate in her decision to make the protection order (see [88]).
Ultimately, it was the terms in which the Magistrate made the order that necessitated modification of the protection order. His Honour noted that under s 57(1) of the DFVPA, before the court may impose other conditions in addition to those set out in s 56, it must be satisfied that the condition is both necessary in the circumstances and desirable in the interests of the aggrieved, named person or the respondent. Having recognised this, his Honour then pointed out that the Magistrate failed to explain that she was satisfied that the imposition of other conditions was both necessary and desirable (see [89]-[90]). The order to remove conditions 2, 3 and 5 of the protection order reflect this view of his Honour that the Magistrate erred in imposing those other conditions.
MEG v Commissioner of Police [2017] QDC 302 (10 November 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach domestic violence order’ – ‘Probation’ – ‘Procedural fairness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing submissions’
Charges: Contravention of a domestic violence order as an aggravated offence x 1; Assault or obstruction of a police officer as a domestic violence offence x 1; Possession of dangerous drugs x 1; Contravene direction x 1; Contravention of a domestic violence order simpliciter x 1; Authority for controlled drugs x 1; Failure to properly dispose of a syringe or needle x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant breached a domestic violence order naming the appellant’s mother as the aggrieved and her son as a named person in the order. The breach occurred when the appellant made threats to kill herself and her son, in the presence of her son ([17]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for the contravention of a domestic violence order as an aggravated offence and four months’ imprisonment for the contravention of a domestic violence order simpliciter. For the other charges, the appellant was convicted and not further punished ([2]).
At sentence, the Magistrate indicated that he was considering a prison probation order of 2 months’ imprisonment and 12 months’ probation ([5]). After hearing submissions on that sentence, the Magistrate asked the appellant whether she consented to the probation order. MEG asked, ‘what happens if I say no?’ The Magistrate interpreted this question to mean that MEG did not consent to the order, and immediately imposed the four- and six-month sentences of imprisonment ([29]).
Issues: Whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness, and whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was re-sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, which was time already served.
Judge Horneman-Wren SC held that the Magistrate erred in construing MEG’s question (‘what happens if I say no?’) as a refusal to consent. Further, the Magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant to a head sentence of six months without inviting further submissions on the sentence ([32]). The Magistrate did not give reasons for why six months was an appropriate head sentence, and did not refer to any comparable cases ([33]).
PFM v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 210 (11 August 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Extending protection order’ – ‘History of domestic violence offences’ – ‘Parole’ – ‘Post-separation abuse’ – ‘Re-sentence’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant had obtained a domestic violence order with the appellant as the aggrieved. The order contained a condition that the appellant was not to have contact with the complainant. In contravention of this condition, the appellant travelled to the complainant’s house, stood outside, and called out to her and her son ([16]). The appellant had a criminal history including 13 breaches of domestic violence orders, spanning 12 years to 2015. The appellant was sentenced to 4 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed for two reasons: first, the sentencing judge erred in not applying the principle of totality; and second, the sentence was manifestly excessive.
In relation to totality, the appellant had previously been sentenced for a failure to appear, and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment. Since the appellant was on parole, the imposition of the new sentence automatically cancelled his parole. Therefore, the effect of the sentence was to impose a 9-month sentence. The magistrate did not treat the matter in this way, and calculated the parole eligibility date as one third of the 4-month sentence ([40]-[41]).
In relation to the length of the sentence, the sentence was outside the appropriate range. Morzone QC DCJ stated that ‘it seems that the Court allowed the appellant’s previous offending to overwhelm other material considerations and the nature and seriousness of the offending subject of the sentence’ ([42]). The offending conduct was in the lower range, and would not normally attract a sentence of imprisonment. However, the nature of offending in the context of previous past breaches of domestic violence offences warranted a period of one month’s imprisonment ([64]).
The judge determined that the extension of the protection order to was ‘necessary or desirable for the order to regulate the parties’ communication and contact for that period. By that time, the parties’ parental relationship and need for contact will change as the child matures into his early teens.’ [70]
NAS v QPS [2017] QDC 173 (21 June 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Partially suspended sentence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed with an instrument x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married and had a 5-month-old baby. The appellant was from Papua New Guinea and was staying in Australia on a tourist visa ([2]). The offence occurred when the appellant became angry and threw an apple at the complainant, struck her with a broomstick, and struck the back of her head while she was holding the baby ([3]).
The appellant pleaded guilty on the following day and was immediately sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment, suspended after serving a period of 2 months for an operational period of 3 years ([1]). He was represented by a duty lawyer ([5]).
The magistrate stated that the ‘only’ appropriate sentence was 15 months’ imprisonment ([11]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
Judge Reid held that the Magistrate erred by stating that 15 months was the ‘only appropriate term’ ([23]). Comparable cases, most relevantly R v Pierpoint [2001] QCA 493, indicated that a lesser sentence was also open ([25]).
On one hand, the offending was serious: it was somewhat protracted, committed against a female partner, and in the presence of a young child. On the other hand, the appellant had no criminal history, the appellant had ceased hitting the complainant before the police arrived, and there was no previous domestic violence order in place ([26]-[27]).
The appellant was re-sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment, to be suspended in 10 days, after the appellant had completed serving the sentence of 2 months imprisonment ([30]). Had a pre-sentence custody certificate been provided, a wholly suspended sentence could have been imposed ([30]).
LDS v QRR [2017] QDC 199 (15 June 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Cumulative sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Natural justice’ – ‘Psychologist’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Wilful damage’
Charges: Contravening domestic violence order x 3; wilful damage x 1; common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the aggrieved in a domestic violence order taken out against the defendant. The breaches of domestic violence order and common assault charge occurred when the appellant punched and pushed the complainant to the ground on three occasions ([6]). The wilful damage charge occurred when the appellant stomped on her mobile phone while she was trying to contact the police ([7]). Following a plea of guilty, the Magistrate imposed cumulative sentences totalling 18 months’ imprisonment, with a parole release date after 6 months ([3]).
Issues: There were three grounds of appeal: first, that the Magistrate placed disproportionate weight on general community deterrence; second, that the Magistrate disregarded the appellant’s mental health issues; third, that the Magistrate erred in ordering the sentences to run cumulatively without consulting either party.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
In relation to the first ground, the Magistrate described the appellant’s offending as a ‘reign of terror heaped upon the complainant’ ([16]). District Court Judge Muir described this statement as an exaggeration because the violence was at the lower end of the scale and the offences were committed within a short time period ([31]). The Magistrate also referred to statistics that 700 women would be killed in the next 10 years if nothing was done about domestic violence ([19]). District Judge Muir held that using statistics in this way indicated that the Magistrate did not place sufficient weight on the appellant’s mitigating factors.
On the second ground, the appellant asserted that he suffered from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and schizophrenia. However, the psychologist’s letter tendered in evidence did not mention those conditions. The Magistrate enquired as to who gave the diagnoses, but more information could not be tendered ([27]). District Judge Muir held that the Magistrate was entitled to place little weight on the diagnoses.
On the third ground, Muir DCJ held that it was an error for the Magistrate to not invite submissions about the possibility of cumulative sentences ([36]).
On the whole, Muir DCJ concluded that the sentence was outside the appropriate range ([47]). The appellant was re-sentenced to an overall head sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment, with the appellant to be released immediately on parole after having served approximately 4 months in prison ([50]).
JC v KP [2017] QDC 175 (26 May 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Consent’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Weapons licence’
Appeal type: Appeal against decision to grant protection order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were brothers. A Magistrate ordered that a protection order be made against the appellant by consent (p 2), with the respondent as the aggrieved. The Magistrate represented to the appellant that the order would not affect the appellant’s weapons license (p 3). In fact, a protection order would limit the applicant’s weapon’s license for five years (p 5). The appellant appealed the decision on the ground that the appellant was induced to consent to the order being made (p 2-3).
Issues: Whether the order should be set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The order was set aside. Judge Long of the District Court concluded that the appellant did not understand the full consequences of the order being made, and the matter was remitted to a contested hearing (p 6-7).
CDX v Queensland Police Service [2017] QDC 96 (5 April 2017) – Queensland District Court
‘Conflating factual issues’ – ‘Contravention of domestic violence order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Text messages’
Charges: Contravention of domestic violence order (DVO) x 1; Possess restricted items x 1; Possess explosives x 1; Assault or obstruct police officer x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence from Magistrates Court.
Facts: The appellant was subject to a DVO with the complainant named as the aggrieved ([12]). The appellant sent threatening text messages to the complainant, and took their child out of school ([12]). This formed the basis of Charge 1, contravening a DVO. When the police arrived at the appellant’s house, he refused to cooperate, and appeared to reach for a knife while holding the child ([12]). This formed the basis of Charge 4, obstruct police officer.
The appellant was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two months ([1]).
Issues: The defendant appealed on the grounds that: the sentence was manifestly excessive; the Magistrate took irrelevant matters into consideration by relying on the documentation from the domestic violence order; the Magistrate fettered her objectivity; and the Magistrate conflated the facts of Charge 1 and Charge 4 ([2]-[3]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Horneman-Wren SC DCJ concluded that the Magistrate erred in conflating the factual issues in charges 1 and 4 ([42]). The other grounds of appeal were not made out. Horneman-Wren SC DCJ considered that a shorter sentence would have been appropriate, but since the appellant had been in custody for 7 weeks, his Honour recorded a conviction and did not further punish the appellant ([47]).
CED v HL [2016] QDC 345 (22 December 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Children’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Vary’
Appeal Type: Appeal against variation to Temporary Protection Order.
Facts: A temporary protection order was made against the appellant which stipulated his former female partner, the respondent, as the protected person. The appellant and the respondent had a son together, K. The terms of the temporary protection order were varied twice. The first variation occurred after the respondent took K out of school (against K’s wishes). The appellant arrived to pick up K, at K’s request. An argument ensued between the appellant and the respondent. The temporary protection order was varied to name K as a protected person.
Second, the respondent reported that her father (the maternal grandfather of K) had made threats against the appellant in the presence of K. The temporary protection order was varied to prevent the appellant from permitting, encouraging or facilitating in-person contact between K and the grandfather. The appellant’s position was that he had never been threatened by the respondent’s father in that way and that K wanted to see his grandfather.
The appellant applied to a magistrate to have these terms varied and removed. The application was refused.
Issue/s: Whether the variations ought to be allowed?
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Kent J held that there were insufficient reasons given for the orders made refusing the variations. This was an error of law and the decision had to be set aside on that basis. Further, there was an insufficient evidentiary basis to prove that either of the contested conditions were necessary or desirable. First, K’s presence at the incident between the appellant and respondent was purely incidental. It was upsetting but no more upsetting than other separate actions of the respondent. It was not prolonged or dangerous and not wilfully brought about, or persisted with, by the appellant. Second, the grandfather’s threats against the appellant were out of the appellant’s presence and not initiated by the appellant. They were unlikely to be repeated and did not involve any violence against K. This was too tenuous to substantiate the challenged conditions (see [38]).
RWT v BZX [2016] QDC 246 (30 September 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Cross-application’ – ‘Cross-orders’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a protection order and an order for costs.
Facts: The male appellant and the female respondent were married in India. It was an arranged marriage. They lived in Australia with their son and the appellant’s parents. Each applied for a protection order against the other, making serious allegations which were denied. There were also proceedings in the family court at the time of the protection order hearing.
The respondent’s application and affidavit set out particulars of domestic violence under several headings: verbal abuse, controlling behaviour, psychological abuse using the child, sexual abuse, financial abuse, threats and intimidation. She perceived an alliance against her (the appellant, his parents and the son). She annexed to her affidavit a transcript of a recording she made as she was packing to leave the family home to provide evidence of this. Conversely, the appellant alleged that the respondent had assaulted the child. He had previously taken the child to a doctor and reported the complaint.
The magistrate made an order in favour of the wife. He dismissed the appellant’s application and also made an order for costs. In doing so His Honour stated:
‘Sadly what I say in these proceedings can’t be used in the Family Court. These proceedings are private proceedings. I wish they could. I wish the Family Court could hear what I think about the reliability of [the appellant]. It’s been a scurrilous case. On my view, his application has been deliberately false and vexatious. I can say that, in 12 years as a magistrate, I have never ordered costs in a domestic violence case before. I intend to today for the first time in many hundreds of cases’.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
There was no proper basis on the evidence for the learned Magistrate to make a protection order under s 37 of the [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’);
2.
There was no proper basis for the learned Magistrate to order costs under s 157 of the Act against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Was there a proper basis for the order made against the appellant? (see [4]-[34])
1.
Devereaux SC DCJ held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the appellant had committed acts of domestic violence against the respondent: s 37(1)(b) of the Act.
(a)
The magistrate was correct to use the transcript of the recording made by the respondent as proof of her case and as relevant to the credibility of the appellant. The transcript showed the manner in which the appellant treated the respondent. Further, the ‘startling’ language and attitude of the child towards his mother in the transcript gave rise to the inference that the appellant had treated the respondent in such a way over a lengthy period in front of the child: see [12].
(b)
The magistrate, correctly, interpreted the transcript as confirmation of the respondent’s claim that the discussion was principally about money – the appellant’s demand that she deposit all her wages into the joint account: see [13]. Evidence of the respondent’s friend further corroborated the respondent’s evidence about financial abuse: see [18].
(c)
Devereaux SC DCJ agreed with the magistrate’s analysis of the transcript of the recording (see [14], [29]). It provided evidence of threats by the appellant, that the appellant would shout at her in front of the child, and that the child had been ‘coached and poisoned against his mother’ (see [15]-[24]).
(d)
His Honour further held that: ‘the passages I have referred to in this judgment from His Honour’s reasons reduce to the finding that his Honour rejected utterly the credibility of the appellant and accepted completely the credibility and reliability of the respondent. There is nothing in the materials which objectively suggests that those findings were not open to His Honour or that I should draw different inferences from facts in the record’ at [29].
2.
Devereaux SC DCJ also held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence: s 37(1)(c) of the Act.
(a)
Devereaux SC DCJ noted the magistrate’s conclusions about the appellant’s application, namely that it was ‘an outrageous case and pure nasty, vindictiveness on this woman because she wouldn’t hand over her money to a controlling, bullying husband. I don’t believe she has been anything other than a good mother to her child. I dismiss the [appellant’s] application …, as I said, but I do intend to make an order in favour of the wife’.
(b)
The magistrate continued: ‘[i]n my view, as I mentioned during submissions, the fact that property settlements in family law matters are still contentious and, indeed, the mother still isn’t even getting face-to-face contact with her own child at the moment, there is every opportunity for the husband to continue his bullying behaviour to try and manipulate the wife into caving in to his demands about the child, about financial affairs, and anything else that he might have a penchant to do in his bullying behaviour. She is absolutely in need of protection. He needs to be kept well away from her’ (see [26]).
(c)
Devereaux SC DCJ held that these statements could be properly understood as the magistrate’s reasons for being satisfied that the protection order was ‘necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ (see [28]). This reasoning, that it was necessary or desirable for an order to protect the respondent from domestic violence in the setting of the continuing family court proceedings, was correct: GKE v EUT (see [32]).
Devereaux SC DCJ noted generally that ‘[i]t is advisable that a magistrate make specific findings with respect to the matters set out in s 37 of the DVFP Act’ (see [27]). However, here, ‘the manner in which His Honour reached and set out conclusions is sufficiently clear to be amenable to examination and review’ see [28].
•
The appeal against the costs order (see [35]-[68])
Devereaux SC DCJ held that the magistrate was entitled to thoroughly reject any of the appellant’s assertions. Having done so, it was open to the magistrate to conclude that the appellant’s application was brought to vex the respondent – ‘it was deliberately false and vexatious’, brought because ‘she wouldn’t hand over her money to a controlling bullying husband’’ (see [65]-[66]).
WJ v AT [2016] QDC 211 (19 August 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Cross-application’ – ‘Cross-order’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Purpose of the domestic and family violence protection act 2012 (qld)’ – ‘Risk’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the making of a protection order against the appellant and appeal against the decision of the Court to dismiss the appellant’s application for an order.
Facts: The male appellant and the female respondent were in a relationship. They had two children together, DJ and MJ (aged 3 and 2), and another daughter, LS (aged 8), from the respondent’s previous relationship. The appellant had been abusive to LS in the past. The parties had separated and the three children lived with the respondent. The respondent and the appellant each applied for a protection order against the other. There were also contact/care proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court.
The respondent’s case was that on 14 August 2015 the appellant spoke loudly and in an insulting way towards her. Many, if not all, of these statements were made in front of DJ and MJ, upsetting the children. The appellant rubbed his beard against the respondent’s eye area and continued to verbally abuse her. The respondent tried to ignore him. He took her phone and ran outside. There was a struggle. He pushed the respondent, she was thrown onto the car bonnet and the appellant sustained some scratches (see [6]-[32], [112]-[126]). Conversely, the appellant alleged that the respondent ‘went berserk’, pushed him around the balcony, grabbed and attacked him, and he ran away from her. She then physically assaulted him. He sustained scratches and a ripped shirt. He also alleged he was a victim of economic abuse (see [33]-[53]).
The Judicial Registrar (JR) made a protection order against the appellant in favour of the respondent. The JR dismissed the cross-application by the appellant (see [56]-[58]).
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the decisions of the Judicial Registrar were made against the weight of the evidence, namely the making of a protection order against the appellant in favour of the respondent; including the two children, MJ and DJ, in the order; including the child LS in the order; and the refusal to make a protection order against the respondent in favour of the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
•
Should an order have been made against the appellant?
First, Smith DCJA held that a number of the acts committed by the appellant amounted to domestic violence as per s 37(1)(b) of the Act Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’) – ‘the rubbing of the beard was physically abusive, the taking of the phone was physically abusive and the insulting words about the first respondent was in my view emotionally or psychologically abusive’ (see [131]).
Second, in considering whether a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ to protect the aggrieved as per s 37(1)(c), Smith DCJ noted that the reasoning of McGill SC DCJ in GKE v EUT applied here. McGill SC DCJ said:
‘I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made, and then consider whether in view of that the making of an order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved … I also agree that there must be a proper evidentiary basis for concluding that there is such a risk, and the matter does not depend simply upon the mere possibility of such a thing occurring in the future, or the mere fact that the applicant for the order is concerned that such a thing may happen in the future’(see [32]-[33]).
Smith DCJA noted that ‘necessary’ is defined by the dictionary as ‘requiring to be done, achieved; requisite, essential’ and desirable is defined as ‘worth having’. There is therefore a ‘lower threshold when one is concerned with the term ‘desirable’. But both are focused on the need to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ (see [137]-[139]).
His Honour ultimately agreed with the JR’s reasoning that an order was both necessary and desirable to protect the aggrieved from respondent. At [140]:
‘There is no doubt that the parties are embroiled in Federal Circuit Court proceedings. There are children of the relationship about whom contact/care arrangements will need to be made. These will need to be dealt with in a civilised and appropriate fashion. I have considered s 4 of the Act. In light of the history between the parties, the events of 14 August 2015, the nature of the relationship, and degree of animosity expressed by the appellant towards the first respondent, in my view, it was both desirable and necessary that the order be made in favour of the first respondent. Like the JR, I consider without such an order there is a real risk of future domestic violence’.
•
Should MJ and DJ have been included in the order?
Section 53 of the Act provides that the court may name a child ‘if the court is satisfied that naming the child in the order is necessary or desirable to protect the child from (a) associated domestic violence or (b) being exposed to domestic violence committed from the respondent’. Section 10 of the Act defines the meaning of ‘exposed to domestic violence’.
Smith DCJA was satisfied that the children were exposed to domestic violence (see [148]). Further, His Honour stated: ‘I do not consider there is any requirement they understand the words spoke, particularly bearing in mind they were spoken aggressively’(see [149]). Additionally, it was also necessary and desirable for the children to be included in the order because, as the JR found, there was a continued risk of exposure to domestic violence in the future. This was because the parties would continue to be in contact through the children of the relationship and proceedings were on foot in the Federal Circuit Court (see [150]-[151]).
•
Should LS have been included in the order?
His Honour held that:
‘[I]n all of the circumstances, bearing in mind that there is a real possibility of contact between the appellant and LS, and bearing in mind the acrimonious situation between the parties and the events of 9 July 2015 [when the appellant was physically abusive towards LS] and 15 August 2015, I consider the JR was right to add LS to the order to avoid the risk of her being exposed to domestic violence’ at [159].
•
Should an order have been made against the first respondent?
In this regard, Smith DCJA noted the respondent had tried to ignore the appellant and that the scratches sustained by the appellant could have been caused in self-defence or accidently by the respondent. In this regard, His Honour quoted the explanatory notes to the 2011 Bill at [166]:
‘Lastly, the Bill aims to ensure that the person who is most in need of protection is identified. This is particularly important where cross-applications are made, which is where each party to a relationship alleges domestic violence against the other and which often result in cross-orders. During consultation, stakeholders reported a disproportionate number of cross-applications and cross-orders and expressed the concern that in many instances domestic violence orders are made against both people involved. This is inconsistent with the notion that domestic violence is characterised by one person being subjected to an ongoing pattern of abuse by another person who is motivated by the desire to dominate and control them. Both people in a relationship cannot be a victim and perpetrator of this type of violence at the same time. A cross-application may be used by a respondent to continue victimising the aggrieved person, to exact revenge or to gain a tactical advantage in other court proceedings. Also, violence used in self-defence and to protect children can be misconstrued as domestic violence if a broader view of the circumstances is not taken’ (His Honour’s emphasis).
In light of this, Smith DCJA held that there was no ‘physical abuse’ of the respondent by the appellant. Also, on the totality of the evidence, the respondent was most in need of protection (see [167]-[172]).
EAV v Commissioner of Police [2016] QDC 237 (16 September 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Alternatives to imprisonment’ – ‘Community based orders’ – ‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Cross-application for mutual protection orders’ – ‘Magistrates’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Previous breaches of domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of a domestic and family violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. They were subject to a domestic violence protection order on 8 July 2015 for a period of two years. These were cross-orders. In October 2015, the appellant breached these orders and was fined $500. On 20 November 2015, police attended their address after reports of a dispute. The appellant told police that he and the complainant were in a heated argument, which the complainant had initiated. The appellant said he bumped into the complainant, causing her to stumble. The complainant slapped the appellant. He then grabbed the complainant, threw her on the bed, and restrained her with his body weight. He released her and the argument continued until police arrived.
In sentencing, the magistrate expressed significant concern about the chronology of events namely, that the domestic violence order had been made in July 2015, breached by the appellant on 27 October 2015, the appellant was sentenced for that breach on 11 November 2015, and he then breached the domestic violence order again on 20 November 2015. The appellant was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended, with an operational period of 12 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Dearden DCJ noted that the magistrate failed to give appropriate recognition to a number of relevant factors, namely at [22]:
•
‘there were mutual, cross-orders for domestic violence in place at the time of the offending;
•
‘the initial violence in the incident was, in fact, the complainant slapping the appellant;
•
‘the appellant’s violence, in response, was relatively low level (although nonetheless unacceptable);
•
‘the appellant had been in receipt of medical care in respect of a significant mental health issue, and importantly, had undertaken the Anglicare Living Without Violence Program, which was a substantial program, indicating on his part a significant willingness to change;
•
‘the appellant had expressed his remorse to police immediately after the event’.
His Honour noted that ‘magistrates dealing with breaches of domestic violence are, of course, under significant time pressures and the learned magistrates sentencing remarks are brief’. However, His Honour held that, ‘the transcript does not indicate that the learned magistrate in any way considered alternatives other than imprisonment in respect of this matter, and appears only to have taken into account the chronology (which is obviously significant) and to some very minor extent (referenced at the conclusion of her sentencing remarks) the steps that the appellant had taken in respect of receiving assistance from Dr Calder-Potts and Anglicare’ (see [24]).
The appellant was resentenced to 18 months’ probation with a special condition that he continue treatment and complete 100 hours of community service. No conviction was recorded.
IFM v Queensland Police Service [2016] QDC 140 (17 May 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach bail condition’ – ‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Repeated contraventions’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order x 2, breach bail condition x 2, and a further contravention charge.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. In relation to the first contravention of a domestic violence order, on 18 March 2015, the appellant pushed the complainant over and punched her to the jaw. No physical injury was alleged. After being arrested and charged, the appellant was released on bail. The second contravention of a domestic violence order occurred on 30 May 2015. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat and hit her, knocking her to the ground. He kicked her, dragged her to her feet and verbally abused her. The appellant then dragged her to a nearby park, knocking her to the ground again, hit her in the head, picked her up and continued to drag her. No physical injury was alleged. A head sentence of 15 months imprisonment was imposed on the second contravention of domestic violence order.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a sentence of 12 months imprisonment with a release after four months was appropriate in light of the authorities of PMB v Kelly [2014] QDC 301 and Singh v QPS [2013] QDC 37. Durward SC DCJ distinguished both of these cases (see [20]).
Here, Durward SC DCJ was satisfied that a sentence of 15 months imprisonment was not manifestly excessive. This was in light of a number of factors. The appellant’s conduct involved significant aggravating circumstances namely, the first contravention of a domestic violence order was committed two weeks after the expiration of an earlier imposed sentence, the second contravention charge occurred while the appellant was on bail for the former offence, and the appellant had previous convictions for breaches of domestic violence orders (including one committed against the same complainant) (see [21]). Further, the conduct of the appellant in the second charge was ‘sustained and patently violent’. It occurred not only in a residence but in a public area (see [22]). Finally, the appellant had a significant criminal history (see [23]).
AJS v KLB v Anor [2016] QDC 103 (13 May 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk of future domestic violence’ – ‘Whether a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence’
Appeal Type: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The female respondent and the male appellant began a relationship in March 2014. The appellant gave her a false name, ‘Cray’, and other false details about his life. The respondent ended the relationship on 31 December 2014. From January to May 2015, the respondent received a series of text messages from the appellant. While at first these messages were consistent with someone trying to salvage the relationship, they became increasingly aggressive and abusive. Some included sexually explicit references.
The respondent contacted police in February 2015. The police made contact with the appellant. The appellant asserted that he was not ‘Cray’ and, in a series of phone calls, threatened the police and the respondent with legal action. He then sent the respondent a nine page threatening and intimidating letter. A temporary protection order was made in favour of the respondent. The appellant then instructed his solicitors to write a letter seeking the proceedings to be discontinued. This letter denied that he ever knew the respondent.
On 20 November 2015, the court made a protection order in favour of the respondent against the appellant. The magistrate noted in his findings that the respondent was clearly upset and frightened in court. She had difficulty giving evidence and, even when removed to the vulnerable witness room, she covered her face from the camera. The appellant, on the other hand, appeared confident and in control.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that there was no or no sufficient evidence to support the finding that His Honour was satisfied that an order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Harrison DCJ had regard to the decision of Morzone DCJ in MDE v MLG & Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service where he asserted that the question of whether ‘the protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence’ in s 37(1)(c) of [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] (‘the Act’) requires a three-stage process supported by proper evidentiary basis. As per Morzone DCJ at [55]:
•
‘Firstly, the court must assess the risk of future domestic violence between the parties in the absence of any order:
(a)
‘There must evidence to make factual findings or draw inferences of the nature of, and prospect that domestic violence may occur in the future. This will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. Relevant considerations may include evidence of past domestic violence and conduct, genuine remorse, rehabilitation, medical treatment, physiological counselling, compliance with any voluntary temporary orders (s 37(2)(b)), and changes of circumstances.
(b)
‘Unlike, its predecessor provision under the now superseded legislation, the court does not need to be satisfied that future domestic violence is ‘likely’. However, there must be more than a mere possibility or speculation of the prospect of domestic violence’.
•
‘Secondly, the court must assess the need to protect the aggrieved from that domestic violence in the absence of any order. Relevant considerations may include evidence of the parties’ future personal and familial relationships, their places or residence and work, the size of the community in which they reside and the opportunities for direct and indirect contact and future communication, for example, in relation to children’.
•
‘Thirdly, the court must then consider whether imposing a protection order is “necessary or desirable” to protect the aggrieved from the domestic violence. In this regard, pursuant to s 37(2)(a), the court must consider the principles in s 4(1)’.
Harrison DCJ held that although the magistrate did not refer specifically to each of the three stages of the three-stage process described in MDE, the magistrate did not err in finding that it was desirable to make the necessary protection order for the protection of respondent from domestic violence:
1.
There was sufficient evidence to make the finding that there was a risk of future domestic violence in the absence of any order. Here, the magistrate had regard particular regard to the two letters from the appellant. These did not show any remorse or rehabilitation and the mere fact that the appellant had not contacted the respondent since he was caught on 9 June 2015 did not advance the issue of rehabilitation any further. Additionally, it was particularly relevant that the appellant tried to lie his way out of the temporary protection order. These considerations ‘took the matter much further than the mere possibility or speculation of the prospect of domestic violence’ (see [85]-[87]).
2.
The magistrate had regard to the impact of the appellant’s behaviour on the respondent, and the fact that they both lived and worked in the Atherton Tablelands (a relatively small community where there would be real opportunities for direct and indirect contact in the future). This evidence was clearly sufficient to satisfy the second stage in MDE (see [88]).
3.
In relation to the third stage, a number of matters in s 4(1) of the Act were relevant namely, the safety, protection and wellbeing of the respondent; the need to treat her with respect and to ensure minimal disruption to her life; holding the appellant responsible for his domestic violence and the impact it had on the respondent; and the respondent was vulnerable as under paragraph (d), as was demonstrated with her difficulties in giving evidence (see [89]-[90]).
DMK v CAG [2016] QDC 106 (15 April 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Definition of domestic violence’ – ‘Desirability of protection order’ – ‘Domestic violence protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidentiary standard of proof’ – ‘Relevant relationship’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vexatious or frivolous’
Appeal type: Appeal against domestic violence protection order
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a de-facto relationship for almost 10 years and had children together. After separating, the respondent became the children’s primary caregiver. The appellant assisted her in looking after the children and they continued in a parenting relationship. A domestic violence protection order was made against the appellant to protect the respondent in the Magistrates Court. The magistrate had regard to three court orders existing between the parties in making this order. These were a Family Court order, a protection order made against the respondent naming the appellant as aggrieved, and a temporary protection order with the respondent as the aggrieved.
Prior to the making of the domestic violence protection order, the appellant made a complaint to police that his daughter was ‘sexting’. A few weeks later, he made another complaint that the respondent texted him in contravention of the protection order naming him as the aggrieved. However, after investigations the police determined both these complaints were unfounded. The appellant then allegedly threatened to kill their children, the respondent, her new partner and his children. The appellant than made a further complaint that the respondent’s new partner had unregistered firearms. After searching his home, the police did not find any of the alleged firearms. Several months later the appellant complained that the respondent kidnapped his 17-year-old daughter. This complaint was also unfounded. Finally, the appellant allegedly threatened the children that the respondent would be sent to gaol.
The magistrate was satisfied that a protection order was desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence. He accepted that the appellant’s conduct in making complaints to police caused the respondent to live in constant fear of the appellant. In particular, she feared that the appellant would act on his threats to kill her and her family. The magistrate considered that this amounted to domestic violence for the purposes of s 8 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act).
Issues: Some grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether magistrate erred in finding the appellant’s conduct in making complaints to the police was ‘domestic violence’ within the meaning of the Act.
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to exercise his discretion reasonably by not finding that the prosecution case was frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process.
3.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to exercise his discretion reasonably by making the protection order.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed and the protection order was affirmed.
As a preliminary issue, Morzone QC DCJ denied the appellant’s request for a de novo rehearing as of right ([12]-[23]). Further, His Honour rejected the submission that the evidentiary standard of proof under the Act is higher than on the balance of probabilities ([24]-[27]- discussing Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34).
1.
The magistrate did not err in finding the conduct amounted to domestic violence under the Act. The appellant’s complaints to police were ‘over-reaching, baseless or made for a collateral purpose’ ([44]). They were not made for the purpose of protecting the children as submitted by the appellant, but rather to harass the respondent. This, together with the appellant’s threats to the children, impacted the respondent and caused her to live in substantial fear for her own safety and the safety of her children, her partner and his children. The complaints to police were harassing and intimating to amount to emotional and psychological abuse. They were also threatening and controlling or dominating to cause fear to the respondent’s safety. Therefore, the behaviour fell within the definition of domestic violence under ss 8(1)(b),(d) and (f) of the Act.
In finding that the complaints amounted to domestic violence, the magistrate accepted the uncontested facts and rejected the appellant’s evidence where it conflicted with other witnesses. There were no identifiable incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony to demonstrate the magistrate erred in making these conclusions about the evidence.
2.
The proceeding in making the protection order was not frivolous or vexatious: ‘It could not be characterised as being of little or no weight, worth or importance, and thereby frivolous. It is not usual for proceedings of this nature to trouble, annoy, or distress one of both parties. That may be natural consequence of the proper conduct of proceedings in the context of highly emotional family breakdown and litigation. There is no evidence of vexatious conduct in this case’ ([7]). Nor was the proceeding an abuse of process. The proceeding was commenced and maintained by the prosecution for the ‘substantial and legitimate purpose of obtaining the appropriate remedy under the Act’ ([10]).
3.
The magistrate did not err in concluding that a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence under s 37(1)(c) of the Act. The respondent was fearful of future domestic violence from the appellant. Therefore, the order was desirable. In coming to this conclusion, the magistrate considered and assessed that there was a risk of future domestic violence if an order was not made. The appellant and respondent remained in a dispute before the Family Court, were in contact frequently in relation to their children, and the appellant showed no remorse for his conduct. There was no requirement that the magistrate was satisfied that future domestic violence was ‘likely’. The magistrate also assessed that the appellant’s behaviour in the ongoing parental relationship was inappropriate and that he was misconceived about his ‘responsibility, entitlement and nobility, which manifested in an absence of insight into the consequences of his actions’ ([16]). These findings were open on the facts. Therefore, the magistrate exercised his discretion properly and reasonably in making the protection order against the appellant.
BJH v CJH [2016] QDC 27 (26 February 2016) – Queensland District Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Meaning of domestic violence s 8’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Whether it was necessary or desirable to make an order to protect the aggrieved’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a Protection Order.
Facts: The appellant appealed against a magistrate’s decision to make a Protection Order requiring him to be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved (his partner) and her son. The order was made after a disagreement over the family meal. The appellant took the aggrieved’s mobile phone in an attempt to get her to go downstairs to discuss matters with him. The aggrieved tried to get the phone back and the appellant discarded it onto the floor, causing minor but irreparable damage to its cover. At some point, the back of the appellant’s hand came into contact with the aggrieved’s ear, causing relatively low level pain and no injury to the aggrieved. The appellant and the aggrieved continued arguing loudly until the police arrived (see [9]).
The magistrate made the following findings of domestic violence (see [10]):
•
The appellant took the aggrieved’s phone in an attempt to force her downstairs. He threw the phone to the ground in response to the aggrieved’s attempts to retrieve the phone.
•
The appellant slapped the aggrieved in a backhanded motion to the head on purpose.
•
There was constant harassment by the appellant towards the aggrieved that night that was intimidating (causing her to retreat from him). This intimidation and harassment amounted to an act of domestic violence when considered with the yelling and the banging of plates (emotional and psychological abuse).
Issue/s: Whether the magistrate erred in making a protection order under s 37 [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)], specifically:
1.
Whether the magistrate erred in finding that domestic violence had been committed against the aggrieved: s 37(1)(b).
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in finding that it was necessary or desirable to make the order to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence: s 37(1)(c).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Rackemann DCJ held that it was open to the magistrate to conclude that there was at least some domestic violence committed by the appellant against the aggrieved. His Honour agreed that the following behaviour amounted to domestic violence under s 8 [of Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)]:
‘The action of the appellant in seizing the aggrieved’s mobile telephone was behaviour which, in the circumstances, was coercive - being designed to compel the aggrieved to do something which she did not wish to do (ie come downstairs to discuss matters of concern to the appellant). Further, the appellant responded to the aggrieved’s attempt to get her telephone back by, amongst other things, throwing the phone onto the floor thereby damaging it. That the phone was discarded in a throwing motion had support in the evidence’ at [11].
However, beyond that, the magistrate erred in her findings of domestic violence. In light of the evidence (see consideration at [14]-[29]), the magistrate’s finding of an ‘intentional back-handed slap’ could not be supported. Further, the magistrate erred in characterising the appellant’s behaviour as emotionally or psychologically abusive – behaviour that, amongst other things, intimidates (a process where the person is made fearful or overawed, particularly with a view to influencing that person’s conduct or behaviour) or harasses (there must be an element of persistence): GKE v EUT. A consideration of the evidence could not support this conclusion (see [30]-[46]).
The finding of more extensive domestic violence on the night in question than what occurred further affected the magistrate’s consideration of whether an order was necessary or desirable. In reconsidering whether an order was necessary or desirable, Rackemann DCJ again noted the decision in GKE v EUT where McGill SC DCJ observed in relation to s 37(1)(c) [Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)] that:
‘I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made, and then consider whether in view of that the making of an order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved … I also agree that there must be a proper evidentiary basis for concluding that there is such a risk, and the matter does not depend simply upon the mere possibility of such a thing occurring in the future, or the mere fact that the applicant for the order is concerned that such a thing may happen in the future’ (see [32]-[33]).
Here, the risk was not such to conclude that the making of a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable’ on the facts as established at the time of the hearing before the magistrate in February 2015. This was in circumstances where: there was no demonstrated history of domestic violence prior to the night in question; the event was a single incident involving domestic violence which, whilst in no way acceptable, was not at the most serious end of the scale of such conduct; the aggrieved gave evidence that she was not fearful of the appellant and did not believe that she needed protection from him; and, at the time of the hearing before the magistrate, the appellant and the aggrieved had continued their relationship without suggestion of further incident (see [49]-[50]).
Commissioner of Police v DGM [2016] QDC 022 (15/3279) Kingham DCJ 22 February 2016 – Queensland District Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of temporary protection order’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Verbal abuse’ – ‘Victim’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm, breach of temporary protection order (TPO) (4 counts), breach of bail (7 counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Two weeks before the offending, a TPO was served on the respondent (an Aboriginal man) which named the complainant (his partner), their young son and their unborn child as protected persons. The order prohibited him from being in the vicinity of the complainant apart from authorised contact with their child with the complainant’s consent and required that he be of good behaviour towards the protected persons. The offending occurred when the respondent went to the complainant’s house to visit his son without authorisation. He approached the complainant with a metal pole and verbally abused her. He dropped the pole and walked towards the complainant with a clenched fist. He then punched, struck and kicked her which caused her to fall to the ground. She was taken to hospital and released that night. After fleeing, the respondent returned later that night, came into her yard and asked to talk to her. Police found him sitting in a car with a machete at his feet. His criminal history included property, street and driving offences, as well as a history of breaching community based orders. He had a serious drug addiction. He pleaded guilty early and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for assault occasioning bodily harm. Concurrent lesser terms for the other offences were imposed. The offending also wholly activated an existing suspended sentence. He was released on parole immediately.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Her Honour held that the Magistrate erred in taking considering the respondent’s eventual surrender to police as a mitigating factor. While the surrender was voluntary, it had to be considered in the context of numerous bail breaches leading up to sentence, which was consistent with his history of disregard for court orders. In relation to the complainant’s apparent wish to continue the relationship with the respondent, her Honour noted at [34]-[35] that – ‘Courts in Queensland and in other states of Australia, have recognised the need to approach submissions about reconciliation with real caution, because of the particular features of domestic and family violence. The fact that a victim is a reluctant complainant is not a mitigating factor. Likewise, reconciliation after the victim has complained ought not mitigate the sentence. There may be cases in which reconciliation is relevant to an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. However, that comes from the offender’s conduct, not the victim’s forgiveness. The nature of the relationship means victims may, contrary to their own welfare, forgive their attacker. That does not reduce the risk posed by the offender and, depending on the dynamics in a particular relationship, it could well exacerbate the risk. Necessarily, prospects of rehabilitation must be assessed by reference to the offender’s attitude and conduct, not the victim’s.’
In this case, the Magistrate correctly did not treat the complainant’s support as a mitigating factor. However, the Magistrate did err by immediately releasing the respondent to encourage his rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is an important consideration for young indigenous people with drug addictions. However, given the seriousness of the offence and the vulnerability of the victim, the need for denunciation and deterrence outweighed the need for rehabilitation. In citing comparable authorities, (see from [45]-[62]), her Honour then concluded that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was re-sentenced for assault occasioning bodily harm to 18 months’ imprisonment, with parole release set at the one third mark in the sentence. A conviction for a domestic violence offence was recorded.
Green v Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 341 (27 November 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Contravention of a domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Prior history of contravention of domestic violence orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Too much emphasis on prior criminal history’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Contravention of a domestic violence order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was 24. He had a criminal history, including nine previous convictions for contravention of domestic violence orders. The appellant was hospitalised when his female partner, the aggrieved, stabbed him in the leg and foot with a knife during an argument. A temporary protection order was made prohibiting the appellant from contacting the aggrieved. The stabbing incident was not the subject of any charge. Over the next two days, the appellant contacted the aggrieved on her mobile phone 60 times. These calls did not involve any threats or actual violence. The appellant was on parole for a sentence imposed at an earlier time. The appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment, which was to be served cumulatively upon the 15 month prior sentence.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in two significant respects which resulted in an excessive sentence:
1.
The magistrate placed too much emphasis on the appellant’s criminal history for like offending and imposed a sentence which was disproportionate to the gravity of the instant offence; and
2.
In imposing a cumulative term, the magistrate failed to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the total sentence imposed was just and appropriate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, Morzone QC DCJ noted that the surrounding circumstances, the appellant’s criminal history and the stabbing incident, were properly provided by the prosecution by way of context for the subject offending. However, His Honour continued at [17]:
‘[t]he danger was that that context could potentially take on an overwhelming character with the prospect of elevating the nature of the offending the subject of the sentence. It seems to me that that danger was realised and can be demonstrated by the sentencing remarks of the magistrate where she conflated the past criminal history, other intervening behaviour and the subject offending’.
Here, the criminal history and the conduct that constituted it were not as proximate to the subject offending as apprehended by the magistrate. Evidence of the stabbing was accepted in the context that the police did not press charges against the aggrieved but the magistrate determined that the aggrieved was acting in self-defence. Further, there was little or no regard given to any particular findings of fact surrounding the subject offending, namely, the 60 occasions of telephone contact. Rather, this was relegated to almost incident behaviour. Thus, Morzone QC DCJ held that ‘[b]y conflating the historical criminal behaviour and other violent behaviour with the subject offending, it seems to me that Her Honour mistook the facts and allowed erroneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect her exercise of discretion’ (see [18]-[21]).
Second, Morzone QC DCJ held that at [30]:
‘the magistrate acted on a wrong principle by characterising the pre-existing sentence to a “different issue altogether” because the appellant breached his parole by reoffending. She apparently had no regard to the “period of imprisonment” required by section 160F of the [Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld)]… and the extension of the totality principle … It seems to me that her approach caused her to fall into error by failing to take into account material considerations of the whole period of imprisonment (including the balance of the previous sentence), reviewing the aggregate sentences and considering whether the latter was just and appropriate’.
The appellant was re-sentenced to three months imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the existing sentence.
TZL v Commissioner of Police [2015] QDC 171 (3 July 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Minor breach’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted for contravening a domestic violence order and sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. The order prohibited the appellant from contacting the aggrieved apart from matters in relation to their child. He breached this condition by 41 sending emails over an 11 week period, the content of some of which were not solely in relation to their child. He was released on parole on the day of sentence. The appellant had an ‘appalling’ (see at [21]) history of breaching protection orders – consisting of 10 total convictions of which 8 related to the aggrieved. In fact, he was on probation for these offences when this offence was committed.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Kingham DCJ acknowledged at [17] that this was an ‘unusual’ sentence. There was no physical violence, actual or threatened. There was no intimidation or any harassing or controlling behaviour. While there were 41 emails, they were sent over an 11 week period and not all of them breached the order as some were related solely to the child. There was also one very minor personal contact at a child care centre. Kingham DCJ found these facts in combination do not warrant a sentence of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, the appellant’s clear ‘disdain’ ([21]) for protection orders as evidenced by his criminal history warranted a strong element of personal deterrence in the sentence. However, her Honour emphasised that the purpose of the sentence was not to punish the appellant again for prior offending, and that the Magistrate, ‘gave the Appellant’s prior history such weight that it led to the imposition of a penalty which was disproportionate to the gravity of this offending’ (See at [22]). As such, the Court concluded (while also taking into account comparable authorities) that the sentence was excessive. It was reduced to 6 months. The immediate parole release was not changed.
MDE v MLG & Queensland Police Service [2015] QDC 151 (2 June 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Necessary or desirable test’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Three stage approach’
Appeal type: appeal against a protection order.
Facts: On 17 October 2014, a police officer made an application for a protection order against the appellant (MDE) for the benefit of the first respondent (MLG) under the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (DFVPA). MDE had been continually harassing MLG over the phone and outside her apartment (see [1]-[6]). On 23 October 2013, a temporary protection order was issued with the standard condition (under s56 DFVPA) that “the respondent be of good behaviour towards the aggrieved and not commit domestic violence against the aggrieved.” Three months later, on 21 January 2015, the Magistrate heard the application and decided to issue a protection order against MDE having been satisfied the requirements under s 37 of DFVPA could be established. The order incorporated the standard condition under s 56 and other conditions under s 57 of the DFVPA ([13]).
Issues: The appellant appealed against the Magistrate’s decision on six grounds, of which the first three questioned the correctness of the Magistrate’s application of s 37 of the DFVPA and the last three concerned procedural and fact-finding errors on the Magistrate’s part (see [18]). Relevantly, the first ground of appeal was that the Magistrate failed to follow, as required, the decision in GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 at [33] which provides that a future ‘risk’ of violence must be considered and, if absent, a protection order should not be issued (see [64]).
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the protection order was therefore set aside.
The second and third grounds of the appeal (see [69] and [56] respectively), along with the fourth, fifth and sixth grounds (see [73]-[79]), were rejected by Morzone QC DCJ (see [72] and [63] respectively). The first, however, was allowed.
Morzone QC DCJ found that the Magistrate relied on erroneous or irrelevant matters and principles in their determination of whether the order was “necessary or desirable” ([68]). Specifically, his Honour highlighted at para [65]-[66] that the Magistrate’s reasons confused the requirements set by s 37(1)(a) and s 37(1)(c). His Honour further noted that the Magistrate failed to expressly examine the material considerations relevant to s 37(1)(c) and (2) ([67]). These included the nature and risk of future domestic violence, the protective needs of the aggrieved (if any), and, if a need was found, how imposing a protection order would be “necessary or desirable” to meet those needs ([67]).
The Magistrate’s decision was therefore considered unreasonable by Morzone QC DCJ. This prompted his Honour to re-examine the third element posed by s 37(1)(c), that is, whether a protection order is necessary or desirable to protect the aggrieved from domestic violence ([84]).
Importantly, earlier in his judgement, Morzone QC DCJ expressed the view that the third element of s 37(1) requires a three-stage process supported by a proper evidentiary basis (adduced pursuant to s 145 of the DFVPA) (see [55]). In short, the three steps involve (1) assessing the risk of future domestic violence between the parties in the absence of any order, (2) the need to protect the aggrieved from that domestic violence in the absence of any order, and (3) whether imposing an order is “necessary or desirable” to protect the aggrieved from the domestic violence (see [55]).
Upon analysis of the evidence in para [85]-[89], Morzone QC DCJ reached the conclusion that the first and second stage cannot be established, meaning the imposition of a protection order was neither necessary nor desirable to protect MLG from the domestic violence and therefore, the protection order ought not remain in force.
SM v AA [2015] QDC 172 (29 May 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Ex parte application’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Appeal Type: Application for an extension of time in which to file an appeal against the variation of a domestic violence order.
Facts: The appellant (the respondent in a domestic violence order) failed to appear at the Magistrates’ Court for an application to extend the order. The Magistrate noted appellant’s absence. The Court proceeded to ‘hear and decide the application’ pursuant to section 94 of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld).
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate correctly heard and decided the matter.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Judge Reid considered the remarks of the Magistrate. The remarks did not consider the reasons put before the Court by the applicant as to why the domestic violence order should be extended. These reasons included allegations of physical and verbal abuse and multiple breaches of the order. Instead, the Magistrate simply made the order and considered whether the order should be extended for 18 months or for two years. Judge Reid was concerned that the Magistrate dealt with the matter, ‘merely as a rubber stamp exercise’. There was nothing in the Magistrate’s remarks to indicate that she had read the material to ascertain whether or not the breaches of the order actually occurred. There was little or no particularity in the allegations, specifically about when or where the breaches occurred. In circumstances where parties do not attend, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to ‘hear and decide’ the matter, even if it is entirely upon affidavit evidence. The transcript did not indicate that the Magistrate considered the question at all. As such, the order was set aside.
LKL v BSL [2015] QDC 337 (15 May 2015) – Queensland District Court
‘Affidavit evidence’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Appeal Type: Appeal from dismissal of application for protection order.
Facts: The appellant appeared unrepresented in the Magistrates’ Court and filed for a protection order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld). She was initially granted a temporary protection order in the Magistrates’ Court. The Magistrate then made directions to the effect that the evidence of all witnesses in support of the application was to be filed as affidavit evidence. No such affidavit evidence was provided. The appellant believed that the application itself, without further affidavit evidence was sufficient. The application for the protection order was then refused, with the Magistrate concluding that there was no material before the Court (see further at [7]-[9]).
Issue/s: Whether the aggrieved in a protection order application can rely solely on the application without further affidavit evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld) makes clear that the formal rules of evidence do not apply and gives the Court broad powers to ‘inform itself in any way it considers appropriate’ (see s 145). However, the court obviously still has an obligation of procedural fairness. Dick SC DCJ explained that in hearing and determining an application for a protection order, ‘there still must be evidence in the sense of there being some material put before the Court which provides a rational basis for the determination and it must be put before the Court in a way which gives the opposite party the opportunity to challenge that evidence and put the opposite party’s case in relation to the matter’ (See at [11]). The Magistrate’s directions did not exclude the appellant’s sworn application as evidence. Therefore, the Magistrate’s conclusion that there was no material before the Court was an error of law. The Magistrate did not consider and determine the application. As such, it is clear that an aggrieved person can rely solely on the application as evidence without the need for further affidavit evidence. The respondent can then respond to the application if they choose. The application was remitted back to the Magistrates’ Court for determination by a different magistrate.
GKE v EUT [2014] QDC 248 (27 August 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Necessary or desirable’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the making of a domestic violence order.
Facts: A domestic violence order was made in the Magistrates’ Court against the appellant in favour of the respondent. There had already been orders made in the Family Court in relation to arrangements for their three children. The appellant filed for enforcement of these orders in the Family Court. He attended the respondent’s home for the purpose of serving court documents. When the respondent opened the door, she closed it immediately because she felt frightened. This incident and other prior incidents led to the application for the order.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the appellant’s commencement of proceedings in the Family Court and the personal service of documents on the respondent constituted intimidation or harassment sufficient to meet the definition of emotional or psychological abuse and therefore domestic violence within the meaning of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act).
2.
Whether a protection order was necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence.
3.
Whether costs should be awarded against the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
McGill DCJ upheld the Magistrate’s finding that the incident at the respondent’s home constituted domestic violence. His Honour considered the definition of ‘emotional and psychological abuse’ in s 11 of the Act. He noted that the issue is whether the behaviour is subjectively intimidating or harassing to the other person. Therefore, evidence of the subjective response of the aggrieved is relevant (see at [21]). His Honour noted at [22] that while examples in the Act refer to persistent conduct, intimidation within the meaning of s 11 could arise from a single incident. However, harassment cannot arise from a single incident. His Honour stated that there has to be ‘some element of persistence’ such that, ‘It is not just a question of whether the aggrieved finds something upsetting’ (see at [23]). As such, while the incident at the house amounted to domestic violence, the Family Court application itself was not an example of domestic violence –
‘I suspect it would be possible for the making of repeated applications to the Family Court without justification to amount to “harassment”, though it would have to be a clear case; it would certainly not be harassment simply because from time to time the respondent denied the appellant access to the children and he made an application to the Family Court to obtain it’ (see at [20]). The mere fact the appellant takes steps to enforce Family Court orders does not and cannot constitute domestic violence. Conversely, the respondent unjustifiably withholding the children cannot justify domestic violence by the appellant.
2.
McGill DCJ noted that this question is concerned with the future. Another relevant consideration was that while the respondent did not want to see the appellant at all, the terms of the Family Court order and the presence of the children dictated that there had to be some continuing contact between the parties.
See at [32] – ‘In my opinion the focus must be on the issue of protecting the aggrieved from future domestic violence, the extent to which on the evidence there is a prospect of such a thing in the future, and of what nature, and whether it can properly be said in the light of that evidence that is necessary or desirable to make an order in order to protect the aggrieved from that…I agree with the Magistrate that it is necessary to assess the risk of domestic violence in the future towards the aggrieved if no order is made….’
The evidentiary basis for this risk must amount to more than the mere possibility of such conduct occurring (See at [33]). It is also relevant to consider the seriousness of the violence that is threatened, the credibility of the threat and the practical consequences of the order on the person against whom the order is made. For example, a no contact order ought not be made where some contact is necessary in relation to children (see at [42]-[43]). In applying these principles, his Honour found that it was not necessary or desirable to make an order. His Honour noted that while it was possible that circumstances could arise which amount to intimidation, the issues relating to the children remain in the Family Court. It would not be appropriate to make a protection order to interfere with the appellant’s right to enforce his rights in that jurisdiction. There was no real risk of domestic violence as long as the respondent complied with the Family Court orders (see at [67]).
3.
Costs were not ordered in favour of the appellant. Section 157 of the Act provides that each party must bear their own costs unless the court decides that their application was malicious, deliberately false, frivolous or vexatious. It is not clear whether this section applies to an appeal. However, his Honour concluded that while the general power to award costs under s 15 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 has not been expressly excluded by the Act, that power should be exercised having regard to the specific costs provision in s 157. Therefore, it is not simply a matter that costs follow the event for this type of proceeding. In any case, an adverse costs order against the respondent was not appropriate.
TND v Queensland Police Service [2014] QDC 154 (18 July 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breach of domestic violence order, assault of a police officer.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the aggrieved were drinking, then returned home (in the Normanton district). Following a dispute, the appellant became agitated and punched the aggrieved, causing a minor injury. After police were called, officers were forced to use capsicum spray to subdue the appellant. He continued to threaten violence after his arrest. He had a long criminal history including many property and drug offences. He had one prior conviction for breaching a domestic violence order, for which he was fined $100. He submitted this matter was not one of ‘significant gravity’ (See at [9]). The appellant submitted in the Magistrates’ Court that the relationship was not one characterised by violence. Following pleading guilty, he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with immediate parole release for the breach offence. He was sentenced to one month imprisonment wholly suspended for an operational period of nine months for the assault offence. In his sentencing remarks, the Magistrate referred to crime statistics and noted the prevalence of breaches of domestic violence orders and offences against police in the Normanton district, which necessitated a strong element of general deterrence in sentencing.
Issue: Whether the sentence for the breach offence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court acknowledged that the Magistrate did err by not properly indicating how he took into account of the plea of guilty, and by using the statistics, which were found to not be reliable. Mitigating factors included the appellant’s youth and his early plea of guilty. The relationship was long-term and was not characterised by actual violence. His criminal history, while relevant, was minor. However, at [35] Bradley DCJ emphasised that domestic violence involving psychical violence is a serious issue and the appellant did cause some injury to the aggrieved. He had been recently convicted of breaching a protection order and general and specific deterrence were important. He was subject to various court orders when he committed the offence. The maximum penalty was three years. As such, the sentence was held to be appropriate.
R v MKW [2014] QDC 300 (18 June 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Concurrent criminal proceeding’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Permanent stay of proceedings’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm.
Proceeding: Application for a permanent stay of proceedings.
Facts: An indictment before the District Court charged the applicant with grievous bodily harm. The incident involved the applicant drinking alcohol in a group which included the complainant (his de facto partner). An argument ensued. The applicant struck the complainant with a collapsible chair. He was charged with breaching a domestic violence order, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole release after four months. The police then obtained a medical report indicating that the complainant’s injuries, if left untreated were likely to have caused ‘disfigurement or loss of vision’ and could have proved life threatening (see at [3]). As a result, he was then charged with grievous bodily harm (GBH) three days after being released from custody.
Issue/s: Whether the continued prosecution of the GBH charge would constitute an abuse of process under s 16 of the Queensland Criminal Code because the applicant had already been punished for the same act.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed. O’Brien DCJA considered the test as applied in R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014). His Honour concluded at [9] that the applicant was punished in the Magistrates’ Court for the act of striking the complainant with the chair and that it was this same act which formed the basis of the GBH charge. Ordinarily, to punish the defendant again for that same act would contravene s 16 of the Code. However, the Crown submitted that s 138 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (the Act) operates to authorise the continued prosecution of the GBH charge. The Court accepted this argument. The crucial issue was whether the original prosecution for the breach offence against the Act constituted a ‘proceeding’ under that act. If it did, s 138(3)(a) would apply so that the prosecution for the breach offence would not affect any other proceeding against the applicant arising out of the same conduct. His Honour concluded that the prosecution for the breach offence was a proceeding under the Act (see at [15]). As such, R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (where a permanent stay was granted) was distinguished on the basis that the Act specifically authorises continuation of the prosecution. However, this issue has not been authoritatively resolved and uncertainty remains. See at [17] where his Honour states –
‘I should add that, if my tentative view of s 138(4) of the legislation is correct and if the applicant were to be convicted of the indictable offence, then the question remains as to whether s 16 of the Code prohibits him being further punished for that offence. At the very least, I would consider that ordinary and well-established sentencing principles would require that regard be had to the penalty imposed in the Magistrates Court for the breaching offence.’
See pages 111-113 of the Queensland Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act (2012) Bench Book and the summary of R v Dibble; ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 8 (11 February 2014) for further information.
CPS v CNJ [2014] QDC 47 (21 March 2014) – Queensland District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Establish relationship with victim's former partner’ – ‘Harassing’ – ‘Meaning of domestic violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Protection order necessary or desirable’ – ‘S 8(1) of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld)’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Appeal against the making of a protection order.
Ground: The magistrate erred in making a protection order pursuant to the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (‘DFVPA’).
Facts: The appellant male and respondent female had been in a relationship from May until late September or early October 2021. The magistrate hearing the original application found that both parties lived as though in ‘a soap opera’, behaving in puerile, immature and childish ways. The conduct of the appellant was identified as ‘repeated early contact amounting to harassment’. Further, complaints about property amounted to harassment. After the relationship between the respondent and appellant came to an end, the appellant sought out the respondent’s ex-partner and struck up a relationship with him.
Decision and Reasoning: The continuous contact with the respondent following the end of the relationship, as well as the contact with the respondent’s ex-partner, were found to be capable of constituting domestic violence. The appellant’s conduct was capable of falling into one or more of the categories enumerated in s 8(1) of the DFVPA, namely, behaviour that is “emotionally or psychologically abusive” and/or “is threatening” and/or “coercive” or “in any other way controls or dominates the second person and causes the second person to fear for the second person’s safety or wellbeing of that of someone else”.
However, the court was not persuaded, on balance, that the actions of the appellant in seeking out and striking up a relationship with the respondent’s ex-partner was sufficient to persuade the magistrate that a protection order was ‘necessary or desirable to protect the respondent from domestic violence’ in future. Therefore, it was found that the domestic violence order should not have been made.
W v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 87 (2 May 2013) – Queensland District Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of dangerous drug’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, breach of domestic violence order, possession of dangerous drug.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following an argument with the complainant, the appellant followed her, grabbed her by the harms and threatened her. She broke free, but was punched by the appellant in the right side of the jaw, causing her to bleed profusely. He was highly intoxicated. That constituted the assault offence. He was found to be in possession of cannabis at the time. The breach involved the same complainant. That offence occurred when she was heavily pregnant. The appellant demanded she have sex with him and she refused. He threw her phone at her and punched a door. He was intoxicated. He had a criminal history consisting of various street offences, one conviction for assault occasioning bodily harm and one conviction for breaching a domestic violence order. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for the breach charge and nine months’ imprisonment for the assault charge, and fined $400 for the drug charge.
Issue/s: Whether the penalty was too severe. More specifically, there were issues concerning –
1.
Whether the Magistrate misapplied Earl v Heron [2011] QDC 183.
2.
Whether the Magistrate gave excessive weight to the appellant’s criminal history and the need for specific deterrence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
In relation to Earl v Heron, the appellant submitted inter alia that - in that case the offender committed a random act of violence on a stranger. This case concerned violence during a heated domestic argument between long term spouses, which makes this cases less serious. This argument was dismissed – with Smith DCJ concluding at [44] – ‘I do not accept the submission that an act of violence during a heated domestic argument between spouses is necessarily less serious than a random act of gratuitous violence on a stranger. It all depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.’ His Honour went on to make clear that the courts cannot condone either type of violence.
2.
In relation to the appellant’s criminal history, the Court concluded that the Magistrate was entitled to take into account the relevant prior convictions, and was also entitled to consider the injuries caused (a broken jaw), which were ‘reasonably significant’ (See at [50]). This made it an offence not at the low end of the scale.
MAA v SAG [2013] QDC 31 (28 February 2013) – Queensland District Court
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Following, harassing, and monitoring’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Use of authorities’
Proceedings: Appeal against protection order.
Facts: The appellant and the aggrieved were in a domestic relationship from 2007 to 2009 [6]. The appellant sent the aggrieved abusive and derogatory text messages and disturbed the aggrieved’s place of residence, which prompted her to change the locks. The aggrieved accused him of shoving and pushing her when she was pregnant with one of their children in 2008.
The appellant made numerous baseless complaints to a range of governmental bodies to intimidate the aggrieved, including:
1.
the Queensland Ombudsman.
2.
the Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland.
3.
the Registry of Births, Deaths, and Marriages, regarding the registering of their daughter’s name, with the result that this was not registered until the Family Court made an order in relation to her name.
4.
Centrelink, which lead to an investigation of the aggrieved’s parenting payments.
5.
the Commission for Children and Young People.
6.
the Child Guardian.
7.
Queensland Health.
8.
The Health Quality and Complaints Commission.
9.
The Medical Board, against the children’s medical practitioner.
10.
Legal Services Commission, against her legal representatives.
11.
The Family Court where a notice of Child Abuse and subsequent investigation concerning the aggrieved’s three daughters.
12.
Complaints of abuse and her parenting that lead to a police investigation and welfare checks; and
13.
The initiation of two unwarranted and dismissed court proceedings by the appellant against the aggrieved
Grounds of Appeal: The Magistrate erred in finding that the appellant committed an act of domestic violence against the aggrieved and that the appellant is likely to commit an act of domestic violence again or is likely to carry out a threat to commit an act of domestic violence [24].
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
It was open to the Magistrate to reject the appellant’s evidence that he committed the acts of complaining to numerous bodies for bona fide reasons [36]. The appellant’s numerous complaints to governmental bodies were unjustified and an abuse of process and were made to and had the effect of harassing and intimidating the aggrieved [38]. That the aggrieved’s children were subject to repeated investigation was further evidence of the harassment caused by the appellant.
The appellant's intimidation and harassment, on the evidence, amounted to acts of domestic violence and there was proper basis that the appellant would likely commit a further act of domestic violence. The aggrieved’s daughters also required protection.
Singh v Queensland Police Service [2013] QDC 37 (20 February 2013) – Queensland District Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of bail condition’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence order (2 counts), breach of bail condition.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court to two counts of breaching a domestic violence order. The order prevented him from directly or indirectly contacting the aggrieved. The parties had been in a de facto relationship for five years. The first count involved the appellant standing over the aggrieved, pointing menacingly at her. He was taken into custody and released on bail with a no contact condition. In breach of this condition, he attended her home, yelled insults at her, broke property, head butted an informant and verbally abused her, all in the presence of their children and a witness. The Magistrate acknowledged that the presence of the three young children was a serious aggravating feature. The appellant had a relevant criminal history, including four previous domestic violence convictions committed against the aggrieved. The Prosecutor provided minimal assistance to the Magistrate as to the appropriate sentence. He was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation for each count, to be served concurrently. He was convicted and not further punished for the breach of bail.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was initially dismissed. Robertson DCJ commented that it is ‘regrettable’ (see at [7] & [25]) that the prosecutor did not provide the Magistrate with any assistance as to the appropriate sentence. The Court held that these acts were a ‘nasty and prolonged’ (see at [29]) example of domestic violence against a vulnerable complainant, by an offender who had a long history of violence against the same woman. He had previously shown disregard for court orders, and in this case also showed complete disregard for the bail undertaking. The only mitigating factor was the early plea of guilty. While the sentences were ‘severe’, they were not so severe as to amount to an error by the Magistrate.
(The appeal was then re-opened and upheld due to a procedural issue with taking into account the appellant’s prior convictions following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Miers v Blewett [2013] QCA 23 (22 February 2013). The requisite notice was not given, so the appellant’s prior convictions could not be taken into account. However, the Legislature has now amended s 47 of the Justices Act 1886 to ensure that prior convictions can be taken into account in sentencing whether or not notice has been served.)
LCJ v KGC and Commissioner of Police [2012] QDC 67 (30 March 2012) – Queensland District Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Domestic violence order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a protection order.
Facts: The appellant applied for and was granted a protection order (under the then Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1989 (Qld)). The applicant (the respondent/aggrieved) tendered evidence to the Magistrate that the appellant was physically violent to her on two occasions by grabbing her around the neck. There was also evidence that the appellant threatened to kill her if she went to the police. There was a history of violence in the relationship, which had involved verbal and physical abuse and controlling behaviour since 1992.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied that the appellant committed domestic violence against the aggrieved.
2.
Whether it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied that the appellant was likely to commit further domestic violence against the aggrieved.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the protection order was discharged.
1.
In relation to whether the Magistrate’s conclusion that the appellant committed domestic violence against the applicant was correct, Irwin DCJ concluded that the Magistrate was entitled to prefer the evidence of the applicant’s witnesses over the unsigned statements of the appellant and his witnesses. The statements tendered by the applicant were signed. The appellant’s statements were not. It was also open to the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant had continually harassed and intimidated the applicant.
2.
However, Irwin DCJ concluded that it was not open on the evidence for the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant was likely to commit an act of domestic violence again, or carry out a threat to do so. After the application was made, the applicant stated that the appellant had left the house where they were living, had not returned and there had been minimal contact since a temporary protection order was made. There was no evidence of physical violence and she said she did not feel threatened by him. As such, there was not sufficient evidence to support an inference that domestic violence was likely to occur again. While there were a string of emails that did constitute harassment, the last of these were 12 months before the Magistrate made the protection order. The appellant had also clearly indicated he wished to have no further contact with the applicant.
Magistrates' Court
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
ABC v Assistant Commissioner Maurice Carless [2023] QCAT 85 (8 March 2023) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Discipline finding pursuant to s7.4 of the police service administration act 1990 (qld)’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Police officer offender’ – ‘Protection order’
Proceedings: Police officer’s application for review of the respondent’s decision on a disciplinary finding pursuant to s7.4 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld) and proposed sanction made 14 September 2020.
Issue: Whether the findings of domestic violence were valid, and whether the domestic violence constituted misconduct.
Facts: The first allegation was of acts of domestic violence committed against the applicant’s wife following their separation after the discovery of her affair. The applicant was alleged to have read her texts, private emails and Skype account messages and had consented to the grant of a protection order to his wife.
The final four aspects of contravened conduct were unrelated to domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Domestic violence was made out, and held to be unacceptable conduct from a police officer in a private setting and therefore misconduct.
The Tribunal found that the applicant’s consent to the protection order was not evidence of acts of domestic violence, as no admissions were made in the order and its terms had no suggestion of acts of domestic violence. On the evidence, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant accessed his partner’s texts and emails without her permission but was unable to make the same finding relating to her Skype account.
The Tribunal found that a physical altercation had occurred on one occasion over the phone and that this demonstrated that the applicant’s ex-partner was at least offended by the applicant accessing her private emails and texts. Domestic violence was therefore made out under s 8 of the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (Qld) (includes conduct that is ‘offensive’).
In assessing whether the domestic violence constituted misconduct, the Tribunal considered whether the conduct that met that which the community could reasonably expect of a police officer. The significance of the deeply personal and distressing context of the applicant’s behaviour was noted, the Tribunal stating it made his relatively low-level behaviour explicable to the community. However, it was nonetheless found to be unacceptable conduct from a police officer in a private setting. The Tribunal confirmed the finding made at the disciplinary hearing in relation to the domestic violence matter.
NK v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 270 (30 July 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Working with children negative notice’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to issue the applicant a negative notice.
Facts: The applicant’s ex-partner had been granted a ‘Protection Order for ongoing physical violence and controlling behaviour’ [13]. Within five months, the applicant was convicted of contravening the Order by being with his ex-partner and her two children, one of whom was the applicant’s son [1]. As a result, the applicant was issued with a ‘negative notice’ to work with children preventing the issue of a positive notice blue card. The applicant applied for administrative review of the Department’s decision. As the applicant had not been convicted of a ‘serious offence’, he was entitled to be issued with a positive notice unless his case was ‘exceptional’ [2]. A case is exceptional if it is not in the best interests of children to issue a positive notice.
Decision and reasoning: The Tribunal confirmed the department’s decision that the applicant’s case was exceptional.
The Tribunal assessed the risk in allowing the applicant to work with children, ‘by identifying and weighing protective factors with risk factors’ [3]. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had taken steps to address his issues, as evidenced by his participation in a men’s behavioural change program [9]. However, the applicant was not ‘aware of the psychological and emotional impact of his behaviour on others’ nor able to ‘exercise restraint and self-control… sufficient to work with children’ [28]. The Tribunal noted that applicant’s submissions focused on ‘minimising and not admitting responsibility’ for his actions while failing to demonstrate his ability to identify the triggers for his behaviour or use appropriate coping strategies [10]. Therefore, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had reduced ‘the risk of his susceptibility to [the offending behaviour] in stressful situations’ [20]. The Tribunal noted that the applicant faced recent and serious allegations of ongoing physical violence and controlling behaviour, which included threatening to kill his partner, and subjecting her to physical and verbal abuse in front of children. This behaviour had continued despite the Order, which he had breached within 5 months of its commencement [13]. Therefore, the applicant’s ‘limited insight into the seriousness of his behaviour and its impact on others, together with evidence of ongoing coercive control’ were risk factors that outweighed protective factors and made the applicant an unsuitable candidate for working with children [26].
Applicant SIL v Scheme Manager, Victim Assist Queensland, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 237 (13 July 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Application for financial assistance’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘False police reports’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prior acts of domestic violence’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’ – ‘Visa threats’ – ‘Weapon’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to deny an application for financial assistance.
Facts: The male perpetrator and female victim were married and living together with their infant daughter. The perpetrator was sponsoring the victim, a Taiwanese citizen, for a permanent visa. The victim reported being subjected to ‘ongoing incidents of strangulation, financial, emotional, verbal and social abuse’, and ‘control and coercion’, involving threats of deportation and child removal [21]. In December 2017, the victim reported to police that her husband had attacked her with a knife. However, due to the victim speaking ‘very limited English’ police interviewed the perpetrator only, who stated that he had been attacked by the victim [33]. In February 2019, the victim’s application for financial assistance under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 2009 (Qld) (‘the Act’) was refused [5].
Decision and Reasoning: The original decision was set aside and returned for reconsideration with a direction that the victim was eligible for financial assistance.
Under the Act, a person who is directly injured by an act of violence is eligible for financial assistance [9]. The Tribunal reviewed the evidence of the December 2017 incident and found that it had directly resulted in an injury to the victim [39]. The Tribunal’s finding was based on evidence that the victim had been admitted to hospital with lacerations to her hand, while her husband had not required medical attention [37]. The Tribunal acknowledged that there were ‘discrepancies’ in the account provided by the victim to hospital staff but found that this was due to the language barrier and the victim’s physical state, which included dizziness [31]. The Tribunal accepted the victim’s version of events and noted that she had been ‘denied a voice’ by Queensland Police [33]. In addition, the Tribunal noted that the perpetrator’s position as the victim’s sponsor gave him ‘considerable power’ over the victim, as she was required to be in a relationship with him for 2 years to be eligible for a permanent visa [36].
SF v Department of Education [2021] QCAT 10 (13 January 2021) – Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Applicant and children in hiding to escape domestic violence’ – ‘Application for home education registration’ – ‘Confidentiality provisions’ – ‘Following, harassing monitoring’ – ‘Human rights’ – ‘Non-disclosure of registered address’ – ‘Ongoing risk of harm’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Separation’
Proceedings: Application for external review of the Department’s decision to deny an application for home education registration.
Facts: The applicant and her children had moved in an attempt to escape domestic violence and were forced to hide their location to keep the family safe. The applicant’s former partner had used numerous unlikely resources to locate her. One of the applicant’s children had been diagnosed with conditions affecting their ability to learn, and the applicant applied to the Department of Education to home school the child. Although her application met the requirements for home education, the Department did not grant the application as the applicant did not provide her street number, street name and town name. Where the approved form required details of “residential address” and “address where the home education will be delivered”, the applicant inserted “address suppressed (due to privacy, see attached)” with a town name, a postal address and mobile phone number.
Decision and reasoning: The decision of the Department of Education was set aside and substituted with a decision to grant home education registration for the student.
The Tribunal found that none of the provisions of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld), read together or in isolation, imposed an express obligation on the applicant to disclose her street number, street name and town name (at [9]-[16]). In addition, while the approved form – which was required for the application – asked the applicant to provide details of her “residential address” and “address where the home education will be delivered”, the Tribunal found that the requirements of this will vary according to the individual circumstances of the case, within the context of the overarching objects and guiding principles. Here, the form could not operate “to require SF to disclose these details in circumstances where it compromises her and her family’s safety contrary to those objects and guiding principles” (at [17]-[26]).
The Department made a number of submissions, including that the confidentiality provisions of the Act and its own internal policies were sufficient to ameliorate the risk of unauthorised disclosure. However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that these were sufficient to ameliorate the risk, based on the applicant’s evidence and submissions regarding the circumstances of her and her children (at [29]). As at [30]-[31]:
“The risk for SF is that the confidentiality provisions and policies repose a discretion in departmental officers about the use and disclosure of information, require interpretation by departmental officers and leave it open for a person to apply to the department to access the information under the Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld) and Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld). Moreover, adding another layer of people with access to SF’s information increases the opportunity for human error or failure, with potentially tragic and irreversible consequences.
The more information SF is required to disclose and the more people who have access to that information, the greater the risk to her and her children…”
Moreover, while it was not strictly necessary to consider the substantial compliance provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) as the Tribunal found that the applicant had provided sufficient information to meet the procedural requirements of the application form, the Tribunal was satisfied of substantial compliance in any event (at [35]-[41]).
Finally, the Tribunal’s decision and interpretation of the statutory provisions was compatible with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). As at [46]-[47]:
“SF and her children have moved to escape domestic violence. They are still at risk of harm. The child she seeks to home school has a dual diagnosis of conditions affecting the child’s ability to learn, sufficient to constitute an impairment and therefore a protected attribute under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). SF has identified that her child learns best with one-on-one educational support and has tailored a detailed, goal-directed home education program suited to the child’s needs. An interpretation that would mandate SF to provide her street number, street name and town name before granting her application for home education in these circumstances, is not an interpretation that least infringes her and her family’s human rights.
Moreover, the Tribunal does not accept this interpretation limits human rights only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. The Tribunal accepts SF’s evidence of the serious risk to her and her family from an interpretation mandating her to disclose her street number, street name and town name. The Tribunal does not accept that the confidentiality provisions of the Act and the Department’s own internal policies are sufficient to uphold her children’s right to protection in their particular circumstances.”
An interpretation requiring the applicant to disclose her street number, street name and town name was not necessary to achieve the purposes of ensuring the child was properly registered and the applicant was able to be contacted in circumstances where she had provided a postal address, mobile number and details of her circumstances (at [48]).
South Australia
Court of Appeal
MT v SE SASCA 8 (7 February 2025) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Malicious prosecution’ – ‘collateral abuse of process’ – ‘whether police or complainant initiated intervention order proceedings’ – ‘whether proceedings initiated for improper purpose’ – ‘systems abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against summary judgment in favour of the respondent
Charge: Malicious prosecution x1, collateral abuse of process x1
Facts: The appellant brought claims for the torts of malicious prosecution and collateral abuse of process against the respondent. The respondent had made a report to the South Australian Police (SAPOL) on the basis of which intervention order proceedings were brought against the respondent. The appellant alleged that the proceedings had prevented him from obtaining employment as a teacher and claimed damages for loss of income as well as aggravated and exemplary damages. The appellant’s claims were dismissed by the primary judge pursuant to an application for summary judgment made by the appellant. The primary judge took the view that SAPOL, not the respondent, had been the party that initiated the intervention order proceedings and that automatically defeated any claim of malicious prosecution or collateral abuse of process against the respondent [4], [6].
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on two grounds of appeal [7]:
1.
The primary judge erred in fact and law by concluding that there was no reasonable basis for contending that the respondent initiated the intervention order proceedings.
2.
The primary judge erred in fact and law by concluding that there was no reasonable basis for contending that the respondent had initiated the intervention order proceedings for an improper purpose.
In addition, the respondent filed a notice of contention alleging that the decision of the primary judge could be upheld on alternative grounds [8]:
1.
The appellant could not prove that the intervention order proceedings terminated favourably to him, and this is fatal to the malicious prosecution claim.
2.
The appellant could not prove he suffered special damage with respect to the collateral abuse of process claim, and this is fatal to that claim.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in part: the summary judgment was set aside in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, but it was affirmed regarding the collateral abuse of process claim [11].
Regarding the first ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the application for the intervention order was made by SAPOL, it was necessary consider the substance and not merely the legal form of the proceedings [70]. The mere fact that the police brought the application did not exclude the respondent from being the effective prosecutor. It was necessary to consider whether SAPOL were exercising an independent discretion or were, in effect, agents for the respondent [70].
There was nothing to indicate that the police undertook any independent investigation into the respondent’s allegations of domestic violence [71]. The respondent’s objective in making her statement to SAPOL was to obtain an intervention order [72]. There was no independent exercise of discretion by SAPOL, and therefore there was a reasonable basis for advancing a claim that the respondent was the instigator of the proceedings [72]. The primary judge erred in finding that there was no reasonable basis. This ground of appeal succeeded [77].
In respect of the domestic violence evidence, the Court held that the trial judge’s description of the “only relevance” of the domestic violence evidence did not adequately “identify and explain” the use for which that evidence was not to be used [68] and so did not comply with s 34R(1) [69].
Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Court began by observing that to establish the tort of collateral abuse of process, the plaintiff must establish that the proceedings were instituted for an improper purpose (as the predominant purpose) [79]. To establish this, there needs to be evidence of a demand or threat made in furtherance of the improper purpose [80]. The appellant relied on Facebook messages sent by the respondent to him as evidence of the demand or threat [82]. The Court found that the Facebook messages were not connected with the intervention order proceedings, and therefore there was no reasonable basis for claiming that those proceedings involved a demand, threat or over coercion [83]. This ground of appeal failed [110].
In response to the respondent’s notice of contention, the Court found that the primary judge had been correct to find there was a reasonable basis to argue that the intervention order proceedings had been terminated in favour of the appellant [110]. It also agreed with the primary judge’s finding that, in respect of the collateral abuse of process claim, there was a reasonable basis to argue that the appellant had suffered special damage [110].
Adamson (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] SASCA 91 (1 August 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Discreditable conduct evidence’ – ‘permissible and impermissible uses’ – ‘adequacy of judicial directions’ – ‘delayed complaint’ – ‘domestic violence evidence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Charge: Maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child (x1).
Facts: The applicant was charged with, and convicted of, maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied on two grounds of appeal, both of which challenged the trial judge’s directions in relation to evidence of discreditable conduct [46]:
1.
The trial judge failed to adequately identify and explain the impermissible use of the domestic violence evidence such that he did not comply with the obligation in s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
2.
The trial judge failed to adequately identify and explain the permissible use of sexual comments evidence such that he did not comply with the obligation in s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground of appeal relates to evidence about the applicant’s violence towards the complainant’s mother (domestic violence evidence). The second ground relates to evidence from the complainant about sexual comments made by the applicant to the complainant (sexual comments and evidence).
The prosecution had relied on the domestic violence evidence as an explanation for the late timing of the complaint (i.e., the complainant had waited until she and her mother were separated from the applicant before disclosing the offending against her) [32]. The prosecution had adduced the sexual comments evidence on the basis that it was relevant to the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the applicant [33].
Both the domestic violence evidence and the sexual comments evidence constituted evidence of discreditable conduct, the admissibility of which is governed by ss 34P, 34Q and 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Discreditable conduct evidence is only admissible for a permissible use and may not be used for any inadmissible use, including to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence in question [49]. Where discreditable conduct evidence is admitted, the trial judge must give directions as for the purpose for which the evidence may or may not be used [52].
In respect of the domestic violence evidence, the Court held that the trial judge’s description of the “only relevance” of the domestic violence evidence did not adequately “identify and explain” the use for which that evidence was not to be used [68] and so did not comply with s 34R(1) [69].
In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that the accuracy and precision with which the judge describes the permissible use may inform what is necessary to adequately direct in relation to the impermissible use of the evidence, however, it will not ordinarily overcome a failure to give any direction at all in relation to an impermissible use of the evidence [62]. The point of outlining the impermissible uses alongside the permissible uses was explained to be so that the impermissible uses are identified and understood so they may be consciously excluded from the decision-making process [63]. The fact that the judge had given himself a direction as to the impermissible uses of the sexual comments evidence did not discharge the obligation in respect of the domestic violence evidence [64]. A finding that s 34R(1) has not been followed does not turn upon whether there has in fact been some impermissible use of the evidence [67]. Ground 1 of the appeal was made out [69].
In respect of the sexual comments evidence, the Court opined that from the terms of the directions the trial judge gave, the Court had no confidence that the trial judge properly understood the permissible and impermissible uses of the sexual comments evidence [77]. Therefore, the judge did not comply with s 34R(1), and ground 2 was made out [79]-[80].
Millwood v The King [2024] SASCA 84 (28 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol-fuelled offending’ – ‘Baseball bat’ – ‘Grabbing neck’ – ‘No history of family violence’ – ‘Statistics on family violence’ – ‘Insight into offending’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Sentencing for greater offence than convicted of’
Proceedings: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Aggravated assault x2
Facts: At the time of the offending, the applicant and the complainant were in a domestic relationship. One night, the applicant had been drinking and there was an argument. The complainant went to bed. The applicant went into the bedroom, grabbed a baseball bat and swung it several times into the bedhead, causing three indentations to the bedhead. This comprised count 1.
On another occasion, the applicant and the complainant had been drinking heavily. Upon learning that the complainant had pawned his fishing reels, the applicant pushed the complainant around the kitchen before grabbing her neck with one hand. This caused bruising on the side of her neck. This comprised count 2.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon four grounds of appeal [25]:
1.
The sentencing judge sentenced on an erroneous factual basis, by finding that the conduct the subject of count 2 carried with it ‘a risk of impeding [the complainant’s] breathing and/or blood flow through her neck’ and that it followed that the conduct involved a risk of ‘serious physical harm’.
2.
The sentencing judge erred by sentencing the applicant on the basis he had committed a more serious offence than he had been convicted of.
3.
The sentencing judge erred by sentencing the applicant on the basis he had no remorse or insight into his offending, and was therefore at some risk of reoffending.
4.
The order that the applicant spend 6 months of the sentence in prison was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Permission to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed. The sentence was set aside and the applicant was resentenced.
The Court began by considering the need for denunciation, punishment, and deterrence in relation to family violence offending [30]-[33]. It observed that victims of this kind of offending are usually vulnerable, so offenders can expect to receive harsher sentences compared to offending in other contexts not involving vulnerable victims [33]. The Court found that in this case the sentencing discretion miscarried for three reasons. The sentencing judge had erred:
1.
in finding that the applicant had expressed no insight into his offending (alcohol had played a causal role in the offending, and at the time of the appeal, the applicant had remained abstinent from alcohol for over 2 years) [35];
2.
in finding that they were unable to conclude that there was “no risk” of the applicant reoffending against a future domestic partner (the applicant had not previously been involved in domestic violence, and had expressed insight into his offending) [36]; and
3.
in sentencing the applicant for an offence involving physical and emotional harm while the applicant had pleaded guilty to a lesser offence [37].
The applicant was resentenced to 10 months and 5 days’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on the condition the applicant enter into a good behaviour bond for 18 months [45].
R v Singh [2024] SASCA 81 (27 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘Serious offending’ – ‘Premeditation’ – ‘Cruelty’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Personal circumstances in mitigation for serious offending’ – ‘following, harassing, monitoring’- ‘Sentence so low as to undermine confidence in the administration of justice’
Proceedings: Crown application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Murder x1
Facts: At around 10pm on 5 March 2021, the respondent abducted the victim, his former partner, from her workplace. He drove several hours to Moralana Creek, about 400 kilometres north of Adelaide. Once there, the respondent dug a shallow grave. He placed the victim, blindfolded, in the grave with her hands and feet bound, and buried her alive. The victim died by asphyxiation. It is not known how long it took her to die.
Grounds of appeal: The Crown’s application relied on one ground in its application: that the sentence (life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 22 years and 10 months) was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: Permission to appeal against sentence was granted, and the appeal was allowed.
The Court noted that the principles governing an application for permission to appeal against sentence were well-established that that there will only be a grant of permission in a ‘rare and exceptional case’, such as where a sentence is so manifestly inadequate that it amounts to an error of principle [30]. The Crown challenged the adequacy of the sentence on the basis that to allow the non-parole period to stand would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and erode the sentencing standards for the offence of murder [32]. The sentence was life imprisonment; the non-parole period set by the sentencing judge started at 24 years and was reduced on account of the respondent’s guilty plea to 22 years and 10 months [29]. The mandatory non-parole period for murder is 20 years.
The Court discussed the approach in R v Hallcroft (2016) 126 SASR 415 to fixing a non-parole periods [41]-[49]. It also discussed the impact of the abolition of the ‘partial defence’ of provocation and s 48(1) of the Sentencing Act [50]-[67]. The upshot of this discussion was an observation that the mandatory minimum non-parole period for murder affects the sentencing discretion in fixing the non-parole period in two ways [64]. First, it imposes a floor, which the non-parole period must not go below unless there are exceptional circumstances. Second, the mandatory minimum non-parole period is a “yardstick” or “benchmark” representing the appropriate non-parole period for an offence within the least serious category of offending.
Turning to the offending in question, the Court noted there were several egregious features to the offending [69]. It involved a high level of pre-mediation with the respondent arranging an alibi and purchasing items used in the murder the previous day. The respondent therefore had numerous opportunities to reconsider his decision to offend. Moreover, the offending occurred against a background of repeated attempts to re-establish a relationship with the victim, which involved shaming her, continuing to communicate with her against her wishes, and stalking her. Finally, the way the offence was committed was particularly terrifying and degrading [70].
The Court considered that the respondent’s personal circumstances (youth, major depressive disorder, deprived background, lack of prior convictions, guilty plea, cooperation with police, and good employment history) did little to mitigate the seriousness of the offending, bearing in mind its calculated and pre-meditated nature [71]. The four-year uplift from the mandatory minimum non-parole period was held to be manifestly inadequate, and so low as to justify the grant of permission and the Court’s intervention [72].
In resentencing the respondent, the Court imposed the mandatory life sentence. The Court then adopted a starting point for the non-parole period of 30 years, and reduced it on account of the respondent’s guilty plea to 28 years and six months [74].
Mlakar v The King [2024] SASCA 76 (18 June 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘appeal against sentence’ – ‘general and personal deterrence’ – ‘manifestly excessive’ – ‘appropriate sentencing range’ – ‘rehabilitation as mitigation’ – ‘courts’ intolerance for domestic violence’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charge: Aggravated assault x1.
Facts: The complainant, the applicant’s partner, was lying down on a couch, when the applicant assaulted her for no apparent reason [5]. The applicant pulled the complainant off the couch, hit her with his elbows, slapped and punched her, and slammed her head into the ground. The complainant suffered bruising and pain all over her body, and some of her hair was torn out during the assault [6].
Grounds of appeal: The sole ground of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was granted; the appeal was dismissed [25].
The applicant submitted that the sentence of 83 percent of the maximum penalty for the offence was outside the appropriate sentencing range given the circumstances of the offence and the applicant’s personal circumstances [11]. Which circumstances in particular were relied upon in mitigation is unclear, but it is noted that the applicant had previously been addicted to methamphetamine prior to being on home detention, when he regularly tested negative for drugs [15]. The applicant also attended an abuse prevention program whilst on home detention [15].
In dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that general and personal deterrence will play a significant role in assessing an appropriate penalty for domestic violence offending [21]. The Court echoed Nicholson J in R v Nedza, who opined that courts must make it plain that they “will not tolerate domestic violence, particularly where, as is typical, it is meted out to physically weaker or defenceless women or children” [21].
The Court opined that the sentence was high, but it matched the severity of the offending, being a vicious attack on a vulnerable victim [24].
Sondhi v King [2024] SASCA 7 (8 February 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Physical and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Reliability’ – ‘Evidence’
Charge: Rape x 5.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by judge alone, the male applicant was found guilty of five counts of rape perpetrated against the female complainant, his wife. Each count occurred between January and March 2021, shortly after the birth of their only child. [2]–[6] At trial, the applicant denied the charges, submitting that the initial complaint was fabricated. [7]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant appealed the conviction on five grounds with significant overlap. Overarchingly, the grounds concerned:
1.
Failure to give adequate reasons and/or adopt adequate reasoning to explain why the conflicting evidence raised by the applicant did not engender reasonable doubt;
2.
Erroneous consideration of the complainant’s credibility and reliability due to a failure to properly evaluate inconsistencies in her testimony and behaviour;
3.
Erroneous approach to the evaluation of the evidence of the initial complaint raised by the complainant and her brother (a witness);
4.
Erroneous application of the burden and standard of proof; and
5.
Failure to consider the complainant’s reliability, as distinct from considerations of credibility [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Doyle, Blue and Kimber JJ) granted the applicant permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal.
The Court held that the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence — concerning the time of day on which the complaint was made (eg, afternoon or evening) — was ‘hardly … significant’ to affect the credibility of the complainant. This finding extended to the inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant and her brother, concerning the date on which the complaint was made. [40]–[46]
It was observed that the trial judge was ‘cognisant of the need to consider the whole of the evidence’ before finding any count proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [77] This included findings of the complainant’s credibility and reliability, the latter of which had limited relevance to the issues in the trial. [78]; [129]
Further, the Court held that the trial judge’s provision of directions to himself, concerning the principle of innocence and the prosecution’s burden, did not constitute preferential reasoning or a misapplication of the onus of proof. [109]–[111]
TM v King [2024] SASCA 5 (8 February 2024) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Physical and sexual abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Adequate Reasoning’
Charge: Rape x 6.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by judge alone, the male applicant was found guilty of six counts of rape perpetrated against the female complainant, his partner. Each count occurred over thirteen years. [1]–[2] According to the complainant, the relationship started off ‘good’ in 2004. However, the applicant became aggressive and sexually violent. The complainant alleged that the accused had raped her on multiple occasions, including while pregnant. The applicant’s aggressive behaviour fluctuated throughout the marriage, and the birth of their first and second children. By 2019, the complainant told the applicant to leave the home. [9]
Grounds of appeal: The applicant appealed the conviction on four grounds:
1.
Erroneous approach to the evaluation of the evidence of the initial complaint;
2.
Erroneous assessment of the credibility and reliability of the complaint;
3.
Engagement in adequate reasoning; and
4.
Inadequate reasons.
5.
Failure to consider the complainant’s reliability, as distinct from considerations of credibility [4]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Doyle, Bleby and Kimber JJ) granted the applicant permission to appeal but dismissed the appeal.
With respect to ground one, the Court specified that section 34M of the Evidence Act — governing evidence relating to complaint in sexual cases — does ‘not condition the admissibility and use of evidence’ of initial complaints upon the existence of ‘independent support’. [40] Even if it did, the evidence of AT (a witness) provided independent support to the fact that the complainant made the initial complaint. [41]
The Court further clarified R v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522 as not establishing the principle that ‘the absence of support for the making of a complaint means that evidence always has limited weight’. [49] This is a matter dependent on the evidence given in the trial, and it was open to the trial Judge to prefer the evidence of the complainant as to the terms of the initial complaint. [49]
With respect to ground three and four, the Court held that the approach of the trial judge was ‘open’ to him, and subsequently not inadequate. The reasons of the trial judge rationally supported the facts found the final verdicts. [87]; [129]; [136]
Groom v Attorney General [2023] SASCA 5 (1 August 2023) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Abuse of Process’ – ‘Vexatious Litigant’ – ‘Systems Abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal against order prohibiting institution of proceedings in relation to protection order.
Facts: In 2011, the male appellant was subject to a protection order, which he ‘sedulously’ sought to overturn in at least eight proceedings; all of which were instituted without reasonable grounds. In 2021, following a referral from the Court of Appeal in Groom v Police [2021] SASCA 1, the Attorney-General commenced proceedings seeking to declare the appellant a vexatious litigant. [1]-[2]
After hearing the application in 2023, Justice Blue of the Supreme Court (see Attorney General v Groom [2023] SASC 18) ordered the appellant to be prohibited, without prior leave of the Court, from instituting proceedings in relation to the protection order.
Grounds of appeal: The appellants advanced the appeal on several grounds concerning procedural failures and inadequate reasoning. [12]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in Blue J’s reasoning, nor merit in any of the appellant’s grounds of appeal.
Blue J gave clear and cogent reasons for all of his findings. Mr Groom was either unwilling, or more likely unable, to point to any error in Blue J’s findings other than asserting that he was “wrong”. [17]
South Australia Police v Hill [2022] SASCA 22 (22 March 2022) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Double jeopardy’ – ‘Impermissible double charging’ – ‘Subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)’
Charges: assault aggravated (formerly) in a relationship with the victim x 2, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection in a manner involving physical violence or the threat of physical violence x2.
Proceedings: Police appeal against order of Magistrate allowing the withdrawal of pleas of guilt to and dismissal of two counts in ruling each pair of charges involved impermissible double charging.
Facts: The respondent was charged by Police with assault of the complainant aggravated because he was (formerly) in a relationship with her, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection in a manner involving physical violence or the threat of physical violence, committed on 16 December 2019. The respondent was later charged by Police with assault of the complainant aggravated because he was (formerly) in a relationship with her and/or used an offensive weapon, and contravening a term of an intervention order for her protection, committed on 29 March 2020. The respondent pleaded guilty to each of these four counts (together with other counts). The Magistrate ruled that each pair of counts involved impermissible double charging. The Magistrate granted permission to the respondent to withdraw his guilty pleas to two of the counts and dismissed them. The Magistrate imposed a single penalty in respect of the remaining counts.
Issue: Firstly, does subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) create a single offence or multiple offences? Secondly, does a conviction for an offence of contravening a condition of an intervention order, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence, preclude a conviction for the substantive offence when the substantive offence is aggravated by another circumstance and vice versa?
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed.
Held by the Court:
1.
(Per Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) Subsection 20(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) creates a single offence albeit with differential maximum penalties depending on the existence of circumstances of aggravation (at [143] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA (Doyle JA agreeing)).
(Per Kourakis CJ) It is not necessary to decide whether subsection 20(3) creates one or two offences depending on the existence of circumstances of aggravation (at [19] per Kourakis CJ).
2.
(Per Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) A conviction for contravening an intervention order condition, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence, does not preclude a conviction for the substantive offence or vice versa (at [172] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA; at [178] per Doyle JA).
(Per Kourakis CJ) A conviction for contravening an intervention order condition, where the contravening conduct comprises a substantive offence aggravated by another circumstance, does not preclude a conviction for the substantive offence or vice versa (at [19] per Kourakis CJ).
3.
(Per Kourakis CJ, Lovell, Doyle and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA) The appeal should be allowed and, subject to hearing the parties, a conviction recorded on the two counts dismissed by the Magistrate with no alteration to the sentence imposed by the Magistrate under section 26 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (at [174] per Lovell and Livesey JJA and Blue AJA (Kourakis CJ and Doyle JA agreeing)).
Groom v Police [2020] SASCA 1 (22 January 2021) – South Australian Court of Appeal
‘Abuse of process’ – ‘Application for permission to appeal’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Proceedings: Application for permission to appeal the dismissal of an application for revocation of an intervention order.
Facts: This matter had an extensive history (set out at [7]). The intervention order was originally made on 19 October 2011, and confirmed by consent on 22 February 2012. The applicant’s appeal against confirmation of the interim intervention was upheld on 25 June 2013: Groom v Police (No 3). On 10 December 2013, the application to confirm the intervention order was again confirmed by consent in the Magistrates Court. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by a single judge on 21 March 2014 and an application for permission to appeal to the Full Court refused on 19 November 2014: Groom v Police. In December 2014, the applicant was convicted of contravening a term of the intervention order and an appeal was dismissed in July 2015: Groom v Police. In 2016, the applicant filed an application to revoke the intervention order, which was dismissed by the Magistrate. Various appeals were dismissed by a single judge and the Full Court in 2017. Notwithstanding the Full Court’s judgment, the applicant again applied to a Magistrate to revoke the order made on 19 October 2011 and confirmed on 10 December 2013. The Magistrate dismissed the application on 26 May 2020 and this was affirmed on appeal by Lovell J.
Grounds of appeal: The Magistrate and Lovell J erred in failing to find that there was new and compelling evidence to demonstrate that the order was invalid and should be revoked.
Held: The Court not only dismissed the application for permission to appeal but also held at [10]-[11] that:
“In our view, the latest material filed in support of the application for permission to appeal demonstrates that the applicant continues to attempt to relitigate matters previously ventilated and considered in the Magistrates Court, by the various Judges of this Court and by the Full Court.
We consider the current application for permission to appeal, in the circumstances, to be an abuse of process.”
The Court referred the matter to the Attorney-General to consider whether there were proper grounds for an application to be made under s 39 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) to stay any further proceedings sought to be instituted by the applicant (at [12]-[13]).
Police v Peel [2021] SASCFC 7 (5 February 2021) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Breach of suspended sentence bond’ – ‘Breach protection order’ – ‘Prosecution appeal against decision to allow appeal’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Several offences including contraventions of an intervention order and breach of suspended sentence bond.
Proceedings: Prosecution appeal against Supreme Court decision to allow respondent’s appeal against breach of suspended sentence bond: Peel v Police [2020] SASC 48 (7 April 2020).
Facts: The male respondent was convicted of several offences including contraventions of an intervention order protecting his female former partner. He was sentenced to 4 months and 15 days imprisonment, partially suspended on a good behaviour bond. The respondent breached the bond by further contravening the intervention order. The Magistrate declined to excuse the breach and revoked the suspension. A single judge allowed the respondent’s appeal.
Grounds of appeal: Whether “proper grounds” existed for excusing a failure to comply with a suspended sentence bond.
Held: The single judge below erred, but there was no utility granting permission to appeal or allowing the appeal in this case as the respondent had served the unexpired portion of the sentence.
Consideration of whether there are “proper grounds” involves “consideration of the nature of the breach and the circumstances in which it was committed, and of any disproportionality between the nature and extent of the breach and the severity of the consequence of revoking the suspension and requiring the original sentence to be served” (at [38]). Any history of similar offending may be relevant “on the basis that it informs a full understanding of both the seriousness of the breach offending, and of the circumstances in which, and reasons for which, the original suspended sentence was imposed and hence the proportionality or otherwise of revoking the suspension of that sentence”(at [44]).
The Magistrate was entitled to have regard to the respondent’s history of similar offending, which was a “relevant, and indeed quite significant consideration” in the context of the case, and the judge below erred in concluding otherwise (at [46]).
Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 124 (21 December 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against re-sentence’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Basic assault x 1; Aggravated assault causing harm x 2; Possession of a Class A firearm without a licence x 1; Aggravated threatening life x 1; Aggravated assault x 3.
Proceedings: Appeal against re-sentence (re-sentence was imposed following a successful appeal against conviction).
Facts: The offences occurred in connection with a domestic relationship between the appellant man and his female former partner. The appellant was convicted of 8 charges following a trial by jury. He was sentenced to 4 years and 5 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years. The appellant successfully appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault causing harm. The re-sentencing arising from the appeal against conviction was undertaken by a different judge, as the first sentencing judge had retired. The re-sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 4 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 4 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
It was an error to impose a head sentence and a non-parole period that was greater than that which had been imposed prior to the appellant’s successful appeal.
2.
The re-sentencing judge’s starting point was too great.
3.
The re-sentencing judge erred in finding that home detention was not appropriate in all the circumstances.
4.
The re-sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The appeal was allowed. Based on the submissions made to the re-sentencing judge and the content of the sentencing remarks made, Hughes J (with Peek and Stanley JJ agreeing) inferred that the re-sentencing judge overlooked the approach to be taken when imposing subsequent sentences for the same offending identified in R v Baltensperger [2004] SASC 392. In re-sentencing, the judge is “required to firstly have regard to the original sentence and only upon concluding that if there is good reason to depart from it, sentencing in a different manner. Where there is a departure, it would be appropriate to provide some explanation for it and in this case, there was none” (at [41]). This inference gained further support by the lack of significant disparity between the re-sentence and the original sentence (at [42]).
After considering the relevant circumstances, Hughes J held that the original sentence was not manifestly excessive (at [48]-[56]). Hughes J (Peek and Stanley JJ agreeing) noted a controlling course of conduct:
[51] The course of conduct in February 2017 was sustained and violent. The appellant caused injuries to the victim and also sought to control her with frightening and dangerous behaviour tending to place her in fear for her life and to submit. That was reinforced by the explicit threat made by the appellant to the victim whilst he directed a firearm at her at close range. There has been no expression of remorse or contrition by the appellant, or any indication of insight on his part with respect to his conduct.
However, the circumstances concerning the count of aggravated assault causing harm, which was successful on appeal, were to be properly viewed as separate from the other acts as charged, thereby not attracting principles of concurrency. This was therefore the basis for imposing a sentence lower than the original sentence namely, 4 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years and 8 months (at [57]-[59]).
Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 12 (26 February 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Assault x 1; Aggravated assault x 3; Aggravated assault causing harm x 2; Possessing a firearm without a licence x 1; Aggravated threatening life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant in respect of each of the charges of violent offending was the male appellant’s then female partner. The assault charges were aggravated by reason that they were alleged to have occurred in contravention of an Intervention Order.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to their obligations to decide the case only on the evidence, to not discuss the case with persons other than their fellow jurors, to not make their own enquiries, and to bring to the trial judge’s attention any departure from the above by any member of the jury.
2.
The trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to self-defence.
3.
The trial judge’s directions lacked balance to the extent that they resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
4.
The trial judge erred in failing to adequately direct the jury in relation to the potential implications for the complainant’s credit of the timing of the photographs purportedly showing the injuries alleged to have been sustained during the course of the conduct the subject of count 1.
Held: Permission to appeal in respect of grounds 1 and 2, and allowing the appeal on ground 2, but only to the extent of setting aside the conviction on count 2 (aggravated assault causing harm) and ordering a retrial on that count, and otherwise dismissing the appeal.
Ground 1: The trial judge ought to have given post-empanelment directions to the effect contended for by the appellant. Nevertheless, there was no miscarriage of justice. This was not a case where there had been media publicity and the appellant did not identify any information of significance that might have been available through internet searching. It was speculative to suggest that the jury’s deliberations were infected by extraneous information.
Ground 2: There was a sufficient evidential basis to require that the trial judge leave self-defence to the jury in respect of the charge the subject of count 2 as the alleged assault was immediately preceded by verbal and physical aggressive conduct by the complainant. The trial judge’s directions in this respect were inadequate, falling short of an accurate and clear articulation of the defence.
However, the court did not accept that the evidence as to the generally volatile nature of the parties’ relationship, and instances of aggressive behaviour by the complainant on other occasions (including her use of an axe in the context of the incident leading to count 2), provided a sufficient evidential foundation for self-defence in respect of the balance of the counts of violent offending with which the appellant was charged.
The appeal in respect of ground 2 was allowed, but only to the extent of setting aside the conviction on count 2.
Application for permission to appeal on grounds 3 and 4 was dismissed. The appellant did not demonstrate any lack of balance in the trial judge’s summing up.
Subsequent appeal against re-sentence was allowed: Warne v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 124 (21 December 2020).
SPC v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 43 (28 May 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 8 counts, including aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm, aggravated threatening life, rape
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant an was convicted of 2 counts of aggravated causing harm with intent to cause harm, 3 counts of aggravated threatening life and 2 counts of rape. He was acquitted of a charge of aggravated cause harm. The victim was the appellant’s wife, who had migrated from China in 2009, and with whom the appellant had children. The victim testified that their relationship was marred by verbal, physical and sexual abuse, and recounted an incident of violence and rape which had preceded the charged counts (relationship evidence).
Grounds:
•
The judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the use of evidence of the victim’s distress when she reported the offending to a police officer.
•
The judge failed to properly direct the jury on the use of the evidence of the violent relationship on the element of consent on the rape charges.
•
The verdict on the last rape offence (Count 8) was unreasonable because the evidence could not exclude the possibility that the appellant failed to appreciate that the victim was not consenting.
Held: Kourakis CJ (Nicholson and Bampton JJ agreeing) dismissed the appeal.
As to ground 1, the appellant argued that the judge failed to give any directions as to the proper use of the evidence of the victim’s distress when she attended at the police station. It was submitted that the judge should have directed the jury that (1) because of the passage of time and the significance of the reconciliation contended for by the appellant, the distress was not relevant; and (2) if they were to use the distress as circumstantial evidence of consistency with respect to the alleged rape, they would need to be satisfied that distress was not an emotional reaction to the victim’s decision to leave the appellant ([36]). The Court, however, dismissed this ground for 4 reasons. First, it was not put by the prosecutor, nor left to the jury by the judge, that the victim’s distress was corroborative or supportive of her testimony ([44]). Second, the evidence was admissible due to the close temporal connection to the last rape offence, the degree of distress and the circumstances in which the victim abandoned the course in which she had enrolled to report the appellant’s violence against her. The distress was also proximate to the rape the victim alleged occurred the night before ([45]). Third, the alternative explanations for the victim’s distress proposed on appeal were unrealistic ([46]). Fourth, counsel for the appellant at trial consented to the judge’s proposal not to give any directions on the evidence of distress ([47]).
As to ground 2, the appellant’s complaint primarily related to the judge’s failure to give specific directions on how the relationship evidence was relevant to prove the mental element on 2 of the rape counts ([50]). The Court found that the the judge’s directions on the use of the relationship evidence in considering whether the objective elements of the offence had been established were sound ([56]). The judge did not err by omission in not directing the jury to ignore the relationship evidence on the question of the appellant’s appreciation of whether or not the victim was consenting to sexual intercourse on the rape charges. Neither counsel referred to the relationship evidence on that issue. It was common ground that, notwithstanding their violent relationship, consensual sexual intercourse was a feature of their relationship. The proper use of the relationship evidence on the subjective element of the rape charges was, therefore, not a live issue at trial.
The verdict on count 8 was not unreasonable. It was sufficiently supported by the victim’s evidence, and there was no evidentiary matter capable of raising a doubt as to the appellant’s guilt which could not be dissipated by the jury’s evaluation of her testimony ([64]).
R v Roberts [2019] SASCFC 94 (1 August 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court) [Summary prepared by Magistrates’ Associates of the Adelaide Magistrates Court]
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Propensity’ – ‘Relevancy’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The defendant was convicted by jury of causing harm with intent to cause harm to the complainant who he was in a sexual relationship with. The defendant, while intoxicated, grabbed her and dragged her out of the house, pushed her on to the footpath and kicked her body causing various injuries. The appellant’s brothers Stephen and Joe were present at the house. The complainant said that before living with the defendant, a former partner, Ray, had also been violent to her. The defence put to the complainant in cross-examination that it was Ray not the appellant who assaulted the complainant. Ray was deceased by the time of the trial. The complainant gave:
•
General evidence that the appellant was ‘rough to [her] nearly everyday [they] were together’ and ‘slapped’ her around; and
•
Specific evidence that on 14 February 2017 the appellant was angry at her and twisted and broken her arm for which the injury required surgery. The complainant lied to medical staff that she had fallen off a deck.
A police officer who attended the scene gave evidence of two tranches of the appellant’s brother, Stephen’s, statements and conduct:
•
The first tranche was that Stephen ‘loudly told police to leave the property and shut the front door’.
•
The second was that when told the appellant was arrested for assaulting the complainant, Stephen stated ‘If she’s saying those things she needs to be dealt with. She needs to learn the Aboriginal way’.
Grounds of Appeal:
•
Ground 1: Did the Trial Judge err in admitting the specific evidence as to the appellant having broken the arm of the complainant on 14 February 2017, and in doing so cause a miscarriage of justice?
•
Ground 2: Did the Trial Judge err at law in admitting evidence of words spoken out of Court by a person not called as a witness (Stephen Roberts), and in doing so cause a miscarriage of justice?
Held:
•
Ground 1: Peek J and Hughes J allowing the appeal, Kourakis CJ dismissing the appeal.
•
Ground 2: Peek J allowing the appeal, Kourakis CJ and Hughes J concurring.
Reasons:
Ground 1 – Kourakis CJ (dismissing)
•
‘The admissibility of evidence of a violent relationship…between a perpetrator and a victim involved in a domestic relationship has long been held to be admissible on a charge of a violent criminal offence’ citing R v Olasiuki (1973) 6 SASR 255 at 263-264 and R v Hissey at [2] (1973) 6 SASR 280.
•
On the admission of the evidence relating to the breaking of the complainant’s wrist by the appellant, the jury ‘could not reason in the appellant’s favour that he was unlikely to be the complainant’s assailant because he was in a romantic relationship with her’ at [4].
•
‘The risk of misuse of discreditable conduct evidence is greatest when it is admitted as propensity evidence. It is more difficult to compartmentalise specific propensity reasoning from bad person reasoning’ at [9]
•
The probative value of the evidence ‘substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect’ as ‘it showed that the appellant’s romantic relationship with the appellant did not inhibit him from bashing and slapping her around and, importantly, causing her serious bodily harm three weeks earlier’ and as such was admissible under s 34P(2)(a) at [10].
•
The evidence of the broken arm assault ‘did not materially add to the prejudicial effect of the evidence that the appellant bashed and slapped around the complainant’ at [10].
•
‘Prejudice is not necessarily accumulated by the arithmetic addition of the occasions of discreditable conduct. The prejudice lies in the error of reasoning’ at [10].
Ground 1 – Peek J (allowing) (Hughes J concurring)
•
In relation to s 34P(2)(a) prosecution often contend in domestic violence matters that there is a ‘permitted use’ under s 34P(2) for the admission of evidence of prior conduct at [74].
•
The only ‘permitted use’ here is said to be that such evidence is relevant to the alleged assault on the basis that ‘the assault did not come out of the blue’ (the out of the blue argument) at [74].
•
The out of the blue argument is often linked to and strengthened by delays in reporting to police due to fears of repercussions and situations where the existence of a violent relationship is established or confirmed by independent evidence at [76].
•
‘If only evidence of the specific allegation is led…it is not unlikely that members of a jury may gain the impression that the assault charged involves an incongruous, unprovoked and unexplained occurrence’ at [75].
•
Tection 34P(2)(a) requires that separate assessments must be made as to both ‘any probative value’ and ‘any prejudicial effect’ of the evidence to determine whether the prosecution have ‘demonstrated that the former substantially outweighs the latter’ at [77].
•
In relation to the probative value: If the 14 February 2017 assault is set aside it may be contended that ‘there is an apparent difference in the evidence of the complainant as between the usual degree of violence (‘rough’ and ‘slapping around’) and ‘the high degree of violence alleged to be involved in the subject assault’ at [79].
•
The out of the blue argument in this matter is narrow. There was no delay in reporting and there is no independent evidence outside of the complainant’s to establish the existence of a violent relationship at [81].
•
In relation to the prejudicial effect: although prosecution eschewed any reliance on s 34P(2)(b), the question arises under s 34P(2)(a) and s 34P(3) ‘as to the extent of the risk that the jury might adopt a process of propensity reasoning due to the doubling of the number of allegations of a high level of violence in circumstances where the allegations appeared superficially similar’ at [82].
•
The prosecution did not call medical evidence in relation to the 14 February 2017 assault and in doing so denied the appellant ‘the ability to cross-examine as to whether such injuries where more consistent with her original history of falling from a deck than her later version of an assault’ at [82].
•
Under s 34P(3) the Judge is ‘specifically required’ to determine whether the permissible use can be kept ‘sufficiently separate and distinct from the impermissible use’ at [83].
•
‘It is quite evident from the transcript that the Judge did not undertake a sufficient analysis of the application of s 34P and did not refer to s 34P(3) at all’ at [83].
Ground 2 - Peek J (allowing) (Kourakis CJ and Hughes J concurring)
•
The prosecution ‘attempted to justify the admission of both tranches of Parkinson’s evidence by citing Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283 and R v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 that stand for the proposition that ‘in some circumstances a person’s state of mind may be proved by contemporaneous acts or statements made by that person’ at [27].
•
Although the decisions in Walton and Hendrie are ‘unexceptionable’, ‘…the danger of proliferation of tendering evidence of statements or actions of persons not called as witnesses must be guarded against’ at [36].
•
Evidence of this nature should only be received ‘if it is of direct and immediate relevance to an issue which arises at trial’ (R v Blastland [1986] AC 41, 53 and R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504) at [47].
•
The trial judge admitted the evidence of Parkinson in this case to rebut the suggestion put to the complainant in cross-examination that she was assaulted by someone else other than the complainant at [52].
•
While it was open to the prosecution to call further evidence that it was not Ray that has assaulted the complainant, this evidence had to be admissible at [58].
•
In relation to the first tranche: Stephen’s ‘less than cordial welcome of police arriving at his home was entirely consistent with personal beliefs or feelings he holds about police which could be referable to any number of reasons or previous experiences’ and not necessarily connected to the crime at [60].
•
The second tranche of evidence the prosecution’s position is that Stephen’s statement was’ "Consistent" with knowledge that the appellant did consult the complainant’. However, there was in fact no evidence that Stephen knew who assaulted the complainant
•
The evidence as to Stephen Roberts’ statement and conduct was ‘nebulous and highly speculative’ as distinct from being directly relevant to trial at [60].
•
It ‘is simply not the type of clear and unequivocal "state of mind" evidence’ referred to in Hendrie and Walton. There was no evidence that Stephen knew who assaulted the complainant at [63].
•
The prosecution was ‘simply not permitted to tender evidence of an action or statement of a person who they were not prepared to call, on some sort of ‘prophylactic’ basis that the jury might consider that the words were consistent with a prosecution case theory’ at [64].
Appendix 1: 34P–Evidence of discreditable conduct
•
•
(1) In the trial of a charge of an offence, evidence tending to suggest that a defendant has engaged in discreditable conduct, whether or not constituting an offence, other than conduct constituting the offence (discreditable conduct evidence)–
◦
(a) cannot be used to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence because he or she has engaged in discreditable conduct; and
◦
(b) is inadmissible for that purpose (impermissible use); and
◦
(c) subject to subsection (2), is inadmissible for any other purpose.
•
(2) Discreditable conduct evidence may be admitted for a use (the permissible use) other than the impermissible use if, and only if–
◦
(a) the judge is satisfied that the probative value of the evidence admitted for a permissible use substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant; and
◦
(b) in the case of evidence admitted for a permissible use that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue–the evidence has strong probative value having regard to the particular issue or issues arising at trial.
•
(3) In the determination of the question in subsection (2)(a), the judge must have regard to whether the permissible use is, and can be kept, sufficiently separate and distinct from the impermissible use so as to remove any appreciable risk of the evidence being used for that purpose.
•
(4) Subject to subsection (5), a party seeking to adduce evidence that relies on a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue under this section must give reasonable notice in writing to each other party in the proceedings in accordance with the rules of court.
•
(5) The court may, if it thinks fit, dispense with the requirement in subsection (4).
R v Wilton [2019] SASCFC 65 (13 June 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Adequacy of directions to jury’ – ‘Confessions and admissions’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Property offences’
Charges: 1x aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence, 1x theft.
Appeal type: appeal against conviction of above charges.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant were in a relationship and two children were born of that relationship. The appellant and the complainant had separated and there were family court orders allowing the appellant fortnightly access to the children and restraining him from being within 50 metres of the complainant’s house. The appellant was found in the complainant’s house in possession of various items belonging to the complainant. Upon the police’s arrival, the appellant stated, “I fucked up” and begged the complainant not to press charges.
Issues: The appellant advanced two grounds of appeal; both grounds were considered together since they were intrinsically linked in both time and context ([42]). The appellant argued that the trial Judge failed to give adequate directions to the jury as to the use that could be made of the purported confessional statement “I fucked up” and the evidence of the appellant begging not to be charged ([3]).
Decision and reasoning: appeal dismissed.
To illustrate that the trial judge’s directions were not deficient, Parker J first made two material observations of the trial proceedings. The first was that the trial Judge reminded the jury of the defence’s submission that the appellant’s remarks were potentially equivocal and couldn’t be regarded as determinative ([47]). The second was that the trial Judge expressly stated that the use that could be made of the appellant’s behaviour was entirely within the jury’s discretion; it could be used for or against him, rejected in whole or in part, or attributed with different degrees of significance ([48]).
His Honour then referred to the observations of the High Court in RPS v The Queen to reflect the absence of any error in the trial Judge’s directions. In the extract, the High Court stated that the facts are to be determined by the jury and the trial Judge may comment on the facts but often the safest course for a trial Judge will be to make no comment on the facts beyond reminding the jury of the arguments of counsel ([49]). In addition, for the same purpose, his Honour referred to similar observations made in R v Golubovic where it was pointed out that in trials such as the one at hand, there may be little need for the judge to identify the issue or explain the cases of the parties ([50]).
Collectively, these observations are said to point towards a key principle relevant to the appeal, that is, when considering the adequacy of the Judge’s directions to the jury, it is important that the factual issues are few and not complex ([49]-[51]).
For these reasons, amongst others, his Honour deemed that it was unnecessary for the Judge to provide more elaborate directions in the terms suggested by the appellant (see [3]). The directions given by the Judge were viewed as sufficient to ensure the jury wasn’t confused about the issues that needed to be determined ([53]).
Police v Heritage [2019] SASCFC 60 (31 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Activation of suspended sentence’ – ‘Breach of conditions of good behaviour bond’ – ‘Sentence’
Charge: Aggravated assault.
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s sentence (excusal of breach of bond).
Facts: In 2016 the respondent assaulted his partner and was sentenced to imprisonment for 9 months, suspended upon entering into a good behaviour bond for 18 months. In 2017 the respondent breached his good behaviour bond by committing a further assault on his partner. The Magistrate excused the breach of bond, extended the bond by 6 months, and sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 28 days for the fresh offending suspended upon the respondent entering into a further good behaviour bond for 18 months. The Police appealed against the excusal of the breach of bond ‘on the ground that, in excusing the breach, the Magistrate erroneously relied on the respondent’s personal circumstances as opposed to the nature and circumstances of the offending’ at [3].
Appeal dismissed by single Judge. Police sought permission to appeal to Full Court.
Issue: Did the Magistrate erroneously rely upon the respondent’s personal circumstances as opposed to the nature and circumstances of the offending when excusing the breach of bond?
Decision and reasoning: Granting permission to appeal and dismissing the appeal, the Full Court held:
‘The approach by the Magistrate to the finding of proper grounds to refrain from revoking the suspension was erroneous, as was the Magistrate’s conclusion that there were proper grounds to refrain from revoking the suspension’ at [41]. ‘The Judge erred in concluding that the Magistrate did not rely on the respondent’s personal circumstances in deciding to refrain from revoking the suspension’ at [47]. Notwithstanding the error, the appeal should be dismissed in the exercise of the court’s residual discretion, as the respondent has been living a law-abiding life in the community for an extended period of time since being sentenced, and the balance of the original period of suspension of the original sentence and the extended period of the suspension has now expired at [63].
Reasoning - proper grounds:
The police relied upon a series of decisions commencing with Norman v Lovegrove [1986] 40 SASR 266and R v Buckman [1988] 47 SASR 303 in which the Supreme Court held that when determining whether there are proper grounds within the meaning of s 58(3) of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA)—a largely identical provision is now contained in s 114(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA)—upon which a breach of bond should be excused, those proper grounds must relate to the ‘nature and circumstances of the breaching offence as opposed to the personal circumstances of the defendant’ at [13]. Blue J held in relation to the meaning of the expression proper grounds that ‘it has authoritatively been decided by this Court and it follows from the text, context and evident purpose of subsection 58(3) that those grounds are confined to the nature and circumstances of the breach; they do not extend to personal circumstances of the offender or to circumstances occurring after the breach’ at [22]. His Honour reasoned that the ‘distinction between circumstances of the offence and personal circumstances is well understood in practice although it is more difficult to define in a priori terms. The circumstances of the offence comprise those circumstances existing at the time of commission of the offence which bear on the culpability of the offender in committing the offence’ at [31].His Honour differentiated between a ‘circumstance of the offence’, for example, an offender suffering a mental impairment which contributed to the committing of the offence, and a ‘personal circumstance’, for example, where ‘it is desirable that a defendant receive treatment for a mental impairment which cannot effectively be provided in prison’ or where hardship is caused to the defendant’s dependant at [31].
His Honour, at [35], cited the Magistrates three reasons for refraining from revoking the suspension:
•
That the respondent needed professional assistance to address his mental health and anger management issues;
•
That the respondent was supporting his partner and 10 month old child who would suffer hardship if the respondent were to be imprisoned; and
•
That the revocation of the suspension of the sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate and oppressive to the 2017 offending.
His Honour held that reasons 1 and 2 were personal circumstances. While the third reason related to the circumstances of the breach, his Honour held that ‘there was no basis on which it was open to the Magistrate to conclude that activation of the original sentence would be a disproportionate consequence of the 2017 offending’ at [40].
Reasoning – the reasons of the Judge:
The Judge referred ‘to decisions of single Judges of the Court that the Full Court authorities do not preclude a court taking into account personal circumstances’, however, stated that it was not necessary to decide this as the Magistrate did not take into account the respondent’s personal circumstances when deciding to restrain from revoking the suspension’ at [43]. Blue J held the Judge erred in his conclusion that the Magistrate did not rely on the respondent’s personal circumstances in refraining from revoking the suspension.
Reasoning – permission to appeal:
Permission to bring a second appeal by the Crown against sentence by a magistrate ‘will only be granted in rare and exceptional cases. This will ordinarily only be when it is necessary to establish or maintain correct sentencing principles or adequate sentencing standards or where the error is so disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime that it demands correction on appeal’ at [49]. Permission to appeal should be granted ‘having regard to the importance of the maintenance of the correct sentencing principles and the availability of the residual discretion’ at [61]. However, as allowing the appeal would have resulted in the defendant’s imprisonment after he had been living a law-abiding life in the community for a sustained period’ at [62], the Court should dismiss the appeal in the exercise of its residual discretion.
R v Dhir [2019] SASCFC 55 (22 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Permissible and impermissible use of evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 1 x digital rape (count 2), 4 x aggravated assault causing harm (counts 1, 3, 4 and 5).
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction of above charges.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married. The appellant allegedly committed the rape by putting his hand under the complainant’s jeans at a train station platform. The assault (count 3) was alleged to have been committed soon after the rape when the couple was walking home from the train station. The remaining offences were committed in the matrimonial home.
Issues: The appellant appealed against the convictions on seven grounds (see [4]), all of which generally concerned the directions given to the jury by the Judge.
Decision and reasoning: appeal was allowed on grounds 3, 4, 5 and 7 and dismissed on grounds 1, 2 and 6. All convictions ordered on the District Court information were quashed and the matter was remitted for a new trial.
For the purposes of convenience, Kourakis CJ first dealt with the fifth ground of appeal in which the appellant contended the Judge erred in directing the jury to ignore a defence submission concerning the plausibility of the digital rape charge (see [49]-[50]). His Honour accepted this ground of appeal, claiming the Judge withdrew a legitimate and factually compelling submission ([50]) with the likely effect of leading the jury to interpret the Judge’s direction as withdrawing the defence counsel’s broader implausibility submission (of which this particular submission formed an integral part of) from their consideration ([51]).
The first ground of appeal was divided into two complaints; his Honour rejected the first complaint, stating it was unnecessary to draw the distinction in order to comply with s 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (see [53]). As to the second complaint, His Honour acknowledges that the Judge ought to have expressly directed the jury in relation to the impermissible use of the discreditable conduct evidence under s 34R(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). In failing to do this, the Judge was said to have failed to comply with the obligations laid out under s 34R(1). Nonetheless, such an omission did not occasion any miscarriage of justice and the second complaint was therefore rejected ([58]).
His Honour notes the merit of the second ground of appeal in stating that the Judge should have directed the jury as to the limited use that could be made of the alleged admissions ([59]). However, his Honour discerned no miscarriage of justice in this omission on the Judge’s part, particularly in light of the Judge’s cautionary observations ([45]-[46]) and the fact that the complainant’s evidence was proven unreliable in any event ([59]).
The third, fourth and seventh ground of appeal raised a particular issue that was considered through the relevant authorities (see [61]-[75]). Ultimately, his Honour allowed these grounds of appeal in recognising that the Judge placed undue weight to the evidence of distress.
R v Mark [2019] SASCFC 48 (9 May 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Grounds for interference’ – ‘Sentence manifestly excessive’
Charges: 1x aggravated assault, 1x breach of a suspended sentence bond.
Appeal type: appeal against sentence for the above offences.
Facts: the appellant punched his domestic partner in the face. In doing so, the appellant breached the intervention order in place at the time which prohibited the appellant from assaulting, threatening or intimidating his domestic partner. The appellant entered a guilty plea to the assault charge and the matter was transferred to the District Court for sentencing with the breached bond and other matters. An 11-month sentence was imposed for the aggravated assault while the suspended sentence was revoked and a six-month sentence (subject of the good behaviour bond) was ordered to be served cumulatively on the sentence for the aggravated assault.
Issues: the appellant’s grounds of appeal were two-fold. First, the sentence imposed for the aggravated assault was manifestly excessive ([6]). Second, the judge erred in sentencing the appellant on the basis that the offence was committed against a background of previous domestic violence ([6]).
Decision and reasoning: appeal was allowed, sentence imposed by trial Judge was set aside and the appellant was resentenced (see [36]).
His Honour first set out the authority and principles relevant to determining whether to interfere on appeal with a decision on sentence and whether a sentence is manifestly excessive ([17]-[21]).
His Honour rejected the appellant’s submission that the assault was on the lower end of the scale of seriousness. A single punch to the face was deemed serious by his Honour in light of the fatal consequences such an action may have had ([23]-[24]). It’s seriousness was also heightened by the fact it was committed with an intervention order in place at the time which aimed to protect the victim from the assault that occurred ([27]).
Whether the starting point of 18 months for a first offence of violence produced a sentence outside the permissible range for the offending and offender in question was determined in reference to multiple factors. First, the importance of specific and general deterrence in sentencing for offence of domestic violence lent some justification to the sentence imposed ([26]). Second however, the offender’s poor track record of responding to the leniency extended to him by the courts (see [10]) was considered in light of his personal and mitigating circumstances ([28]). Ultimately, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending, and having regard to the fact that the assault was the appellant’s first offence of violence, his Honour concluded that a starting point of 18 months was too high and outside the permissible range of sentences for this offending and this offender ([31]).
The second ground of appeal was allowed since the factual basis of the judge’s sentence lacked a sufficient foundation on the evidence presented to the court and wasn’t actually conceded by the appellant ([32]).
R v Adamson [2018] SASCFC 114 (11 November 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’
Charges: Arson x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of arson following jury trial. It was alleged that he deliberately lit a fire inside a townhouse in which he and his partner lived until their separation three weeks prior to the fire. His alibi was that he was at a lacrosse club at the time that the fire was lit. The prosecution relied upon a number of items of circumstantial evidence which it argued cumulatively showed the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues: The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, and in particular in consideration of his alibi. He contended that no reasonable jury could have rejected his alibi as a reasonable possibility.
Decision and reasoning: In considering the grounds of appeal, the Court applied the principle set out M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63, namely, whether, on the totality of the evidence, it would be open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty. On a thorough analysis of all the evidence, the Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that:
•
The evidence established that the fire in the townhouse had been deliberately lit. It also established that a few hours prior to the fire being lit, the appellant spoke of burning it down.
•
The strength of the evidence that supported the appellant’s alibi was a matter for the jury, to be considered in light of the other evidence presented in the trial.
•
There was a sufficient basis in the evidence for the jury to reject the appellant’s alibi as a reasonable possibility, and to find beyond reasonable doubt that he deliberately lit the fire.
R v Peet [2018] SASCFC 91 (5 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Children’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The circumstances of the offending were that early in the morning, following an argument with the respondent’s partner, during which she slapped, kicked and hit him with a vacuum cleaner pole, the respondent struck her with a crow bar at least six times. The respondent dragged her body to the laundry where he placed a cable tie around her neck and tightened it. The combined effect of the blows and the compression of her neck caused her death. Not long after this occurred the children woke. The respondent made breakfast for them. He then went outside and smoked a cigarette before returning inside. There was a knock at the door. The respondent put the children in their rooms and told them to be quiet. He did not answer the door and the people knocking went away. At some point, and possibly whilst the people were still at the front door, the respondent went back to each child. The respondent restrained the six-year-old with cable ties and placed a sock in her mouth, fixing it in position with packing tape. He placed a cable tie around her neck and tightened it. Her death was caused by the combined effect of suffocation and asphyxiation. The respondent also restrained the five-year-old with cable ties and asphyxiated him. His tongue was bruised suggesting that prior to death he too may have had something placed in his mouth obstructing his airway.
The sentencing Judge sentenced the respondent to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30-years to commence on the day the respondent was taken into custody. The sentencing Judge accepted that the respondent was experiencing a degree of dissociation when he killed the children. On appeal, the DPP contended that the 30-year non-parole period was manifestly inadequate, and submitted that the inadequacy was so great, having regard to the gravity of the offending, that the Court should increase the non-parole period to ensure the maintenance of adequate standards of punishment for the offence of murder. The respondent conceded that the non-parole period was manifestly inadequate and that it should be set aside and a new non-parole period fixed.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The Court took into account the respondent’s personal circumstances ([87]), loss felt by the family ([85]), and the value of human life. At [83]-[84], the Court noted that –
‘A just sentence in the present case must accord due recognition to the human dignity of three victims… It has been said that the value of human life is intrinsic. The murderer denies their victim life and all the potentialities that accompany living which are of inestimable worth. Speaking generally, that denial, that exaction, cost or loss, is magnified where the victim is a child. The younger and more innocent the child the more the murderer repulses us as a community and the more grave or heinous the act of murder because of the value we place on life.’
The punitive, protective and rehabilitative purposes of fixing a non-parole period were also relevant. The punitive purpose in particular reflected the gravity of the offending. The sentencing Judge found that the respondent intended to kill each victim. As King CJ said in R v Stewart (1984) 35 SASR 477, multiple murders fall into the worst category of offending. Therefore, condign punishment was afforded great weight. The Court also noted that the respondent should not be left without hope for spending some time in the community again in the future, as this promotes rehabilitation. The murder was not premeditated in the conventional sense. The murder also occurred in the context of a relationship characterized by domestic violence. The murder was described at [78] as being brutal and the final act cold and lacking in humanity. Citing Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600, ‘A just sentence must accord due recognition to the human dignity of the victim of domestic violence and the legitimate interest of the general community in the denunciation and punishment of a brutal, alcohol-fuelled destruction of a woman by her partner’. Although the sentencing Judge found that the respondent suffered a degree of dissociation at the time of the incident, this neither prevented him from forming the intent to kill nor did it prevent him from understanding the nature and quality of his actions. It helped him to depersonalize his two children, but did not prevent him taking action which he considered necessary for the purposes of his own self-preservation ([80]).
The Court found that the determination of a non-parole period in this case could not be reduced to a formula and that the totality principle was applicable to the setting of a non-parole period in relation to a life sentence for murder. The Court allowed the appeal and held that the non-parole period fixed by the sentencing Judge was manifestly inadequate. A non-parole period of 36 years was substituted. Although the respondent was entitled to a discount of up to 10% on the basis of his guilty pleas, to allow the respondent any further reduction would result in a non-parole period unacceptably disproportionate to the gravity of the offending which would vindicate the dignity of the victims ([90]).
R v Hibeljic [2018] SASCFC 35 (11 May 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Blackmail x 1; Knowingly distributing an invasive image x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the victim. They were both 18 years old. He threatened to distribute a video of the victim with her breasts exposed unless she had sex with him, and in fact distributed it to three people (her friend, new boyfriend and father). He knew that her father was of Syrian background, very strict and was likely to react harshly if he became aware of the video ([10]). Upon watching the video, her father subjected her to ‘significant physical harm’ in a ‘frightening and vicious physical attack’ ([22]). The victim’s relationship with her family was significantly damaged, and she was forced to leave Adelaide and abandon her tertiary education ([24]).
The sentencing judge sentenced the appellant to 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. It was significant that both offences involved a sexually explicit video of the victim, and the appellant’s gross betrayal of trust involved in distributing it ([45]). The blackmail was a ‘particularly serious instance’ of this type of offending ([46]). The appellant was aware of the likelihood of a serious and significant reaction on the part of the victim’s father ([51]).
The appellant submitted the sentencing judge did not properly take into account his youth, lack of criminal history, general good character and likelihood of rehabilitation ([60]). However, the Court held that the sentence of imprisonment, without suspension or home detention, was reasonably imposed ([63], [68] [81]).
R v Taheri [2017] SASCFC 115 (8 September 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Character reference’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of deportation’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Written reference’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Aggravated threatening harm x 2; Aggravated threatening life x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were married but separated. An intervention order was in place. The appellant broke into the complainant’s house while the complainant and her sister were inside. He cut through a flyscreen window with a knife and put a rope around the complainant’s throat. The appellant threatened to kill the complainant and hurt her sister if she did not withdraw the complaint she made to the police about him ([10]). The appellant came to Australia as a refugee and was living on a permanent residence visa.
The appellant was sentenced to a head sentence of five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years ([5]). The judge ordered partial concurrency to the extent of 12 months ([34]).
Issues: The appellant appealed on 4 grounds, that the judge erred in:
1.
failing to make a finding as to the risk the appellant posed to community safety in declining to make a home detention order under s 33BB Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1998 (SA) ([15]);
2.
the approach in relation to partial concurrency;
3.
her treatment of a written reference provided on behalf of the appellant;
4.
failing to consider the risk of deportation in imposing a sentence of more than 12 months ([7]).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
On the first ground, Nicholson J held that s 33BB Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1998 (SA) does not require a sentencing judge to make a specific finding as to the risk that an offender poses to the community. Nicholson J held that declining to order home detention was within the judge’s discretion ([31]).
On the second ground, Nicholson J held that it was open to the judge to discount the written reference as to character. The reference did not consider the appellant’s character apart from how he presented himself in a social setting ([20]-[22]).
On the third ground, Nicholson J held that concurrency between the sentences was within the judge’s discretion ([36])
On the fourth ground, Nicholson J held that on the assumption that the risk of deportation was relevant, the sentencing judge considered those matters ([46]).
R v Saunders [2017] SASCFC 86 (27 July 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Damage to property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’
Charges: Property damage x 1; Breach bail x 1; Contravening term of intervention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant went to the complainant’s residence, knocked on her bedroom window and then smashed the window by punching it ([10]). The appellant was subject a bail agreement and intervention order that prohibited him from approaching the complainant ([11]). The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 10 months and 22 days ([2]-[3]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed (see [29], [30] and [47]). Justice Stanley commented that ‘the very point’ of the appellant’s bail agreement and intervention order was that the complainant could feel safe and protected in her own home ([26]). His Honour emphasised that ‘the purpose of those instruments is to prevent acts of domestic violence which are often emotional and psychological as much as physical’ and which ‘can have profound consequences for the victim’ ([27]). Justice Hinton added that ‘it is important to the maintenance of confidence in the protection that intervention orders are intended to provide that the courts treat any breach as very serious’ (emphasis added), not only physical violence ([44]). The sentence was at the high end of the permissible range, but was not plainly wrong (see [28], [47]).
R v Sykes [2017] SASCFC 59 (31 May 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Burglary’ – ‘Contravention of a protection order’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Aggravated kidnapping x 1; Aggravated threaten life x 1; Aggravated indecent assault x 1; Aggravated assault causing harm x 1; Aggravated threaten harm x 2; and threaten harm x 1; Breach intervention order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim had been in a relationship ([6]-[7]). Shortly after the relationship had ended, the appellant entered the victim’s house at midnight ([9]). He bound her arms and legs, blindfolded her and removed her clothes ([11]). He told her that he was going to cut off her nipples, breasts and fingers, break her nose, penetrate her with objects, and drive her to a secluded place to make her suffer ([12]-[16]). The offending continued for at least several hours ([22]). The appellant pleaded guilty to the offences. He was sentenced to 11 years and one month imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Parker J, Vanstone J and Blue J agreeing, held that the sentence took into account all relevant factors, and the sentence was within an appropriate range.
Parker J stated at [33]:
‘Every person has a right to feel safe in their house and the appellant had violated the security and safety of the victim and also violated her personally. He had terrorised her for what must have been hours in her own home. In her view his behaviour appeared to have been deliberately designed to inflict the maximum amount of terror.’
Counsel for the appellant referred to two other cases concerning home invasions (R v Siviour [2016] SASCFC 51 and R v Stephen John Forbes DCCRM 15-1418 and 15-340). Parker J emphasised that conduct giving rise to charges of trespass and kidnapping may be extremely varied, and therefore the length of reasonable sentences may differ ([58]). His Honour considered that the appellant’s sexual offending against a former domestic partner was an aggravating factor not present in Siviour and Forbes ([59]). His Honour held that the sentencing judge balanced the appellant’s lack of criminal history, expression of remorse and strong work history, against the serious nature of the offending and the enormous impact on the victim ([62]).
R v Nelson [2017] SASCFC 40 (8 May 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘General and specific deterrence.’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Traumatic brain injury’
Charges: Causing serious harm with intent to cause serious harm x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim and defendant were formerly in a domestic partnership. The offences occurred on one occasion. In the presence of other people at their home, the defendant: grabbed the victim and dragged her outside; began to call her names; repeatedly hit her head and kick her head and body ([6]). The victim sustained an extremely severe traumatic brain injury, and was likely to be left with long-term cognitive defects ([7]). The sentencing judge had regard to the defendant’s disadvantaged background and low level of cognitive functioning (attributed to the defendant having sniffed petrol since he was four years old) (see [10]-[20], [26]-[27]).
The defendant was sentenced to 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of one year and six months.
Issues: The prosecution argued that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Court (Parker J, with Kourakis CJ and Nicholson J agreeing) found that this was an exceptional case that required intervention by the appellate court ([36]). Parker J considered that the sentence did not give enough weight to the need for general and specific deterrence in domestic violence offences. Parker J stated (at [45]-[47]) that:
“It was necessary for the sentencing judge to take into account, as his Honour did, the defendant’s background of disadvantage and social deprivation arising from his upbringing in a traditional and remote Aboriginal community. However, the fact that … the defendant had very recently been released after a period of imprisonment imposed for two assaults on a different female drinking companion operated to reduce the leniency that his personal circumstances might otherwise have attracted. Moreover, the attack by the defendant upon his domestic partner was particularly brutal and has had grave consequences for her … The sentence did not give appropriate effect to the views consistently expressed by this Court concerning the need to give significant weight to considerations of specific and general deterrence when sentencing defendants who have engaged in serious domestic violence.”
The defendant was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years.
R v Neilson [2016] SASCFC 90 (19 August 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm x 1; Aggravated assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and one of the complainants (J) were divorced ([8]). The appellant went to the matrimonial house, where J lived with her new partner (M), the other complainant ([10]). The appellant pushed the J and M into the house. The appellant grabbed M around the throat, pushed her against a wall and punched her ([11]). The appellant picked J up off the floor and threw her onto the dining table ([13]). M suffered ongoing damage to her eye and both women suffered psychological consequences ([17]).
Issues: Whether the judge erred in not suspending the sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant had favourable personal circumstances, including his lack of criminal history, little risk of reoffending, remorse and lack of planning in the attack ([25]-[33]). Bampton J held that the sentence was within range, and those factors were reflected in the fixing of the non-parole period at approximately 42 percent of the head sentence ([41]). The favourable factors were appropriately balanced with the unfavourable factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the ongoing injuries, the fact that the offences were committed in the victims’ home, and the fact that the offences constituted domestic violence ([43]).
R v Ritter [2016] SASCFC 88 (16 August 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault causing harm’ – ‘Causing harm with intent’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Threats to children’
Charge/s: Assault causing harm, causing harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim had been in a relationship for two years. His behaviour towards her had been violent and controlling. On 19 March 2014, the applicant was yelling abuse at the victim and she became so fearful she ran into the streets. He chased her and punched her in the face. On 22 April 2014, the applicant verbally abused the victim, hit her around the head with a pillow and punched her to the left side of her mouth. The second assault caused injuries requiring surgery. As a result of the two incidents, the victim had scars on the left and right sides of her mouth. There was also evidence of a number of uncharged acts. The applicant was sentenced to a total head sentence of six years and eleven months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of five years.
Issue/s:
1.
Fresh evidence, a psychologist’s report and a report from an officer of the Department of Correctional Services, ought to be admitted.
2.
The head sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in not having or seeking materials on which a proper assessment could be made of the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, Parker J held that the reports were not to be received as fresh evidence. The psychologist report could have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial, it added very little to what was before the sentencing judge, and the psychologist was not completely briefed on the applicant’s substantial criminal history. The report from Correctional Services also did not add anything significant to what would have been before the sentencing judge (see [50]-[67]).
Second, the head sentence was not manifestly excessive. This was in light of the gravity of the offending conduct, the abusive nature the relationship and the applicant’s significant criminal history of violence. Parker J further rejected the submission that the two sentences ought to have been served concurrently. The offending conduct occurred almost five weeks apart (see [78]-[86]). The non-parole period was also not manifestly excessive. Considerations of deterrence, prevention and punishment militated towards a relatively higher non-parole period, as did the nature of the offences and the context in which they occurred (see [87]-[91]).
Third, the sentencing judge did not err in concluding that the appellant had extremely poor prospects for rehabilitation. The appellant had a long criminal history, including numerous convictions for assaults (many involving domestic violence). He also had many convictions for breach of restraining orders, failure to comply with bail agreements and breaches of bonds (see [92]-[96]).
Parker J (Lovell and Nicholson JJ concurring) described the coercive control which the appellant subjected the victim to:
[19] When the victim was threatened or attacked by the appellant she would try to leave their flat, often running into nearby streets and parks and attempting to hide. The appellant would frequently chase her or track her down in order to continue his abuse.
[20] The appellant monitored the victim’s movements and rarely let her leave the house without him. He also controlled her finances, regularly forcing her to withdraw money from her account for his benefit, including so that he could buy drugs and alcohol.
[21] The appellant regularly threatened that if the victim reported any abuse to the police or left the relationship he would harm her and her children. She was too frightened to leave or to report the abuse to police, friends and family.
R v Gardiner [2015] SASCFC 107 (5 August 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the murder of his domestic partner. The applicant had camped with the victim in his car in an isolated location. The victim’s body was found in the car. Medical evidence relating to the nature of the injuries and the cause of death was led at trial. The trial judge found on the basis of this evidence that the victim suffered a severe beating. There was no dispute that the injuries were caused by the applicant. The trial was concerned with whether the evidence could prove that the injuries that the applicant inflicted caused her death and whether they were inflicted with an intention to cause grievous bodily harm.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the guilty verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the requisite intent for murder.
2.
Whether the judge misinterpreted the medical evidence in concluding that severe force was required to cause a certain injury.
3.
Whether the judge misused evidence of the applicant’s post-offence conduct, such as not calling an ambulance while claiming he had.
Decision and Reasoning: L eave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.
1.
There was a long history of violence in the relationship. The applicant had previously been charged with assaulting the victim. In this context and also taking into account the extent and number of injuries suffered by the victim, Kourakis CJ (with whom Blue J and Stanley JJ agreed) held that the trial judge was correct in concluding that the evidence showed beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause grievous bodily harm.
2.
The Court acknowledged that the judge did mistakenly conclude that the doctor’s evidence indicated that severe force was required to cause an injury to the victim’s liver. However, the judge did not reason from this misunderstanding to reach her conclusion. Instead, the judge reasoned that the applicant had the requisite intention from evidence of all the injuries, not just evidence of the liver injury. The judge then correctly reasoned from the nature and extent of the injuries that the applicant had intended to cause grievous bodily harm.
3.
The applicant lied to various witnesses that he had called an ambulance but it had not arrived. In fact, he did not call an ambulance. The Court found that the judge correctly used this evidence to show that he was aware how badly the victim was injured, and that his failure to call an ambulance showed he possessed the requisite intention.
R v McDonald [2015] SASCFC 99 (29 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Contemporaneity between intention and action’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of murdering his de facto partner. It was not in dispute that he inflicted the blows that caused her death. The pathologist’s view was that the appellant inflicted at least 50 blows. The injuries were inflicted over several hours, possibly intermittently. The issue at trial was whether he had inflicted these blows with the requisite intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The appellant was highly intoxicated at the time of the incident.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred by not directing the jury of the following - that it is necessary that the intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm exists contemporaneously with the infliction of the injuries that caused the victim’s death.
Decision and Reasoning:
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [4].
2.
The Court agreed that parts of the judge’s directions amounted to an error of law. A correct direction was initially given by the trial judge. This was – ‘The prosecution must prove that at the time that McDonald struck any collection of blows the combined effect of which was to cause a degree of internal bleeding…which caused LT’s death, he intended to kill her or cause her grievous bodily harm’ (see at [29]). However, the judge then gave subsequent directions to the jury. These directions stated that it was sufficient that the appellant formed an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm when any of the blows were struck, even if that particular blow (struck with the requisite intent) did not contribute to or cause the internal bleeding that led to her death. Other directions given by the judge were not capable of correcting this error. However, the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the proviso.
See also at [33] where Kourakis CJ (with whom Sulan J and Parker J agreed) noted that the inference of intention, ‘overwhelmingly supported as it is by the evidence of the beating, is reinforced by the evidence of the prior violence to which the appellant subjected LT in their relationship and his admission that he was enraged at the time. The appellant is more likely by reason of those related circumstances to have formed an intention to cause grievous bodily harm relatively early on in the course of the beating.’
R v Capaldo [2015] SASCFC 56 (28 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of firearm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charge/s: Various offences relating to the possession of a loaded, semi-automatic handgun.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: At trial, evidence was put before the judge relating to the violent behaviour of the appellant’s former partner. The appellant made a statement to police indicating that she obtained the handgun for her own protection. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence should have been suspended and whether the trial judge demonstrated pre-judgment and an appearance of bias.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. In a joint judgment, Gray and Sulan JJ found that the Judge impermissibly intervened in the trial process, giving rise to an appearance of bias in the eyes of a fair-minded lay observer. The judge constantly interrupted and in cross-examining the appellant, suggested that she was not willing to participate in a police interview, which was false. The Judge was also in error by not accepting the appellant’s explanation for the reasons that she possessed the firearm. The sentencing therefore proceeded on errors of fact. In resentencing, Gray and Sulan JJ acknowledged the serious nature of the offending, particularly that the gun was loaded and easily concealable. Counsel for the appellant conceded that a sentence of imprisonment was warranted. In mitigation, the appellant had no criminal history and had suffered serious abuse at the hands of her former partner, to the extent that she suffers from PTSD. As such, the head sentence was reduced to 17 months with a reduced non-parole period of 4 months and the sentence was also suspended upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour bond for 3 years. Kelly J also upheld the appeal but dissented with respect to re-sentencing and concluded that it should be remitted back to the District Court, given the disputed facts.
Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASCFC 58 (27 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Purpose of intervention orders’
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court who dismissed an appeal against a decision of a Magistrate who refused to make an interim intervention order.
Facts: The applicant brought an application for an interim intervention order in the Magistrates’ Court against the respondent (the applicant’s former girlfriend’s mother). The applicant claimed that the respondent had been bullying, cyber stalking and contacting his psychiatrist online and in person, as well as defaming him on the internet. The basis of his application was that it was reasonable to suspect that the respondent would commit an act of abuse against him by causing personal injury and criminal defamation on the internet. In the original appeal to a single judge of the Supreme Court, Peek J dismissed every ground of appeal - see Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASC 37. The applicant had a long history of psychiatric issues, and a psychiatrist’s report detailed the impact of the websites on his general well-being (See at [31] of Peek J’s decision).
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the applicant had a sufficient opportunity to present his application in the Magistrates’ Court.
2.
Whether the Magistrate correctly applied ss 8 and 10 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act) which define different types of abuse and sets out general principles which the Court must follow in considering intervention orders.
3.
Whether the Magistrate correctly exercised her discretion to refuse the applicant’s application and whether she should have found that there was evidence which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the respondent would commit an act of abuse.
4.
Whether the Magistrate correctly applied ss 6, 10 and 28 of the Act which set out what must be proven in an intervention order application.
Decision and Reasoning: All aspects of the Supreme Court decision (Peek J - Rana v Gregurev [2015] SASC 37) were upheld by the Full Court.
1.
This argument had no substance – he appeared before the Magistrate on four occasions. The Magistrate was concerned to ascertain the detail of the case.
2.
Peek J (in the Supreme Court) noted at [14]-[15] that the purpose of the Act is to, ‘protect people when it is reasonable to suspect that somebody…will, without intervention, commit an act of abuse’. His Honour also noted that because abuse is defined so broadly, it is important for the courts to ensure that this does not result in the Act being abused through ‘specious or unwarranted claims’ which will have ‘detrimental consequences’ to the courts and to people who become the subject of unwarranted orders. The Magistrate correctly applied the Act to conclude that it was not reasonable to suspect that without an intervention order there would be any further abuse.
3.
In dismissing ground 3, the Court noted that the crucial issue is not whether acts of abuse had been committed in the past, but whether, without an intervention order, such acts would be committed again, and whether the imposition of such an order is appropriate in the circumstances.
4.
The Court found the Magistrate correctly approached the task in the application which was to decide whether there was a reasonable suspicion that an act of abuse would occur.
R v Koch [2015] SASCFC 31 (27 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Causing serious harm with intent’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of guilty plea’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: C riminal trespass in a place of residence, causing serious harm with intent and using a motor vehicle without consent.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim of the offending was the mother of the respondent’s former partner. After entering her house by the back door, he questioned her about his relationship with her daughter. He became enraged, at which point he restrained her, pushed her to the floor and punched her multiple times to the side of the head. He provided no medical assistance to her and left her lying unconscious on the floor. The victim sustained lasting injuries as a result of the offending. The sentencing judge’s starting point was 6 years’ imprisonment. Taking into account his pleas of guilty, the respondent was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning:
In granting permission and allowing the appeal, the Court noted the high maximum penalties, (life imprisonment for criminal trespass and 20 years for causing serious harm with intent) and the relatively insignificant mitigating factors. The offending was ‘particularly brutal’ (See at [35]). Parker J (Kourakis CJ and Bampton J concurring) held that the notional starting point of 6 years was manifestly inadequate and the sentence itself was not adequate to amount to general deterrence or just punishment. See in particular at [42] – ‘General deterrence is a very important consideration in sentencing for offences of violence committed in the course of domestic disputes. The sentence imposed fails to provide the level of general deterrence necessary to ensure public confidence in the enforcement of the criminal law in this fraught area.’ The Court also found that the trial judge’s 25% discount for the guilty plea was too high. The respondent ‘had no practicable option other than to plead guilty’ (see at [46]), which needed to be taken into account in determining the quantum of the discount. The total effective sentence was therefore increased to six years and eight months (applying a 20% discount for the guilty plea), with the non-parole period set at four years and two months.
Groom v Police [2014] SASCFC 125 (19 November 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Consent to confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court.
Facts: After the appeal in Groom v Police (No 3) was upheld, the matter was remitted back to the Magistrates’ Court, where confirmation of the interim intervention order was again made. The applicant consented to the order following negotiation with the prosecution who agreed to withdraw 31 charges for breach of the order. The applicant then appealed to a single judge of the Supreme Court (Kelly J), and argued that consent should be withdrawn because he was under ‘enormous stress’ and had been ‘railroaded’ (See at [7]). Kelly J refused permission to appeal because the applicant’s counsel had been properly briefed to represent him in the Magistrates’ Court, the consent to the confirmation was informed, the applicant was present throughout the process and he raised no objection and confirmed to the Magistrate that he would accept the order. This was different to the hearing considered in Groom v Police (No 3), where the applicant was in custody and believed he could not properly defend the proceedings.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant could withdraw his consent to the intervention order and have the confirmation set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: Permission to appeal was refused. The applicant submitted to the Full Court that he was denied natural justice because he was not provided with a copy of the transcript from the Magistrates’ Court hearing, and questioned the ‘officiality’ of the transcript on which Kelly J had relied. He also questioned the behavior of members of Police Prosecutions in relation to their conduct with the transcript. The appeal was dismissed – the Court held that the applicant did not identify how the missing transcript caused prejudice. The differences in the arguments in this appeal compared to Groom v Police (No 3) were stark. It is likely that the applicant’s ‘ongoing and deeply felt grievance against his former partner’ were the cause of the continuing appeals rather than any legal error.
R v Barnes [2014] SASCFC 79 (18 July 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault causing harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing harm (two counts) – Circumstance of aggravation: that the victim was the defendant’s domestic partner.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant discovered messages from his cousin to his de facto partner on her phone. After waking her up at 3am to question her about these messages, he hit her on the left side of the head before he gave her time to explain. This caused bleeding. He then pinned her down after she tried to break free. Their son, who was sleeping in the same room, witnessed the defendant hitting the complainant. A similar incident occurred the following evening. The defendant punched her to the right of the face with a closed fist and hit her in the right eye. He tried to strangle the complainant who could still breathe so she pretended to pass out. He held up her phone, put it on a coffee table and stomped on it which caused the phone and the table to break. After carrying their son towards his bedroom, he kicked her on the lower back despite her begging him not to hit her again. His criminal history included many driving offences as well as dishonesty and drug offences. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for each count to be served cumulatively, with a non-parole period of 18 months. The judge stated he reduced the sentence by 25% on account of the guilty plea.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the sentences should have been made concurrent.
3.
Whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in respect of concurrency.
1.
Gray J (with whom Peek and Stanley JJ agreed) firstly noted that the offences were unprovoked. The defendant was woken from sleep and defenceless. The Court then acknowledged the various mitigating factors, including the defendant taking steps towards rehabilitation and the fact that he had formed a new relationship with no evidence of domestic violence. However, in applying the authorities which indicate the seriousness of domestic violence and the need for strong personal and general deterrence and noting the defendant’s long criminal history of defying court orders, the Court held that a head sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence was open. See in particular from [17] – [22] for a summary of the relevant authorities.
2.
The Court noted that when there are two truly separate occurrences of criminal conduct, cumulative sentences are likely to be appropriate. When a number of offences form a course of criminal conduct, concurrent sentences are likely to be appropriate. As such, the Court held that the sentence should have included some element of concurrency because the offending was, in substance, a course of conduct separated by a short period of time. Partial concurrency of 6 months was appropriate. As such, the 18 month sentence for the second count was made concurrent for 6 months, so that the total effective sentence became 2 years and 6 months.
3.
This argument was rejected. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to not suspend the sentence notwithstanding the applicable mitigating factors. The offending was extremely serious, cowardly and brutal. Furthermore, it partly took place in the presence of a child, who became distressed on the second occasion.
R v Nedza [2013] SASCFC 142 (18 December 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempting to dissuade a witness’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Concurrency’ – ‘Creating risk of harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Rape (two counts), creating a risk of harm, attempting to dissuade a witness, breach of bail, breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Application for permission to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attended the home of his former partner and then proceeded to threaten her with a knife, assault her multiple times, commit two acts of anal rape, threaten her daughter and parents and caused her to swallow petrol. He had possession of a cigarette lighter and threatened to set her alight. He also pressed the knife against their sleeping baby’s cheek. The respondent then, through his sister offered to pay the complainant money if she dropped the charges. All of the conduct was in breach of bail and a domestic violence restraining order. The respondent’s criminal history included multiple instances of prior violent offences committed against the complainant and her mother which demonstrate a pattern of domestic violence. The respondent pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced to a total term of imprisonment of 10 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and six months, imposed concurrently with a sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment for different offences.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Permission to appeal was granted and the respondent was re-sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years. The Crown submitted that the sentence failed to reflect the seriousness of the offending and the need for deterrence (personal and general). Gray J (with whom Stanley J agreed) agreed with this argument and noted the offending involved various aggravating factors including that it was committed in breach of bail and the restraining order, the presence of children, the use of a knife and the putting of a knife on the head of a sleeping baby. His Honour concluded that the sentencing judge did not give sufficient consideration to these mitigating factors.
See in particular at [46] – ‘In seeking and obtaining a restraining order against the defendant, the complainant had sought the law’s protection against violence inflicted by her former partner, the defendant. Despite this and in breach of that restraining order, the complainant was again the victim of violent offending of a most serious nature. The restraining order ought to have demonstrated to the defendant in the clearest terms the seriousness with which domestic violence is regarded both by the courts and by wider society. The fact that the offending occurred in breach of that order is a serious matter of aggravation and a significant factor in my conclusion that the sentence imposed by the Judge was manifestly inadequate.’
Nicholson J also upheld the appeal and made the same orders but made some additional comments regarding concurrency and double punishment in sentencing. His Honour noted that it was appropriate to deal with the breaches of bail and restraining orders (both summary offences) together with the more serious offences. However, it was important to avoid any double punishment in doing so, especially when the more serious offences were ‘aggravated by and assumed colour and context from’ (see at [102]) the summary breach offences. The trial judge ordered separate sentences and made them partially or wholly concurrent. However, ‘the success of this approach depends upon being able to notionally but accurately separate out that component of the sentence nominated for the two summary offences which represents the aggravating feature with respect to the principal offences. Only by being able to do this can a sentencing Judge accurately identify the extent to which, if at all, partial or full concurrency ought to be ordered. Adopting the approach of sentencing separately for the two summary offences where those offences also aggravated the principal offences enhances the risk of an overall under-punishment or over (double) punishment (see at [103])’ – (see further at [105]). His Honour concluded that in this case, the best approach was to impose a single sentence for all offences as opposed to ordering individual sentences with partial and whole concurrency periods. Concurrency and totality however still should not be overlooked when employing that approach.
R v M, AG [2013] SASCFC 39 (24 May 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Rape x 5; Theft x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant was the victim’s (M) former partner ([1]). The defendant had been arrested and granted bail on multiple occasions for offences committed against M ([6]-[10]). The present offences occurred when the defendant attended M’s home while on bail. He pushed her into the house, leaving their baby in the car. He took a sledgehammer that M left inside her house for her own protection. He threatened to rape her with it, and then proceeded to force her to perform fellatio on him, vaginally and anally raped her, and forced the hammer of the sledgehammer into her vagina ([12]).
The defendant initially pleaded not guilty and provided an alibi notice, but after the prosecution presented him with evidence disproving the alibi notice, the defendant pleaded guilty ([15]). The defendant was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years. The judge declined to make an intervention order ([2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate and whether the judge erred in failing to make an intervention order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was almost doubled to 13 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 years ([55]). The Court also imposed an intervention order with the sentence ([64]).
Sulan J (Vanstone and Peek JJ agreeing) held that the sentencing judge appeared to have overlooked the brutality and seriousness of the offending and placed too much weight on the appellant's personal circumstances ([45]-[46]). His Honour said that ‘personal and general deterrence must take precedence over the personal circumstances of the defendant’ ([46]).
The offences were serious because they occurred in the victim’s own home ([29]), the defendant had a criminal history that suggested a disregard for the law ([34]) and the terrifying nature of the weapon used ([41]). The pleas of guilty did not demonstrate genuine contrition, coming only after his alibi evidence had been disproved ([47]). The fact that the defendant and victim were previously in a relationship was not a mitigating factor ([42]).
R v Maiolo (No 2) [2013] SASCFC 36 (16 May 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence of discreditable conduct’ – ‘Evidence of initial complaint’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unlawful sexual intercourse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault (five counts), Unlawful sexual intercourse (four counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Three of the complainants were sisters. The fourth complainant was the appellant’s daughter. The appellant’s partner was the elder sister of the three complainants but was not a complainant.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned -
1.
Whether the evidence of one of the sisters established an initial complainant within the meaning of s 34M(6) of the Evidence Act 1929.
2.
Whether evidence of previous ‘uncharged acts’ constituted relationship evidence, and whether the trial judge correctly directed the jury in relation to the permissible use of such evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
At trial, there was evidence that one of the sisters had a conversation with police and a counsellor regarding allegations of sexual misbehaviour by the appellant. The content of these conversations were unclear and it was not clear whether the sister was referring to sexual offending against herself or other persons. The trial judge directed the jury to the effect that they could use this evidence to assess (and possibly bolster) her evidence as well as the evidence of the other complainants. This was an error of law – the complaint was not sufficiently clear. The complaint did not make clear who the subject of the offending was. It was also unclear which particular incident it referred to. The convictions were set aside.
2.
Evidence of prior ‘uncharged acts’ were admitted under s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 as relationship evidence. See at [50]-[52] where Peek J, (with whom Kourakis CJ and Stanley J agreed) outlined the operation of s 34P in its common law context. Section 34R required the judge to (among other things) explain the purpose for which such evidence can and cannot be used. The trial judge, in her directions to the jury, referred to the evidence in question throwing light on the ‘nature of the relationship’ or providing ‘context’ (see at [110]). She did not elaborate further on the purpose of the evidence. Peek J found that these directions were deficient. See at [111] - ‘With respect, the use of vague words such as “context” or “relationship” without specific elaboration and guidance to the jury was rightly criticised by Doyle CJ in R v Nieterink [1999] SASC 560 where his Honour made the important point that while evidence of uncharged acts may be admissible under heads of relevance which tend to recur in various cases that come before the courts, it is crucial that the Judge, first, positively determines that the particular evidence of discreditable conduct does satisfy a head of relevance in the particular case and, second, gives very clear directions as to how such evidence may, and may not, be used.’ See also at [54]-[57], where his Honour commented on the construction of s 34P and specifically how to determine whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect on the accused.
R v Fleming [2011] SASCFC 41 (10 May 2011) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of domestic violence inadvertently led’ – ‘Persistent sexual exploitation’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Persistent sexual exploitation.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted by a jury of persistent exploitation of a five-and-a-half-year-old girl. The prosecution alleged that the appellant had been in a relationship with the girl’s mother and that he committed at least more than one act of sexual exploitation. At trial, evidence was inadvertently admitted that the complainant was seeing a domestic violence counsellor. Further evidence about the appellant’s aggressive and sometimes violent behaviour was also put before the Court. Following a question from the jury during deliberations, the judge directed the jury to ignore all of the evidence relating to the domestic violence counsellor and the appellant’s aggressive behaviour because it was not relevant to whether the appellant had committed the offences.
Issue/s: Whether the judge should have discharged the jury after the evidence of alleged domestic violence by the appellant was inadvertently led. Alternatively, whether the directions given by the trial judge when he refused to discharge the jury were inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: David J (Kourakis J and Sulan J concurring) dismissed the appeal. David J firstly noted at [23] that, ‘in cases involving allegations of sexual impropriety in domestic situations evidence of extraneous violence is often allowed for many reasons. Such evidence is often relevant to the question of the relationship between the parties or providing a reason or reasons as to why an alleged victim may not complain.’ This did not apply in this case, as the prosecution did not seek to introduce the evidence. Rather, it came out inadvertently. While David J was concerned that the judge’s direction could have given the jury an impression that there was some ‘sinister impermissible material’ (see at [31]) that had not been introduced, his directions regarding the irrelevance of the evidence were clear and he correctly warned against propensity reasoning. As such, while the situation was not ideal, it did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.
R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 53 A Crim R 362; (1992) 56 SASR 114; [1991] SASC 2951 (28 June 1991) – South Australia Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Expert evidence - psychologist’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The two female appellants were in a relationship with a man named Hill. There was a consistent pattern of domineering and violent conduct by Hill towards both appellants. The appellants were part of a plan to help Hill forcibly confine the complainant and cause her injury. At trial, they sought to admit expert evidence of ‘battered woman syndrome’ to support a claim of duress. The trial judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible on the ground that the test for duress was objective and expert evidence of the state of mind of the appellants was therefore irrelevant.
Issue/s: Whether the expert evidence of battered woman syndrome ought to have been admissible to support a claim of duress.
Decision and Reasoning: King CJ (with whom Bollen and Legoe JJ agreed) held that the evidence ought to have been admissible and a re-trial was ordered. In reaching this decision, King CJ first held that the trial judge’s reason did not provide a sound basis for excluding the evidence. It ignored the subjective aspect of the test for duress and it also misunderstood the main thrust of the proffered evidence. While the expert might have been in a position to comment on the state of mind of the appellants, the primary thrust of such evidence was to establish a pattern of responses commonly exhibited by battered women. At [23]:
‘The proffered evidence is concerned not so much with the particular responses of these appellants as with what would be expected of women generally, that is to say women of reasonable firmness, who should find themselves in a domestic situation such as that in which the appellants were. It is designed to assist the court in assessing whether women of reasonable firmness would succumb to the pressure to participate in the offences. It also serves to explain why even a woman of reasonable firmness would not escape the situation rather than participate in criminal activity. As such it is relevant’.
Second, King CJ considered whether expert evidence of battered woman syndrome met the essential pre-requisite that it had been accepted by experts in the field of psychology or psychiatry as a scientifically accepted facet of psychology. Following significant consideration of scientific literature, at [24] and [26], King CJ held that the evidence was admissible:
‘It is not sufficient, in order to justify the admission of expert evidence of the battered woman syndrome, as was argued by counsel for the appellant, that the ordinary juror would have no experience of the situation of a battered woman. Jurors are constantly expected to judge of situations, and of the behaviour of people in situations, which are outside their experience. Much conduct which occupies the attention of the criminal courts occurs in the criminal underworld, or in sordid conditions and situations, of which jurors would generally have no experience. It is not considered to be beyond the capacity of juries, or of the Court if it is the trier of the facts, to judge of the reactions and behaviour of people in those situations. Expert evidence of how life in criminal or sordid conditions might affect a person's responses to situations, would not be admitted.
‘This is an area in which the courts must move with great caution. The admission of expert evidence of patterns of behaviour of normal human beings, even in abnormal situations or relations, is fraught with danger for the integrity of the trial process. The risk that, by degrees, trials, especially criminal trials, will become battle grounds for experts and that the capacity of juries and courts to discharge their fact-finding functions will be thereby impaired is to be taken seriously. I have considered anxiously whether the situation of the habitually battered woman is so special and so outside ordinary experience that the knowledge of experts should be made available to courts and juries called upon to judge behaviour in such situations. In the end, I have been impressed by what I have read of the insights which have been gained by special study of the subject, insights which I am sure would not be shared or shared fully by ordinary jurors. It seems to me that a just judgment of the actions of women in those situations requires that the court or jury have the benefit of the insights which have been gained’.
Supreme Court
R v Gawel [2021] SASC 67 (1 June 2021) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Covid-19 delays’ – ‘Home detention’ – ‘No prior domestic violence convictions’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 2, Choke, suffocate or strangle a person in a domestic setting x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of bail.
Issues: Whether special circumstances justified bail.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were in a domestic relationship. The applicant was convicted of trespass offences and released on home detention bail. Within 48 hours of his release, the applicant was charged with three domestic violence offences, remanded in custody, and denied bail. The applicant applied for a review of the Magistrate’s decision, arguing that if he was denied bail his time spent in custody would likely exceed the sentence imposed if convicted of the alleged domestic violence offences [1]-[3].
Decision and Reasoning: Bail granted.
Justice Parker found that special circumstances existed to justify the applicant’s release on bail for two reasons:
1.
The applicant’s time spent in custody would likely exceed the sentence imposed if convicted.
2.
The applicant was no longer in a relationship with the victim and the proposed home detention bail address was 13 km from the victim’s home [1]-[2].
His Honour granted bail on strict home detention conditions, with electronic monitoring and a guarantee by the applicant’s friend with whom he would be residing [2]. His Honour adopted the reasoning of Livesey J in Homsi v The Queen [2020] SASC 242, who found that a ‘delay of… two years until… trial when combined with the fact that the complainant was no longer in a relationship with the applicant and that her whereabouts were not known to him was sufficient to amount to special circumstances’ [23]. His Honour accepted the applicant’s submission that ‘based on the most recent District Court listings’ the applicant faced two years in custody awaiting trial [10]. His Honour noted that this delay was due to Covid-19. Furthermore, His Honour found that the applicant’s ‘alleged conduct [was] less serious than… in Homsi’ and noted that he had no prior domestic violence convictions [25], [27].
Homsi v The Queen [2020] SASC 242 (8 December 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Impact of covid19’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Unlawful imprisonment’ – ‘Victim credibility’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: 9 charges including aggravated assault, unlawful imprisonment and detention and unlawful choking under s 20A(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), most in circumstances of aggravation, that the applicant committed the offence knowing the complainant was a person with whom he was, or was formerly, in a relationship.
Facts: The applicant was in custody from April 2020. The charges relate to incidents of alleged violence towards the male applicant’s female partner in November and December 2019. The November incidents included allegations of threatening and forcing the complainant to take her to a car using a knife and shooting her with a gel pellet gun repeatedly over a 2 hour period.
The December allegations include refusing the complainant permission to leave her apartment while seriously assaulting her, including hitting the complainant in the head twice with the blunt side of a machete, slapping her in the face, threatening her whilst holding the machete, stating that the applicant was “going to gaol today for murder”, putting a blowtorch near the complainant’s face and, later, holding a pillow against her face, restricting the complainant’s breathing, causing her to fear that she might lose consciousness. On the same day, two superficial lacerations were caused to the complainant’s throat with the machete, together with a large defensive laceration to the complainant’s finger. She escaped and contacted police and a blowtorch and machete were recovered from the scene. Police abandoned a chase for safety reasons and the complainant was subsequently found to be resident in Victoria.
The applicant has a history of failure to comply with bail conditions. A prosecutor initially expressed concerns as to the complainant’s credibility and did not oppose bail in the Magistrates Court, seemingly because the complainant visited the applicant in Victoria and has a serious drug dependency. At the time of the instant application these concerns were expressed as matters for trial.
Proceedings: Application for review of denial of bail.
Issues: As a prescribed applicant within the meaning of s 10(2) of the Bail Act 1985 (SA), the applicant must show "special circumstances" within the meaning of s 10A(1) of the Act.
Held: Application allowed:
1.
Special circumstances exist for two reasons:
(a)
While the alleged offending is very serious, the applicant and the complainant are no longer in a relationship and the complainant's whereabouts are not known to the applicant. The prosecution accepts that there are issues regarding the credibility of the complainant.
(b)
The applicant has been in custody in connection with these matters since April 2020. The matter is unlikely to be tried until the first half of 2022, with the delays exacerbated by the recent lockdowns associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.
2.
Bail is granted on strict home detention conditions, supported by a guarantee.
R v Sumner [2020] SASC 231 (4 December 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Aggravated assault against a child or spouse x 8; Choke, suffocate or strangle a person in a domestic setting x 3; Aggravated threaten to kill or endanger life x 1; Aggravated assault that causes harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for review of bail.
Facts: The allegations related to the applicant man’s former domestic partner and their two year old daughter. The applicant was originally granted bail by a Magistrate in May 2020, which was then revoked on an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to review the decision. An application for bail before the Chief Magistrate in September 2020 was refused. This review application related to a further refusal of an application for bail made in November 2020. The key factor that the respondent relied on was that the complainants had moved to Queensland.
Issues: Whether the complainants’ move to Queensland altered the position such that it could be said there were “special circumstances”, pursuant to s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA).
Decision and reasoning: Bail was granted under strict home detention conditions.
The applicant was a prescribed person for the purposes of s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) which provides that bail is not to be granted unless the applicant demonstrates the existence of special circumstances justifying release on bail. The court was also required to have regard to the matters specified in s 10, including the gravity of the alleged offences (s 10(1)(a)) and the need that the victim may have, or perceive, for physical protection from the applicant (s 10(4)) (at [11]).
Not without hesitation, the Court was prepared to conclude that there was a fundamental change of circumstances with the complainants’ relocation to Queensland. This, in combination with other matters, particularly the support from the applicant’s father, the proposal of monitored, home detention bail in the applicant’s family home and the applicant’s lack of offending history outside of the relationship, was capable of amounting to special circumstances justifying the applicant’s release on bail (at [31]). Had the complainants not moved to Queensland for their protection the Court would have refused bail (at [32]).
Brook v Police [2020] SASC 131 (16 July 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Appeal against conviction by magistrate’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Child victim’ – ‘Stepchild in the family’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal.
Facts: The appellant man and the complainant’s mother were domestic partners. The complainant (child) gave evidence that his mother told him it was not safe for him to be at home and told him to go to his father’s house. The complainant did not leave the house and later had a verbal exchange with the appellant. The appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat, he then pushed him, and the complainant fell. The appellant straddled the complainant and punched him multiple times. The appellant relied on the defences of removing a trespasser and self-defence.
Grounds for appeal: (1) The magistrate wrongly rejected the appellant’s barrister’s application to appear as amicus curiae; (2) The magistrate erred in refusing to disqualify himself for apprehended bias; (3) The magistrate erred in his approach to witness evidence.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed on Ground 3. Conviction quashed and matter remitted to a different magistrate. (1) Administration of justice overwhelmingly favoured giving leave to counsel to appear as amicus curiae. However, the magistrate’s error in failing to allow counsel to appear did not cause a miscarriage of justice. (2) The course the magistrate took in relation to the trial, including allegedly referring to the complainant as the ‘victim’, did not establish any substantial ground for a reasonable apprehension of bias. (3) The magistrate based his rejection of the mother’s evidence on the acceptance of the child’s evidence. Appeal allowed based on errors in assessing witness evidence as well as a failure to consider the defence of removing a trespasser.
BRK v Police [2020] SASC 116 (26 June 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Home detention’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Property damage’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; property damage x 1; resist police x 1; breach of intervention order x 2
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist.
Facts: The appellant man was sentenced to 5 months and 2 weeks imprisonment suspended after 2 months upon the appellant entering into a good behaviour bond for 2 years. At sentencing the appellant conceded incarceration was appropriate but argued it should either be wholly suspended under s 96 Sentencing Act 2017 (the ‘Act’) or served on home detention pursuant to s 71 of the Act.
The appellant and his daughter argued and she rang her mother (the victim and his former domestic partner) to ask her to collect her. The appellant was argumentative, aggressive and assaulted the victim by pushing her towards the wall. The appellant also damaged the victim’s vehicle. A mental health assessment deemed the appellant suicidal (he had a history of depression and bi-polar disorder). He resisted police when arrested 5 days later and breached an intervention order by failing to attend the Safe Relationships Abuse Prevention Program, and sending a SMS message to the victim asking for a character reference.
Grounds: That the Magistrate erred:
1.
By imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive in that an immediate custodial sentence was imposed and the sentence was not wholly suspended;
2.
In the alternative to ground 1, in declining to order that the custodial sentence be served on home detention under s 71;
3.
In erring in the approach taken to the ‘sentencing hierarchy’, in particular, the interpretation and application of ss 71 and 96.
4.
In the alternative to ground 3, in failing to provide adequate reasons for refusing to order that the appellant serve the custodial sentence on home detention.
Held:
1.
The Magistrate erred in failing to consider whether the sentence of imprisonment should be served on home detention. Section 71(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) does not prevent a sentencing court from considering home detention where partial suspension is in contemplation.
2.
The Magistrate erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for declining to order that the term of imprisonment be served on home detention.
3.
The parties will be heard on the factual basis on which the Court should exercise its discretion when considering whether to re-sentence the appellant.
It is a benefit of suspension under s 96 that a bond with a duration longer than the period of incarceration can be imposed with scope for supervision and directed counselling to facilitate ongoing rehabilitation [98]. Home detention cannot be ‘partially’ ordered under s 71, only ordered for the whole term of a sentence of imprisonment. If some period of imprisonment is considered necessary home detention must be rejected in favour of partial suspension [101]. In deciding whether to make a home detention order, the paramount consideration is community safety, whether that is the offender’s family in the case of domestic violence or the community generally [102]. Another important factor is whether a home detention order "would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice", in which case it must not be made. The sentencing court must consider the impact home detention is likely to have on the victim, spouse, domestic partner or any other person residing with the offender ([103]). The sentencing court must also reflect on whether home detention exposes the community and domestic violence victims to safety risks. The fact that the Magistrate was prepared to partially suspend the sentence suggested the appellant is not currently thought to represent an immediate threat. It also appeared that the appellant had been on bail without incident pending the outcome of this appeal [104].
As his Honour had little information about the steps taken to assist with the appellant’s rehabilitation, the availability of courses or counselling for his difficulties in managing violence and intimate relationships, and his current work and family circumstances, he proposed to stand the matter over for further submissions or evidence on the factual basis on which the Court should exercise its discretion when considering whether to re-sentence the appellant [106].
Note: On 17 July 2020 the appellant withdrew this appeal with the result that the appeal was dismissed and the matter did not proceed to resentencing.
Coleman v Police [2020] SASC 66 (30 April 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’ – ‘Withdrawal and restoration of plea’ – ‘Withdrawal of legal representation’
Offences: Assault x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issue: Whether the appellant’s lack of legal representation when he entered guilty pleas amounted to a miscarriage of justice.
Facts: The appellant, an Aboriginal man, assaulted his female ex-partner by punching her three or four times in the face and throwing a shoe at her. He had been represented by different solicitors from the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement in the Magistrates Court on at least four occasions with respect to the charge, but the matter had not been progressed. The appellant’s solicitor withdrew from the file after the appellant indicated in open court that he wanted to plead guilty and "get it over and done with" [6]. The Magistrate informed the appellant that she was "likely, potentially to impose a period of imprisonment as a penalty" [6]. She sentenced him to five months’ imprisonment and imposed an intervention order prohibiting him from contacting the victim, except for telephone or text contact for the purpose of child access arrangements. The appellant appealed on the ground that he had not been represented and therefore the Magistrate should not have accepted his guilty plea, and that the Magistrate misled him about the consequences that would flow from the pleas and induced the appellant to plead at the hearing.
Judgment: The judge dismissed the appeal, holding that there had been no miscarriage of justice due to lack of legal representation. The appellant understood the charges to which he was pleading, the Magistrate explained the seriousness of the offences and that the appellant was likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment, and the appellant volunteered his wish to plead [14]. The appellant had also been legally represented over the several months prior to the hearing and had accepted an opportunity to receive legal advice [20]. His Honour emphasised that the appellant was entitled to proceed unrepresented and that "the withdrawal of legal representation before the appellant entered his pleas is not, in isolation, a ground which can justify appellate interference" [20].
His Honour also held that there was no miscarriage of justice in respect of the appellant being induced to plea, because the appellant entered his pleas voluntarily, "free of any pressure or threat" [19].
Butler v The Queen [2020] SASC 74 (16 April 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for review of bail’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic to bail application’ – ‘Weapon-protection order’
Offences: Aggravated assault x 2, contravention of intervention order
Proceedings: Application for review of bail
Issue: Whether special circumstances exist for the granting of bail.
Facts: The appellant man was charged with aggravated assault against his female former partner on two separate occasions and contravention of an intervention order. The appellant punched the back of the victim’s head, struck her with a water bottle, and punched and kicked her in the head on several occasions. A Magistrate refused bail but the appellant sought a review of this decision, contending that special circumstances existed for the granting of bail, pursuant to s 10A Bail Act 1985 (SA).
Judgment: Kourakis CJ dismissed the appellant’s application for review of the bail decision, holding that no combination of the appellant’s circumstances was sufficient to constitute special circumstances indicating that he, as someone charged with assaulting a domestic partner in breach of an intervention order, should be admitted to bail [5]. His Honour did note the systematic and endemic disadvantage of Indigenous people [7] (particularly where they are imprisoned [8]) and the burden of being imprisoned during the COVID-19 pandemic with its attendant restrictions [9]. However, His Honour ultimately held that the presumption against bail applies to all bail (even home detention bail) [14] and the appellant failed to establish special circumstances. Furthermore, the appellant had breached bail orders and intervention orders in past and the charged offences were serious in themselves [4]. His Honour highlighted that "the underlying problem is not [the appellant’s] relationship with the victim … but the alleged resort to violence in dealing with interpersonal conflict" [15]. His Honour did provide that a fresh review of the question of bail would arise, however, if it appeared in the future that a trial was a long way off or that the appellant’s mental health was deteriorating [17].
Peel v Police [2020] SASC 48 (7 April 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Breach of suspended sentence’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Protection order’
Offences: Contravening a term of an intervention order x2; aggravated assault x1; failing to comply with a bail agreement x1; and driving under disqualification or suspension x 1
Type of Appeal: Appeal against sentence following breach of suspended sentence of imprisonment
Ground: The Sentencing Magistrate erred in the exercise of his discretion pursuant to s 114(3) of the Sentencing Act 2017 in that:
•
the learned Magistrate did not give adequate or appropriate consideration to the terms of the section and the meaning of "proper grounds" therein; and
•
gave undue weight to considerations personal to the Appellant including his criminal history, as opposed to the circumstances of the breach itself, such that the sentencing process miscarried.
Facts: The appellant man was convicted of two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order, aggravated assault, failing to comply with a bail agreement and driving under disqualification or suspension on 2 September 2019. He was sentenced to four months and 15 days imprisonment to be suspended after one month upon entering into a 15 months good behaviour bond. With backdating the bond was entered into on 13 September 2019. Since 17 October 2016 the appellant had been the subject of an intervention order for three years. Condition 3 of the order read "the defendant must not be within 100 metres of the protected persons". The appellant breached this order by being found with the protected person (his female former partner) in the front yard of his family member on 23 October 2019. He was visiting family and while he was at their home the protected person attended. He did not know she would be there and nothing untoward happened between them. It was a chance encounter and by not leaving immediately, the appellant was found to have breached a good behaviour bond and convicted of contravening a term of the intervention order. The Magistrate sentencing him to three weeks imprisonment and at the same time revoked the suspended sentence bond and ordering that the appellant serve the remaining time in imprisonment [3]. An application was made before the sentencing Magistrate providing that the Magistrate "should find that there were proper grounds to say that the failure to comply with the conditions of the suspended sentence bond should be excused and that no further action should be taken in respect to that failure" [4].
Judgment: The appeal was allowed and the suspended sentence of three months and 15 days was revoked. David AJ stated that "[t]he question whether there are proper grounds for excusing the breach is to be confined to the nature of the breach itself without any consideration of matters personal to the offender. That principle has been clearly stated in Heritage" [15]. The sentencing Magistrate was found to have gone beyond this principle and was instead influenced by the previous offending [15]. In considering this, the sentencing Magistrate was found to have erred.
Healy v Police [2020] SASC 40 (19 March 2020) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘General deterrence outweighed personal circumstances’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Property settlement’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault upon his wife (complainant), with whom he was now separated. There was some variance about the facts. The prosecution alleged that the appellant and complainant were experiencing domestic difficulties. The complainant came into their bedroom, looking for her mobile phone. On the prosecution case, the appellant pushed her to the dresser and moved her face in the direction of her phone. Such conduct was clearly against her will and involved force ([4]-[5]).
The sentencing Magistrate regarded the offending as ‘out of character’ and unlikely to be repeated but was concerned about general deterrence for this type of behaviour, which involved violence towards female partners. He placed less reliance on personal deterrence and considered that the recording of a conviction could potentially affect the appellant’s future employment. Nevertheless, he recorded a conviction on the basis of general deterrence ([7]), and sentenced the appellant to a $200 good behaviour bond for a period of 18 months.
Issue: The appellant appealed on the basis that the sentencing Magistrate erred in recording a conviction and did not consider the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his low risk of re-offending, the impact of a conviction on his employment and the background of the offending ([8]-[9]).
Held: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s personal circumstances were noted at [6]. He had no criminal history, had already spent 9 hours in custody, and was employed as an electrician. The appellant and his wife no longer lived together and Family Court proceedings in relation to their property were finalised. Further, there had been no contact between the parties as a result of an intervention order.
The Court dismissed the appeal as no error could be demonstrated. The sentencing Magistrate considered all matters relevant to the appellant’s personal circumstances and was entitled to approach the matter by considering that general deterrence outweighed those matters. He was also entitled to be concerned about the prevalence and nature of domestic violence.
Miller v Police [2020] SASC 20 (13 February 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application made out of time’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Recording’
Charges: 1 x contravening a term of an intervention order
Case type: Application for permission to appeal out of time against an order for costs made by a Magistrate.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with contravening a term of an intervention order, the protected person was called at trial by the prosecution to give evidence. The evidence included the victim’s recording of an offending phone call, a copy of which was tendered. After she gave evidence, the prosecution closed its case and she was released. The Magistrate found a case to answer and the matter was adjourned. During the adjourned period, the victim was charged with property damage to the applicant’s vehicle. Consequently, the applicant applied for the witness to be recalled to cross-examine her further because of this behaviour. The Magistrate allowed the prosecution case to be reopened and reversed his ruling that there was a case to answer in order that the victim might be cross-examined. The victim could not be found as she had been released from giving further evidence. The Court issued a witness summons for her return, however, she was not served the summons. It was clear that she believed the matter was finished at least to the extent that her participation was concerned ([2]-[4]).
The applicant sought his costs. The Magistrate ordered that no costs should be allowed with respect to all appearances and work done up to and inclusive of the date of trial, but costs were granted for a number of hearing attendances after that date, albeit at an amount lower than that sought by the applicant ([9]).
A police officer who attended the scene gave evidence of two tranches of the appellant’s brother, Stephen’s, statements and conduct:
•
The first tranche was that Stephen ‘loudly told police to leave the property and shut the front door’.
•
The second was that when told the appellant was arrested for assaulting the complainant, Stephen stated ‘If she’s saying those things she needs to be dealt with. She needs to learn the Aboriginal way’.
Issue: The applicant sought permission to appeal the Magistrate’s orders as to costs. This application was made around 4 months out of time. The applicant submitted that he should be awarded appropriate costs up to the time the Magistrate found there was a case to answer, and that there should not have been a reduction to the costs awarded for work done after the trial date.
Held: The applicant submitted that he was successful in the matter as no conviction was recorded and no finding of guilt was made. As a result, he contended that costs should follow the event and that he should be awarded appropriate costs up to the time that the Magistrate found that there was a case to answer ([10]). The respondent submitted that the question of costs is discretionary, and noted s 189 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA).
In his reasons, the Magistrate indicated that in allowing the case to be reopened for further cross-examination of the victim, the matter had not been completed. It is uncertain how that cross-examination would have impacted his decision to find a case to answer. The alleged offending behaviour was presented by the victim’s evidence and by way of recording. It might go to the question of credit or her attitude towards the applicant, but it is difficult to determine a scenario where that would disturb the relatively low threshold of finding a case to answer. Additionally, the Magistrate had to consider that a permanent stay of proceedings is not necessarily a completion of the matter. In light of these difficulties, David AJ held that the Magistrate did not fall into error in exercising his discretion as to costs ([10]-[13]), and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
Rana v Police [2020] SASC 21 (13 February 2020) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Application for revocation of an intervention order’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Protected person’ – ‘Revocation of an intervention order’ – ‘Women’
Case type: Application for permission to appeal against a Magistrate’s decision refusing an application for the revocation of an intervention order.
Facts: The appellant filed an application in the Magistrates Court for revocation of an intervention order that was issued against him in 2008. The appellant was absent at the application hearing. The intervention order involved allegations that ‘the appellant sent letters to the protected person (a female), presented at the protected person’s door on a number of occasions, caused the protected person to install additional security in her home and other matters’ ([3]). The protected person maintained that she regularly did not feel safe and believed that the appellant was capable of inflicting harm as he was not mentally stable ([4]). The Magistrate noted that the appellant had significant mental health problems in the past, and summarily dismissed the application pursuant to s 26(4) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ([8]. Under s 26(4), the Court may dismiss an application for revocation of a final intervention order without receiving submissions or evidence from the protected person if 1) it is satisfied the application is frivolous or vexatious; or 2) if not satisfied there has been a substantial change in the relevant circumstances since the order was issued or last varied ([9]).
Issue: The appellant sought permission to appeal against the Magistrate’s decision to refuse his application for the revocation of the intervention order on 3 grounds:
•
‘The Magistrate applied the wrong onus, as the burden of proof applied was proof beyond reasonable doubt rather than proof on the balance of probabilities;
•
There was an apprehension of bias as the matter was decided in his absence; and
•
A psychological report the appellant sought to tender on appeal stated he would benefit from release of the order.’
Held: David AJ refused permission to appeal and found that the Magistrate was open to summarily dismiss the appellant’s application for the revocation of the intervention order ([16]). In respect of the first appeal ground, David AJ held that although the Magistrate did apply the incorrect onus, this could have only been in the appellant’s favour. By applying the higher onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it was apparent that the Magistrate was satisfied on the balance of probabilities either that the application was frivolous or vexatious or he was not satisfied that there was a substantial change in the circumstances ([11]). In respect of the second appeal ground, his Honour found that the basis of the appellant’s submissions in his affidavit did not go to the question of whether there had been a change in the relevant circumstances. Instead, the submissions indicated a preoccupation with past events ([12]). In respect of the third appeal ground, David AJ held that the psychologist’s conclusion that the appellant ‘is a different person now tha[n] in the past and would benefit from release of the order’ fell short of there being a change in the relevant circumstances since the order was last issued. Consequently, there was no merit in the appeal ([13]-[15]).
Attorney-General (SA) v Pennington [2019] SASC 180 (25 October 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appreciable risk’ – ‘Childhood abuse’ – ‘Conditions’ – ‘Cultural obligations’ – ‘Extended supervision order’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Forensic evidence’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Traditional lands’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: 1 x aggravated recklessly causing serious harm
Case type: Application by the Attorney-General (SA) for an Extended Supervision Order (ESO) pursuant to s 7 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (the HRO Act) in respect of the respondent for a 3-year term.
Facts: The male respondent was found guilty at trial of aggravated recklessly causing serious harm against his former domestic partner and was ultimately sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment ([5]). The respondent had a significant history of serious criminal offending, especially violent offending against women ([6]). His history included offences of non-consensual sexual penetration, armed robbery, aggravated unlawful wounding, possession of a weapon with intent to cause injury and fear, and unlawful assault causing bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation and breaching protective bail conditions. It was against this background and while subject to a suspended sentence, that the respondent was sentenced to the offending in question. The circumstances of that offending were that the respondent, while in an intoxicated state, stabbed the victim in the back and fled the house without rendering her assistance. The victim may have died within hours had she not been airlifted to Adelaide ([10]).
The applicant filed an application for an ESO under the terms of the HRO Act. An Interim Supervision Order was made pursuant to s 9 pending the determination of the application for an ESO, which was enlivened upon the respondent’s release from custody in September 2018. Further, a psychiatric report pursuant to s 7(3) of the HRO Act was provided ([11]-[13]).
Issue: The applicant sought an ESO in respect of the respondent for a period of 3 years on the basis that he is a high risk offender who would present an appreciable risk to the community’s safety if not supervised under such an order. The main issue for the Court, however, was the nature of the terms and conditions of the ESO, especially those relating to whether or not the respondent is restrained from leaving South Australia without permission ([3]).
The respondent accepted that he was a high risk offender pursuant to s 5 of the HRO Act, and did not oppose the making of an ESO provided that the order included the following conditions ([14]):
•
The respondent may depart from South Australia with the intention of living in another State, and if he chooses to do so, he will not be subject to the order unless he returns to South Australia during the period of the order.
•
The order will take effect if the respondent returns to South Australia.
The applicant submitted that the terms of the ESO as proposed by the respondent were beyond the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction, would render it impossible to effectively supervise him when he is absent from South Australia, and would not protect the community’s safety in an effective manner ([29]).
Held: The respondent was born in the dry community of Tjuntjuntjara in Western Australia ([15]), which is described as ‘relatively stable and safe’ and as ‘one of the remotest communities in Australia’ ([21]). The respondent’s daughter, grandson and elderly, ill father also lived in that community. His father’s family originally came from the A?angu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands in the remote north-west of South Australia. The respondent proposed that he would move between the Tjuntjuntjara community and Kurrawang, where he has other relatives. He also expressed an intention to live in Esperance ([15]-[16]).
The respondent submitted that given that Tjuntjuntjara is a dry community and he has family support and access to traditional healers, he could participate in men’s business and would therefore unlikely reoffend ([17]). In his opinion, an ESO in the terms proposed by the applicant would require him to stay in South Australia, rendering it difficult to visit the APY Lands ([18]). Further, it was submitted that if he was prevented from living on or near his traditional lands, both on the APY Lands and in Western Australia, this would negatively affect him and increase his likelihood to reoffend, as he would be deprived of the opportunity to play a meaningful role in his culture and lore ([19]). While it was undoubtedly in the respondent’s best interests that he be permitted to return to his homeland, Kelly J noted that the question was not ‘simple’, and required an analysis of the relevant provisions of the HRO Act ([26]-[28]).
Her Honour placed great reliance on the psychiatric report ([35]), which noted that the respondent was at high risk of further violent offending, due to his significant history of violent and sexual offending, his limited (and only very recent) insight into that behaviour, and his tendencies to minimise his behaviour and blame circumstances and victims for his past behaviour ([36]). It was also noted that the respondent was at a heightened risk of sexual offending due to his issues with childhood abuse and increased risk of violence ([37]). If the respondent returned to his traditional lands in South Australia, he would be at a greater risk of reoffending due to potential personal conflicts with other community members and the difficulties in accessing adequate supervision in remote communities. There would also be a real risk of the respondent resuming alcohol abuse without adequate supervision and therapy ([43]). Her Honour further considered therapies appropriate to the respondent’s personality type, and concluded that he would benefit from a combination of traditional western psychological therapy and support provided by traditional healers ([44]-[46]). The further the respondent travels from Adelaide, the more difficult it would be for him to access the necessary therapy ([47]).
The psychiatric report also raised the issue of the respondent’s desire to return to his traditional lands to fulfil his cultural obligations and identified some risk factors involved if he were to return ([48]). Importantly, the majority of the respondent’s offending occurred when he was living on his traditional lands and when he was under the influence of alcohol ([49]). Even though Tjuntjuntjara is a dry community, other communities in which the respondent had expressed a desire to visit are not ([50]). Under the terms of the order proposed by the respondent, there would be no practical way for the Court to satisfy itself that the community is protected should he choose to visit or reside in South Australia ([53]), as South Australian supervisory authorities have no practical way of determining if he was to re-enter the APY Lands ([52]).
Her Honour held that an ESO for a 12-month term would adequately protect the community and enable the respondent to continue with appropriate rehabilitation and therapy ([55]). Her Honour also found that the respondent was a high risk offender who posed an appreciable risk to the community’s safety if not supervised under the order, and that it would be outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction to make an ESO in the terms requested by the respondent, and would render his effective supervision impossible when he is absent from South Australia ([33]).
Harwood v Police [2019] SASC 129 (26 July 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Legal representation and self-represented litigants’
Charges: 3 x contravening a term of an intervention order contrary to s 31(2) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA)
Case type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, was convicted of three counts of contravening a term of an intervention order, contrary to section 31(2) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The protected person under the intervention order was the appellant’s ex-partner, the victim ([1]). The agreed facts were that on 3 separate nights, the appellant attended the home of the victim’s father where the victim and their daughter were residing. The appellant left letters addressed to the victim’s father and old family photographs. Although he admitted to attending the premises, he argued that he genuinely believed that the victim and their daughter were residing at a different address ([2], [9]).
Under s 13B of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), the appellant was not allowed to cross-examine the victim at trial unless it was done so by counsel. The Magistrate failed to refer to the appellant’s rights under s 13B(b)(ii), which includes a reference to the Criminal Law (Legal Representation) Act 2001 (SA). Section 6(1a) of that Act provides that if a defendant who is not legally represented at trial applies to the Commission for legal assistance for the cross-examination of a s 13B witness in the trial, the Commission must, subject to qualifications, grant such assistance ([17]).
Although the Magistrate advised the appellant of his right to apply for legal aid ([14], [16]), he did not advise him that legal assistance must be granted to a defendant subject to certain qualifications (terms), and instead informed the appellant that he probably would not qualify for legal assistance ([18]). The trial was adjourned, and upon resumption, the appellant remained under the mistaken belief that he would not qualify for legal assistance and was not advised of s 6 of the Criminal Law (Legal Representation) Act 2001 (SA). The appellant was unable to test the victim’s evidence in any way. Consequently, the Magistrate accepted her evidence and convicted the appellant ([21]).
Issue: The appellant appealed on the ground that the trial court did not properly and fully advise him of his right to obtain a counsel’s assistance for the purpose of cross-examining the victim ([4]).
Held: Lovell J allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. Her Honour remitted the matter for retrial before a different Magistrate and ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s appeal costs ([29]). Importantly, her Honour noted a trial judge’s obligation to ensure that an accused self-represented person understands their rights and has all the necessary information in order to receive fair trial and make informed choices about his or her case ([22]-[23]). In the present instance, the appellant was required to be aware of and fully understand his rights provided for by s 13B and, by extension, s 6(1a) in order to receive a fair trial ([23]). The Magistrate was obliged to ensure that he fully understood that cross-examination of the victim could only occur if he employed counsel to do so on his behalf, and that if he applied to the Commission for legal assistance, they were bound by law to provide it, subject to any conditions they saw fit ([24]). The trial miscarried because the Magistrate failed to properly and fully advise the appellant of his right to obtain counsel’s assistance for the purpose of cross-examination ([25]).
Siropoulos v Police [2019] SASC 127 (19 July 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Conditions’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Good behaviour bond’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of re-offending’ – ‘Step child in family’
Charges: 1 x assault causing harm
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was convicted of assault causing harm after having repeatedly punched the victim in the face, in the presence of her twin daughters from a previous relationship ([14]). The appellant and victim had been in a relationship for approximately 9 years. The relationship was marred by allegations of infidelity made by the appellant, and ‘he felt betrayed and became very angry’ upon discovering that the victim had regularly contacted another man ([13]). The victim’s injuries were extensive ([16]), and she told the Court in her Victim Impact Statement that ‘she was upset that the offending occurred unprovoked in her and her children’s home’ ([18]).
The appellant was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to a prison term of 8 months and 2 weeks as a result of his early guilty plea. The sentence was partially suspended, allowing the appellant’s release after serving 4 months imprisonment upon him entering into a good behaviour bond for 2 years ([2]). The conditions of the bond are noted at [3], and included the requirements that he does not leave South Australia unless given permission by his Community Corrections Officer for specific purposes, and that he attend any programs and appointments as directed.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive and that it was manifestly unreasonable to not wholly suspend the prison sentence. He also appealed the condition of the partially suspended sentence bond requiring him not to leave South Australia without permission.
Held: Kourakis CJ noted the appellant’s personal circumstances at [19]-[27]. He was aged 47 at the time of the offending, worked in the fishing industry, suffered a lengthy period of depression after his father’s death, had numerous previous convictions of driving offences, and consumed an excessive amount of alcohol, particularly after his father’s death and to numb his emotions during hostile relationships. Although the appellant has not consumed alcohol in over 3 years, he reported weekly use of cannabis ([23]). His mother was dependant on him and he also had a brother who suffers from schizophrenia ([20]). The appellant experienced anxiety and low self-esteem, as well as health issues. His psychologist opined that he exhibited dysfunctional personality traits, and experienced self-doubt and feelings of inadequacy ([25]). According to a violence risk assessment, the appellant was identified as likely to pose a Moderate-High risk of re-offending ([26]).
Having regard to the relative importance of general deterrence, Kourakis CJ held that the length of the prison sentence was not manifestly excessive. The appellant had reoffended despite the leniency that had been previously shown to him, and the victim’s physical injuries were very serious. At [35], his Honour stated that ‘[p]ersonal and general deterrence must be given substantial relative weight in sentencing for assaults committed by men against women with whom they are, or have been, in a relationship, particularly when in a jealous rage’. The length of both the notional starting point and the actual prison term was well within the permissible range.
Kourakis CJ also found that the Magistrate’s decision to partially suspend the sentence fell within the proper exercise of the sentencing decision ([36]), and that the Magistrate considered all relevant matters ([38]). It was not unreasonable for the Magistrate to conclude that the appellant’s sentencing would be optimised by a combination of both punishment and deterrence effected by imprisonment for 4 months and rehabilitation over an 18-month period ([40]).
Kourakis CJ allowed the appeal only to the extent of removing the condition of the bond requiring the appellant to not leave South Australia unless given permission by his Community Corrections Officer, as such a condition was unreasonable. The appellant’s home was in Melbourne, where his dependent mother resided and his brother received treatment for his mental illness. His Honour found that ‘Australia is one nation and there is much movement between the south east corner of [South Australia] and Victoria’. His Honour also considered that there was ‘no real connection between the condition that he obtain treatment and counselling and the obligation to obtain permission.’ The appellant should be entitled to ‘come and go from his own home, to help his mother as and when he sees fit, and to fish in Victorian waters without first obtaining permission’ ([42]).
Lang v Police [2019] SASC 97 (7 June 2019) – South Australian Supreme Court
‘Community protection’ – ‘Condign punishment’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive--assault police’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step child in family - past domestic and family violence’
Charges: 2 x aggravated assault, 1 x contravening a term of an intervention order, 1 x property damage
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The offending occurred in the context of a domestic relationship which was in the process of ending ([5]). At the relevant time, the appellant was subject to an intervention order ([11]). The appellant was living with his former domestic partner and her daughter (the protected person under that order). One count of aggravated assault involved the appellant punching his former domestic partner with a clenched first to her left shoulder in the presence of her daughter ([8]). The police were called to the house. The second count of aggravated assault involved the appellant punching the attending Sergeant numerous times, one of which was described as ‘an unusual two-handed punch delivered in a jabbing manner’. The property damage occurred when the Sergeant’s glasses were broken as a result of the altercation between the appellant and himself ([10]). The Magistrate found that the appellant’s behaviour amounted to a breach of the intervention order, as he intimidated the daughter by assaulting her mother and the Sergeant in her presence, abusing her and conducting himself in a violent and abusive manner ([11]).
At trial, the Magistrate noted the appellant’s personal circumstances at [13], referring to his age, his previous marriage, and his employment history. His character references indicated that he was a hardworking, honest person who made a positive contribution to his community ([14]). The appellant had a prior conviction for assault of a police officer for which he was ordered to perform 200 hours of community service within 10 months ([15]). The Magistrate did not refer to the circumstances that led to the making of the intervention order ([17]). In his view, specific and general deterrence were significant sentencing principles ([18]). His Honour also ‘correctly observed’ that the law is required to protect police officers when performing their duties, as well as domestic partners ([19]). Consequently, the Magistrate imposed convictions on all counts and sentenced the appellant to 6 months’ imprisonment ([20]).
Issue: The appellant appealed against his sentence on 2 grounds, namely, 1) that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the appellant’s lack of antecedents, age, community work, good character and the interests of justice in sentencing the appellant; and 2) that the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Held: Hinton J allowed the appeal in part. His Honour considered each ground separately, and placed reliance on relevant case law and statistics from the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. His Honour noted that the first ground of appeal was essentially a contention that the appellant’s lack of antecedents, age, community work, and good character should have attracted a weight that resulted in a lesser sentence, or resulted in the sentence imposed being suspended in part or in whole ([21]). Referring to House v The King and R v Lutze, his Honour concluded that the submissions made in support of the first appeal ground should be treated as forming part of the submission in support of the second appeal ground ([24]).
As to the second appeal ground, his Honour found that the offending was ‘particularly serious’ and that the Magistrate correctly referred to the court’s duty to protect vulnerable people from domestic violence ([29]). His Honour cited R v Saunders for the proposition that intervention orders and bail conditions can prevent acts of domestic violence, and that the violation of such orders and conditions can have profound consequences for the victim’s sense of safety and security. Hinton J observed ‘the effectiveness of intervention orders as a means of protecting members of the community will be undermined if the courts do not respond appropriately to their breach’ ([33]).
Hinton J did not find the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment to be manifestly excessive per se. The appellant did not provide any explanation for his conduct or express remorse or contrition, and mitigating circumstances were absent. Although he is an intelligent person, his prior involvement with the courts and police should have been a clear reminder that such violent, abusive conduct towards his family and police is not tolerated ([40]). The appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation were good, as he generally lived a ‘good and productive life’ and would likely continue to do so upon his release ([41]).
His Honour, however, found the requirement that ‘he serve the entirety of the 6 month sentence so as to punish, to deter specifically and generally and to provide the protection’ to be manifestly excessive. The Magistrate’s approach was not reasonably open, having regard to the appellant’s personal circumstances and, in particular, his age, antecedents, previous good character, work history and prospects of rehabilitation ([43]-[44]). The Magistrate appeared to focus on condign punishment to the exclusion of rehabilitation, and overlooked the appellant’s likely response to supervision in the community for an extended period, which would have provided greater protection for the community ([44]).
In summary, the appeal was allowed, but to the limited extent of directing, pursuant to s 96(4) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), that the appellant serve 16 weeks of his 6-month sentence in prison and suspend the remainder of the sentence on condition that he 1) enter into a good behaviour bond for 18 months; 2) be subject to supervision by a Community Corrections Officer; and 3) attend any counselling, treatment and therapeutic programs that deal with anger management and/or domestic violence as directed and deemed appropriate by his Community Corrections Officer ([45]).
Wondimu v Police [2019] SASC 62 (18 April 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail conditions’ – ‘Breach’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Self-represented’
Charges: Stalking x 1; non-compliance with bail agreement x 3.
Case type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: On 2 November 2016, the appellant was arrested and charged with stalking his father-in-law. He was released on bail subject to conditions, one of which prohibited him contacting his then wife of 13 years, who was also the mother of his five children and the daughter of his father-in-law. On 10 November 2016, the appellant telephoned his wife, but did not leave a message. The appellant also sent 2 text messages on a separate occasion. As a result, he was arrested and charged with 3 counts of breaching the terms of his bail. The Magistrate found the appellant guilty, and imposed convictions in relation to each count and released him upon his entering into a 6 months’ good behaviour bond in the sum of $500. The appellant appealed against the conviction and sentence. His appeal against conviction was over 40 weeks out of time.
Issue: This is an appeal against a conviction and sentence, where the appeal against conviction was made out of time. The appellant submitted that the relevant bail condition was unreasonable or unlawful for including the prohibition against contact with his wife when she was not the complainant. He also argued that he had not been competently represented by counsel at his trial.
Held: Upon the hearing of the appeal, the appellant was unrepresented. Hinton J noted that one of the purposes of conditions of a bail agreement is to prevent further offending ([33]). Hinton J was not satisfied that the impugned condition was legally unreasonable, as the evidence suggested a domestic disturbance between the appellant and his wife, a repeat of which the police intended to prevent by prohibiting contact. Further, Hinton J found that the validity of a bail agreement does not depend on the prosecution’s success at trial of any charge to which the bail agreement relates. The fact that a person is charged is sufficient to subject him or her to bail ([36]).
Hinton J also found that it was open to the Magistrate to be satisfied of the appellant’s guilt on Count 1 beyond reasonable doubt ([44]). His Honour noted that contact, in terms of communication, can be direct or indirect and that the evidence established that the call was made from the appellant’s phone. His Honour found that it is irrelevant whether a mental element attaches to the act, as the offence of breaching a bail agreement pursuant to section 17 of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) is one of strict liability. A bail agreement, in his view, not only seeks to ensure compliance but also requires the accused to take positive steps to ensure compliance. To hold that an offence is one that has a mental element attaching to the act would undermine the requirement that an accused granted bail take positive steps to avoid an inadvertent breach ([43]).
His Honour refused to grant the appellant an extension of time in which to appeal against his convictions, as no explanation was provided for the delay and the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success. His Honour held that the the appeal was, in effect, an effort to have the appellant’s case re-tried so that he could adopt a different approach ([45]). The appeal against sentence was also dismissed. The appellant was obliged to take steps to ensure compliance with the bail conditions, which he failed to do ([46]-[51]).
Mathew (SA) Nominees Pty Ltd v Belconnen Automotive Pty Ltd [2019] SASC 39 (21 March 2019) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contract’ – ‘Costs’ – ‘Misleading conduct’ – ‘Specific performance’
Civil proceedings: claim by plaintiff for specific performance of motor vehicle purchase contracts; counterclaim by defendant for misleading conduct, jurisdictional challenge; and security for costs application by defendant.
Appeal type: appeal against Magistrate’s reasons, security for costs order, and failure to make jurisdictional challenge order.
Facts: The plaintiff purchased three high performance Holden motor vehicles in the name of the plaintiff’s company. Only two are relevant to this matter. The purchases were negotiated by Mr Mazzacano and two others. Mr Mazzacano, as a former Holden employee, was entitled to an employee discount scheme. The plaintiff’s claims that he ordered the vehicles and was invoiced for each by the defendant ($42,927 and $44,467). He paid both the balance and deposit. The defendant contends that the plaintiff company was not entitled to access the discounts as the purchase was not for the benefit of Mr Mazzacano. The defendant did not deliver the vehicles but returned the purchase monies to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought specific performance of its contracts with the defendant on 19 July 2017 and filed an application for summary judgment. The defendant filed a defence stating that the plaintiff was not entitled to the EPSA discount. The defendant subsequently filed an amended defence and counterclaim, and included a counterclaim for misleading conduct and the defendant filed interrogatories seeking clarification on the nature of the business being operated by the plaintiff asking ‘what is the nature of the business that was being operated by the plaintiff during 2017’.
The defendants made a jurisdictional challenge and a security for costs application. The plaintiff appeals against orders granting security for costs and declining to order costs in relation to the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge.
Issues:
1.
The Magistrate’s Reasons are inadequate in that they fail to address various issues raised by the plaintiff.
2.
The Magistrate erred in his decision to order security for costs in giving no weight, or insufficient wait to various matters.
3.
The Magistrate erred in ordering security for costs in an excessive amount, in particular having regard to the true quantum of the dispute, the inclusion of past the failure to make to make reductions for the costs of the counterclaim and the interruption caused by the failed jurisdiction application.
4.
The magistrate erred in failing to make an order (in respect of the defendant’s jurisdictional challenge that the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of that application).
Decision and reasoning:
Dismissing the appeal, Doyle J held:
There was no error in relation to the Magistrate’s exercise of his discretion to order security for costs per House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499.
The plaintiff did not establish that there was the potential for substantial injustice were permission to be refused and the orders for security left to stand.
Reasoning – appeal ground 1:
That a Magistrate attaches insufficient weight to a particular consideration is not, in itself, an allegation of error in the sense required by House v The King at [49]. That ‘Appellate intervention in interlocutory decision making’ should be ‘truly exceptional at [50]. In relation to the alleged inadequacy of reasons in relation to both security for costs and the costs of the failed jurisdiction application, his Honour, held at [53] that ‘in the case of interlocutory disputes, little by way of reasoning may be required’…’as long as the key planks in the judge’s reasoning process leading to the relevant decision are apparent, that will generally suffice’. The Magistrate in their reasons, ‘identified the plaintiff’s status as a trustee company’, the ‘defendant’s delay in bringing the application’ and ‘stated his conclusions in relation to the availability of security for past costs’ at [55].In the event that a plaintiff is a trustee, a defendant ‘should not be subjected to the potential complexity…expense and uncertainty, associated with having to resort to derivative rights in order to recover any costs’ at [64]. The plaintiff did not identify whether it holds the properties in its own right or as trustee, and as such the Magistrate was right to attach significance to the consideration [75]. In relation to the Magistrate not giving any weight to the defendants’ delay in bringing the application for security. While ‘it is a well-established that applications for security should be brought promptly’ [at 78], whether it is in the interests of justice to make an order for security is also a factor [at 82].
Other matters that were of some relevance to the discretion to order security was the absence of indication by the plaintiff that it would not be able to provide security, further there was no challenge to the bona fides or arguable merit of the plaintiff’s claim including that he had paid the for the cars prior to the order for security for costs. At [104] it was open for the Magistrate to make a reduction to the quantum of security upon the existence of the counterclaim, however the amount ordered was not ‘erroneously high’.
Conclusion as to security for costs:
•
The plaintiff did not suggest that it was unable to provide security.
•
The plaintiff having to meet its costs obligations flowing form the litigation constitutes an injustice or prejudice in this case.
Reasoning – appeal ground 2:
At [65] ‘while it is significant, the context of an application for security, that a plaintiff is suing as trustee, it does not follow automatically that it will be appropriate that there be an order for security’.
Shahin v El-Shafei; El-Shafei v Shahin [2018] SASC 167 (6 November 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Disclosure’ – ‘Domestic, family or apprehended violence or for personal safety’ – ‘Orders and convictions’ – ‘Orders to restrain’
Proceeding: Private application for final intervention order.
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s revocation of interim intervention order.
Facts: Mr Shahin is the owner of two adjacent properties, numbers 17 and 18. His family occupies number 17, while his sister occupies number 18. Dr El-Shafei owns number 19, which is adjacent to number 18. There have been ongoing disputes between the parties regarding a number of matters. Dr El-Shafei alleges he was assaulted by Mr Shahin, claiming a resulting wrist injury. Dr El-Shafei is charged with an offence relating to damage caused to the boundary fence. Following the dismissal of a police application for an intervention order, Dr El-Shafei filed a private application which proceeded ex parte withDr Cannon (then Deputy Magistrate) granting an interim order pursuant to s 21 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The application for a final intervention order was heard a week later by Magistrate Sheppard. The interim order was revoked and the matter referred back to Dr Cannon for further hearing. Dr Cannon declined to award costs of the intervention order application in favour of Mr Shahin. Mr Shahin filed a notice of appeal again Dr Cannon’s dismissal of his application for costs. Dr El-Shafei subsequently filed a notice of appeal against Magistrate Sheppard’s revocation of the interim intervention order on 29 June 2018. A second and third amended notice of appeal were filed by Dr El-Shafei on the 12 July and 5 September 2018. The second notice amended an incorrect identification of the parties. The third notice filed the day before the appeal hearing, was not served on Mr Shahin’s representatives until the morning of the hearing.
Issues:
•
Whether an applicant for an intervention order is required to make full and fair disclosure on the same basis as any other person seeking an ex parte order.
•
Whether s 76A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) was available to set aside an interim intervention order or whether the operation of s 76A is precluded by s 26(5) Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA)(‘IO Act’).
•
Whether Magistrate Sheppard erred in revoking the interim order or denied Dr El-Shafei procedural fairness by declining to adjourn proceedings until Dr El-Shafei arranged legal representation.
•
Whether Dr Cannon misdirected himself as a matter of law and fact by referring to his own conduct rather than by inquiring whether Dr El-Shafei had acted in bad faith or unreasonably pursuant to s 189C of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA).
Decision and reasoning:
Permission to appeal
As a criminal proceeding (per R 4.07 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), the jurisdiction conferred on by the IO Act is vested in the Criminal Division), any appeal relating to an intervention order is subject to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) at [41]. S 42(1a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) does not preclude an appeal against interlocutory judgment in these circumstances. Per Sulan J in Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93, the words “before commencement or completion of the trial” in s 42(1a)(c) have no operative effect unless there is a trial. Accordingly, ‘the Court has power to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal if … there are special reasons why that would be in the interests of the administration of justice’ at [45]. Granting permission, his Honour was satisfied special reasons existed due to the significant questions of law raised (ie the application of s 76A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) and validity of referring the matter for further hearing) at [48].
Dismissing Dr El-Shafei’s appeal, Parker J held
‘An applicant for an interim intervention order is not required to make full and fair disclosure in the same manner as an applicant for an ex parte order’ at [76]. ‘The relevant issue is not whether one party is more or less blameworthy than the other, but rather whether it is reasonable to suspect that an act of abuse may be committed’ (grounds for issuing an intervention order per s 6 IO Act) at [77]. S 23 IO Act provides the Defendant with an opportunity to respond before the Court concludes whether a final order is appropriate at [78]. ‘There is a real risk that the imposition of a full and fair disclosure obligation in such an environment is likely to frustrate or impede the object of providing prompt intervention to protect those at risk of abuse’ at [78]. Given the impracticality of subjecting the police to full and fair disclosure, private applications should be under no greater obligation at [81].
S 26 IO Act does not operate to preclude the Court from exercising its powers under s 76A where the operation of s 76A is considered necessary to remedy an injustice. The power conferred by s 76A was available to the Magistrate at [109], [112].
•
S 76A was not applied to frustrate the operation of a legislative scheme (the IO Act) but to rectify a situation considered unjust (Police v Clayton-Smith [2010] SASC 127 per Gray J).
•
The requirement to award persons with a relevant interest an opportunity to be heard before the revocation or variation of an order, as enacted by s 26(5)(a) IO Act, exists at common law and is therefore a relevant consideration in applying s 76A at [107], [109], [112].
•
Likewise, s 26(5)(b) does not extend the requirements of the common law as the same matters will be considered in making an order as in the varying or revoking that order at [110].
There was no process or outcome error in the decision of Magistrate Sheppard. Her Honour’s concern about the accuracy and timing of the information provided by Dr El-Shafei was a proper reason for revoking the interim order at [117]. As the ‘decisive issue was the reliability of the information put before the Court’ and as Dr El-Shafei was awarded ample opportunity to address those issues, he was not unfairly disadvantaged by a lack of legal representation at [129]. The orders of Magistrate Sheppard required a rehearing of the application for an interim order. A rehearing did not occur and the proceedings of 18 May 2018 before Dr Cannon therefore miscarried at [132]. If Dr El-Shafei pursues his application the matter should proceed to a hearing to determine whether a final order should be made (per s 23 IO Act) at [135].
Upholding Mr Shahin’s appeal against the dismissal of his costs application, Parker J held
There were not proper grounds to reject Dr El-Shafei’s application for costs as Dr Cannon ‘did not have sufficient information to decide whether or not Dr El-Shafei had acted in bad faith or unreasonably’ at [139]:
•
Given Justice Parker’s finding that an applicant for an ex parte intervention order is not required to provide full and fair disclosure, Dr El-Shafei’s failure to provide all relevant information did not warrant a cost order against him at [137]-[138]
•
While Dr El-Shafei may have caused the Court to be misled (a proper basis for setting aside the interim order), without a determination of the factual allegations made against him, Dr El-Shafei cannot be said to have acted in bad faith or unreasonably at [138]. That question should be determined if and when a final order is determined at [140].
Stone v Police [2018] SASC 147 (27 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contravention of an intervention order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Contravention of an intervention order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted after trial of two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order. After finding the evidence of the protected persons to be truthful and accurate, the Magistrate recorded convictions and imposed a good behaviour bond for 12 months.
Issues: The appellant appealed the convictions on a number of grounds including that the Magistrate erred in admitting evidence of past discreditable conduct, applied the wrong onus of proof in relation to the charges, placed undue reliance on the credibility of the protected person, impermissibly relied on evidence of a charge that was dismissed in finding the appellant guilty of the two charges, wrongly regulated the cross-examination of the appellant, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision and reasoning: Kelly J dismissed the appeal on the following grounds:
•
The evidence of past discreditable conduct complained of was properly admitted.
•
The Magistrate applied the proper onus of proof in finding the charges proven.
•
The evidence was sufficient to satisfy the convictions.
•
The Magistrate made proper assessments of the witnesses at trial, as required, and was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the credibility of the protected person as a witness following his assessment of that person’s evidence.
•
The Magistrate did not rely on evidence relating to the dismissed charge in finding the appellant guilty of the two counts on which he was convicted.
•
The cross-examination of the appellant at trial did not go beyond the bounds of fair and proper cross-examination.
White v Police [2018] SASC 124 (5 September 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Vulnerable people’
Appeal type: Appeal against decision of a magistrate to issue a final intervention order.
Facts: The police issued an interim intervention order against the appellant for the protection of Mr Larkins, his wife, his child and three other children in his care, all of whom lived in the same street as the appellant. The appellant and his wife (who had separated, but continued to live in the same house) had a poor relationship with Mr Larkins and his wife. Mr Larkins and his wife were Indigenous Australians. Mrs Larkins had been involved in Federal Court proceedings relating to unspecified issues with the appellant’s wife.
The Magistrate was required to determine whether or not the interim intervention order should be confirmed as a final intervention order or a final intervention order be made in substitution. The order was declared to address a domestic violence concern. The Magistrate made a final intervention order against the appellant in substitution for the interim order, finding that it was reasonable to suspect that the appellant would, without intervention, commit acts of abuse against the protected persons and that it was appropriate in the circumstances to issue a final order. The protected persons were unchanged but the terms of the final intervention order differed somewhat from those of the interim order.
Issues: Whether a final intervention order should be made; Whether the Magistrate erred with respect to evidentiary matters and in applying the statutory requirements for making a final intervention order.
Decision and reasoning: It was entirely open to the Magistrate to accept the evidence of Mr Larkins and his wife on critical issues in preference to that of the appellant and his wife. The transcript showed that the appellant appeared angry and malevolent towards Mr Larkins and his family, displaying significant animosity with racial overtones towards them. It was reasonable to find that the appellant would commit further acts of abuse in the absence of an intervention order. In all the circumstances, the Magistrate’s order was appropriate.
Dismissing the appeal, Nicholson J held that:
•
The order made by the Magistrate was interlocutory and special reasons must be established in order to obtain leave to appeal.
•
The features of a final intervention order, together with the fact that the appellant has no right to apply for a variation or revocation for at least 12 months, were sufficient to establish special reasons, at least where there is an arguable case on appeal.
•
Bearing in mind the usual advantages possessed by a trial judge when assessing oral evidence, it was open to the Magistrate to make the findings of fact he made on the evidence that was before him.
•
The Magistrate did not err with respect to the evidentiary matters complained of by the appellant.
•
The Magistrate did not err in applying the statutory requirements of s 6 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). The findings made in satisfaction of these requirements were open on the evidence.
Hussey v Police [2018] SASC 122 (31 August 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Breach of bail x 1; Property damage x 2; Assault causing harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction for assault.
Facts: The appellant and complainant had been in a relationship for about eight weeks. Each had one daughter. The complainant was woken by her daughter vomiting. The next day, the complainant and appellant argued. When the complainant told the appellant to leave her home, he became very angry and violent. The complainant alleges that the appellant kicked, punched and shoved her. She ran to her neighbour’s house with her daughter and asked them to call the police. She could hear him ripping the flyscreens off her house. The Magistrate described the appellant and complainant as witnesses who ‘gave their evidence clearly and with some passion, both of them without major discrepancies’. He found the appellant guilty of assault but not guilty of the property damage charges.
Issues: Whether the verdict was open on the evidence; Whether the Magistrate adequately explained why the appellant’s evidence was rejected; Whether the magistrate’s reasons were adequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant appealed the guilty verdict on the grounds that (1) the Magistrate’s reasons were insufficient to explain his finding that ‘Nothing was sufficient to justify a movement of the foot sufficiently hard to damage the side of her face. He could have extracted his foot without kicking her to the cheek’; (2) that the Magistrate did not explain why his evidence was rejected beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence for the Magistrate to have rejected beyond reasonable doubt his version of events, which should have led to the Magistrate entertaining a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in relation to the assault charge.
Bampton J held that, having read the evidence in its entirety and in accordance with the requirements referred to in M v the Queen [1994] HCA 63, the finding of guilt was not supported by the evidence. The state of the evidence was such that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant intentionally applied force to the complainant causing ‘harm to the tongue and cheek’. Her Honour held that the Magistrate did not adequately explain his finding of guilt and did not explain how the elements of assault were satisfied. The Magistrate’s reasons were not underpinned by a reasoning process linking and justifying the findings made ([53]). There was reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. It was not open to the Magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the verdict of guilty was set aside and a verdict of not guilty was substituted.
R v Hayes [2018] SASC 114 (9 August 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Intentionally causing harm x 1; Contravening an intervention order x 1.
Proceeding type: Prosecution appeal against grant of bail.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was charged with intentionally causing harm and contravening an intervention order. The respondent assaulted his former partner (the complainant) during an access visit to their son. The circumstances of aggravation included that the complainant was his ex-partner and the respondent used a coffee mug, to inflict injuries to the head and face of the victim ([5]). The respondent also had a criminal history for offences of violence and dishonesty ([9]). The respondent was a prescribed applicant within the meaning of s 10A of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) such that bail may not be granted unless special circumstances are established. The DPP contended that bail should not be granted due to the risk of re-offending (given the respondent’s history of non-compliance with various court orders) and concerns for the complainant’s safety ([15]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Kelly J dismissed the appeal. Special circumstances justifying release on bail included that the complainant no longer resided in the Court’s jurisdiction ([17]), the likely trial date would not be for some time, and a recent report that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are highly over-represented in the remand population. According to the Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 133, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people continue to be over-represented in the remand population by a factor of over 11. However, a finding of special circumstances does not mean that bail is automatically granted. At [12], her Honour stated –
‘Ordinarily, it may be expected that if special circumstances are established, then a grant of bail may follow but upon special circumstances being established, it will remain open to the bail authority to refuse bail if nonetheless, having regard in particular to the gravity of the offending, the likelihood that the prescribed applicant will re-offend, the likelihood that the prescribed applicant will interfere with a witness or evidence and the likelihood that he or she will abscond, the bail authority considers that bail should not be granted’.
Notwithstanding that the respondent was a prescribed applicant, her Honour held that there were special circumstances. It was therefore appropriate to grant the respondent bail on conditions of strict home detention ([18]).
Parish v Police [2018] SASC 18 (27 February 2018) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Adequacy of reasons’ – ‘Magistrates court’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Assault causing harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant gave evidence that the appellant punched her from behind, pushed her to the floor, pushed her head into the floor and wall, and bit her on the cheek ([16]-[17]).
Issues: Whether the conviction was unreasonable or insupportable having regard to the evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for retrial before a different magistrate ([98]).
Lovell J described the case as an ‘oath on oath’ case ([10]). At [51]-[54], Lovell J provides a useful exposition of what is necessary for a Magistrate to include in a judgement to amount to adequate reasons. Simply summarising the evidence is not sufficient. The reasons must engage with conflicts in evidence and how those conflicts can be resolved.
Lovell J held that the Magistrate failed to provide adequate reasons in two areas. First, in accepting the evidence of a police officer and M’s treating doctor without explaining how the Magistrate reconciled the inconsistencies between their evidence and M’s evidence ([57]-[79]). Second, in dismissing the evidence of the appellant’s uncle without explaining why ([80]-[86]).
B, JL v Police [2017] SASC 9 (10 February 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Intermediate sanctions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a domestic relationship. They had a 7-month-old child and the complainant was pregnant with another child. The appellant was 17 years old at the time of the offences. An intervention order was in place requiring the appellant to not assault, harass, intimidate or threaten the complainant. The offence occurred when the appellant grabbed the complainant by the upper arms and squeezes them ([6]).
The Magistrate recorded a conviction and imposed a 12-month good behaviour bond.
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in recording a conviction.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The conviction was set aside, and again imposed the 12-month good behaviour bond ([24]).
The appellant submitted that the magistrate failed to have sufficient regard to the appellant’s youth and the purposes of the Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA), in particular the policy that there should be no unnecessary interruption of employment ([12]).
Stanley J emphasised that the appellant had a history of domestic violence and highlighted the need for general deterrence at [19]:
Offences of violence by men against women are all too prevalent. All too often they result in harm but the deterrence of those offences will not be adequately achieved unless all offences of violence, whether they cause harm or not, are properly addressed.
Nonetheless, Stanley J held that the public interest in a conviction being recorded is diminished when the defendant is a youth ([18]). It was important that the appellant was now reconciled with the complainant and his ability to provide for her and their children would be diminished by recording a conviction ([22]).
R v Fox [2017] SASC 5 (3 February 2017) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption against bail’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Protective function’ – ‘Special circumstances’
Appeal Type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The applicant and the female complainant had been in a relationship for 10 years. On 14 September 2016, the applicant was charged with using a dangerous article, aggravated assault with a weapon against his own child or spouse, and committing an assault aggravated by the use of an offensive weapon. These offences occurred in the context of the breakdown of the applicant and complainant’s relationship and were committed against the complainant and her new partner. On 14 September 2016, an interim intervention order was made against the applicant. The applicant breached this order on two occasions.
The applicant was charged with two counts of contravening a term of an intervention order pursuant to s 31 of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) and one count of aggravated threat to cause harm. The applicant was a prescribed applicant pursuant to s 10A(2)(ba) of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) because he was charged with breaching an intervention order in circumstances involving violence. As such, there was a presumption against the grant of bail unless the applicant established the existence of special circumstances: s 10A(1). The magistrate refused to grant bail.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in failing to find there were special circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Hinton J noted generally that Parliament’s approach to an act of defiance to a protective order allegedly perpetrated in circumstances involving violence ‘only tolerates release into the community on bail if special circumstances can be established’ (see [16]). This is part of the community’s recognition of the ‘prevalence of domestic violence’ and the need to insist on strict compliance with intervention orders to ensure they fulfil their protective purpose (see [17]).
His Honour continued that, ‘special circumstances will only exist where the applicant can demonstrate that he or she does not pose the risk which Parliament had in contemplation in reversing the presumption and in relation to whom the denial of bail would result in consequences beyond the contemplation of Parliament’. The relevant risk here was ‘of further defiance of an order and violence threatened or perpetrated in doing so’ (see [19]).
The ability to fashion bail conditions which reduce the risk of offending and offer protection to the victim will not ordinarily amount to special circumstances (see [40]).
On the facts, Hinton J held that there were no special circumstances warranting the grant of bail. None of the sorts of special circumstances referred to in R v Buhlmann were present (see [20] of this case). The applicant had not pointed to any exceptional hardship that would result from his continued incarceration (see [42]).
Police v Martin [2016] SASC 194 (14 December 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Error of law’ – ‘Failure to provide inadequate reasons’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Power to issue intervention orders’ – ‘Protection orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the imposition of a final intervention order.
Facts: The male appellant was having an affair with a married woman, Ms P, who told him her marriage was over. The appellant was concerned that she was not telling the truth. On 8 October 2015, after an argument, the appellant went to Ms P’s home address at night. Being unable to see or raise her, he went to the backyard and called out to her. Ms P and her husband contacted the police. The appellant left without making any threat or committing any violence.
The next day, police approached the appellant and searched his vehicle. They found a can of OC spray (oleoresin capsicum spray), a hammer and a small knife, but it was agreed that he did not take these onto Ms P’s premises. The appellant was charged with being on premises without lawful excuse and for the items in his car. A police interim intervention order was issued against him with respect to Ms P, her husband and their children. On 19 August 2016, the appellant pleaded guilty. Relevant to this appeal, on the same day, the magistrate imposed an intervention order pursuant to s 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA).
Issue/s:
1.
The magistrate did not give any, or adequate, reasons for issuing the intervention order.
2.
The magistrate erred in the exercise of his discretion to issue the intervention order against the appellant pursuant to s 19A(1)Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Peek J held that s 19A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 did not create a freestanding power to issue final intervention orders. At [24], His Honour stated that:
‘Section 19A does no more than enable a court hearing substantive charges – in this case it happened to be a Magistrate – to issue an intervention order as if a complaint had been made under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009; the critical question of whether an order is to be made pursuant to such a complaint (or “as if a complaint had been made”) will depend on the substantive provisions of the Intervention Orders Act.’
Here, the sentencing magistrate made no reference to the requirements set out in the Intervention Orders Act. As such, it was impossible to assess whether the magistrate approached the matter incorrectly and failed to address the issues relevant to making a restraining order (see [33]-[34]). There was also an unacceptable risk that the magistrate took an incorrect approach to s 19A and failed to have sufficient regard to the requirements of the Intervention Orders Act (see [35]). Accordingly, the intervention order was quashed. The original police interim intervention order was declared to be continuing in force until it was withdrawn or a confirmation hearing convened.
Craill v Police [2016] SASC 168 (4 November 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breaching bail’ – ‘Contravention of an intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated contraventions of protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault x 1; contravention of an intervention order x 9, breaching bail x 5.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant attended the home of the female victim (his former partner). An argument ensued. While holding their eight-week-old child, the appellant pushed the victim against the bedroom door by holding her throat (aggravated assault). The appellant was also charged with nine counts of failing to comply with a term of an intervention order and the five counts of breaching bail. The applicant was sentenced to five months and two weeks imprisonment. This also involved revoking a suspended sentence imposed for an offence of driving while disqualified. The breaching offences were five of the counts of contravening an intervention order and one of the counts of breaching bail.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The magistrate erred in the application of s 18A of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA);
2.
The magistrate erred in failing to find that there were no proper grounds to refrain from revoking a suspended sentence.
3.
The magistrate erred in failing to have regard or sufficient regard to the complainant’s attitude toward penalty;
4.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
First, the magistrate did not err in the application of s 18A. It was appropriate and convenient to go directly to the single sentence imposed for the course of conduct constituting the breach and contravention charges. The magistrate treated this offending separately from the offending on the charge of aggravated assault. Any descent into further detail would have created unnecessary elaboration – R v Major applied: see [18].
Second, there was no error in the approach of the magistrate. One of the key submissions rejected by Stanley J was that proper grounds existed to refrain from revoking a suspended sentence because there was a marked disproportion between the seriousness of the offence constituting the breach and the sentence of imprisonment that would be activated. In rejecting this, Stanley J held that the breaching offences shared the same characteristic as the earlier offending; they involved the appellant failing to comply with a term or condition imposed on him. However, more importantly, there was not a marked disproportion between the seriousness of the breaching offences and the sentence of imprisonment activated. The contraventions of an intervention order were ‘serious offending’. As per Stanley J at [28]:
‘In R v McMutrie this Court said that a breach of a restraining order is a matter of particular gravity. The object of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) is the prevention of domestic and non-domestic abuse, and the exposure of children to the effects of such abuse. The principal instrument for achieving this objective is the making of intervention orders. The protective objects of the Act can only be achieved if courts are scrupulous in doing what they can to ensure that persons who are subject to such orders comply with them. The repeated breaches of those orders by the appellant demonstrate a persistent, blatant and contumelious disregard for the orders and the authorities that impose them. Crimes of domestic violence are often occasions for the exercise, or attempted exercise, of power over the victim by the offender. Breaches of intervention orders can be occasions for the offender to intimidate the victim with an implied threat that such orders will not protect them. The courts must act to contradict this impression’.
Third, there was no error in the approach taken by the magistrate to the victim’s attitude towards penalty. Stanley J noted that ‘[w]hile the attitude of the victim to an offence is not an irrelevant factor in sentencing, that attitude cannot be determinative of what constitutes an appropriate sentence. Moreover, this principle must be applied with considerable caution in cases of domestic violence’ ([33]). His Honour continued at [36]:
‘The reason for such caution is obvious. In situations of domestic violence a victim’s motivation for advocating a particular penalty is often influenced by their ongoing relationship with the defendant and an unhealthy relationship of dependency between them. Their attitude is often influenced by apprehension about the consequences for them in the future given a continuing relationship with the defendant. This attitude frequently fails to reflect what is in their best interests and what the court might consider appropriate in all the circumstances. It would be contrary to sound sentencing practice to place victims of domestic violence in the position where they hold, or appear to hold, the keys to the offender’s release. To place victims in that position is to impose on them a burden they ought not be required to bear’.
Finally, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. This was in circumstances where the aggravated offence was towards the lower end of the scale for that offence but it was still a serious offence, exacerbated by the presence of a small child; the aggravated assault was not mitigated by the expressed attitude of the victim; the repeated breaches of the intervention order constituted serious offending; the appellant did not have a favourable criminal history; and considerations of general and specific deterrence were particularly important here: see [52]-[53].
Thakur v Police (2016) SASR 180; [2016] SASC 75 (3 June 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Court not to allow appeal against order confirmed by consent unless consent was not freely given’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Protection orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal to set aside an interim intervention order.
Facts: On 13 January 2015, a magistrate issued an interim intervention order against the appellant protecting his wife. The appellant was reported for five breaches of this order. On 7 May, the appellant was interviewed by police in relation to those alleged breaches. The appellant provided the police with his phone and its passcode. On the same day, the prosecutor contacted the appellant’s solicitor and offered to resolve the trial if the appellant consented to the confirmation of the intervention order. The prosecutor also offered not to proceed with the fresh charges in relation to the alleged breaches in those circumstances. The appellant’s solicitor said his client agreed to this. After being charged with subsequent breaches, the appellant sought to appeal the confirmation of the order.
Issue/s: The appellant consented to the confirmation of the interim intervention order in error or by mistake because he believed there was no other satisfactory alternative available to him to recover his mobile telephone from police and thereby protect the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.
Decision and Reasoning: To find ‘special reasons’ under s 42(1a)(c) of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) to allow an appeal against an interlocutory order, only an ‘arguable’ case needs to be demonstrated. The appellant’s case was arguable (see [26]-[27]). Permission to appeal was granted.
However, the appeal was dismissed. At [38], Stanley J held that:
‘a court will allow an appeal from the confirmation of an intervention order made pursuant to s 23(3) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) in circumstances where the defendant’s consent was not freely given in the sense that the consent was not properly informed, was made inadvertently or was made by mistake or in error in the sense that the person giving the purported consent did not appreciate to what it was he or she was consenting’.
His Honour rejected the submission that ‘it is sufficient to set aside the order that a defendant only establishes that he or she consented to the confirmation of the order without due consideration to material matters, if that proposition is understood as requiring merely a failure on the part of the defendant to direct his or her mind to some relevant consideration in giving consent’ (see [39]).
Here, the appellant’s consent was freely given. Stanley J did not accept that the appellant had no satisfactory alternative but to consent to the confirmation of the intervention order. He could have been under no misapprehension as to what it was consenting to (see [40]-[41]).
Police v Hodder [2016] SASC 70 (24 May 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Costs order’ – ‘Investigations before applying for protection order’ – ‘Police domestic violence’ – ‘Police protection order’ – ‘Reasonableness of police actions’
Case type: appeal against costs order following a magistrate’s refusal to confirm an intervention order.
Facts: The respondent (Mr Hodder), his former wife (Ms Hodder) and her new partner (Mr Minchin) were police officers. Mr Minchin made an application for an intervention order against Mr Hodder alleging that Mr Hodder acted in a threatening and harassing manner towards him. The police obtained an interim intervention order on his behalf. After a trial, the magistrate found that Ms Hodder and Mr Minchin were not reliable witnesses. The magistrate found no basis for confirming the order and dismissed the application ([19]).
The magistrate ordered costs against the police for the whole of the proceedings, holding that they acted unreasonably in bringing and maintaining the proceedings ([20]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred by:
1.
ordering costs when the police had not acted in bad faith or unreasonably;
2.
awarding costs for the entirety of the proceedings; and
3.
fixing costs above the scale.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was partly allowed.
On the first ground, Parker J held that the magistrate erred in finding that the police acted unreasonably. The prima facie position is that costs should not be awarded against a complainant in proceedings for a restraining order. The fact that the police could have investigated a matter further does not establish unreasonableness. Prosecutors should not prejudge the issue and should proceed where it is open to the court to accept the complainant as a credible witness ([37], [56]).
The second ground depended on whether it was reasonable for the police to continue the proceeding after the second day, when Mr Minchin’s credibility had been damaged. The matter was remitted to the same magistrate to decide whether the police acted unreasonably in continuing with the application after the second day of the trial ([78]).
On the third ground, Parker J held that it was within the magistrate’s discretion to award costs above the scale, having regard to the complexity of the evidence such as subpoenas and telephone recordings and the need to engage senior counsel ([88]).
Police v Kritcos [2016] SASC 28 (10 March 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’
Appeal Type: Appeal against a Magistrate’s decision to revoke an interim intervention order.
Facts: An interim intervention order was made against the respondent (the appellant’s former husband). A Magistrate dismissed an application to confirm the order and revoked the order. The alleged abuse consisted of three letters that the respondent sent to the appellant. One of the letters concerned renewal of their deceased pet dog’s council registration and the attached dog tag. She believed that the respondent was making a point of using her address when he knew she did not want it disclosed and that the letter was a ‘gratuitous and hurtful’ reminder of the dog’s death. During their marriage, they had intimidated the respondent’s former wife by driving past her house. She was worried she would suffer similar harassment. The respondent denied all knowledge of the other letters. The appellant gave evidence which alleged prior acts of abuse by the respondent, including threats to kill and physical abuse. The Magistrate largely rejected this evidence as not proven, taking into account the fact that the appellant admitted lying in an affidavit previously filed in the Family Court. The Magistrate also rejected the respondent’s explanation about sending the dog tag and found it was sent out of spite to upset the appellant.
Notwithstanding, while this conduct was spiteful, the Magistrate was not satisfied it resulted in emotional and psychological harm within the meaning of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act). The Magistrate concluded that it was reasonable to suspect that the conduct would cause ‘upset, annoyance and anger’ but not harm. While the Magistrate found it was reasonable to suspect that the conduct would continue without intervention because the respondent’s evidence ‘did not provide any direct reassurance that the conduct will not continue’ (See at [19]), he found that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances to confirm the order. He gave the respondent an opportunity to show he would not persist with the conduct. If the conduct persisted, the appellant could make an application for a further interim order. The Magistrate also noted the appellant was a personal trainer, coaches kick boxing and holds a black belt in martial arts.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in concluding that the letters did not amount to an act of abuse under the Act.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in concluding that it was not appropriate to make an order in the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the Magistrate erred by not having regard to the definition of emotional and psychological harm in the Act which includes ‘distress, anxiety or fear that is more than trivial’. Doyle J held that while the Magistrate should have expressly referred to this definition, the Magistrate’s finding was that, ‘the correspondence was reasonably expected to cause “upset, annoyance and anger” in contradistinction to non-trivial “distress, anxiety or fear”’ (see at [36]). The appellant also submitted that the Magistrate erred in ‘approaching the issue of harm on the basis that he needed to be satisfied that the defendant’s conduct was “intended to, and caused” harm. Doyle J concluded that the Magistrate had to consider three issues – ‘First, whether the letters might reasonably be expected to cause harm (s 8(4)(j)) and then whether they were intended to, and did in fact, result in harm (s 8(2))’ (see at [39]). His Honour concluded that the effect of the Magistrate’s finding was that, ‘the letters were neither intended to, nor did in fact, result in harm’ and ‘(the Magistrate) appropriately addressed both the respondent’s state of mind in engaging in the relevant conduct and the (subjective) impact of this conduct on the protected person’ (see at [39]). In relation to the exclusion of other evidence relating to the history of the relationship, Doyle J held that the appellant was given several opportunities to detail the effect of the letters upon her.
2.
The appellant submitted that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the principles set out in s 10 of the Act which are relevant to determining whether it is appropriate to make an order. In particular, the section makes clear that abuse can consist of isolated incidents. Doyle J stated at [44] – ‘his Honour did not suggest that isolated instances could not constitute abuse. His reasoning was merely that on the facts of this case the letters (neither individually nor cumulatively) were not sufficient to constitute abuse.’ In relation to the Magistrate’s references to the appellant being a personal trainer and having martial arts qualifications, his Honour stated that this was a ‘somewhat obscure’ reference, but it was, ‘probably best understood as being a reference to matters which might have given the protected person some level of personal confidence and physical prowess. While I consider these matters to have been of only marginal relevance, I do not think they are entirely irrelevant or that it was erroneous to take them into account’ (see at [45]). The Magistrate’s conclusion to give the respondent an opportunity to not persist with the relevant conduct is not a factor referred to in s 10(1) of the Act, but was nevertheless not irrelevant. It is a relevant consideration that the respondent is someone who might respond to an opportunity to change their behaviour. See finally at [48] –
‘Here there was no proven act of past abuse. While the Magistrate accepted there was a reasonable suspicion abuse would occur in the future without intervention, it might be inferred that the Magistrate did not consider there to be a high likelihood of this occurring. Indeed, the Magistrate’s judgment appears (from his reference to the contingency that his judgment might prove to be misplaced) to have been that the suspicion will probably not come to fruition. It is also relevant that while there was a suspicion of abuse in the broad sense contemplated by the Act (i.e. extending to emotional and psychological harm), the Magistrate made a positive finding that it was not reasonable to suspect that the defendant would cause physical harm to the protected person.
R v LI [2016] SASC 4 (4 February 2016) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Proceeding: Application to exclude expert evidence.
Facts: The defendant was tried for murdering his mother. His counsel sought to adduce expert psychiatric evidence relating to his relationships with his family, his mother as well as his childhood. The Director of Public Prosecutions sought to have this evidence excluded.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence fell outside the area of human knowledge or experience, such that a jury would be able to form a judgment about it without expert assistance.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed and the evidence was excluded. It was not in dispute that the defendant caused his mother’s death – the issue at trial related to self-defence. The evidence detailed his traumatic upbringing where he witnessed episodes of domestic violence. It explored the dynamics of the relationship between the accused and his mother. It did not detail any recognised psychiatric illness or disability that the accused suffered which would affect his capacity to give evidence or recollect events. Indeed, the psychiatrist was in fact impressed with the accused’s ability to describe subtleties of his history in a way that convinced the psychiatrist that his account was accurate and that the relationship was abusive. The psychiatrist’s view was that the case was ‘unusual’. Blue J noted at [12] that the only ‘expert’ element of the report was the psychiatrist’s view that the accused was fit to stand trial and that the mental impairment defence was not available. His Honour then distinguished the case of R v Runjanjic; R v Kontinnen (1992) 56 SASR 114; [1991] SASC 2951 (28 June 1991), where the Court held that expert evidence regarding the ‘learned helplessness’ associated with ‘battered woman syndrome’ were contrary to ordinary expectations of human behaviour such that juries could be misled without the assistance of expert evidence. The recent Queensland Court of Appeal decision of R v Jones [2015] QCA 161 (1 September 2015) was analogous. In that case, the proposed expert psychiatric evidence was found to be a matter of common knowledge. The same approach was adopted in this case. Many of the matters in the evidence simply detailed the history of the relationship and issues relating to Chinese family culture. These were not issues that needed explanation from a psychiatrist. See at [22] – ‘The accused can give the evidence as he sees fit about the verbal or physical violence that he suffered at the hands of his mother. If that evidence is accepted by the jury it will be self-evident that the relationship between Mr Li and his mother was both complex and intense.’
Koay v Police [2015] SASC 158 (7 October 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘alleged prior violence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant, a woman, and the complainant, a man, met in 2011 and married in 2012. The appellant was on a spousal visa. The complainant’s version of events involved the appellant coming into his bedroom at night when he was trying to sleep. He asked her to leave the room multiple times but she did not. He recorded some of the incident on his phone (and the recording was admitted in evidence). As they were grappling with a light switch, he claimed that the appellant punched and scratched him. He attempted to block the punches. He asked her to stop punching him. He suffered minor injuries. At trial, the appellant claimed that she acted in self-defence. She claimed that she was scared of him because he had previously been violent towards her, and that the reason for going into his bedroom was to discuss her visa.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred by rejecting her claim of self-defence without the proper analysis required by s 15 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The appellant submitted that rather than restricting himself to the events on the night, the Magistrate should have considered the evidence of alleged prior violence by the complainant to place context around the incident. The Magistrate noted that the appellant’s claim that she was scared of the complainant lacked credibility, as she decided to enter his room in the middle of the night, notwithstanding his requests that she leave. The Magistrate found it difficult to accept her reason for going into the room (to discuss the visa) and also difficult to accept that the middle of the night was the most convenient time to do so. He described the appellant’s evidence of self-defence as vague. It did not explain how the conduct was reasonable for her own defence. Vanstone J accepted the Magistrate’s conclusions – the appellant made no attempt to directly address the elements required for self-defence in her evidence and she did not explain why, despite the complainant’s requests, she did not leave the room. Vanstone J also held that the Magistrate was correct not to rely on the evidence of alleged prior violence inflicted by the complainant because it was not ‘fleshed out in detail’ (see at [18]) and there was nothing in this evidence which was relevant to the incident on the night.
Police v Baker [2015] SASC 110 (30 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against acquittal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against acquittal.
Facts: The respondent allegedly slapped his female companion in the face. This was witnessed by a police officer, whose evidence formed the basis of the prosecution case. The companion did not give evidence and at the time of the incident was not distressed. She informed the police officer that it was ‘OK’. According to the officer, at the time of the incident, the companion did not want the respondent to be arrested. During the hearing, the Magistrate invited submissions as to whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to ground consent or ‘otherwise of having received force from the defendant’ (see at [3]). The respondent was acquitted of the charge, with the Magistrate concluding that the prosecution’s evidence was so lacking in weight or reliability that no reasonable tribunal of fact could safely convict (an R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; (1979) 2 A Crim R 45) direction). The Magistrate found a reasonable doubt about the ‘lack of consent’ element in the offence of assault. He noted that the prosecution’s case was ‘hampered’ by the victim’s failure to give evidence (See at [13]).
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in finding that the prosecution’s evidence lacked in weight or reliability and whether the Magistrate erred in finding a reasonable doubt as to the ‘lack of consent’ element.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court firstly noted the hesitance of appellate courts to interfere with Magistrates’ decision to acquit. The appeal was dismissed for this reason but Nicholson J accepted the appellant’s submissions relating to the trial process.
The Court accepted that there was a prima facie case to answer. The Magistrate gave no reasons regarding how he concluded that lack of consent could not be inferred beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant submitted that a reasonable tribunal of fact would not be able to ignore the inherent unlikelihood that a person would consent to being hit with the force as described by the police officer. Nicholson J accepted this submission, finding that the Prasad direction should not have been made and the case should have proceeded. The victim’s lack of complaint, lack of cooperation with the police and her request that the respondent not be charged were evidentiary matters which may assist in determining whether she had consented to the slap. In fact, they were consistent with a finding that the victim was prepared to submit to the conduct. Importantly, Nicholson J noted at [24] – ‘Submission and failure to complain are not the same as consent’ and at [27] – ‘Whilst each case will turn on its own facts, the mere fact that an alleged victim does not give evidence, will not necessarily mean that lack of consent cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt.’ However, while there were errors in the Magistrate’s approach, there were no ‘clear and compelling circumstances’ ([27]) to interfere with the acquittal in this case.
Groom v Police [2015] SASC 101 (14 July 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Construction of terms’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Electronic listening device’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Interpretation of intervention order’ – ‘Protected person’ – ‘Public interest’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An intervention order was in place between the appellant and his former partner. The breach arose from a conversation between the appellant and his former partner. The order prohibited discussions between the pair other than with respect to their child. In conversation, the appellant then brought up the appellant’s ongoing court proceedings relating to the intervention order itself. At trial, the Magistrate admitted into evidence an audio recording of this conversation secretly made by his former partner. His former partner claimed she was advised by police to record communications between her and the appellant. Conversations between her and the appellant were usually unwitnessed by anyone else, which made previous complaints that she had made to police a case of her word against his and thus difficult to prove in court.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the conversation was permitted by the intervention order.
2.
Whether the recording should have been excluded because it was unlawful pursuant to the Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (the Act). More specifically, whether the use of the device was in the public interest or for the protection of the former partner’s lawful interests under section 7 of the Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1. The Court rejected an argument that the conversation was permitted by the intervention order. The topic of the conversation, (the intervention order itself) was not related to their child which was the only topic that the intervention order allowed them to discuss. See further at [47]-[58].
2. Nicholson J held: the conversation was a private conversation within the meaning of the Act; the former partner intended to use the device to record the conversation and that there was no consent to the conversation being recorded. The Court then considered whether the use of the device was in the public interest or for the protection of the former partner’s lawful interests. While his Honour acknowledged that the breach was relatively minor, he noted that breaches of intervention orders are serious. In this case, the former partner had made many allegations of breaches but had encountered problems with proof. The Court accepted that the former partner held genuine concerns for her own safety. Nicholson J then made the following comments at [39]-[40] about how recording private conversations can be in a protected person’s ‘lawful interests’ – ‘… there is no way of knowing how seriously an intervention order might be breached until the fact of breach takes place. Breaches of intervention orders are capable of constituting serious crimes. Irrespective of whether or not a serious crime is in contemplation, a court should more readily accept that the recording of a “private conversation” has been carried out in pursuit of a person’s lawful interest in circumstances where that person has a genuine concern for their own safety. Domestic violence is a very serious problem in our community. It would appear that, at least, the recognition and reporting of domestic abuse, be it physical, psychological, or by threatening behaviour, is on the rise. An intervention order is a very important first step in protecting a person, usually a woman, who has been the subject of domestic abuse. Such an order gains much of its value in this respect according to the extent that it can be enforced. Respondents must be discouraged from infringing any such court order.’
The Court also accepted that the recording was in the public interest for two reasons. Firstly, that there is a public interest in, ‘allowing a protected person… the ongoing protection available through the recording and documenting of interactions that result in breaches’ (See at [44]). Secondly, that these recordings can assist the defence as well as the prosecution (see at [45]). It would also be possible for a defendant to make similar recordings to disprove a false allegation.
Murray v Police [2015] SASC 64 (22 April 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Assault’ – ‘Assaulting police’ – ‘Being unlawfully on premises’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Hindering or resisting police’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Unlawful damage’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Being unlawfully on premises, unlawful damage, assault (two counts), contravention of intervention order (three counts), hindering or resisting police (three counts), assault police (one count)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant was in an intermittent relationship with the victim. There were various incidents of verbal and physical violence over several years. This led the victim to apply for an intervention order which prohibited the defendant from approaching, contacting or communicating with the victim or her daughter. However, he returned to live with the victim on various occasions without the intervention order being changed. On the day in question, the defendant and the victim were arguing. The victim attempted to shut him out but he forced the door open, which knocked the victim onto the ground. He attempted to enter the victim’s daughter’s room multiple times to prevent her from calling the police. The daughter was pushing against it from the inside. He damaged various objects and threw a television across the room. He pushed the victim into a door frame and attempted to light a spray can while pointing it at the victim. He then pushed and attempted to punch two police officers, who had to use capsicum spray to subdue him. A psychiatrist diagnosed the defendant as suffering from an adjustment disorder with depressive features when he committed the offences. A single penalty for all offences of 14 months, 23 days’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 months was imposed. The defendant’s history included one like offence of violence committed against the same victim. He had had previous long term relationships which did not involve violence. The Magistrate concluded that the defendant had no insight into the offences he committed, and that his prospects of rehabilitation were minimal.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Blue J found that while the Magistrate was rightly appalled at the nature of the violence, insufficient weight was given to the defendant’s prospects of rehabilitation given the fact he had previous relationships that did not involve violence. The Magistrate also erred in not taking into account the lack of prior convictions for violence before his relationship with the victim and the psychiatric illness that he was suffering. He also had the support of a former long-term partner. As such, taking into account his pleas of guilty, he was resentenced to 11 months and 19 days’ imprisonment. This was suspended after the defendant served 5 months and five days upon entering into a good behaviour bond for 18 months.
Cook v Galloway [2015] SASC 36 (6 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Costs’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Appeal Type: Appeal against dismissal of an application for the confirmation of an interim intervention order.
Facts: The appellant and the respondent were in a de facto relationship and had separated. While proceedings in the Family Court were on foot, the appellant applied for an interim intervention order that was granted, but not confirmed. The factual basis for the intervention order was a series of incidents following the end of the relationship, where the appellant alleged his former de facto partner had, among other things, sexually assaulted him and punched him (See at [8]-[18]).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the intervention order should have been confirmed.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred finding that the proceedings were brought unreasonably which led to an adverse costs order against the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of costs but otherwise dismissed.
1.
Nicholson J found that the role of a Court in confirming an intervention order involves considering whether it is reasonable to suspect that the defendant, without intervention, will commit an act of abuse, and secondly, that the order is appropriate in the circumstances. His Honour acknowledged that the Magistrate neglected to make several findings of fact, and as such did not wholly follow the approach of Kourakis CJ in Police v Giles [2013] SASC 11 (15 January 2013). However, the Court held that the Magistrate was correct to conclude that there was no reasonable suspicion that abuse would occur in the future. The respondent lived away from the appellant and they rarely saw each other. Furthermore, the relationship was over and there was no longer any aggressive behaviour.
2.
The Court held that the appellant’s concerns were genuine, and called for determination by a Magistrate. Nicholson J noted that just because the application failed, this did not mean that the proceedings were brought unreasonably. The Court cited previous authority and noted the public policy concerns of making adverse costs orders against applicants in intervention order applications, as they may deter people from bringing worthy applications.
Stone v Police [2015] SASC 28 (3 March 2015) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of discreditable conduct’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order (two counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The protected persons in the order were the appellant’s neighbours, with whom the appellant had been in conflict for an extended period. There was a considerable amount of evidence admitted at trial regarding the history of the appellant’s behaviour towards the complainants.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred by admitting evidence of the appellant’s prior discreditable conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court found that the Magistrate did not give an adequate explanation of the purpose of the evidence of the appellant’s prior behaviour towards the complainants. Furthermore, the Magistrate made no reference to s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 which sets out rules regarding this type of evidence. The Court found that the evidence was ‘highly prejudicial’ to the appellant because it was similar to the offences which were the subject matter of the trial, and indicates that the accused has a propensity to commit offences of a similar nature. If it was to be used in that way, the Magistrate had to be satisfied that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect on the accused. Furthermore, no notice was given by the prosecution of their intention to adduce such evidence, and no direction was made by the Magistrate as to its use.
Fenton v Police [2014] SASC 167 (7 November 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Evidence of distress’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Uncooperative witness’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault – (Circumstance of aggravation: that the defendant committed the offence knowing the victim was his domestic partner.)
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The defendant assaulted the victim by pushing her onto the floor with his knees in her back, twisting her arms and forcing her face into the floor. At trial, the defendant claimed he was acting in self-defence. Both the defendant and the victim were severely intoxicated.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred by not taking into account inconsistencies in the victim’s evidence.
2.
Whether the Magistrate should have left certain matters for expert evidence.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred by relying on evidence of the victim’s distress as observed by police.
Decision and Reasoning: Blue J dismissed all grounds of appeal.
1.
In relation to the inconsistencies in the victim’s account, his Honour at [22] stated that the Magistrate in fact did consider this in relation to the victim’s credibility as a witness, but it did not have a substantial impact on the case. The second ground of appeal, which was that the victim gave new information in cross-examination that she had not previously given in her witness statements was dismissed for similar reasons (See [26]). The third ground of appeal was that the Magistrate failed to have regard to the victim’s ‘guarded and defensive’ answers during cross-examination. This was rejected – the Magistrate had the benefit of seeing the victim give evidence. It was open to him to make a favourable assessment of her credibility.
2.
Blue J acknowledged that had the Magistrate gone further in making conclusions regarding the consistency of bruises to the victim’s back with the victim’s account and the potential effect of alcohol on self-control, this may have transgressed into the realms of expert evidence. However, the Magistrate only made limited use of his own common sense and experience when making conclusions with respect to the bruises on the victim’s back and the potential impact of alcohol. It is common knowledge that - alcohol can reduce inhibitions which can lead to a loss of self-control and if a person is disposed to be aggressive, alcohol can lead a person to act aggressively. The Magistrate was entitled to make limited use of these observations without needing expert evidence.
3.
On the defendant’s version of events, the victim’s distress was caused by embarrassment about, among other things, her own conduct of striking and slapping the defendant. Blue J held that it was not self-evident that a person in the victim’s position would have exhibited distress as a result of embarrassment as submitted by the defendant. The Magistrate was not obliged to expressly reject this possibility. He used the evidence of distress legitimately.
Police v Siaosi [2014] SASC 131 (5 September 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Certainty of terms’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Impact of breach on offender’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Validity of terms in intervention order’
Charge/s: Contravention of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An intervention order was made in favour of the appellant’s former wife. The fifth term of the order prohibited the appellant from entering or remaining ‘in the vicinity’ of the property at which his former wife lived. The appellant formed a friendship with another woman who, by coincidence, lived quite close to his former wife’s home. After visiting this property, the appellant realised that there was a direct line of sight between the backyard of his friend’s property and his former wife’s property. There was no direct route of access between the houses, and they were not addresses on the same street. The distance between the two houses was measured to be 26 metres. He was convicted of breaching the fifth term of the order.
Issue/s: Whether the fifth term which prohibited the appellant from being ‘in the vicinity of’ specified premises was void for uncertainty and whether it was a valid exercise of power under s 12(1) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (the Act).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The term was void for uncertainty and not a valid exercise of power under the Act. Peek J held that mandatory terms in intervention orders must be ‘clearly and specifically authorised by the words of s 12(1)’ (See at [18]). The terms of intervention orders can leave the affected person in no doubt as to the meaning and extent of the order. His Honour noted that the term ‘vicinity’ is inherently imprecise, which is in contrast to s 12(1) of the Act which requires that orders be specific and certain. Police do not have powers to insert ‘broad and vague terms’ (See at [28]) which gives them a right to use their individual opinions to determine in a particular case whether a contravention of the term has occurred.
Callow v Police [2014] SASC 8 (24 January 2014) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Contravention of bail agreement’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (2 counts) – Circumstance of aggravation: that the applicant committed the offence knowing the victim was his wife, aggravated assault causing harm, driving while disqualified, contravention of bail agreement (5 counts), contravention of intervention order (5 counts), property damage.
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time to appeal against sentence.
Facts: See at [4] for a detailed factual summary of each offence. The assault offences involved the appellant kicking his wife while she was in bed and on a separate occasion punching her when she was on the couch recoiling from the applicant. The contravention of the intervention order counts all involved the applicant leaving voicemail messages for his wife. The applicant was sentenced to a single term of 1 month imprisonment for all offences. The remaining eight months were suspended with a good behaviour bond.
Issue/s: Whether the whole sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed. The applicant submitted that the Magistrate should have suspended the whole sentence based on the mitigating factors which led the Magistrate to suspend most of it. The Magistrate placed large weight on the mitigating factors, including that the applicant runs a successful business which he uses to help pay child support, as well as favourable character references. In fact, the Court described the sentence as ‘merciful’ given that the offending was repetitive, protracted and serious, and included ‘contumacious disregard’ of court orders (See at [10]). The Court also upheld previous authority that deterrence is an important factor in sentencing where there is a history of domestic violence, particularly breaches of intervention orders.
F, S v Police [2013] SASC 164 (1 November 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Standard of proof’
Appeal Type: Appeal against confirmation of intervention order.
Facts: The Magistrate confirmed an intervention order made in favour of the appellant’s ex-wife. Some of the alleged incidents of domestic violence included the appellant holding a screwdriver to his ex-wife’s throat, swearing and throwing clothes and shoes around in arguments. The Magistrate made findings of fact in relation to each alleged incident. On that basis he found a reasonable suspicion that the appellant would, without intervention, commit an act of abuse against his ex-wife and that such an act would cause distress, anxiety or fear which was not trivial.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate made proper findings of fact. Whether the Magistrate should have applied the higher standard of proof of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, rather than the ‘balance of probabilities’.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Magistrate set out the evidence very carefully, and in fact found that most of the alleged incidents were not sufficiently proven. The Court also found that the balance of probabilities is the correct standard, because the consequences of the imposition of an intervention order are ‘not so grave as to warrant such a heavier onus’ (at [18]). Finally, the Magistrate did not err by finding that the proven facts could amount to distress, anxiety or fear which is not trivial, because these considerations are somewhat subjective so the trier of fact has a distinct advantage.
Mullins v Police [2013] SASC 148 (20 September 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Contravention of intervention order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Resisting police’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (three counts), Contravention of intervention order (three counts), breach of bail (two counts), resisting police, damaging property.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to all 10 offences which were on four Magistrates’ Court files. All of the offences were committed either against or in the presence of the appellant’s partner (the mother of his child) in the context of arguments. The contravention of the intervention order arose from conduct that would have made his partner feel threatened, as opposed to a positive intention to make her feel threatened or any physical contact. A single sentence was imposed for each file and the four sentences were made cumulative. None of the sentences were suspended.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in ordering a sentence of imprisonment for the resist police charge.
2.
Whether the sentence imposed on the appellant contravened the rule against double punishment.
3.
How the appellant should be re-sentenced.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
One sentence of three months’ imprisonment was imposed for the resist police and the first aggravated assault charge. The Magistrate made no reference to the facts of the resist police charge, which was in fact not particularly serious and only involved ‘childish and idiotic’ behaviour (see at [15]) and nothing more. Even though the aggravated assault charge required a sentence of imprisonment, this did not mean that the resist police charge also required a sentence of imprisonment. A similar conclusion was reached in relation to the second Magistrates’ Court file, where the appellant was sentenced to one term of one month imprisonment for the breach of bail and contravention of intervention order offence. He should not have been punished for the breach of bail offence because he believed he was not in breach of bail, which was acknowledged by the Magistrate.
2.
The facts that formed the basis of the contravention offence in the fourth file were the same facts that formed the basis of the aggravated assault charge. The facts that formed the basis of the second contravention offence relied on the same facts as the property damage charge. Therefore, Peek J found that there was both ‘double charging’ and ‘double punishment’. Convictions were recorded for four offences when they only should have been recorded for two and a penalty imposed for four offences when it only should have been imposed for two. It may have been possible to charge alternative offences, but once pleas of guilty were taken the other count should have been dismissed. Peek J did acknowledge the problem that where a breach is particularly serious, the maximum penalty for a contravention offence is two years, while the maximum penalty for offences such as aggravated assault is higher. In that case, his Honour stated that the best option would be to lay the more serious charge with the contravention offence laid as an alternative charge, to be withdrawn upon a guilty plea to the more serious charge. Furthermore, the fact that the offender knew that the assault was also a contravention of an intervention order would be an aggravating factor in sentencing the more serious charge.
3.
In resentencing, his Honour took into account the appellant’s youth, minimal criminal history and good rehabilitation prospects. He also took into account the victim impact statement, in which the complainant stated she wished to maintain a relationship with the appellant and stated that she is ‘not a victim’. His Honour described this as a ‘mature and balanced view of the relationship’. However, relevant also was the need to protect domestic partners, the repeated nature of the offending and the need to ensure intervention orders are obeyed. The appellant was re-sentenced to 50 weeks’ imprisonment, fully suspended.
Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93 (25 June 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Adjournment’ – ‘Consent to confirmation of intervention order’ – ‘Interlocutory orders’
Appeal Type: Appeal against the order of a Magistrate.
Facts: With the appellant’s consent, a Magistrate confirmed an interim intervention order which had been put in place against him in favour of his domestic partner pursuant to s 23(3) of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009. At the time of the hearing, the appellant was in custody and appeared unrepresented in the Magistrates’ Court. On the day of the hearing, he did not have documentation relating to his case including an affidavit sworn by the applicant, and his responses to this affidavit. This was because he had attempted to have the documents brought to him in prison by a friend but permission was refused. The prosecution had not provided him with the affidavit. The Magistrate granted an adjournment until the afternoon, but refused to grant a longer adjournment.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant’s consent to the intervention order was freely given and whether he could withdraw his consent and have the order set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Before deciding the main issue, the Court confirmed as a matter of procedure that the Magistrate’s confirmation order was interlocutory in nature as it was capable of variation or revocation. As such, permission to appeal was required (See at [29]- [32]). The Court then found (at [40]) that had the longer adjournment been granted, no prejudice to the protected person would have occurred because the interim intervention order would have remained in place. Sulan J drew an analogy between consent under s 23(3) and admissions made in civil proceedings. As such, the corresponding principles that govern whether such admissions can be withdrawn became relevant. The Court found that the appellant’s consent was given in circumstances, ‘in which he considered that he had no satisfactory alternative but to agree’, because of all the circumstances outlined above, the fact that he was partially unrepresented, as well as the fact that he was not aware that he could have applied for a further adjournment. As such, his consent was not freely given.
T, R v L, KC [2013] SASC 51 (15 April 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Family law proceedings’ – ‘Intersection of legal systems’ – ‘Jurisdiction of family court of australia’ – ‘Jurisdiction of state courts’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’
Appeal type: Appeal against Magistrate’s decision to dismiss application for intervention order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were separated and had two children. Orders were made in the Federal Magistrates Court in relation to custody, access and protection of their children ([4]). The orders provided that the children live with the appellant, that the respondent have limited access to the children, and preventing the respondent from bringing the children into contact with certain people ([5]-[6]).
The appellant sought an intervention order in the Magistrates Court restraining the respondent from contacting the children ([11]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that the Family Court was the proper forum for the appellant to pursue the relief he seeks.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Family Court had jurisdiction over the proceedings and could amend the parenting orders if it considered appropriate ([18]-[19]). An intervention order made by the Magistrates Court would be invalid to the extent of inconsistency with the Family Law Act ([16]).
Police v Giles [2013] SASC 11 (15 January 2013) – South Australia Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence of prior abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reasonable suspicion’
Appeal Type: Police appeal against a Magistrate’s refusal to confirm an interim intervention order.
Facts: The Magistrate refused to confirm an interim intervention order which had previously been made ex parte against the respondent in favour of his former de facto partner. At trial, there were disputed facts regarding various prior incidents of physical and verbal abuse. The Magistrate made no findings of fact about these incidents.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate’s failure to make findings of fact about these incidents amounted to an error of law.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in finding that there was no reasonable suspicion that the respondent ‘would if unrestrained commit an act of abuse which was to result in more than trivial emotional harm’ (See at [4]). This appeal therefore concerned the meaning of ‘trivial’ distress, anxiety or fear and the degree of suspicion which is required.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
The Magistrate’s failure to make factual findings amounted to an error of law because: they were important to determining the nature of the relationship; they affected the degree of anxiety that the respondent’s former de facto partner may have felt about potential further acts of abuse and they were probative of further allegations made by his former de facto partner. Kourakis CJ noted at [29] that while proof of past acts of abuse is not a precondition to the making of an intervention order, the Act ‘appears to contemplate that the court will make findings of fact about past events and provides that it is to make those findings on the balance of probabilities’. As such, a reasonable suspicion (under s 6) that an act of abuse will be committed must be based on findings of fact made on the balance of probabilities.
2.
The Court found the Magistrate erred in finding that there was no reasonable suspicion in the circumstances. There is no requirement that the facts found by the Magistrate themselves constitute an act of abuse, that they be recent or that they occur before or after a relationship breakdown. An order could be made based on a statement of intention to commit an act of abuse, no matter who that statement was made to. While the timing of the acts is relevant, Kourakis CJ stated that depending on the circumstances, an event many years earlier could constitute a reasonable suspicion (See at [30]-[31]). A reasonable suspicion will include a suspicion that the ‘defendant will act in a certain way’ and a suspicion that those acts would have the prescribed effect on the protected person of something more than a trivial kind (See at [32]). In this case, the respondent’s former de facto partner had anxiety that the respondent may kill her. This was not trivial and the Magistrate had erred in finding it was.
Kourakis CJ then made several factual findings including that the appellant used a knife and verbally abused his former de facto partner and therefore found that the prescribed reasonable suspicion under the Act existed. His Honour then found that it would be appropriate in the circumstances to make the order.
RYSZ v Police [2011] SASC 167 (7 October 2011) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening to cause harm’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Breach of domestic violence restraining order, threatening to cause harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In 1999, a domestic violence restraining order was made against the appellant in favour of his wife. In 2010, he called his wife, verbally abused her and threatened her partner. This conduct amounted to a breach of the order which prohibited him from contacting her in any way. His criminal history was relevant and included offences of violence against his wife and daughter, as well as many prior breaches of the restraining order. He had an alcohol problem. At the time of the offending, he had ceased taking anti-depressant medication and had increased his alcohol consumption. He was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in not partially suspending the sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed in respect of the partial suspension.
1.
The appellant submitted, inter alia that as over 7 years had elapsed since the last breach of the order, the current offence should be seen as an isolated lapse and that the latest breach was relatively minor. This submission was rejected. Given the applicant’s history of seven previous convictions for breach of the order, leniency was not warranted. White J then discussed the nature of breaches of restraining orders and noted that their purpose is to protect vulnerable family members. His Honour at [31] then drew an analogy between breaches of domestic violence restraining orders and driving while disqualified, in that, ‘both involve some defiance of a court order; both negate the protection of the community which they were intended to achieve; and considerations of general and personal deterrence are important in each case.’ Generally, the most appropriate penalty for driving while disqualified is imprisonment. His Honour (again at [31]) then drew some distinctions between the nature of the two offences. His Honour then concluded, notwithstanding the differences between the two types of offences, ‘I consider that, having regard to the important role of domestic violence restraining orders and of the necessity of courts promoting respect for their own orders, a sentence of imprisonment may be appropriate in those cases, like the present, in which the order has been repeatedly breached and the offender has not taken advantage of the lenience previously extended to him. In cases of contumacious breaches of order, considerations of both general and personal deterrence are especially important’ (see at [32]).
2.
The Court agreed with the appellant’s submission that the sentence should have been partially suspended. The appellant had complied with the order for a long period since 2003 and the latest offence did appear to be isolated. Furthermore, it was at the lower end of the scale of seriousness for offences of that type. The offence was also explained by the fact that the appellant was coming off anti-depressants’ and was intoxicated (see further at [41]-[45]).
Police v Dolan [2010] SASC 341 (9 December 2010) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: Common assault, trespass, breach of bail.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant had been in a relationship with the victim for nine months. The victim was 8 weeks’ pregnant at the time of the offending. The defendant was the father and aware of the pregnancy. While the defendant and the victim were having a conversation, the defendant became aggressive, at which point the defendant punched her in the left side of the head which caused her to fall to the ground. He then kicked her in the head while she lay on the ground, which caused her to pass out. While she suffered no permanent injury, she experienced extreme pain. After being arrested and placed on bail, the defendant breached this bail by trespassing because he wanted to see if his partner was with another man. He again breached bail by having a conversation with his partner. He pleaded guilty and was placed on an 18 month supervised good behaviour bond, which included conditions that he obey the directions of a Correctional Services Officer, particularly in relation to attending programs for mental health, anger management and domestic violence. The Magistrate stated that a term of imprisonment would have been appropriate but for the guilty plea.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Gray J held that the Magistrate erred by not paying sufficient regard to the fact that this was an act of domestic violence against a young pregnant woman, which was not justified by the fact that the defendant was angry. While the defendant was not charged with an aggravated assault based on a domestic relationship, this remained a relevant factor. The mere fact that the defendant pleaded guilty should not have resulted in a term of imprisonment not being imposed. Indeed, other factors, such as the fact that it was an offence of domestic violence required consideration. His Honour’s starting point for common assault was 6 months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to 4 months’ because of the guilty plea and remorse. His Honour then had regard to the lack of criminal history and evident remorse and suspended the sentence, upon the defendant entering into a three-year good behaviour bond to be supervised for 18 months. Conditions that he attend anger management, drug and alcohol abuse and domestic violence programs were included. The convictions for the other offences were confirmed but no further penalty was imposed.
Vonstanke v Police [2010] SASC 15 (4 February 2010) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Contravention of restraining order’ – ‘Evidence of prior abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault (aggravating factor – that the offence was committed against the appellant’s domestic partner), contravention of restraining order (two counts), breach of bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s domestic partner believed the appellant was having an affair. She obtained documents from his computer. In attempting to get the documents back, the appellant pushed her backwards into a chair after grabbing her. The appellant prevented her from getting help by cutting the power to her telephone. She was fearful of the appellant. This conduct constituted the breach of the restraining order as well as the assault. After being arrested and released on bail with conditions that he not contact the victim, the appellant contacted the victim daily through the internet as well as by appearing at locations the victim drove to and sending her flowers. This conduct was in breach of bail and the restraining order. The offences were committed in the context of a background of domestic violence. The total effective sentence imposed was nine months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. While the victim suffered no physical injury, she was isolated, in considerable fear and subjected to physical force while the applicant prevented her from obtaining assistance. The fact that this incident was not unique was also relevant - the physical assaults she had suffered from the appellant in the past were an important consideration. See in particular the following comments by Duggan J at [16] – ‘Personal and general deterrence play an important role in offences involving domestic violence. This is particularly so in the case of a repeat offender. Furthermore, Parliament has acknowledged the importance of deterrence in such cases by declaring that an offence of violence against a domestic partner is an aggravated offence attracting an increase in the maximum penalty over and above that applicable in the case of an offence of common assault. The fact that the assault constituted a breach of a restraining order made by the Court is a further factor to take into account in considering the single sentence imposed in respect of the assault and breach of restraining order.’
Johnstone v Police [2008] SASC 357 (17 December 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Domestic discipline’ – ‘Offences against children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated Assault (aggravating factor – that the offence was committed knowing the victim of the offence was their child)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant plead guilty and was convicted for the aggravated assault of his son. The appellant inflicted a substantial blow on the child, which left bruising and finger marks on his leg. However, he did not require any hospital treatment. It occurred in the context of the appellant attempting to discipline his son. The appellant’s criminal history included a prior conviction for an assault in a domestic setting. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, fully suspended upon entering into a good behaviour bond for two years with conditions that he be under the supervision of a Community Corrections Officer and that he undertake counselling for drug issues, anger management and domestic violence issues.
Issue/s: One issue concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the sentence was reduced to three months’ imprisonment, fully suspended with the same bond conditions as fixed by the Magistrate. While acknowledging the appellant’s criminal history, Nyland J found that this was an isolated incident in the context of the appellant attempting to discipline his son, and was not intended to cause any injury. As such, while the sentence was excessive, the Court agreed with the Magistrate that a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate – ‘the court must make it clear, not only to the appellant but to others who might be like-minded, that violence of any kind to a child will not be tolerated’ (see at [28]).
R v Wilkinson [2008] SASC 172 (4 July 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravated serious harm with intent’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated serious harm with intent, aggravated assault causing harm, aggravated harm with intent. (Aggravating factors – that the appellant knew the victim was his de facto spouse).
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was on bail for an unrelated charge at the time of the offending. The first incident arose when the complainant went to collect the appellant (her de facto partner) due to the appellant’s curfew as a condition of his bail. The appellant reacted angrily to this, which led to the assault. She was admitted to hospital for four days. The complainant’s injuries were extremely serious with lasting effects including permanent facial and dental damage, ongoing amnesia, psychological issues and disfigurement. The appellant was arrested and eventually released on bail with conditions that he not approach or communicate with the complainant in any way. In breach of this bail, the appellant seriously assaulted the complainant again by punching her in the face, choking her, pulling her by the hair and throwing her into a mirror. The complainant again sustained serious injuries and required hospital treatment. There was a long history of domestic violence in the relationship, and one of the past incidents involved an assault by the appellant. The complainant called police but was unable to explain what occurred. When police returned the call, the appellant held a gun to the complainant’s head. She told the police all was OK and hung up. At the time of the offending, the appellant was 27 and the complainant was 17. They had been in a relationship for some years and the police had been contacted about domestic violence three times in the 12 months prior. The appellant had relevant criminal history apart from the history of domestic violence. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 7 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Gray J (with whom Sulan J and White J agreed) discussed the causes of domestic violence and the preferred response of the courts. See at [27]- [28] -
‘The causes of domestic violence are multiple. It has been recognised that relevant contributing factors include immaturity, mental illness, abnormal personality disorders, inhibition through drug abuse, poor anger management and lack of counselling and support. Courts have identified all of the above as common causative factors in modern times. Although imposing longer and longer terms of imprisonment does remove perpetrators from the community, domestic violence continues and its incidence increases. The imposing of sentences of imprisonment is a blunt instrument that does not adequately address the underlying causes of domestic violence in any real way.
The courts have long recognised that personal and general deterrence have a heightened significance when sentencing for the crimes of domestic violence. As King CJ observed in R v Banens (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, King CJ, Legoe and Von Doussa JJ, 18 November 1987) at 7-8:
“The sentence which is imposed by the court for a crime of domestic violence is aimed, in large part, at deterring other people who may be involved in like situations. I think that, in a serious case of domestic violence, it is necessary for this Court to make clear, by actual intervention, to the public that the sentences imposed for this type of crime are calculated to provide effective deterrence to those who might be tempted to commit similar crimes. Not only must the penalties imposed operate, as far as such penalties can, as an effective deterrent, but it must be made clear to the public that the courts are imposing sentences having that effect. It is a question not only of actual deterrence but assurance to the public that deterrent penalties are being imposed.”’
His Honour went onto comment on the vulnerability of victims at [29] – ‘Domestic violence is predominantly directed by men toward women. The community expects the law to protect women, to protect the weak from the strong, and to protect the vulnerable from the oppressor. These are factors that have led the courts to treat crimes involving domestic violence as grave crimes. Parliament has enacted laws designed to provide protection to those subjected to domestic violence. Parliament has recognised that crimes involving violence and assault may be aggravated by a domestic situation.’
This was particularly relevant on these facts as the victim/complainant was only 17. She had made multiple complaints to police but had received little protection, other than the no contact and no alcohol conditions of the appellant’s bail. The Court did not make use of the wide powers under s 11 of the Bail Act 1985. While the bail agreement indicated there was to be supervision by a Community Corrections Officer, there is no evidence that this occurred. Also, the appellant was not required to undertake counselling to address his violence, alcohol abuse and anger issues. As such, in this case, the no contact condition provided little protection and the complainant was left vulnerable and in danger. The Court concluded that the sentencing judge was correct to take a serious view of the appellant’s conduct. Over the preceding 12 months, the appellant had ‘bullied, victimised and brutalised his younger partner’ (See at [41]) and had continued this conduct notwithstanding the fact that the complainant sought protection from police and the bail conditions. Personal deterrence was important as the appellant had not been deterred by earlier warnings. General deterrence was also particularly important. See finally at [42] where Gray J referred to the fact that Parliament has made an assault in a de facto relationship an aggravating factor, which draws attention to the seriousness of this conduct. The Courts should pay due attention to this factor in sentencing.
R v Carr [2008] SASC 125 (13 May 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Antecedents’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening life’
Charge/s: Common assault (two counts), threatening life.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the appellant’s wife. There was a long history of physical and psychological abuse in the relationship. The assaults involved the appellant slapping and spitting on his wife. The threatening life offence involved the appellant holding a knife to his wife’s throat. He was sentenced to two years and five months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of twelve months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the appellant was re-sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 9 months. The appellant submitted that the sentencing judge erred in not sufficiently taking into account the time he spent in custody and in home detention and his prospects of rehabilitation. The respondent submitted that there was no error in the sentencing judge’s approach, and that the charges had to be considered against the background of domestic violence that occurred over the period of a 17 year marriage. The respondent argued that this made general deterrence of paramount importance. Anderson J (Doyle CJ and Bleby J agreeing), agreed at [31] that general deterrence is a very important consideration in sentencing where there has been a history of domestic violence in the relationship. This was applied at [38], where Anderson J held that the history of domestic violence in the relationship and the importance of general deterrence could not justify suspending the sentence. However, the sentencing judge erred in assessing the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation as moderate. This was contradictory to the information that was before him, which included a lack of prior convictions and the fact the appellant no longer had a problem with alcohol abuse. The sentencing judge also erred by not specifying the extent to which he took the period of home detention into account.
R v Lennon [2003] SASC 337 (2 October 2003) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful and malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Unlawful and malicious wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was intoxicated and engaged in an argument with his de facto wife. He lost his temper and struck her on the head with the blade of a shovel which caused very serious injuries. He then threatened to break her legs, struck her on the knees with the shovel handle and struck her on the arm, which was already broken and in plaster. He had a relevant criminal history including offences of violence. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Mitigating factors included the fact that the offence was committed on the spur of the moment while he was intoxicated and he was immediately remorseful (see at [9]). However, Doyle CJ (with whom Prior J and Vanstone J agreed) described the attack as ‘brutal’ and ‘cowardly’ (see at [10]). Doyle CJ then made the following comments at [12] –
‘The court has said consistently that it must do what it can to protect women from violence by men. This applies just as much to violence within a domestic relationship as it does to violence in other situations. In cases like this the community expects, and protection of women requires, that the court should impose a sentence that is likely to deter the individual offender and to deter other potential offenders. The fact that the violence occurs on the spur of the moment is a relevant factor, but this is often true in the case of domestic violence. The impulsive nature of such offences is often offset by the fact that, as here, there is a pattern of violence within the particular relationship, or on the part of the particular offender. Mr Lennon's record makes it clear that he has not yet learned that violence towards women cannot be accepted.’
As such, while there was no error in the primary judge’s reasoning, the sentence was too low. It was not justified by the mitigating factors in the context of the objective seriousness of the crime and the respondent’s criminal history. The respondent’s Aboriginality was acknowledged but no significance of that factor was identified. The Court held that the head sentence should have been twice what was imposed. There was a need for the Court to re-sentence because the original punishment was, ‘so inadequate as to shake confidence in the administration of justice’ (see at [18]). The appellant was then re-sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months. While Doyle CJ was of the view that a longer non-parole period was warranted, this was not appropriate because the original non-parole date fixed by the trial judge was to expire within two weeks of the decision being handed down. To increase the non-parole period so close to this date would have been particularly harsh on the respondent.
R v Parisi [2003] SASC 249 (14 August 2003) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily actual harm’ – ‘Contravention of restraining order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threatening life’
Charge/s: Damaging property (two counts), contravention of restraining order (two counts), threatening life, assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty in the District Court to all of the above charges. The victim was the appellant’s estranged wife. Prior to the offences, there was domestic and family violence that led to the restraining order being obtained. The property damage offences involved the appellant damaging his wife’s car. The threatening life and assault offences involved the appellant attending a house at which his wife was staying and producing a knife. He was allowed to enter the house after he handed over the knife and stated that he would not harm his wife. He then entered the house, grabbed his wife in a headlock and punched her in the face multiple times while threatening to kill her. She suffered a broken nose and black eye. The appellant’s criminal history included various drug and assault offences. A psychiatrist concluded that the appellant had developed a depressive disorder associated with the deterioration of his relationship, which had caused him to act aggressively and violently towards his wife and children over some years. His condition had not stabilised. He was sentenced to three years and two months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that the primary judge did not adequately consider the appellant’s rehabilitation and had given undue weight to his criminal history and the comments of the psychiatrist. He submitted that the sentence should have been suspended. However, the appeal was not upheld for these reasons. Rather, the original sentence was set aside due to an error with calculating the maximum penalties for the property damage offences. In re-sentencing, Nyland J (with whom Gray J and Debelle J agreed) concluded that while the two property damage offences might not appear particularly serious, they should be treated as part of an escalating course of conduct which culminated in the assault, which caused serious injury and would have been a terrifying experience. Her Honour also noted that the fact the conduct was committed in breach of a domestic violence order was an aggravating factor. General deterrence was significant to ‘bring home to others who might be like-minded that the courts will not tolerate this type of behaviour’ (See at [21]).’ He was re-sentenced to two years and nine months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months. The reduced length of the sentence gave credit for the appellant’s guilty plea and time already served in custody and on home detention bail. The non-parole period was reduced to take account of the positive reports from the psychiatrist about the appellant’s rehabilitation, such that he was no longer a threat to his wife and personal deterrence was no longer necessary.
R v McMutrie [2002] SASC 253 (8 August 2002) – South Australia Supreme Court
*Note this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possession of a knife with intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge/s: Attempted murder, wounding with intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm, unlawful wounding, breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s relationship with his former de facto partner had recently ended. The appellant approached her at a club because he wanted her to come outside to witness him attempt to cut his own throat. As he attempted to force her to leave, a struggle ensued and she was wounded by his knife. They had been in a relationship for 20 years. The appellant had a history of domestic violence, mental health issues and various other illnesses. His criminal history involved alcohol and drug related offending and prior breaches of restraining orders. He was acquitted of attempted murder and wounding with intent but convicted of unlawful wounding and possessing a knife with intent. The trial judge indicated that the possession of the knife and unlawful wounding offences arose out of the same events. He pleaded guilty to breaching the restraining order. He was sentenced for all three offences to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the appellant was convicted twice for the same offending conduct, as the same facts were relied upon for the possess knife with intent charge and the unlawful wounding charge, such that the rule against double jeopardy was infringed.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was upheld and the appeal against sentence was dismissed.
1.
The Crown conceded that there was a risk of a miscarriage of justice and acknowledged that the jury may have relied on the same factual circumstances for both convictions. As such, the appellant would have been entitled to the defence of ‘autrefois acquit’. The conviction for the possess knife offence was therefore set aside.
2.
In upholding the original sentence, Gray J (with whom Perry J and Williams J agreed) noted the lasting impacts of the history of domestic violence on the victim and their children. The Court held that an immediate custodial sentence was needed. See in particular these remarks at [15]-[18] –
‘Domestic violence is not just physical abuse but includes a range of violent and abusive behaviours perpetrated by one person against another. A high percentage of victims are women and children. Domestic violence has existed for centuries. However over the last 30 years its prevalence has been increasingly recognised. This has caused considerable community and governmental concern. More recently legislation has evolved in an effort to protect the vulnerable…The law seeks to protect the innocent and vulnerable. The legislative scheme is directed towards providing protection. This protection is primarily provided through the mechanism of restraining orders (Now known as intervention orders). Restraining orders are the principal legal response to domestic violence. They are can be (sic) obtained expeditiously from a magistrate's court. The standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. Orders can be tailored to the particular conduct of the abuser and breaches are a criminal offence. In this case the victim had obtained a restraining order. She had done all she could to protect herself. The breach of that order is a matter of particular gravity. The use of the knife to engender fear and wound was an aggravating feature to the appellant's crime. The gravity of his conduct called for the imposition of an immediate custodial sentence’
See furtherat [23] – ‘A restraining order had been obtained to prevent the very conduct the subject of the wounding conviction. The need for personal deterrence is a significant factor in this case. The appellant needs to understand that court orders must be obeyed and that non compliance in circumstances of domestic violence will be viewed very seriously. General deterrence is also an important consideration in sentencing.’
District Court
R v Fraser [2020] SADC 127 (2 September 2020) – South Australian District Court
‘Actus reus’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Recklessness’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Choking, suffocating or strangling a person in a domestic setting x 1.
Proceedings: Application for ruling whether mens rea is an element of the offence.
Decision and reasoning: Mens rea is an element of the offence.
There is no Supreme Court authority that has considered the elements of this offence, and, in particular, whether mens rea is an element of the offence. The judge in this case agreed with the reasoning of the QCA in R v HBZ (2020) with respect to actus reas:
[17] In my view, the actus reus of choking, suffocating or strangling is the stopping, or significantly hindering or restricting of the complainant’s breathing, whether by application of force or by other means.
…
[20] Even where the actus reus does not involve the application of pressure or force, for example, the luring of the victim into an airless chamber, the placing of a plastic bag over the victim’s face, or the administration of a poison that causes an anaphylactic reaction, the resultant stopping or significantly hindering or restricting of the victim’s breathing is not a separate element of the offence but is the very evidence required to prove that the conduct (the luring, placing of the bag, the administration of the poison) was the act of choking, suffocation or strangling.
[21] For these reasons I conclude that, if mens rea is an element of the offence, the intention accompanying the conduct must be an intention to stop or significantly hinder or restrict the victim’s breathing.
[22] There is no express or implied exclusion of mens rea in s 20A. The offence in s 20A was created to avoid ‘relying on existing offences such as causing harm or serious harm, endangering life or attempted murder’. All of those offences require proof of mens rea. In enacting s 20A as a substitute for those offences and in dispensing with any requirement to prove injury or harm and yet providing a maximum penalty of 7 years imprisonment, Parliament cannot have intended to dispense with the element of mens rea. However, the offence does not require proof of harm or injury and thus does not require proof of a specific intent with respect to the consequence of the prohibited conduct.
[23] The very act the accused intends to perform must be to stop, significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s breathing. The intention to choke, suffocate or strangle will generally be inferred from the conduct itself but may also be established by additional evidence.
[24] Accordingly, I conclude that the presumption that mens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a grave criminal offence is not displaced in relation to s 20A of the CLCA. On a charge under that provision, the prosecution bears the onus of proving that the accused intended to choke, suffocate or strangle the complainant, that he, is intended to stop, significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s breathing.
…
[30] Accordingly, I consider it unlikely that Parliament would have intended to exclude recklessness as an alternative basis for liability …
[31] As there is no statutory definition of recklessness for the purposes of s 20A, and given the characterisation by Parliament of this offence as an indicator of escalation to domestic homicide, it is appropriate to apply the common law test for recklessness set out by the High Court in Crabbe.
[32] I rule that the elements of the offence under s 20A are:
•
At the time of the alleged offence the accused was or had been, in a relationship with the complainant.
•
The accused intentionally engaged in conduct which choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant; that is conduct that stopped or significantly hindered or restricted the complainant’s respiration. In the alternative, the accused engaged in the conduct which choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant foreseeing that it was probable that this conduct would stop or significantly hinder or restrict the complainant’s respiration.
•
The complainant did not consent to being choked, suffocated or strangled.
•
The act of choking, suffocating or strangling the complainant was done without lawful justification.
R v Rogers [2020] SADC 72 (16 June 2020) – South Australian District Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Credibility of complainant’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step-children’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: Causing harm with intent to cause harm x 1; damaging property x 1; assault x 1; rape x 2; assault causing harm x 1.
Case type: Judge only trial.
Facts: The accused man was charged with 6 offences alleged to have been committed against the complainant woman between 2016 and 2018 when they were in a ‘romantic relationship’ and were living together for periods of time. The offences included causing harm with intent to cause harm, damaging property, assault, rape, and assault causing harm. The alleged offences were committed in a domestic setting, at different addresses where the complainant resided with her 3 children, apart from periods on weekends or school holidays when they stayed with their respective fathers. The prosecution alleged that the relationship was characterised by the accused’s violence and aggression, and that the complainant was trapped in a destructive cycle of physical violence, abuse, threats and controlling behaviour, which usually occurred in the presence of her young children. According to the prosecution, the charges are specific examples of a general pattern of behaviour demonstrated by the accused in the course of the relationship.
In relation to Count 1, the accused was alleged to have choked the complainant. He also punched and slapped her in the face (Count 3). Further, the complainant allegedly woke to the sensation of her vagina being penetrated (Count 4), and the accused further penetrated her with his fingers (Count 5). The accused also allegedly threw the complainant and stood on her ankle with his body weight, causing extreme pain (Count 6).
Held: Tracey J held that the prosecution failed to exclude the defence case as a reasonable possibility on any of the charges, and found the accused not guilty on each count ([281]-[282]). Much of the complainant’s evidence was inconsistent and unreliable. Her Honour was troubled by the delay the complainant made in reporting Count 1 to police and the delay in providing the letter relied on by the prosecution as the accused’s acknowledgment of the violent acts that had occurred the previous night ([234]). Whilst the letter could be interpreted as referring to the event where he strangled the complainant as she alleged, it could also be viewed as an apology for calling her a bad mother, threatening suicide, punching the wall and grabbing her arms as the defence alleged ([236]).
Much of the defence case was focused on blaming the complainant for issues in the relationship, consistent with the threatening and intimidating abuse she allegedly experienced. Her Honour rejected the defence argument that she was often the perpetrator of violence. The evidence in relation to the complainant’s previous relationships did not demonstrate a propensity for violence or false reporting to police. It was clear that on some occasions, she had not been the instigator and/or was the victim. Tracey J also formed the impression that the accused exhibited manipulative behaviour ([272]). Moreover, behaviours, such as the complainant’s contacting police, making statements on some occasions and not others, withdrawing complaints, denying incidents occurred, allowing the accused back into her life and seeking variation to intervention orders, are common features in serious domestic violence cases. Abusive and violent relationships give rise to behaviours that may appear too odd or counterintuitive to be believed ([273]).
Tracey J did not doubt that some aspects of the complainant’s evidence were true or that she loved the accused. However, she did have difficulty assessing the complainant’s evidence overall. Whilst she sometimes appeared to be focused and doing her best to describe the events, she also appeared distant, non-committal and prone to exaggeration. She was open about her methamphetamine use and the fact that she had used drugs in her home, albeit not in front of her children ([274]). At times, the complainant’s manner seemed perplexing and her Honour had difficulty accepting her version of events as credible. The differences between her evidence and what she told police were troubling. Such inconsistencies could not be excused, even allowing for the passage of time, the frequent and repetitive nature of alleged abuse blurring a memory of an event, or the chaotic lifestyle that often accompanies drug use ([275]). It appeared much of her angst stemmed from the accused’s relationship with another woman. The complainant’s credibility was undermined by her initial refusal to accept the accuracy of texts she had sent to this woman and her denial that the relationship with the accused did not affect her, despite text messages to the contrary ([276]). Further, her Honour noted that although domestic violence victims may not seek attention for the injuries they sustain and may take extraordinary steps to conceal evidence of abuse, the complainant’s graphic descriptions of her injuries and episodes of violence were not borne out by other evidence. There was no evidence from the complainant’s consultations with doctors of any bruising or injury consistent with the allegations. Her daughter’s distress, apparently in response to questions about drugs, raised the question of whether there had been some discussion between her and the complainant before giving evidence ([279]). Tracey J observed that the police officers who gave evidence appeared to be careful and impressive witnesses who would have assessed and recorded any sign of injury ([280]).
R v Hanks [2019] SADC 139 (16 September 2019) – South Australian District Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity reasoning’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: 4 x assault causing harm (Counts 1-4), 1 x rape (Count 5), 2 x aggravated assault causing harm (Counts 6-7), 1 x aggravated assault (Count 8), 1 x aggravated creating likelihood of harm (Count 9)
Case type: Criminal trial by judge alone
Facts: The accused was charged with 4 counts of assault causing harm, 1 count of rape, 2 counts of aggravated assault causing harm, 1 count of aggravated assault and 1 count of aggravated creating likelihood of harm. The complainant was his former de facto partner ([1]). The prosecution argued that the charged acts were committed during their de facto relationship ([3]). The defence case, however, was that the relationship was not a violent one and that the charged acts of violence and rape did not take place ([5]).
Held: The accused was found guilty of Counts 1-5 and 7-9. Judge Chapman did not find him guilty of Count 6, but guilty of the alternative offence of aggravated assault ([188]-[221]). The complainant gave evidence that the accused suffered from alcohol and drug abuse, and would get emotional about his past, resulting in rage ([19]-[20]). Judge Chapman emphasised that she avoided using the evidence in any prejudicial way against the accused, such as to reason that he was generally violent and therefore must have committed the charged acts ([187]). Her Honour noted that the fact the accused used drugs did not mean that he was a bad person or had the propensity to commit the charged offences. Rather, her Honour stated that the evidence of his alcohol and/or drug use may only partly explain his aggressive behaviour towards the complainant and his inability to control outbursts of rage ([21]). Evidence of various uncharged acts was further discussed at [23]-[52]. Judge Chapman was satisfied that all the uncharged acts occurred as described by the complainant and showed that the charged acts did not "come out of the blue" ([185]).
R v Schmidt [2017] SADC 98 (30 August 2017) – South Australian District Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence not accepted’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Judge-only trial’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uncharged acts of violence’
Charges: Aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence x 1; Indecent assault x 1; Assault x 1; Theft x 1.
Case type: Trial by a single judge.
Facts: The complainant alleged that the accused entered her house, strangled her, grabbed her in the vagina, punched her in the face and stole her mobile phone ([23]-[[26]). The accused denied all the allegations ([6]).
Issues: Whether the accused should be convicted.
Decision and Reasoning: Judge Rice convicted the accused on counts 1, 2 and 4 ([56]). In relation to Count 3 (assault), Rice J found that it was not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused punched the complainant ([54]).
Evidence of uncharged acts of violence occurring earlier in the relationship was also admitted. The prosecution said that it showed that ‘the accused had a tendency to act in a violent and controlling manner’ towards the complainant ([12]). However, Judge Rice ignored the evidence on the basis that some of the complainant’s evidence was inconsistent, and was not supported by independent evidence ([20]).
Tasmania
Court of Criminal Appeal
Davey v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 11 (20 September 2024) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Burning victim’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Majority verdict’ – ‘Context evidence of controlling and abuse relationship’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘separation’-‘Admissibility” – ‘Competency of trial counsel’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Lack of credibility’
Charges: Attempted murder x1, persistent family violence contrary to s 170A of the Criminal Code x 1 (this latter charge was not appealed as the applicant had pleaded guilty)
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: On the day of the attempted murder, the applicant went to the complainant’s house where the complainant told him their relationship was over. This caused an argument during which the applicant spat and threw a can of Coke at the complainant, and damaged her property. The complainant and her mother left the house and returned later that evening. As he had no other way of getting back to his house and was subject to a curfew, the complainant offered to drive the applicant to his house. Once there, they went into a shed where they had another argument which escalated into a physical fight. The complainant wanted to leave, but the applicant would not let her. He doused her with petrol. There was further arguing. When the complainant went to leave the shed, the applicant set her alight with a cigarette lighter. She suffered burns to 68% of her body, resulting in life threatening injuries.
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon 21 grounds in applying for leave to appeal his conviction of attempted murder. For four of these grounds, he was represented by counsel; for the remainder, he was self-represented. The grounds are set out below, along with the Court’s decision and reasoning.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to appeal the conviction was allowed, and the appeal was dismissed.
1.
Majority verdict of guilty of attempted murder not lawful (represented). The applicant cited s 43 of the Juries Act 2003, under which the court is directed to take a majority verdict as the verdict of the jury in particular circumstances, except in trials “relating to treason or murder”. The applicant argued that trials “relating to… murder” included trials regarding attempted murder, and therefore the trial judge had erred by accepting a majority verdict. On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that an accurate reading of s 43 meant that a court cannot take a majority verdict in a trial for murder, however, this did not extend to attempted murder or other crimes adjacent to murder [160]-[161].
2.
The admission of tendency evidence (represented). The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of previous violence in the applicant and complainant’s relationship to establish behavioural tendencies on the part of the applicant. The Court of Appeal found that the evidence strongly supported the asserted tendencies and was of significant probative value. The risk of the jury improperly using the evidence or giving it disproportionate weight was limited, and was ameliorated by the trial judge’s directions. The evidence was admitted properly [196].
3.
The admission of a letter written by the complainant (represented). The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence of a letter written by the complainant prior to the offending. The letter was written by the complainant shortly before the applicant was released from prison, and expressed her fear of the applicant and her belief that he was capable of killing her. The Court rejected the applicant’s argument that the jury would give too much weight to the evidence on account of its predictive nature. Accordingly, the Court considered that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and the evidence was admitted properly [210]-[211].
4.
The verdict was unreasonable or incapable of being supported by the evidence (represented). The Court considered that the jury was entitled to reject the applicant’s evidence and to accept the complainant’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt [228].
5.
Category 1 of self-represented grounds: miscarriage of justice due to the incompetence of the applicant’s trial counsel. The applicant argued that the cross-examination of the complainant had been inadequate; that his trial counsel had failed to object to the use of certain evidence; that his trial counsel had failed to adduce all relevant evidence; and that his trial counsel had failed to seek a direction. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant’s trial counsel had acted competently [314].
6.
Category 2 of self-represented grounds: errors on the part of the trial judge, which led to evidence being admitted erroneously and/or the jury not being discharged in circumstances where it was warranted. The applicant argued that the trial judge had erred by admitting certain evidence, and permitting the cross-examination of certain witnesses. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments. The Court found that other matters raised – the adequacy of the time allowed for jury deliberation, the permitting of the re-examination of a witness and the admission of prior inconsistent statements – similarly did not give rise to issues [347].
7.
Category 3 of self-represented grounds: miscarriage of justice due to the misconduct of the Crown prosecutor at trial. The applicant argued that the Crown prosecutor had been unfair in cross-examination by suggesting that the applicant had recently invented his evidence. The Court found that parts of the cross-examination should not have occurred, and should have been objected to. Even so, the Court found that the failure to object did not suggest that a miscarriage of justice had arisen, particularly in light of the trial judge’s directions to the jury. The prosecutor’s failure to call a certain witness was found to be an error of prosecutorial judgment, but resulted in no miscarriage of justice [417].
8.
Category 4 of self-represented grounds: contention that is fresh evidence which gives rise to the applicant’s conviction being a miscarriage of justice. The Court held that this fresh evidence was not credible, and could not be accepted [435].
Palmer v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 6 (5 July 2024) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
'strangulation' - 'assault - 'following, harassing, monitoring' - 'threat to animals
Charges: 2 x assault
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant had pleaded not guilty to two counts of assault but on the second day of the trial before Wood J, he changed his pleas to guilty and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with 14 months suspended. Both counts relate to his then female partner. Their relationship had deteriorated, and he had become very jealous and paranoid, watching the victim's movements via cameras installed in the house via an app on his mobile phone [8]. The victim had left with their baby son, but he had threatened to kill the horses if she did not return. [9] The assaults were committed during one incident on the same day, 24 February 2020. The appellant slapped the victim to the face, pushed her onto a bed, put his hands around her throat and squeezed, and headbutted her to the head (assault × 1). He also wrapped a dressing gown cord around her neck and pulled it tightly, and headbutted her to the head (assault x 2).
Grounds of appeal: That the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal is dismissed.
Porter AJ (Blow CJ and Bret J agreeing with his conclusion and reasons concluded that the offences 'constitute quite appalling conduct. They were done in the context of an obsessive and possessive attitude on the part of the appellant. Those physical assaults, as is always the case with assaults in a domestic relationship, amount to breaches of trust. The second assault, involving strangulation by use of the dressing gown cord, is to be regarded in a particularly serious light...it is fortunate she was not more seriously injured.' [50] Error was not shown in the sentence and the sentence was not outside the permissible range
Gee v Tasmania [2022] TASCCA 1 (2 February 2022) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Admissibility of prison telephone call recordings’ – ‘Admissions of guilt’ – ‘Appeal’ – ‘Credibility of victim’ – ‘Lies of victim’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Post-offence conduct consistent with guilt’ – ‘Prison telephone calls’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was found guilty of persistent family violence [8]. He appealed on the following grounds:
1.
The learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in ruling that the complainant’s evidence be taken at a special hearing.
2.
The learned trial judge erred in fact and in law in admitting into evidence the recorded content of phone calls made by the appellant to the complainant:
◦
‘…in finding that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the appellant’;
◦
‘…in finding that it would not be unfair to admit the evidence having regard to its late disclosure’; and
◦
‘…in admitting the evidence conditional upon the State recalling the witness in circumstances where it had previously asserted in support of the application for special hearing that it would not do so under any circumstances’ [7].
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal is dismissed.
Ground 1: The Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling on the special hearing, dismissing the first ground of appeal [32]. The trial judge had found that when faced with the prospect of giving evidence in court in the presence of the accused, the complainant experienced symptoms of anxiety that ‘adversely affected’ her ability to comprehend and respond to questions ‘to a significant degree’. The trial judge noted that the complainant’s anxiety manifested ‘itself physically by her shaking and becoming effectively unresponsive’. Therefore, the trial judge was satisfied that by requiring the complainant to give evidence ‘in the usual way’ she would likely ‘suffer severe emotional trauma’ and ‘be so intimidated or distressed as to be unable to give evidence… satisfactorily’. The trial judge explained that this was due to the nature of the complainant’s ‘relationship with the accused and… the subject matter’ [16].
Ground 2: The court dismissed the second ground of appeal, stating that ‘the evidence was highly probative, involving admissions of guilt, post-offence conduct consistent with guilt and evidence highlighting the complainant's credibility’ [48]. The court held that the complainant’s admitted lies did not mean none of her evidence was to be believed.
Otto v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 15 (16 December 2021) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accessory after the fact’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal’ – ‘Crown appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Murder’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction; Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted of the murder of her husband, the allegations being that she instigated her husband’s friend and her former lover Bradley Purkiss to commit the crime. The case against the applicant was solely circumstantial. The victim had been behaving erratically in the weeks leading up to the murder and the applicant and co-accused had spent a number of hours together on the afternoon before the murder. It was clear that the jury did not believe the applicant’s exculpatory statements in her police record of interview. The applicant and victim had been experiencing financial difficultied prior to the murder and she had reported to witnesses that her husband had mental and physical health issues which prevented him from working, and he was said to be an intimidating person. The applicant and Purkiss had a brief sexual relationship which ended prior to the murder, but they remained close. Text messages between Purkiss and the victim on the day of the murder were recovered from the victim’s phone, there was video evidence a man wearing a hood entered the applicant and victim’s home met after the murder and the CCV was disconnected after that person entered the home.
Grounds:
Application for leave to appeal – the verdict of the jury was unreasonable and cannot be supported with regards to the evidence (accepting a verdict of accessory after the fact should be substituted if successful).
Appeal against sentence – manifest inadequacy.
Decision and reasoning:
1.
Leave granted and appeal allowed.
2.
Verdict of guilty of murder set aside and verdict of being an accessory after the fact to murder substituted.
3.
Sentence for murder set aside.*
Porter J (Brett and Geason JJ concurring) held that the question for the court was whether it was open for the jury to have excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. On the evidence before the jury it was not possible to exclude the hypothesis put by the applicant in argument.
*Note: On 17 December 2021, for the crime of being an accessory after the fact to murder, the Court recorded a conviction and sentenced the appellant to six years' imprisonment to commence on 30 May 2017. The Court ordered that she not be eligible for parole until she had served one half of that sentence.
McCall v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 11 (12 November 2021) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Accusations of infidelity’ – ‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Home invasion’ – ‘Manifestly excessive or inadequate’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People who are homeless’ – ‘People who are pregnant’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges:
Incident 1: Aggravated burglary x 1, assault x 1, associated summary offences;
Incident 2: evading police x 1, dangerous driving x 1, associated summary offences.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The accused man appealed the sentences imposed by Brett J for offending arising out of two separate incidents. The first incident was of violent offending including aggravated burglary and assault towards his then domestic partner (pregnant with a former partner’s child) and the violent invasion of the home of people with whom they were staying during a period of homelessness. The second incident related to the accused’s attempts to avoid arrest for the first incident by engaging in dangerous driving while under police pursuit. The accused had an extensive criminal history “which manifests in persistent and serious violent offending” and “a lengthy history of traffic offending, including a number of convictions for disqualified driving, and convictions for evading police and negligent driving”. Brett J noted that the only factors which could be taken into account in the accused’s favour were his pleas of guilty and the principles of totality. The appellant argued that the 18-month delay between his arrest and sentence should have been taken into account in mitigation.
Issue: Were the sentences imposed (7 years total term of imprisonments, eligible for parole after 5 years, together with a driving disqualification for an aggregate of 6 years from the date of release) manifestly excessive?
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Aggravating circumstances related to the first incident included:
•
The aggravated burglary took the form of a very frightening home invasion.
•
The victim of the assault was a pregnant woman.
•
It was a prolonged assault.
•
It amounted to domestic violence. [11]
Aggravating circumstances in relation to the dangerous driving included:
•
The crime occurred on a Monday afternoon, when it was likely that there would be motorists and pedestrians on the streets of Penguin.
•
A number of drivers had to swerve to avoid collisions.
•
A number of pedestrians, including an elderly woman, were crossing roads when the appellant drove towards them.
•
A number of police officers were involved in intercepting the appellant.
•
The appellant drove for about 7 kilometres when evading the police.
•
He ignored emergency lights and sirens.
•
He continued to drive after the vehicle's tyres were deflated.
•
He was a disqualified driver. [12]
The appellant was always likely to receive a term of imprisonment greater than the 18-month delay, negating any mitigation this factor might grant. [13]
Blow CJ, Jago J and Martin AJ observed:
….it cannot be said the impugned sentences, separately or in the aggregate, were out of proportion to the seriousness of the appellant's offending, particularly since provision was made for him to be eligible for parole two years before the expiration of the last sentence. [25]
Gordon v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 17 (2 December 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Traumatic childhood’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Wounding x 1; Common assault x 2.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant had a traumatic childhood, being sexually abused by her father and exposed to domestic and family violence. She had a history of mental illness (including depression, borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder), substance misuse (she had ceased drug use but was drinking heavily at the time of the offending), and a lengthy record of offending. The offences occurred during the course of an argument between the appellant and her mother, and related to feelings of love/betrayal the appellant felt towards her mother for her childhood. The appellant cut her mother’s fringe with a knife and forced her head back onto the couch. She put her mother in a headlock and cut across her neck. The appellant threatened to stab a neighbour while holding two knives. The appellant was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. The sentencing judge determined not to make an order that the appellant was eligible for parole. The appellant was made the subject of a community correction order for 12 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in fact and/or law in determining that an order for parole eligibility ought not be made.
Held: The appeal was allowed on ground 2 and the appellant re-sentenced.
Ground 1: There was sufficient evidence in the forensic psychiatrist’s report to establish a connection between the appellant’s impaired mental functioning and its contribution to the offending: 6 Verdins principles discussed at [27]-[33], [39]-[46] and [47]-[50]. Nevertheless, the 2 year head sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. It was not outside the range available to the sentencing judge. The appellant’s traumatic childhood, presence of mental disorders, and the relationship issue which lay at the heart of the offending were more appropriately taken into account in whether relief ought to be afforded in relation to the service of 2 years’ imprisonment (at [53]-[56]).
Ground 2: The appellant alleged that the sentencing judge misapplied certain material relevant to parole. However, the court declined to take the alleged factual errors further, instead allowing the appeal on other grounds (at [57]-[64]).
The failure to provide some relief from the full force of 2 years imprisonment was unreasonable and plainly unjust. The circumstances of the offences/offender called for some individualisation, these being: “the appellant's background of sexual abuse, her nature and extent of her illnesses, the underlying explanation for the attack on her mother, her remorse and the prospects of rehabilitation with sustained psychological therapy” (at [78]). The appellant was re-sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment, 8 months suspended on conditions including supervision of a probation officer in relation to drug/alcohol treatment, and undergoing medical, psychological or psychiatric assessment or treatment.
Tatnell v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 13 (7 August 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Prior inconsistent statements’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Trauma informed judicial practice’
Charges: Assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant was charged with 3 counts of assault against his wife during the course an argument. A jury found the appellant guilty of the first count, which included strangling his wife and punching the wall above her head, but not guilty of the other counts. The trial judge imposed a wholly suspended sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment and made a community correction order.
Grounds of appeal: Whether inconsistencies between the complainant’s description of the relevant events in evidence and that provided to police made the jury’s verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Held: Appeal was dismissed.
The jury was entitled to accept the complainant’s explanation of the inconsistencies. This was particularly so given the jury’s advantage of hearing the complainant give evidence and in the context of all the evidence (including objective evidence of strangulation). The jury’s acceptance of this evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilt on count 1.
Parker v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 9 (12 June 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Terminally ill victim’ – ‘Vulnerable victim’
Charges: Assault x 2
Case type: Second appeal against sentence
Facts: This is a second sentencing appeal by the appellant man in respect of 2 counts of assault on his female partner (see Parker v Tasmania [2019] TASCCA 16 (8 October 2019) . He plead guilty and his plea to one count was accepted in satisfaction of a charge of causing grievous bodily harm. The appellant was sentenced by Blow CJ to 4 years’ and 3 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years, 9 months. He appealed on grounds the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the sentencing judge erred in determined the factual basis for sentence. Blow CJ resentenced him to 3 months longer than the original sentence with the same non-parole period. The offences were recorded as family violence offences.
The appellant struck the complainant, a terminally ill cancer patient, in the head with a teapot, and then pushed her, causing her to fall over. The fall caused the complainant’s hysterectomy wound to split open and her bowel to protrude. He had been drinking prior to the assaults. The appellant’s version of events differed from the complainant’s; the complainant’s sworn evidence was found to be more reliable.
The appellant’s lengthy criminal history included prior convictions for assault and for breaching family violence orders for violence towards an earlier partner and the current complainant. Factors in the appellant’s favour included the fact that he pleaded guilty, phoned the ambulance and did not flee from the scene, and admitted what he had done to the 000 operator and police. He left the complainant alone and bleeding to ask a neighbour for a cigarette. He recognised his violence was associated with his alcohol problem and sought treatment. The complainant was vulnerable and suffered terrible physical and mental health consequences as a result of the appellant’s actions ([11]). Aggravating features included that the assaults occurred in the context of a domestic relationship, the complainant suffered from a terminal illness and the appellant was her carer ([12]).
Ground: The second sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal dismissed, Estcourt, Pearce and Geason JJ concurring.
Estcourt J considered Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14, a case which considered comparative sentencing statistics. In considering the "yardstick" of the available statistical and comparable sentencing data, Estcourt J held that the sentence imposed on the appellant was "heavy", but not plainly unjust or unreasonable. The appellant was sentenced on the basis that he did not intend or foresee the serious harm to the complainant, but the consequences of the assault were nevertheless egregious ([29]). As the sentencing judge noted, the situation was worse than that of a drunken man assaulting a terminally ill partner, because the appellant knew that the complainant had an untreated abdominal hernia. This made the breach of trust even greater ([30]).
Pearce J did not characterise the sentence as "heavy". Whilst the appellant did not intend or foresee the terrible harm caused, the likelihood of such harm ought to have been obvious to any reasonable person with knowledge of the complainant’s vulnerability ([35]).
Geason J agreed with Estcourt J’s characterisation of the sentence as "heavy". His Honour noted that "this Court has on a number of occasions emphasised the importance of general deterrence in sentencing for offences involving the infliction of violence on the vulnerable", which frequently occur in a domestic or relationship setting, and that "[s]uch conduct requires a sentence that reflects the insidious nature of such offending, and the importance of protecting those vulnerable to such harm" ([41]).
Director of Public Prosecution v Johnson [2020] TASCCA 4 (8 April 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Alcohol misuse’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to interfere with witness’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous and obsessive behaviours’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking.’ – ‘Suffocation’ – ‘Use of family members’
Offences: Assault x 2; Stalking x 1; Attempt to interfere with a witness x 1; Breaching a family violence order x 15; Attempting to breach a family violence order x 23
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate
Facts: The male respondent and female victim were in a relationship and had moved in together. The respondent was arrested for breaches of a protective order made for the benefit of the victim, sentenced and a 12-month family violence order was imposed consisting of full non-contact conditions. Nine days later, the respondent made contact with the victim in breach of the order, promising he had changed. The respondent called the victim telling her he had paid for a hotel for the two of them to meet. The victim agreed and when she arrived, they had consensual sexual intercourse. They then consumed a fair amount of alcohol. Later that evening, the victim received a text message from a male friend. The respondent became aggressive and claimed the victim had been cheating. He pushed her head onto the bed and struck her face four times, pulling a clump of hair out. The respondent went to the bathroom for a few minutes and when he returned, he pushed the victim’s face into a pillow and sat on her back so that she couldn’t move. The victim thought she was going to die. The respondent eventually let her go but grabbed her arm and told her she would never see her children again. The victim told the respondent that she had to use the bathroom; she went inside, locked the door and sat in the shower. The respondent banged on the door, but the victim came out when he stopped. She asked to be allowed to sleep; the respondent allowed her to while he was holding her arm.
The next morning, the victim called her sister to tell her what had happened, asking her to pick her up. The victim reported the matter to police. Over the next few days, the respondent sent torrents of text messages and made numerous calls to the victim, which ranged from threats to pleading. He later had his father pass two letters onto the victim, asking her to withdraw the charges and refuse to give evidence. The victim refused. The respondent was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of twelve months.
Judgment: The court allowed the appeal, finding the sentence to be manifestly inadequate in that it "[fell] short of that required to adequately respond to the gravity of the offending" [41], and resentenced the respondent to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months. The court held that "Apart from the fact that the offending occurred in breach of court orders intended to protect a vulnerable female, the respondent's conduct involved acts of significant persistent violence including suffocation, followed by persistent attempts to have her drop the charges or refuse to give evidence; and stalking" [31]. The court emphasised that "Offending occurring in the privacy of the home, unseen, and away from help must be met with a penalty that serves as a warning to others that detection and conviction will result in severe consequences" [31].
The court condemned suffocation, providing that "The fact that the respondent's conduct included suffocation has significance to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending. Suffocation should be treated with the same level of seriousness as is afforded strangulation or throttling. Such conduct is inherently dangerous, and capable of causing serious consequences within a very short period. It renders victims incapable of acting to protect themselves … it is a form of dominance and control which has the potential to cause grave psychological harm, serious injury and even death" [33]. The court held this to be an aggravating factor, along with the fact that the offending occurred just 12 days after the respondent was released and that the respondent attempted to interfere with prosecution of the case [34]-[35]. The court noted that "the objective seriousness of the offending was very high encompassing serious assaults in circumstances where help was not available, followed by a series of attempts to avoid prosecution. Because that sort of interference has a probability of success, to the detriment of the safety of the victim and the frustration of community attempts to protect the vulnerable, gaol should be the inevitable consequence of such conduct" [37].
The court concluded that:
"the prosecution of family violence matters is notoriously difficult due to the vulnerability of victims to interference and pressure from perpetrators, with whom they will often have been in a relationship … the circumstances of this case make it an appropriate vehicle through which to assert a general principle that conduct directed at interfering in the prosecution of family violence matters so significantly erodes the administration of justice that it should attract a heavy sentence of imprisonment. This is important to encourage community participation in reporting such violence, and to provide confidence in the processes which follow reporting. The importance of this principle prevails over the matters referred to by the respondent in respect of his rehabilitation and parole" [55]. And further, "Prosecutions are the cornerstone of the system for the protection of victims. They serve to expose the offending, protect the victim and afford an opportunity for intervention directed towards the rehabilitation of the offender" [54] and that "A message needs to be sent to violent men in the community that serious assaults on females and intimidatory and stalking behaviour, and behaviour designed to persuade a witness not to give evidence, will result in considerable periods of imprisonment" [74].
Hardwick v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 2 (20 March 2020) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Assault of child’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Error in assessment and use of evidentiary material relevant to sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Parenting dispute’ – ‘People affected by alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Spousal assault risk assessment guide’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Trespass’
Charges: Aggravated burglary and assault x 1; Common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and assault, and to a summary offence of common assault. He was sentenced to 2 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment on various conditions. The crimes were committed in the context of a domestic relationship against his wife (the victim) and teenage son. The appellant and victim had separated after 22 years of marriage, and had 3 children. On the day of offending, the appellant attended the family home where the victim and children lived, having been denied contact with the youngest child, after having consumed a considerable amount of alcohol. He smashed into the home and choked and punched his wife and teenage child. The sentencing judge was satisfied that the appellant was not coping well with the dissolution of the marriage. The appellant had attempted suicide, and the family was concerned about his psychological state. He breached an agreement that he was not to attend the home without the victim’s consent, and was therefore a trespasser. The sentencing judge made a family violence order and directed that the crimes and summary offence be recorded on the appellant's criminal record as family violence offences.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. It was also contended that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment and use of evidentiary material relevant to sentence. Underlying much of this submission was the complaint that the sentencing judge should have relied on a pre-sentence report which concluded that the appellant presented ‘a low risk of future family violence’. The appellant also submitted that the sentencing judge misused or gave undue weight to statements in the Victim Impact Statements, in particular, the description of the effects of the act of choking.
Held: The learned judge’s sentencing considerations were discussed again on appeal ([20]-[27]). The appellant had not previously committed any criminal offences and had a "significant potential for employment". Whilst the offending was not premeditated, the medical evidence stated that he was suffering from an adjustment disorder at the time of the offending. As to the likelihood of future violence, a psychologist used a ‘structured professional judgment tool’ (SARA) designed to predict intimate partner violence recidivism. Based on the SARA, the appellant was assessed at being at moderate risk of further violence towards the victim. The combination of the SARA and other ‘red-flag’ risk factors led the psychologist to conclude that the appellant still posed a risk to the victim. Further, notwithstanding his guilty plea and cooperation in the proceedings, the appellant lacked insight and remorse and minimised the severity of his conduct. There was a need for personal deterrence as his personality traits, such as narcissism, predisposed him to having a ‘severe explosive reaction to the relationship separation’.
The appellant contended that the sentencing judge should have accepted the assessment of the probation officer in the pre-sentence report over the SARA. The Court held that the sentencing judge was not bound to accept the officer’s assessment or the reliability of the appellant’s statements to the officer ([36]). The officer was not provided with the SARA conducted by the psychologist, and took the appellant’s statements at face value ([37]). The officer’s assessment therefore provided a less reliable basis for findings relevant to sentence than the SARA ([39]-[40]).
Further, there was no basis for concern that the sentencing judge misused the Victim Impact Statements. In his sentencing remarks, he noted the victim's description of the terror she experienced while being choked and said it was "clear" that she perceived the choking as a "potentially lethal attack and felt powerless" to stop the appellant. He also described the violence as "unexpected, explosive, and unrestrained", and concluded that the assault was "brutal" with the potential to inflict serious injury ([50]). In relation to strangulation, the sentencing judge found:
"Attempted strangulation which does not result in death or physical injury, can still have long-term physical and psychological impact, and leave the victim susceptible to ongoing symptoms. In criminal assault such acts are generally used to subdue and force compliance by the victim without any real thought being given to the danger inherent in such conduct. Those dangers were clearly apparent in your actions in this case. Your rage and lack of restraint meant that you had no real capacity to judge or moderate your attack, and the complainant was therefore in real danger of serious injury or worse."
The Court of Appeal held that there was ample foundation in the evidence to support the sentencing judge’s remarks. His Honour correctly regarded the choking as a "particularly concerning aspect" of the assault, and appropriately considered the dangers attached to the appellant’s conduct as part of his overall assessment of the gravity of the offending ([52]-[53]). He also observed that the appellant’s conduct "constituted an extremely serious episode of family violence" ([63]). The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the choking of female victims by male offenders is understood by criminal courts as a "prevalent and dangerous feature of violence perpetrated in domestic circumstances" ([53]). Victims of domestic violence are vulnerable and the crimes are often committed in breach of the sanctity and safety of the family home ([64]). It referred to DPP v Foster and Gregson v Tasmania as support for the propositions that women in domestic circumstances are particularly vulnerable and violent behaviour by men towards women "must be condemned and discouraged" ([65]).
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. Notwithstanding the appellant’s prospects of successful rehabilitation, he engaged in dangerous and distressing conduct against his wife and child and remains an ongoing risk of future violence ([66]-[70]).
Parker v Tasmania [2019] TASCCA 16 (8 October 2019) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal (This decision was the subject of an unsuccessful appeal - Parker v Tasmania [2020] TASCCA 9 (12 June 2020))
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’
Charge(s): Assualt; Causing grievous bodily harm
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Grounds:
•
1a. The sentencing judge erred by making factual findings inconsistent with the unchallenged assertions of fact by the defence;
•
1b. The findings of fact made were objectively more serious than those asserted by the defence and led to the imposition of a sentence that was manifestly excessive
•
2. The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: Appellant man pleaded guilty to two counts of assault against his then female domestic partner. The plea of one of the counts was accepted by the Crown in satisfaction of a charge of causing grievous bodily harm. The appellant was convicted and sentenced to four years and three months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
The appellant and complainant had been in a domestic relationship for about five years. The complainant was diagnosed with terminal ovarian cancer in May 2017, whilst the appellant was in prison for driving offences from April to August 2017. The complainant had treatment and on the appellant’s release he was her carer. She had a number of hospitalisations and had had a hysterectomy in July. On 27 September the appellant and complainant had a prolonged argument after he had been drinking all day. The appellant struck the complaint in the back of the head with a teapot during the course of an argument. He then pushed the complainant over, causing her to strike her head on a hard item of furniture. The fall caused her surgical wound to rupture and her bowel to protrude. The complainant required immediate surgical treatment and was later assessed that have suffered an evisceration of her small bowel, an abrasion to her nose, a laceration to the back of her head, grazes to her hands and left knee, and was developing bruises [8]. The appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the offence.
Judgment: The appellant’s sentence was quashed and the matter was remitted to the sentencing judge for resentencing.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that "there were a number of inconsistencies between the facts asserted to the sentencing judge by the Crown and the defence" [11]. Justice Pearce noted that the only difference that was of consequence was the immediate circumstances of the assaults as the circumstances would inform the objective gravity of the assaults and the appellant’s culpability. Reviewing the sentencing judge’s reasons, Pearce J found that "the sentencing judge either did not realise, or ignored, the inconsistencies" between the versions [15]. By ignoring these inconsistencies, the "exercise of the sentencing discretion miscarried" [22]. Given that the sentencing judge imposed sentence on the basis of disputed facts, the first ground of appeal succeeded [22]. Although the first ground succeeded, Pearce J provided that "[n]o assessment of the remaining grounds of appeal asserting that the sentence is manifestly excessive can be undertaken until the proper factual basis of sentence is determined" [23].
Director of Public Prosecutions v Foster [2019] TASCCA 15 (12 September 2019) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic relationship’ – ‘Family violence order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 5 x assault; 1 x demanding property with menaces with intent to steal
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent pleaded not guilty to 5 counts of assault and 1 count of demanding property with menaces with intent to steal. The offences committed by the respondent occurred during the course of a domestic relationship. He was found not guilty of 3 counts of assault, but guilty of the remaining counts. The learned sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to 16 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of half of that term. His Honour also made a Family Violence Order.
The DPP appealed against the sentence on the sole ground that it was manifestly inadequate. The appellant submitted that the respondent committed 2 serious assaults, both of which were prolonged and involved strangulation. The crime of demanding property with menaces with intent to steal was arguably serious as it was committed during a prolonged attack and involved threats to kill the complainant and her children. It was also submitted that these matters were not isolated as they occurred in the context of a violent and abusive relationship ([13]).
Issue: The question for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or inadequate.
Held: The sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was found to be manifestly inadequate, having regard to the seriousness of the offending in the context of the domestic relationship ([42]). Estcourt J accepted that appellant’s submissions as ‘undoubtedly correct’ ([19]). Each incident involved ‘vicious and cowardly attacks by the respondent on a woman’. The respondent had convictions for violent offences, including ones of family violence. Citing an article by Heather Douglas and Robin Fitzgerald, his Honour observed that ‘strangulation is a form of power and control that can have devastating psychological long-term effects on its victims in addition to a potentially fatal outcome’ ([26]). It can cause loss of consciousness and lead to a sudden death ([27]). Further, the respondent’s prior convictions indicated that the present offences were not isolated or unusual. He did not plead guilty and did not show any remorse ([28]). His Honour allowed the appeal, set aside the sentencing order and imposed a new sentence of 2 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with parole eligibility after serving half of that sentence. The Family Violence Order made by the learned sentencing judge was undisturbed ([36]-[37]). Brett J and Marshall AJ agreed with Estcourt J’s reasons.
Gregson v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 14 (31 August 2018) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Coercive control’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable grounds’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Assault x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had violently attacked his vulnerable female partner with whom he was in a domestic relationship. The parties were arguing, mostly about the appellant’s intoxication and his lifestyle, characterised by his drug and alcohol abuse. The appellant delivered numerous forceful punches to the victim’s face, and shortly afterwards, returned and delivered more forceful blows to her head. She did not sustain any fractures, but the conduct was unprovoked and caused her to suffer nightmares. Estcourt J sentenced the appellant to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The appellant submitted that:
•
He was sentenced during ‘women’s month’ which may have influenced the sentencing judge’s decision.
•
The sentencing judge failed to take into account that immediately before the second assault, the appellant was ‘assaulted by the victim with a large serrated-edge kitchen knife’, and acted in ‘self-defence’.
•
He should have been sentenced in the Magistrates Court.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court agreed with the sentencing judge’s description of the offending as a ‘cowardly attack’ and his observation that ‘Vulnerable women such as the complainant are entitled to the protection of the law against brutal partners, and the community expectation is that such protection will be provided by the Courts’ ([29]). Although he did not use a weapon or kick the victim, the nature and strength used was not insignificant. The Court held that although the appellant should not be re-punished for his prior criminal conduct, he was not entitled to any leniency. The Court noted that the appellant had a history of violence towards women. The prevalence of this type of conduct impacts on the community at large. Women in domestic circumstances are particularly vulnerable to the abuse of power and breach of trust by violent male partners (Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6 [54]–[60]). Women who become victims in these circumstances, and other potential victims in the community, are entitled to such protection as the law can provide by the imposition of sentences that will act as both a personal and general deterrent ([37]). Whilst the sentence of two years’ imprisonment was towards the upper end of the appropriate range of the sentencing discretion, it was not manifestly excessive, harsh or unjust. Having regard to the appellant’s record of prior offending and disregard for court orders, the sentencing judge was found to be lenient in fixing a non-parole period, and the non-parole period of 18 months was within the range of sentencing discretion.
Director of Public Prosecutions v Karklins [2018] TASCCA 6 (20 April 2018) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’
Charges: Assault x 1; Assault on a pregnant woman x 3; Attempt to interfere with a witness x 5; Destroying property x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and complainant had been living together for 5 months with the complainant’s son ([6]). The complainant was 4 weeks pregnant at the time of the offences ([7]). The respondent threatened to leave the complainant, but the complainant asked him to stay ([9]-[10]). The respondent threatened to kill her and the baby. He headbutted the complainant and strangled her three times, causing her to lose consciousness twice ([13]-[16]).
The respondent was arrested and on remand. The respondent told a friend to tell the complainant that if she retracted her statement, he would ‘consider getting back with her’ ([22]). The complainant did so ([23]). The respondent was sentenced to 1 year and 10 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 months.
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Geason J emphasised aggravating features of the case, such as the fact that the respondent had the opportunity to reflect on his conduct between each attack ([55]), that he did not seek help for the complainant ([51]), that the crimes were committed in the context of a domestic relationship ([54]), and that the complainant was unable to defend herself ([50]). Mitigating considerations included the fact that the respondent pleaded guilty early ([61]).
In relation to the charges of interfering with a witness, Geason J at [56] remarked on the importance of such charges in aiding the administration of justice in relation to domestic violence:
The respondent's attempts to frustrate his prosecution should also be seen as particularly serious matters. They were a cynical exercise in emotional blackmail … Domestic violence typically occurs behind closed doors, making detection inherently difficult. Relationship dynamics frequently militate against a prosecution. Conduct directed at interfering with the prosecutorial process undermines the system intended to afford protection to victims of violence, making an inherently difficult process more so … It should be accepted in cases of family violence that attempts to interfere with the due administration of justice by the means of emotional manipulation of a vulnerable victim is a serious matter the consequences of which will always be severe.
Geason J referred to R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48, where the High Court stated at [21] that sentencing practices for offences involving domestic violence may ‘depart from past sentencing practices for this category of offence because of changes in societal attitudes to domestic relations’. His Honour at [92] subsequently justified interfering with the sentence on the basis that:
Domestic violence is properly regarded as a most serious form of offending, frequently hidden from view, and thus difficult to detect. The court has a symbolic function. Censure for domestic violence should be communicated through the sentences which are imposed.
His Honour cautioned against giving weight to the complaint’s forgiveness of the respondent ([77]). His Honour questioned the sentencing judge’s generous characterisation of the respondent’s conduct during the assault ([83]-[86]).
Price v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 22 (6 December 2016) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Extraordinary case’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Public protection’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charge/s: Assault x 3; unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm x 1.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant were in a relationship. The three assault counts occurred in August 2014 and April 2015 after the appellant had been drinking. The appellant punched the complainant in the face, choked her, and fractured her wrist. The final count occurred in June 2015 when, after an argument, the intoxicated appellant threw petrol on the complainant and ignited her. The complainant’s daughter heard the screams and rescued her mother. The appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Daley v State of Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 10 (22 August 2016) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of impact on children’
Charge/s: Murder x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 60 year old appellant murdered his former partner, 31 year old Meagan Wilton, and her new partner, 34 year old Benjamin Eyles, by shooting them with a shotgun. The appellant and Ms Wilton had a 21 month old son together, and Ms Wilton had two other girls, aged 12 and 9. Ms Wilton’s youngest daughter and the appellant’s son were in the house at the time of the murders. After leaving the premises, the appellant tried to commit suicide by shooting himself in the head. He suffered brain damage, lost the ability to walk, and required visual and hearing aids. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 45 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Estcourt J provided the lead judgment, with Blow CJ and Brett J agreeing but providing additional comments. Relevantly, Blow CJ stated that while the punishment here was significant and that there were a number of mitigating factors in the circumstances, these carried little weight in light of the aggravating factors of this case. As per His Honour: ‘[t]hese were deliberate killings. They were premeditated. They were motivated by vindictiveness towards a former partner’ (see [4]). Moreover, ‘[t]his was a case in which the impact of the killings on survivors [was] particularly significant’. The children who were present in the house could suffer long-term psychological or psychiatric consequences (see [5]). Further, the impact of the crime would be felt by family members raising the children, and police officers who worked on this case.
Devine v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 19 (26 August 2015) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’
Charges: Aggravated burglary, Unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm, Breach of family violence order, Motor vehicle stealing, Destroying property
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and the protected person had been in a domestic relationship that ended towards the end of 2012. As a result of the appellant threatening to cut her throat and burn her house down, the protected person moved away from Hobart. Early in 2015, her house was burnt down, although no one was charged. The protected person then moved back to Hobart and entered into a new relationship. The appellant threatened her new partner, resulting in a family violence order restraining him from approaching the protected person.
On the day of offending, the appellant went to the protected person’s home, kicked the front door, smashed a window, drew a knife and threatened to kill her. The appellant then lunged towards the protected person who cut her hand as a result of trying to stop him. When the protected person’s partner came to assist, the appellant was holding the knife to the protected person’s throat and threatened ‘Why shouldn’t I kill him’. When her partner attempted to separate them, the appellant stabbed him in the stomach. In relation to this conduct the appellant was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm, three breaches of a family violence order, one count of motor vehicle stealing, and one count of destroying property. He was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with no non-parole period.
The appellant had a long history of dishonest and violent offending commencing from childhood. When given the benefit of suspended sentences, bonds and parole in relation to these offences, the appellant breached them. A psychologist’s report noted the appellant had extremely low to borderline intellectual functioning and could be considered to have a mild intellectual disability. This was substantially the result of substance abuse in the view of the psychologist. The sentencing magistrate did not consider this as a mitigating factor, concluding there was a significant risk he would re-offend and therefore there was a need for specific deterrence.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive due to the magistrate failing to order a non-parole period.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Tennent J, with whom Porter and Pearce JJ agreed, held that the issue of whether or not to order a parole period is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge. His Honour took into account the relevant factors including the appellant’s offending history and disregard for orders in refusing to grant a non-parole order. The psychologist report did not suggest rehabilitation was likely. The sentencing judge therefore did not err in failing to order a non-parole period and the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Connelly v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 15 (29 June 2015) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder (two counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant’s relationship with his wife deteriorated after she told him that she had a sexual relationship with another man. She moved out of the family home. The appellant attempted to kill his two sons by blowing up the family car when they were sitting in it with him. He was unsuccessful but he caused an explosion and a very fierce fire. His two sons suffered life-threatening burns. Their injuries are ongoing and they will have ‘functional and cosmetic problems for life’. They are at risk of ongoing psychological harm. The impact on their mother was devastating. The trial judge was satisfied that the appellant intended to kill the boys to ‘deprive his wife of them’ or to ‘spite his wife’ ([29]). He was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of the non-parole period. Estcourt J (with whom Tennent J agreed) held that the head sentence of 20 years was not excessive. The offending was serious and both victims were young children. However, Estcourt J noted that there was one act that impacted both victims. While the sentence encompassed the entirety of the appellant’s criminal behaviour, he should not be sentenced for his conduct twice.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the head sentence was not excessive, the non-parole period was excessive because of factors such as his lack of prior relevant offending, the unlikelihood of any re-offending ‘given the crime was directly related to his family circumstances’ and the fact that ‘it could not be said that the appellant’s “incorrigibility” justified the setting of the non-parole period at 75% of the head sentence’ ([38]). Estcourt J (Tennent J agreeing) accepted these submissions notwithstanding the appellant’s almost complete lack of remorse and reduced the non-parole period to 12 years.
Wood J agreed with Estcourt J’s reasoning with respect to the head sentence but dissented in regards to the non-parole period. At [7]-[21], her Honour engaged in general discussion about the applicable principles in determining the most appropriate non-parole period. Wood J then noted at [23] a number of considerations relevant to the nature of the crime. These included that it involved deliberate acts to kill two young children, the appellant’s ‘vindictive motive to inflict maximum anguish and emotional trauma upon his wife’, his son’s extensive injuries and degree of emotional suffering and physical pain, risks to their psychological well-being and the torment and harm suffered by his wife. It was appropriate for the sentencing judge to give effect to the aims of denunciation and retribution and, ‘the goal of assuaging informed moral outrage of the community, reasserting society's values and giving proper weight to the harm done to the victims’ ([24]).
Groenewege v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 7 (26 July 2013) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Course of conduct’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Arson, Assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant suffered from depression and became abusive and intimidating towards his wife. After she ended the relationship, the appellant became angry and upset. He cornered his wife in a shed, pushed her to the chest, grabbed her around the throat and squeezed for four seconds, causing her to become very fearful. The appellant asked to see his four children. His wife then walked with him to the car, got in and locked the doors before attempting to drive off and call the police. However, the appellant grabbed the vehicle and punched the window, which caused it to shatter. His wife then attended her children’s school. Meanwhile, the appellant poured methylated spirits onto the main bedroom of their house, set fire to the bed and left knowing the bed was on fire. The house was damaged beyond repair. An insurance claim was denied. The impact of the offending on the appellant’s wife and children was very significant. He was sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
Issues:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the trial judge erred by placing too much weight on general deterrence given the appellant’s mental health condition.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 1.
1.
The appellant submitted that various mitigating factors existed ([39]) and that the sentence was outside the range of permissible sentences for arson. Further, the appellant submitted that the assault was brief and no physical harm was caused. The respondent conceded that the assault would not add to a sentence imposed for arson, but submitted that it was relevant as a course of conduct and to demonstrate the appellant’s attitude towards his wife ([44]). Porter J (with whom Wood J and Tennent J agreed) held that while the head sentence was very high, it was not outside the permissible range: ‘The appellant intentionally set fire to the house and intentionally caused its entire destruction. His motive for doing so was to exact some sort of vengeance on his estranged wife intending to destroy his wife's interest in the building and its availability as a home’…‘This was obsessive and possessive conduct, involving some violence, committed in the aftermath of a broken relationship. It is the type of conduct which simply cannot be tolerated’ ([52]-[53]).
Nevertheless, the non-parole period was found to be excessive. Porter J noted that in considering the length of a non-parole period, the issue is whether the period makes the sentence manifestly excessive, ‘"sentence" in this context, being used in a broader sense’ ([56]). The non-parole period amounted to a little over 60% of the head sentence. Given factors such as the appellant’s prior good character, his mental health condition and apparent remorse ([60]), the non-parole period made the overall sentence manifestly excessive and was therefore reduced to one half of the head sentence.
2.
The appellant submitted that his psychiatric condition affected his ability to properly consider the consequences of his actions, such that it was inappropriate for general deterrence to remain a large consideration in sentencing. Porter J (with whom Tennent J and Wood J agreed) held that notwithstanding the psychiatric condition, mood disorders are reasonably common in the community. As such, the sentencing judge was correct to conclude that the appellant was, ‘an appropriate vehicle by which to convey a message to the general community about the seriousness and likely consequences of this type of offending’.
Enniss v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 10 (2 October 2010) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Risk factor - weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Assault (five counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant lived intermittently with his partner (the complainant). The first count occurred when, during an argument, the appellant grabbed the complainant by the throat, forced her to the floor, punched her to the head multiple times and kicked her to the hip as she tried to stand up. The second assault occurred when the complainant was in her three-year-old child’s bed. The appellant pointed a knife at the complainant and threatened to stab her if she did not give him her phone (i.e. an assault by means of a threatening gesture). The child remained asleep throughout the incident. The next count occurred when the appellant kicked the complainant between the legs twice, which caused her to fall to the floor. The final count was again an assault by means of a threatening gesture and involved the appellant sharpening knives and threatening to kill or violently assault the complainant. The appellant was arrested but escaped on arrival at the police station and was not found until 10 days later. While the complainant did not suffer serious physical injuries, there were lasting psychological consequences for her and her daughter. The appellant had a significant criminal history. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years. Before being sentenced for these offences, he was sentenced to another 3 years’ imprisonment (with a two-year non-parole period) in respect of 50 unrelated offences. This resulted in an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment with a four-year non-parole period.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. ‘The ordeal that the appellant inflicted on his partner was horrific. He had many opportunities to desist from assaulting her, but did so over and over again, with their young daughter in the house. It was an unusually bad case of family violence. The only appropriate penalty was a significant cumulative sentence of imprisonment.’ ([20]).
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the fact the appellant was unlikely to be granted parole (even if eligible) should have been taken into account in his favour. The Court rejected this argument, holding that this is not an appropriate consideration in determining the sentence. However, the magistrate imposed the two-year non-parole period for the assault offences so as to not impose a crushing sentence. If the head sentence of three years was ‘crushing’, a non-parole period should not be regarded as changing that situation because parole may not be granted. Given the length of the sentence in combination with the fact that the complainant suffered no physical injuries, the head sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offending and the aggregate term was also disproportionate. The appellant was re-sentenced for the assault offences to 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 months.
Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 (13 October 2011) – Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Admission of guilt’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’
Charge: Arson
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The appellant was tried by jury and found guilty of arson purely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It was alleged that he unlawfully set fire to the house of his former female partner. She gave evidence that the night before the fire the appellant slept over at her place. She and the appellant argued the next morning as she was leaving the property. He called her a ‘leg-opening slut’ and said that if she left he was going to burn the house down. She left and not long after received a phone call from the appellant who asked whether she was ‘warm enough’. She returned home to find the house on fire. Evidence was also given by a neighbour that he heard the appellant and his former partner arguing that morning for 10 minutes. He ignored the argument and did not claim to have seen the appellant on the morning of the fire.
Before trial, the appellant pleaded guilty to breaching a family violence order on the day of the fire by approaching his former partner and calling her a ‘leg-opening cunt’. The Crown alleged that this amounted to an admission of guilt. At trial, the appellant asserted that he did not realise the significance of this date and that he had used those words but not on the day of the fire. The appellant’s younger sister provided the appellant with an alibi. She said he was asleep at their mother’s place on the morning of the fire.
Issues: Some of the grounds of appeal were:
1.
Whether the trial judge failed to correct the prosecution’s lack of adherence to the ‘rule’ in Browne v Dunn.
2.
Whether the trial judge failed to give an adequate warning in relation to the neighbour’s voice identification evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and the conviction set aside.
1.
‘In the context of a criminal trial, the "rule" in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 requires defence counsel to put to a Crown witness in cross-examination the case upon which the accused proposes to rely, to the extent that it is proposed to contradict the evidence of the Crown witness. Similarly, if it is proposed, as part of the defence case, to lead evidence of a fact which, if true, would be within the knowledge of a Crown witness, it is usually expected, at least in this State, that defence counsel will put that part of the defence case to the Crown witness in cross-examination’ ([21]). Here, the Crown did not do this and sought to rely on such evidence in summing up. The trial judge did not correct this mistake in her directions to the jury and further she incorrectly directed the jury that they should be careful about the appellant’s sister’s evidence.
2.
The direction that the jury had ‘to clearly be careful’ about the identification evidence from the neighbour fell short of informing the jury that there was a ‘special need for caution.’ The trial judge said nothing about the reasons for that caution namely, the conviction of innocent persons as a result of mistaken identification by an apparently honest witness ([34]-[35]).
Legal Profession Board of Tasmania v W [2023] TASFC 1 (17 March 2023) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Legal practitioner’ – ‘Offer to settle dispute by withdrawal of complaints to police’ – ‘Professional misconduct’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unprofessional conduct’
Proceeding: Legal Profession Board appeal from finding of mere unprofessional conduct by a legal practitioner.
Grounds:
1.
The primary judge erred in holding that for a finding of professional misconduct both s 421(1)(a) and (c) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) had to be satisfied;
2.
The primary judge erred in failing to make a declaration of professional misconduct having found that the respondent’s conduct constituted a serious failure to reach a standard of competence and diligence.
Facts: A client of the respondent was charged with two counts of common assault against his former wife who had been granted a protection order against the client.
The lawyer wrote to the complainant on behalf of his client, offering to settle their matrimonial property dispute on terms which included that “all legal pursuits and accusations cease including Tas. Police. All matters are then resolved, finalised”. The client was charged with perversion of justice. Despite this, the respondent wrote to the ex-wife’s lawyer offering again to settle the matrimonial dispute upon the withdrawal of the complaints. Senior counsel for the respondent conceded ground 1.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
Appeal allowed.
2.
Declaration of unprofessional conduct set aside.
3.
Declaration of guilt of professional misconduct made.
Estcourt J observed:
[1] I do not have the slightest doubt that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to offer to settle a client's dispute with another person on the condition that the other person withdraw a criminal complaint that person has made against the client and which is pending before a court.
Estcourt J found that the gravity of the respondent’s attempt to have pending charges withdrawn or undermined constituted a “substantial failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence” within the meaning of s421(a) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas). This was regardless of the client’s instructions or whether the offers amounted to a crime.
The court rejected the primary judge’s reasoning that the two paragraphs in s421 were to be read conjunctively. However, it was found that even if that were correct, the conduct would still amount to professional misconduct (per Porter AJ at [33].
PQR v Sundram [2020] TASFC 10 (4 December 2020) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Federal circuit court order’ – ‘Inconsistency’ – ‘Meaning of "parental responsibility"’ – ‘Protection orders’
Charges: Breaches of police family violence order, breach condition of bail.
Proceedings: Appeal against breaches of police family violence order.
Facts: The appellant and his former wife had separated, and had two children. In 2014, the Federal Circuit Court made parenting orders which included provision for “equal shared parental responsibility”, and designated contact days. In 2018, police issued and served the appellant with a family violence order. This prohibited the appellant being within 50 m of the children (para 3), except in accordance with a court order (para 3(c)). It also prohibited the appellant being within 50 m of the children’s school where the children “may be present from time to time” (para 11). The appellant was charged with a number of breaches.
The Chief Justice dismissed charges relating to circumstances where the appellant was within 50 m of the children during contact periods allowed by the parenting orders and when the children were not present at the school. The Chief Justice found a charge proven, imposing a fine without recording a conviction, for an instance where the appellant attended the school on a non-contact day to speak to the principal while the child was there. The visit did not fall within the exception in para 3(c) of the family violence order, and breached para 11.
Grounds of appeal: The appellant's conduct in attending at the school on 24 July 2018 was permitted by the "Parenting Orders" made by the Federal Circuit Court which effectively restored the appellant his full rights as their father, including by having equal shared parental responsibility and a substantial and significant role in their lives, such that it cannot have been in breach of the police family violence order. There was inconsistency between the family violence orders and the parenting orders in the Federal Circuit Court and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court prevailed to the exclusion of the family violence order which underpinned the finding of guilt.
Held: The appeal was dismissed (Martin AJ, Pearce J agreeing). Martin AJ rejected the broad proposition that any constraint on the appellant’s ability to visit the school, at any time, necessarily created a relevant inconsistency between the parenting orders and the family violence order. Para 11 only applied when a child “may be present” and was not relevantly inconsistent with the appellant’s obligations (and rights) pursuant to the parenting order (at [47]-[49]).
In separate reasons and also agreeing with Martin AJ, Estcourt J also dismissed the appeal. While the family violence orders might “detract” from the appellant’s unqualified “parental responsibility” by limiting the means by which the appellant might communicate with teachers while the children were at school, those orders did not abrogate or nullify the appellant’s parental responsibilities. It could not be said that there was any relevant inconsistency between them and the parenting orders, or that the police family violence orders were incapable of operating “subject to” the Federal Circuit Court orders (at [15]-[17]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting) v J C N [2015] TASFC 13 (27 November 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court (Full Court)
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’
Charges: Attempted aggravated assault, Breach of family violence order, Common assault, Damaging property
Appeal type: Appeal against order for bail
Facts: The respondent and the complainant had previously been in a relationship for more than two years. The complainant had two children. A family violence order was made against the respondent, restraining him from threatening, harassing or assaulting the complainant. On one occasion when the complainant went to the respondent’s house with her daughter and mother, the respondent seriously assaulted her and her mother. He was charged with two counts of assault and breaching the family violence order and was granted bail. Subsequently, the respondent breached the conditions of bail and the order when the complainant and her children stayed with him. After fighting the next morning, the respondent followed the complainant into shopping centre toilets, kicked in the door and punched her in the face twice. An interim family violence order was then made with a condition that he would not contact the complainant. In breach of that order, the respondent phoned the complainant seven times from prison. The respondent was sentenced for these offences to four months’ imprisonment and a new family violence order was made to protect the complainant and her children.
Just after a month after his release, the respondent seriously assaulted another female, his former partner, and was held in custody. While in custody, he phoned the complainant 19 times. He was then granted bail. After interviewing the complainant, the police discovered that the respondent had assaulted the complainant’s daughter by grabbing her bottom. He also threw a bar stool at the complainant and her son, striking him on the leg. The respondent then forced the complainant’s pants down and attempted to insert a plastic vibrator into her anus, witnessed by the two children. He then punched her five times in the face, bit her ear and pushed a hot cigarette butt into her forehead. The next morning the respondent emptied the complainant’s daughter’s school bag onto the floor and stomped on it, threatening ‘This is going to be your face’. He then grabbed her hair and pushed her against the wall. The respondent then threatened the complainant’s son that he would kill him, his sister and the complainant if the police were notified of the assaults.
In relation to this conduct, the respondent was charged with 35 counts of breaching the family violence order, one count of assault with indecent intent, five counts of common assault, three counts of damaging property, and one count of attempted aggravated assault. The respondent was granted bail, having satisfied the court that bail would not adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of an affected person or child under s 12 Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas).
Issue: Whether the order for bail should be set aside.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the order for bail was revoked.
In favour of granting bail was that the respondent’s mother and father were both ill. His mother was prepared to offer a surety of $4,000 to secure his attendance at court and compliance with bail conditions. The respondent agreed to comply with a curfew and reporting conditions. However, there was a significant risk he would continue to offend if bail was granted when considering his history of breaching court orders and violent offending. There was also a considerable amount of evidence to prove guilt once at trial.
Supreme Court
Smith v Boarder [2022] TASSC 30 (16 May 2022) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Costs of unsuccessful application to extend protection order’ – ‘Discretion to order costs s34 family violence act 2004 (tas)’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of objects of family violence act 2004 (tas) to costs order’ – ‘Separation’
Proceedings: Motion for costs for unsuccessful application to extend protection order pursuant to Family Violence Act 2004 (the Act), s 34.
Facts: On 19 February 2020 an interim protection order was granted to Ms Boarder. At the hearing of Ms Boarder’s application to extend the protection order for a further 3 years leave was refused, the interim order revoked and, following a further hearing on the issues, Mr Smith’s application for costs refused. The Magistrate held that the was no change in circumstances and the only contact between the parties during the term of the interim order was a letter delivered to Ms Boarder by Mr Smith, “which contained nothing which could reasonably be construed as abusive, threatening, intimidating or coercive”[8]. Both parties had been represented by counsel at the extension hearings.
Grounds of motion to review: The magistrate erred in dismissing the costs application in that:
(a) she took into account irrelevant matters, namely:
1. Ms Boarder 's subjective fear and psychological state; and
2. the objects of the Act as stated in s 3; and
(b) she acted on a wrong principle by misdirecting herself that "a holistic approach, rather than a compensatory approach, should be taken to the issue of whether costs should be ordered." [11]
Decision and Reasoning: Motion allowed; order of magistrate set aside; Ms Boarder is to pay Mr Smith's costs of the application for extension of a family violence order in the agreed sum.
The objects of the Act in s3 were relevant considerations but Ms Boarder’s demeanour while giving evidence, was, without more an irrelevant consideration. There was no finding that the fear Ms Boarder expressed related to any conduct of Mr Smith while the protection order was in force.
State of Tasmania v Levi Joseph David Hall (Sentence) [2021] TASSC unreported (27 September 2021) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
Comments on passing sentence Pearce J
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1; breaching a police family violence order x 5.
Proceedings: Comments on passing sentence.
Facts: The male defendant lived with the female victim and her children for 12-months. The defendant entered pleas of guilty. Throughout their relationship, the defendant used ‘violence, intimidation, threats and abuse’ towards the victim in the context of his ‘generally violent, abusive and controlling behaviour. The defendant monitored and controlled the victim’s phone use, controlled when she left the house, and subjected her to physical violence in the presence of her children. On one occasion, the defendant strangled and threatened to kill the victim. A family violence order made in May 2019, was immediately breached by finding the victim, taking her to his friend’s house, and holding her there while subjecting her to physical abuse.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 ½ years, with a non-parole period of 3 ½ years.
Pearce J viewed the defendant’s behaviour as a serious example of the crime of persistent family violence. His Honour highlighted that the offending included strangulation, which caused the victim to fear for her life and has had a ‘profound’ and lasting ‘psychological impact’. His Honour viewed the defendant’s repeated offending as discounting ‘any claim to… genuine remorse…’, and the fact that the offending was ‘committed in breach of a police family violence order’ as evidence of his ‘repeated refusal to comply with the law and… contempt of authority’. In sentencing, Pearce J considered the need for punishment and condemnation, and viewed the defendant’s ‘long and concerning record for violence… against women in particular’ as an ‘important factor in sentencing’. His Honour also considered the need to vindicate the victim and protect the community by imposing a sentence that achieved specific and general deterrence.
State of Tasmania v ARJ (Sentence) [2021] TASSC unreported (11 March 2021) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
Comments on passing sentence Pearce J
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Jealous behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stepchildren’ – ‘Threat to cause abortion’
Charges: Persistent family violence x 1, constituting 16 unlawful family violence offences: one rape, one assault of a pregnant woman and 14 assaults.
Proceedings: Comments on passing sentence.
Facts: The male defendant was found guilty following jury trial. The 16 offences constituting the charge were committed over 9 occasions during the defendant’s two-and-a-half-month relationship with his pregnant younger female partner. The defendant’s conduct began soon after the relationship started, and ‘was characterised by ongoing domineering conduct, torment and the exercise of power, control and intimidation’. The assaults included striking with a hammer, baseball bat and power cord, burning with a cigarette, and threats to cut with glass in addition to assaults without weapons. The rape was constituted by the forcible penetration of the victim’s genitalia by striking with a baseball bat and the assault of a pregnant woman was the attempt to stomp on the victim’s stomach with the stated intent to cause an abortion. Some of the offending occurred in the presence of the victim’s children. The defendant had a history of family violence and drug abuse. The defendant was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years, and the court imposed a family violence order to remain in force for 7 years from the date of sentencing.
Issues: Sentencing.
Decision and reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years, and the court made a family violence order for 7 years from the date of sentencing.
Pearce J considered the offending in the context of the defendant’s criminal record, which included family violence offences, assaults, and breaches of family violence orders. His Honour considered the ongoing psychological impact of the offending on the victim, and the need for punishment, general and personal deterrence, vindication of the victim, and protection of the community’. ‘All of the offences were committed when you were subject to a family violence order… and while you were subject to electronic monitoring, thus displaying your contempt for the law and to court orders.’
Hopkinson v Wilkie [2020] TASSC 32 (3 July 2020) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault in a domestic setting’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Motion to review conviction’
Charges: Common assault.
Proceedings: Motion to review conviction by Magistrate.
Facts: The male applicant was found guilty of assaulting his female partner. The Magistrate found that the applicant hit the complainant in the head, pulled her hair and dragged her. The complainant kicked the defendant. The complainant gave evidence that she had a ‘mutual argument’ with the applicant and was not punched. Shelton (a witness to the incident) gave evidence that the applicant punched the complainant during a ‘verbal argument between them’. The magistrate accepted Shelton’s evidence and did not accept the complainant’s evidence or the applicant’s argument that there was consent, stating that a defence of consent ‘doesn’t apply to victims of domestic violence’.
Ground: The Magistrate erred in law in stating the defence of consent does not apply in the context of domestic violence.
Decision and reasoning: Motion to review dismissed.
As a matter of statutory construction, provisions relating to consensual violence as a defence do not include a ‘carve-out … for any category or class of cases such as domestic violence cases’ [34]. As a general statement of law, the defence of consent does not avail the applicant if ‘there either was no consent or if there was, the complainant did not consent to the degree of force involved in the assault’ [28]. Based on the magistrate’s findings of fact, the defence of consent was excluded.
Baker v Barratt [2019] TASSC 28 (4 July 2019) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Administrative law’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Appeal and review’ – ‘Apprehended bias’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Motion to review’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Procedural error of magistrate in not playing record of interview in open court’ – ‘Procedure and evidence’ – ‘Visa threats’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Case type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The applicant man appealed against his conviction on a charge of common assault on the ground that the court erred in convicting him against "the preponderance of the evidence". The complainant, a Philippino woman who was applying for a visa, told the court that she had an argument with the applicant with whom she was in a relationship. During the course of the argument, she alleged that he slapped her in the face, twisted her arm and pushed her to the floor. He then allegedly tried to kick her. She also gave evidence that she rang a friend after the incident. The friend confirmed that this call was made and that the complainant had told him that she had been assaulted. He took photos of her for the purposes of recording the consequences of the assault. These were tendered along with the applicant’s record of interview. The applicant admitted in his video interview that he regularly threatened to withdraw support for the complainant’s Visa and controlled her access to a mobile telephone and the Magistrate identified this as evidence of the applicant’s controlling behaviour. The applicant denied the assault.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the Magistrate reasonably came to his conclusion on the evidence at trial.
Held: Geason J found that the applicant failed to establish that the Magistrate’s conclusion was not reasonably open to him. It was noted that the evidence was "of narrow compass" in that the applicant and complainant had engaged in a physical argument, evidenced by the bruising shown in the photographic evidence. Moreover, the Magistrate’s conclusions and reasons were found to be unimpeachable, and he was entitled to prefer the complainant’s evidence. This was because the complainant’s evidence was unshaken in cross-examination and corroborated in material respects by a third party ([13]-[15]).
A further issue on appeal was that of apprehended bias. Whilst the Magistrate had a familial relationship with the complainant’s employer, Geason J concluded that there was nothing in the conduct of the case or the reasons for the decision which gave the appearance of any pre-judgment based on that relationship ([21]).
Geason J also noted that the applicant’s record of interview was not played in court in its entirety, such that not all evidence was heard in open court prior to the court reaching its decision ([24]). The Magistrate elected to read the transcript of the interview rather than listen to it in full. His Honour was highly critical of this practice, emphasising that all evidence relied upon to prove a case should be heard in open court, and that the transcript itself was not evidence. The Magistrate ran the risk that something material to the case was not "seen" ([27]). Whilst this was considered to be an error, it did not give rise to any miscarriage of justice.
Irons v Moore [2019] TASSC 22 (22 May 2019) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Application of Weissensteiner’ – ‘Consent and disclosure’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Hostile witness’
Charges: Assault x 1; Breach of protection order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The facts of both charges were the same: the appellant grabbed and punched the complainant in front of her children ([3]).
While giving evidence, the complainant claimed that she could not remember what happened on the day. The prosecution successfully applied to treat her as a hostile witness ([3]). The evidence was limited to circumstantial evidence and hearsay evidence of witnesses who saw the complainant’s injuries immediately after the assault ([4]). The magistrate found the appellant guilty of both charges and imposed a fine.
Issues: The sole ground of review is that on no reasonable view of the evidence could the magistrate have been satisfied of the appeallant’s guilt.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
The principle in Weissensteiner v The Queen [1993] HCA 65 was considered, namely that a ‘hypotheses consistent with innocence may cease to be rational or reasonable in the absence of evidence to support them when that evidence, if it exists at all, must be within the knowledge of the accused’ ([20]). In this case, while the complainant had given evidence, she could not remember what happened. Therefore, the only person who could have known how the injuries were inflicted was the defendant ([21]).
‘In the light of the evidence that force had been applied by the applicant to the complainant and in the absence of any contradictory or explanatory evidence from the applicant, I am satisfied that the application of force in lawful self-defence was not available to the magistrate as a reasonable possibility or hypothesis consistent with innocence.’ [24]
Cannell v G; G v Cannell [2018] TASSC 55 (1 November 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Meaning of harass’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Safety and protection of victims and witnesses’ – ‘Systems abuse’
Charges: Trespass x 1; Making a false report to police x 1; Contravening an interim family violence order x 3.
Case type: Prosecution seeking review of dismissal of charges; defendant seeking review of charge proved.
Facts: The defendant and complainant were separated. The evidence in this case was contested by both parties.
The trespass charge occurred when the defendant entered the complainant’s house and did not leave when asked. The false report charge occurred when the defendant alleged that the complainant had struck him in the chest while she was telling him to leave. The first contravention charge occurred when the defendant approached the complainant in the Federal Circuit Court building. The complainant alleged that the defendant said ‘you’re all going down’. The magistrate was not satisfied that those words were spoken, but even if they were, they did not constitute a threat. The second contravention charge occurred when the defendant parked his car next to the complainant’s car during a handover of one of the children. The magistrate found that the defendant breached the order and that was no exception in the contact arrangement that would have allowed this ([39]). The third contravention charge occurred when the defendant approached the complainant on numerous occasions to serve her with an application for a restraining order ([43]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate’s decisions were reasonably open on the evidence and whether the Magistrate gave adequate reasons.
Decision and reasoning: Brett J affirmed all the magistrate’s decisions.
Note: in relation to the third contravention of the restraining order, the defendant argued that the prosecution had not proved the ‘mental element’ of the charge because he did not intend to harass the complainant but rather serve her with legal processes. Brett J discussed the statutory definition of the word harass, which includes following the person or keeping the person under surveillance ([48]). His Honour considered that “there is no requirement that the defendant intend or otherwise foresee the causation of [an effect on the person harassed, eg worry, fear or mental anguish]” ([60]).
‘The evidence overwhelmingly supported the magistrate's conclusion that the defendant had harassed the complainant by following her, and that following her was deliberate and intentional…. Whilst the service of documents on the complainant was a legitimate purpose, it did not justify conduct on the part of the defendant that was in breach of the order. It goes without saying that there were other ways of achieving that legitimate purpose which did not involve contravention of the family violence order.’ [63]
His Honour considered that this construction is consistent with the relevant legislation, that is, to protect likely victims of family violence from likely perpetrators of that violence ([61]).
Harrison v Moore [2018] TASSC 53 (19 October 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘oath on oath case’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Technology-facilitated domestic and family violence’ – ‘trivial breach’
Charges: Common assault x 2; Contravention of an interim family violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The complainant and applicant had two young children. The assault charges occurred on one day where the complainant alleged that the applicant punched the complainant in the face and kicked her in the head ([5]-[6]). The breach of the interim family violence order occurred when the applicant sent the complainant 4 text messages asking about her and the children ([26]).
The applicant gave evidence at the Magistrates Court trial alleging that he was acting in self-defence. The magistrate accepted the complainant’s evidence over the applicant’s ([10]).
Issues: Whether the finding of guilt was not reasonably open to the magistrate as a matter of law; whether the magistrate should have applied the principle of ‘de minimis non curat lex’ (the law should not concern itself with trifles).
Decision and reasoning: All grounds of appeal was dismissed.
There were 3 grounds of appeal in relation to the assault charge. Ground 1 of the appeal was that the finding of guilt was not reasonably open to the magistrate as a matter of law because the magistrate said she substantially accepted the complainant’s version of events but accepted aspects of the applicant’s version as well. This ground was rejected because the magistrate was entitled to do so ([14]-[15]).
In relation to the breach of the interim family violence order, the ground of appeal was that the magistrate should have applied the principle of ‘de minimis non curat lex’. This was because the magistrate found that sending the messages constituted breaches that were ‘trivial at best’. However, Brett J stated that the principle of ‘de minimis’ is likely not applicable in criminal proceedings ([33]). In any event, it was not applicable in this case because the Magistrate’s reference to ‘trivial’ should be seen as an indication of the relative seriousness of the breaches compared to other examples of that offence, not that the direct contact with the complainant was a trivial matter ([34]).
Bonde v Maney [2018] TASSC 23 (17 May 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Dismissal of charges’ – ‘Evidence of respondent’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Case type: Application for review of Magistrate’s decision to dismiss charge.
Facts: The complainant alleged that the respondent tried to grab the complainant’s car keys from her, injuring her fingers in the process ([3]). The respondent denied assaulting the complainant and alleged that the complainant injured her fingers when she was trying to retrieve her keys ([4]). After the prosecution case closed, the Magistrate immediately moved to judgement without giving the respondent the opportunity to give evidence ([5]). The Magistrate dismissed the charge of assault on the basis that she was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent deliberately or recklessly caused the injury ([5]).
Issues: The complainant argued that the magistrate erred in law by:
•
first, stating that the respondent must have intended the injuries for the charge of assault to be made out;
•
second, failing to give sufficient reasons as to why she was not satisfied that the charge was proven; and
•
third, dismissing the complaint when on no reasonable view of the evidence could the learned magistrate have failed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the respondent.
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground was upheld because the causation of injury is not an element of assault ([7]-[8]). The second ground was also upheld because it was not possible to discern from the Magistrate’s reasons the factual basis for the determination ([15]). Therefore, it was not necessary to consider the third ground ([16]).
The case was remitted to be determined by another Magistrate ([20]).
Moore v Rittman [2018] TASSC 5 (13 February 2018) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Conviction not recorded’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault x 2; Breaching a police family violence order x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and the aggrieved, his partner, were in a relationship and had 2 children. The assaults occurred on two occasions when the respondent choked his partner, causing her to lose breath and bruising ([4]). A police family violence order was made, requiring him to not return to the home where his partner and children were living ([5]). The police later found the respondent in the home [(6]). The respondent pleaded guilty to all charges ([7]). The respondent had no criminal history and had independently sought out participation in a men’s behavioural change program.
At the sentencing hearing, the magistrate did not ask the respondent to make submissions or to provide her with information as to his personal circumstances ([9]). The magistrate, pursuant to s 7(f) of the Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas), did not record a conviction and adjourned the proceedings on the condition that the respondent be of good behaviour and complete the Men’s Behaviour Change Program ([1]). The charges were recorded as family violence offences under s 13A of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) ([10]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Brett first addressed the fact that the magistrate did not allow the respondent to make submissions. His Honour at [11] noted that:
In the case of an unrepresented defendant, it is incumbent on the magistrate to ensure that, not only is such an opportunity provided, but that the defendant is aware of his or her right to address the court, and given some assistance with respect to the nature of the matters and information which should be the subject of the plea.
Nonetheless, this error was not directly in issue so was not determinative ([12]).
His Honour next addressed the sentence. The prosecution argued that the failure to record a conviction renders the sentence manifestly inadequate ([12]). His Honour emphasised the importance of therapeutic interventions for first-time family violence offenders at [24]:
While a punitive and protective response is essential in cases of serious and repeated family violence, it must also be consistent with the stated purpose of the legislation that consideration is given to therapeutic intervention with a view to achieving rehabilitation and behavioural change, when an offender presents before the court for the first time in respect of acts of spontaneous family violence. Prevention of future violence by use of effective strategies to modify behaviour in respect of offenders who have appropriate insight and desire for change is likely to promote the safety, psychological wellbeing and interests of people affected by family violence.
His Honour emphasised that the good behaviour bond and conditions attached were tailored to the respondent’s personal circumstances and was designed to rehabilitate the respondent and ensure that he did not reoffend ([20]). In all the circumstances, the sentence was not manifestly inadequate ([21]).
Barnes v Crossin [2017] TASSC 61 (12 October 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Arrest’ – ‘Reasonable suspicion’ – ‘Responses in criminal proceedings’
Charges: Resisting a police officer in the execution of their duty x 1.
Case type: Review of Magistrate’s decision to dismiss charge.
Facts: The police attended the respondent’s house in response to a call from the respondent’s son, who told the police that his father was ‘going off’ and had hit his mother. When they arrived, there were clothes strewn around the front yard. The police arrested the respondent. They gave the reason to ‘investigate family violence’ ([3]). The respondent struggled against the police, which gave rise to the resisting police officer charge. The Magistrate dismissed the charge on the basis that the arrest was unlawful in the first place ([4]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the charge.
Decision and Reasoning: The Magistrate did err in dismissing the charge.
The power to arrest is derived from the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas), which requires ‘a reasonable suspicion that the person concerned has committed family violence’ ([27]). This is distinct from a suspicion that the person committed a family violence offence ([33]). Brett J held that there was ample evidence to support the suspicion that there had been family violence, and he had adequately communicated that fact to the respondent ([46]).
Brett J remitted the matter to be decided by the same Magistrate ([53]).
Kirkwood v Thomas [2017] TASSC 56 (15 September 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Not manifestly excessive’ – ‘Text messages’ – ‘Threats’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charges: Breach of family violence order x 2.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and the complainant were separated. The order prohibited him from threatening, abusing or assaulting the complainant, but not from going to her house. The first charge related to the defendant attending her house, ringing and knocking on the doors, and calling the complainant. The second charge related to the defendant sending the complainant 8 text messages also insulting the complainant and demanding money ([2]). The magistrate sentenced the appellant to two months’ imprisonment, cumulatively with a 5½ year sentence he was currently serving ([5]). That sentence related to a subsequent attack on the complainant, where the defendant broke into the complainant’s house and beat her with a baseball bat, leaving her with permanent disfiguring injuries and pain ([6]-[9]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate gave insufficient weight to the principle of totality, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive ([11]).
Decision and Reasoning: The judge had to decide first if the sentence of two months was manifestly excessive in order to conclude whether the principle of totality had been breached ([12]). It was relevant that the defendant could have been sentenced for longer than 5½ years for the attack with the baseball bat ([12]). There is usually a discount for subsequent sentences, especially because denunciation and personal deterrence may have been achieved by the first sentence ([13]). There was evidence that the appellant had undertaken some family violence and anger management programs in custody ([19]). However, in this case, a heavy sentence was warranted because there had been repeated breaches of the family violence order in the past, and family violence cases warrant tough sentences ([18]). Therefore, it was open to the magistrate to impose the cumulative sentence of two months ([22]).
Mayne v Tasmania [2017] TASSC 38 (29 June 2017) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘General deterrence’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Smothering’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Common assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The defendant and complainant had a child together but were not living together. The complainant and defendant were arguing while the complainant was lying in bed. The defendant pushed a pillow onto her face, causing her to struggle for breath for two to five seconds ([3]). The complainant did not suffer any physical injuries. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment ([13]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence was not manifestly excessive. Wood J held that the Magistrate was right to highlight the aggravating factors of the offence, including that smothering is a dangerous act, the defendant did not stop of his own accord, and it would have been a terrifying experience for the complainant ([41]). While the sentence was high, it was appropriate to give prominence for general deterrence ([43]).
Wood J said at [43]:
… it is important that deterrent sentences be imposed not merely for crimes that cause grave physical or psychological harm to victims. There is a need to counter the perception that somehow violence of this kind in the home is less serious than the same kind of violence inflicted on a stranger in a public place. Also, acts of violence committed in a family or domestic context causing fear and distress to victims can have debilitating effects upon their well-being or the well-being of a family member witnessing such violence. It is not only violence resulting in visible injury that must be seen as unacceptable, and these victims, as vulnerable members of our society who have experienced fear and trauma, are entitled to the court's protection.
Parker v Hall [2015] TASSC 60 (10 December 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge: Breach of family violence order
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent and complainant had been in an on-again off-again relationship for two years. A police family violence order was made against the respondent, restraining him from contacting or approaching the complainant within 50 metres. The respondent contravened this order on four separate occasions by phoning the complainant, writing her a letter expressing his affection and remorse, going camping with her, and giving her a letter conveying his desire for reconciliation. An interim family violence order was then made. The conditions of the order were substantially the same as the police family violence order. The respondent then breached this order by meeting the complainant to talk on two separate occasions. The respondent was charged and found guilty of four breaches of a police family violence order and two breaches of an interim family violence order. The magistrate adjourned the charges without conviction for 12 months on the condition that the respondent enter into a good behaviour undertaking and not commit similar offences during the period.
The respondent had previously been found guilty of breaching a police family violence order and an interim family violence order, which were also sentenced without conviction. This offending occurred during the same time period as the six charges in question. The prosecution submitted a more severe sentence would have been imposed if all the charges had been sentenced together. The respondent had no other relevant prior convictions. His conduct did not involve any threats or violence and occurred with the complainant’s consent to varying degrees. Further, the respondent’s counsel submitted that as a legal practitioner, he suffered more than the average citizen as a consequence of the charges.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Despite the complainant’s compliance, the respondent knew that his conduct was in breach of the orders. Further, his repeated offending of eight separate breaches increased his culpability and pointed towards the need for specific deterrence. However, the respondent’s breaches, while not trivial, were not at the serious end of offending. The public interest did not favour a conviction being recorded. As a result of the media attention attracted by the matter, the respondent had already felt the consequences of his offending behaviour to a degree. If the charges were heard together with the previous two offences, the offending would not have necessarily demanded a heavier or more punitive response. Considering these factors together, Wood J concluded that there was sufficient justification for leniency extended to the respondent and the sentence was not manifestly inadequate.
Lacroix v Lacroix [2015] TASSC 42 (3 September 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Extension of family violence order’ – ‘Family violence order’ – ‘Procedural fairness’
Proceeding: Review of family violence order
Facts: A family violence order was made against the applicant on 5 March 2015, in anticipation of the expiration of another 12-month family violence order made on 7 March 2014 (the first order). The applicant made no admissions in relation to the conduct resulting in the making of the first order. On 23 February 2015 the respondent, the applicant’s partner, made an application for an extension of the first order. The magistrate denied this extension but suggested the respondent lodge an application for a fresh order and said, ‘[The applicant] heard me say that, so he’s effectively on notice that that may well occur in the course of the morning and taking care of the service requirements [sic]’. Counsel for the respondent then lodged the application for a fresh order.
Issue: Whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness because he was not served with a sealed copy of the new application filed by the respondent.
Decision and reasoning: The motion to review the order was dismissed.
The magistrate was obliged to give the applicant a reasonable opportunity to be present at the hearing of the application, to obtain legal representation, and to make submissions and dispute allegations of fact at common law. The applicant was not denied these opportunities. He was present when the magistrate directed the respondent to lodge the fresh application that would be dealt with later that day. As a result, he had an opportunity to remain at court and instruct his counsel, who was also present at the time, to prepare submissions to defend the application on his behalf. The evidence relied on by the respondent for the fresh application was the same as for the extension of time. The common law rule of procedural fairness did not require the magistrate to proceed only if the applicant was served with a sealed copy of the fresh application.
The magistrate did not err in applying the statutory requirements. Section 106E Justice Act 1959 (Tas) does not apply to family violence orders, as submitted by the applicant’s counsel. Further, rule 54N(1)(a) Justices Rules 2003 (Tas) was complied with. The fresh application was served on the applicant on 11 March 2015. The rule does not require service before the family violence order is made, but as soon as practical after it is filed with the clerk.
However, the magistrate erred in making a final family violence order. He did not have authority to make such an order under s 31(7) Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas), as a sealed copy of the application had not been served on the applicant and no attempt had been made to carry out service. Despite this error, no substantial miscarriage of justice resulted. The applicant had notice of the application, when and where it would be made and the evidence to be relied upon. Further, the applicant was in court the morning of the application with a lawyer and merely needed to stay until the afternoon to defend the fresh application. Therefore, there was no procedural unfairness and no substantial miscarriage of justice.
Young v Wilson [2015] TASSC 16 (28 April 2015) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Using carriage service’
Charges: Using a carriage service to harass, Breach of police family violence order (6 counts), Common assault
Appeal Type: Application for review of sentence
Facts: A police family violence order prohibited the applicant from approaching within 50 metres or contacting the complainant in any way. The breaches of this order involved the applicant phoning the complainant, sending her two text messages, threatening to kill her and punching her to the head and face. The punch also gave rise to the common assault charge. The carriage service offence involved the applicant phoning and sending eight menacing text messages to the complainant. The applicant had a substantial and relevant criminal history. A sentence of eight months’ imprisonment was imposed. This offending also activated previously imposed suspended sentences of imprisonment. This resulted in a total effective sentence of 26 months’ imprisonment with no parole eligibility.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was allowed.
The eight-month sentence was not excessive. The applicant had previously shown a disregard for orders made in favour of the complainant. The assault offences were serious and the applicant did not appreciate this. A deterrent sentence was needed. It was not unjust to activate two of the previous suspended sentences resulting in six months’ imprisonment. However, a previous suspended term of imprisonment of 18 months for trespass, breaches of a family violence order and various traffic offences was substituted with a period of 12 months’ imprisonment. This was considered too harsh, given the other sentences of imprisonment to be served by the applicant and the fact the applicant has not reoffended with respect to the driving offences. Furthermore, there was no justification for not imposing a non-parole period. The applicant’s alcohol problem contributed to his ongoing offending behaviour: ‘The granting of parole may encourage reformation and increase the chances of rehabilitation under supervision through conditional freedom’ ([69]). He was resentenced to a total term of 18 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of nine months.
(Note also at [17]-[27] where Wood J made some general comments on the correct procedure to be followed for breaches of suspended sentences in Magistrates’ Courts and at [37]-[53] which contains general consideration of totality, suspended sentences and non-parole periods).
Higgins v McCulloch [2013] TASSC 49 (11 September 2013) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recording a conviction’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault
Appeal Type: Motion to review conviction and penalty
Facts: The applicant was found guilty of one count of assaulting his wife by punching her in the face. The complainant had died by the time the matter came to trial. The parties were living together in unusual circumstances and the assault occurred in a bedroom of the family home in the presence of an adult daughter. The applicant had no prior convictions. A good behaviour bond was imposed and a conviction was recorded.
Issues:
1.
Whether the finding of guilt was reasonably open on the evidence.
2.
Whether the magistrate erred in recording a conviction.
Decision and Reasoning: The notice to review was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed based on the evidence before the magistrate: see paragraphs [5]-[27].
2.
At [33], Tennent J outlined the relevant issues to be considered when deciding whether to record a conviction. A court must consider the public interest, the need for an official record to be made of the commission of the offence and whether the victim might reasonably not feel vindicated by the failure to record a conviction. These factors are to be weighed against the benefits to the offender of a conviction not being recorded. This was a family violence offence. The applicant was not entitled to any discount for a guilty plea and did not display remorse. The applicant was suffering from mental health issues, which partly explained his ‘bizarre’ ([44]) behaviour that occurred in the background to the assault. There was nothing put before the magistrate indicating that recording a conviction would have an adverse impact on the applicant.
Tasmania v Finnegan (No 2) [2012] TASSC 1 (19 January 2012) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Evidence - relationship’ – ‘Evidence - tendency’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Probative value’ – ‘Unlawful wounding’
Charge: Unlawful wounding
Proceeding: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence
Facts: The accused was charged with unlawfully wounding the complainant (his partner) by striking her to the face with a glass. He pleaded not guilty. The Crown sought to lead evidence from the complainant given on a voir dire about the accused’s conduct towards her on other occasions, both before and after the alleged wounding. The accused objected to the admission of some of the evidence ([6]).
Issues: Whether some of the evidence given by the complainant should be ruled inadmissible on at least one of the following bases:
1.
Irrelevance;
2.
Failure to satisfy the common law rule established in Pfennig v R whereby propensity or similar fact evidence is not admissible if, viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of that evidence that is consistent with innocence;
3.
The danger of unfair prejudice to the accused outweighing the probative value of the evidence: s 137 Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); or
4.
The probative value of the tendency evidence not substantially outweighing any prejudicial effect that it may have on the accused: s 101(2) Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The evidence led from the complainant as to the conduct of the accused was admissible. It was relevant on a number of bases: as ‘relationship evidence’, enabling the jury to assess the evidence as to what occurred at the time of the alleged wounding; as evidence of motive (jealousy); as evidence explaining why the complainant asserted she was injured because of a fall and why there was delay in her reporting what occurred; and as tendency evidence, showing that the accused had a tendency to be jealous of anyone who had a friendship/relationship with the complainant and to be generally violent towards her ([11]-[15]).
Further, the probative value of all the evidence under consideration substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect and danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. In this regard, Blow J noted at [30]-[31]:
‘In my view the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused is not great… [A] properly instructed jury, having heard all the evidence of jealousy and violence, is unlikely to be distracted from its duty of impartiality and its duty to give a true verdict in accordance with the evidence.
‘In my view the evidence of jealousy has substantial probative value. Without that evidence the jury might well take the view that the accused had not given any indication of jealousy on any other occasion. If the only evidence available for the jury as to violence on other occasions was the evidence of the three charged assaults, two of which shortly preceded the first report to the police of the accused wounding the complainant with the glass, that could result in the jury overestimating the likelihood of the complainant having fabricated the critical allegations. Having regard to that factor, and to the various bases on which the evidence of violence is relevant, I consider that all the evidence of violence also has substantial probative value’.
Here, there was nothing about the facts that made it one where s101(2) or s137 [Evidence Act 2001 (Tas)] required the Pfennig test to be applied (at [32]).
Note: this decision has been overtaken by legislative changes effective 12 December 2017. See section 13B Family Violence Act 2004.
James v Tasmania [2010] TASSC 50 (11 November 2010) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Breach of a family violence order, Common assault, Driving offences, Perverting the course of justice
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The magistrate imposed three terms of imprisonment. First, the applicant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 4 four months, for charges relating to driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and driving with alcohol in his body. Second, the applicant was sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment, cumulative on the first period of imprisonment, for perverting justice by providing a false name to a police officer. Third, the applicant was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 3 months, for 3 charges. These were: breaching a family violence order by sending an abusive and threatening text message to a woman protected by the order; breaching the order by telling the woman he would punch her in the head if she did not pack his property; and committing common assault by placing both hands around her neck and squeezing, threatening to bash her head in if she did not give him a telephone, grabbing her by the back of the neck, and placing his arm around her neck. The magistrate merely expressed this sentence as being ‘cumulative.’ If the third period of imprisonment was cumulative on both sentences, the effective sentence was 10 months’ imprisonment. However, if it was cumulative only on the first sentence, the effective sentence was 7 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in failing to make the sentence clear and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The lack of clarity as to the cumulative nature of the third sentence amounted to a sentencing error and the applicant was re-sentenced. The first and second periods of imprisonment imposed were not manifestly excessive. However, the sentence for the assault and the breach of the family violence order was found to be manifestly excessive. A sentence of three months’ imprisonment wholly suspended was substituted. His Honour stated, ‘[t]he nature of the assault was not severe enough to warrant a greater punishment. His culpability for breaching the order was ameliorated by his belief, the claim to which was unchallenged, that the order no longer operated, and by the complainant reconciling and living with him since the order had been made’ ([22]).
Beechey v McDonald [2010] TASSC 47 (25 October 2010) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Guilty plea - unequivocal’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charges: Breach of a family violence protection order (2 counts), Assault
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to two breaches of a family violence protection order and was sentenced to a wholly suspended sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment. The family violence order included an order that he not enter the premises of the complainant, his wife and mother of his 4 children. On one occasion, when returning the children to the premises, the applicant entered the residence and placed some of the children’s belongings inside (the first complaint – breach of a family violence protection order). The family violence order was later replaced with an order including a term that the applicant not directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault the complainant. The applicant and the complainant agreed to spend Christmas day together. On the day, a box the applicant was carrying came into contact with the complainant. She fell over and dislocated a shoulder (the second complaint – breach of a family violence protection order by assault).
Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in accepting the applicant’s plea to one of the charges as he had made assertions that were inconsistent with his plea of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Sentencing submissions from counsel for the applicant evidenced that he denied applying force to the complainant intentionally. This was inconsistent with his plea of guilty on the second complaint. A plea of guilty must be unequivocal. The magistrate should have informed counsel for the applicant of this inconsistency ([9]-[12]).
Maingay v Seabourne [2009] TASSC 67 (19 August 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’
Charges: Breach of police family violence order (6 counts), Assault (2 counts), Breach of interim family violence order, Damaging property, Abuse of police
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence
Facts: The male respondent was sentenced by a magistrate in respect of numerous offences. The magistrate dealt with the offences in batches and the State sought review of a suspended sentence imposed in respect of two of these batches. The first batch of offences pertained largely to charges of stealing. More relevantly, the second batch of offences related to a number of breaches of police family violence orders. On 12 December 2005, a police family violence order was made for the protection of Cassandra Deering. The respondent breached this order by head-butting and punching Ms Deering. On 5 January 2007, a second police family violence order was made. The respondent breached this by approaching Ms Deering, damaging the car belonging to her new partner, and sending a threatening text message. A number of these breaches occurred while the respondent was on bail for earlier breaches.
On 2 October 2008, a police family violence order was made for the protection of Dana Smith. The respondent breached this order by kicking Ms Smith in the head. He also said she was lucky he did not slit her throat and that he should have snapped her neck. On 27 October 2008, an interim family violence order was made which required the respondent to immediately surrender firearms. The respondent also breached this order.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The sentence imposed in respect of the batch of offences incorporating the family violence offences was manifestly inadequate. The respondent was a repeat offender. He showed a complete disregard for the orders made to restrict his behaviour and should have felt the full effect of a deterrent sentence, notwithstanding his age and lack of a prior history. If his offending had extended only to breach by approach (potentially instigated by the protected person) the outcome would have been different. However, the respondent’s offending went far beyond that; it extended to physical assaults against two separate female partners ([24]).
Her Honour noted that, ‘While it is accepted that, at the time the respondent was dealt with for all of this offending, he was still a young man with no relevant prior history, the legislation pursuant to which he had been charged was enacted to protect members of the community, and in particular to protect persons in close relationships with offenders. Deterrent sentences were required to give effect to that legislation … However, in practical terms, it is impossible in my view to argue that the deterrent effect of an actual term of imprisonment is the same as that of a suspended term of imprisonment’ ([23]).
The respondent was ordered to serve a period of four months’ imprisonment. Although it might have been unfair in all the circumstances to impose a custodial sentence several months after his release, if the error in the sentence was not corrected, the perception would remain that the sentence imposed lacked the requisite deterrent effect ([26]-[30]).
Bradshaw v Tasmania [2009] TASSC 22 (9 April 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charges: Unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm (2 counts), Aggravated burglary
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant had lived with the female complainant and her 7 year old daughter for over a year before the offending occurred. The relationship was violent and the complainant accordingly obtained a family violence order requiring the appellant not to threaten, harass or abuse the complainant, to keep the peace towards her, and not to damage any property at her home. The order was in place at the time of the offending. The appellant committed a series of offences against the complainant and they ceased cohabiting together. Following this, the appellant broke into the complainant’s house and stabbed her twice to her right side. He took a few steps away before turning back and stabbing her again twice to her left side. The complainant was holding her daughter at the time of the attacks. The appellant was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with eligibility for parole after four years.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was rejected by all judges but with separate reasoning provided. Tennent J (with whom Porter J agreed) found that while there were mitigating factors (remorse, giving himself up, and pleading guilty), the applicant committed very deliberate acts of violence in the complainant’s own home when he had no right to be there and there was a need for both personal and general deterrence ([35]-[36]). The appellant was sentenced for two particularly serious crimes. The stabbings occurred very close together but constituted two crimes because the appellant walked away and made a conscious decision to return and stab the complainant again ([33]). Further, the appellant committed a number of other offences and showed a complete disregard for orders of the court. He caused significant, long-term physical and psychological damage to both the complainant and her daughter ([34]).
In a separate judgment, Evans J also held that the sentence was not manifestly excessive in light of the totality of the appellant’s criminal conduct. The appellant’s criminal conduct was particularly serious. It was not impulsive. He went to the complainant’s home intending to inflict harm and acted in contravention of both a bail condition and a family violence order. One of the wounds he inflicted could have been fatal. The appellant also had prior convictions for violence and carrying weapons. His attack had a profound adverse impact on the complainant ([13]-[14]).
Allen v Kerr [2009] TASSC 10 (25 February 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Common assault
Appeal Type: Motion to review sentence
Facts: The applicant was in a relationship with the victim for three years and they had one child together. The victim also had a child from another relationship. Both of these children were present during the incident. The applicant was intoxicated and swore at the victim. An argument ensued and the victim spat in his face, which the applicant claimed led to his subsequent actions. The applicant took the victim’s house keys and told her to go inside before telling her to get in the car. He then smashed the car window, leaned inside and punched the victim twice to the face and four or five times to the back of the head and bit her multiple times. The police applied for a family violence order to operate for 12 months, which the applicant consented to. The applicant had a significant criminal history (though no convictions for assault) and was subject to a probation order and two suspended sentences. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment.
Issue: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The motion to review was dismissed.
Porter J found that the assault was not premeditated and arose from the applicant’s state of intoxication. The act of the victim spitting in the applicant’s face was a provocative act and an assault in itself. No weapon was used and the complainant suffered no lasting injury. On the other hand, the assault was serious particularly given the biting. Furthermore, the presence of the two children at the time of the attack was an aggravating factor, as recognised by s 13 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas): ‘Violence witnessed by children in the domestic environment not only is distressing (usually the victim is a parent or someone in the place of a parent), but it also serves to desensitise impressionable minds to violence, and to encourage the notion that resort to violence is acceptable’ ([13]).
The community has a general intolerance towards offences of violence. However, although immediate custodial sentences are appropriate for serious cases of assault, there is no prima facie position that assault offences should be punished by an immediate gaol term. The fact that the applicant was subject to the probation order and suspended prison sentences indicates that these measures did not deter the applicant from offending. ‘General deterrence in relation to offences of violence is a weighty factor’ ([27]). While the penalty was a relatively severe one, it did not demonstrate error having regard to the applicant’s circumstances.
Tasmania v R D P [2009] TASSC 72 (25 February 2009) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Police family violence order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge: Rape
Proceeding: Application to adduce relationship evidence
Facts: The defendant was in a relationship with the complainant for about 14 months. The alleged offence occurred after the relationship ended. A police family violence order was in place against the defendant. The complainant arranged to attend the defendant’s house to collect her belongings with her 10-year-old son and her brother. She collected her belongings and then went to the bathroom with her son where she found the defendant. There was a knife on the hand basin. The complainant informed the defendant that she did not want to have sex, but he performed oral sex on her. She exposed her breasts on his demands because she thought he might hurt her if she did not. The complainant screamed for help and tried to defend herself by kicking the defendant. The defendant then threatened to rape her anally unless she uncrossed her legs. She then uncrossed her legs and the defendant vaginally raped her. This was done in front of their child.
Issue: Whether the relationship evidence should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The evidence as to the nature of the relationship was admitted, with the exception of evidence of general physical and verbal abuse unconnected with sexual activity. The evidence included general physical abuse and physical violence used to coerce the complainant into sexual intercourse, one prior occasion of non-consensual vaginal intercourse and an act of anal intercourse. Porter J held that the evidence would allow the jury to more readily assess the actions of the complainant and defendant and ascribe meaning to things said by the defendant. In particular, evidence of prior sexual intercourse without consent might serve to explain why the complainant may have displayed some acquiescence to the oral sex and the vaginal penetration. Also, evidence of prior anal penetration was relevant to the jury’s assessment of why the complainant uncrossed her legs prior to vaginal penetration, given the high level of pain and discomfort the complainant suffered as a result of the earlier anal penetration. The probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudice.
Director of Public Prosecutions v P [2007] TASSC 51 (26 June 2007) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge: Rape
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent’s relationship with the complainant ended. The complainant attempted to maintain a friendship with the respondent but he could not accept that the relationship was over. He kept coming to her home and tried to kiss and cuddle her. She would sometimes relent to avoid an argument. She was pregnant with his child at the time. On the night of the offence, he arrived at the complainant’s home intoxicated. She asked him to leave but he refused. He stopped her from calling a friend. He then refused to allow her to go to the toilet, forcibly pinned her to their bed and raped her. She eventually stopped resisting and he stopped after about 5 minutes. The rape resulted in lasting psychological impacts on the complainant. The respondent had a long record of offending, including offences of violence and threatened violence. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. Crawford J (with whom Slicer and Evans JJ agreed) held that a sentence of two years is low for the crime of rape, which is ‘a crime of violence, domination and degradation and it usually causes great psychological trauma to the victim. It requires a substantial sentence of imprisonment in most cases. Leniency may be extended in exceptional circumstances, but there were none in this case’ ([16]). His Honour was of the view that it is conceivable that a crime committed ‘during the currency of a sexual relationship’ might allow some leniency, but the fact of a prior sexual relationship is not a mitigating factor and the appellant’s disappointment about the relationship breakdown is not relevant to sentencing: ‘In no sense was his crime an act of unrequited love.’ ([16]). Evans J also noted that, ‘it is significant that the respondent's criminal conduct cannot be categorised as an impetuous response to the break-up of his relationship with the complainant and a manifestation of his love for her. His conduct over the period of in excess of an hour after she first asked him to leave bears all the hallmarks of an assertion of physical and sexual dominion over the complainant’ ([23]). The respondent was re-sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Lambie v State of Tasmania [2007] TASSC 10 (7 March 2007) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Assault (two counts)
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant was in an ‘up and down’ relationship with the complainant that was marked with arguments and assaults. On the day of the offence, the appellant attended the complainant’s home. An argument occurred and the complainant said she wanted to sort out the issues in the relationship. She stood in the doorway, preventing the appellant from leaving. The argument continued and the appellant grabbed the complainant and threw her backwards out of the way. The appellant then followed the complainant into their bedroom and shoved his motorcycle helmet into her chest, knelt on her chest and shouted in her face. The appellant later returned to the house and took her a glass of water. The assaults aggravated an existing unknown spinal condition and the complainant had to undergo surgery and suffered temporary and permanent disabilities. There were also lasting psychological impacts. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 months.
Issue: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on the basis of another ground of appeal (that the sentencing judge had taken extraneous or irrelevant material into account). In relation to the issue of manifest excess, Underwood CJ (with whom Blow J and Tennent J agreed) stated that the key consideration was ‘the extent of the appellant's criminal culpability for the consequences of his direct and intentional applications of force’ because the sentencing judge sentenced on the basis the appellant was ‘culpably liable’ for all the consequences of his criminality ([19]). However, there were no submissions on this issue from counsel so the Court was reluctant to make a determination. In any case, it was not necessary to do so because the consequences of the appellant’s criminal conduct were not reasonably foreseeable by him and the exceptional circumstances were such that the consequences should carry little weight in sentencing.
In re-sentencing the appellant, the Court held that the conduct was serious and that, ‘the nature of the criminal conduct was such that a sentence of imprisonment is called for to mark condemnation of this kind of domestic violence and to punish the appellant’ ([31]). However, the lack of relevant prior convictions made a 12-month sentence manifestly excessive. The appellant was re sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, fully suspended on the condition that the appellant be of good behaviour for two years after his release.
Remess v Rabe [2006] TASSC 105 (4 December 2006) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Ex parte proceedings’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Leave’
Appeal Type: Application for review of the making of interim family violence order
Facts: An interim family violence order (FVO) was applied for on behalf of the complainant by the manager of Victim Support Services within the Department of Justice. An interim order was made in the applicant’s absence and the order was to last for 60 days.
Issues:
1a. | Whether the magistrate erred in making the order when leave to make an application under the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (the Act) had neither been sought nor granted. |
|---|---|
1b. | Alternatively, whether the magistrate erred in granting leave to make the application when the material was insufficient for that purpose. |
2. | Whether the magistrate erred in making an interim order because the evidence contained in the application was entirely hearsay. |
Decision and Reasoning: The application was dismissed.
1a. | The applicant submitted that the victim support officer was a person who was required to seek leave under s 15(2)(d) of the Act such that magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the application without leave being granted. Tennent J held that a grant of leave was not a pre-condition to jurisdiction, and that s 15 merely provides for the procedure of the classes of persons who may make an application for an FVO. |
|---|---|
1b. | Counsel for the applicant conceded that the application for the order was an interlocutory proceeding. Under s 75 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the hearsay rule does not apply as long as the party adducing the evidence also adduces evidence of its source. Counsel submitted that because the application did not disclose the sources of the information, the evidence was inadmissible. Therefore, there was nothing in the application upon which the magistrate could properly have considered the issue of leave. Tennent J held that in relation to leave the Court should consider ‘the position of the person seeking leave, their relationship to the affected person and whether they may have acquired knowledge of the matters the subject of the application’ ([15]). In this case, the magistrate recognised the person seeking leave and that the protected person was a client of hers. Her position and relationship with her client, of itself, would have identified her as being able to provide assistance to the protected person. It was appropriate in those circumstances for the magistrate to grant leave. While leave should have been expressly addressed, a grant of leave was implicit from the conduct of the proceedings. |
2. | The applicant submitted that while some of the material in the application came from police reports, it was not clear whether the officers referred to were reporting from personal contact with the protected person or relying on others. Tennent J held that the protected person clearly identified her sources as two police officers. Her Honour stated that s 75 of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) is not limited to ‘first hand hearsay’. As such, the evidence was admissible. Her Honour then commented on the making of interim orders generally at [28]. Counsel for the applicant also raised the issue of the basis on which the magistrate made an order that extended to the children of the parties. The magistrate imposed the order so as to ‘err on the side of caution’ but was careful to not make an order preventing the applicant form approaching his children. Tennent J held this was appropriate: ‘It is well recognised that children in families where domestic violence is a factor can be affected by such violence whether or not they are directly subjected to it’. Even though there was limited material available to the magistrate, the interim nature of the order was reflected in its duration and an acknowledgment that the issue could be revisited. |
Oliver v Tasmania [2006] TASSC 95 (17 November 2006) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Hardship’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aggravated burglary (two counts), Unlawfully injuring property (two counts), Arson
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The offending related to the appellant’s former partner and father of her two children. The relationship had ended acrimoniously as the appellant found out that her former partner had an affair about the time their relationship ended that resulted in the birth of a child. She broke into his home on two separate occasions and damaged it. On the first occasion she broke nine windows, destroyed a collection of vinyl records and smashed a photo frame. On the second occasion she set fire to the home and damaged the complainant’s vehicle parked outside. The damage exceeded $50,000 and the contents lost had a value between $15,000 and $20,000. At the time of sentencing the appellant had three young children. She had relevant prior convictions. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that insufficient weight was given to the fact that the appellant was the mother of three children. However, nothing was put to the sentencing judge that suggested any particular hardship to the children arising from their mother’s imprisonment. Counsel also submitted that the penalty imposed for arson was the harshest in the preceding five years. Counsel for the respondent submitted that this was a deliberate action and resulted in substantial damage. Other dwellings could have been at risk. The offending was motivated by ‘significant ill will’. The appellant showed no remorse and attempted to place the blame elsewhere. The fire was lit late at night at a time when it would be expected that it would not be immediately detected. Tennent J (with whom Evans J agreed) held that the appellant’s conduct could only be described as ‘vindictive attacks in no way justified by what she presumably perceived as the wrongs done to her by him. The gravity of her behaviour escalated in that she went from simply smashing things to using fire, a much more dangerous tool’ ([44]).
Underwood CJ (with whom Evans J agreed) held that there was nothing to indicate that the trial judge did not give appropriate weight to the fact that the appellant was a mother of three children. His Honour held that family hardship is only relevant in the ‘most unusual case’ ([11]). In regards to the appellant’s ‘tariff submission’ that the sentence was the longest imposed for arson in the preceding five years, Underwood CJ noted that the appellant was sentenced for arson as well as other crimes. Further, the fact that the arson was intentional made it more serious. The appellant was neither youthful nor remorseful and this was ‘calculated’ conduct borne out of anger designed to cause maximum distress, such that the totality of the conduct called for a substantial sentence of imprisonment.
Re S [2005] TASSC 89 (19 September 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of innocence’ – ‘Risk assessment tool’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’
Proceeding: Application for bail
Facts: The applicant was arrested following a complaint that he assaulted his partner. She alleged that he had taken her car keys. When she asked for them back, he verbally abused her, grabbed her throat and pushed her backwards. The complainant stated that the applicant kept a gun on the property (though this was not untoward because it was a farming property with livestock) and that she lived in fear of her partner’s threats. The applicant denied the allegations and stated that he did not see the complainant on the day in question. He alleged that the complainant made threats against his safety and that she made the assault complaint maliciously in an attempt to force him to pay her money. Following his arrest, an application for a family violence order (FVO) was made. The applicant had no history of violence or prior convictions. The police officer completed a ‘Tasmania Police Family Violence Risk Assessment Screening Tool’. This involved a subjective assessment provided by the complainant and was part of a whole of government response to domestic and family violence instituted in Tasmania in 2004 ([18]). While the applicant was in the remand centre, the complainant called and asked to speak to the complainant. She indicated that she was willing to drop the assault charge if she was paid money that she was owed.
Issue: Whether bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted. The Court held that various problems with duplication within the risk assessment, the mixture of protective legislation within the criminal law and the mandatory nature of the legislation meant that a court is inhibited in its assessment of future risk, especially in the case of an unrepresented defendant. There was evidence that the phone message from the complainant while the applicant was on remand could be construed, ‘as a form of pressure designed to enhance a financial outcome favourable to the maker’, which would be contrary to the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas). Section 12 of the Act creates a presumption against bail for a person charged with a family violence offence unless the court is satisfied that release, "would not be likely to adversely affect the safety … of an affected person". At [23], Slicer J made some general comments on the effectiveness of the statutory scheme, noting concerns that the public must have confidence in the administration of the scheme and that public confidence is diminished when an arbitrary approach is taken. By tasking the courts to assess the future risk of a person, reliable primary material must be put before the court to deal with issues such as deprivation of liberty and consequences to the family unit. Slicer J also noted the risk that, ‘deprivation of liberty is seen as a sanction imposed for unproven conduct.’
The Court held that it is not possible to determine the merits of the domestic violence complaint at first instance and that it remained an issue for trial. His Honour also noted tensions between the presumption of innocence and the need to protect victims. In applying this to the facts, his Honour granted bail on the provision of a surety and the imposition of residential, geographical and contact provisions.
Olsen v State of Tasmania [2005] TASSC 40 (13 May 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Legal representation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge: Aggravated assault
Proceedings: Bail application
Facts: The applicant was charged with aggravated assault against his former female partner. The Crown case was that the assault consisted of a threatening gesture or gestures with a replica pistol. The applicant vehemently denied these allegations. The Crown informed the court that they would not oppose bail if the applicant was able to produce a suitable surety. The applicant suffered from schizophrenia and would benefit from the supervision of a surety to ensure he did not breach any bail conditions. However, through no fault of his own, the applicant was unable to produce a surety.
Issue: Whether the application for bail should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for bail was refused. His Honour noted that, ‘Were I free of the restraints imposed by the Family Violence Act, s12, I would grant bail. I would do so because on the face of it, the assault is not a serious one, because the applicant has been in custody since 10 or 11 April, and because it will be some time before this applicant has his case heard.’ His Honour further noted that the applicant had no relevant prior convictions ([3]).
However, s 12 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) provided that the applicant not be granted bail unless his release on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, well being and interests of the complainant. The onus was on the unrepresented applicant to show this but he had no idea of where the complainant was living (so as to ascertain information about her safety). In light of this and in the absence of a surety to monitor the applicant’s behaviour, the application for bail was refused. His Honour concluded by stating that, ‘I want to say very strongly that this man needs legal assistance and he needs it urgently, otherwise he is likely to stay where he is for a considerable period of time’ ([10]).
S v White [2005] TASSC 27 (21 April 2005) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factors’
Charges: Assault (3 counts), Destroying property, Application for a restraint order
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal to grant bail
Facts: It was alleged that the appellant assaulted his former partner and two of her children, and that he destroyed the windscreen of her car. A police officer also applied for a restraint order as a result of this incident. The magistrate refused to grant the applicant bail.
Issue: Whether the release of the appellant on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of an affected person (the former partner).
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and bail was granted with condition as to surety recognisance and a residential condition. There were a number of factors weighing against the appellant: the prosecution had a strong case; this was a case involving not only physical assault but a threat to kill; the appellant used weapons in the commission of the offence; the Family Violence Risk Assessment prepared by the complainant immediately following the incident noted alcohol problems, potential mental health issues, jealousy and possessiveness, threats to kill, violence in the relationship escalating and the relationship had only recently broken down; the proposed surety (the appellant’s mother) was not in good health and would be unable to stop the appellant harming his former partner ([14]-[18]).
However, in spite of this, Blow J was satisfied that the release of the appellant on bail would not be likely to adversely affect the safety, wellbeing and interests of his former partner and her children. The appellant had not assaulted his former partner or children prior to this incident. Despite allegations of mental illness, the appellant had not been diagnosed with such a disorder. The appellant’s demeanour in court was ‘ideal and exemplary,’ precautions had been taken to ensure the appellant did not know where his former partner was, and he had a previous good employment history ([19]-[23]).
Her Majesty's Attorney-General v O [2004] TASSC 53 (9 June 2004) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Assault, indecent assault
Appeal type: Attorney-General appeal against sentence
Facts: The responded pleaded guilty to assault and indecent assault against a woman with whom he cohabited for seven years. They had four children together. In March 2001, the respondent assaulted the complainant by raising his fist at her, waving a knife in her face and threatening to kill her. The relationship ceased some weeks prior to 30th May 2002. On 30th May 2002, the respondent trespassed into the complainant’s home and ejaculated over her legs while she was asleep. The complainant reported the incident to police soon after it occurred and, at the same time, reported the assault of March 2001. Considerable time was taken to obtain a DNA analysis of the semen on the complainant’s legs. As a result, police did not interview the respondent until a little more than a year after the indecent assault. The respondent was ordered to perform 80 hours of community service.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed by Underwood and Slicer JJ but upheld by Blow J in dissent. The judges provided different reasoning.
Underwood J, in the majority, agreed with Blow J (in dissent) that the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate. However, he dismissed the appeal. The time in custody the respondent would have to serve would unlikely exceed 6 months and absent some point of principle, ‘it was unjust to take away the respondent's liberty and put him in prison because an undefined error, not caused or contributed to by him in any way, infected the sentencing discretion exercised with respect to crimes that occurred two and three years ago’ ([7]).
Slicer J, also in the majority, held that the sentence was not manifestly inadequate. His Honour quoted Parker v R [1994] TASSC 94 which in turn quoted from a Canadian case R v Brown (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 242, 249 articulating principles for the sentencing of crimes of domestic violence: ‘When a man assaults his wife or other female partner, his violence toward her can be accurately characterised as a breach of the position of trust which he occupies. It is an aggravating factor. Men who assault their wives are abusing the power and control which they so often have over the women with whom they live. The vulnerability of many such women is increased by the financial and emotional situation in which they find themselves, which makes it difficult for them to escape’.
However, His Honour nonetheless held that the circumstances of this case did not show manifest disparity or inconsistency with the sentencing standard (which was not to say that a more severe penalty would not have been appropriate). Here, the original assault (followed by the resumption of cohabitation) and the act of indecency were not charged for a further period of 12 months. There was no material advanced that suggested continuation of harassment or manifestation of aggression. The respondent had successfully completed the order of community service ([19]-[20]).
Slicer J also stated: ‘Resolution of the problem of violence within a domestic situation is complex and resumption of cohabitation, as in this case where the complainant had decided to give her partner another chance, makes any assessment of sanction difficult’ ([19]).
Blow J, in dissent, held that the nature of the indecent assault (ejaculating over a former partner’s legs) and the circumstances of aggravation in which it occurred made it a particularly serious example of that sort of crime such that a community service order was so inadequate a penalty that the appeal ought to be allowed ([30], [36]). The circumstances of aggravation were that the respondent entered the complainant’s house as a trespasser at night, the complainant was asleep, and it was committed in the immediate presence of the couple’s four young children which created a strong risk of them witnessing the incident ([26]). A sentence of 11 months’ imprisonment, suspended after 8 months, was appropriate.
His Honour disagreed with the comments of Slicer J as to delay insofar as they related to the indecent assault. He noted that, ‘Certainly fairness to an offender can require a judge imposing a sentence for a stale crime, long after it was committed, to extend what otherwise might be an undue degree of leniency: R v Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 at 519 - 520. There is also authority that a delay need not be inordinate before it deserves to be taken into account: Miceli v R [1997] VSC 22; (1997) 94 A Crim R 327 at 330. However the respondent was sentenced for the indecent assault some 20 months after committing it, and a delay of that order is now, regrettably, quite normal in this State. I therefore think that the delay in relation to that charge is of little significance’.
Waddington v R [2003] TASSC 21 (30 April 2003) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge: Murder
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and the female deceased lived together for 10 or 12 years. The appellant drank 10 cans of beer on the afternoon of the murder. While the appellant prepared dinner, the deceased telephoned a friend. According to counsel for the appellant, these telephone calls occurred on a regular basis meaning that the deceased would often eat dinner cold or not eat dinner at all. The appellant had become frustrated with these calls over the years. The appellant finished making dinner and told the deceased it was ready. She told him that she would eat it later. The friend on the other end of the phone then heard the appellant become enraged. He yelled, ‘Get off that fucking phone … I've been putting up with it for the last ten years … I'm sick to death of the fucking phone.’ The telephone connection was broken. In a rage, the appellant killed his partner. He held a pillow over her face for about three to four minutes, smothering her until she died. An hour later he went to the police and confessed.
Issues:
1.
Whether the sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the order fixing a non-parole period of 12 years was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2.
1.
A sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. Although the appellant expressed remorse, confessed to the crime quickly, and pleaded guilty, the appellant maintained his suffocation of the deceased for a prolonged period of time, the deceased did not provoke the appellant’s violence in any way, and the appellant had prior convictions ([25]-[27]).
2.
However, a non-parole period of 12 years was harsh, particularly when considered in light of orders for parole eligibility in other murder cases. Taking into account the appellant’s genuine and deep remorse and his full acceptance of responsibility, a non-parole period of 10 years was substituted ([30]).
Burton v R [2002] TASSC 64 (11 September 2002) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Impact of offence on victim’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful assault causing bodily harm’
Charges: Assault (2 counts), Aggravated burglary with intent to commit murder or assault
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant resided in a de facto relationship between May 2001 and 20 July 2001. The complainant had a six month old child. However, in July, the complainant informed the appellant she wanted to end the relationship. She went to live with her mother. On the morning of 29 July, the appellant smashed a window to enter the complainant’s mother’s flat, holding a large knife (count 1). He yelled, ‘where is the fucking slut’ and ‘where is she’. He entered the complainant’s bedroom, where she was sleeping with her child, shouting that he was going to kill her. The appellant dragged the complainant by her hair to the kitchen and started to cut her neck. She grabbed the blade of the knife and it snapped (count 2 and 3). The appellant dragged her outside the house (count 4) before calming down. The complainant sustained a superficial laceration to her neck and ongoing psychological injury.
The appellant was found guilty of assault at a first trial (count 4). At a second trial, he was found guilty of aggravated burglary (count 1) and assault (count 3). The assault subject of count 3 was framed as an alternative to counts alleging the commission of the crimes of attempted murder and committing an act intended to cause bodily harm (wounding). He was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment for the offences subject of the second trial. In respect of the assault, he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment cumulative on the first sentence.
Issue: One of the grounds of appeal was whether the sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed by all judges but with separate reasoning provided. Crawford J (with whom Underwood J agreed) held that the sentence of three years and six months was manifestly excessive. The sentence was well outside the range of sentences typically imposed for these types of offences ([20]-[23]). In light of the need for consistency, the sentence was set aside and a sentence of two years and three months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Slicer J also found the sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment was manifestly excessive. The circumstances of the offences warranted the sentence namely, this was a case of ‘home invasion’ and ‘domestic violence,’ the appellant had prior convictions, he was not entitled to the benefit of a guilty plea, there was no evidence of remorse, and the impact on the complainant was likely to be long standing ([46]-[50]). However, the problem was not with the sentence but with the verdict. It was strange that the jury found that the evidence supported that there had been a ‘cutting of the neck’ but returned a verdict of not guilty of wounding. Nevertheless, the sentence was constrained by the jury’s finding of assault, not wounding. On that basis alone, the sentence was manifestly excessive ([50]-[52]). His Honour agreed with Crawford J that a sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment was appropriate.
Rice v McDonald [2000] TASSC 70 (21 June 2000) – Tasmanian Supreme Court
‘Compulsion’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stealing’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Where the offender is also a victim’
Charges: Stealing, Making a false report to police
Appeal Type: Notice to review conviction
Facts: The applicant and her partner were in a domestic relationship riddled with violence. For a summary of the history of the violence against her, see paragraphs [4]-[10]. The applicant was charged with stealing a television. She entered into an agreement to rent the television under instructions from her partner, who then arranged for the television to be sold to a friend. He instructed the applicant to tell the purchaser that the television came from her sister. After the applicant did not report that the television was stolen to the police, her partner became very angry. As a result of fearing what her partner would do if she defied him, the applicant then reported the television was stolen to the police and the rental company. After the police located the television in the possession of the purchaser, the applicant fully admitted to the crime and protected her partner by providing a false name.
At trial, the applicant gave evidence that she had acted out of fear that she would suffer grievous bodily harm if she did not follow her partner’s demands to commit the offences. She alleged that her partner threatened to kill her if she did not accept full responsibility for the crime and provide a false name to police. That is, she established an evidentiary basis for the court to consider compulsion under s 20 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) (the Code) and duress at common law. The magistrate found that neither of those defences applied.
Issues:
1.
Whether the magistrate erred by applying the provisions of the Code governing criminal responsibility to the charge of making a false report.
2.
Whether the magistrate made legal errors in applying the defences of duress and compulsion.
3.
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to sufficiently consider the evidence of a psychologist with extensive experience in domestic violence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues 2 and 3.
1.
The respondent conceded that this ground was made out. One difference between the common law defence of compulsion and the statutory defence is that it is not necessary for the person making the threat to be present at the time the offence is committed. The applicant was entitled to the benefit of the common law defence. However, this was not sufficient to overturn the conviction because the magistrate was satisfied that the prosecution proved that the applicant was not acting under duress.
2.
The magistrate concluded that the applicant’s contention that her partner would ‘bash the hell out of me’ contained a qualification and because of a slight hesitation in her response, she had not given credible evidence that she was threatened with serious violence. The Court disagreed, holding that given the history of violence, the words ‘bash the hell out of me’ amounted to a clear threat of serious harm.
In referring to the requirement of immediacy under s 20 of the Code, the magistrate concluded that her partner’s threat would not be carried out immediately because of the presence of the purchaser of the television. The Court disagreed, holding that immediacy does not mean that the threat will be carried out at the time of compliance or refusal, but that it is ‘proximate’ to the making of the threat. It requires that the person coerced ‘believes that such threats will be executed’ at the time when the person making the threats is able to carry them out. The magistrate also erred in concluding that the applicant could not have believed the threats could be carried out immediately. Given the history of violence, she was entitled to believe that the threats would be carried out immediately. In relation to seeking the protection of the purchaser, the Court held that this proposition ‘defies logic and experience’ ([25]). The magistrate did not sufficiently take into account the history of the relationship in determining the conduct said to give rise to compulsion. Her partner had complete domination over her and had assaulted her in a refuge. The false report was made at the direction of her partner in the face of explicit and implicit threats. While she theoretically could have made a complaint to the officer about her partner when she filed the report, the option of applying for a restraining order was not consistent with complying with the threats.
3.
The magistrate concluded that the psychologist’s evidence did not assist the defence in establishing duress and compulsion. This amounted to an error and the magistrate was required at least to consider the psychologist’s evidence and the history of violence in determining whether the applicant acted under duress or compulsion.
Magistrates' Court
Police v H [2021] TASMC 13 (22 December 2021) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Breach of police family violence order x 3.
Proceedings: Reasons for decision.
Issues: Whether text messages sent by the defendant fell within an exception to the non-contact condition of the police family violence order; the accused’s guilt.
Facts: The male defendant and female victim were married for 14 years and had two children. After the couple separated, the defendant was subject to a protection order that prohibited contact with the victim ‘except… for the purpose of discussing matters arising out of their relationship including related to their children by… electronic message’ [1]. The defendant was charged with breaching the order by sending three text messages to the victim. The messages invited the victim to the defendant’s house and made a statement about the parties’ relationship and children [28], [32], [36].
Decision and Reasoning: Two of the three messages constituted a breach of the order.
Magistrate Stanton outlined his approach to construing the order: ‘the construction of the clause should be what a reasonable person in the circumstances of the person bound by the order would understand the words to mean’, while ‘considering the context of the exception within the entire order’ [8]-[9]. His Honour found that the ‘intention of the order [was] to keep the parties physically separate and to prevent communication generally while allowing limited communication’ that was for the purpose of discussing matters arising out of their relationship [11], [18]. His Honour found that the text messages that invited the victim to the defendant’s house were invitations ‘to engage in an activity which would otherwise be prohibited by the order’, and ‘not solely a discussion about matters arising out of the relationship’ [31]. Therefore, these messages breached the order. His Honour found that the statement about the parties’ relationship and children, which read: ‘You may hate me but I know my kids love me’, was sent during a discussion between the parties about matters related to the children and arising out of the relationship [33]-[35]. Therefore, the message fell within the exception and did not breach the order.
Purton v Purton [2016] TASMC 9 (19 October 2016) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Management of application proceedings’ – ‘Procedure’ – ‘Protection orders’
Case type: Directions in relation to application to revoke a Police Family Violence Order (‘PFVO’).
Facts: The applicant was served with a PFVO. It stated that the Sergeant was satisfied that the applicant had committed a family violence offence but did not explain why the order was made ([9]). The applicant applied to revoke the order ([10]).
Issues: The parties sought directions in relation to the nature of the application to revoke, the manner in which such an order should be made, and which party bears the onus of proof ([29]).
Decision and Reasoning: Magistrate McKee explained the procedure for challenging a PFVO. The application is not an appeal, nor an administrative review ([40]). It is an application for the court to exercise a discretion to revoke a PFVO ([41]).
The onus of proof is on the applicant to satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that it is appropriate to revoke the PFVO ([24]). Since the applicant is unaware of the basis upon which the order was made, the respondents (the police) would have to lead evidence to establish that the applicant committed the offence ([50]).
However, if the police applied to revoke or extend the PFVO, the onus of proof would lie on them ([56]).
McKenna v Smith [2014] TASMC 11 (27 March 2014) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Vulnerable - new partner’ – ‘Wilfully and unlawful destroying or damaging property’
Charges: Damaging property (3 counts), Breach of police family violence order (2 counts), Assault
Facts: At 2.30pm on 14 July 2013, the defendant smashed the windscreen of her former de facto partner’s car. Her former partner saw the incident occur and reported it to the police. A short time later, the defendant went to the police station and said she had smashed the windscreen of a car. At 5.45pm, a police officer who had attended the premises of the defendant’s former partner, made and served upon the defendant a police family violence order.
In breach of the police family violence order, at 8.00pm, the defendant again went to her former partner’s house. She began to abuse her former partner and his current partner. She threatened them both and at one point pushed the current partner of her ex-partner. Before leaving, she smashed the panels of her former partner’s car. The incident was reported immediately to police and the defendant was placed under arrest. She resisted arrest, kicking and screaming. This conduct continued at the police station.
The magistrate was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the acts.
Issues:
1.
Whether the police family violence order was not validly made because:
◦
it was not made by a police officer of the rank of sergeant or above; and/or
◦
the officer who made the order was not satisfied, or the evidence available to him was not sufficient to satisfy him, that the defendant had committed or was likely to commit a family violence offence.
2.
Whether the defendant was not criminally responsible for any of the acts charged having regard to her mental illness and the provisions of s 16 of the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas).
Decision and Reasoning: The magistrate rejected defence counsel’s submissions in relation to the first issue (the validity of the family violence protection order) but upheld submissions in relation to the second issue (insanity).
1.
The police family violence order was validly made because the police officer was acting in the rank of sergeant at the time the order was made. The magistrate also rejected counsel submissions in relation to the second limb of the argument. These submissions amounted to a collateral challenge to the validity of the police family violence order. A collateral challenge is a challenge to the validity of an order in proceedings where the existence of the order is an element of the offence (not in proceedings to review or set aside the order). The legislation did not permit collateral challenge at least on the basis alleged here i.e. whether the factual basis of the order was sufficient ([26]-[30]). However, even if collateral challenge were available, the ground would not succeed because there was sufficient evidence to support the making of a police family violence order ([19]-[21], [31]).
2.
The defendant was not criminally responsible for any of the acts contained in each charge. On the balance of probabilities the defendant was deprived of the capacity of knowing whether the acts that she performed in respect of each charge were ones that she ought not to do because of her mental illness, i.e. the Bipolar Disorder that resulted in her entering into a hypomanic or manic state. The defendant clearly knew what she was doing but was not able to rationally think about her actions with a moderate degree of sense and composure. This was because of the impact of her mental illness.
Howe v S [2013] TASMC 33 (29 July 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Charge particulars’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Guilty plea - withdrawal’ – ‘Protection order’
Charge: Breach of a police family violence order (3 counts)
Proceeding: Application for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty in respect of each charge and substitute a plea of not guilty
Facts: On 4 May 2012, a police family violence order was made against the male defendant that included the following order: ‘you must not directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault J’. It was alleged that the defendant contravened this order by harassing the female protected person (‘J’). The defendant demanded that the protected person spend the night with him. The defendant threatened to take her child away if she refused to do so. In relation to pending family law court proceedings, the defendant also stated, ‘if you take this to court, things will get vicious and you know what happens when things get vicious. So it’s up to you. Either come and meet me tonight at the house or we will be enemies’ (count 1). This conduct also amounted to a breach of s 9 (emotional abuse or intimidation) of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (count 3). The police family violence order included an order that, ‘you must not approach (J) directly or indirectly threaten, harass, abuse or assault; by telephone, email, facsimile or letter’ [sic]. It was alleged that the defendant contravened this order by approaching the protected person on numerous times by text messages (count 2).
The defendant pleaded guilty because of advice from his lawyer. He obtained new legal representation and they advised him to lodge an application for leave to withdraw the guilty pleas. His counsel submitted that leave ought to be granted because the particulars alleged of the complaint were insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the allegation contained in each charge. It would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the guilty pleas to stand.
Issue: Whether leave should be granted to withdraw the pleas of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for leave to withdraw the guilty plea was allowed in respect of counts 2 and 3 but refused in respect of count 1. In relation to count 2, a miscarriage of justice would result if the guilty plea was allowed to stand. The particulars of the charge alleged the defendant approached the complainant on numerous undefined occasions by use of text messages. This breached the requirements of the Justices Act because the prosecution failed to set out each matter of complaint in separate numbered paragraphs and because the prosecution failed to provide particulars by which to identify the text messages said to constitute breach. The ‘rolling up’ of charges meant that the defendant had no real understanding as to what approach and which text message/s constituted the offence. It was impossible to determine what exactly he admitted to in the plea of guilty ([17]-[18]).
Leave was also granted in respect of count 3. The magistrate held that ‘the mental element required to amount to a breach of s 9 is that the defendant knew or ought to know that the course of conduct in which he was engaging is “likely to have the effect of unreasonably controlling or intimidating, or causing mental harm, apprehension or fear in his spouse or partner”. This is not what has been alleged. That he knew or should have known that his conduct was “likely to have the effect of abusing or intimidating” his partner, is a different mental element from that referred to in the section’ ([23]).
However, the guilty plea was held to stand in relation to count 1. Counsel for the defence submitted that a person could not be ‘harassed’, as a matter of law, by one act alone. The magistrate concluded that, ‘Whilst I accept that the term “harass” as used in the general community could well include an element of persistence or repetition, I see no reason why a person cannot be harassed within the context of a Family Violence Order, by one act alone. This view is in fact consistent with the definition in s.4 of the Family Violence Act of the word “harassing” … The reference in the definition to “any one or more of the following actions” suggests that a single act might be sufficient. Furthermore, it is appropriate, in my view, to interpret the term having regard to the context in which it is used in the order. The reference to “threaten, harass, abuse or assault” suggests that the order is to be understood as providing protection to a person from contact with the respondent which is unwelcome, and might be in various forms or have variable effect’ ([12]-[16]).
Kerr v Brown [2013] TASMC 30 (8 July 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Breach of domestic violence order’ – ‘Interpretation of order’
Charge: Breach of family violence order (FVO)
Facts: A family violence order (FVO) was made in favour of the protected person that prohibited the defendant from approaching the protected person directly or indirectly. After the order was made, she phoned the defendant and caught a bus to Hobart where he was residing and commenced residing at his property.
The defendant submitted that he never approached the protected person, notwithstanding the fact that when she approached him, he allowed her to remain living at his home. The prosecutor submitted that the order should be interpreted to mean that the defendant was not permitted to allow the protected person to come into his presence, and that if she did, he must immediately leave her presence.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the offence charged.
Decision and Reasoning: The charge was dismissed. ‘Clearly the intention of the order is to prevent the respondent from coming near or initiating communication with the person to be protected. However, my impression is that police, and perhaps courts, view the condition as a primary mechanism for keeping persons apart in cases where family violence has been alleged or perpetrated, and may well consider the order to have the more extensive effect contended for by the prosecution in this case.’ ([5]). The ordinary meaning of ‘approach’ in the context of the FVO is that a person should not intentionally contact or bring themselves into the presence of the protected person. The order should be interpreted in a way that it would be understood by persons in the position of the defendant without legal training and of limited education: ‘The defendant cannot, in my view, be said to have approached (the protected person) by simply allowing her into the house, even for an extended stay, once she was there. To hold otherwise would be to give the word an extended meaning which is beyond its ordinary common meaning.’
Lusted v MRB [2013] TASMC 9 (19 February 2013) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Uncooperative witness’
Charge: Assault (6 counts)
Facts: The alleged assaults involved the defendant grabbing, pushing, striking, punching and pinching the complainant. One count involved the defendant grabbing her throat and pinning her against a table. Another involved pushing hot chicken into her face, grabbing hold of her by the chest and pouring cold water over her head ([17]-[28]). The complainant’s relationship with the defendant started when she was 15 and lasted for about 6 years. The prosecution’s evidence indicated that the defendant was controlling and violent towards the complainant throughout their relationship. The complainant was socially isolated and the defendant prevented her from contacting friends. He demanded that she wait on him and would strangle and abuse her if she did not comply with his demands. On one occasion, he threw a bottle at her. For further detail of the ‘uncharged acts’, see paragraphs [8]-[16]. There was one child of the relationship. The infant daughter witnessed two of the assaults.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the charged offences.
Decision and Reasoning: The charges were dismissed.
The prosecution adduced various circumstantial evidence from other witnesses ([29]-[42]). This included evidence of witnesses who noticed that the complainant had various physical injuries. The prosecution also sought to adduce evidence of the defendant’s tendency to engage in violent conduct against the complainant. Magistrate Pearse admitted this evidence on the basis that it had substantial probative value because it could be inferred that the relationship involved violent and controlling behaviour. The danger of unfair prejudice posed by the evidence was low, particularly in circumstances where no jury was involved. The prosecution also sought to adduce relationship evidence relating to uncharged conduct. This evidence was also admitted on the basis that it removed the implausibility of the assault being isolated. It also supported the assertion that the defendant exercised dominance and control and that the complainant feared the defendant.
This case involved serious and prolonged domestic violence. However, the complainant had not been entirely truthful about the relationship and her evidence was inconsistent with her parents’. She had discussed the possibility of ending the relationship with her parents and decided to leave him at the urgings of her mother once her father returned to town. However, on the day she decided to leave the defendant, she decided to return to him because he seemed remorseful and he offered to buy her dinner. As such, given the gravity of the conduct that was the subject of the complaint, the magistrate found it difficult to believe that the fear of what might happen in her father’s absence was a plausible explanation for her not leaving him. While the magistrate acknowledged that other explanations such as the fact that she may have become conditioned to such behaviour could be relevant, her account was doubted. There were no photographs, medical reports, phone records or other corroborating evidence. As such, the complaints were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The magistrate nonetheless emphasised the widespread scale and seriousness of family violence. ‘It is a significant social problem, of concern to the community and the justice system. The parliament saw fit to enact legislation, the Family Violence Act 2004, expressly to “provide for an integrated criminal justice response to family violence which promotes the safety of people affected by family violence”. The nature of family violence is that it is difficult to detect and prosecute. It is frequently the case that offences are committed in private and with little or no independent corroborative evidence. Moreover, family violence offences are often characterised by reluctance on the part of the victim to assist in the prosecution of offences. That is so for a range of factors including fear and a wish to preserve relationships, even dysfunctional ones, for the sake of loyalty, affection, companionship, economic and domestic support and in the perceived interest of children. Sometimes those motivations are misguided but persist nevertheless. As a consequence of such factors victims sometimes act in a way that seems to an outside observer to be incongruous and difficult to understand, including by failing to complain about, or hiding or lying about violence directed at them. Even if victims are willing to give evidence then the success of prosecutions depends principally on credibility of the uncorroborated account of the victim, a factor often taken advantage of by perpetrators and further adding to the reluctance of victims to complain.’ ([68]).
K v K [2012] TASMC 3 (25 January 2012) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Interim intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - suicide threat’
Proceeding: Application for revocation of an interim family violence order (IFVO)
Facts: A police family violence order was made against the applicant, which prohibited him from threatening, assaulting or approaching his wife. The order was made on the basis that the police officer was satisfied that family violence was likely to be committed. The applicant and his wife had separated. An argument occurred about the contents of their house but the applicant claimed he was not aggressive and did not threaten or abuse the complainant or threaten to harm himself. He claimed that when he was wheeling a motorbike out of the house, she stepped in front of it to prevent him from taking it and the bike struck her legs which caused her to fall. The complainant claimed that when the applicant attended her home to collect belongings, he was volatile and aggressive and threatened to shoot himself with guns kept on their property. She did not specify what words amounted to these threats or abuse. She claimed he pushed the motorbike against her.
Issue: Whether the order should be revoked.
Decisions and Reasoning: The order was revoked.
A police family violence order cannot be issued only on the basis that the officer believes family violence has been committed. Rather, the officer must be satisfied that a family violence offence has been or is likely to be committed. This is because the definition of family violence includes acts that may not amount to a family violence offence within the meaning of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas).
The protected person’s evidence was not corroborated. Family breakdowns can be traumatic so each party tends to perceive events influenced by their own interests. The only way an order could be made would be by proving that the applicant engaged in threats, intimidation, verbal abuse or a course of conduct that amounted to emotional abuse and intimidation. Alternatively, an order could have been made if an assault by pushing the motorbike was proven. Such conduct was not proven: ‘It is difficult to characterise or define what words may amount to threats, intimidation or abuse. The same words may in some circumstances amount to a threat or abuse when in other circumstances they may not. Much depends on the background and the context. In some circumstances even the most seemingly innocent words may be highly intimidatory. The court should consider whether one of the parties is in a position of disadvantage, either physically, emotionally, intellectually, socially or economically’ ([29]). The applicant was more credible as a witness than the complainant and the complainant would not be in a position of disadvantage in an exchange with her husband. She demonstrated throughout the course of the hearing that she was capable of protecting her own interests and it was unlikely that she would have felt threatened, coerced or intimidated. She also likely prevailed in the arguments about property and she likely overstated her evidence to paint the applicant in the worst light.
Buxton v Brinckman [2011] TASMC (21 July 2011) – Tasmanian Magistrates’ Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail – interim family violence order’ – ‘Breach of temporary protection order’ – ‘Inconsistency’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charge: Breach of interim family violence order
Proceeding: Reasons for decision
Facts: An interim family violence order (IFVO) was made against the defendant that prohibited him from entering the premises of the protected persons. The defendant was living with his parents. The agreed facts established that one of the protected persons started living at his parents’ address as well. In breach of the order, the defendant continued to live in his parents’ house. However, at the relevant time the defendant was on bail. One of the conditions of the bail order was that he was to reside at his parents’ house.
The magistrate found that the elements of the offence were proven. The defendant submitted that given that he was obliged to reside at his parents’ house by the bail conditions, this relieved him of criminal responsibility for the breach of the IFVO. That is, because the failure to live at his parents’ premises would amount to a breach of bail, this should excuse the breach of the IFVO.
Issue: Whether the defendant was guilty of the offence charged.
Decision and Reasoning: While there may be some circumstances where a person might claim a defence of breaching a statutory obligation on the basis that some other law compels the breach, this was not the situation in this case. Section 6 of the Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) (the Act) provides that the Act prevails to the extent of any inconsistency with another act. The Court acknowledged that the defendant’s parents made it impossible for him to comply with the bail condition without breaching the IFVO. However, the defendant could have applied for a variation of bail. In the interim period before bringing that matter before the court, the breach of bail may have been excused on the grounds of ‘reasonable cause’. As such, he was not relieved of criminal responsibility for breaching the IFVO.
Victoria
Court of Appeal
Qayyum v The King [2025] VSCA 14 (20 February 2025) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘attempting to pervert the course of justice’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Charge: Attempt to pervert the course of justice (committed in a family violence context) (x1).
Facts: The applicant, Jawad Qayyum, pleaded guilty to attempting to pervert the course of justice and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year.
The subject offending arose in the context of a series of family violence charges brought against the applicant by his wife, HB. While on remand for those charges in February 2021, Qayyum made multiple monitored telephone calls from Ravenhall Detention Centre to his brother Bilal. In these calls, the applicant instructed Bilal to pressure FM, a close friend of HB, to provide a false statement to police regarding the applicant’s relationship with his wife and her mental state. The applicant specifically directed Bilal to tell FM not to mention any “arguments” between himself and HB and to avoid any reference to beatings or her observations of physical violence. Over a three-week period in February 2021, Bilal, in accordance with these instructions, contacted FM by phone and text message, urging her to provide a statement favourable to the applicant. FM ultimately made a statement to police in March 2021, in which she described both her knowledge of the relationship between the applicant and HB, including regular arguments and repeated violence and Bilal’s attempts to pressure her into altering her account.
The applicant’s conduct was part of a broader pattern of family violence and manipulative behaviour. In April 2016, the applicant had previously been charged with recklessly causing injury and unlawful assault of HB, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 12-month good behaviour undertaking and fined $1,000. In August 2020, HB reported to police that the applicant had assaulted their daughter Z, resulting in a family violence safety notice and a Family Violence Intervention Order naming both HB and Z as protected persons. HB subsequently suffered a mental health episode and was diagnosed with PTSD, disclosing to treating doctors a longstanding history of weekly physical beatings, mental abuse, threats of violence and coercion by the applicant, including efforts to create a false record of her mental illness. Between September and November 2020, the applicant repeatedly contravened the terms of the intervention order by covertly attempting to influence Z during supervised contact, whispering instructions to her about what to say to authorities and asking her about her disclosures to child protection. He was ultimately arrested and charged with further offences including assault, intentionally causing injury, persistent contravention of the intervention order and committing an indictable offence whilst on bail. After his bail was revoked, he was remanded in custody pending trial. During this remand period, the applicant made the monitored phone calls that formed the basis for the present offence.
On 19 May 2021, the applicant pleaded guilty to the family violence offences and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and a 12-month Community Correction Order, including requirements to participate in behaviour change and anger management programs. Upon his release from prison in August 2021, the applicant was immediately placed in immigration detention and was released in December 2021. In March 2022, he was charged with the present offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice, to which he ultimately pleaded guilty after his trial had commenced and the jury was discharged.
Grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: the judge amended the factual basis of the plea beyond the terms of the plea indictment and the prosecution opening (procedural fairness).
Ground 2: the sentencing judge overstated the objective gravity of the applicant’s offending (objective gravity).
Decision: The Court of Appeal (Emerton P and J Forrest AJA) refused leave to appeal the sentence on both grounds.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: The applicant argued that the judge sentenced him on an aggravated factual basis, specifically FM’s observations of marks consistent with violence and the applicant’s admissions to FM about beatings, when these matters were not referred to in the indictment or prosecution opening [69-70]. He claimed that he was not notified that he would be sentenced on this basis and that this amounted to a denial of procedural fairness [72].
The Court rejected this submission. Referring to R v Lowe [72], the Court explained there is no rigid rule requiring a sentencing judge to confine themselves strictly to the facts in the indictment or prosecution opening [74]. Instead, the test is whether, in all the circumstances, fairness dictates that disclosure of any additional material be made before sentencing. The authorities emphasise the importance of context in determining whether a judge may rely on certain material [76]. For example, as noted in R v Healey and R v Mielicki, procedural fairness may require the judge to alert counsel if they intend to rely on disputed or aggravating facts not previously disclosed [76]. Further, as set out in R v Formosa [77], the Crown opening and depositions typically provide the factual basis for sentence, and any additional matters must be raised by the parties and proved by admissible evidence. Critically, a sentencing judge cannot take adverse facts into account unless they are established beyond reasonable doubt [77].
In this case, FM’s statement (part of the depositions) clearly included both the applicant’s admissions and FM’s observations of violence [80], and the amended prosecution opening expressly referred to the applicant instructing Bilal that FM should not mention beatings [81]. The applicant and his counsel were provided with all relevant materials, including FM’s statement and the call transcripts and could have been under no illusion as to the scope of the case. The exchange during the plea hearing further confirmed that both “arguments” and “beatings” were at issue, and no objection was raised at the time [82]. The Court was satisfied that the applicant and his counsel must have been aware that sentencing would proceed on the basis of FM’s evidence about violence [83–86]. There was, accordingly, no denial of procedural fairness [87]. This ground failed [88].
Grounds 2: The applicant submitted that whilst the judge did not explicitly state the level of objective gravity of the applicant’s offending, her reasons nevertheless enabled a conclusion that she regarded the objective gravity of the offending as ‘relatively high’ [89].
He contended that the absence of threats or direct violence and the fact that the conduct was directed at a witness (FM) rather than the victim herself, placed the offending towards the lower end [90]. The applicant relied on various authorities involving attempts to pervert the course of justice in family violence contexts, arguing such cases are more serious when the pressure is exerted on the primary victim, not a witness [91].
The Court accepted that the judge did not make an explicit finding as to the level of seriousness but found that her Honour’s reasons overall conveyed the impression that the offending was treated as serious [93-94]. However, the Court rejected the submission that the absence of threats or the fact that FM was a witness diminished the seriousness [95]. The Court held that the judge was entitled to regard the offending as grave, having regard to a range of relevant factors, including the inherent seriousness of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the family violence context, the attempt to undermine HB and Z’s protection under the law, the emotional pressure and fear imposed on FM and the calculated, persistent and manipulative nature of the conduct [95].
The Court reiterated established authority that an attempt to pervert the course of justice in a family violence context is “always a grave matter” [96]. None of the authorities relied on by the applicant supported a lower assessment of gravity [97]. The absence of threats of physical violence or the fact the conduct was directed towards a close personal friend of the victim and not the victim herself, does not ameliorate the objective seriousness of the conduct; sentencing must be based on what actually occurred, not what might have aggravated the offending further [98-99]. Even though the conduct was not directed at the primary victim, the effect on FM and the indirect retraumatisation of HB, supported the judge’s approach [100].
The Court concluded there was no error in the judge’s assessment of seriousness. This ground of appeal failed [101].
Fusca v The King [2024] VSCA 297 (3 December 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘systems abuse’ – ‘influencing a witness’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Charge:
Charge 1: intentionally causing injury (x1)
Charge 2: theft (x1)
Charge 3: attempt to pervert the course of justice (x1)
Charge 4: persistent contravention of family violence intervention order (x1)
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in an intimate relationship for approximately four months and lived together at the time of the offending. On the evening of 30 June 2023, the applicant and the complainant were at home with Mr Malloy (the owner of the unit they were living in). After drinking heavily and arguing throughout the evening, the applicant left the unit with the complainant’s phone. The complainant used Mr Malloy’s phone to call a friend for help. When the applicant returned, he checked the call log on Mr Malloy’s phone and believed the complainant had called her ex-partner. He then assaulted the complainant, smacking her face, dragging her back inside by the hair as she tried to escape, throwing her onto a bed, yelling abuse, inserting his fingers into her throat and blocking her airway and hitting her until she lost consciousness. The assault caused significant injuries, including facial bruising, jaw swelling, a lacerated uvula, a dislocated jaw and floating bone requiring surgery.
The next morning, the complainant discovered $400 had been transferred to the applicant using her mobile phone at 3:00 am, described as “rent.” She did not have access to her phone overnight and was not awake at the time. Later that day, she reported the assault to police and was hospitalised. The applicant was arrested on 1 July 2023 and remanded in custody, an interim family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) was made prohibiting contact with the complainant.
Between 14 and 19 July 2023, the applicant called Mr Malloy from prison six times, asking him to alter or withdraw his statement, offering inducements and suggesting what to say. Mr Malloy, fearing harm, reported the calls to police. Between 10 July and 7 August 2023, the applicant also used associates to contact the complainant, breaching the FVIO, with messages expressing affection and intent to return. He admitted arranging at least one of these contacts. The applicant pleaded guilty to all charges in November 2023, before the second committal case conference.
Grounds of appeal:
Ground 1: The sentence and order for cumulation on charge 3 of attempting to pervert the course of justice is manifestly excessive.
Ground 2: The sentence and order for cumulation on charge [2] of theft is manifestly excessive.
Decision: The Court (Walker and T Forrest JJA) refused leave to appeal on both grounds.
Reasoning:
Ground 1: Ground 1 was that the sentence imposed for attempting to pervert the course of justice and the cumulation for that offence, were manifestly excessive [42]. The Court noted the test for manifest excessiveness was stringent and found it was not satisfied [42]. Attempting to pervert the course of justice is objectively serious, carrying a maximum of 25 years, and the judge had correctly referenced R v Oksuz [2015] VSCA 316, where a 6-month sentence was found manifestly inadequate [43]. The judge had also observed that he seriousness of the underlying offence the applicant sought to avoid was relevant, and that sentences of between 2 and 4 years have regularly been imposed for such offending [44]. On appeal, the Court stated that little benefit is to be gained from arguments pointing to the absence of aggravating features. Instead, sentencing judges are required to assess the objective gravity and moral culpability based on what actually occurred and the absence of aggravating factors does not reduce that gravity [45].
The Court rejected the applicant’s submission that the offending lacked aggravating features, accepting that the offending was persistent over a relatively extended period of five days and was calculated, involving repeated attempts to persuade Mr Malloy to alter his statement, including suggestions as to what to say and offering inducements [46-48]. Although the offending may have been unsophisticated, it was nonetheless serious and involved high moral culpability [49]. The judge took into account all mitigating and personal factors, but none was of such significance as to compel the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive [50].
In relation to comparable cases, the Court found the sentence imposed to be consistent with current sentencing practice [51]. The Court also found that the cumulation was not manifestly excessive, as the offending involved separate criminality from the intentionally causing injury charge [54]. The offending had important effects on the administration of justice, and general deterrence required a substantial sentence [55]. The Court concluded that more than a minimal degree of cumulation was warranted and that the cumulation of eight months was within range [56]. Leave to appeal on ground 1 was refused [57].
Grounds 2: The Court considered that the sentence imposed for theft was within the range open to the judge in the circumstances [62]. It was necessary and appropriate to consider the full context of the offending, not just the amount stolen or the method used [62]. The victim was vulnerable, having recently been subjected to a serious assault by the applicant in a context of family violence [62]. The applicant took advantage of her unconscious state to transfer money from her account using her phone. The judge was correct to conclude this was a “not insignificant” example of theft [62]. The applicant also had a relevant prior criminal history for theft and at the time of the offending, was subject to a community correction order for related offences. He was in breach of that order by committing further offences, including those before the Court [63]. The judge was entitled to regard the applicant’s failure to comply with the order as significant for specific deterrence and in assessing rehabilitation prospects [64]. The cumulation of one month was moderate and not outside the range, as the offending involved distinct criminality and warranted a distinct sentence [65]. For these reasons, leave to appeal on ground 2 was refused [66].
Payne v The King [2024] VSCA 273 (20 November 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Admissibility of VARE and special hearing evidence’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Unfair prejudice’ – ‘Substantial miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Prosecution submissions to jury’ – ‘Intellectual disability’ – ‘victims as alleged perpetrators’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence to appeal against conviction.
Charge: Murder x 1.
Facts: The applicant and Noel Payne were married, and were living in their family home with Alice, a woman with an intellectual disability and an acquired brain injury, whom Noel had moved into the home. Both the applicant and Alice were subject to serious and prolonged abuse by Noel. One day, the applicant made biscuits. She crushed temazepam tablets (which had been prescribed to her for insomnia) into the icing of one of the biscuits, which she then gave to Noel. Later that day, Noel fell into unconsciousness. On the applicant’s account, she found Noel slumped at his computer and, unable to detect a pulse, concluded he had died. She wrapped Noel’s body in a blanket and moved him outside into an unused freezer. After asking her neighbour to store the freezer on the neighbour’s property, the neighbour’s son discovered the body.
Grounds of appeal: In respect of the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the applicant relied on two grounds. The first was that the evidence of Alice should not have been admitted at trial, and that its admission had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice. The second was that a substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred because of submissions made during the prosecutor’s closing address. In respect of the application for leave to appeal against sentence, the ground relied upon was that the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The application for leave to appeal against conviction was dismissed; the application for leave to appeal against sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.
In respect of the first ground relied upon in the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the Court observed that the trial judge’s task had been to determine whether Alice’s evidence was relevant. The Court accepted that some evidence could be so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous such that it could not be accepted by a rational jury, and that the trial judge would be expected to withhold such evidence on the basis of irrelevance [53]. Alice’s account of what had happened on the night in question had changed over time. At first, she gave a detailed account of the applicant and deceased’s activities on the night in question, but at a later hearing, she attributed her earlier evidence to guesswork and claimed to have witnessed little of the night [40]. The Court held that it was for the jury to decide whether to accept the truth of the evidence, and the weight to be given to it. The Court further found that Alice had confirmed the truth of her initial VARE evidence at a special hearing, and that her evidence was corroborated by other evidence, meaning that this was not a case where the evidence could not be rationally accepted [55]. The Court ruled the evidence relevant, and therefore admissible.
In respect of the second ground relied upon in the application for leave to appeal against conviction, the Court found for the respondent on all of the seven criticisms of the prosecution case the applicant had made. In brief, the Court’s findings were that:
•
the prosecution had not inappropriately enlarged the Crown case [72];
•
the prosecution was entitled to suggest to the jury reasons for the inconsistencies in Alice’s evidence and propose how they should resolve these [76];
•
the prosecution was entitled to offer their own possible quantification of the dose of temazepam that was consistent with the expert evidence given at trial [83];
•
the prosecution was entitled to say that it was a matter of speculation whether Noel Payne had died as a result of positional asphyxia while sitting at his computer [90];
•
the prosecution did not reverse the onus of proof when the prosecutor said to the jury that the applicant was “asking you to accept” her account [95];
•
the prosecution was entitled to submit on the issue of family violence – while the prosecutor should have refrained from using the language of personal opinion, his submissions did not unfairly diminish the significance of the violence [102]; and
•
the prosecution was within bounds to pose a hypothetical situation of self-defence [106].
In respect of the appeal against sentence, the Court noted that the standard sentence for murder is 25 years. The sentence that had been given in this case was 16 years’ imprisonment (NB non-parole period is not specified). The Court explained that the case was one that called for mercy given the applicant had suffered over 10 years of serious abuse [137]. The Court cautioned, however, that these exceptional circumstances had to be balanced against the need to denounce and deter the deliberate taking of human life [122].
The Court noted that the applicant had pleaded guilty to manslaughter when she was arraigned at the commencement of trial, and that this showed her taking some responsibility for causing the death of the deceased [134]. Ultimately, the Court agreed that the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive, and substituted a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 years [138].
Clayton (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 203 (16 September 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence and escalation’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘use of context evidence
Case type: Appeal of conviction.
Charges: The applicant faced multiple indictments across three trials:
Trial 1: common assault (x3); rape (x1), acquitted.
Trial 2: common assault (x3); rape (x1), guilty of common assault (x2) and rape (x1)
Trial 3: common assault (x3), make threat to kill (x2), intentionally cause injury (x1), alternative charge of recklessly cause injury (x1), applicant was acquitted of the charge of intentionally cause injury but found guilty of the remaining charges.
Further indictment: possession of a drug of dependence (x2) contravening bail conditions (x1) possessing a controlled weapon (x1) and possessing cartridge ammunition (x1), plead guilty to all.
Facts: The applicant, Robert Clayton (a pseudonym), was convicted at two County Court trials of offences arising from alleged acts of physical and sexual violence against his former partner, with whom he had an intimate relationship from late 2017 until November 2019. The complainant lived with the applicant at his mother’s property in regional Victoria for most of their relationship. In October 2019, she provided a statement to police alleging multiple incidents of family violence. She later gave birth to the applicant’s child in 2020.
Before the first trial, the prosecution sought to adduce both tendency and context evidence. The trial judge excluded the tendency evidence but ruled that the context evidence was admissible to explain the nature of the relationship and the complainant’s behaviour. This evidence included four alleged incidents of uncharged violence (the paddock, goose, pokies, and car-purchase occasions) and two sets of injury photographs, the right eye photos and the selfie black left eye photo. The applicant was acquitted of all charges at the first trial.
At the second trial, the complainant gave evidence of a 2018 incident in which the applicant allegedly pushed her into a wall, choked her, restrained her with cable ties, and raped her, causing injury and scarring. The prosecution again relied on the previously admitted context evidence. The complainant described the relationship as violent and controlling. The defence denied all allegations, asserting that any injuries were the result of consensual rough sex or drug use, and argued the complainant had fabricated the claims to obtain crisis accommodation.
At the third trial, the prosecution alleged that, in September 2019, following a dispute over missing money, the applicant punched the complainant, poured alcohol on her, trashed the room, threatened to kill her, stomped on her neck, and used a sharp object to cut her knee. Again, the prosecution relied on the same contextual material. The complainant reiterated that she remained in the relationship due to fear, dependence and emotional isolation. The defence contended that the relationship was not violent and highlighted inconsistencies in the complainant’s account and conduct.
On appeal, the applicant challenged the admission and use of context evidence at the second and third trials. He submitted that the complainant’s evidence went beyond the limits of the trial judge’s ruling and was unfairly prejudicial, particularly because the photographs were not linked to specific events. He further argued that the prosecution’s closing address improperly used the context material to suggest that uncharged acts corroborated the complainant’s credibility in relation to the charged offences.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his convictions sustained at the second and third trials.
1.
Excessive detail in context evidence: the trial judge erred by allowing the prosecution to lead context evidence in excessive detail, resulting in a miscarriage of justice across the course of the three trials.
2.
Improper use of context evidence to bolster credibility: the trial judge erred by allowing evidence admitted for context purposes to bolster the credibility of the complainant in the third trial.
Decision: The Court of Appeal (Boyce, Orr and T Forrest JJA) dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the applicant’s convictions of the second and third trials.
Reasoning:
Ground 1 (Excessive Detail in Context Evidence):
The applicant did not dispute the admissibility of the context evidence but argued that the detail with which it was presented made the trial unfair. This argument was rejected [130].
The Court found that the failure to seek edits to the complainant’s pre-recorded evidence was not due to any tacit approval from the judge but was instead a forensic decision made by defence counsel [130]. Given the acquittals at the first trial and the inconsistencies revealed within the context evidence, the defence appeared to have made a deliberate and reasonable strategic choice to attack the complainant’s credibility on the basis of her detailed testimony [131].
The Court emphasised the significance of the context evidence in providing a rational explanation for the complainant’s otherwise counter-intuitive behaviour, such as remaining in the relationship, expressing affection, and seeking to vary the intervention order [134]. Her claim that she had been “Stockholm’d” by the applicant required a proper evidential foundation. The prosecution largely succeeded in keeping the evidence appropriately confined, and further narrowing it would have risked making the explanation seem artificial or glib [134].
As for the photographic evidence, the right eye photos and the selfie black left eye photo, although the defence consistently sought exclusion, the Court accepted that it had legitimate forensic value, particularly in light of the complainant’s cross-examination [136]-[137]. The photos did not materially increase the level of detail but instead supported the existing narrative. Any marginal increase in detail was not sufficient to justify exclusion [138]. Finally, the Court emphasised the significance of the trial judge’s directions, which instructed the jury that the context evidence, including the photos, could only be used to assess the nature of the relationship and the complainant’s credibility, and not as proof of the charged offences. These directions substantially mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice [140].
Ground 2 (Improper use of context evidence to bolster credibility):
The applicant contended that the prosecutor’s closing addresses at the second and third trials engaged in an impermissible form of ‘bootstraps’ reasoning, that is, inviting the jury to accept the complainant’s account of the charged offences because her uncharged context evidence was corroborated [142]. While the written submissions focused on the third trial and oral argument emphasised the second, the Court assumed the same issue was raised in both [143].
The Court rejected this ground. It held that context evidence, if accepted, may legitimately enhance a complainant’s credibility. On reviewing the prosecutor’s closing addresses in full, the Court found that the submissions did not overstep. The prosecutor did not suggest that the complainant’s evidence of the charged offences should be accepted merely because her context evidence was independently supported [144]-[145]. Rather, the addresses pointed to points of support for both kinds of evidence, consistent with the structure of the trial and the judge’s directions.
The trial judge gave careful and repeated directions at both trials, instructing the jury that only independent evidence directly referable to the charged acts, such as the photograph of the scar in the second trial, could be used to support the complainant’s account of those acts [146]–[147]. Other supporting material, including photos or witness observations relating only to past uncharged conduct, could not be used to support proof of the charged offences. The judge expressly warned the jury against reasoning that truthfulness in context meant truthfulness in relation to the charges. As he stated in the third trial, “It is not a matter of saying look, she told the truth about that [context], therefore we accept her evidence about this [charged event].” [148].
The Court concluded that the prosecutor’s submissions stayed within legitimate bounds, the Judge’s directions were clear and comprehensive, and there was no real risk of jury confusion or misuse of the context evidence in the manner alleged [149]-[150].
Sturt (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 102 (20 May 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Separation ’ – ‘Evidence ’ – ‘Admission’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Jury directions’
Charges: Rape x 2; sexual assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male appellant was found guilty and sentenced to 8 years and 4 months’ imprisonment for the offences of rape and sexual assault. The complainant was the appellant’s wife.
At trial, the prosecution led evidence from the complainant that, following the second incident of rape, the appellant stated, “I shouldn’t have done that”. [5] Neither party made any request pursuant to the Jury Directions Act 2015 for a jury direction concerning the relevance or use of this statement.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant proposed five grounds of appeal, the second of which concerned the prosecution’s use of the appellant’s statement:
•
The learned Judge erred in failing to direct the jury not to engage in impermissible reasoning relating to the statement “I shouldn’t have done that” resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The Court (Macauley, Kaye and T Forrest JJA) held that it was mandatory for the trial judge to give the jury the direction required under s 21 of the Jury Directions Act 2015, irrespective of whether either party requested or failed to request it. [33] This is because the statement was ‘capable of being construed as an implied admission’, the prosecution sought to use the evidence to establish that the appellant ‘had no reasonable belief in the complainant’s consent’, and the jury’s acceptance of the admission on one occasion had the capacity to influence the jury’s view about the appellant’s belief about consent in all instances [30]–[32].
The omission of a jury direction was material: ‘Evidence as to the state of mind of the appellant was, apart from the impugned statement, entirely a matter of inference from the circumstances of and surrounding the events, in the context of the nature of the relationship between the parties’ [35]
Accordingly, the judge’s failure to direct the jury ‘deprived the appellant of a most significant mandatory safeguard in the context of the trial’ [37]
Dragovic v The King [2024] VSCA 95 (16 May 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Attempt to pervert court of justice ’ – ‘Damaging property ’ – ‘threats’
Charges: criminal damage x 1; common assault x 6; persistent contravention of protection order x 1; attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On 28 November 2023, the male applicant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to all charged offences. The primary complainant was the applicant’s ‘on and off’ again intimate female partner. The applicant physically assaulted the complainant on several occasions (e.g., punching, kicking, and throwing her on multiple occasions).
The applicant was arrested and remanded in custody. The complainant sought a protection order against the applicant, prohibiting the applicant from contacting her. Two months later, the complainant sought to withdraw her complaint of assault(s) against the applicant, stating that the applicant had contacted her from prison and threatening her to ‘get rid’ of the case. [10]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on a single proposed ground:
•
The sentencing Judge erred in imposing a sentence in respect of charges 2–7 (common assault) and making orders for cumulation in respect of the remaining offences, that was manifestly excessive having regard to all relevant circumstances.[3]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (Kennedy and T Forrest JJA) held the aggregated sentence of 16 months’ for the common assault charges was not manifestly excessive. The Court emphasised the inherent difficulty in establishing tis particular ground, and the aggravating fact of the assaults being committed against the applicant’s partner.
Any ground of manifest excess is difficult to establish. An applicant must demonstrate that the sentence or sentences imposed are ‘wholly outside the range of sentencing options available’ in the reasonable exercise of sentencing discretion [29]
[T]he applicant involved himself in serious violence against his intimate partner. Violence towards an intimate partner can never be justified but in this case, there seems little if any reason for this sustained course of violence. The applicant’s apparent grievance seems to be that the complainant, having cared for him during his illness, called an ambulance against his wishes. She then had the temerity to leave his presence for a few hours [31]
Those (mostly) men who elect to engage in violent activity within the home can expect little sympathy from sentencing courts [33]
Gardner (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 83 (30 April 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People with disability and impairment ’
Charges: false imprisonment x 1; rape x 4.
Proceedings: Application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the male applicant was found guilty of one count of false imprisonment and four counts of rape. The victim was the male applicant’s long-term female partner of 18 years (although the par separated for a period of three years). [2]; [8] The offences occurred in one instance. The prosecution case was that the applicant restrained the complainant to the bed and penetrated her four times, all without consent. [2]
The primary evidence was given by the complainant, who was opined by a clinical neuropsychologist to have a tendency to ‘exaggerate and embellish’: a tendency exacerbated by the removal of a large tumour from the complainant’s brain in 2001. [4]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on two grounds:
•
The guilty verdicts were unreasonable or could not be supported by the available evidence; and
•
The guilty verdict pertaining to the charge of penile penetration was unreasonable, as the complainant’s evidence indicated uncertainty as to whether the applicant had in fact penetrated her anus [6]
Decision and Reasoning: Application dismissed. The Court (Emerton P, McLeish and Macaulay JA) held the complainant to be an ‘unreliable witness’ in many respects. [75]
The complainant was clearly ‘prone to embellishment’ and gave ‘conflicting evidence’ on the nature and extent of digital penetrations, such that an unreliable evidence direction under s 32 of the Jury Directions Act was appropriate. [76]
Despite these matters, the jury accepted the complainant’s evidence as ‘credible and reliable’. [79] Accordingly, the question is ‘whether the jury ought, acting rationally, to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of the applicant’s guilt, whether by reason of inconsistencies, discrepancies or other inadequacy[ies] in the complainant’s evidence’. [85]
The evidence of the clinical neuropsychologist might have suggested that the jury ought rationally to have doubted the applicant’s guilt. However, the Court did not accept that the jury have must have done so. [93] The jury did not have to accept the applicant’s account of consensual activity. Further, the evidence of the complainant was corroborated by medical evidence, concerning the nature of her injuries. [94]
Russo (a pseudonym) v The King [2024] VSCA 40 (22 March 2024) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Threat to kill ’ – ‘ Economic and financial abuse ’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence ’ – ‘ separation ’ – ‘ threats’
Charges: common assault x 9; causing injury intentionally x 3; conduct endangering persons x 1; threat to kill x 2; persistent contravention of protection order x 3.
Proceedings: Application to leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty in the County Court to several offences committed against his former wife. [1] The applicant was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Over the course of their relationship (2012–2017), the applicant was physically violent to the complainant, and her son from a previous relationship. [5]–[6]
This violence persisted after the complainant sought a protection order against the complainant in 2014. The applicant assaulted the complainant after she communicated her decision to terminate the relationship and her pregnancy due to the ‘violent nature of the relationship’ and choked her on another occasion when she re-attempted to end the relationship. [7]–[8]. Further, while serving time in prison, the applicant contacted the complainant 281 times, with 100 calls involving ‘economic, electronic, financial and psychological and emotional abuse’. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against on three grounds:
•
The sentencing judge erred in their approach to the issue of totality by failing to impose appropriate individual sentences;
•
The learned sentencing judge erred in failing to recognise that the applicant’s guilty plea was worthy of additional credit; and
•
The individual charges, total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
With respect to ground one, the Court (Niall and Boyce JJA) recognised a ‘broad brush’ approach by the sentencing judge in not drawing any ‘fine distinctions … to the imposition of individual sentences on each of the respective charges of common assault, intentionally causing injury and threat to kill’. [35]
Leaving aside whether distinctions in ‘months’ or ‘years’ were in fact made between the separate charges of intentionally causing injury, on the one hand, and the instances of make threat to kill on the other, in circumstances where there were only two instances each of these particular charges, it is difficult to conclude that the circumstances of those charges alone permitted … utilisation of the so-called broad-brush approach [41]
Accordingly, the Court held that a broad-brush approach was inappropriate in this case, with the applicant entitled to have ‘the sentencing discretion brought to bear properly upon each individual charge in the conventional manner’. [45]
With respect to ground two, the Court noted the applicant’s plea was late, indicated on the first morning of the trial after the Crown withdrew a charge of rape. [54] In this capacity, the plea had ‘all the hallmarks of a pragmatic decision taken by the applicant upon the Crown’s decision to withdraw’. [64] Accordingly, the Court dismissed ground two.
Lastly, with respect to ground three, the Court held that there was ‘no reasonable prospect’ that this Court would impose a lesser total effective sentence. [71] This view is informed by the fact that the case concerns family violence. [70]
Dhal v The King [2023] VSCA 289 (29 November 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Manifesttly excessive’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury ’ – ‘ Recklessly cause serious injury ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ Jealousy ’ – ‘ History of domestic and family violence ’ – ‘ separation’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; recklessly causing injury x 1; commit indictable offence whilst on bail x 1; possess a controlled weapon without lawful excuse x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to several offences perpetrated against his former female partner (‘Ms Malith’) and friend. In the days following the end of the relationship, the applicant assaulted Ms Malith and a friend in the gaming room of a hotel, swiping and stabbing both with a knife ([13]–[19]). The applicant received a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that the offending was premeditated;
2.
The sentencing judge afforded insufficient weight to the applicant’s ‘deprived’ childhood; and
3.
The sentences imposed on the charges of intentionally causing serious injury, recklessly causing serious injury and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive [3]
Decision and Reasoning: The Court (Osborn and Whelan JJA) denied the applicant leave to appeal.
First, the Court upheld the trial judge’s assessment of the CCTV footage as making clear the applicant’s determination ‘to attack Ms Malith with knife as he entered the gaming room’ [43].
Second, the Court affirmed the trial judge’s application of the Bugmy principles. Childhood deprivation may reduce moral culpability, but it may also ‘bear upon the weight of other sentencing principles’, including the need for community protection [56]:
[T]his is a case where consideration of the applicant’s deprived background, and the effects of that background on his psychological make-up, particularly insofar as current and former intimate partners are concerned, significantly increases the need for community protection [58]
Lastly, the Court observed the original sentence as appropriate in light of the applicant’s limited prospects of rehabilitation, heightened risk of reoffending and history of violence towards intimate partners:
The evidence reveals he represents a significant risk of violence to intimate partners and former partners in the future. The applicant’s criminal history is more concerning than that in either Packard or Lukudu, particularly in relation to intimate partners and former partners, and he has repeatedly disobeyed intervention orders [66]
The fact that the victim was the former partner of the applicant, and the fact that the applicant has prior convictions for assaults on a partner or former partner, were significant. As this Court said in Smith v The Queen, male violence against women is a ‘scourge of our society’, and those who engage in it ‘should be in no doubt that offending of this kind will attract very heavy sentences’ [67]
The offending in this case visited horrific injuries on a 21-year-old former partner. The applicant was motivated by jealousy and revenge. He used a boning knife. As a result of his work as a butcher, he was familiar with the effect of the use of such a knife [68]
Harlen (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 269 (09 November 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal ’ – ‘ Rape’ – ‘Rendency evidence’ – ‘Stalking ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ control ’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the County Court concerning the admissibility of tendency evidence.
Facts: The applicant was charged with several offences, including stalking and rape, arising from ‘the breakdown’ of his relationship with the complainant ([9]–[19]). At pre-trial, the judge allowed the prosecution’s application to adduce tendency evidence to demonstrate the applicant’s willingness to engage in — or to actually engage in — verbal violence and physical violence towards the complainant (and another previous intimate partner) as a ‘means of control’ over them ([2]; [12]–[17]).
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant’s appeal was advanced on the ground that the judge erred in ruling the tendency evidence as disclosed in the ‘Tendency Notice’ was admissible [40]. In particular:
1.
The evidence did support the alleged tendency that the applicant’s alleged conduct was engaged in as ‘a means of control’ ([44]–[45])
2.
The evidence concerning a previous intimate partner was ‘irrelevant’ to the present proceedings ([43]); and
3.
The evidence was ‘not significantly probative’, and if it were, it did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect ([46]–[49])
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (McLeish, Niall and Kennedy JJA) emphasised that a consideration of the admissibility of tendency evidence (as governed by the principles of House v The King) is “fact specific” [69].
The conduct the subject of each charge involves verbal or physical violence undertaken in an effort to control Ms Abbott at the end of her relationship with the applicant during October 2020. We do not consider the concept of “control” lacks substance in this context where ethe conduct evinced a tendency to become threatening or violent so as to regain control during a relationship breakdown.
The evidence was not just relevant … but had a significant value in making more likely the facts making up the other charged offences [73]
The applicant’s tendency to engage in verbal and physical violence as to exercise control (in the non-rape charges) was clearly relevant to whether he might have also sought to manifest physical control, as alleged by the rape charges. His willingness to engage in such verbal and physical violence in the past was also highly relevant to whether he reasonably believed there was consent on the part of Ms Abbott [74]
The Court also upheld the trial judge’s admission of the evidence concerning the former intimate partner:
Although it is not a condition of admission that the tendency evidence have similarities with the conduct in issue, similarities can still have significance provided they are addressed in the manner Hughes requires. In this case, those similarities include that: both women were in an intimate relationship with the applicant which was breaking down; the applicant used aggressive behaviour in an effort to control each women; and threats were made to each woman and/or her family [79]
Headland v The King [2023] VSCA 269 (03 October 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Interlocutory Appeal ’ – ‘ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Admissions ’ – ‘ Victims as (alleged) perpetrators ’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal interlocutory decision.
Facts: The Applicant was allegedly complicit in an aggravated burglary committed by her former partner and his accomplice ([6]–[7]). In her record of interview with police, the applicant admitted that she drove her partner (and his accomplice) to the victim’s home and did not protest her involvement in the plan ‘because she still loved’ her former partner [14].
Prior to the empanelment of a jury, the applicant sought the exclusion of admissions contained in the record of interview [2]. The applicant submitted that the truth of any admission made was ‘adversely affected’ by her illicit substance abuse and intoxication in the lead up to, and at the time of, the interview, her cognitive disfunction, Aboriginality and experience of domestic violence [24]. The judge refused this application.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant appeals the decision via one ground:
1.
When exercising discretion under sections 85 and 90 of the Evidence Act, the judge failed to take into account the applicant’s status as an ‘Aboriginal woman who has been a victim of domestic abuse’ ([4]; [29]–[30])
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. The Court (Emerton P, Priest and Kennedy JJA) affirmed the trial judge’s conclusion that the truth of the admissions was not adversely affected by the circumstances in which the admissions were made [57].
In our opinion, there was nothing in the evidence in this case which would have justified a finding that the applicant was at a disadvantage or was vulnerable by reason of a lack of comprehension of English or for cultural reasons. English was her primary language, and there was nothing in the evidence which might have founded an inference that the applicant might have answered questions “in the way in which they think the questioner wants” [63]
Indeed, having viewed the record of interview ourselves, it is far from obvious to us that the applicant’s cognition is impaired, whether through alcohol consumption, drug use or fatigue (or a combination of factors)’ [71]
Skeates (A Pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 226 (19 September 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence ’ – ‘ Threats’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Beach of protection order ’ – ‘ History of family violence offending ’ – ‘ Manifest excess ’ – ‘ Gravity of offending ’ – ‘ Miscarriage ’ – ‘ Coercive control ’
Charges: Common assault x 5; intentionally cause injury x 5; recklessly cause injury x 1; threat to inflict serious injury x 1; rape x 1; persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to 15 charges across two indictments. The charges concerned threats, various assault offences, rape and breaches of family violence intervention orders committed against four previous intimate partners between July 2016 and September 2019 ([8]–[41]). The applicant received a total effective sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years.
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on the ground that the individual sentences imposed on the charges, and the orders for cumulation between charges and indictments, were manifestly excessive [3].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal dismissed. The Court (Emerton P, Niall and Taylor JJA) rejected the applicant’s submission that the gravity of his offending ought to be understood by separately measuring the ‘relatively limited physical consequences’ of his assaults [77].
It is incorrect to deconstruct the whole in an attempt to divorce each individual offence from its context. While the degree of physical injury sustained in each assault is relevant, the applicant’s offending must be understood in the context of his persistent perpetration of family violence. His behaviour towards each of the victims was degrading. He exhibited an alarming attitude of ownership and control. He created domestic environments in which there was an ongoing latent threat of physical violence if he was displeased. He was prepared to engage in physical and verbal violence in front of his children. He minimised the harm he caused to his partners. The learned sentencing judge’s characterisation of him as a “serial woman basher” and “a classic example of a perpetrator” was apt [77]
In doing so, the Court affirmed the sentencing judge’s emphasis on general and specific deterrence, along with community protection, ‘as being of primary significance’ in the sentencing determination:
The sentence imposed needed to carry heavy opprobrium of the applicant’s conduct, to both punish him adequately for it and deter him from such conduct in the future, as well as to signal to other family violence perpetrators that such behaviour will not be lightly regarded. Community protection is also a very important consideration, given the applicant’s apparent inability to learn — despite the intervention of the justice system on a number of occasions — that violent, controlling behaviour towards domestic partners will not be tolerated by the community [79]
The Court has “made it clear that acts of violence in a domestic setting, and in particular by men towards women, are utterly abhorrent and unacceptable”. The strength of the language used in these statements is not accidental. Family violence is contemptible. It warrants both condemnation and appropriate punishment. [59]
The Court also specified that the gravity of family violence offending is aggravated if ‘it breaches an extant FVIO [ie, prevention order] or is committed in front of children’ [59]. Further, the Court emphasised the multifarious nature of family violence, as constituting more than physical injury:
[T]he seriousness of family violence and the harm it inflicts is not to be simply equated with physical injury. Family violence is now understood — and defined in law — to encompass behaviour that is physically, sexually, emotionally, psychologically and economically abusive or threatening or coercive, even if such behaviour does not constitute a criminal offence. That kind of behaviour produces situations where people disproportionately women, live in “real and justified fear of men who are, or were, their intimate partners”. It produces a domestic atmosphere steeped in dread. It robs victims of capacity and agency and also engenders shame. [61]
DPP v Cormick [2023] VSCA 186 (15 August 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal on a question of law ’ – ‘ Beach of protection order ’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘ Protection order ’ – ‘ Mens rea ’
Charges: Persistent contravention of family violence intervention order x 1; contravention of a family violence intervention order x 4.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal on a question of Law.
Facts: The male respondent was subject to an interim protection order on 12 May 2021. The protected person was the respondent’s female former partner, with whom he shared a daughter. On 2 September 2021, the respondent was charged with several contraventions of the order. The alleged contraventions involved committing family violence against the protected person in the form of telephone calls and text messages which amounted to emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviour.
A Magistrate rejected the prosecution’s argument that the contraventions were strict liability offences and determined that the prosecution had been unable to prove the respondent’s intention to breach the order. The DPP unsuccessfully appealed the Magistrate’s decision.
Grounds of Appeal: An appeal was brought by the DPP on the following question of law:
1.
What is the correct relationship between the physical element and the fault element under section 123 of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (‘the Act’), and in particular, what is the correct relationship where the form of ‘family violence’ is the type described in section 5(1)(a)(ii) and section 7 of the Act?
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted and appeal dismissed.
The majority accepted the DPP’s submission that the language of sections 5 and 7 of the Act separate the act (of family violence) from its consequences [70]. Accordingly, behaviour is abusive ‘because of its effect’ and not because it is intended to be so [70].
The majority (Emerton P and Osborn JA) held that there was nothing in the text of the relevant provisions, construed in the context of the Act as a whole and having regard to its purpose to support the implication of a specific intent to section 123. [77]
As a matter of fact, emotional or psychological abuse can occur without the perpetrator intending to intimidate, harass or offend. [82]
The Act seeks to address a pervasive social problem, the victims of which are vulnerable people caught in dysfunctional domestic arrangements. It therefore seeks to capture forms of abuse that, while subtle, are nonetheless pernicious. Tearing the buds off a rose bush at the family home might be regarded a trivial, but in the context of a family relationship that has broken down and a pronounced power imbalance (which might be based on physical strength or financial control or both), that act might well be perceived as menacing or “offensive”. It is notorious that those who are alleged to have committed family violence offer other reasons for their conduct. In many cases, it will be difficult to ascribe a particular or specific intention to an act which results in emotional or psychological abuse. [96]
The majority granted leave to appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal for two reasons:
1.
The prosecution should not be permitted to ‘rerun’ its case before the magistrate on a different basis from that which it contended at first instance (ie, that section 123(2) is a strict liability offence) [101]; and
2.
The order served on the respondent did not explain the extent of the order with respect to emotional and psychological abuse nor that it prohibited the ‘giving of offence whether intentionally or unintentionally’ [102] Justice Forrest agreed with the conclusions of the majority but favoured a construction of section 123(2) that incorporated an element of specific intent. His Honour considered the majority’s preferred construction to encourage ‘criminal prosecution for actions that by any sensible measure are harmless or benign’. [112]
Perry v King [2023] VSCA 218 (12 September 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence ’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive ’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm ’ – ‘ Attempted rape ’ – ‘ Common assault ’
Charges: Attempted rape x 1; common assault x 2; sexual assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Facts: The male applicant received a sentence of 3 years and 9 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years, after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against his former female partner. The conduct constituting the charges included forcibly attempting vaginal penetration, punching the complainant in the face, non-consensually touching the complainant’s breasts and biting her arm ([6]–[9]).
Grounds of Appeal: The applicant sought leave to appeal the sentence on the ground that the sentences imposed, the orders for cumulation, the non-parole period and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive [18].
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted. The Court (Beach and Walker JJA) held that the sentences imposed on the charges concerning common assault and sexual assault were manifestly excessive.
The punch to the face, though ‘violent’, was outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge, bearing in mind the applicant’s ‘good prospects of rehabilitation, and his relative youthfulness’ [35]. Similarly, the act of touching the complainant’s breast was without force and concluded when the complainant articulated her lack of consent [37]. In this capacity, the applicant’s conduct was ‘at the low end of the spectrum’ of sexual assault offending [37]. Further, the act of biting the complainant’s arm was observed to be ‘minor in nature’ [38].
The Court, however, upheld the original sentence imposed on the offence of attempted rape:
The offence of attempted rape is an objectively serious offence … Sexual violence within an intimate partner relationship is a particularly insidious and degrading form of domestic violence. Denunciation of such behaviour plays an important role in sentencing for this offending. In that regard, we agree with the trial judge’s remarks to the effect that the sentence imposed for such offending must send a signal that all sexual exchanges must be consensual [28]
The total effective sentence was re-formulated to be 3 years and 3 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 months [44].
Morey (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 153 (23 June 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Open to jury to convict’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Significant probative value’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Tendency evidence’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Whether convictions were unreasonable and unsupported by evidence’ – ‘Whether probative value of tendency evidence substantially outweighed prejudicial effect’
Charges: Rape x 3; Common assault x 1; Theft of motor vehicle x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.
Facts: Following conviction at trial the male applicant was sentenced to 12 years and 4 months, with a non-parole period of 8 years. The trial judge allowed the prosecution’s pre-trial application to adduce tendency evidence to demonstrate the applicant to engaged in a pattern of threats of violence to compel the complainant’s compliance. The prosecution’s pre-trial tendency notice (s97(1)(a) Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)) noted their intention to rely on the tendency of the applicant to:
•
Act in a particular way, namely:
(a)
To threaten to assault, or cause harm to [the complainant], if she did not comply with his demands.
(b)
To threaten to kill [the complainant], or members of her family, if she did not comply with his demands.
(c)
To assault [the complainant] in order to compel her to comply with his demands. [26]
•
Have a particular state of mind, namely:
(a)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he threatened to assault, or cause harm, to her.
(b)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he threatened to kill her or members of her family.
(c)
A belief that [the complainant] would do as he demanded if he assaulted, or caused harm to her. [27]
It was asserted that the ‘demands’ referred to included that the complainant not report his behaviour to police. [28]
Grounds:
Conviction
(1) The convictions are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence; and (3) the judge erred in ruling the tendency evidence admissible, particularised as follows:
(a)
The judge erred in finding that the tendency evidence showed the applicant acted in a particular way that was significantly probative of the sexual offences on indictment.
(b)
The judge erred in finding that the tendency evidence showed the applicant had a particular state of mind that was significantly probative of the sexual offences on indictment.
(c)
The judge erred in finding that the 2017 threats of dumping the complainant in a shit dam was significantly probative of the offences of rape.
(d)
The judge erred in finding that the 2018 SMS messages of threats made by the applicant in the context of frustration regarding a friend’s marriage breakup were significantly probative of the offences of rape.
(e)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats as not unfairly prejudicial.
(f)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats was not a generalised assertion of general bad character.
(g)
The judge erred in finding the 2017 and 2018 threats was probative of committing the rapes with the requisite intent.
Sentence
1.
The judge erred in characterising of the objective gravity of his offending as ‘serious’;
2.
the judge erred in applying the standard sentencing regime;
3.
the judge erred in finding that offending in 2018 was a relevant sentencing consideration in respect of the rape charges; and
4.
the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Reasoning and decision: Leave to appeal granted, appeal was allowed on conviction ground 2 and the applicant’s conviction and sentences on charges 5 to 8 will be set aside, retrial ordered.
Beach JA, Forrest JA and Kaye JA refused leave to appeal on conviction ground 1.
Conviction ground 1: Nothing in the evidence relied upon by the applicant required the jury to have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the applicant on charges 5, 6, 7 and 8 [24].
Conviction ground 3: The court held the prosecution tendency evidence ‘barely established the asserted tendency’ [47]. The court also identified that charges 5 to 8 did not involve any threat by the applicant [48]. It was held the tendency evidence had no probative value and had a prejudicial effect. It was therefore deemed inadmissible [50].
Sentencing: Due to the court’s decision on conviction ground 2, it was not necessary for the court to consider sentencing grounds 1-3. However, the court held that 18 months was for the theft of the complainant’s vehicle was manifestly excessive [54]. The sentence was reduced to 1 month of imprisonment [55].
Giudice v The King [2023] VSCA 105 (8 May 2023) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Adverse effect of imprisonment on mental health’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences for victims’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Damaging property x 2; Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male offender entered his female former partner’s bedroom and repeatedly punched her in the face, stomach and head before strangling her until she could not breathe [3]-[5]. The offender then went to the victim’s parent’s home and damaged the complainant’s car. The offender pleaded guilty to charges of damaging property, intentionally causing serious injury and contravention of protection orders [10].
The offender had an extensive criminal history, commencing in 2011, including offences of violence against other women he had shared relationships with. The seriousness of offending had escalated, and the offender had persistently breached previous community correction orders.
The offender had suffered significant trauma throughout his life and had a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder [21].
In the County Court, Dean J held that the offender’s borderline personality disorder did not moderate his moral culpability, as he had not taken any steps to address his mental health despite numerous acts of serious violence since 2011 [18]. The offender was sentenced to 8 years, with a non-parole period of 5 years 6 months [10].
Grounds: The sentencing judge failed to give appropriate weight to the adverse effect of an excessive term of imprisonment on the applicant’s mental health, particularly given the offender’s history of self-harming in prison.
Decision and reasoning: Ferguson CJ, Emerton P and Osborn JA refused the application for leave to appeal.
A psychological report stated the offender required ongoing treatment, which he was receiving in prison. The report confirmed that the offender’s mental health was not being exacerbated in prison. The offender was free from stressors, such as alcohol, and was not self-harming [34]-[35].
It was held that Dean J appropriately balanced the requirement to protect the community from the offender per s 6D of the Sentencing Act 1991 and the adverse effects of imprisonment on the applicant’s mental health during sentencing [37].
Rowan (a pseudonym) v The King [2022] VSCA 236 (28 October 2022) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Battered wife syndrome’ – ‘Bestiality’ – ‘Common law duress’ – ‘Continuing or ever-present threats sufficient’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Defence of duress’ – ‘Duress of circumstances’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Incest’ – ‘Indecent act with child under 16’ – ‘Inferred threat’ – ‘People with an intellectual disability’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Specific, overt threat’ – ‘Threat by implication’ – ‘Threat of physical and sexual abuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Note: a Crown special leave application to appeal to the High Court of Australia was granted on 16 June 2023 and the matter has been listed for hearing in October 2023. The Crown argues that the Court of Appeal “committed an error in principle by extending the law of duress as it applies to both common law and by operation of statute, to cover what is known as duress of circumstances”.
Charges: Incest x 11; indecent act with a child under 16 x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The applicant was convicted following trial of 11 counts of incest (s 44(1) and one count of indecent act with a child under 16 (s 47(1)) contrary to the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Her partner, JR, was the father of the two complainant daughters and had previously been convicted of sexual offences against them. At the applicant’s trial it was argued that JR had directed the applicant to commit the offences, and she had complied due to an ever-present threat of physical and sexual violence by JR if she did not do what he demanded of her. It was submitted that this constituted duress. The judge, however, ruled that this did not constitute duress, as duress required there to have been a specific or overt threat, not just an ever-present threat. Consequently, duress was not left to the jury and the applicant was convicted of the offences on the basis that she was present and encouraged the daughters to comply with his abuse.
The applicant and JR’s relationship commenced when the appellant was 18 years old. They lived on a rural property owned by JR’s father and had 4 children. The applicant had a mild intellectual disability and was financially and socially dependent on JR. There was evidence that JR was physically, emotionally and sexually violent to the applicant, he isolated her on the farm, was highly controlling of her movements and had a bad temper. The prosecution accepted that JR’s violence towards the applicant was ‘severe’ [57]. It was reported that the applicant had tried to leave in the past but had returned because she ‘would struggle with the kids’ and that she had not reported the violence to the police because ‘noone would believe her because she was nothing.’ [107] A psychologist gave evidence that the applicant suffered from learned helplessness and low self-esteem characteristic of ‘battered women’s syndrome’, a subset of post-traumatic stress disorder. The applicant’s counsel submitted that ‘JR’s conduct created and maintained a serious, standing threat of significant, ongoing harm, namely, angry subjection to the domineering, violent, rape-embracing regime of life imposed by a brute upon a traumatised, vulnerable person. Under that regime, refusal was said to always have its consequences and this had the effect of overbearing the applicant’s will so that she always submitted to the will of JR.’ [132]
Grounds: The trial judge erred in ruling that the defence of duress was not open on the evidence and thereby caused a substantial miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal granted; appeal against conviction upheld; new trial ordered; unnecessary to consider appeal against sentence.
Kyrou & McLeish JJA:
Their Honours found there was ‘considerable overlap’ in the elements of each form of the defence [188].
They made the following remarks regarding element (i) of common law duress in the context of the case:
[155] We accept that no previous case has expressly accepted the proposition that a continuing or ever present threat — whether overt or tacit — as distinct from a specific, overt threat, is sufficient. However, no case has expressly considered that proposition and rejected it. …. Further, the analysis of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Runjanjic [(1992) 56 SASR 114] is consistent with the proposition that a continuing or ever present threat may be sufficient.
[156] In our opinion, a continuing or ever present threat which is subsisting at the time an accused committed the charged offence can suffice if, in all other respects, the defence of duress can be made out. We cannot think of any reason in principle or policy that requires exclusion of a continuing or ever present threat where, due to the threat, the accused has lost his or her freedom to choose to refrain from committing the charged offence. In this context, it is relevant to note the additional limiting factors identified in element (iii) [common law duress above] which requires that the threat be present and continuing, imminent and impending at the time each offence is committed.
[169] Having regard to the above features of the relationship between JR and the applicant … it would have been open to the jury to conclude that it was reasonably possible that the applicant understood that there was a continuing or ever present threat of physical and sexual violence (including rape) by JR if she did not do what he demanded of her. If the jury reached this conclusion, it would have been open to them to find that it was reasonably possible that, when JR requested the applicant to be involved in each of the sexual offences against the complainants, she understood that, if she did not comply, he would physically and sexually harm her, including by raping her.
[174] We are also of the opinion that it is not fatal in this case that there is no direct evidence that JR told the applicant shortly prior to each offence that, unless she performed the acts that constitute each of the charged offences, he would physically and sexually abuse her. That is because it would be open to the jury to infer that this was a reasonable possibility based upon the history of the relationship between JR and the applicant as set out in the …[evidence].
Their Honours made the following remarks regarding element (ii) of common law duress in the context of the case:
[180] A person of ‘ordinary firmness of mind’ in the present case would be a female domestic partner of JR who was of the applicant’s age and who has lived with JR in the same circumstances as the applicant and has endured the physical and sexual abuse that she has experienced. That person would also have the same isolated lifestyle as the applicant and possess her knowledge of JR’s personality and behaviour. However, that person would not have the applicant’s history of sexual abuse as an adolescent or her mild intellectual disability.
There was evidence that the AR suffered ‘battered woman syndrome’:
[181] In our opinion, upon the basis of the [evidence], it would have been open to the jury to conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that a person of ordinary firmness of mind having the characteristics described… above would have been likely to:
(a)
develop a battered woman syndrome with the consequence of learned helplessness, and yield to JR’s continuing or ever present threat in the way the applicant did; and
(b)
not seek to escape the situation.
Their Honours then briefly considered elements (iv), (v), (vii) and (viii) of Common Law duress in turn but did not consider element (vi) because the accused was not charged with murder, or any other crime excepted from common law duress:
[184] In relation to element (iv), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out based upon JR’s history of punishing her if she sought to disobey him.
[185] In relation to element (v), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant was induced by the continuing or ever present threat to commit the charged offences based upon our previous analysis regarding her will being overborne by that threat.
[186] In relation to element (vii), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant did not, by fault on her part when free from the duress, expose herself to its application. That is because the threat was a continuing or ever present threat and the jury could conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant was not free of the threat at any time during the period of the offending.
[187] In relation to element (viii), the jury could find that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant did not have the means, with safety to herself, of preventing the execution of the threat. That is because the jury could conclude that there was a reasonable possibility that the applicant’s battered woman syndrome rendered her incapable of escaping from her abusive relationship with JR.
McLeish JA agreed with the reasons given by Kyrou and Niall JJA in respect of elements of the defence of duress’ both under common law and under 32O.’ [228] McLeish JA also observed:
[208] It is not necessary that the threat which underpins a defence of duress be the subject of direct evidence of the accused. There is no reason in principle why the requisite threat might not be found by a process of inference from other evidence. That inference may, in principle, be drawn from evidence about an ongoing course of conduct. The threat may also be conveyed to the accused by implication rather than express words. Naturally, the defence may very well be weaker in the absence of direct evidence from the accused; but that is not the only way it may be raised.
Shiryar v The Queen [2022] VSCA 96 (25 May 2022) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert course of justice’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Persistent contravention of protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Use of third party’
Charges: 1 x attempting to pervert the course of justice; 1 x persistently contravening a family violence intervention order.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice and one charge of persistently contravening a family violence intervention order. These offences were committed whilst the applicant was on remand for separate charges (to which he also pleaded guilty): two charges of criminal damage, one charge of stalking, one charge of making a threat to kill, and two charges of committing an indictable offence while on bail. The charge of stalking related to the applicant’s former partner, ES. The charge of making a threat to kill related to her father.
The applicant’s relationship with ES ended shortly before the offending. An interim family violence intervention order was made against the applicant. Whilst on remand for the initial offending, the applicant instructed someone to phone ES to ask that she and her father drop the charges against him, and to tell her that if the charges were dropped, he would give her a car that had been the subject of a dispute between him and her family. The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment for attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Issue: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive?
Held: The Court refused leave to appeal. The applicant had an extensive criminal history, which predominately involved contravening family violence intervention orders and breaching bail. The sentencing judge viewed the applicant’s convictions on the initial offending as relevant to the present offending, because the present offending occurred shortly after the applicant was remanded in custody and informed the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation ([19]). The sentencing judge took into account, inter alia, the applicant’s early guilty plea, mental health difficulties, apparent insight into the offending and support from his family. The offending was described as “premeditated, repeated and persistent, involved enlisting others, and employed veiled threats and inducements” ([25]).
The Court of Appeal found that any attempt to pervert the course of justice is to be denounced, and that, within a family violence context, it is a very serious matter ([38]).
Frecker v The Queen [2021] VSCA 331 (2 December 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing appeal’
Charges: Common law assault x 2, intentionally damage property x 1, intentionally cause serious injury x 1, persistent contravention of family violence intervention order x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 23-year-old appellant received a sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years and 8 months, and a 2-year alcohol exclusion order after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against two of his former female partners. The appellant repeatedly punched and pushed each victim on several occasions, often after consuming alcohol [7]-[11]. On one occasion, the appellant repeatedly punched the second victim’s face and neck, which fractured her jaw and seriously injured her left eye [12]-[26]. The appellant persistently contravened a protection order by repeatedly contacting the second victim while she was in hospital, and parking near her house ([28-35]). The appellant had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety and alcohol use disorder, had no prior criminal history, was employed and supported by his family [42]-[45].
Grounds:
The sentencing judge erred in failing to consider:
1.
As a form of additional punishment, the alcohol exclusion order imposed upon the appellant.
2.
The appellant’s youth at the time of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Kyrou and T Forrest JJA dismissed both grounds of appeal. ‘[T]he judge did not err by failing to explain in his sentencing remarks how any punitive elements of the AEO informed the exercise of his sentencing discretion… because defence counsel did not submit that the AEO had an additional punitive impact upon the appellant which warranted discrete moderation in his sentence’ [76]. Furthermore, the j sentencing judge remarked on the applicant’s youthfulness as a relevant sentencing consideration, especially in relation to his ‘very positive’ prospects of rehabilitation [92]while noting the appellant was at the ‘upper end of youthfulness’, and his offending was of a ‘particularly egregious nature’ such that the judge appropriately gave more weight to the sentencing considerations of community protection, denunciation, specific deterrence and just punishment [94]).
Dunford v The Queen [2021] VSCA 304 (9 November 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to control using extended family’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Covid 19 pandemic’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of drug and alcohol abuse’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Step-child’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: intentionally cause injury x 1; false imprisonment x 2; make threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges and received a total effective sentence of 4 years and 9 months ([1]). The sentencing judge reduced the applicant’s sentence by 9 months due to his guilty plea because it showed remorse and saved the Court’s time ([19]-[20]).
The female victim and male applicant did not reside together. In January 2020, the applicant assaulted the victim in the presence of her nine-year old daughter The applicant punched, kicked and strangled the victim, threatening to kill her or her daughter whenever they attempted to leave, for approximately 2.5 hours ([3]-[6]). While in custody, the applicant told family members to persuade the victim not to cooperate with police and to accuse her of ‘just keeping him away from the kids’ ([12]). The applicant suffered from a mental health condition and had a history of alcohol abuse ([16]-[17]) and family violence offending([15]).
Grounds: The individual sentences, orders for cumulation, total effective sentence and non-parole period were each manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Beach JA dismissed the appeal ([45]). His Honour affirmed her Honour’s description of the applicant’s behaviour as ‘a protracted ordeal of violence… threats and control… that did not cease upon the applicant being remanded into custody’ ([25]). His Honour accepted that the applicant’s plea of guilty during the COVID-19 pandemic entitled him to a ‘more pronounced amelioration of sentence’ as in Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169 (18 June 2021) ([43]). Honour found that the individual sentences could only be described as ‘modest’ ([38]), and the non-parole period as ‘very moderate’ ([39]), due to the objective seriousness of each offence. In his Honour’s view, ‘[t]he imprisoning of the victim and her daughter, resulting in the victim’s daughter witnessing the acts of violence perpetrated by the applicant against her mother, was undoubtedly very serious offending. Any submission to the contrary is not reasonably arguable.’ ([38]).
Newton v The Queen [2021] VSCA 207 (29 July 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing appeal’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Persistent contravention of a family violence safety notice, aggravated burglary, intentionally causing injury x 2, making threat to kill, damage property, making threat to inflict serious injury.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Grounds:
1.
The orders for cumulation breached the principle of totality and produced a total effective sentence that was manifestly excessive.
2.
The learned sentencing judge was wrong not to find that:
(a)
The Appellant’s anti-social personality disorder and clinical depression meant his sentence of imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him compared to a person in normal health; and
(b)
Imprisonment would have a significant adverse effect on the Appellant’s mental health [5].
Facts: The 35-year-old male appellant received a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 4 months, after pleading guilty to offences perpetrated against his 28-year-old former female partner. The couple had been in a ‘volatile’ relationship for three years, and shared a 2-year-old son [6]. The appellant made threats to kill or injure the victim via text for several days before forcing entry into her home. Armed with a kitchen knife, the appellant made several ‘chilling’ threats to kill the victim, before punching, strangling, and eventually pushing her head through a plaster wall. The appellant’s conduct constituted persistent breaches of a family violence safety notice and occurred in the presence of a child [6]. The applicant had a ‘significant criminal record’, and had been diagnosed with a substance abuse disorder, depression, anxiety, and mild psychosis [9],[12]. The appellant identified as Aboriginal [11].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed, appellant resentenced to 6 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. The appellant’s psychological assessment stated that R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 ‘may’ apply [43] and on this basis, the appellant’s legal counsel had not raised Verdins at the plea hearing. Niall JJA (Priest JA concurring) found that this reasoning, which was incorrect, had led the sentencing Judge into a specific error that vitiated the sentence [46]. His Honour stated that ‘whether any of the Verdins principles’ apply ‘to mitigate sentence’ is ‘a matter for the judge to determine on the basis of the evidence’ [44].
In resentencing, Their Honours found that psychological evidence of the appellant’s ‘impaired mental functioning and his deprived and violent upbringing’ reduced his moral culpability and required consideration of whether incarceration would be more onerous [31]. The appellant’s substance abuse severely compromised his judgment and capacity to control his behaviour [27] and was caused by ‘childhood trauma’, which had also impacted on his ‘development of empathy and distinction between right and wrong’ [28], and had arisen ‘through no fault of his own’ [61]. Their Honour’s noted that the appellant’s conduct had ‘escalated over a number of days, giving him an opportunity to desist which he failed to take’. However, it was accepted that the appellant’s ability to regulate his behaviour was significantly impaired [60].
Baker (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 158 (9 June 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the court of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Intellectual impairment’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘People affected by drugs or alcohol’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with illness or impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat of image abuse’ – ‘Threat of suicide’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 14 charges arising out of abuse of his female domestic partner over a period of 18 months. He sought leave to appeal in relation to charges 5, causing injury recklessly, and 8, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Charge 5 related to causing injury by pushing the victim’s face into a pot of boiling water, following which he did not call an ambulance and instructed the victim to conceal his role in her injuries and return home the same day, not remaining in hospital for treatment. There was dispute as to whether permanent injury was caused. The offending was in breach of a protection order, occurred after earlier offending against the same victim and when the applicant had only just been released from prison. Charge 8 related to sending a large number of text messages to the victim demanding the withdrawal of charges against him, threatening variously to keep their stillborn child’s ashes and urn from her, distribute intimate images of her and commit suicide stating it would be her fault if he did so.
The applicant had a history of prior violent offending (having only just been released from jail) including against the victim, had intellectual impairment, a traumatic upbringing and was abusing methylamphetamine at the time of the offending. It took place in the context of a history of violence, manipulation and coercion against the victim and sought to exploit her emotional and psychological vulnerability by threatening her ability to access the ashes of her stillborn child and also threatening her dignity and right to privacy with the exposure of intimate images.
Grounds:
Ground 1: The sentence imposed on indictment charge 5 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Ground 2: The sentence imposed on indictment charge 8 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Ground 3: The cumulation order fixed in respect of charge 8 is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Held: leave to appeal refused.
Ground 1: The court held that notwithstanding the mitigating factors raised by the applicant which ought to be taken into account, this was horrific violence inflicted on a woman by her domestic partner in her own home. The offending was at the upper end of the range with a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, and 3 years was within the appropriate range:
In all the circumstances, the infliction of such horrific violence against a woman at the hands of her domestic partner in their own home called for denunciation, just punishment and general deterrence, especially in the context of persistent defiance of a family violence intervention order and bearing in mind the applicant’s criminal history. In that context, specific deterrence also remained a relevant consideration. We accept that the mitigating features to which the applicant referred were matters of weight that fell to be taken into account, as we have discussed. However, even when that is done, we are unable to conclude that the sentence was outside the range available to the sentencing judge. To the contrary, bearing in mind that this was an offence at the upper end of the range, punishable by a maximum term of 5 years’ imprisonment, a sentence of 3 years on a guilty plea was well open. [32]
Ground 2: While at the lower end of the scale for attempting to pervert the course of justice, any attempt to pervert the course of justice is serious and should be denounced. The offending occurred in the context of violence, manipulation and coercion of the victim, with “especially unpleasant features of seeking to exploit Ms Anderson’s emotional and psychological vulnerability by threatening her ability to access the ashes of her stillborn child and also threatening her dignity and right to privacy with the exposure of intimate images.” [36]
Ground 3: The applicant’s submission that accumulation of 12 months of the charge 8 sentence on the balance of the sentences failed to accord with the principles of totality and was therefore manifestly excessive was dismissed:
An attempt by a perpetrator of family violence to prevent a victim from seeking the full protection of the law and their physical and emotional safety is a very serious matter which calls for general deterrence and denunciation…[37]
Charge 8 involved repeated attempts by the applicant to conceal his wrongdoing over the previous 18 months, by means of emotional and physical threats directed at Ms Anderson. It was distinct offending that called for significant additional punishment. [40]
Mercer (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 132 (14 May 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence’ – ‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘False imprisonment’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (FVIO) x 1.
Proceedings: Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was charged with 5 offences against his de facto female partner (the complainant). The applicant instructed her to drop the charges over telephone calls while remanded in custody. At trial, she gave evidence unfavourable to the prosecution case, recanting statements previously made to police, and giving evidence that the applicant had neither imprisoned nor assaulted her. The judge gave the prosecution leave to cross-examine the complainant about prior inconsistent statements she had made and in relation to her evidence on charges 1-4. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years and 3 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The trial judge should not have given any direction on incriminating conduct as: (a) The prosecutor did not rely on the relevant phone calls as incriminating conduct in his final address; and (b) Using phone calls as evidence of incriminating conduct involved the jury engaging in impermissible ‘bootstraps’ reasoning.
2.
The sentence imposed on the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Held: Application for extension of time within which to file application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence dismissed.
Re conviction:
Re Ground 1(a), it was difficult to see how there was any miscarriage of justice in the judge giving a direction under s 21. If defence counsel had raised the prosecutor’s failure to address the incriminating conduct, the judge would have granted the prosecutor leave to address the jury further and given the same direction.
Re Ground 1(b), it was well open to the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was attempting to persuade the complainant to lie in the relevant phone conversations. There was no issue that the applicant told the complainant:
•
she should tell the police that she was not in her right state of mind when she made the allegations and that she wished to drop the charges;
•
he would pay for a lawyer to make a statutory declaration for her, in which she would state that she was not in her right mind when she made her statement and could not remember making the allegations against him; and
•
she should not talk on the phone about him assaulting her, as the calls between them were being recorded.
These words were not neutral as to the applicant’s guilt or otherwise of the offending. Nothing he said suggested that the complainant’s allegations were false or that the alleged events had not taken place. On the contrary, it was open to the jury to view the statements as demonstrating his belief that he was guilty.
Re sentence:
The court made the following observations relevant to coercive control at [65]:
In our view, the applicant’s persistent and cynical assertion of control over the complainant, and his exploitation of her known vulnerabilities, made this case just as serious as if there had been explicit threats or actual violence. The transcripts of the calls make plain his exertion of coercive psychological pressure on her, encouraging her to think that they can ‘work things out’ between them and asking questions like ‘Do you want me to get out or not?’ The fact that the conduct about which he was asking her to lie involved his own criminal violence against her was a further aggravating feature. In our view, the applicant’s moral culpability for this offence was high.
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive including in light of: the applicant’s high moral culpability, not guilty plea, seriousness of the offending, significant prior criminal history, and the importance of general and specific deterrence.
Re delay:
The lack of an adequate explanation for months of delay was unsatisfactory. It provided further basis upon which to refuse the extension of time applications.
Hardwick (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 67 (19 March 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to offences committed against his wife following their separation. The appellant waited until she returned home, restrained her (including using cable ties), prevented her from escaping, and threatened to kill her. The wife managed to escape. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a 3 year non-parole period. He had also breached an order protecting his wife on numerous previous occasions.
Grounds of appeal: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: Appeal was dismissed but noting that the sentence was “very stern” and “at the uppermost extremity of the appropriate range.”
The sentence for the aggravated burglary charge was not manifestly excessive. Previous decisions reinforced “the seriousness with which the courts view aggravated burglaries” and identify typical matters that might aggravate a particular instance of the offence. While the offending was not “an act of extreme domestic violence,” as characterised by the sentencing judge, overall the offending was serious. The sentencing judge was entitled to have significant reservations regarding the appellant’s remorse and insight which underpinned the importance of specific deterrence. General deterrence was also important in the context of family violence.
The sentences for false imprisonment and threat to kill were also not manifestly excessive. In particular, “[t]he false imprisonment extended over a period of time and involved physical restraint. The imprisonment in her own home, in the context of family violence would have been extremely distressing to the victim. It deserves powerful denunciation. Equally, the threat to kill was serious. The threat was made in circumstances where the appellant told his victim that he was concealing things ‘that you don’t want to see’. The whole incident did not have an obvious end point and the appellant’s behaviour would have instilled a substantial sense of dread and fear.” The degree of cumulation was also not manifestly excessive.
Packard (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 56 (15 March 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Forgiveness of victim’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Lack of history of domestic violence’ – ‘Listening to Victims’ – ‘Mercy’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Intentionally causing serious injury x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to stabbing his wife 5 times. There was no prior history of domestic and family violence. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 6 months.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in failing to take into account the victim’s full recovery.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in treating the victim’s forgiveness with extreme caution, and having regard to it only insofar as it boded well for the applicant’s rehabilitation, rather than also taking it into account in assessing the impact upon the victim and in considering the application of the principle of mercy. In particular:
(a)
Her Honour took into account irrelevant considerations namely forgiveness of a victim is often attributable to a pattern of behaviour on the part of perpetrators of family violence and her family had “persuaded” her to forgive the applicant.
(b)
Her Honour failed to take into account relevant considerations which indicated that the victim’s forgiveness was genuine/informed.
(c)
Her Honour’s conclusion was not reasonable open.
(d)
The applicant was denied procedural fairness.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of all the relevant matters, including that the applicant called emergency services, his confessions, his very early guilty plea, his lack of relevant prior convictions, his lack of history of violence, and the fact that he was of no risk of reoffending.
Held: Application for leave to appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: It was fortunate that the victim had made a good physical and emotional recovery but this did not negate that this was a serious example of the offence causing serious injury. The applicant’s moral culpability was also high.
Ground 2: Counsel for the applicant was plainly on notice that the judge was minded to apply the principles regarding victims’ forgiveness stated by Neave JA in R v Hester at [27]. It was not open to argue he was denied procedural fairness.
It could not be reasonably maintained that the judge erred in failing to extend “mercy” to the applicant. This was a serious instance of intentionally causing serious injury, noting “[i]t would be most difficult to comprehend how mercy can be properly extended in a case in which a man has overpowered his wife in her home, and proceeded to violently stab her five times with a knife, thereby penetrating her vital organs and putting her life at risk” at [45].
While it seemed the sentencing judge incorrectly inferred that the victim had been persuaded by male family members to express forgiveness (with reference to Hester), that observation “could not materially have affected the question whether her Honour should have extended mercy to the applicant.” Further, the judge correctly took into account the relevance of the victim’s forgiveness to motivating the applicant’s rehabilitation.
Ground 3: Without the compelling mitigating circumstances present in this case, the sentence would have been properly characterised as lenient. Accordingly, the sentence appropriately reflected the mitigating factors referred to by the applicant. In light of the gravity of the offending, and the importance of general deterrence and denunciation, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive: [53]-[57].
Edwards v The Queen [2020] VSCA 339 (23 December 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Dysfunctional upbringing’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant woman stabbed the male victim, her partner for just over 12 months, in the neck and he died of the injuries inflicted. The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 years and 9 months: R v Edwards [2019] VSC 234 (12 April 2019).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that her moral culpability was not lessened in any way by the violence perpetrated upon her.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in finding that her moral culpability was high notwithstanding her severely disadvantaged background.
3.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Held: The appeal was refused.
Ground 1: The sentencing judge’s finding of moral culpability was open on the evidence for the reasons she gave. This included evidence that the applicant and victim had been violent towards each other, but with the applicant as most often the aggressor; the offending took place in the context of heavy methamphetamine use; and the applicant had a traumatic childhood, and a history of controlling and abusive relationships. Had there been evidence of a causal link between the applicant’s stabbing of the victim and his acts of violence towards her, the sentencing considerations may have been quite different (at [15]-[23]).
Ground 2: It was well open to the sentencing judge to find that notwithstanding the applicant’s severely disadvantaged background her moral culpability remained high. The applicant’s offending was heavily influenced by her drug use at the relevant time (at [24]-[27]). It was also not open for the applicant to contend that her moral culpability was lessened as her offending was causally linked to her drug use. She had expressly disavowed such a causal link on the plea and the submission was not supported by the authorities (which instead related to instances where a person commits an offence to satisfy a drug addiction, relevant to moral culpability and rehabilitation) ([28]-[32]).
Ground 3: The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge gave proper consideration to all relevant features of the offending and the offender. After finding that high moral culpability was established, it was not reasonably arguable that the sentence was outside the range open to the sentencing judge given the objective seriousness of the offending (“planned and deliberate”), the maximum penalty for manslaughter, and the weight to be given to the sentencing purposes identified by the sentencing judge (particularly “just punishment, denunciation…and general deterrence”) ([33]-[39]).
Shau v The Queen [2020] VSCA 252 (25 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘No history of domestic violence’ – ‘People who are pregnant’
Charges: Recklessly causing injury x 1; Reckless conduct endangering life x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant man punched, kicked and stomped on his pregnant wife. The attack started in a car, which his wife was driving, and ended up at a service station.
[18] Footage captured on CCTV at the service station depicts the appellant grabbing and dragging Lee by the hair on at least two occasions; punching and striking her with his hands and fists, mostly in the region of her head, on at least seven occasions; and kicking and stomping her to the head, neck, shoulder and torso region on at least 19 occasions. Lee curled up into a ball to protect her unborn child and raised her hands to protect her face.
The wife suffered extensive injuries. The appellant then drove his car at speed into the service station where his wife had sought shelter, smashing through the wall and wedging the vehicle inside the store. That conduct endangered the life of the service station attendant who had locked the doors of the shop to prevent the appellant from coming in after his wife. The victim gave evidence that there had been ‘no earlier instances of domestic violence’ and that the appellant was ‘drunk at the time of the offending’.
Issues: (1) Whether the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Aggravating factors considered by the sentencing judge included that:
[32] … the offending occurred in the context of domestic violence …
[the victim] was five months’ pregnant at the time …
It was a lengthy, repetitive and violent bashing of a woman who was considerably smaller and of much lesser strength than you …
You must have been aware of the likelihood of injury to her …
You must have been aware that she would be terrified as a consequence of your attack upon her and terrified of the serious risk of injury to her and to her unborn child.
Priest JA referred to his own comments in granting the application for leave to appeal observing that the seriousness of the offence in this case ‘is not only to be gauged by the injuries caused, but also the manner of their infliction (in this case a protracted and very violent assault on a vulnerable victim)’.
Niall JA observed:
[46] Compounding, to a significant degree, the seriousness of the offence is the fact that it occurred within the context of a family relationship. That fact had two relevant consequences. First, it meant that the offending arose in a relationship of trust. Lee was five months’ pregnant and ought to have enjoyed protection and care from her husband. The breach of trust necessarily made the offending more serious.
[47] Next, the courts must respond to the blight of family violence by imposing punishment that denounces the conduct and adequately addresses general deterrence. Unlike in many cases, there was no basis in the evidence to suggest that there had been earlier incidents of violence. In her evidence, Lee said that the appellant had never assaulted her before. For that reason, the conduct was, on the evidence, an aberration. Lee expressed support for her husband on the plea. However, there remains a very high public interest in punishing family violence, both for its denunciatory and deterrent effect, even where the victim seeks leniency and incarceration would place great pressure on the domestic relationship.
…
[50] Accommodating all of the relevant factors, both aggravating and moderating the sentence, may result in a sentence that represents a high proportion of the maximum, even on a plea of guilty.
Hardwick (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 227 (7 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: False imprisonment x 1; Common assault x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Making threats to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant man, who was subject to a protection order, entered the marital home and repositioned the CCTV cameras away from the house. When his female former partner (the victim) came home, he grabbed and restrained her, putting her in a headlock, then pinning her to the ground. The applicant tried to tape the victim’s mouth with duct tape and bound her hands with cable ties before forcing her inside the house. The applicant locked the door and bound the victim’s feet with cable ties. The applicant threatened to kill her. When one of the children arrived at the house, the victim was able to escape from the house. A neighbour called the police.
Grounds: (3) Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal granted for Ground 3.
[55] Coincidentally, on the very day that this application was argued before me, this Court delivered judgment in Hill v The Queen. That case concerned a home invasion by a woman who had been left by her former partner. She armed herself with a knife, forced her way into the house, and stabbed both her former partner and his new girlfriend. She faced charges not only of aggravated burglary, but also two counts of intentionally causing injury. The offending seemed to have been premeditated, and was described by the judge as ‘grievance driven’ and ‘purposeful’. The total effective sentence is 6 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. In effect, the motive for the applicant’s conduct in was anger at abandonment, and animosity towards her husband’s new partner.
…
[57] It is noteworthy that the offender in Hill received a non-parole period which was only 6 months greater than that fixed for the applicant. That minimal disparity, of itself, raises a question in my mind as to whether he was treated in accordance with current sentencing practice. It is of some interest to note that the sentencing judge in Hill was the same judge who sentenced the applicant in the present matter. I recognise, of course, that this Court described the sentences imposed in Hill as ‘moderate’, as indeed they were. Be that as it may, I regard the offending in Hill as far more serious than that in the present case.
Hill v The Queen [2020] VSCA 220 (3 September 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Causing injury intentionally’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Home invasion’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Threat to kill x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Causing injury intentionally x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and her husband separated seven months earlier, when the husband formed a relationship with his new partner. The applicant regularly accused her former partner of infidelity and made disparaging comments about his new partner. The applicant occasionally made threats about killing her former partner and his new partner to the applicant’s daughter, but the daughter did not take these seriously. On 19 October 2017, the applicant assaulted her daughter. The applicant was charged with assault and a protection order was taken out against her to protect her daughter. On the same day, the applicant threatened to kill her former husband, his new partner and his next-door neighbour. Later that day, the applicant carried out the violent home invasion.
The female applicant armed herself with weapons (a length of pipe and a knife) and smashed a window to enter the home of her ex-husband and his new partner. The applicant attacked her ex-husband and his new partner, stabbing them both.
Grounds: The sentencing judge erred in (a) failing to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the applicant had experienced protracted family violence; and (b) finding that the offending was ‘purposeful and grievance-driven’.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
[4] In seeking leave to appeal, the applicant disputed the judge’s characterisation of the offending as ‘purposeful and grievance-driven’. According to the submission, the true explanation for the applicant’s conduct lay in the history of violence inflicted on her by [former partner] during the marriage. Instead of aligning the case with those involving male-to-female violence following a relationship breakdown, it was said, the judge should have viewed the applicant’s conduct as reflecting the ‘very different psychological pathway’ which results from protracted domestic violence.
That submission was rejected as there was no objective evidence to establish a link between the offending and violence experienced by the applicant during the marriage. All of the evidence before the sentencing judge supported the conclusion that “what drove this very serious offending was the applicant’s distress at having been ‘abandoned’ by her former partner and anger towards [his new partner] for ‘taking’ her husband”.
[37] … in Filiz [v The Queen (2014)], the Court said:
Senior counsel for the applicant rightly conceded that general deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in this case, not only in relation to aggravated burglary generally, but most particularly in relation to violent offending against a former domestic partner. … Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to the breakdown of a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear that such offending will attract serious consequences …
[38] In the present case, the offending was perpetrated by a female against her former male partner (and his new partner). But, in our respectful view, the judge was quite correct to view it as falling into the same category of post-separation, anger-driven violence.
[39] In our view, no other conclusion was reasonably open on the material before the Court but that it was that anger — directed both at [her former partner and his new partner] — which was the driving force behind this offending. This was well illustrated by the applicant’s having said to [the victim] that she would ‘never stop’ stabbing her. It may be accepted that the applicant was not making ‘an assertion of possession and control’. But that seems to us to be immaterial. What matters is that, seemingly unable to accept the fact of the separation, the applicant gave vent to her anger and distress by this appallingly violent invasion of [her former husband’s] home.
[40] The position would have been entirely different had there been any evidence before the sentencing judge that prior violence (or threats of violence) by [her former partner] towards the applicant had so affected her as to provide an explanation for the offending. The profound and long-lasting psychological effects of domestic violence are well-established and, where a proper evidentiary basis is established, can have a very significant impact on the court’s view of the culpability of an offender and may even preclude criminal responsibility.
[41] But that was not this case. As defence counsel properly conceded on the plea, there was no such evidence. There was no suggestion, for example, that the applicant had been driven to act in this way by things done to her during the marriage. On the contrary, all the evidence showed that what prompted this attack was the ending of the marriage and [her former partner’s] commencement of a relationship with another woman.
Freeburn v The Queen [2020] VSCA 155 (17 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, possessive behaviour’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction
Facts: The applicant man was convicted of the murder of his female intimate partner and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 years. The victim was mildly intellectually disabled and had been the victim of domestic violence in a prior relationship. The applicant acted in a jealous and possessive manner towards her, which sometimes included acts of violence. After the assault which resulted in the victim’s death the applicant left the victim alive, but in a debilitated state and failed to seek assistance. He admitted to having "lost control" and seriously injuring the victim. An autopsy showed the victim suffered around 43 injuries, mostly soft tissue injuries caused by moderate blunt force trauma. Toxicology testing revealed the presence of GHB in her body. Expert witnesses disagreed as to whether the assault caused the victim’s death: one forensic pathologist believed the victim died as a consequence of soft tissue injuries sustained in an assault in the context of her using GHB; another said that the cause of death could not be determined.
Grounds:
1.
The jury’s verdict of guilt was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. Particulars:
(a)
The evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had caused the death of the deceased.
(b)
The evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had intended to cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased.
2.
The trial miscarried due to the admission of prejudicial evidence that a closed circuit television system had been deactivated prior to the death of the deceased.
Held: Ground 1 was allowed, the murder conviction was set aside, and the Court substituted a verdict of manslaughter. Ground 2 was dismissed.
The Court found that whilst it was open for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant’s actions, in assaulting the victim, were the substantial and operative cause of her death, it was not reasonably open to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause her really serious injury ([106]). Taken at its highest, the admission the applicant made to Witness A was that as a result of causing her death, he had enjoyed or experienced a significant rush of adrenalin ([93]). Further, the Court accepted that a jury could not reasonably conclude that Witness A’s evidence was either truthful or reliable ([94]). Whilst the assessment and credibility of a particular witness is essentially a matter for the jury, that proposition does not preclude the assessment by an appellate court of the evidence given by that witness (Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12 (7 April 2020)) ([95]).
The verdict of manslaughter was substituted because the applicant caused the victim’s death by an unlawful and dangerous act and it was inevitable that the jury would conclude that a reasonable person in the applicant’s position would have realised they were exposing the victim to an appreciable risk of serious injury [104]. Leaving the victim in a severely debilitated state and refraining from obtaining medical or other assistance constituted criminal negligence for the purpose of the offence of manslaughter. The evidence was that the applicant was well-aware that the victim required assistance and treatment. It was inevitable that the jury would have been satisfied the applicant’s actions fell so far short of the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the circumstances, and involved such a high risk of death or really serious bodily injury, as to merit criminal punishment ([105]).
Ground 2 failed because the prosecution did not put to the jury that the evidence could or should be used as evidence of incriminating conduct by the applicant ([120]) and the judge gave a clear and specific direction to the jury that it should not rely on the evidence, and explained why it was of no probative value ([121]).
Note: The applicant was subsequently resentenced to 12 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years: Freeburn v The Queen (No 2) [2020] VSCA 176 (1 July 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal.
Carter v The Queen [2020] VSCA 156 (15 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Recklessly cause injury x 1; intentionally damage property x 1; possess a firearm while a prohibited person x 1; attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; persistently contravene a family violence intervention order x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to recklessly causing injury (grabbing her by the throat causing bruising and breathing difficulty), intentionally damaging property, possessing a firearm while a prohibited person, attempting to pervert the course of justice (a number of phone calls demanding the victim retract her statement), and persistently contravening a family violence intervention order. He also pleaded guilty to a series of related summary charges, including failing to store a firearm in a secure manner, possessing cartridge ammunition while unlicensed, and committing an indictable offence while on bail. The offending occurred in the context of family violence within a domestic relationship. The applicant was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years.
At the time of the offending, the applicant lived with his former partner (the victim). They had been in a ‘turbulent "on again, off again"’ relationship for around 16 years. The applicant had been subject to 3 intervention orders and a family violence safety notice prior to the present offending. The relationship came to an end, however, the victim and their daughters had continued to visit the applicant in custody until the recent COVID-19 pandemic.
In relation to the most serious charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice, the sentencing judge noted the fear that the victim must have experienced as a result of the applicant’s threats over the phone ([20]). The offences involving the possession of the firearm were linked to, and committed "because of [the applicant’s] mental state with the intention of self-harm" ([22]). With regard to the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation, his Honour accepted that the offending occurred "in the context of a daily methamphetamine habit". The applicant had a long history of addiction to drugs, and his prospects of rehabilitation were considered guarded ([25]). The applicant’s guilty pleas, however, entitled him to a reduction in sentence ([26]). His criminal history related mainly to driving or drink-driving offences ([27]). With regard to the applicant’s Indigenous background, the judge took into account the fact that he came from a disadvantaged background, experienced deprivation and poverty, suffered from learning difficulties, and had been exposed to substance abuse and mental health issues ([28]).
•
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
•
The applicant had suffered double punishment in that the base sentence of 2 years imposed on charge 4 (attempt to pervert the course of justice), and the sentence of 6 months imposed on charge 5 (persistent breach of intervention order), had resulted in 3 months cumulation.
•
The totality principle was offended in cumulation of sentencing.
•
Insufficient weight was given to prospects for rehabilitation based on the applicant’s limited history of prior offending, his not having served a previous term of imprisonment, Aboriginal background, difficulties faced while in prison and efforts made to participate in programs while on remand.
Held: The Court of Appeal held that the sentence imposed on the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice was not manifestly excessive. The applicant’s conduct was persistent and involved repeated threats of violence to the victim ([69]). "An attempt to pervert the course of justice is a substantive, and not an inchoate offence", and "any conduct that meets [its] description must be viewed seriously and denounced appropriately" ([70]). The submission in relation to double punishment was rejected as the elements of charges 4 and 5 were separate and distinct: "The criminality involved in attempting to persuade [the victim] to withdraw her complaint against the applicant, through the use of threats, harassment, and a form of emotional blackmail, was conceptually, and practically, separate from the deliberate and persistent contraventions of the family violence intervention order". The judge was therefore entitled to order some degree of cumulation between them ([72]). Ground 4 also failed as the judge considered all relevant matters, and it was open, on the evidence, to conclude that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were guarded ([73]). As there was no error by the sentencing judge, the Court refused leave to appeal.
Stapleton v The Queen [2020] VSCA 147 (4 June 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Gambling’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Theft’
Charge(s): Aggravated burglary x 1; intentionally causing injury x 1; intentionally damaging property x 1; theft x 1; unlawful assault x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds: The sentence was manifestly excessive, in particular:
1.
the sentences imposed on the charges of aggravated burglary, intentionally causing injury and unlawful assault were manifestly excessive;
2.
the learned sentencing judge placed excessive weight on a finding of a lack of remorse, and insufficient weight on compelling mitigating factors (such as his guilty plea, prior good character and the absence of prior convictions); and
3.
the orders for cumulation infringed the totality principle and produced a manifestly excessive total effective sentence and non-parole period.
Facts: In 2018, the applicant man pleaded guilty to a series of offences committed against his wife of 20 years (the victim). The offending occurred in the context of the breakdown of their domestic relationship, in the early hours of the morning at the victim’s home. He broke into the house, pushed the victim against the wall, and assaulted her boyfriend. When the victim sought to intervene, the applicant verbally abused her and threw her against the bedroom wall, causing her head to go through the plaster. The applicant continued to punch the victim’s boyfriend, and after another attempted intervention by the victim, he threw her across the room. He also damaged her boyfriend’s car. The applicant left the premises but returned about half an hour later. Once again, he barged through the front door, entered the bedroom, grabbed the victim’s hair and threw her against the wall, and continued to physically abuse her boyfriend. He also punched the victim in the face. While she was attempting to contact her friend, the applicant snatched her phone and left the house with it. The applicant was arrested later the same morning.
At sentence, the judge noted that the applicant had been drinking heavily and told police that there had been a slow build-up of emotion. His account to police was also seen as an attempt to minimise his conduct ([23]-[25]). Further, the sentencing judge stated that "offending of this nature is all too often perpetrated by men who respond to difficulties in a relationship, with possessive, violent rage" ([27]). Mention was also made to the victim impact statements which detailed the applicant’s history of domestic violence towards the victim, specifically in the form of mental abuse ([28]-[29]). The applicant had a lengthy history of heavy drinking and extensive difficulties with gambling, which resulted in the sale of the family home in order to pay his debts ([32]). The judge characterised the motive for the applicant’s offending as a desire to exact revenge for the victim’s having interfered in his relationship with another woman, and observed that his return to the house on the second occasion demonstrated a degree of premeditation. The applicant had no prior convictions ([33]). His guilty plea was not made at the earliest opportunity, and in his record of interview, he sought to downplay the gravity of the offending, blamed the victim for his behaviour, and falsely denied having punched her boyfriend ([34]). In these circumstances, her Honour was not persuaded that the applicant "deeply regretted his wrongdoing and desired to atone for it". While there was some level of remorse, this was not given much weight ([36]). Her Honour also explained that a combination sentence was inappropriate as the offending was too serious ([38]). He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 3 years’ and 7 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Held: The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. It stated that "aggravated burglary, where the offender’s intent is to assault and injure a former domestic partner, must always be regarded as an offence of a serious nature" ([60]). The appeal ground of manifest excessiveness was difficult to maintain in light of the aggravated burglary and serious assaults committed on that second occasion ([62]). The Court held that the sentencing judge took into account and gave weight to all relevant mitigating factors. The applicant did not succeed in his submission that the judge erred in her finding that little weight should be given to his remorse, as she "took great pains to explain why, putting to one side the remorse associated with the plea of guilty, she could give little weight to what the applicant had told various third parties about how he felt" ([64]-[65]).
Johns v The Queen [2020] VSCA 135 (29 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mental element’ – ‘Obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unsafe and unsatisfactory verdict’
Offences: Recklessly cause serious injury in circumstances of gross violence; Intentionally destroy property
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction; Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds (conviction):
1.
The jury verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory, where there was a marked disparity between the size and weight of the appellant’s car and the victim’s truck and trailer such that it was not open to the jury to find that by consciously voluntarily and deliberately colliding with the truck and trailer she:
(a)
Foresaw the likelihood that the collision would cause serious injury, or
(b)
When planning her conduct, either intended, was reckless that or foresaw it was more likely than not that her conduct would cause serious injury to the victim.
2.
The judge incorrectly directed the jury that the Intentionally destroy property charge could be established by an intent to damage or destroy the truck, when the indictment alleged that the appellant intended to destroy the truck, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
Grounds (sentence):
1.
The judge erred by applying the wrong test under s 10A(2)(e) Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) when considering whether "special reasons" existed to justify imposing a non-parole period of less than four years.
2.
The judge should have imposed a large, if not complete, degree of concurrency in relation to the sentences for the two charges.
3.
The head sentence imposed was outside the permissible range, the non-parole period was excessive, and the judge failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant’s previous good character and prospects of rehabilitation.
Facts: The female applicant was driving a Toyota Camry car when it collided with a truck and tanker trailer which was driven by the male victim. The vehicles were travelling in opposite directions on an open stretch of highway; the applicant’s car crossing the centre line and colliding with the front right-hand side of the truck. The truck rolled, causing the victim serious injury (a severe laceration to his scalp and two fractured vertebrae in his neck) and extensive damage ($900,000 worth) to the truck and trailer (which were later written-off). The applicant sustained minor injuries.
The applicant and victim had been in a sexual relationship for some time and had a daughter together, although they disagreed as to the nature of the relationship (the victim believed it to be only sexual/physical while the applicant was "besotted" with the victim). When the victim was driving his truck, the appellant would often follow him in her car and turn up at his home. On the day of the offending, the victim had stopped for a break at a parking bay and was approached by the applicant who threw the remote control to the victim’s garage at him, told him she was pregnant and yelled "I’ll kill you" before driving off. The applicant had stated on numerous occasions that "if she couldn’t have [the victim], nobody would" and that she should "take him out" by "driving straight into him".
The applicant was convicted of recklessly causing serious injury in circumstances of gross violence and intentionally destroying property, and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years.
Judgment: The court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against conviction. The court rejected Ground 1, finding that it was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant knew the collision would probably cause serious injury to the victim because of the nature of the collision (high speed, head-on, on an open road) and the threats made by the applicant [40]. The court noted that "The issue for the jury was not which of the two drivers bore the greatest risk of injury but whether the applicant knew the truck driver would probably be seriously injured" [39]. The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the applicant did not seek to make a distinction between damage and destruction at trial [48] and in any event, any disconformity between the indictment and the way the case was run at trial could have been resolved by amending the indictment [49].
The court also dismissed the appeal against sentence. The court rejected Ground 1, finding that while the judge incorrectly approached s 10(1) as if it called for an assessment of a non-parole period for the s 15B offence alone, the answer the judge gave to that assessment demonstrated that "there was never any possibility of a non-parole period for the whole of the offending of less than four years" and that there was no basis to consider that the judge could have found substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a non-parole period of less than four years [94]. The court further held that, "When regard is had to the additional criminality of the conduct underpinning [the Intentionally destroy property charge], we are satisfied that any error in applying the ‘special reasons’ provisions could not have played any role in the sentence imposed on the individual charges or in setting the non-parole period" [94].
The court also rejected Ground 2, holding that the two charges were very serious, and separate, offences and the extent to which the sentences were to be made concurrent was the discretion of the sentencing judge [99]. The court further rejected Ground 3, holding that neither the sentence nor its constituent parts were wholly outside the permissible range [100]. The court noted that the offending was grave and "exceptionally dangerous conduct" that had "very serious consequences" for which the conduct needed to be denounced and punished [103]. The appellant did not have the utilitarian benefit of a plea and there was no evidence of remorse [103].
Laa v The Queen [2020] VSCA 136 (28 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Offences: Using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence; Aggravated burglary; Common assault; Making a threat to kill.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The findings by the judge concerning the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects for rehabilitation, were not supported by the evidence.
Facts: The male applicant commenced a relationship with the female victim in 2006 and the couple had two children together. Their relationship involved periods of separation and reconciliation. During the periods of separation, the applicant would stay at the victim’s house overnight on the days he would see the children. However, the overnight stays and the regular visits to see the children ceased after several arguments between the applicant and the victim. One night, the applicant sent the victim 14 text messages, threatening to come after her and kill her. The next morning, the applicant went to the victim’s house and banged on the front door repeatedly. The victim told the applicant to leave and that she had called police. The applicant tried to break open a sliding door with an outdoor chair but failed, so smashed two front windows and entered the house through the unlocked front door. The victim secured herself and the children in her bedroom by placing a wedge under the door but the applicant forced the door open. The victim was on the phone to 000, so the applicant took the phone, terminated the call and hit the victim repeatedly on the head, face and neck with the phone. The children were crying as this occurred.
The victim fled outside but the applicant followed her and dragged her indoors where he forced her to the ground, choked her and told her he would kill her and her family. The applicant took the children and placed them in the car, then returned and punched the victim in the face, knocking her to the ground. He drove off (during which time the victim called 000) but returned and started banging on the front door again. The victim let him in because she did not want to antagonise him. The applicant locked the front door and punched her in the face a number of times, telling her that he would kill her whole family. Police arrived and arrested the applicant who denied the assaults and the threats to kill. He was convicted on all charges and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and two months.
At trial, the court accepted that the applicant was a refugee from South Sudan [20] and that he began drinking excessive quantities of alcohol due to his financial struggles and it was in this context that the offending occurred [23].
Judgment: The court dismissed the appeal. In rejecting Ground 1, the court held that the offending was particularly serious and the applicant’s moral culpability was high [53], despite the mitigating factors being "quite substantial" [55]. The court noted that "confrontational aggravated burglaries, in the setting of an underlying domestic dispute, are all too prevalent in our society. They are calculated to cause lasting and serious physical and emotional harm to the victim. By their nature, such offences have the potential to escalate into incidents that result in serious harm and, on occasion, human tragedy" [50]. As a result, general deterrence is of significance in such cases [50], as is condemnation by the courts of such conduct [51]. The court further noted that "The courts have made it clear that acts of violence in a domestic setting, and in particular by men towards women, are utterly abhorrent and unacceptable" and the fact that the assaults occurred in the presence of the couple’s children was a serious aggravating factor, a "serious breach of [the applicant’s] duty as a parent towards his own children" and an "appalling example" of behaviour for the children, particularly the son [52].
The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the delay between the date of offending and the date the applicant entered a guilty plea (22 months) was a sufficient basis for the judge to entertain genuine reservations about the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects of rehabilitation [42], despite a plea of guilty often being an indicator of genuine remorse [45].
Ballantyne v The Queen [2020] VSCA 115 (11 May 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Early plea’ – ‘Loaded firearm’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Offences: Carrying a loaded firearm in a place with reckless disregard for the safety of another x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1; Possessing drug of dependence x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order x 2; Failing to store a category A/B long arm correctly x 1; Failing to store category A/B long arm ammunition correctly x 1; Possessing a prohibited weapon x 1
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issue: Whether sentence was manifestly excessive.
Facts: The appellant man and female victim had been in a relationship for 14 years and were married at the time of the offending. The appellant threatened to kill himself in front of the victim, leaving the house and returning with a shotgun. He swung the shotgun in front of the victim like a baseball bat, then touched the barrel to her forehead before pushing it into her eye socket and threatening to kill her "slowly" [25]. The appellant fired a shot into the TV then pointed the gun back at the victim’s head and threatened to shoot her again [25]. The victim was held like this for around three hours. The appellant plead guilty and was sentenced to four years and three months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years and six months. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant alleged that he did not remember the incident. Medical evidence was also tendered showing that the appellant had a history of depression and alcohol abuse, but that he had committed to make improvements and had ceased alcohol and prescription medication [17].
The appellant appealed against this sentence on the following grounds:
1.
The individual sentences on charges 1 and 2 and the total effective sentence are manifestly excessive.
2.
The non-parole period is manifestly excessive and in particular:
1.
The ratio of 17.65% of the head sentence is manifestly low having regard to the fact that the applicant had no relevant prior convictions and his prospects for rehabilitation were relatively good;
2.
The purported reason for this ratio that ‘… there is potently no remorse …’ … was not a good reason for denying the applicant a greater period of parole; and
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding that in the circumstances there was ‘… potently no remorse …’ ….
3.
The learned sentencing judge erred in finding that there was a complete absence of remorse, and as a result the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
Held: The court refused to uphold ground 1 as the sentences were not manifestly excessive. The conduct founding the Making a threat to kill charge "constituted a very serious example of the offence" [25] and that, balancing the seriousness of the offending with the mitigating factors (see [24]), the sentence was proportionate [26] and punished the appellant to an extent just in all the circumstances [28]. Even though the sentence imposed was more lengthy than the general trend for the offence of threat to kill in recent cases, "[s]entences in comparable cases … are not precedents which must be applied", but each case must turn on its own facts [28].
However, the court upheld ground 2, providing that the finding by the sentencing judge that the appellant was not remorseful did not justify the imposition of a relatively high non-parole period [32]. The purpose of fixing a non-parole period is to "provide for mitigation of the punishment of the prisoner in favour of his rehabilitation through conditional freedom, when appropriate" (Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623 at 629). The court substituted a non-parole period of two years and six months [33].
Furthermore, the court partially upheld ground 3, finding that the trial judge erred in finding that there was a complete absence of remorse. The court provided that it considered "that there was some evidence of remorse to be drawn from the early pleas of guilty and from the applicant’s insight and incipient commitment to reform" [19]. The court referred to its reasons for finding against the remainder of ground 3 (namely, whether the sentences and non-parole period were manifestly excessive).
Zakkour v The Queen [2020] VSCA 72 (26 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order possession of weapon’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Criminal damage x 1; attempt to pervert the course of justice x 1; possess prohibited weapon x 1; contravene family violence intervention order x 1
Case Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence for possess prohibited weapon
Facts: In 2019, the applicant went to his former partner’s property and caused damage. He was arrested the next day, and police searched his vehicle and found a home-made laser pointer. While in custody, he made telephone calls whereby he attempted to have people call his former partner and ask her to withdraw her police statement. The applicant pleaded guilty to criminal damage, and attempting to pervert the course of justice. He also pleaded guilty to 2 summary offences, carrying a prohibited weapon and contravening a family violence intervention order. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months. The individual sentence imposed on the weapon offence was 2 months’ imprisonment to be served cumulatively on the sentences for the other offending.
Ground: The sentence and the order for cumulation on this charge was manifestly excessive because, inter alia, the offending was not aggravated in any material way and the accused pleaded guilty to the offence at the earliest available opportunity.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence on the weapon offence, and ordered that the applicant be convicted and discharged on that charge. The applicant’s counsel submitted that the laser pointer had not been used as a weapon, and that it was not used in connection with any of the other offending. Despite the fact that the applicant had prior convictions for possessing controlled and prohibited weapons, it was clear that the sentence for the weapon offence was "egregiously excessive", given the intrinsic nature of the weapon, the lack of material as to whether the applicant had or would have used it, and the complete absence of evidence supporting the sentencing judge’s findings that it was potentially dangerous and could cause injury ([18]). As a consequence, the total effective sentence was amended to 22 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 months.
Tedford v The Queen [2020] VSCA 71 (26 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Motor vehicle’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide attempt’
Charges: Attempted murder x1; Reckless conduct endangering persons of serious injury x1.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Ground: The individual sentence on Charge 2, order for cumulation, total effective sentence and non-parole period are manifestly excessive, having regard to the five-year maximum penalty for the offence, the fact that it was committed in the context of a suicide attempt, and the significant factors in mitigation, including the applicant’s early pleas of guilty, advanced age and ill health, and prior good character.
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on the charge of attempted murder of his wife and two years and six months’ imprisonment on the charge of reckless conduct endangering persons of serious injury for driving his vehicle into a train. On year of the sentence or chare 2 was cumulative on the sentence for charge 1, resulting in a total effective sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.
The applicant 77 year old man and female victim were married but had separated at the time of offending, the wife moving out of the family home into a bungalow at the back of the property. On the day of offending, the applicant and victim had consumed a large amount of alcohol together and the applicant became argumentative [5]. The victim suggested the applicant see a psychologist. That evening, the applicant told a friend that he felt depressed, he needed his wife to look after him to survive and that "if anything were to happen to him, [the friend] should make sure he claimed a Holden Kingswood motor car presently garaged at the applicant’s home" [5]. Two hours later, the applicant entered the wife’s bungalow and deadlocked the door behind him before saying "I’ve got something for you" and producing a large knife [6]. He proceeded to stab the victim 13 times, including defensive injuries, mostly to the chest and arms. The applicant stated that he was going to kill both himself and the victim during the attack. The victim also suffered blunt force trauma and other lacerations before managing to escape the offender when he fell over and struck his head.
The applicant then drove away from the property. "A dash camera recorded him in a confused, angry and emotional state of mind. He expressed disbelief that he had not killed his wife [and] then discussed with himself how he could kill himself" [8]. The applicant then proceeded the drive his car into a train. "The train struck the driver’s side of the applicant’s car, pushing it for a considerable distance. No one on the train was injured" [8] and the applicant did not sustain substantial injuries.
Judgment: Leave to appeal against sentence was refused [41]. To demonstrate manifest excess "an applicant must demonstrate that the impugned sentence is ‘wholly outside the range’ of sentences available for that particular offence in the relevant circumstances" [29]. Likewise "arguments for excessive cumulation must fail unless an applicant can demonstrate that the order for cumulation is manifestly excessive" [30]. The sentence for the reckless conduct charge was not manifestly excessive: "[w]hilst a sentence of 50 per cent of the maximum available upon a plea of guilty to a man in the applicant’s circumstances can reasonably be viewed as ‘stern’, we are not persuaded that it is beyond the range of sentences reasonably available to his Honour."[36] The cumulation of one year upon the base sentence for attempted murder was also not manifestly excessive. The sentence for attempted murder "represents less than a third of the maximum penalty available for what was an appalling example of domestic violence, committed with homicidal intent. Whilst old age, ill health and an almost pristine criminal history all counted in the applicant’s favour, in the face of his conduct towards his wife, it could not count for a great deal" [38]. The sentence was moderate in all the circumstances. In considering the appropriate degree of cumulation the sentencing judge appropriately considered "the temporal and circumstantial relationship between the offences" and specifically considered the sentencing factors such as overall criminality, general deterrence and the principle of totality.
The court also rejected Ground 2, finding that the delay between the date of offending and the date the applicant entered a guilty plea (22 months) was a sufficient basis for the judge to entertain genuine reservations about the applicant’s level of remorse, and his prospects of rehabilitation [42], despite a plea of guilty often being an indicator of genuine remorse [45].
Guirguis v The Queen [2020] VSCA 48 (13 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Community correction order’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Uncharged act’
Charges: Sexual assault x 1; Make threat to kill x 1
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man and the female victim were in a relationship for 11 years and had 2 children. The relationship terminated in 2016. Before the relationship ended the applicant allegedly forced the victim to engage in oral sex (Charge 1) and, months later, told the victim that he would ‘slit her throat’ if she ever left with the children (Charge 2). The applicant also said he would ‘take [the children] out too’ which constituted an uncharged act. In 2016, an interim protection order was granted in favour of the victim and the children, and in 2017 a final intervention order was made for an indefinite period. Relevantly, the applicant had been sentenced at the Magistrate’s Court in early-2017 to 91 days’ imprisonment, combined with an 18 month Community Correction Order for other offending against the victim that occurred on the same date on which the offending giving rise to Charge 2 in the present matter occurred ([3]-[14]).
In sentencing the applicant, the judge recognised that the victim suffered profound trauma as a result of the applicant’s degrading, cruel and humiliating treatment of her. These adverse effects continuously and significantly affected her. Given the seriousness of the offending, there was a need for stern punishment to achieve general and specific deterrence and denunciation ([22]). The applicant, on pleas of guilty, was sentenced to 23 months’ imprisonment in combination with a 3-year Community Correction Order (CCO). The sentence imposed in early-2017 and time that the applicant had spent in a residential drug rehabilitation clinic were relevant to totality.
Issue: The applicant completed the term of 23 months’ imprisonment in February 2019 and sought leave to appeal on the grounds that the sentence of imprisonment followed by a 3-year CCO is manifestly excessive.
Held: The Court refused leave to appeal ([38]). The two offences constituted serious acts of family violence and the offending was not isolated ([33]). Further, a CCO was necessarily and properly punitive, and was structured towards advancing the applicant’s rehabilitation and community protection ([34]). It could not be said that the decision to attach a CCO to the term of 23 months’ imprisonment was clearly or wholly outside the range open to the sentencing judge, and there was no error of principle ([36]). The offending was ‘grave’ as the applicant’s conduct towards the victim was ‘cruel and degrading’, ‘designed to be humiliating and hurtful’, and resulted in substantial trauma ([37]). The sexual assault was described as a ‘humiliating and degrading act’. Further, the threat to kill was ‘chilling and menacing, and had a traumatic and ongoing effect’ on the victim ([33]). The conduct resulted in profound trauma.
Vu v The Queen [2020] VSCA 59 (23 March 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Totality principle’
Offences: manslaughter x1; attempted murder x1and recklessly causing serious injury x1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant man and the female victim lived together in a domestic relationship for many years and had two children together. In 2013 the applicant was charged with drug-related offences and imprisoned for three years. During this time, the female and male victims commenced a relationship and were married. Shortly before the applicant was released, the male victim moved out of the female’s house and into a nearby residence. They continued their relationship in secret after the applicant was released and resumed living with the female victim.
The applicant was later informed of the victims’ relationship and confronted them about it. The victims’ stated they were just friends, but the applicant refused to accept their denials. The applicant then grabbed a hunting knife he had previously hidden and stabbed both victims in the chest. The male victim died at the scene and the female was seriously injured, though there was no evidence of any permanent or ongoing impairment as a result of the injury.
Applicant was charged with murder of the male victim and attempted murder of the female victim and in the alternative either intentionally or recklessly causing serious injury. Prior to trial the applicant offered in writing to plead guilty to manslaughter. No offer was made in respect to the charges relating to the female victim’s injuries. Following trial he was convicted of the manslaughter of the male victim and recklessly causing serious injury to the female victim. He was given a total effective sentence of 15 year’s imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years.
Grounds of appeal:
•
The order for cumulation was excessive and thereby infringed the totality principle.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by granting the applicant only a modest benefit for the utilitarian value of his plea offer.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by granting the applicant no benefit for his plea offer other than for its utilitarian value.
•
The learned sentencing judge erred by not treating the applicant’s post-offence conduct as mitigatory.
•
The individual sentences imposed for both offences, the order for cumulation and the total effective sentence were manifestly excessive, particularly in light of:
◦
The totality principle (see ground 1 above);
◦
The finding that the recklessly causing serious injury was mid-range example of the offence;
◦
The applicant’s offer to plead guilty (see grounds 2 and 3 above);
◦
The mitigatory effect of the applicant’s conduct immediately after the offending (see ground 4 above);
◦
There being, it is argued, some evidence of remorse, acceptance of responsibility and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice;
◦
The finding that the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation are ‘quite good’;
◦
The finding that specific deterrence ‘does not loom large’ in this case.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal on against sentence on grounds 1 and 5 (in part), limited to the order for cumulation only. The order for cumulation was quashed and ordered a total effective sentence of 13 years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years.
In regard to Grounds 2 and 3, the Court held the sentencing judge was entitled to consider the utilitarian value of the applicant’s offer to plead guilty as ‘relatively modest’ given the overall circumstances of the case and rejected the second ground. While the offender offered to plead guilty, this is not necessarily a sign of remorse and agreed with the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the offer was most likely motivated by pragmatic considerations [40], thus also rejecting the third ground. In light of the Court’s rejection of an inference of remorse, they noted that the sentencing judge’s reasoning "embraced a consideration of the entirety of [the] post-offence conduct, favourable and unfavourable to the applicant" and rejected the fourth ground [44].
Turning to Grounds 1 and 5, the Court noted that while the individual sentences were each particularly stern but not wholly outside the range of sentencing discretion [48], this was not the case for the order for cumulation. "Given the very significant overlap in time, context and conduct, and particularly, the high sentences imposed on both charges, [the Court] consider[s] that the principles of totality and proportionality ought to have operated to moderate the order for cumulation to a considerably greater extent" [54]
Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 26 (20 February 2020) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Credibility’ – ‘Fair trial’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Lack of disclosure’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Retrial’
Charges: Charges 1 and 2 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury – acquitted following trial); Charges 3 and 4 (intentionally causing injury – acquitted - and alternatively recklessly causing injury - convicted); Charge 5 (common law assault - acquitted)
Case Type: Application for leave to appeal against conviction on charge 4
Facts: The charges related to two occasions on which the applicant man was alleged to have assaulted the complainant woman, with whom he was then in a de facto relationship. Charges 1 and 2 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury) concerned an allegation that the applicant threw the complainant, causing her to hit her head. Charges 3 and 4 (intentionally causing injury and alternatively recklessly causing injury) related to an allegation that the applicant, on a different day, grabbed the complainant’s arms and held her down, causing bruising to her arms and back. It was alleged that immediately after that incident, the applicant also pushed her, constituting the basis of Charge 5 (common law assault). The applicant was found guilty of Charge 4, acquitted on the other charges and, following a plea, was convicted and fined $4,000 ([1]-[4]).
After verdict, the prosecution served a victim impact statement from the complainant, to which a document called ‘Initial report - Recommendation for more than five hours of counselling’ was attached. The report noted that the complainant consulted a psychologist and recounted events the subject of Charges 3 and 4. The appellant submitted that this was the first occasion, known to him, that the complainant had given a different account in which it was suggested that he had thrown her across the room against the wall ([9]-[10]). Applying the principles in R v Nguyen and Tran to the relevant evidence, the appellant submitted that although the report existed at the time of trial, he exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining relevant records and this had failed to result in the production of the report. It was argued that his legal representatives sought disclosure of various documents which would have included the report; that he sought production of the victim impact statement during committal proceedings and the complainant refused to provide it at that time; and that he obtained a subpoena to compel the complainant to produce the victim impact statement. The appellant contended that as he was acquitted on Charges 1, 2 and 5 and given the case largely turned on the complainant’s evidence, the existence of a different version of events as evidenced in the report potentially further undermined the complainant’s credibility ([12]-[13]).
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The prosecution failed to disclose relevant information in its possession; and
2.
fresh evidence that is now available since the time of conviction would have led the jury to hold a reasonable doubt as to the applicant’s guilt or would have given rise to a significant possibility that the jury would have held such doubt.
The respondent conceded Ground 2, and in light of this, the applicant did not press Ground 1 ([5]-[6])
Held: Having decided Ground 2 was established, the Court was required to determine whether to order a new trial or enter a judgment of acquittal. The report met the threshold for fresh evidence and, had the evidence been before the jury, there was a significant possibility that the appellant would have been acquitted on Charge 4 ([18]).
In determining whether to order a new trial, the Court considered that the appellant would be compromised in his ability to test the complainant’s evidence on Charge 4 by reference to the inconsistencies in the complainant’s account of events which underpinned Charges 1, 2 and 5. Any disadvantage to the appellant would be particularly acute in relation to Charge 5 which was so closely tied in time and context to Charge 4 ([35]). The Court drew an analogy with R v Bartlett ([37]), and held that a retrial of Charge 4 alone would be ‘unfair’. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction on Charge 4 and entered judgment of acquittal on that charge ([39]).
The Court emphasised the public interest in seeing allegations of domestic violence, where there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, being prosecuted in accordance with the law ([25]). The gravity of domestic violence is not solely measured by the extent of the physical injury. Women and children ‘who suffer the brunt of domestic violence’ are entitled to feel safe and secure in their own homes. Other ‘very important factors’ the Court will consider in assessing the severity of a particular offence include the breach of trust reposed in a domestic partner and the compromising of the security of the home ([26]).
Director of Public Prosecutions v Ristevski [2019] VSCA 287 (06 December 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Remorse’
Offence: Manslaughter
Proceedings: Crown appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether sentence was manifestly inadequate;
Whether sentence was manifestly inadequate;
(a)
failed to fix a sentence commensurate with the circumstances of the offending, giving too much weight to the lack of information about the unlawful and dangerous act;
(b)
failed to have sufficient regard to significant aggravating features when determining the nature and the objective gravity of the offending (cf the circumstances of the killing), particularly in the context of family violence and the breach of trust;
(c)
failed to have sufficient regard to the impact of the Respondent’s offending on the victims;
(d)
failed to give sufficient weight to the principles of general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and just punishment;
(e)
failed to have sufficient regard to the maximum penalty for the offence; and
(f)
placed too much weight on the matters in mitigation, particularly in light of the lack of remorse, including the Respondent’s plea of guilty and prospects of rehabilitation.
Facts: The exact events surrounding the offence are unclear. What is known is that the respondent husband "killed [the victim (his wife) by unlawful and dangerous act(s); put her body into the body of her car; and disposed of [and concealed] her body in a remote location" [4]. When later questioned about his wife, the offender lied to relatives and police by claiming that she "had left the family home after they had an argument saying that she was going to clear her head" but never returned [5].
There was no evidence of earlier domestic violence in the relationship. He was convicted on his plea of guilty to manslaugter following a contested committal where the charge was murder.
Held: The offender was resentenced by majority to 13 years’ imprisonment with non-parole period of 10 years.
The sentence was held to be manifestly inadequate, with Priest JA stating the "sentence imposed on the respondent was far too low to reflect the needs of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment". The disposal of the wife’s body was treated as a significant aggravating factor and "emblematic of [the offender’s] complete lack of remorse" [73]. The domestic setting of the offence was also an aggravating circumstance, with Ferguson CJ and Whelan JA providing that while "there was a time when the seriousness of such domestic violence offences was not properly recognised. That is no longer the case…[The wife] should have been able to live without any fear in her own home. It should have been a safe place for her" [10]. General deterrence and denunciation were particularly significant. These factors were not sufficiently outweighed by the offender’s previous good character, prospects of rehabilitation or the utilitarian value of his guilty plea.
DPP v Smith [2019] VSCA 266 (21 November 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Intervention order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: 3 x causing injury intentionally; 1 x false imprisonment; 1 x rape; 1 x make a threat to kill; 2 x contravention of Final Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending involved intentionally causing physical injury, threatening to kill, false imprisonment, rape and breaching FVIOs. The respondent and complainant were in an intermittent de facto relationship for a few years prior to the offending. The respondent was sentenced to 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years.
Issue: The appellant appealed against the sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly inadequate, and that the learned sentencing judge failed to:
•
Properly consider the objective gravity of the offending;
•
Give sufficient weight to the sentencing principles of just punishment, denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence and community protection;
•
Give sufficient weight to the maximum penalties for the offences; and
•
Give sufficient weight to the impact of the offending on the victim.
Held: Manifest inadequacy is difficult to establish ([28]). Nevertheless, the respondent was re-sentenced to 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years. Notwithstanding the factors relied upon in mitigation ([21]), several of the individual sentences imposed and the orders for cumulation were found to be inadequate, and therefore produced a total effective sentence that was below the range of sentences available to the sentencing judge so as to reveal an error of principle ([28]). Personal factors included: history of drug and alcohol abuse; criminal history which included a number of dishonesty and drug matters, assault and robbery, intentionally and recklessly causing injury, and failure to comply with court orders; a disadvantaged and dysfunctional upbringing; and low cognitive functioning. However, in the Court’s view, there was a need for both specific and general deterrence, given the respondent’s long history of violence, especially towards the complainant ([34]-[35]). The offending in question was ‘brutish, cowardly…and calculated to humiliate and degrade a powerless, diminutive woman’ ([32]). The Court also noted that ‘people considering similar brutal, degrading abuse of a domestic partner must understand that the courts have a duty to protect vulnerable members of [the] community and will not hesitate to impose stern punishment upon wrongdoers’ ([35]).
DPP v Evans [2019] VSCA 239 (25 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attack on former partner's new partner’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Causing serious injury intentionally x 1
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent pleaded guilty following a self-serving confession 4 years after the assault having previously denied all involvement several times. The DPP appealed the sentence and non-parole period. The complainant, who had been involved in a domestic relationship with the respondent’s estranged wife, sustained life-altering and life-threatening injuries as a result of being struck with a metal bar. The original sentence was 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.
Issues: Whether the individual sentence and non-parole period are each manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal allowed and resentenced to 7 years and 6 months with non-parole period of 4 years 6 months. The discount given for the respondent’s confession was too great, as the respondent’s admissions did not go so far as to warrant a full discount.
The court also considered that the seriousness of offending called for a stern response and strong denunciation, as this was a case of extraordinary violence which had a devastating impact on the victim ([83]).
"[84] There is a further important consideration, that of general deterrence. This was a violent act of reprisal following the breakup of the respondent’s marriage, expressing his animosity and anger towards the person who had been his wife’s partner. Although there are differences between a case like this and a direct attack against a former partner, they are closely related. Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. It is never justified. The sentences imposed must convey that message strongly.
[85] For similar reasons, nothing should be said in sentencing reasons to suggest that statements by such an offender to the effect of ‘I just snapped’ or ‘I’d had enough’ in any way mitigate the seriousness of the offending or reduce the offender’s moral culpability. Such self-justifying statements are, regrettably, all too common in cases of family violence. Marital breakdown is stressful and upsetting for all concerned. But a resort to violence can never be condoned.
Tan v The Queen [2019] VSCA 226 (14 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Physical harm and violence -separation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant was sentenced to 5 years 6 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months. The applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive given that the offending was not at the median of offending for the type of offence.
The victim of the incident was the applicant’s de facto partner. Around the time of offending, the applicant sent the victim a series of text messages asking for money, which the victim refused. The applicant was angered by the refusal and when he returned to the couple’s home, he started verbally abusing her. He pushed her off the bed, injuring the victim’s knee, before pulling back on to the bed with his hand around her throat. Threatening to kill the victim, the applicant obtained a knife from the kitchen and pushed it against the victim’s throat while she was still on the bed. This caused a superficial laceration. The owner of the apartment became aware of the altercation and called the police. While the owner was on the phone the victim tried to push the applicant off her, causing him to slash her on the left arm with the knife.
The applicant pleaded guilty prior to the committal hearing despite previously denying he was the aggressor. The judge "accepted this plea as being ‘indicative of some remorse’" [19].
Issue: Whether sentence was manifestly excessive
Decision and reasoning: The sentence was manifestly excessive. A sentence of 4 years 3 months was substituted.
There was no finding that the wound to the victim’s arm was deliberately inflicted, unlike the laceration to her neck. When compared to more serious cases (Marrah, Nolan [63]) of the same offence this was significantly less serious. Ashley and Weinberg JJA state that ‘it is the fact that, despite the limited utility of raw sentencing statistics, the sentence imposed in this case was not far short of twice the median length of imprisonment for the offence over the 2016/2017 year, and that over the five-year period ending 2017 only a very small number of those imprisoned for this particular offence were subject to a sentence exceeding five years. Underlining the severity of the sentence imposed here, by no means did all persons sentenced for this offence in the five year period receive a custodial disposition.’[65]
Nevertheless, the court also pointed out that despite the sentence being manifestly excessive, this conclusion "does not gainsay the need for sentences for this offence, committed in a domestic setting, to reflect the need for general deterrence, specific deterrence … and protection of the community as pertinent sentencing considerations" and noted that "sentences for this offence, committed in a domestic setting, have increased in recent years." ([63]).
Ivanov (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 219 (8 October 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Perpetrator self-reported to police’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Victim testified in favour of perpetrator’
Offences: Rape x 2
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been partners for 22 years and had three children together. The appellant found out that the victim had been having an affair for the last five years. He lost self-control and raped the victim, verbally abusing her during the assault while she just lay there. Afterwards, the appellant felt terrible and apologised. Two days later, the appellant discovered more details of the affair and lost control and raped the victim again. The couple cried together afterwards and the appellant apologised many times. The day after this, the appellant became concerned that the victim would try to harm herself and the appellant felt guilty about what he had done, so he reported his actions to a mental health clinician. The clinician alerted police and arrested the appellant who plead guilty immediately. The victim never intended to report the offending and saw police involvement in their marriage as ridiculous.
At the sentencing hearing, the victim gave evidence in support of the appellant and told the court that this was a private matter for the appellant and the victim to work out together. She testified that she wanted the appellant to be released as soon as possible so that the couple could start repairing what had happened, but that this had not been allowed to occur because of the imposition of an Intervention Order. Despite this, the judge sentenced the appellant to nine and a half years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years.
Grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge failed to synthesise properly the sworn and mostly unchallenged evidence of the victim. Specifically, the sentencing judge made findings on the impact of the offending that:
(a)
were not open to the judge or not properly founded on the victim’s evidence, and
(b)
failed, in the circumstances, to accord the appellant procedural fairness.
2.
The sentencing judge’s discretion miscarried as a result of the judge’s findings regarding remorse and the circumstances of the appellant’s own reporting of his crime. Specifically, the judge erred by:
3.
The individual sentences, the total effective sentence and non-parole period were manifestly excessive.
(a)
departing from the agreed statement of facts, and
(b)
denying the appellant, in the circumstances, procedural fairness.
Judgment: The court allowed all grounds of appeal, holding that the sentences were manifestly excessive and resentencing the appellant to four years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years. The court held that while the appellant’s behaviour was reprehensible [2] and involved a "grave breach of trust and violation of … bodily integrity" [153], "the prison sentences in this case must be much shorter than would ordinarily be required" [10]. This was because of two exceptional factors: 1) the appellant’s self-reporting and confession (without which he never would have been prosecuted), and 2) the victim’s "remarkable and powerful evidence" [10]. The court stressed that this was "an exceptional case" [1] and "these are wholly extraordinary circumstances calling for an equally extraordinary response" [10]. However, the court noted that denunciation and just punishment were relevant sentences factors in this case [153].
The court noted that a twelve-month Intervention Order was previously taken out against the appellant on behalf of the victim for smashing food into the victim’s face. However, the couple remained living together and their sexual relationship continued [17]. The court noted that the couple got divorced (because the appellant was frustrated that the victim worked so much), but continued to live together as if nothing had changed [20]. They did not tell the children of the divorce. The victim testified that she was the "Alpha female" and "glory parent" and would only see the children two or three times a week, and that the appellant was the sole carer of the children, the one who did all the hard work [21].
Regarding Ground 1, the court accepted that the sentencing judge erroneously found that the impact on the victim (who would now have to arrange for care of the children and explain the appellant’s absence to them) was an aggravating factor, as opposed to a mitigating factor [84]. The court also accepted that it was not open to the judge to have qualified the mitigation resulting from the reduced psychological and emotional impact of the offending on the victim in the way the judge did [95] and that the judge erred in qualifying the mitigatory effect of the victim’s evidence by being "mindful of the complex nature of the potential damage resulting from sexual offences committed in the context of family violence, which may not be readily apparent" [102]. While the court accepted the sentencing judge’s comments regarding the nature of sexual violence in a family setting and held that it was "therefore appropriate for sentencing judges to be cautious when confronted with evidence of forgiveness by victims of violence, whether sexual or otherwise" [103], the court held that each case turns on its own facts. In this case, there was no evidence that the relationship was afflicted by family violence or that the victim was persuaded to reconcile by the appellant [106]. The court noted that "There is not the slightest suggestion that [the victim] gave this evidence as woman ground down by years of ill-treatment and ensnared in a relationship from which she found it impossible to escape" [5].
The court also upheld Ground 2, finding that the fact that the appellant could not remember certain things was "not inconsistent with a high level of remorse" in part because the appellant consistently make extensive admissions about his conduct to police but also consistently told police that there were parts he could not remember [123]. The court accepted that there was overwhelming positive evidence of remorse [124]. The court considered that it was not open to qualify the level of the appellant’s remorse on the basis that his reporting of the offending was about the victim, not the appellant’s crimes [125].
The court further upheld Ground 3, holding that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive because they failed to reflect all relevant considerations (including the appellant’s early pleas, remorse, previous good character, hardship involved in his imprisonment, and strong prospects of rehabilitation) and the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the two exceptional factors outlined above [139].
The court noted that the resentenced non-parole period was shorter than what otherwise might be imposed, but that this would still adequately reflect all of the sentencing purposes mentioned [166].
Degney v The Queen [2019] VSCA 183 (19 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence imposed for the offence of attempted aggravated burglary (3 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment) on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. The applicant and victim lived together at the time of the offending, and were in a relationship ‘on and off’ for around 6 years.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, having regard to the objective gravity of the offending, the applicant’s limited criminal history and youth, the early plea of guilty and current sentencing practices.
Held: The applicant submitted that his criminal history was ‘limited and relatively minor’ ([32]). He had previously been sentenced, without conviction, to a community correction order (‘CCO’) for offences, including a charge of unlawful assault, charges of possession and use of cannabis and descending onto a railway track ([26]). He did not complete the CCO and was subsequently fined ([27]). The applicant contended that the offending was not towards the ‘serious end of the spectrum’ as it was brief, was not committed in company, and there was limited evidence of planning. He argued that there was only an intention to assault, not an intention to inflict actual physical harm ([31]).
The Court held that the seriousness of the offending was increased by factors, such as the fact that it involved ‘an attempted forced intrusion into a residence’ during the night, while possessing a ‘menacing weapon … with an intention to assault a terrified and vulnerable domestic partner’ by creating fear ([45]). His efforts to enter the premises were persistent and threatening ([46]), and his conduct could not be described as brief or short-lived as had been submitted by the applicant ([48]). His conduct was viewed within the context of his earlier abusive behaviour towards the victim ([47]). The absence of an intention to physically harm the victim and of a history of family violence was found not to diminish the inherent gravity of the offending ([49], [53]). Significantly, the offending was committed in circumstances of family violence, which aggravated the offending ([50]). His conduct was motivated by a sense of entitlement, which reflected on his moral culpability and exemplified ‘the very worst of male attitudes towards women’ ([51]). As a result, general deterrence was an important sentencing purpose ([52]).
Mitigating factors included the applicant’s early guilty plea, relative youth, limited prior history and remorse ([62]); however, when balanced against the objective gravity of the offending, these factors did not persuade the Court that the sentence was wholly outside the range of sentences reasonably available to the sentencing judge ([62]). The Court also noted the dearth of sentencing decisions involving attempted aggravated burglary ([58-[59]). Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the appeal against the sentence.
Lim v The Queen [2019] VSCA 182 (16 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Contravening a family violence order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Offences: Aggravated burglary; intentionally causing injury x2; threat to kill x2; persistently breaching a family violence intervention order; summary assault x1; summary offence of using a drug of dependence; and unlawful assault.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
•
Whether sentence on summary assault exceeded maximum penalty;
•
Whether the individual sentences and orders for cumulation, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive;
•
Whether the sentencing judge paid insufficient regard to the principle of totality; and
•
Whether the sentencing judge erred in treating the applicant’s prior convictions as relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the applicant’s offending.
While drunk and drug-affected, the applicant forced his way into the home of his female ex-partner, the protected person in a FVIO to which he was the respondent. Upon entering, he grabbed KC’s father, threatened to kill him and chocked him in a sleeper hold to the point of unconsciousness. He followed KC as she fled the home and similarly choked and threatened her in the presence of her young daughter, continuing the choke hold until a police officer struck him with a torch and placed him in a headlock, having failed to subdue him with pepper spray. An elderly neighbour tried to comfort those at the scene but was also threatened by the applicant. When police arrived, they were only able to subdue the applicant with force.
The applicant persistently breached a family violence intervention order during the month leading up to the offence and had previously committed violent offences against KC and her father. He entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of nine years and seven months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years. The sentencing judge described the offending as "very grave", "sustained and dangerous", "gratuitous" and "cruel and chilling". Sentencing considerations were general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and protection of the community. Weight was placed on the applicant’s significant criminal history and "selfish and cowardly" approach to relationships. Significant mitigating factors were raised on his behalf including his early pleas of guilty, remorse, medical conditions causing particular hardship in custody, and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.
Held: The first ground was conceded by the Crown. In respect to the second and third grounds, it was held that the sentence for aggravated burglary, cumulation, base sentence and resulting total effective sentence were all manifestly excessive and in breach of totality, providing that it is "likely that the judge placed too much weight on Mr Lim’s prior criminal history, was overwhelmed by the gravity of the offending or gave insufficient weight to the mitigating factors, or that some combination of these factors was operative" [122]. The sentence for unlawful assault was also held to be manifestly excessive.
The Court rejected the fourth ground of appeal as they considered using the offender’s prior convictions to inform an ‘assessment of the gravity of his crimes [was] not the same "as speaking of an assessment of the objective gravity of a crime" [53].
Nicholson (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 177 (14 August 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social abuse’
Charges: 1 x stalking; 1 x damage property; 1 x intentionally causing injury; 1 x sexual assault; 1 x commit indictable offence on bail; 3 x contravention of Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO)
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant and victim were in a relationship for about 3 years, and had married. They separated in 2016 due to infidelity and domestic violence issues. The charges to which the appellant pleaded guilty were contained in 2 separate indictments. 2 summary charges were brought against him. The appellant was subject to a Final FVIO in 2016 which he breached by attending the victim’s address, damaging her car, and coming within 5 metres of her on two occasions. He also stalked the victim by contacting her in breach of the Intervention Order ([9]-[17]), damaged her car ([21]), pinned her to the ground, and choked and sexually assaulted her by kissing her on the lips ([25]-[26]). The appellant also wrote the victim letters and emails over a period of several months that were threatening in nature. At the time of committing the offences, the appellant was on bail for other matters ([29]). The victim was injured as a result of the attack ([30]).
The sentencing judge concluded that the offending was serious, ‘protracted, violent and terrifying’, and sentenced the appellant to 6 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether the sentence and orders for cumulation were manifestly excessive, given the mitigating factors of the applicant’s health issues and the characterisation of offences.
Held: The Court dismissed the appeal as the total effective sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was not manifestly excessive and did not fail to adequately reflect the principle of totality ([75]-[81]). The offences were committed over a period of many months within the context of family violence. The damage caused to the victim’s property was found to be significant, planned and executed to cause harm ([56]). At [62], the Court noted that the sentencing judge correctly emphasised the seriousness of the offence of intentionally causing injury. The victim was frightened and threatened with words, such as ‘You are going to get it’ and ‘Just die’ ([61]). Further, the context of the sexual assault was considered to be ‘significant and inextricable’, as it occurred during a ‘frightening physical attack’, and was motivated by hatred and contempt ([66]). As for the 2 charges of contravention of the FVIO on the separate indictment, the Court did not consider the individual sentences to be manifestly excessive and that despite the applicant having no ability to carry out the threat as he was in custody, the fact that they contained death threats and were sent by someone who had previously employed threats of death made it very serious offending ([69]-[74]). As each offence was committed over an extended period of time, directed at the one person within the context of family violence, and escalated and continued even in custody, the overall criminality meant that the orders for cumulation was not manifestly excessive ([79]-[80]).
Kiril (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2019] VSCA 133 (14 June 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Elder abuse’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’
Offences: Reckless conduct endangering life
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, in particular that the Learned Sentencing Judge gave insufficient weight to the delay in these proceedings being finalised.
Facts: The male appellant and his wife severely neglected the 83-year-old victim, the appellant’s mother, who relied entirely upon them for care. The victim previously lived in a supported residential service where she was very healthy and active, and would routinely visit the doctor. However, her visits to the doctor (which included filling her prescriptions) declined and ceased altogether when she returned to live with the appellant. The victim was found dead in her bed in squalid conditions. She died as a result of bronchopneumonia in a setting of cerebral infarction, weighing only 34kg and covered in bruises and abrasions. The appellant plead guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 months. The appellant appealed this sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive because the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the delay in the proceedings being finalised.
Judgment: The court refused to allow the appeal, holding that the sentence was not manifestly excessive but could even be regarded as "lenient" [49], [54]. The court noted that "the proper approach for this Court to adopt is to consider the circumstances of the offence and those of the applicant, instinctively synthesising the aggravating features and those going in mitigation – including the considerable delay – to determine whether the sentence imposed by the judge is wholly outside the range open in the sound exercise of discretion" [41]. While the delay had been considerable (five years from the offending to sentencing) and the court held that "ordinarily, a delay of that order would constitute a very powerful mitigating factor" [43], in this case, the appellant did not have a lengthy period of rehabilitation (the court accepting that he had developed no insight into his offending and did not have good prospects of rehabilitation) nor did he suffer stress or anxiety as a result of the delay [43]-[45]. Beyond the delay, the court emphasised, there was little that mitigated the offence [46].
The court noted the seriousness of the offending, holding that the victim was in such poor condition "because of the applicant’s callous disregard for her welfare" [48]. It further accepted that the appellant’s treatment of his mother was "cruel, heartless and inhumane" [48]. Forrest JA held that the appellant "admitted he foresaw that his conduct placed [the victim] at an appreciable risk of death, and yet he continued to neglect her … I consider that conduct to be truly reprehensible" [53].
Milosev v The Queen [2019] VSCA 121 (3 June 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breaches of community correction order’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Drug dependency’ – ‘History of abuse of accused’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; theft x 1; recklessly causing serious injury x 1; conspiracy to commit theft x 1; breach of community correction order (CCO) x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant pleaded guilty to charges of aggravated burglary, theft, recklessly causing serious injury and conspiracy to commit theft. She was ordered to serve a community correction order (CCO), but was later charged with breaching that order and the mandatory terms contained in it. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective term of 15 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 months.
Issue: The applicant sought leave to appeal against the sentence on two grounds. The first ground was that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. It was also contended that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to 1) the impact of family violence suffered by the applicant, which compromised her ability to comply with the CCO; and 2) the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation. The second ground was that the sentencing judge erred by not deferring sentencing before making a finding that the applicant was ‘unwilling and unable’ to comply with a further CCO.
Held: The application for leave to appeal against the sentence was refused. The applicant’s counsel contended that the applicant’s capacity to fully comply with the terms of the CCO was affected by the domestic violence perpetrated on her by her partner ([20]). It was argued that the applicant was the ‘captive of her partner throughout the term of the [CCO]’, and found it difficult to leave him and the drug infected environment in which she was then living ([25]). Although the Court recognised that the applicant was clearly subjected to domestic violence by her ex-partner, their Honours noted that the materials placed before the sentencing judge did not sufficiently explain her substantial and repeated failures to comply with the conditions of her CCO ([48]). While it was understandable that the applicant, under the pressure of the domestic circumstances in which she was living, relapsed into drug use, it appeared that she sometimes managed to remove herself from the abuse. Taking those matters into account, and giving full weight to the impact of her partner’s conduct towards her, their Honours did not accept that the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the applicant was either unwilling or unable to comply with a further CCO ([49], [56]). No sufficient circumstances were put to the sentencing judge which would require him to defer sentencing ([56]).
Neil v R [2019] VSCA 64 (25 March 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: For about four months leading up to the victim’s death, the applicant and the victim were in an intimate relationship. In the period leading up to the incident, the applicant, Marmo (the applicant’s co-accused) and the victim were heavy ice users. On the day of the incident, the applicant was angry with the victim because she made a family violence complaint against him to police. The victim was savagely beaten by the applicant for ‘snitching and dobbing’ ([9]). Marmo and two other people were present. The applicant’s attack on the victim escalated, and involved kicking her to the head and body with extreme force. The victim later died and the applicant and Marmo agreed that Marmo should ‘dispose of her’, by dumping her body down a mineshaft and then burning it using petrol ([12]). The trial judge sentenced the applicant to a term of 26 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 22 years. Marmo was sentenced to a term of 24 years’ imprisonment ([3]).
Issues: The applicant seeks leave to appeal against his sentence on the following grounds:
•
The judge erred in applying the parity principle, for example, in that she imposed a greater sentence on the applicant than Marmo, even though the applicant pleaded guilty and Marmo pleaded not guilty, and where the applicant offered to give evidence against Marmo.
•
The non-parole period is manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The Court refused the applicant’s application for leave to appeal against the sentence. In determining the first ground of the appeal, the Court found nothing wrong with the trial judge’s conclusions about the respective roles of the applicant and Marmo. It was the conduct of the applicant that was ‘at the heart’ of the horrific offending and but for his anger with, and treatment of, the victim, her death would not have occurred ([42]). The Court was also unpersuaded that the applicant’s late plea of guilty required the trial judge to impose a lesser sentence than the sentence she imposed on Marmo ([43]). Overall, her Honour correctly differentiated the cases of the applicant and Marmo, and the Court therefore rejected the first ground of appeal ([44]).
The Court found that there was no substance in the applicant’s second ground of appeal, that the non-parole period was manifestly excessive. The fact that the non-parole period was almost 85% of the head sentence did not indicate any error. The higher the head sentence, the higher the percentage of the head sentence the non-parole period will likely be, and often it will exceed 80% ([46]). The non-parole period was not manifestly excessive in light of the circumstances of the applicant’s offending. The Court also held that the trial judge’s conclusions that a lower non-parole period need not be fixed on the basis that the applicant’s prospects for rehabilitation ‘appear reasonable’.
DPP v Elfata [2019] VSCA 63 (21 March 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: Rape x 1; reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1 (acquitted); common law assault x 1 (acquitted); stalking (intent to cause physical harm) x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of rape and stalking with intent to cause physical harm. He was acquitted of reckless conduct endangering serious injury and common law assault. The respondent and the complainant had been in a relationship for two years before the offending conduct. In relation to the charge of rape, it was alleged that the respondent placed his fingers inside the complainant’s vagina, so as to constitute digital, rather than penile, penetration ([5]).
The respondent was sentenced to two years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year. The Crown appealed on the ground that the individual sentence imposed for the rape charge (two years), the total effective sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly inadequate, and that the sentences imposed failed to:
•
Have sufficient regard to the maximum penalty for the prescribed offences;
•
Properly reflect the objective gravity of the offending;
•
Have sufficient regard to the impact of the offending on the victim;
•
Give sufficient weight to principles of community protection, general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation and the need for just punishment; and
•
Give weight to mitigating factors that was not excessive ([28]).
Issues: Whether the sentence and non-parole period were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and reasoning: The Court (Priest AP, Beach and Forrest JA) noted the difficulty in establishing a ground of manifest inadequacy as it requires the Crown to show that it was not reasonably open to the sentencing judge to come to the sentencing conclusion reached, and that the sentence imposed was ‘wholly outside the range of the sentencing options available’ ([35]). The appeal was dismissed because the objective gravity of the offending was lower than is often seen for rape offences. The Court distinguished Shrestha v The Queen [2017] VSCA 364 as the respondent did not display the same degree of criminality as the offender in that case ([36]). The Court agreed with the sentencing judge’s findings that the incident was a single, impulsive act, which did not appear to be premeditated. Excessive violence was not involved and the duration of the incident was relatively brief. Further, as the rape involved digital, rather than penile, penetration, ‘the offence could properly be described as a breach of an agreement as to the limits of intimacy, in the context of a longstanding relationship in which intimacy occurred throughout.’ ([37])
Moreover, the Court, agreeing with the sentencing judge, held that the fact the respondent exhibited little remorse and ran a trial was an important mitigating factor ([38]). Their Honours also did not disagree with the sentencing judge’s finding that the respondent had ‘relatively good’ prospects for rehabilitation ([27]). Although the sentence imposed was lenient, the Court held that is was within the range of available sentencing options.
DPP v Weaver (a Pseudonym) [2019] VSCA 26 (21 February 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pretext call’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Suicide threats’
Charges: Rape x 2; common assault x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal.
Facts: At the time of the offending, the respondent and the complainant were in a relationship. Their relationship was characterised by physical and emotional abuse. On two separate instances, the respondent raped the complainant ([2]-[3]). He also assaulted her by punching her in the face ([4]). In the past, the respondent had generally acted in a possessive and aggressive manner towards the complainant ([8]). He had previously made threats to commit suicide if she left him and had insisted on having sex with her on many occasions ([6]-[7]). An important piece of evidence in this application was a pretext call between the respondent and complainant. In the pretext call, the respondent made an admission to one or more of the allegations made by the complainant. Before the empanelment of the jury, the trial judge made a ruling excluding the admission into evidence of the contents of the pretext call.
Issues: Whether leave to appeal should be granted. Whether the exclusion of the evidence would eliminate or substantially weaken the prosecution’s case.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that the trial judge did not err in considering that the jury could not reasonably conclude that the complainant specifically referred to either of the incidents subject to the two rape charges in the pretext call ([45]). Further, it was held that the trial judge correctly accepted that the jury could conclude that the respondent did make an admission of sexual misconduct in the pretext call. However, this admission was of limited probative value in the context of the case. The trial judge did not err in concluding that the probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its prejudicial effect ([54]). Consequently, the Court concluded that the applicant should not be granted leave to appeal the decision of the trial judge to exclude the contents of the pretext call from evidence ([55]).
DPP v Missen [2019] VSCA 32 (4 February 2019) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Murder of parent’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of his father (the victim). The offence took place at the offender’s house that he occupied with the victim and his then girlfriend. The offender had an argument with the victim which erupted into a violent altercation, leading him to physically assault the victim until he was dead. Following the murder, the offender and his then girlfriend approached two men to help remove the body from the house and take it to a disused mineshaft for disposal. The offender’s relationship with his father at the time of the offending was ‘intensely troubled’; however despite the difficulties, they had a close and co-dependant bond. Further, he suffered from a range of emotional and psychological problems and was prone to drug abuse ([9], [57]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Dixon J sentenced the offender to 21 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years. The offender had a limited criminal history which included contravening a family violence safety notice and offences against police ([74]). Further, he pleaded guilty late and therefore was not entitled to the same degree of mitigation as if he had pleaded guilty at the earliest possible stage. There was also delay in the finalisation of proceedings which was due to factors beyond the offender’s control. For example, his then girlfriend changed legal representation more than once, and he was also diagnosed and treated for testicular cancer. As a result of these matters, the offender had been on remand since March 2016 ([75]-[78]). Her Honour noted that he had used this time productively, having enrolled in several programs open to remand prisoners, and received training in drug education ([79]). The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were found to be reasonable, particularly if he remained on stabilising medication and avoided illicit drugs upon release ([82]-[83]).
The objective gravity of the crime was aggravated by the way the offender continued to assault the victim when he was already severely incapacitated. It was further increased by the nature of the physical violence, together with his efforts to dispose of the body and involve other people in that conduct. The concealment of the offence meant that the victim’s relatives did not learn of his death for some time after it occurred. Regardless of the pressures that the offender may have endured, her Honour found him to be solely responsible for the victim’s death ‘in an episode of appalling brutality’ ([84]-[85]).
The offending was not premeditated but arose in circumstances of sudden rage in the context of a highly dysfunctional household. Her Honour accepted that the offender was contrite but noted that expression of sincere remorse gave way to self-interest in the aftermath of the murder. She gave weight to denunciation, just punishment, general and specific deterrence, and the need for rehabilitation. However, specific deterrence was somewhat diminished as a factor given his limited criminal history and conduct on remand ([86]-[90]).
The parties only referred to a small number of cases involving the murder of a parent, none of which were comparable to the present case. A notable feature of this case was that despite the history of conflict between the offender and the victim, he ‘accepted responsibility for murdering the person [he] had come to depend on most’ ([91]-[93]).
Forbes (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 341 (18 December 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Multiple counts of assault and rape.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was charged with 12 counts of assault and rape. The first five charges involved intentionally causing injury and rape against his former domestic partner. The remaining seven charges concerned offences of assault, rape, making a threat to kill and intentionally causing injury against the same domestic partner, however, the parties had separated at the time these particular offences were alleged to have been committed. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the offences. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of 10 years 10 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years and three months.
Issues: The applicant sought leave to appeal because the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in that:
•
The individual sentence imposed for one of the counts of rape (count 11) was excessive; and
•
The sentencing judge incorrectly characterised each offence as a serious example of that kind of offence; and
•
The sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation.
Decision and reasoning: The Court emphasised that the ground of manifest excess will only succeed if it can be proven that the sentence imposed fell wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the sentencing judge. Their Honours considered the applicant’s limited criminal history to be relevant, but given his lack of remorse, denial of the offending and the circumstances of the offending, the sentencing judge was open to conclude that his prospects of rehabilitation were ‘guarded’ ([39]). The offending was found to be very serious, and the context of domestic violence significant ([42]). The applicant’s personal circumstances were also considered, including his previous experiences as a victim of sexual abuse, and his medical and psychological history (including brain damage and bipolar disorder). Ultimately, the Court refused the appeal as the total effective sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was not outside the range of sentencing options available to him.
The Court observed that the context of domestic violence is also very important. The Court quoted from Pasinis [2014] VSCA 97:
Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
The Court noted the importance of general deterrence in this context.
Hayden Samuels (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 251 (1 October 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Cumulative sentence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Rape x 2; make a threat to kill x 1.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence. Determined ‘on the papers’.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s wife of many years. The applicant and the victim married in 1996 and have 2 children. The family emigrated from Egypt in 2009, and practise the Coptic Christian Orthodox faith. The rape offences involved penile-anal penetration, contrary to the Coptic religious faith (charges 3 and 4). The applicant also threatened to kill the victim, telling her that if she saw a counsellor he would kill her and tell everyone that she was mentally unstable and had committed suicide (charge 5). The victim suffered an anal injury as a result of the rape the subject of charge 4. The applicant was sentenced to 10 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 7 years and 9 months. For the charge of making a threat to kill, the individual sentence was 2 years, and for the two rape charges, the individual sentences were 8 years each. The applicant was also sentenced as a serious sexual offender in respect of charge 5.
Issue: The applicant sought to appeal against the sentence. One ground of appeal was that the sentences imposed on each of the individual counts, and the order for cumulation of the sentence imposed on charge 4, were excessive.
Held: Tate JA refused leave to appeal as she was not persuaded that it was reasonably arguable that the sentences imposed against the applicant went beyond a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion ([48]). The sentences imposed against the applicant in relation to the rape charges were ‘very stern’. However, the offending was ‘extremely serious’ and, as the sentencing judge acknowledged, there has been a recent shift towards sterner sentencing for rape and other sexual offences. This has been a conscious decision of the courts to reflect the seriousness of domestic violence and sexual crimes committed against women in Victoria ([39]).
Her Honour noted the extreme seriousness of the offending and the absence of remorse. Therefore, there was a need for specific and general deterrence in the context of protecting the community from a serious sex offender in respect of charge 5 ([43]). Having regard to the facts, circumstances and available data regarding current sentencing practices, the sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment in respect of charge 5 was not manifestly excessive nor was the relatively modest cumulation of 6 months ([46]). Further, the order for cumulation with respect to charge 3 was found to be necessary to reflect the fact that the 2 rape offences occurred as ‘distinct and separate episodes’ ([47]).
McLean v The Queen [2018] VSCA 209 (24 August 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; Criminal damage x 1; Resisting an emergency worker on duty x 1.
Appeal type: Applicant for leave to appeal.
Facts: The applicant and his ex-partner argued by text message, culminating in the applicant’s text: ‘Addie won’t had no mother from today’ and ‘I’ll have the last laugh I promise you that’. Addie was their six-month old daughter. On the same day, the applicant broke into his ex-partner’s home, causing damage and turning on the gas before leaving. The applicant was charged with aggravated burglary, in that he entered as a trespasser, intending to destroy property with reckless disregard as to the presence of another person. He was also charged with causing criminal damage and resisting an emergency worker. He was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years.
Issues: The applicant sought leave to appeal on the basis that (1) the sentencing judge erred by imposing a manifestly excessive non-parole period of 80% of the total effective sentence; and (2) his Honour did not explain the necessity for the imposition of the relatively high non-parole period.
Decision and reasoning: The high ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence was such that leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed ([27]). Given the nature of the offending and the applicant’s criminal history, the sentences imposed (leaving to one side the non-parole period) were very modest and not excessive. The Court found that the explanation for the moderate sentence was largely the significance placed by the judge on the prospect of deportation. As the sentence exceeded two years’ imprisonment, the sentencing judge was required by s 11(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)to fix a non-parole period, unless he considered it inappropriate to do so, having regard to the nature of the offence or the offender’s past history. Clearly, his Honour considered it appropriate to fix a non-parole period. s 11(3) required that period to be at least six-months less than the term of the sentence. Here, the non-parole period fixed was, in a sense, the ‘maximum’ period that could be fixed. In determining the non-parole period, the judge was required to take into account the purpose of parole, namely, to provide for mitigation of punishment in favour of rehabilitation after the offender had served the non-parole period (see Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26). The seriousness of the offending was such that justice required a non-parole period of at least two years. Therefore, the high ratio between the head sentence and the non-parole period was explicable by the very modest sentences imposed (and cumulation ordered) for the offences. There was no error in his Honour fixing the non-parole period.
Sawyer-Thompson v The Queen [2018] VSCA 161 (22 June 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Defensive homicide x 1
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The female appellant had been in an abusive and violent relationship with her male partner for 12 months prior to her offending. Her partner threatened to kill her family unless she killed the victim. Acting under the fear of this threat, she killed the victim. The appellant pleaded guilty to defensive homicide.
Issues: Whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Maxwell ACJ and Tate JA held that the sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years was manifestly excessive. The appellant was re-sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of five years.
The sentencing judge accepted that the killing took place at the direction of the appellant’s violent and abusive partner who had threatened to kill her family unless she killed the victim. She had been subjected to ‘repeated acts of violence, degradation and humiliation at the hands of her partner, who was… a highly dangerous person’. The fact that she proceeded to kill the victim rather than attempting to flee, and that she used excessive violence, ‘could only be understood through the lens of the sustained family violence she had experienced’ ([7]).
Maxwell ACJ and Tate JA held that the sentence imposed reflected a mischaracterisation of the gravity of the offending and of the appellant’s culpability. Insufficient weight was also given to the mitigating factors of cooperation with authority and youth ([65]).
The appellant’s undertaking to assist, and the provision of her statement, reflected remorse and a genuine desire to bring a person to justice ([55]). As a result, discount for cooperation was necessary because ‘there [was] some personal risk’ to the applicant, as a result of which she had already spent some time in protective custody.
Beach JA held that whilst the sentence was stern, it was not manifestly excessive ([133]).
Lewis (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 40 (27 February 2018) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Hearsay rule’ – ‘Interlocutory appeal’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charges: Aggravated burglary x 1; Intentionally cause injury x 2; Recklessly cause injury x 2; Intentionally damage property x 1; Extortion with a threat to kill x 1; False imprisonment x 1; Making threat to kill x 1; Contravening family violence intervention order x 1; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2.
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against interlocutory decisions.
Facts: The charges related to an incident of violence committed by the applicant against the aggrieved, his partner. The aggrieved was to be the central witness for the prosecution ([5]-[7]). The aggrieved invoked s 18 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), which provides that a person can avoid giving evidence against their partner if there is a sufficient likelihood that harm would be caused to the person ([9]-[11]). The prosecution then gave notice under s 65 Evidence Act 2008 that they would rely on statements that the aggrieved had made to the police as tendency evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule ([16]).
Issues: The applicant appealed against 3 main interlocutory decisions made by the judge. First, admitting the statements the aggrieved made to the police. Second, refusing to certify the appeal, which is a precondition to appeal against an interlocutory decision under s 295(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). Third, refusing to sever the proceedings for each of the applicant’s charges.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court dismissed all grounds of the appeal. On the first ground, it was reasonably open for the judge to admit the evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. The applicant argued that admitting the evidence might lead to prejudice because the aggrieved could not be cross-examined (since she had invoked the protection against giving evidence against a de facto partner) ([58]). The Court held that there were sufficient protections available to ensure a fair trial, including directions against giving too much weight to untested statements ([59]). Accordingly, in relation to the second ground, it was reasonably open for the judge to refuse to certify ([64]). On the third ground, the Court held that many charges stemmed from the same factual basis, so there was no basis to sever the charges ([68]).
The Court observed that the applicant did not seek to challenge the judge’s ruling that the tendency evidence satisfies the requirements of ss 97 and 101, ‘presumably’ because ‘he regards a submission of that kind as foredoomed to fail, based upon the recent decision of the High Court in Hughes v The Queen’ [2017] HCA 20 (14 June 2017). [72] The Court stated at [73] that:
It is, however, worthy of note that the general evidence of the history of domestic violence, which forms the basis of the tendency notice, may not have quite the probative force in relation to the allegation of the threat to kill and extortion, as it does in relation to the other charges brought against the applicant.
The Court concluded by cautioning trial judges about the use of tendency evidence: ‘[if the tendency] evidence were led, the judge would have to give a careful direction as to how it could be used and, more importantly, how it could not be used’ ([75]).
Saxton v R [2017] VSCA 357 (5 December 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Mental health’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Recklessly cause injury x 4; Common law assault x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and victim were married and had two children. The applicant worked as a solicitor and the wife, the victim, as a librarian. The applicant had an epileptic seizure, which caused him to stop work and his mental health to decline. The applicant became increasingly controlling of the victim, forcing her to relinquish her financial independence and remain at home with him rather than going to work. The ‘recklessly cause injury’ charges occurred when the applicant punched and hit the victim at home and in their bed. The common assault charge occurred when the applicant twisted her arm so violently that her arm broke. The applicant threatened suicide, and the victim went to the police (see [5], the remarks of the sentencing judge).
The applicant was sentenced to 7 months and 14 days’ imprisonment and a 2-year community correction order ([1]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed (see [28]). The applicant argued that the injuries sustained were at the lower end of the scale, and the broken arms was not intended ([21]). The Court did not accept that submission. Justices Santamaria and Coghlan JJA stated that the offending was ‘serious’ and stemmed from an ‘abusive relationship between the applicant and the victim, who was vulnerable and frightened of the applicant’ ([29]). The Court quotes Kalala v The Queen [2017] VSCA 223, discussing the scourge of domestic violence:
The trial courts of this State are imposing sentences for family violence offences with increasing frequency. This Court has repeatedly emphasised the need to condemn family violence, in line with community expectations. In Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 [23], the Court acknowledged the ‘shameful truth’ that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44.
The Court concluded that the principles of general deterrence and denunciation loomed large in the present case, and the sentence was, if anything, merciful ([31]).
DPP v Lade (a pseudonym) [2017] VSCA 264 (21 September 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Breach of family violence intervention order’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘Intimate photos’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Property proceedings’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Suicide threats’ – ‘Technology and abuse’
Charges: Sexual assault x 1; Stalking x 2; Attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1; Contravention of family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) x 1; Making threats to kill x 1; threatening to distribute intimate images of another person x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the defendant’s ex-wife. The offences occurred over an 18-month period after they had separated ([7]). The offences included: the defendant forcing the victim onto her bed and ejaculating on her; threatening to distribute intimate photos to the victim’s father and employer if she did not agree to his terms for their property settlement; entering her house and leaving videos of himself; and sending mail to her house ([7]-[22]); threatening to kill himself if the victim did not drop the charges (attempting to pervert the course of justice). The defendant was originally sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment (see table at [2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed.
The Court (Priest, Hansen and Coghlan JJA) re-sentenced the defendant to 2 years and 11 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 2 years. The primary judge treated the offences as ‘situational in the sense that it was based within a relationship, not that that condones it in any way, shape or form’ [34]. But the Court of Appeal placed more emphasis on the fact that the domestic context, breach of FVIO and offending while in jail were all aggravating factors [49].
The Court appeared to endorse the DPP’s description of the sexual assault as ‘particularly serious … being violent, non-consensual and humiliating for C who was treated as though a marital chattel’ [40].
Nolan v The Queen [2017] VSCA 240 (6 September 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Causing serious injury’ – ‘Gratuitous violence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Not manifestly excessive’ – ‘Presence of children’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Youth’
Charges: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1; False imprisonment x 1; Making threat to kill x 1.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a de facto relationship with two children. Over one afternoon, the appellant inflicted the following actions on the complainant in the presence of the children: throwing a pot of boiling water over her; punching and kicking her; whipping her with a kettle cord; hitting her with a broom; rubbing salt and curry powder into her wounds; and threatening to kill her (see [3]-[11]). The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. The applicant had previously been refused leave to appeal against sentence, but renewed the application to the full Court.
Issues: First, whether the sentencing judge erred in not applying principles relevant to young offenders; and second, whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
The Court (Beach, Ferguson and Coghlan JJA) dismissed the first ground on the basis that the judge took into account the applicant’s age, but also took into account the seriousness of the offences, the fact that the offences took place in a domestic relationship and in the presence of the applicant’s and victim’s children, and the serious injuries inflicted on the victim ([30]-[31]).
The Court dismissed the second ground on the basis that the sentencing judge took into account the applicant’s disadvantaged upbringing, lack of relevant antecedents, plea of guilty and remorse, and no comparable case established that the sentence fell outside the reasonable range ([38]). The Court appeared to endorse the sentencing judge’s comments that this was an unusual case with many aggravating factors ([24]), and that the use of weapons, boiling water and salt as ‘gratuitous and sickening behaviour’ ([22]).
Kalala v R [2017] VSCA 223 (30 August 2017) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Approaching “worst category of case”’ – ‘Current sentencing practices’ – ‘Incitement to murder’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Incitement to murder x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and victim were in a de facto relationship ([4]). While the victim was visiting relatives in Burundi, the applicant became suspicious that she was seeing another man ([7]). The applicant arranged and paid for the victim to be killed ([8]). While speaking with the victim on the phone, the applicant told her to go outside ([9]). Upon walking outside, the victim was forced into a vehicle, held captive for 2 days and told that she would be killed. However, the kidnappers did not kill her because she was a woman ([10]). The victim returned to Australia. The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 9 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years ([1]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The main argument advanced by the applicant was that the sentence was the highest yet imposed for the offence, and the circumstances of the offending were not more serious than previous offences ([3]).
President Maxwell and Redlich JA (‘the joint judgement’) made some general conclusions ([3]), including:
•
previous sentences do not impose an upper limit on a sentencing judge (see [51]-[54]);
•
the circumstances of the offending were more serious than previous sentences (see [44]-[50];
•
inciting the murder of a partner is an extreme form of family violence; and
•
previous sentences for incitement to murder have not reflected the objective gravity of the crime, and must be increased (see [66]-[70]).
The joint judgement remarked that the case had many aggravating factors, including the fact that the applicant played an active role in initiating the plan and delivering her into the hands of the kidnappers ([24], [46]). Since it was not suggested that the case warranted the maximum penalty, it was inappropriate to classify the case was a ‘worst category’ case (citing R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48) ([28]). However, the sentence was reasonably open to the sentencing judge ([54]).
The joint judgement stated at [62]:
The applicant’s motivation — to have NR killed as punishment for perceived infidelity — is expressive of the very worst of male attitudes towards women … It follows that this offending must be viewed as involving moral culpability at the highest level.
Justice Osborn agreed with the joint judgement, but was reluctant to express a global view on the adequacy of current sentences for incitement to murder ([92]).
Fitzpatrick v The Queen [2016] VSCA 63 (6 April 2016) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Common assault’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Repeated breach of protection orders’ – ‘Risk factors’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order, common assault, threat to kill, theft x 2, criminal damage.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The principal victim of the offending was the applicant’s former female domestic partner. After the relationship broke down, the victim obtained a family violence intervention order, which the applicant repeatedly breached. One night, the applicant broke into the victim’s house and wrapped a telephone cord tightly around her neck. He threatened to kill her and cut off 40cm from her hair, saying he wanted to disfigure her to the point that no-one else would find her attractive. He then took the victim’s phone, house and car keys and drove away. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years and nine months with a non-parole period of two years and nine months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The objective gravity of the offending warranted severe punishment, certainly extending to a sentence of the overall length here. In that regard, Beach JA noted that the persistent contravening of a family violence intervention order was itself extremely serious and was ‘no mere breach of an intervention order of the kind so frequently seen’. The conduct on the night of 29 October 2014 was also extremely serious because it must have been terrifying for the victim, the applicant knew there were children in the house, and the assault was not spontaneous. This was not an act brought about by a temporary loss of self-control, resulting from something said or done by the victim. His Honour stated that instead, ‘it was an act of wanton cruelty intended to humiliate and terrify a defenceless woman in her own home’ (See [37]-[41]).
Byrnes v The Queen [2015] VSCA 341 (10 December 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Contravening a family violence intervention order’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnant women’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, threat to kill, contravening a family violence intervention order, assault with a weapon, assault police, resist police.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female victim were in a relationship and the victim was 17 weeks pregnant with their child. The applicant wanted the victim to terminate the pregnancy and had made numerous threats against the victim and the baby. A family violence intervention order was made. On the day of offence, the applicant locked the victim inside the house, held a knife against her, and threatened to kill her if she screamed or called the police. He then tried to force the victim into the bath, saying that he was going to abort the baby. He continued to threaten the victim and the baby until he became tearful. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and nine months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In light of the applicant’s mitigating circumstances (his mental condition, his lack of prior convictions and his steps towards rehabilitation), the sentences imposed were high. However, the circumstances of the offence were particularly serious and required the imposition of a sentence that was sufficient to reflect the gravity of offending and to serve the purposes of sentencing including general deterrence and denunciation (See [24]). In particular, at [22]-[23], Kaye JA held:
‘The applicant’s offending had a number of very serious characteristics. As the respondent has pointed out, it was premeditated, and the applicant had clearly prepared for it. The victim was vulnerable. She was carrying the applicant’s baby. The applicant took advantage of his greater strength, and the fact that he had a weapon, to overwhelm her. The threat to abort the baby was, as the judge correctly said, a ‘most ugly’ aspect of the false imprisonment. The whole experience, to which the applicant subjected her, must have been extraordinarily terrifying. She was justifiably in grave fear for her own life and that of her baby. While the imprisonment did not extend for hours or days, it lasted for over one hour, during the whole of which the applicant terrorised his victim.
In those circumstances, the offending by the applicant, comprising charge 1, called for a stern sentence. In such a case, involving wanton domestic violence, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and denunciation were important considerations: Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212at [21] and Mercer v The Queen [2015] VSCA 257at [54]. While the judge accepted that the applicant’s psychological condition moderated the weight to be given to those considerations, nevertheless, they rightly remained important factors in the determination of the applicant’s sentence: R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376, 381’.
DPP v O’Neill [2015] VSCA 325 (2 December 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Arson’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Male victim’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘People with mental impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Principles in R v Verdins’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charge/s: Murder, arson.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent and the male deceased were in a relationship. The trial judge accepted that the deceased had a dominant and controlling personality while the victim was submissive and often demeaned and belittled by the deceased in public. On the morning of offence, the respondent rejected the deceased’s sexual approach and the deceased called him a ‘frigid bitch’. The respondent tried to apologise but the deceased repeated his abuse. The respondent snapped. He hit the deceased over the head with a steel pan and strangled him with a dog lead. The respondent acted if the deceased was alive for several days before setting fire to their home with the deceased’s body inside. He acted as if the deceased had died accidently until he was arrested.
At sentence, Dr Barth, a psychologist, provided evidence of the respondent’s psychological condition. He diagnosed the respondent as having a maladaptive personality adjustment and as suffering from pervasive feelings of worthlessness, inadequacy and insecurity. The sentencing judge accepted that the respondent’s personality disorder played some role in his offending, and therefore operated to reduce his moral culpability and to moderate to some extent the need for general and specific deterrence. A total effective sentence of 18 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 13 years, was imposed.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
In setting out the background to the matter the Court observed:
The deceased was the dominant partner in the relationship, with the respondent by and large acquiescing to the deceased’s directions. Over the term of the relationship there was regular verbal conflict which intensified with time. The respondent told his psychologist how he was abused and humiliated in front of others by the deceased. Sometimes the conflicts involved verbal abuse and sometimes pushing and shoving. He also told the psychologist that the deceased was sexually demanding of him and if he declined the deceased’s approaches he would call him a ‘frigid bitch’. The respondent said he felt as if the deceased treated him as his own property. Despite all this, the deceased was regarded by the respondent as being loving and affectionate towards him. [7]
The Court also quoted from the earlier sentencing judgment of the Supreme Court, for example:
27 The personalities of both the deceased and the respondent were considered by the judge. Her Honour said this:
Mr Rattle was strong, confident and successful. He also had a dominant, controlling personality; everything had to be done his way, both personally and professionally. No doubt that was part of the key to his professional success. And, because of your own psychological make-up, you felt inadequate; it suited you to be with someone who took control and made all the decisions. But many of your mutual friends have described how Mr Rattle used to demean and belittle you in public. He frequently complained to them that you were not satisfying him sexually. In front of others, he would call you lazy, a parasite; he would threaten to send you back to where you came from. He was critical of your lack of business acumen. There were financial and business pressures on the relationship. In the work context, he treated you like the office boy, not his partner.
The Court provided extensive consideration of the six circumstances identified in R v Verdins in which impaired mental functioning is considered relevant to the appropriate sentence to be passed on an offender (See [66]-[84] in particular). The Court rejected a purely mechanistic approach and they emphasised that careful consideration must be given to whether the evidence establishes that mental capacity has been impaired and which of the circumstances in Verdins are engaged. This requires rigorous evaluation of the evidence (See [68]). Here, the respondent did not establish on the balance of probabilities that he suffered from a mental impairment. As the principles in Verdins do not extend to personality disorders such as those relied upon, the relevant principles (in particular, the moderation of the need for general and specific deterrence, and the reduction of moral culpability) were not engaged (See [85]).
Nevertheless, the respondent’s mental condition was still of some relevance to sentence, it just did not attract the level of mitigation of sentence that must be allowed where Verdins principles are applicable. First, the sentencing judge did not err in accepting that the respondent’s personality disorder operated to moderate, to some extent, the need for general and specific deterrence. Second, the Court also held that on the evidence it was open to the sentencing judge to conclude that the murder of the deceased was not premeditated, vindictive or gratuitous but rather the result of a very complex and conflicted personality structure. In that way, the sentencing judge was correct in taking the respondent’s disorder into account in making an assessment of the moral culpability of the respondent (See [99]-[100]).
The appeal court noted that the sentence was mid-range in light of the trial judge’s rejection of the Crown’s characterisation of the crime as premeditated; the trial judge had noted that while the controlling and belittling behaviour that had characterised Rattle’s relationship with O’Neill did not justify killing him, it did mean that the sentence to be imposed for murder should be towards the lower end of the range for that offence.
DPP v Barnes & Barnes [2015] VSCA 293 (12 November 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection of the community’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, intentionally cause serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: Trevor Barnes (‘the first respondent’) and his younger brother (‘the second respondent’) entered into the premises of the first respondent’s estranged wife, without her consent. Three days prior to the home invasion, the first respondent had been released from prison for offences including assaulting his wife and multiple breaches of an intervention order she had in place against him. The first respondent saw his wife and her new partner in the shower together and smashed the door of the shower. He struck his wife’s new partner and his wife with a jemmy bar before pulling out a Stanley knife. He only stopped when his wife said she loved him. The first respondent was sentenced to six years imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence imposed on the first respondent was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. First, in relation to the charge of aggravated burglary, Redlich JA noted that this was a very serious offence of ‘intimate relationship aggravated burglary’. The first respondent entered into the house, uninvited and in company, carrying a jemmy bar, with the intention to assault his estranged wife, whom he knew was frightened of him because of his past instances of violence. He had just been released from prison and committed these offences in breach of an intervention order and a partly suspended sentence. As Redlich JA stated at [48]-[49]:
‘General deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are important purposes in sentencing for such an offence … Specific deterrence and protection of the community are also important in this case, given that Trevor had not long since been released from prison for offences that included assaulting Ms Bethune and breaching an intervention order in her favour’.
However, the sentence here failed to adequately reflect these purposes.
Second, in relation to the charges of intentionally causing serious injury, in sentencing the first respondent for these offences, the sentencing judge stated: (See [68])
‘I make it plain that I consider that you are the main offender in this criminal enterprise and the whole appalling saga was dictated by your immaturity and inability to control your anger in the context of your possessive and controlling behaviour of Ms Bethune, whom you had subjected to domestic violence on earlier occasions. In sentencing you, the court must denounce your conduct, give emphasis to general deterrence, and impose just punishment. A strong message needs to be sent to males in the community who are inclined to be violent towards their female partners. You do not own them. You have no right … menacingly [to] control them. If you lay a hand on them in anger, the law will not spare you punishment. Men who are bullies towards women usually have some psychological inadequacy. They need to look long and hard at themselves to try to understand why they are inclined to behave with anger and brutality, and seek professional help to overcome such inclinations.
In your case, emphasis must also be placed upon specific deterrence because of your prior history of violence towards Ms Bethune. As I have indicated, your history of offending whilst on a suspended sentence, and breaching an intervention order, do not inspire optimism’.
Redlich JA noted that while the sentencing judge was clearly alive to the need to place considerable weight on the need for general deterrence, denunciation, just punishment, specific deterrence and protection of the community, the sentences imposed did not adequately reflect these purposes (See [69]).
Uzun v The Queen [2015] VSCA 292 (27 October 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Community education’ – ‘Contravening a family violence intervention order’ – ‘General deterrence’ – ‘Making threat to kill’ – ‘Persistent breach’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering a person’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Tendency evidence’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, making a threat to kill x 3, common assault, contravening a family violence intervention order, reckless conduct endangering a person x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and his wife were married and had three children together but separated in 2007. A family violence intervention order was later made against the applicant. In 2013, the applicant went to his wife’s home and committed a number of offences including aggravated burglary, breach of a family violence intervention order, threatening to kill and common assault. At trial, evidence was adduced of three previous incidents where the applicant had been physically and verbally abusive towards his wife and their children. It was adduced as tendency of the applicant to act in a particular way namely, to make threats to kill family members, to assault family members, to falsely imprison family members, and to contravene family violence orders. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of eight years.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge erred in admitting tendency evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive or ‘crushing’.
Decision and Reasoning: Priest JA (Maxwell P and Beale AJA agreeing) dismissed the appeal against conviction. The principles governing the admissibility of tendency reasoning were formulated in Velkoski v The Queen where it was said that:
‘The features relied upon must in combination possess significant probative value which requires far more than ‘mere relevance’. In order to determine whether the features of the acts relied upon permit tendency reasoning, it remains apposite and desirable to assess whether those features reveal ‘underlying unity’, a ‘pattern of conduct’, ‘modus operandi’, or such similarity as logically and cogently implies that the particular features of those previous acts renders the occurrence of the act to be proved more likely. It is the degree of similarity of the operative features that gives the tendency evidence its relative strength’.
Here, consistent with the principles in Velkoski, ’the evidence impugned by the applicant met the necessary high threshold of admissibility. Indeed, the conduct revealed by the tendency evidence was, as I have mentioned, conceded to be strikingly similar to the charged conduct. Given that the live issue for the jury was whether the charged conduct occurred, the evidence introduced as tendency evidence had the potential to shed considerable light on that issue, in circumstances where it could hardly be realistically contended that the probative value of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect’ (See [27]).
Priest JA (Maxwell P and Beale AJA agreeing) also dismissed the appeal against sentence. The total effective sentence and non-parole period could not be said to be excessive in light of the applicant’s extensive and persistent history of criminal offending, the need for general and specific deterrence, his lack of remorse and rehabilitation, and the need for denunciation of his conduct. In particular, Priest JA stated that: ‘general deterrence is important in cases such as this of violence against domestic partners, so as to deter other like-minded individuals from similar offending’ (See [32]-[40]).
Maxwell P (Beale AJA agreeing) made some additional observations at [48]-[50]:
‘Priest JA has referred to the importance of general deterrence and this Court’s repeated statements that sentences imposed for family violence should be set at a level which will send a message to those — predominantly men — who might offend violently against domestic partners or former partners or family members.
Plainly enough, the sentences which the courts impose will not serve that purpose unless the sentences and the reasons for them are properly publicised. As the Court said last year in DPP v Russell(in relation to sentences for random street violence) at [5] and [6]:
‘Obviously enough, … a prison sentence can only have that wider deterrent effect if it is publicised across the community, especially amongst those … who are at risk of offending in this way. Courts have neither the expertise nor the resources to engage in the kind of sustained community education which is necessary if general deterrence is to be a reality. That is a task for government.
After all, it is the responsibility of government to ensure public safety. And government must therefore take responsibility for communicating the deterrent message to those who need to hear it. That requires sustained effort and the commitment of substantial resources. Without that, the community simply will not derive the benefit — in greater public safety — which should flow from the painstaking work of sentencing judges and magistrates in this State. Self-evidently, if the message is not getting through no change in sentencing law can make the difference’.
In view of the community concern about domestic violence and the importance of deterring it, those considerations are particularly pertinent in this area. A copy of the Court's decision in this matter will be forwarded to the Royal Commission on Family Violence for its consideration’.
Mercer (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 257 (17 September 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences’ – ‘Threatening to inflict serious injury’
Charge/s: Assault x 5, intentionally causing injury, threatening to inflict serious injury, false imprisonment.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim was the male applicant’s domestic partner. The applicant accused the victim of concealing drugs, becoming increasingly angry and aggressive. He slapped her, punched her to the side of the face, threw her to the floor, and whipped her with a coat hanger. The applicant then accused the victim of having a relationship with another man. He banged her head against a wall, punched her and threatened to physically harm her. The victim managed to escape but only after she had been confined for several hours. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and six months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. This was a serious example of serious offending. As per Maxwell P and Beach JA at [54]:
‘This Court has said on many occasions that domestic violence will not be tolerated, and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition which must be, and must be seen to be, condemned by the courts: R v Gojanovic [2002] VSC 467, [31]; R v Robertson [2005] VSCA 190, [13]; DPP v Smeaton [2007] VSCA 256, [21]–[22]; R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298, [19]. To borrow from what this Court said recently in Filiz v The Queen, offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to conflict with a partner is one of violent rage. Such a response is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear, and will continue to make it plain, that offending of this kind will attract serious consequences’.
The sentence imposed could not be regarded as manifestly excessive. Indeed, in light of the objective seriousness of the applicant’s conduct and giving full effect to considerations of totality, the sentence imposed by the judge was entirely appropriate (See [55]).
Portelli v The Queen [2015] VSCA 159 (22 June 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating features’ – ‘Assault police officer’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Effects of family violence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Statistics’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally cause serious injury, assault police officer x 3.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was in a de facto relationship with the female victim. A week prior to the offending, the applicant became enraged and, fearful of violence, the victim obtained an interim intervention order. Despite the intervention order, the victim let the applicant stay at her place. On the day of the offence, the applicant cut the complainant’s throat with a razor blade. He then tried to suffocate the complainant with a pillow before producing a serrated knife and trying to cut her throat again. After some time, the applicant stopped attacking the complainant and she asked him to cuddle her because she did not want to die alone. Police arrived and the applicant attacked them with knives in both hands. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 11 years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years and three months.
Issue/s: The sentencing judge erred in making adverse findings about the seriousness of the applicant’s offending namely,
1.
that because of the applicant’s prior experience with drugs, he was aware when he ingested drugs at the time of offending that he was more likely to behave in an abusive, violent manner;
2.
and that there had been an element of planning in the attack on the victim.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Neither finding had been sought by the prosecutor on the plea and the applicant’s counsel were not given notice that the sentencing judge was considering making such findings. Further, there was insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had the relevant foreknowledge of the effect the drugs would have on him (See [4]). The court also made a number of observations about family violence at [29]-[30]:
‘The sentencing judge described the attack on C as ‘extremely vicious and intolerably abhorrent’. It was clear, His Honour said, that C was terrified:
You made her believe she was going to die. To ask you, her attacker, to comfort her after your attack because she thought she was going to die reveals how frightening the experience must have been for her. Yet she was in her home in the presence of an intimate partner and entitled to feel safe and secure. She was doing no more than going about her ordinary life. I do not think that she trusted you; rather, she was in fear of your confrontations when denied what you wanted. Undoubtedly, your vicious attack will be an ongoing nightmare for her. It is clear that the community is intolerant of violent behaviour in such circumstances and expects the courts to send a strong message that behaviour of this kind is totally unacceptable. Women in domestic situations are entitled to feel safe from the violently abusive behaviour of their ex-partners. This circumstance is a significant aggravating feature.
We respectfully agree. What his Honour said accords with recent statements of this Court on the subject of violent attacks by men on their current or former domestic partners. In Filiz v The Queen, the Court said:
It is a shameful truth that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44. It is also sadly true that there are a great number of women who live in real and justified fear of the men who are, or were, their intimate partners.
In Pasinis v The Queen, the Court said:
Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence. The victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities. The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm.
Most recently, in Director of Public Prosecutions v Meyers, the Court said:
Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. The statistics about the incidence of women being killed or seriously injured by vengeful former partners are truly shocking’. See also DPP v Portelli [2013] VSC 588.
Hopkins v The Queen [2015] VSCA 174 (19 June 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Worst category of offending’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: Following a plea of guilty, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30 years for the murder of his de facto partner. Both the applicant and the victim were heavy users of illicit drugs and the relationship was characterised by violence committed by the applicant against the victim. On the day of the offence, the applicant poured petrol over the victim at a petrol station and set her alight. The victim was conscious and screaming the entire time while the applicant taunted her. He actively prevented bystanders from helping the victim by threatening them with a knife. In sentencing the applicant, the judge concluded that the applicant’s behaviour was an example of ‘the worst kind of viciousness and sadistic behaviour that a court is likely to ever see’.
Issue/s: The head sentence and the non-parole period were manifestly excessive. In particular, the sentencing judge erred in placing this murder in the worst category of the offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. While the applicant’s conduct arose out of a drug-fuelled rage, it was very clear the applicant understood what he was doing. In this context, his drug consumption did not reduce his moral culpability in any way (See [42]). Further, significant aggravating circumstances were present which explained why the objective gravity of the offence was elevated namely, the circumstances of the death, the applicant’s conduct at the time of offence, and the fact that others were exposed to this horrific event (See [45]). The applicant’s guilty plea and criminal history were given adequate weight.
DPP v Maxfield [2015] VSCA 95 (12 May 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Community correction order’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female respondent stabbed her male partner four times: twice in the shoulder, once in the lower back and once in the chest. The respondent suffered from a mild intellectual disability and PTSD. She was sentenced to a Community Correction Order (CCO) for 12 months, with conditions including mental health treatment, compliance with a justice plan and the supervision of a community corrections officer.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. In light of the respondent’s intellectual disability and mental illness, her moral culpability was reduced, as was the significance of general and specific deterrence. However, even allowing for the respondent’s reduced moral culpability, the sentence imposed was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of just punishment and denunciation, given the objective gravity of the offence (See [36]-[38]).
In re-sentencing the respondent, the Court had regard to the Court’s guideline judgment in Boulton v The Queen. The Court praised the trial judge for imposing a CCO, which was appropriate in an unusual case such as this. The objective of community protection was more likely to be achieved – through the reduction of the risk of reoffending – by making such an order with appropriate conditions attached, rather than imposing a prison sentence (See [34]-[35]). However, the length of the CCO was increased to three years and greater conditions imposed.
Marocchini v The Queen [2015] VSCA 29 (25 February 2015) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Alternative sentencing orders’ – ‘Assault police’ – ‘Community correction order’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering serious injury’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Criminal damage x 2, reckless conduct endangering serious injury, recklessly causing serious injury, threat to kill, assaulting police, various summary offences.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and one of the victims were married. The applicant suspected his wife was having an affair with their neighbour. Accordingly, he placed a tracking device on his wife’s car, located her, drove dangerously, threatened to kill her and damaged her vehicle. The total effective sentence was 3 years and 3 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The Court considered whether the imposition of a ‘Community Correction Order’ (CCO) would have been more appropriate than imprisonment. Beach JA quoted extensively from Boulton v The Queen, an important guideline judgment about CCO’s. In Boulton, it was noted that imprisonment should always be the last resort, and that a CCO is an alternative punitive option, even for ‘relatively serious offences which might previously have attracted a term of imprisonment’ (See at [23] – [26]).
While Beach JA acknowledged that this was a serious offence, with a number of aggravating features, a CCO should have been ordered here. The offending occurred over a relatively short time, the appellant was married with four children, had no criminal history and he had the support of his wife who was the principal victim. The sentence was set aside and substituted for a sentence of four months’ imprisonment and a CCO of three years’ duration with conditions including 300 hours of unpaid community work (See at [30]). This case confirms that where such mitigating factors exist (particularly a lack of criminal history), the sentencing objectives can be achieved by combining a short term of imprisonment with a CCO. However, Beach JA noted that this would not have applied if the appellant had a criminal history.
The relevant passage in Boulton that his Honour referred to is – ‘The availability of the combination sentence option adds to the flexibility of the CCO regime. It means that, even in cases of objectively grave criminal conduct, the court may conclude that all of the purposes of the sentence can be served by a short term of imprisonment coupled with a CCO of lengthy duration, with conditions tailored to the offender’s circumstances and the causes of the offending’.
DPP v Meyers [2014] VSCA 314 (4 December 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk factor - strangulation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Seriousness’
Charge/s: Damaging property, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment, intentionally causing injury, possessing an unregistered firearm.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female victim was the male respondent’s ex-partner. On the day of the offence, the respondent drove to the victim’s premises with a double-barrelled shotgun, a power nail gun, a crow bar, cable ties and rolls of gorilla tape, various knives and cutting tools, and a plastic drop sheet. He smashed his way into the house and attempted to restrain the victim with cable ties. The victim struggled and the applicant struck her with the shotgun and started strangling her. He eventually managed to restrain the victim. After three and a half hours, police attended the premises and the applicant let the victim go. The respondent was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent re-sentenced to five years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years. For the fourth time in six months, the Court here was concerned with sentencing for an offence of aggravated burglary committed by a male offender against his former domestic partner, ‘intimate relationship aggravated burglary’ (See [3]-[4]). At [5]-[6] the Court said:
‘On this appeal, as in each of the previous appeals, the offender submitted that what was said by the Court in Hogarth— about the need to increase sentences [for confrontational aggravated burglary] — had little or no application to aggravated burglary where the victim was a former domestic partner. That submission failed on each previous occasion, and we likewise reject it.
As these reasons demonstrate, the task of applying Hogarth does not require the classification of offences into categories. Put simply, Hogarth established that current sentencing practices (‘CSP’) for serious forms of aggravated burglary needed to change, as they did not reflect the objective seriousness of such offending. Aggravated burglaries which involve confrontation and violence, or threats of violence, should be viewed very seriously, whether the target of the attack is a former domestic partner or a person against whom some other grievance is held’.
In reaching this decision, the Court made some observations about domestic violence offending. At [45]-[46] they stated:
‘We would wish to endorse the remarks in Filizat [21]-[23] about the particular seriousness of offending involving former domestic partners. Violence of this kind is alarmingly widespread, and extremely harmful. The statistics about the incidence of women being killed or seriously injured by vengeful former partners are truly shocking. Although the cases under consideration do not fall into that worst category, they are symptomatic of what can fairly be described as an epidemic of domestic violence.
General deterrence is, accordingly, a sentencing principle of great importance in cases such as these. Those who might, in a mood of anger or frustration or bitterness, contemplate this kind of violent entry into the home of a former spouse or partner must realise that, if they do so, they will almost certainly spend a long time in prison’.
Filiz v The Queen [2014] VSCA 212 (11 September 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Contravention of family violence intervention order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship to sentencing’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary with intention to assault, intentionally causing serious injury x 2, theft, contravening a Family Violence Intervention Order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant had been in a relationship with the female complainant for ten years and they had three children together. A Family Violence Intervention Order was made against the applicant in relation to the complainant and their children. On the night of the offence, the complainant was lying in bed with her new partner. The applicant kicked open her bedroom door and started striking the complainant and her partner with a curtain rod. The complainant telephoned the police and the applicant fled. Another intervention order was obtained which prohibited the applicant from contacting the complainant. He breached this order on two occasions. The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year and ten months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Redlich JA’s comments at [21]-[23] have often been cited in subsequent cases:
‘Senior counsel for the applicant rightly conceded that general deterrence is a significant sentencing factor in this case, not only in relation to aggravated burglary generally, but most particularly in relation to violent offending against a former domestic partner: Felicite v The Queenat [20]; DPP v Pasinisat [53]. Of particular significance is the fact that the applicant was already subject to a Family Violence Intervention Order. Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to the breakdown of a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. This Court has made it clear that such offending will attract serious consequences and even harsher penalties where it involves the breach of an order which exists for the victim’s protection: Cotham v The Queenat [14]; DPP v Johnsonat [38]-[49].
At the oral hearing it was said that the complainant’s fear would have been greater if her home had been invaded by strangers seeking to steal personal property. It was suggested that the context of the offending affected its seriousness. We do not accept that these matters affect the objective gravity of the offences. The level of fear engendered by the applicant, in kicking in the locked bedroom door and proceeding to beat the victims with an iron rod, did not have to be evaluated according to such niceties. The attack the applicant launched upon his ex-partner was strongly suggestive of a desire to do her and her partner serious harm, and anybody in their position would have feared that such harm would occur. The complainant’s victim impact statement makes clear that the physical and emotional effects will be lasting.
It is a shameful truth that family violence is a leading cause of illness, disability and death among Victorian women aged between 15 and 44. It is also sadly true that there are a great number of women who live in real and justified fear of the men who are, or were, their intimate partners. In such circumstances, the submission that the complainant’s level of fear when being attacked by her ex-partner was less than it might have been if she had been attacked by a stranger should be rejected’.
Although there were a number of relevant factors in mitigation – that is, the applicant’s relatively early plea (but absent any remorse), his previous good character, his rehabilitation, both actual and prospective, work history and solid family support, and the difficulties he would suffer in prison when separated from his children, these had to be balanced against the aggravating factors of the offending and the need for general deterrence discussed above, as well as the need for specific deterrence, just punishment and denunciation. In light of this, it could not be said that the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [29]).
Curypko v The Queen [2014] VSCA 192 (29 August 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Context evidence’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female complainant was the male applicant’s de facto partner. The applicant repeatedly and brutally assaulted the complainant over a four year period. The charged offence occurred in 1989 and concerned a ten hour assault by the applicant which included striking the complainant multiple times and breaking her jaw, hitting her with various objects, heating up a knife and dragging this across her neck, and stabbing her with a syringe. The applicant was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. There was a substantial delay between the offending and the applicant being charged – some 24 years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the maximum penalty, the long delay and the applicant’s rehabilitation during that period, the guilty plea, the applicant’s youth when he offended, and sentencing practice at the time of offence.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in concluding that the gravity of the offending required the applicant’s youth at the time of offending, the delay and his rehabilitation in the interim must ‘give way’.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in departing from the agreed statement of facts and in relying on the Victim Impact Statement as evidence of uncharged offending providing context for the charged offence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Ashley JA acknowledged that the delay was substantial and as such merited substantial consideration as a matter of fairness to the accused. During that period, the applicant had ‘reformed’ (at [65]), was in a stable relationship, had a child, and was able to demonstrate rehabilitation. Notwithstanding this, the sentence imposed at trial, though harsh, was within the discretion of the primary judge.
Second, the sentencing judge did not fall into error by concluding that mitigating factors including delay, rehabilitation and the applicant’s youth, ‘had to take a back seat to circumstances which favoured a greater sentence’ (at [41]). The seriousness of the offending as an example of severe domestic violence meant that just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence took prime consideration. An argument that the delay in bringing the proceedings reduced the need for general deterrence was dismissed. The delay here was connected to the complainant’s fear and trauma and then further delay was caused by change in investigators (See [53]-[56]).
Third, the sentencing judge did not err in referring to statements made by the victim to the police, in supplementing the general description of the assaults relied upon for contextual purposes by recourse to statements made by the complainant, and by referring to the victim impact statement. In particular, the circumstances of earlier assaults were, as the judge repeatedly stated, admitted for contextual purposes only (See [34]-[39]).
Marrah v The Queen [2014] VSCA 119 (18 June 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Contravening an intervention order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury, rape, threat to kill.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: There numerous family violence incidents between the male applicant and the female respondent during their relationship. A family violence intervention order was active at the time of offending. On the day of offence, the applicant and the complainant were arguing after the applicant accused her of having sexual relations with other men. The applicant punched the complainant, picked her up by her hair and threw her to the floor, kicked her several times, and banged her head on the floor. He also grabbed her around the neck such that she could not breathe and the applicant repeatedly shoved his fingers in the complainant’s vagina. He retrieved two knives and said he would kill her and her dog. The applicant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of ten years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The gravity of the applicant’s conduct was aggravated by the fact the applicant was subject to a family violence intervention order. As Tate JA said at [25]:
‘The gravity of the offending was aggravated by the fact that the applicant was at the time the subject of an intervention order, which he flagrantly disregarded. Offending of this nature is too often perpetrated by men whose response to difficulties in a relationship is one of possessive, violent rage. It goes without saying that such a response, to what is a common human situation, is utterly unacceptable. The sentences must convey the unmistakeable message that male partners have no right to subject their female partners to threats or violence. The sentences must be of such an order as to strongly denounce violence within a domestic relationship’.
However, the orders for cumulation did not produce an aggregate sentence that was commensurate with the gravity of the whole of the offending (See [21]-[22], [27]-[28]).
Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 (22 May 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Effects of family violence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Serious consequences for victims’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury (ICSI) x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant were in a de facto relationship. On the day of the first offence, the applicant began punching the complainant and went to kick her in the face. The complainant put up her left arm to protect herself and the applicant’s kick broke her arm. After some delay, the applicant took her to the hospital. Three months later, the applicant started hitting the complainant and again the complainant put her arm up to defend herself and the applicant broke her right arm. Despite her excruciating pain, the applicant did not take the complainant to the doctor until the following day.
When the incidents were first charged, the applicant and the complainant had resumed their relationship and concocted a false version of events to exonerate the applicant. The relationship subsequently ended and the complainant went to the police. They were both charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. The applicant was also charged with two counts of ICSI and sentenced to eight years imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive and the sentencing judge failed to give appropriate consideration to the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence imposed could not be said to be manifestly excessive. Further, the totality principle was appropriately applied. Kyrou AJA made a number of observations about family violence that have been cited in a number of subsequent judgments. The Court considered the serious consequences of violent domestic assaults and emphasised the importance of general deterrence in cases involving offences committed in the context of family violence. As at [53]-[54]:
‘Historically perpetrators of family violence were rarely prosecuted. Even when offenders were convicted of such offences, they often received lenient sentences. Fortunately the criminal law now gives greater recognition to the devastating effects of family violence. It has also been recognised that women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously. This makes both specific and general deterrence very important factors in sentencing men who assault their partner.
The effects of family violence are now well documented. They are not confined to physical injury. Victims often feel responsible for the violence and ashamed that they were not able to prevent the perpetrator from offending. As occurred in this case, it is common for victims to deny or conceal that their partners have assaulted them until the violence becomes unbearable… Victims who have been dominated, controlled and beaten by their partners over a significant period experience serious and longlasting psychological trauma. As in the present case, the physical effects of the violence and its erosion of the victim’s confidence can also affect their ability to participate in paid work and have other serious financial effects’.
His Honour reiterated at [57]:
‘General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence. The victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities. The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm’.
Benson v The Queen [2014] VSCA 51 (28 March 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female complainant had been in a relationship for 13 years. The complainant alleged that in April 2011 the appellant hit her after she refused to have sex with him. She described this as the ‘last straw’ and told the appellant she was leaving him. They remained living in the same house. One month later, the intoxicated appellant forced her into bed and penetrated her with his penis. Their son saw the incident and called the police.
At trial, the Crown sought to admit evidence of physical assaults by the appellant against the complainant that occurred between 1999 and 2003 (none of these assaults happened after the complainant refused to have intercourse with the appellant). The Crown argued that this evidence explained the context in which the alleged rape occurred, and was relevant to whether the complainant had freely agreed to have intercourse with the appellant and whether the appellant was aware that the complainant was not consenting or might not be consenting on the night of the alleged offence. The trial judge took account of the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence but considered that it was both relevant to and probative of the facts in issue and should be admitted for the limited purpose described in her ruling (see [19]-[23]).
Issue/s: The trial judge erred in admitting evidence of past conduct by the appellant because the evidence was not relevant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Neave JA held (Bongiorno and Coghlan JJA agreeing) that the evidence was inadmissible. Bongiorno and Coghlan JJA also held that there was a miscarriage of justice (Neave JA in dissent). Neave JA first considered whether the ‘relationship evidence’ (evidence of physical assaults) was relevant. Her Honour stated generally at [29]:
‘Evidence of the relationship between an accused and the alleged victim of an offence may be relevant and admissible for the purpose of placing the event which is the subject matter of the offence in context, where such evidence may assist the jury to evaluate the conduct of the complainant and the applicant on the occasion which gave rise to the charge. Where the evidence is of criminal or other disreputable acts committed by the accused, so that there is a danger that the jury will treat it as evidence that the accused has a propensity to commit acts of the kind charged, the judge must warn the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence can be used. In particular the jury must be told that the relationship evidence cannot be regarded as a substitute for the evidence that the accused committed the charged acts, or for the purpose of showing that the accused is ‘the kind of person’ likely to have committed that offence (R v Grech (1997) 2 VR 609)’.
Neave JA went on to consider the circumstances in which relationship evidence may be relevant. At [31], Her Honour noted that relationship evidence of prior violence by the accused towards the complainant may be admissible in sexual offence cases ‘because it assists the jury to evaluate whether the complainant had freely agreed to sexual activity on the occasion to which the charge relates, or whether the accused knew that the complainant had not consented or might not have consented to having sex on that occasion’: see, for example, R v Loguancio [2000] VSCA 33; (2000) 1 VR 235, 23 (Callaway JA).
At [33], Her Honour noted that relationship evidence of prior acts of violence by the accused ‘may also be admissible where a person is charged with homicide or an offence arising out of the infliction of injury on a victim, because such evidence is relevant in evaluating the accused person’s claim that he or she had an amicable relationship with the victim, or that he or she acted in self-defence’: see, for example, Wilson v The Queen [1970] HCA 17; (1970) 123 CLR 334 and R v Mala (Unreported, Court of Appeal, Brooking, Ormiston, Batt JJA, 27 November 1997).
In this case, the appellant correctly conceded that evidence of the April 2011 assault when she refused to have sexual intercourse with him only a month before the alleged rape was relevant in assessing the likelihood that she had in fact voluntarily agreed to have intercourse with him or he believed that she had done so (see [35]). However, Neave JA held at [36]-[37] that:
‘[D]espite the appalling nature of the earlier assaults, I consider that the evidence of those assaults was not sufficiently relevant to the nature of the relationship which existed at the time of the alleged rape to the admission of that evidence. There was a lengthy time lapse between the earlier assaults and the alleged rape. Of itself, that time lapse might not have made the evidence irrelevant…’
‘However in this case there was not only a significant time delay between the alleged rape and the earlier assaults, but the complainant remained with the applicant despite the assaults and bore him children after those assaults had occurred. It may be that she did not leave him earlier because she was afraid of him, but there was no evidence that he had assaulted her because she refused to have sex with him, prior to April 2011’.
Bongiorno and Neave JJA agreed with the reasons set out by Neave JA as to why the evidence was inadmissible. However, they also held that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice as a conviction in this case was not inevitable: see Baini v The Queen [2012] HCA 59; (2012) 246 CLR 469. Neave JA in dissent at [52]-[61].
Freeman v The Queen [2011] VSCA 349 (9 November 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Desire to inflict emotional harm on another parent’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had recently divorced from Ms Barnes, the mother of his four year old daughter (the victim). Consent orders were made in the Family Court which reduced the applicant’s share of custody. The applicant was distressed by this outcome. A few days later, he was driving with his three children and had a telephone conversation with Ms Barnes, telling her that she would never see her children again. He pulled the car over and threw his four year old daughter off a bridge.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There were a number of aggravating circumstances on the facts including that the applicant killed an innocent child, the circumstances of the killing were horrendous and the child’s death would have been painful and protracted, the applicant’s conduct was a fundamental breach of trust, the killing was in the presence of his two sons, the applicant killed his daughter in an attempt to hurt his former wife as much as possible, the crime was committed in a public place, the applicant offended the public conscience, and the applicant threatened his ex-wife in the presence of their children (see [15]). The most heinous nature and gravity of the applicant’s offending, his lack of remorse and poor prospects for rehabilitation, meant that a non-parole period of 32 years was not manifestly excessive.
DPP v Johnson [2011] VSCA 288 (23 September 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Breach involving a child’ – ‘Contravening/breaching a family intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, assault, contravening a family intervention order.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male respondent entered the house of his former female partner, the complainant, with two knives and with the intention of killing himself in front of her. The complainant awoke and started screaming. This woke their daughter and the respondent left the premises (aggravated burglary and assault). The applicant was also charged with breach of a family violence intervention order which included conduct of a home invasion four days prior to the aggravated burglary, telephoning the complainant and threatening her and her family, and by coming within 200 metres of the complainant’s house on the night of the offence.
He was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for aggravated burglary, six months imprisonment for assault, and six months imprisonment for contravening a family intervention order. The sentencing judge took the view that the circumstances surrounding the burglary and assault were ‘almost identical’ to those surrounding the breach and ordered the sentence for breach to be made wholly concurrent with these sentences. After cumulation, a head sentence of one year and nine months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of ten months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with Redlich, Neave and Bongiorno JA providing separate reasoning. The judges gave detailed consideration to matters relevant to sentencing for breach of an intervention order.
Neave JA (Bongiorno JA agreeing) agreed with Redlich JA in part but held that the sentence imposed for the breach of the intervention order was manifestly inadequate. Her Honour stated that the frequency with which intervention orders are breached – and the potentially tragic consequences of this – warrants strong judicial condemnation of the contravention of such offences. As per Her Honour at [4]-[5]:
‘All Australian states have enacted legislation which is intended to protect potential victims of family violence from physical injury and from being placed in fear by harassment or threats. Family violence is a serious problem in Australia. In 2004, it was reported that family violence is ‘the leading contributor of death, disability and illness in women in Victoria aged 15 to 44 years’. Breach of intervention orders is relatively common. In its Report on Breaching Intervention Orders, the Sentencing Advisory Council said that, between July 2004 and June 2007, the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria and the County Court of Victoria imposed on average approximately 14,000 intervention orders per year. Over a quarter of all intervention orders imposed were breached.
Further, offenders who breach orders and continue to threaten and assault their partners may go on to seriously injure or even kill them. As was recognised during parliamentary debates on the Family Violence Protection Bill 2008, intervention orders can only protect victims of threatened violence if they are effectively enforced and if breach of an order attracts an appropriate sentence. The Victorian Law Reform Commission, in its report which ‘underpin[ned]’ many of the changes in the Bill, observed:
The response to a breach of an intervention order is crucial to ensuring the intervention order system is effective in protecting family violence victims. If police or the courts do not respond adequately to breaches of intervention orders, they will be perceived as ineffectual – ‘not worth the paper they are written on’ – by victims and perpetrators alike’.
Here, the respondent’s conduct that formed the basis of the breach was conceptually distinguishable from the other offences, including the aggravated burglary. The respondent also had a significant history of breaching these orders and displayed contempt for such orders. Accordingly, the sentence imposed for breach an intervention order was manifestly inadequate.
Redlich JA (with whom Neave JA and Bongiorno JA agreed in part) held that the sentence imposed for the aggravated burglary was manifestly inadequate. In dissent, His Honour held that the sentence for the breach of the intervention was not manifestly inadequate. However, upon re-sentencing the respondent, the sentence imposed for breach of an intervention order was lenient and thus a substantially higher sentence was warranted in the circumstances.
Redlich JA concluded that the sentencing judge erred by having regard to the respondent’s claims that his previous breaches were ‘innocuous or insignificant’ (at [49]). In reaching this conclusion, His Honour noted that it was an aggravating feature of the offending that the respondent had repeatedly contravened intervention orders. Accordingly, the principles of general and specific deterrence had to assume particular importance here (See [42]-[43]). As per the Court in R v Cotham at [14]:
‘Intervention orders must be strictly adhered to, and it is very much in the interests of the community that those against whom such orders are made be under no misapprehension that the courts will punish severely those who breach such orders. The applicant’s actions suggest that he believed he could breach the intervention order with impunity. Only by appropriately severe penalties can the courts make clear to the applicant and the broader community that such conduct will not be tolerated’.
It was also an aggravating feature that the breach involved a child who was protected by the order because such orders are granted pursuant to a legislative regime that places ‘particular emphasis on the protection of children from family violence’ (See [45]).
Redlich JA also concluded that the sentencing judge erred in ordering the sentence for the breach to be wholly concurrent. The offence of breach was not part of a single episode of offending (See [52]-[53]). As per the comments in R v Maher at [16] relating to cumulation and concurrency:
‘I turn to the relationship between, on the one hand, the stalking counts and the burglary and aggravated burglary, and, on the other hand, the breaches of the intervention order. It appears to me that the distinct criminality of the offending means that there should be some cumulation between the sentences imposed. Breaches of the intervention order, were in terms, disobedience of a court order. It would be inappropriate if that was not reflected in the breaches having real impact upon sentence. But, to meet the totality point, some amelioration of the individual sentences for the breaches and on the other counts is, in my view, required’.
Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274 (9 September 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Just punishment’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The relationship between the male applicant and his wife, the victim, was characterised by the applicant’s ‘inability to control his anger’ (at [2]). The victim met another man and said she was ending her relationship with the applicant. A few days later, during the course of an argument, the applicant stabbed the victim repeatedly in the neck and throat. At least part of the attack was witnessed by their four year old son. He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Redlich JA at [20]:
‘The taking of a domestic partner’s life undermines the foundations of personal relationships and family trust upon which our society rests. The sentence must reflect both the sanctity of human life and societies’ abhorrence of violence towards vulnerable and trusting partners who could legitimately have expected the offender to be the protector, not the perpetrator of violent abuse. An outburst of homicidal rage in such contexts is totally unacceptable. The community expectation is that the punishment assigned to such conduct must be condign so as to denounce in the strongest terms the abhorrent nature of domestic murder and to deter others from taking a similar course. Accordingly the principles of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment will ordinarily be given primacy in sentencing for the murder of a partner in a domestic setting even where there are present, circumstances of provocation or great emotional stress’.
The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. It appropriately reflected the considerable weight given to the principles of general deterrence and just punishment arising from the spousal relationship between the applicant and the victim (See [36]).
El Tahir v The Queen [2011] VSCA 46 (4 March 2011) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury, breach of intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the applicant’s estranged wife. The complainant obtained an intervention order against the applicant. In the presence of their two children, the applicant stabbed the complainant in the back, slashed her fingers, punched her, kicked her and pulled some of her hair out.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court held at [23] that ‘the sentence was not manifestly excessive and, indeed, properly reflected the gravity of the offence after taking into account all mitigatory factors including the plea of guilty. The Court rightly treated with the utmost seriousness the appellant’s knife attack on his defenceless wife in the presence of their children and in circumstances which included the invasion of her home in breach of a court order. Further, the relative brevity of the non-parole period might be thought to properly and adequately take into account the personal circumstances of the appellant’.
Kane v R [2010] VSCA 213 (23 August 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Specific deterrence’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury, intentionally causing injury, common assault, criminal damage, breach of an intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending was spread over two indictments. The male applicant and Rachel Delaney were in a de facto relationship. She was married to, but separated from, Daniel Smyth. During the applicant’s relationship with Ms Delaney, there were repeated incidents of tension and conflict between him and Mr Smyth. After Ms Delaney informed the applicant that their relationship was over, he broke into her house and attacked Mr Smyth (who was also present). He bit of a large part of Mr Smyth’s nose and held Ms Delaney by the throat. The applicant was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Nettle JA cited with approval the sentencing judge’s remarks that, ‘it is incumbent on a sentencing judge to impose condign punishment in a case like this in order to send a clear message to likeminded people that a civilised society does not condone people using physical violence to take the law in their own hands to settle disputes and deal with domestic partners in a violent way. Her Honour also observed, correctly, that inasmuch as these attacks were cowardly, unprovoked and unexpected attacks, there was a particular need for specific deterrence’.
However, as the Crown conceded here, the sentence was manifestly excessive (See [24]-[25]). Nettle JA further noted that, although this was not the case in which to do so, there was a need to revisit sentencing practices in relation to offences of intentionally causing injury (See [25], [29]-[30]).
Smith v The Queen [2010] VSCA 192 (29 July 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempting to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Need to condemn family violence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship. They were arguing and the applicant started punching and striking the complainant. The applicant was sentenced to three years and three months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in failing to have any regard or sufficient regard to the attitude of the victim.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There was an assertion from counsel for the applicant that the complainant did not want these charges to be pursued (but no evidence from the complainant to substantiate these assertions). Beach AJA held that the sentencing judge was not bound to give any weight to the unsupported assertions made about the complainant’s attitude to the prosecution. His Honour referred to Neave JA in R v Hester at [27] and held that, ‘even in cases where there is evidence of forgiveness of the victim of domestic violence, this evidence should be treated with extreme caution’ (See [8]).
Further, notwithstanding the applicant’s attempts to deal with his drug and violence problems since being remanded in custody, the sentence imposed was well open and could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge properly took into account the personal circumstances of the appellant, the appellant’s bad criminal record, principles of general deterrence, specific deterrence and denunciation. As per Beach AJA, ‘this Court has said on many occasions that domestic violence will not be tolerated and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition which must be, and must be seen to be, condemned by the courts’. In the circumstances, the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive (See [11]).
Kanakaris v The Queen [2010] VSCA 120 (28 May 2010) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Common assault x 4, intentionally causing injury x 3, threat to kill x 2, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant pleaded guilty to 13 offences, involving appalling physical violence, humiliation and abuse committed against his female de facto partner, sister, mother and four year old daughter. The total effective sentence was nine years and three months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s plea of guilty.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in fixing the non-parole period.
Decision and Reasoning: The first ground of appeal was dismissed but the second ground of appeal allowed. The applicant’s contention that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his plea of guilty was dismissed. The offending here was extremely serious. The conduct involved constituted breach of an intervention order, it was well planned and involved the use of an accomplice, the applicant was armed and threatened his partner, he took away her children, and she was unable to escape for six hours. His Honour also noted the that maximum penalties for aggravated burglary and intentionally causing serious injury as 25 years and 20 years respectively (See [70]-[72]). It was clear that the trial judge incorporated the discount for the plea of guilty in her orders of accumulation, which were only 12 months on the base sentence.
However, the appeal was allowed on the basis of the non-parole period. It was noted that a seven year non-parole period is ‘very substantial’. Coghlan JA concluded that the primary judge must have imposed such a substantial non-parole period because of a ‘guarded view taken of the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation’ (at [83]). However, the applicant had no criminal history and had pleaded guilty. As such, His Honour concluded that the primary judge erred in imposing such a long non-parole period on the basis of her conclusion on rehabilitation alone. The non-parole period was reduced to six years.
Neave JA agreed with Coghlan AJA but made some brief remarks about the complaint of manifestly excess. She noted at [4]:
‘Notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances to which the learned sentencing judge referred, the shocking violence which the offender inflicted on those he professed to love required strong denunciation and considerable emphasis on both general and specific deterrence’.
R v Bastan; DPP v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157 (4 August 2009) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence; Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant gave evidence that her marriage to the applicant was arranged by her parents. After the applicant was aggressive, she fled to a women’s refuge. They were divorced and the complainant obtained a family violence intervention order. The applicant began sending text messages to the complainant, masquerading as another man. The complainant invited this man to her house but told the applicant to leave when he arrived. He then dragged her to the bedroom, forced her onto the bed and penetrated her vagina with his penis. The applicant was found guilty after a trial and sentenced to four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years and three months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The Crown appeal against sentence was allowed. In upholding the appeal, Buchanan JA said at [36]:
‘I consider that the sentence would generally be regarded as inadequate if imposed upon an offender who tricked his way into the house of a stranger and raped her. The fact that the applicant and the complainant, in the past, had shared a consensual sexual relationship may have played a part in producing this sentence. In my opinion it should have played no part save insofar as those who have been in a relationship should be deterred from asserting any right or power in a like fashion against their former partners. This rape constituted an act of dominion by the applicant over the complainant’s body, which is not to be tolerated. In my opinion, the sentence, and in particular the non-parole period, was manifestly inadequate and represents an error that warrants interference by this Court’.
Earl v The Queen [2008] VSCA 162 (25 August 2008) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Offences at home’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: During the course of an argument, the applicant punched his wife, the complainant, six times in the head. The complainant did not seek medical attention for two days. She was admitted to hospital and found to have a large sub-arachnoid haemorrhage. She was also discovered to have carotid aneurysms. As a result of the carotid aneurysms, the complainant suffered permanent changes to her life and could no longer live independently. It was acknowledged by the sentencing judge that, on the basis of medical evidence, it was not possible to know for certain whether there was a causal link between the applicant’s attack and the serious medical events that followed. The applicant was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment suspended after 10 months for a period of 12 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence could not be said to be beyond the range of sound sentencing discretion. Despite the limited nature and extent of the attack, and the injuries which it was shown to have caused, the offence was still serious. The complainant was a person with limited cognitive impairment and, to that extent, she was vulnerable and in need of care and support. The complainant was entitled to the applicant’s love and protection as his wife but was instead assaulted by the applicant in their own home. Nettle JA said at [23]:
‘As such, the offence involved a gross breach of trust in the place where the victim was most entitled to feel safe. General deterrence is of real importance in cases of domestic violence, especially in cases where victims are particularly vulnerable. And because of the applicant's prior convictions, aged as they were, it was apparent that there was a need for some measure of specific deterrence’.
R v Hester [2007] VSCA 298 (29 November 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Difficulty of leaving’ – ‘Evidence of forgiveness’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Need to condemn’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of victim's wishes’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim impact statements’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing injury, intentionally causing serious injury, false imprisonment.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant were in an intimate relationship. On two occasions the applicant physically assaulted the complainant while intoxicated. On the second incident of assault, he also detained the complainant for 45 minutes and refused to let her seek medical attention. At sentence, a victim impact statement was tendered in which the complainant said she was partly to blame for the second incident and that she wanted to resume a relationship with the applicant. The applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in ignoring the victim impact statement for sentencing purposes.
2.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the sentencing judge did not err in not taking into account the part of the victim impact statement in which the complainant assumed blame for the second offending. There was also no substance in the claim that the sentencing judge failed to have regard to have proper regard to the complainant’s attitude to her relationship with the applicant (see [13]). Second, the sentences imposed were balanced, if not lenient, in all the circumstances. The offending was very serious – it was a savage, brutal and cowardly act on a victim who was physically much weaker than the attacker. Chernov JA also noted that the Courts have stated on a number of occasions that ‘such domestic violence will not be tolerated and that general deterrence is a very important sentencing principle in the sentencing disposition’ (see [19]-[20]).
Neave JA agreed with Chernov JA and added at [27]:
‘It is a common pattern of behaviour for perpetrators of domestic violence to express penitence and persuade their victims to reconcile. For a number of complex reasons which have been discussed in the social science literature dealing with this issue, many victims are assaulted on several occasions before they summon the courage to leave an abusive relationship. Often they require considerable support in order to do so. In my view, these are matters which should be given considerable weight by a judge who is considering the weight that should be given to a victim impact statement made by a person who has been the victim of domestic violence. I therefore agree with the comments of Simpson JA in R v Glen at 4 that evidence of forgiveness of the victim of domestic violence should be treated with extreme caution’.
DPP v Smeaton [2007] VSCA 256 (15 November 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Blaming the victim’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent saw the victim, his ex-girlfriend, at a Shopping Centre and became abusive and aggressive after she refused to help him ‘score’ heroin. He punched her and kicked her repeatedly in the head when she fell to the ground. The respondent was sentenced to three years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 months.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. It was possible to infer that after being refused heroin, the respondent ‘snapped’ and his moral culpability was therefore less than it otherwise might have been. However, having said that, ‘this was a vicious, cruel and unprovoked attack on a small and virtually defenceless woman. To kick anyone in the head is grossly dangerous. To do it more than once, deliberately, is courting the worst kind of disaster. Fortunately, that did not occur. But her injuries were serious, and they are to some extent likely to be permanent’. The offence was aggravated by the fact that it was committed in a busy shopping centre and it represented a gross breach of trust the victim reposed in the respondent. Accordingly, the respondent’s moral culpability was high (See [13]). Given the nature and gravity of the offending and the extent of the respondent’s criminal history, Nettle JA held the sentence was manifestly inadequate (See [16]).
Dodds-Streeton JA added further comments regarding some particularly troubling features of this offending. At [21], Her Honour stated:
‘Violence, and in particular violence by men against women as a means of control in current relationships or in relationships which have ended, is a prevalent and even critical social evil. As in the present case, the perpetrator not uncommonly expresses remorse immediately after a violent assault, but nevertheless seeks to blame the victim for causing the attack. Although the respondent did appear to regret the assault, as the sentencing judge observed, his letter to the court denigrated the victim's character and effectively sought to blame her for his backsliding into drug use and for provoking the attack. In the police interview, he denied the crime, at one point apparently claiming that the victim had assaulted him, and called her a lying dog’.
R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (14 August 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female deceased entered into a de facto relationship with the applicant. The relationship deteriorated, in part due to the deceased’s gambling habit. The relationship ended and the deceased moved into separate premises. The applicant started stalking her, largely to monitor her treatment of his son. The applicant followed her home one evening, clubbed her on the head a number of times with a rubber mallet and strangled her with cord. The applicant was found guilty by a jury of murder and was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge was justified in concluding that the applicant was not remorseful for killing the victim. The evidence before the judge was of a vicious, determined and brutal attack by a person with a significant advantage in size and weight over his victim. The sentencing judge was further entitled and correct to regard general deterrence as a significant factor in such a case in the exercise of his sentencing discretion. As per the Court at [140]:
‘[O]ur courts have stated on more than one occasion that in cases of killings of the type which occurred here in a “domestic” setting, the concept of general deterrence is an important and weighty sentencing consideration. The sentence, in such cases, must be such as to provide a strong message that outbursts of homicidal rage, in contexts such as this case are totally unacceptable and will be dealt with by stern sentences of the type imposed upon the applicant’.
The Court continued at [141]:
‘As (the sentencing judge) correctly observed many individuals have to confront circumstances of difficulty in the course of the breakdown of relationships. The Court must send a clear message to estranged parents that custody and other such disputes are to be resolved by proper processes and not by horrendous violence such as that imposed on the deceased in this case. In all the circumstances it cannot be said that the sentence imposed in this case is manifestly excessive’. See also R v Gojanovic [2005] VSC 97 (27 January 2005).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Gojanovic v The Queen [2011] HCATrans 66).
R v Duncan [2007] VSCA 137 (22 June 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Breach of intervention orders’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Damaging property, intentionally causing injury, breach of an intervention order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant engaged in protracted stalking of the female complainant for a number of years, in an attempt to initiate a relationship. The complainant obtained an intervention order against the applicant. In breach of this order, the applicant attended the complainant’s workplace, smashed her car’s windscreen and caused injury.
Issue/s: Some of the issues were that –
1.
The sentencing judge failed to have sufficient regard to the need to avoid double punishment and thus the sentences imposed were excessive. This was based on the principle of double jeopardy i.e. where two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements, it is wrong to punish the offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common (Pearce v The Queen).
2.
The trial judge failed to have sufficient regard to the principle of totality.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Vincent JA remarked at [37] that:
‘I would add that the sentencing judge was clearly correct in attributing a high level of seriousness to the appellant's conduct and reflecting that in the sentences imposed. Not only did the appellant’s conduct involve a savage and sustained attack upon his unfortunate victim but, it must not be forgotten she had sought the protection of the law against his continued and frightening criminal harassment. He responded to her endeavours, and to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment upon him, by seeking to punish her and damage her property. Obviously the community cannot accept that those who avail themselves of its protection may be subject to revenge or retribution if its structures and that protection are to possess credibility and operate to deter potential offenders’.
R v Elias [2007] VSCA 125 (19 June 2007) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Verdins principles’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Theft x 19.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offending took place between 2000 and 2004 when the female applicant was employed as an accountant at a firm. She diverted funds paid by bankrupt estates for creditors to her own accounts. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 20 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 12 months. The sentencing judge accepted evidence that the applicant’s offending behaviour was symptomatic of ‘battered woman syndrome’. There was a history of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of the applicant’s husband.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing judge erred:
(a)
In failing to sufficiently reduce the weight to be accorded to specific deterrence and moral culpability on account of the applicant’s psychological condition; and
(b)
In failing to sufficiently reduce the weight to be accorded to general deterrence on account of the applicant’s psychological condition.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence imposed did not suggest that the sentencing judge failed to give any or sufficient weight to the impact of the applicant’s mental state upon the significance of general deterrence, specific deterrence or moral culpability. His Honour’s sentence, reflecting moderation in individual sentences, and a small extent of cumulation, was in fact merciful (See [16]-[28]).
In obiter, Ashley JA observed that the Verdins principles had not as of yet been applied in respect of offences of this kind, where the offender asserts battered woman syndrome, as the relevant mental impairment, reduced moral culpability and the weight to be accorded to specific and general deterrence in sentencing. The battered woman/learned helplessness situation had typically been raised in homicide cases in relation to the question – why the offender did not leave their abusive partner? His Honour left open the possibility of the Verdins principles applying in a case where learned helplessness is given as the explanation for the commission of, for example, property offences. But this case was not an appropriate vehicle for making such a determination because there was insufficient evidence of the impairment to the applicant’s functioning arising from the history of abuse (See [12]-[14]).
R v Roach [2005] VSCA 162 (8 June 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Conduct endangering persons’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Negligently causing injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’ – ‘Where the victim is an offender’
Charge/s: Burglary, theft, conduct endangering persons, negligently causing serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant and Mr O’Neill, her partner and co-offender, broke into a milk bar and stole goods and cash. The applicant drove off from the store with Mr O’Neill as her passenger. They were chased by police, with Mr O’Neill threatening to kill her if she slowed down. The applicant crashed the car into another vehicle driven by Mr Hahn. The impact caused both vehicles to be engulfed in flames, trapping Mr Hahn inside his vehicle. He suffered extensive burns to his body. Mr O’Neill also suffered injuries as a result of the crash. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in his assessment of the applicant’s moral culpability by giving insufficient weight to the threats made to her by her partner.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Callaway JA at [15]:
‘the judge did accept that O'Neill's threats motivated the appellant to drive as she did and that she took those threats seriously because of the history of violence directed towards her. There was an element of "battered woman" syndrome. Nevertheless, His Honour said, the police were present and protection would have been immediately available to her. I appreciate that she would have feared what O'Neill might do subsequently, but it is one thing to engage in shop-lifting or the like under a threat of violence; it is another thing altogether to engage in conduct so dangerous that it results in the kind of injuries sustained by Mr Hahn. General deterrence is not excluded by threats. On the contrary, general deterrence may provide a counter-threat. The judge was not in error in saying that general deterrence must be the paramount sentencing consideration for offences of the kind the subject of counts 3 to 5 and that a substantial period of imprisonment was required to deter others minded to act in a similar way. I do not consider that his Honour undervalued the threats from O'Neill, particularly when the sentences he imposed on counts 3 to 5 are taken into account’.
R v Pham [2005] VSCA 57 (7 March 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Children’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury x 2.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant was in a relationship with the female victim and lived with her and her son, the other victim, for a few months. The relationship ended but they maintained an association. The applicant married the victim’s sister but started to harass both the victim and her sister. The victim obtained an intervention order protecting her and her children. In breach of the intervention order, the applicant entered into the victim’s house. He stabbed her with a knife to the face, mouth, chest and neck approximately eight times (count 3). The victim’s son tried to intervene but the applicant struck him with the knife twice times, almost severing the child’s hand (count 4). The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
Issue/s: The sentencing discretion miscarried as the judge was required to sentence the applicant on the basis that the verdict on count 4 rested not upon a finding by the jury of the deliberate infliction of serious injury to the victim but upon their application of the instructions of the trial judge concerning the concept of transferred malice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. There was no error on the part of the sentencing judge. His Honour did not impose a sentence on the basis that the applicant deliberately stabbed the victim (See [14]-[19]). Vincent JA further noted that the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion in this case required an order that effectively cumulated part of the sentence imposed on count 4 upon the sentence imposed on count 3. This was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the two separate offences and the particular aggravating features attaching to each, some of which were common and other not. In this context, it was particularly serious that the applicant act in flagrant violation of an intervention order the female victim had obtained to protect herself and her children. This is because the intervention order is:
‘… designed by parliament to provide the protection of the law to vulnerable individuals, usually, as in this case, women and children, who legitimately fear for their safety. Offenders who disregard such orders and occasion injury to persons whose personal security is intended to be guaranteed through this means must anticipate that an extremely stern view will be adopted by the courts of their conduct and, save in the most unusual circumstances, will be subject to condign punishment’ (See [21]-[22]).
DPP v Muliaina [2005] VSCA 13 (2 February 2005) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Causing serious injury recklessly’ – ‘Common assault’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Need for denunciation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Presentment 1 – false imprisonment; Presentment 2 – causing injury recklessly, indecent assault x 2, rape; Presentment 3 – aggravated burglary, common assault, false imprisonment, making a threat to kill, causing injury recklessly.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The primary victim was the male respondent’s former de facto partner and mother of their child. The circumstances of the first presentment were that the victim said she wanted to end their relationship. The respondent dragged her to his house and tied her to a chair. The false imprisonment ended when she was able to convince the respondent to call her mother because their daughter needed feeding. The second presentment related to the respondent’s offending after he had resumed living with the victim. He slapped the victim and hit her with a leather strap. He then tried to force the victim to perform oral sex on him and engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse with her without her consent. The victim obtained an intervention order against the respondent. The offences that were the subject of the third presentment occurred when they had ceased co-habitation and the respondent forced his way into her parent’s home. He assaulted the victim’s friend who was there at the time, threatened to kill the victim, and punched and hit her. The respondent was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, The sentence imposed did not equate with the gravity of the crimes. As per Chernov JA at [21]:
‘It seems plain enough that the respondent's offending conduct had the aggravating features for which the Director contended. It was brutal and cowardly and was, in the relevant sense, ongoing. It involved, in the main, ferocious physical attacks by the respondent on a much weaker victim whom the respondent claimed to love. On those occasions he treated her as if she were his slave who had to do his bidding or be severely punished if she refused. Such conduct is clearly unacceptable to this community and must be denounced by the courts. That the respondent experienced the brutal upbringing for which he contended does not make his behaviour, even though it may have been a manifestation of his uncontrolled anger, any more acceptable’.
R v Sa [2004] VSCA 182 (7 October 2004) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Cautious approach to victim forgiveness’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Role of apology’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim contribution’ – ‘Victim's wishes’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary, intentionally causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant and the victim, his cousin, were born in Western Samoa. They had a heated argument over the phone, in which the applicant said he would ‘chop [the victim’s] head off’. The applicant armed himself with a machete and went to the victim’s home. The applicant entered through an unlocked door and struck the victim twice with the machete to the back of the head and neck, in front of two small children. After the offence, a cultural ceremony of apology and reconciliation was performed. At sentence, the victim expressed his desire that the applicant not be imprisoned, his forgiveness of the applicant and that they now had a very good relationship. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included that the sentencing judge erred in that he failed to take into account the attitude of the victim and the remorse of the offender.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. As per Eames JA at [38]-[40]:
‘The statement of his Honour that the attitude of the victim could not ‘govern’ the sentencing approach was consistent with the principles stated in Skura. In the present case, however, there was good reason why the judge would be cautious in evaluating the weight to be given to the evidence of the victim. In the first place, he was not the only victim of the appellant’s crime; the two children also witnessed what must have been a horrifying incident, although there was no evidence of any long lasting adverse effects on the children. Crimes of violence frequently create alarm and distress to people other than the immediate victims, and in assessing the need for general deterrence a sentencing judge must have regard to the impact of crime more broadly than merely upon the immediate victim.
An additional reason for being cautious about the weight to be given to the evidence of the victim related to the nature of [the victim’s] evidence. One reason why courts do not allow the wishes of the victim to determine the sentence to be imposed is that the victim might not always be able to assess what is in his or her own best interest. For example, when considering what weight to give to factors of general and specific deterrence in a case of a woman assaulted by her partner a sentencing judge would be minded to have regard to the imperatives which might motivate a battered wife to plead for leniency towards her attacker. In such circumstances the sentencing judge might be cautious about giving undue weight to such a plea for leniency.
In the present case, the victim was himself in a difficult position among other members of the Samoan community, and his acceptance of the apology might have been motivated by a range of considerations’.
The sentencing judge accepted that the ceremony was of great cultural significance and that it represented a traditional apology of the most humble and sincere kind. He further accepted that the applicant had expressed genuine contrition and remorse. These statements reflected that the sentencing judge did in fact give weight to the performance of the cultural ceremony and to the factors of remorse and forgiveness (See [43]). Eames JA was not persuaded that the weight given to these factors displayed error in the sentencing judge’s approach. On the contrary, having regard to the seriousness of the offences, the sentences imposed were merciful (See [44]).
R v Skura [2004] VSCA 53 (7 April 2004) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Incitement to murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim impact statements’
Charge/s: Incitement to murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female applicant pleaded guilty to a single charge that she incited Jason Dorrian, an undercover police officer, to murder her husband, the complainant. She was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and six months. At trial, her husband submitted a victim impact statement that stated his forgiveness of the applicant, his desire that she return to live with the family and his willingness to offer her support to enable her to re-enter society. The sentencing judge stated that the relevance of the victim’s attitude was doubtful.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the way the sentencing judge dealt with evidence of a number of factors including the victim impact statement of her husband.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with the judges providing separate reasoning. Smith AJA stated at [48] that:
‘So far as the attitude of the victim to the degree of sentence is concerned, that is generally irrelevant. But evidence that the victim has forgiven the offender may indicate that the effects of the offence had not been long-lasting. It may mean that ‘psychological and mental suffering must be very much less in the circumstances. Accordingly, some mitigation must be seen in that one factor’: R v Hutchinson (1994) 15 Cr App R (S) 134, 137. Where the offence occurs in a domestic situation, the attitude of the victim may also be relevant to the question of rehabilitation’.
Here, the sentencing judge considered one aspect of the victim impact statement – the attitude of the victim and whether it could affect the sentence. His Honour did not appear to consider the impact of the crime on the victim or the relevance of the victim impact statement, and the attitude shown in it, to the question of rehabilitation. However, ‘the evidence revealed by the victim impact statement was in fact significant and, in particular, showed that there was no adverse impact on the victim’. Further, the applicant’s prospects of rehabilitation were enhanced because of the willingness of the victim and the daughter to help the applicant deal with her serious personality disorders. Accordingly, the sentencing judge erred in failing to have regard to this relevance of the victim impact statement (See [50]).
Eames JA also held that the sentencing judge did not give sufficient weight to the victim impact statement of the applicant’s husband (See [13]). His Honour stated at [12]:
‘This Court has often acknowledged that the introduction of victim impact statements has served an important purpose of ensuring that sentencing judges have a full appreciation of the consequences of criminal conduct to the victims of the crimes, thereby ensuring that judges properly weigh the factors relevant to victims which must be considered by virtue of s.5 of the Sentencing Act 1991. The courts have also warned that the victim impact statements should not be misused so as to produce a sentence which is unfair, and that an articulate or emotional victim impact statement could not justify a sentence being imposed which was not just in all the circumstances’.
However, while judges must ensure the contents of victim impact statements do not unbalance the sentencing process so as to cause a miscarriage of the sentencing discretion, Eames JA held that there may be many instances where the victim impact statement may have the effect of producing a more severe sentence. Likewise:
‘If a victim impact statement can have that effect in encouraging a view of the case which would justify a more severe sentence, then in my view sentencing judges ought to give equally appropriate weight to a victim impact statement where the victim positively expresses support for the accused and argues for a more lenient sentence’ (See [13]).
R v MFP [2001] VSCA 96 (15 June 2001) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Domestic context as an aggravating factor’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Risk factors’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Recklessly causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was married to the victim and they had three children together. The applicant forcibly dragged his wife out of the house and into the shed, where he had set up a noose. There was a struggle and he placed a noose so tightly around her neck that she passed out. The applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of one year.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in finding that the offence was aggravated because it occurred in a domestic context.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentencing judge in fact stated that the legislature and the community regarded the offence of recklessly causing serious injury as serious, an attitude that was correct particularly in a domestic context. Ormiston JA held that the sentencing judge was entirely justified as seeing this as a factor to be born in mind (See [19]). His Honour further stated that:
‘ I think [the domestic context] can be seen to be aggravating both as to its potential consequences and also inasmuch as a husband (or a wife) is in a privileged position in relation to a spouse. They each know the everyday movements, the habits, the likes and dislikes, the fears and pleasures of their spouse, which might enable them not only to effect an attack more easily on their victim but also to devise the kinds of attack which could more seriously affect their spouse, not merely physically, but so as to cause mental anguish. Now it was not suggested that there were special advantages which the applicant had in the present case, but he was certainly able to know whether the children would be up or asleep and where they would be, and where to take his wife to gain privacy for this cruelly devised attack. The matter need not be examined any further, for in truth the advantages that he had, including that of surprise, justified the judge in holding that it was proper to view more seriously this attack occurring in the domestic context of this family. The consequences for both his wife and children were manifest, as fairly could have been expected’ (See [20]).
R v Mason [2001] VSCA 62 (2 May 2001) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Common assault’ – ‘Digital rape’ – ‘Existence of prior relationship not mitigating’ – ‘Indecent assault’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Indecent assault, common assault, digital rape.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offences were committed by the applicant against his estranged wife, the complainant, with whom he had two children. During the course of an argument, the applicant grabbed the complainant by the crotch and lifted her up, slamming her into the bed on a number of occasions. Three days later, the applicant broke into the complainant’s house and started to choke and slap her. She struggled against him and he pushed her to the floor and penetrated her vagina with his finger. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and four months, with a non-parole period of 14 months.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to a number of factors including the pre-existing relationship between the applicant and his wife.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Winneke P addressed the submission that where the rape occurs against the background of a previous settled sexual relationship, it should generally be regarded by a sentencing court as less serious than a rape by a total stranger. Winneke P considered the authorities led in support of this submission and at [7] and [8] expressed the following conclusions:
‘I do not regard them as laying down a sentencing principle of inflexible or universal application. A rape committed in the context, and against the background, of a previous settled relationship may in certain circumstances be a factor which a court can take into account in mitigation where it can be seen that the impact upon the victim has, for that reason, been less traumatic than otherwise it might have been. But, equally, it is not difficult to imagine a rape, committed by a man who has been in a previous relationship with his victim, which would be every bit as frightening as a rape committed by a stranger. The one thing which the authorities to which this Court has been referred demonstrate is that the crime of rape, whatever the circumstances, and upon whomsoever committed, is regarded by the courts as a grave insult to its victim and a crime which can rarely give rise to a non-custodial sentence.
It should not be forgotten that the crime of rape is an intensely personal crime which, for sentencing purposes, cannot be divorced from its effects on the victim. But the effects include not only those which flow from the physical invasion of the victim's person and security, but also those which flow from the violation of the more intangible intellectual properties of the victim's rights and freedoms. In a society in which there is an increasing number of couples becoming estranged, the courts have a heightened obligation to deter those who have previously lived in a stable relationship with a wife or partner from regarding such wife or partner as akin to a chattel devoid of rights or freedoms, and as an object readily available for their sexual gratification’.
R v Boaza [1999] VSCA 126 (5 August 1999) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Domestic homicide’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and the female complainant formed a relationship, which the complainant subsequently ended. One evening, the applicant tailgated the complainant, forcing her to stop her vehicle. He dragged her out of the car and threw her down an embankment. Stating that he was going to kill her, the applicant punched the complainant and stabbed her multiple times before he was restrained by passers-by. Despite losing massive amounts of blood, the complainant survived. The applicant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the applicant’s plea of guilty and other matters put in mitigation on his behalf.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed, with separate reasoning provided by Chernov JA and Winneke P but each concurring with the final orders. Chernov JA found that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive in the circumstances. The offence was in the upper range of the scale of seriousness for the crime of attempted murder – it was a brutal, cowardly and unprovoked attack induced because the complainant had left their relationship. The applicant showed no remorse and repeatedly lied to police. A sentence reflecting the principles of denunciation and general and specific deterrence was warranted in the circumstances. Further, without the intervention of others the applicant would have killed the victim. Finally, it was clear the sentencing judge took into account all relevant mitigating factors (See [27]-[31]).
Winneke P similarly held that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. His Honour said at [50]:
‘[T]his was truly a case where the court’s sentence must mark the community’s condemnation of the applicant’s conduct and must be such as to deter others like-minded from resorting to such conduct as a means of resolving emotional disputes. The type of conduct engaged in by the applicant, reflecting as it does a lack of self-discipline and self-centred lack of respect for the freedom of choice of his victim, was rightly viewed by his Honour, I think, as a serious example of this crime’.
R v Harris [1998] 4 VR 21 (3 December 1997) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Existence of a prior relationship’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Recklessly causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charge/s: Rape, recklessly causing serious injury.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of raping and recklessly causing serious injury to his estranged wife. During the assault, which lasted one and a half hours, the respondent punched the complainant over 200 times, predominately to the face. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of one year. The sentencing judge relied on four matters in deciding to impose a sentence at the lower end of the scale: (a) the offender was unlikely to reoffend, (b) the confusion in his mind as to where his relationship with the complainant was going, (c) the offender’s previous good record (which indicated the actions were out of character), and (d) the fact that, since the complainant was his wife, she would not have suffered the long-term traumatisation endured by other rape victims.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Charles JA (Phillips JA agreeing) held that the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate. None of the first three factors (a), (b) or (c) identified by counsel justified the low penalty for the rape of the complainant. Charles JA did not accept the Crown’s submission that factor (d) disclosed a significant error of principle. The sentencing judge’s statement as to traumatisation was no more than a finding of fact in the circumstances of this particular case, and not purely premised on the fact that the complainant was his former wife. Notwithstanding this, a substantially heavier sentence was warranted in the circumstances.
Charles JA further held that the imposition of such a lenient sentence here undervalued two important sentencing considerations. First, general deterrence plays an extremely important role in warning the community that rape, within or outside of marriage, will not be tolerated and will attract condign punishment. Second, the considerations which influenced the sentencing judge to impose a lower sentence suggested that His Honour gave little weight to specific deterrence. In light of the respondent’s lack of remorse for his actions, specific deterrence ought to have played a significant role in the construction of an appropriate sentence. Error was also shown in the sentencing judge’s decision not to direct any cumulation of sentence for the serious physical violence inflicted upon the complainant (See 27).
Tadgell JA also agreed with Charles JA but provided some additional observations. In particular, at 28-29, His Honour stated:
‘In particular, it cannot be said that [the sentencing judge] purported to apply any principle to the effect that rape by a man of his wife or former wife or of a person with whom he is or has been in a close relationship is to be treated more leniently than a rape by a stranger. The authorities do not appear to support any such principle. The most that can be said, in my opinion, is that the penalty to be imposed for the crime of rape cannot be regarded as necessarily conditioned by the relationship of the parties to it. Any relationship or lack of it between them will no doubt usually fall to be considered as one of the circumstances to be taken into account in a determination of the appropriate penalty. In some circumstances a prior relationship may serve as a factor of mitigation, but it need not, and it may indeed serve to aggravate the offence’.
There was no error of that kind here but the sentence was still manifestly inadequate for the reasons articulated by Charles JA.
R v Cotham [1998] VSCA 111 (17 November 1998) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Breach of intervention order’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘False imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Repeated and contemptuous breaches of intervention orders’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Theft’
Charge/s: False imprisonment, theft x 3, breach of intervention order x 5, unlicensed driving.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were divorced and the complainant had obtained multiple intervention orders against the applicant over a period of time. The applicant broke into the complainant’s home, threatened the complainant with a knife and tapped the complainant’s mouth and legs and tied her to the bed. He then took the complainant’s credit cards and left the premises in the complainant’s car. Some days later, the applicant again broke into the complainant’s house. The complainant fled the premises and the applicant took credit cards and various other items. On a final occasion, the applicant telephoned the complainant at work, trying to persuade her to drop the charges against him. All these incidents were in breach of an intervention order. The applicant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of two years and six months imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 months.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Charles JA held that the sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive. The applicant committed serious crimes which adversely affected the victim and her children quite significantly. The applicant was contemptuous of the intervention order, disregarding it and its terms as and when he pleased. And he had been in court on two previous occasions for breaching the same order (See [16]). As per Charles JA at [14]:
‘Intervention orders must be strictly adhered to, and it is very much in the interests of the community that those against whom such orders are made be under no misapprehension that the courts will punish severely those who breach such orders. The applicant's actions suggest that he believed he could breach the intervention order with impunity. Only by appropriately severe penalties can the courts make clear to the applicant and the broader community that such conduct will not be tolerated’.
R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376 (9 October 1997) – Victorian Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Background of emotional and physical abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of the attempted murder by stabbing his wife. He attacked her in a frenzy in public in front of their children. At the time of the incident, the respondent was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Batt JA stated that ‘general deterrence is not eliminated but still operates, sensibly moderated, in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or severe intellectual handicap’ at 381 (See also R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo [2007] VSCA 102 (23 May 2007) and R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 (28 November 1995)). His Honour held that the sentence failed manifestly to meet the gravity of the respondent’s crime. The fact the offence occurred in a domestic situation did not decrease its heinousness. The crime warranted a sentence reflective of the considerations of general and specific deterrence, the community’s expectation of proper punishment and the possibility of rehabilitation (See 381).
Winneke P agreed with Batt JA but added his own observations. His Honour agreed at 382 that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and stated:
‘[T]his was a very serious example of the crime of attempted murder. It was premeditated and vicious and carried out upon a defenceless woman, in a public place, in the presence of the terrified children of both the respondent and the victim. I agree with the learned sentencing judge that the crime is not to be regarded as any the less heinous because it was committed against the background of an emotional domestic dispute. That is merely an explanation and not an excuse for the crime.
Winneke P also held at 383 that ‘whether in the particular case a psychiatric condition should reduce or eliminate general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of punishment will depend upon the nature and severity of its symptoms and its effect upon the mental capacity of the accused’.
R v Towns [1992] VCCA (unrep, 21 September 1992) – Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Seriousness’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The victim was the applicant’s wife. Throughout the marriage, there were episodes where the applicant drank to excess and subjected the victim to mental and physical abuse. The victim obtained an intervention order against the applicant. The applicant stabbed the victim in the throat on a train. The applicant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
Issue/s: The sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The sentence imposed on the applicant was outside the range of sentences imposed for comparable offences. In re-sentencing the applicant, Phillips CJ stated at 7:
‘[T]here appears to be an implication in counsel’s submissions on behalf of the applicant that, in some way, cases involving a murder arising out of a relationship, or arising out of a domestic situation are less heinous as a class than other types. There is no doubt in my mind that the court must set its face against such an implication’.
Supreme Court
Re JP [2024] VSC 691 – Supreme Court of Victoria
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Damaging property ’ – ‘Protection Order ’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ ’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’ ’ – ‘People with children’ ’ – ‘Separation’ ’ – ‘Stalking’ ’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ ’ – ‘Bail’
Case Type: Bail Application
Charges:
Charges dated 12 June 2024
Use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (x3); assault (x1); making a threat to kill (x2); stalking (x1).
Charges dated 30 August 2024
Persistent contravention of a family violence safety notice or family violence intervention order (x1); stalking (x1); use of a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence (x1); contravening a family violence intervention order (x21); threatening to inflict serious injury (x1); making a threat to kill (x2); contravening a family violence intervention order intending to cause harm or fear for safety (x2).
Facts: JP and his former partner were in a relationship from 2016 to 2020 and have three young children. Following their separation, they maintained an "on again, off again" relationship between 2021 and April 2024. In late May 2024, an interim family violence intervention order was made against JP, listing his former partner and their children as protected persons. This was replaced by a final order served on 8 July 2024, prohibiting JP from contacting his former partner except for negotiating child custody through written communication.
12 June 2024 charges: On 13 May 2024, JP allegedly strangled his former partner, pinning her face down on the bed for 30 seconds. On 23 May 2024, JP allegedly let himself in her home, demanded her car keys, when she refused, JP threatened to kill her. She challenged JP and asked if he would kill the mother of his children, he allegedly responded by stating he would “put a hit on her and her family,” and then followed up stating, “fuck it, I’ll do it myself”. His former partner then hid in a closet. JP left to collect their children and police were contacted by the sister of his former partner, who had been on a loudspeaker call in the background.
30 August 2024 charges: Between 29 July and 27 August 2024, JP allegedly made 98 prohibited calls to his former partner. On 26 August 2024, he allegedly threatened to put a gun to her head in a fast-food carpark in an attempt to take possession of his former partners car. On 29 August 2024, he allegedly followed her to her workplace and screamed, “I’m going to fucking kill you” while holding a shifter spanner.
JP is subject to an interim family violence intervention order made on 16 September 2024. Of significance to the following judgement. JP has a limited criminal history, including two theft convictions and a single bail breach in 2023.
Decision: The Supreme Court of Victoria (Elliott J) refused JP’s bail application, finding that exceptional circumstances justifying bail were not established. Even if exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated, JP posed an unacceptable risk to the safety and welfare of his former partner and others if released on bail [84].
Reasoning: The court found that the alleged offending was extremely serious, this was supported by significant evidence, including telephone records and CCTV footage. This evidence significantly undermined JP’s suggestion that the prosecution's case was weak [65]. While it was accepted that JP’s criminal history is limited and of little relevance to the charges he presently faces, in the circumstances of this case, the absence of a relevant criminal record is not exceptional. That is, in cases involving family violence in connection with the breakdown of an intimate relationship, it is not unusual for offenders to have no or only a limited criminal record [67]. The availability of psychological treatment and stable accommodation, while relevant, did not meet the high threshold required for exceptional circumstances. The proposed treatment plan involved only weekly sessions and did not adequately address the significant ongoing risks associated with JP’s history of anger, substance abuse, and financial instability [69]–[75]. The offer of a $100,000 bail guarantee, although significant, was insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the alleged conduct and the high risk of reoffending, given JP’s repeated disregard for court orders and intervention conditions [78]. Lastly, the court also found that JP’s previous breaches of bail and intervention orders, including repeated contact with his former partner despite explicit prohibitions, indicated a substantial risk of further breaches if released, even with strict bail conditions [80]–[82].
DPP v Lindemann [2024] VSC 220 (22 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic violence’ – ‘No genuine remorse’
Charges: Murder x1; Recklessly causing injury x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male defendant pleaded guilty to the murder of his female partner and to recklessly causing injury to their young daughter.
The relationship was strained, owing in part to the defendant’s insecurity and jealousy, and dislike of the victim’s parenting style. [5]–[6]. The victim had developed a relationship with another individual and attempted to end the relationship with the defendant. [13]–[15] The defendant had trouble accepting the termination of the relationship, ‘exploding in a violent, jealous rage’, stabbing, kicking and strangling the victim in her bedroom. [29] Their daughter witnessed this entire incident and attempted to intervene. The victim’s mother also attempted to intervene (she resided in the home and suffered from Parkinson’s disease). The daughter suffered several knife injuries to her hands, elbow and shoulder. [28]–[36] The defendant stabbed the victim 17 times with multiple knives. [49]
The defendant then completed an internal transfer of $71,000 from his accounts before stabbing himself multiple times. [38]
Decision and reasoning: 31 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Justice Hollingworth found the defendant’s conduct to be ‘very serious examples of each offence’, motivated by ‘jealously, rage and a sense of entitlement’. [85] Her Honour held each offence to be ‘well above the mid-range’. [120]
The defendant has no prior criminal history and positive prospects of rehabilitation. [93] However, these prospects are tempered due to the defendant’s ‘limited insight’ into the impact of his conduct and victim-blaming mentality [93]
Accordingly, the defendant’s moral culpability was very high, [83] with the defendant possessing a ‘range of problematic gender-based beliefs’ [81].
DPP v Griffiths [2024] VSC 263 (22 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Ruling’ – ‘Psychological support for jurors during a trial’ – ‘Vicarious trauma’ – ‘Audiovisual evidence’ – ‘Evidence from child witnesses’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Murder x1; Recklessly causing serious injury x 1.
Proceedings: Ruling on the provision of support for jurors during a trial.
Facts: The accused is charged with the murder of his wife, and recklessly causing serious injury to his step-daughter. The accused has pleaded not guilty to these charges. Upon empanelment, the jury were notified that the trial would involve confronting audio-visual evidence: namely, body-worn camera footage of the scene of the crime, and the injured victim. In the presence of his two step-children, the accused poured petrol on his wife and lit the petrol using a cigarette lighter. The victim suffered burns to 90% of her body, dying four days later in hospital. The accused’s step-daughter suffered serious burns in the incident.
Members of the jury, experiencing vicarious trauma, notified the court and queried if counselling would be made available during the trial.
Issue: Whether counselling or other psychological support can and should be provided to a jury during a trial.
Decision and reasoning: Psychological support for jurors should be provided during trials.
When read as a whole, the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) does not prevent ‘a jury from being provided assistance during the trial if it becomes necessary’. [29]
Accordingly, there is ‘no impediment’ a court providing jurors psychological support should, like the present, ‘graphic or confronting evidence’ be played and members of the jury indicate the need for such support. [38] The nature of this support may vary, but typically may involve an information session on vicarious trauma, [49] or ‘a group information session which all jurors attend, or private counselling sessions between individual jurors and a psychologist’. [40]
Re Harris [2024] VSC 226 (09 May 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Bail application’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Charges: Common law assault x 1; Assault x 2; Resist x 2; Assault an emergency worker x2; Threat x 1;
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The male applicant strangled and threw his wife against a wall in their house. One of their children witnessed the incident, and immediately contacted the grandfather and 000. The applicant threw a lit candle at his father (upon his arrival) and pinned him to the ground. The applicant resisted police, punching two officers. The applicant was taken to the hospital, following his father’s concern that he had consumed an illicit substance. Therein he threatened to kill ‘them all’ and punched a security guard several times. [3]
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail approved with conditions
Justice Champion was satisfied that the applicant’s sustained violent behaviour occurred after ‘he had taken an overdose of tablets’. [24] The applicant has no prior criminal history and may spend longer on remand that on any sentence of imprisonment that may be imposed for the charged offences. [22] Accordingly, HH accepted the bail application on the condition the applicant receive residential treatment at a health clinic.
Re Mahat [2024] VSC 140 (01 February 2024) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Bail application’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse ’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Threats of violence ’ – ‘Damaging property ’
Charges: Attempted armed robbery x1; robbery x1; Reckless conduct endangering life x1; Intentionally causing injury x2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Making threats to kill x1; Assault with a weapon x3; Using a prohibited weapon without approval x1; Committing an indictable offence whilst on bail x1; Contravening certain bail conduct conditions x1; Contravention of protection order, intending to cause harm or fear x4; Contravening an interim protection order x 10; Unlawful assault with a weapon x1; Unlawful assault x3; Intentionally damaging property x1; Driving whilst suspended x1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female complainant is the male applicant’s former partner. [15] The present charges cover various incidents of actual and threatened physical harm, emotional/psychological abuse, and withholding and damaging personal property[17]–[39]
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail denied.
Justice Champion held the allegations to be ‘serious examples of family violence’. [96] The incidents escalated in severity and involved weapons: ‘the alleged use of a knife and a taser is highly concerning’. [96] Further, certain incidents involved strangulation, ‘which are commonly accepted to be an indicator of, or risk factor for, homicide’, and the most violent involved the assistance of a third party. [97]–[98]
Lastly, each of these incidents were committed in disregard of protection orders, indicating that the applicant has no ‘insight into the relationship or the seriousness of’ protection orders. [99]
DPP v Malovski [2023] VSC 748 (13 December 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘significant criminal history ’ – ‘Family violence intervention order ’ – ‘Coercive control ’ – ‘Jealousy ’ – ‘Separation ’
Charges: Attempted murder x 1; Being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The defendant confronted, pursued and repeatedly shot a friend of his ex-wife while he assisted her in a flower stall in 2022. The defendant shot no fewer than five shots at the victim, one of which rendered him an incomplete paraplegic. The defendant’s 10-year-old son witnessed the event. The defendant was motivated by anger at the victim for supplanting him in the life of his family and a desire to maintain control over his ex-wife ([6]). The defendant was on a family violence intervention order at the time, issued in 2021 [8]. The defendant was found guilty of attempted murder and pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.
Decision and reasoning: 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. In handing down the sentence, Tinney J noted:
For reasons of anger, resentment, jealousy and probably also a desire to maintain control over your former wife, you carried out a shocking and senseless public attack upon an entirely innocent man in full view of your former wife, your 10 year old son and many others. The very idea of an angry and embittered man chasing his quarry around in circles in a public reserve bordering a busy main road in a suburb of Melbourne and firing a large number of shots from a pistol intending to kill him is quite appalling. You failed to achieve your aim, but not for want of trying. You have left Mr Grant with terrible injuries which will blight his life forever and reduce the quality of that life. This was a terrible crime, as your counsel fairly conceded, and is deserving of condign punishment [79]
Turning to general deterrence, male violence towards former intimate partners, or towards new friends of former intimate partners, is a depressingly frequent occurrence in our society, and is to be deplored and discouraged. The sentence I pass on you must be such as to clearly bring it home to any male, or any person, who would seek to wreak violent retribution against another person motivated by a refusal to accept or deal with the end of a relationship, that such conduct will be met with very strong punishment’ [81]
DPP v Charlton (No 2) [2023] VSC 707 (29 November 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Cold Case’ – ‘16-year gap between offense and laying of charge ’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Active steps to conceal involvement ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: Following a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of the murder of Joanne Howell in 2007.
The defendant and Howell were in a relationship, living together for approximately five months prior to Howell’s death. During this period, the defendant and Ms Howel were experiencing ‘relationship difficulties’ [4]. On the morning of Ms Howell’s death, Ms Howell demanded the defendant move out, giving him 30 days to do so. That evening, after having taken the dog for a walk, the defendant called emergency services, reporting the discovery of Ms Howell unconscious at the bottom of the stairs in their home.
No charges were initially laid in 2007. A coronial inquest into Ms Howell’s death was conducted in 2011 and in 2020, the investigation was revived, and charges of murder laid against the defendant [16]–[18]. Based on the whole evidence, the jury concluded that the defendant struck the back of Ms Howell’s skull, strangled her with a ligature with an intention to kill [13].
Decision and reasoning: 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 19 years. In passing sentencing, Elliot J noted:
Murder is a gravely serious offence. You brutally murdered Ms Howell in her home where she was entitled to feel safe. It is a significant aggravating factor that your offending was an extreme act of domestic violence [42].
The delay between the date of your offending and you being charged is significant. … That being so, the delay cannot simply be characterised as undue and nothing more in circumstances where you took active steps to conceal your involvement in Ms Howell’s murder [48].
DPP v Basham [2023] VSC 655 (14 November 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Application for forfeiture of property’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Tainted property ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Application for forfeiture of property connected to offence.
Facts: The respondent was convicted of the murder of his estranged wife. The murder took place in the victim’s home (‘the home’). The respondent drove his motorcycle to and from here. The DPP applied for forfeiture of the home and motorcycle under s 32 of the Confiscation Act 1997, which empowers the DPP to apply for a forfeiture order of property ‘used in or in connection with certain criminal offences’. [3]
Decision and reasoning: Application for forfeiture granted. Both the home and motorcycle were judicially determined to be ‘tainted property’; each was instrumental to the offence, and the respondent obtained an interest in them by survivorship following the victim’s death. [50];
In outlining the relevant considerations attached to a grant of an order of forfeiture, Taylor JA emphasised the gravity and nature of the offender’s crime as both relevant. [16] The application of these considerations further reinforced the grant:
The objective gravity of Basham’s offending and his moral culpability for it are of the highest order. It was a premeditated murder that occurred against a background of family violence and seven days before Ms Fraser was to give evidence in the committal hearing of rape allegations she made against Basham. The offending itself consisted of Ms Fraser being subjected to a savage beating in which she sustained 41 separate blunt force injuries before being hanged. The forfeiture of [the home] is proportionate to the nature and gravity of the offending, being a ‘worst case’ murder. [53]
Forfeiture also advances deterrence in relation to serious crimes. Deterrence is of particular note when offending occurs in the context of family violence. [53]
DPP v Pandilovski [2023] VSC 514 (30 August 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation ’ – ‘Concealment ’ – ‘History of family violence ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife. In the morning of 14 July 2020, the accused strangled his wife, before moving her body into a storage room. The accused took photos of the victim’s body using the victim’s mobile phone. [5] Not long after leaving the victim’s home, the accused attempted to commit suicide by veering into the path of oncoming traffic. [6] No one was killed. When taken to the Royal Melbourne Hospital, the accused threatened to harm himself. [6] Police discovered the victim’s body in the evening.
Decision and reasoning: 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years. [48]–[49]
Justice Beale considered the victim impact statements of the victim’s family, which referred to the ‘great suffering’ caused by the accused’s actions. [13] His Honour considered the objective gravity of the accused’s offending to be in the ‘upper-mid range example of murder’: it was a ‘domestic murder, carried out in [the victim’s] own home against the backdrop of past violence’ committed by the accused towards her. [16]
His Honour accepted the accused’s plea of guilty, remorse and reasonable prospects of rehabilitation as circumstances of mitigation. [40]
DPP v Tan [2023] VSC 416 (21 July 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘ Sentencing’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Late confession ’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring ’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence ’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was found guilty of the murder of his former female partner. In the month leading to the victim’s death, the victim’s interest in the accused waned. The accused, however, maintained strong possessive feelings for the victim and soon began monitoring the victim, accessing her phone and reading her private messages. One night, following a heated argument concerning the victim’s waning interest, the accused stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest in her home. [9] The victim’s son was in the house. The accused proceed to dispose of the victim’s body in a wheelie bin. [15]
Decision and reasoning: 28 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 23 years. [60]
Justice Fox considered the victim impact statements of the victim’s family and friends, including the victim’s son who has been ‘left traumatised’ by the accused’s actions. [31]
Justice Fox noted that it was only after hearing the victim impact statements that the accused accepted the jury’s verdict and admitted to murdering the victim. [41] A confession ‘after a verdict attracts none of the benefits which attach to a guilty plea’. [42]
The accused had no prior convictions or history of family violence. [45] However, it remained a troubling aspect of the accused’s character that ‘after a relationship of only on month, [he] became so jealous and proprietorial that, when faced with rejection, [he was] capable of murder’. [45]
DPP v McDonough [2023] VSC 352 (23 June 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘High moral culpability’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Homicide’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by drug and alcohol misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Poor prospects of rehabilitation’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter of his female partner. In the course of assaulting the victim, the offender punched the victim in the face, causing her to fall over and hit her head. The fall caused bleeding to the brain, resulting in the victim’s eventual death.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Reasoning and decision: Fox J sentenced the offender to 11 years and 6 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months.
In assessing the offender’s personal circumstances, Fox J acknowledged the offender’s drug abuse led to an unstable lifestyle and significantly contributed to his offending behaviour [27]. Fox J also recognised the offender had a very lengthy and relevant criminal history, dating back to 2001. The offender breached good behaviour bonds, suspended sentences and community correction orders imposed by the courts [29]. The offender was on bail for other matters when he committed manslaughter, aggravating his offending [29].
Mental illness diagnoses were not consistent, but experts discussed schizophrenia, substance use disorder, depression, personality disorder, and a mild acquired brain injury [30]-[34]. However, Fox J held Verdins has no application as there was no evidence prison would be a burden on the offender’s mental health [35].
Fox J provided a sentencing discount for the early-stage guilty plea [36] and accepted prison COVID-19 restrictions as a mitigating factor [38]. The judge also regarded the offender’s post-offence conduct as relevant; he called an ambulance, expressed he knew what he did was seriously wrong, and handed himself into police the same day [41].
However, Fox J considered the offender’s remorse limited [40]. The judge also held the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were poor, as he had declined to engage in prison-based services and had a long-history of breaching court orders [43]. Fox J held that neither the offender’s drug use nor mental health issues mitigate his offending. His moral culpability for the crime was high [45].
Fox J stated when sentencing violence against female partners, ‘the courts must send a message to other would-be offenders that if you commit such crimes, you should expect to receive a substantial term of imprisonment’ [48].
Re Thompson [2023] VSC 274 (17 May 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Compelling reason’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘No prior criminal history’ – ‘Past defence service’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Psychologist evidence’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Serious alleged offending’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Suicide threat by perpetrator’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: rape x 7; rape by compelling sexual penetration; attempted rape x 2; assault x 6; sexual assault x 3; assault with intention to commit sexual offence x 2; recklessly causing injury; false imprisonment x 6; criminal damage x 4; stalking; installation use and maintenance of optical surveillance devices; threatening to distribute intimate image; theft. (Also unrelated charges of driving under the influence of alcohol x 3).
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant man and complainant woman had been in a relationship since 2015. Following unsuccessful IVF treatment their relationship deteriorated and it is alleged the applicant’s violence towards the complainant commenced. The relationship ended in 2021 but despite this, the couple continued a sexual relationship, while agreeing to also see other people, which the complainant commenced to do. They agreed the complainant could keep storing belonging’s in the shed of the home and stay in the shed when visiting Bendigo (he had moved to Melbourne). It was during this period that the offending occurred.
The applicant allegedly broke into the complainant’s house on multiple occasions, including while she was sleeping with another man, and on one occasion secretly filmed her having sexual intercourse with someone else and threatened to distribute the resulting film. The applicant also came to the complainant’s house and tampered with and damaged her car, came into her bedroom while she slept, monitored her phone and sent her images of a cut on his arm, insinuating that he would kill himself.
After the complainant told the applicant she needed space apart from him, he became aggressive, verbally and physically, grabbing the complainant and ripping a door off its hinges. On another occasion, the complainant came home to find the applicant hiding under her bed and there were multiple instances of rape. While the complainant left her house for a period and changed the locks, the applicant later confronted her at her home again and attempted to rape her again, chasing her out onto the street and physically assaulting her.
The applicant admitted to stalking but denied the sexual offences and was initially denied bail. A ten-year protection order was made with a full no-contact condition. The applicant relied heavily on evidence from his psychologist (Cummins) to demonstrate his lack of risk. Cummins opined that the offending was ‘situationally motivated,’ having arisen in the context of a relationship breakdown in which the agreement to see other partners was ‘very provocative’ and difficult for the applicant [82], [87]. Cummins undertook a risk assessment using the ‘Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol’ guidelines (and not the Static-99R), concluding that the applicant displayed none of the markers of re-offending. He was not able to complete a full assessment of the applicant’s risk profile for violence, as he felt limited by the need to distinguish allegation from established fact. The prosecution challenged Cummins’ characterisation of the offending and finding of low risk, which they saw as being largely based on his focus on the applicant’s lack of criminal history and lack of completion of the risk-assessment tests.
Reasoning and decision: Bail refused.
There was no contention that the offender had compelling reasons for bail and Champion J accepted this based on his stable accommodation, possible future employment, substantial surety, ongoing treatment opportunities and lack of criminal history.
Champion J found that the applicant demonstrated an unacceptable level of risk given the degree and protracted, premeditated nature of the offending, his disturbing surveillance of the complainant and his willingness to travel significant distances for the offending, consistent with the prosecution’s rejection of the offending as ‘situationally motivated.’ The complainant had an entitlement to live in peace and privacy which would be undermined by his bail.
While there was no mental health diagnosis, Champion J noted Cummins’ lack of access to historical records, refusal to draw connection between the offending and the applicant’s military history, and limited ability to commit a full sexual offending risk-assessment. Given the arrangement for the committal hearing in a few weeks, the judge concluded that the prosecution case and thus his bail could more realistically be assessed at that time. The applicant relied heavily on evidence from his psychologist (Cummins) to demonstrate his lack of risk. Cummins opined that the offending was ‘situationally motivated,’ having arisen in the context of a relationship breakdown in which the agreement to see other partners was ‘very provocative’ and difficult for the applicant [82], [87]. Cummins undertook a risk assessment using the ‘Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol’ guidelines (and not the Static-99R), concluding that the applicant displayed none of the markers of re-offending. He was not able to complete a full assessment of the applicant’s risk profile for violence, as he felt limited by the need to distinguish allegation from established fact. The prosecution challenged Cummins’ characterisation of the offending and finding of low risk, which the court saw as being largely based on Cummin’s focus on the applicant’s lack of criminal history and lack of completion of the risk-assessment tests.
DPP v Tan (Ruling No 1) [2023] VSC 296 (2 May 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Allegations of infidelity’ – ‘Application to lead hearsay evidence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of accused accessing text messages of victim’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Relevance’ – ‘Short relationship’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Prosecution pre-trial application to lead hearsay evidence.
Facts: The accused objected to the admissibility of two statements in the Crown’s noticer of hearsay evidence filed pursuant to s67 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (‘the Act’). The deceased woman was in a relationship with the accused which commenced on 1 January 2021. She was killed on 1 February 2021, after the accused became aware that she was friendly with another man.
The prosecution submit the hearsay representations for part of the evidence detailing the relationship evidence, and relevant and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to s65(2)(b) and/or s65(2)(c) of the Act.
Issue: The admissibility of the disputed evidence, two hearsay statements of the deceased to the deceased’s friend Ms Chi, namely:
1.
‘That the accused deliberately ejaculated in her vagina without her permission, and that she was angry as a result’ (the parties agree ‘deliberately’ and ‘without her permission’ should be deleted); and
2.
‘The accused had been accessing her mobile phone and reading her messages’.
Objections: The defence objects to the admission of the statements on the following bases:
1.
The first statement is not relevant, does not come within a recognised exception to the hearsay rule, and in any event should be excluded pursuant to s 137 of the Act.
2.
The second statement does not come within a recognised hearsay exception.
Reasoning and decision:
1.
The first statement is not relevant pursuant to s 55 and therefore not admissible pursuant to s 56(2):
In my view, the evidence that the deceased told Ms Chi that the accused ‘came inside my vagina’, and she was very angry and yelled at him about it, could not rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of whether the accused killed the deceased, and if so, whether he killed her with murderous intent. The evidence does not provide a motive or reason for the killing. It does not assist a jury to determine whether the accused in fact killedthe deceased. It does not provide necessary context or background. It is not relevant and therefore not admissible. [53]
2.
The second representation is hearsay and admissible pursuant to s 65(2(c):
Turning to s 65(2)(c). The phrase, ‘made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable’ creates a stringent test. It may be contrasted with the language employed in s 65(d)(ii), which provides that the representation must be ‘made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable’. Clearly, s 65(d)(ii) sets a lower bar than s 65(2)(c).[59]
There are a number of relevant circumstances which bear upon the question of whether it is ‘highly probable’ that the representation is reliable. The deceased and Ms Chi were close friends, and the evidence shows the deceased shared intimate and personal information with Ms Chi. The deceased told Ms Chi a number of things about her relationship with the accused, and not only things that portrayed the deceased positively and the accused negatively. For example, the deceased told Ms Chi that she was not in love with the accused, but liked his money and that he cleaned her house. She said she did not really want to have sex with him, but did it so he would keep paying for things. These disclosures suggest Ms Chi and the deceased had an honest and frank relationship. [60]
The deceased had no reason to lie or embellish, or mislead her friend Ms Chi. She was not drug or alcohol affected. She did not suffer from any physical or mental illness or other issues that would have impacted her reliability. The event about which she spoke had occurred recently, in circumstances where she was still seeing the accused. This was a simple, uncomplicated narrative, made to a close friend who she communicated with multiple times a day. [61]
R v Basham (Sentence) [2023] VSC 79 (27 February 2023) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Controlling, jealous or obsessive behaviours’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Tracking’
Proceedings: Sentencing hearing for a conviction of murder (Category 1 offence).
Issue: Was the murder in the ‘worst category’ of offending such as to justify the imposition of a life sentence?
Facts: The male defendant and female deceased separated after 10 years of a marriage in which the defendant subjected the deceased to physical and emotional abuse.
The victim lived in ‘abject fear’ of the defendant, who monitored her movements and communications and made threats to destroy her. The victim obtained a protection order following the separation, installed security in her home and made two allegations of rape against the defendant, who was charged.
One week before the committal hearing for the rape offences, the defendant hid himself outside the victim’s house while she took her children to school. When she returned into the garage, he brutally beat her (inflicting 41 separate blunt force injuries) and hanged her, attempting to stage the scene as a suicide.
Reasoning and decision: Taylor JA imposed a life-sentence with a non-parole period of minimum 30 years describing the offence as an instance of the ‘worst case’ of murder.
Taylor JA considered both the objective seriousness of the crime itself and the personal circumstances of the criminal (R v Kilic). The premeditated and vicious nature of the attack, the defendant’s motivations of rage, jealousy and preventing the victim giving evidence at his rape trial, and the background of sustained family violence supported the conclusion that the offence was in the most serious category of murders.
Taylor JA was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the murder was a ‘long held, sustained goal,’ apparent in the defendant’s attempts to conceal his presence in the area, stalking of her house and the immediate nature of the attack. Taylor JA rejected the defence suggestion that the attack was a result of a momentary loss of temper, as the victim’s fear of the defendant meant she would not voluntarily have remained in his presence.
Taylor JA was further satisfied that a large part of the defendant’s motive was to prevent the victim from giving evidence in the rape proceedings against him, as well as his rage and jealously at no longer being in control of her.
The defence argued that the defendant’s good character, lack of prior conviction and good prospects for rehabilitation made specific deterrence and community protection of limited relevance. However, Taylor JA refused to accept that equal weight should be given to the criminal’s personal circumstances and the ‘objectively heinous’ nature of the crime. Importantly, Taylor JA drew attention to the fact that domestic violence is pernicious due to its invisibility and frequent perpetration by men with otherwise good reputations.
The defendant was also found to lack remorse – continuing to deny responsibility and remaining impassive during the victim impact statements – and have no ameliorating personal circumstances.
The defendant’s moral culpability was at ‘the highest end’ and the sentence must reflect ‘the abhorrence with which society regards violence towards domestic partners.’ The principles of general deterrence, denunciation, community protection and just punishment guided the decision:
“such violence is pernicious largely due to the fact that it is often invisible in public life, committed disproportionately by men who might otherwise enjoy a reputation for being good fathers, hard-working providers, reliable friends or community minded citizens” [94]
DPP v Cormick [2022] VSC 786 (16 December 2022) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Appeal on a question of law pursuant to s272 criminal procedure act 2009’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Appeal on a question of Law pursuant to s272 Criminal Procedure Act 2009.
Facts: The male respondent was subject to an interim protection order in which the protected person was the respondent’s female former partner made on 12 May 2021. On 2 September 2021 charged with 1 x persistently contravening a protection order section 125A Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) and 4x contravening a protection order s 123 Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) (the factual basis of charge 1 was the contraventions alleged in charges 2-5).
The alleged contraventions involved committing family violence against the protected person in the form of telephone calls and text messages that amounted to emotionally and psychologically abusive behaviour.
The magistrate found that the messages were emotionally and psychologically abusive, making the protected person feel unsafe and threatened. However, the magistrate rejected the prosecution’s argument that contraventions were strict liability offences and determined that the prosecution had been unable to prove the respondent’s intention to breach.
Issue: An appeal was brought by the DPP on two grounds, the first of which was withdrawn.
1.
Contraventions of protection orders are strict liability offences
2.
The learned magistrate erred when construing the relationship between the physical element and the fault element under s 123.
At issue was whether the offence created by s 123 was concerned only with prohibited conduct and not whether the result of that conduct was intended.
Reason and decision: Appeal dismissed. The Magistrate properly directed themselves as to whether the order had been breached.
Niall JA premised the construction of the nature of the mens rea under s 123 on the general principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient and considered authorities that distinguished between specific and general intent offences.
In relation to the offence of contravening a protection order (s 123(2)) by engaging in family violence in the form of emotional or psychological abuse (ss5, 7), it was observed that divorcing the physical act from its impact was impossible and excluding consequences from the mental element would ‘substantially alter the nature of the offence’ [54].
It was concluded that a ‘person must intend to commit an act that has the physical or emotional consequences which form part of the offending conduct’ [61]. In this case, the prosecution was required to prove the accused sent the messages ‘with the intent to torment, intimidate, harass or be offensive to the recipient’ [62]. Niall JA observed that this construction would not undermine the statute’s protective purpose or be unduly burdensome, as intent ‘will be proved inferentially’.[58]
The Queen v Surtees [2022] VSC 124 (11 March 22) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Burning’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Dousing’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Immolation threat’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post traumatic stress disorder’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victims as (alleged) perpetrators’
Charges: manslaughter by unlawful dangerous act x1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her husband. The offender and her husband had been in a relationship for 10 years and had two daughters, aged six and four. The offender’s 11-year-old son from a previous relationship also lived with the couple. The couple would often argue, at times have screaming matches and sometimes hit each other.
In 2016 Victorian Child Protection Services received a report of children being exposed to violence, but an investigation was not pursued [7]. In 2017 the victim pleaded guilty to unlawful assault against the offender [8].
On the night of the offence the victim had been drinking and yelling at people at a party they attended. After returning home he continued to yell at the offender. After the victim had calmed down and was sitting on the couch the offender, angry about the victim’s behaviour through the day, doused the victim in petrol and threatened him with a lighter by igniting it near him. He ‘burst into flames’ leading to serious injuries which resulted in his death [15]. The three children all witnessed their father in flames.
Proceeding: Sentencing.
Decision and Reasoning: 12 years imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 8 years [132].
Justice Tinney noted that 17 victim impact statements were filed, and all detailed the kind and decent nature of the victim. His Honour specifically noted the ongoing financial and emotional impact on the victim’s brother and his wife, who took in the children [111].
The offence was a serious example of manslaughter and the objective gravity of the offence as very high [85], [125]. There was a very high and obvious level of dangerousness inherent in the offender’s actions [90], aggravated due to it occurring in such proximity to her young children [92].
His Honour significance of family violence and provocation [71], however it was not a relationship “marked by frequent violence and controlling behaviour” [81]. The offence was not a long-considered crime; however, it involved several deliberate steps and was not unpremeditated [83]. There was no evidence that justified any contention the victim was physically abusive the day or night of the offence [72] and the offender’s actions were a “very extreme overreaction” [82].
Justice Tinney considered the offender’s PTSD diagnosis as cumulative from childhood sexual abuse, and violence in previous relationships but found no realistic or causal connection between the PTSD and the offence [61]. The victim deliberately attempted to shift a degree of blame onto the victim by giving conflicting accounts [67].
DPP v Kingdon [2021] VSC 858 (21 December 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Impact of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No criminal history’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The 65-year-old male accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his female de-facto partner of three years. The accused stabbed the victim with a kitchen knife 11 times in the chest and neck following an argument about the accused’s divorce settlement, during which victim had attempted to end the relationship.
Decision and Reasoning: 23 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years and 3 months).
Lasry J considered victim impact statements of the victim’s family, which referred to the ‘lifelong’ and ‘severe’ impact of the accused’s actions (20). His Honour explained that while the accused intended to cause really serious injury, and was being sentenced on that basis, his moral culpability would be ‘determined by the nature of the killing… rather than the… intent’ behind the conduct (55). The accused’s moral culpability was high (56). The 5th and 6th limb of R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 applied due to the accused’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and likelihood of internalising ‘the punitive aspects of sentencing’, age, and ‘demographic divergence from… other prisoners’ (43). His Honour stated that general deterrence is an important sentencing principle in the context of domestic violence (60), noting the accused’s explanation for the crime “carries the implication “Look what you made me do”[58]:
People are entitled to leave relationships and, men in particular, who are told their relationships are finished do not have any form of licence, rationale or excuse to then inflict fatal violence as a reaction in order to quell their feelings of rejection [59].
The accused had no prior criminal convictions, was of an ‘advancing age’ and had previously been ‘of good character’ (62) and the utilitarian value of his guilty plea was ‘very high’ due to the Covid-19 pandemic (34), (62).
Re Strachan [2021] VSC 538 (31 August 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Separation’
Charges: Persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order (‘FVIO’) x 1, contravening a FVIO x 7, committing an indictable offence whilst on bail x 1, contravening a conduct condition of bail x 7.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether the applicant posed an unacceptable risk.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were married for 10 years and shared four children. They separated in March 2021. The victim reported to police that throughout the relationship the applicant was frequently verbally abusive, intimidating towards the children, and physically abusive two to three times per year, strangling her on one occasion. The applicant was charged with various offences and bailed on those offences. An interim protection order and then a final protection order was made. The applicant allegedly breached these orders on numerous occasions by contacting the victim via phone and being near his daughter’s school. On one occasion the applicant visited his daughter at school and asked her to leave with him. The applicant suffered from severe mental health issues, including depression and anxiety, and a pain condition. He was charged in relation to the breaches of bail and protection orders and sought further bail.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail refused.
Lasry J found that the applicant had not established exceptional circumstances. His Honour found that the applicant could receive treatment for his mental health issues while in custody and that his pain condition, while serious, had not prevented him from engaging in community sports. Therefore, ‘special vulnerability’ had not been established. Furthermore, it had not been established that without bail the applicant’s time in custody would be ‘far in excess’ of any likely sentence.
Re Windley [2021] VSC 432 (20 July 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘History of family violence’ – ‘Homeless applicant’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Charges: Sexual assault x 2; unlawful assault x 2; persistent contravention of a family violence order; contravention of family violence orders x 9.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of bail
2.
Whether the applicant posed an unacceptable risk
Facts: The applicant was charged with persistently breaching a Family Violence Intervention Order (‘FVIO’) by refusing to move out of his female former partner’s house [1], harassing the victim via phone [25], and perpetrating sexual and unlawful assaults against the victim [3]. The applicant had an extensive criminal record and a history of contravening bail conditions and community corrections orders.
Decision and Reasoning: Bail granted.
Coghlan J found that there were exceptional circumstances, and that by the imposition of appropriate conditions, the risk represented by the applicant was not unacceptable [24]. His Honour acknowledged that conditions of imprisonment had become more difficult due to quarantine requirements [18], and noted that if released the applicant would reside with his aunt, Ms Terri Brown, at a location ‘significantly removed from… the complainant’ and with very few means of transport [21]. Ms Brown had agreed to report any breaches of the applicant’s bail conditions. His Honour highlighted that the applicant had complied with court orders and requirements while previously residing with Ms Brown, and that ‘it was in part due’ to the applicant being homeless ‘that he continued to impose upon the complainant’ [7-8]. The conditions of bail included that the applicant reside with Ms Brown and not leave the house unless accompanied by her and produce his phone to police for inspection [29].
R v Margolis [2021] VSC 341 (15 June 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Charge: Murder.
Facts: The male offender killed the female victim, his domestic partner of one week, by applying force to her neck by holding her in a chokehold. A jury convicted him of murder following a trial in which the issues were whether the victim was killed by a conscious, voluntary and deliberate act and, if so, whether the offender had murderous intent. The offender was diagnosed with long-term Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and alternately borderline or severe personality disorder by psychiatric experts. There was evidence he had mental health issues dating from his teens. He argued he killed the victim in the course of a flashback provoked by the behaviour of the victim, in pushing and haranguing him in the course of an argument which extended over a number of hours. Following the murder, the offender sent text messages to the victim’s family purporting to be from the victim. The offender had no prior history of violent offending and alleged he had been a victim of abuse as a child.
Held: Sentenced to 23 years imprisonment with a minimum term of 17 years. It was noted that this was less than the standard 25 year head sentence to take into account the offender’s prior good character and Verdins principles.
Re Charlton [2021] VSC 342 (11 June 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘14 year gap between alleged offence and laying of charge’ – ‘Alleged murder of partner’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘No relevant criminal history’ – ‘No unacceptable risk posed by applicant’ – ‘Poor mental and physical health of the applicant’ – ‘Separation’
Matter: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant is alleged to have killed his female domestic partner in 2007, approximately 6 months after they had commenced residing together in her unit. He was arrested but released the day after his partner’s death. A coroner found the applicant likely contributed to the death of the deceased in 2011 but the applicant was not re-arrested until 6 January 2021 and has been in custody since then. There is some evidence of a history of violence by the applicant towards the deceased, including an incident where he drove dangerously with the deceased in a vehicle in the days prior to her death which allegedly was a source of arguments between them. There is evidence the deceased asked the applicant to move out of her apartment the day of her death.
Issues: Unacceptable risk and exceptional circumstances.
Held: Bail granted. The fact the applicant remained in the jurisdiction for the many years before he was charged, including while being dealt with for earlier historic offending, and failed to reoffend went a long way to establish that there was no unacceptable risk posed by a grant of bail. The applicant’s counsel’s assertion the prosecution case was weak was rejected, but exceptional circumstances were established by the passage of years and the good behaviour of the applicant during the delay, his lack of relevant prior offending or breach of bail, his serious physical and mental health issues and the effect of incarceration thereon, the conditions he would likely spend remand in, the likely future delay in reaching trial, his stable relationship and accommodation, and the availability of substantial surety.
R v Dellamarta [2021] VSC 220 (4 May 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Impact of covid 19 pandemic’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The female offender, who had an intellectual disability, pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of her male partner. She stabbed her partner once to the upper chest during the course of an argument. She admitted to stabbing the deceased but was unable to say why she had done so. She said that she had never been scared that he would physically hurt her, but that he had called her abusive and hurtful names.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A sentence of 7 years and 6 months imprisonment was imposed, with a non-parole period of 5 years.
The following factors were relevant to objective seriousness: First, the offender deliberately stabbed the deceased with a large kitchen knife. Second, the deceased was her partner, and the offence took place in her home. Third, she grossly overreacted to whatever feelings of hurt and anger she was experiencing in the face of the deceased’s aggression. Fourth, she immediately attempted to revive the deceased, called for help and assisted police.
The offender’s moral culpability for the offending, and the relevance of general deterrence, were somewhat reduced by her intellectual disability and depressive disorder (notwithstanding the lack of a causal link established by expert evidence). Specific deterrence was also modified by her personal factors (genuine remorse, ability to manage the limitations of her intellectual disability and fair prospects for rehabilitation). The guilty plea was also taken into account.
Finally, the court recognised the burden of prison on her at [45]:
“I accept that your deficits mean that your will find prison more burdensome than a person without your disability. Mr Newton described you as a vulnerable prisoner at risk of victimisation and other negative attention in the custodial environment. It seems that this risk has, in fact, materialised. Mr Newton further stated that there is some risk that the intensity of your depressive symptoms will increase as a result of your incarceration. I accept these opinions. I also accept that your experience of custody to date has been difficult given the lack of physical visits between March and December 2020 consequent upon the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Re Dinatale [2021] VSC 104 (9 March 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Impact of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Weapons’
Charges: Numerous family violence charges and protection order breaches.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant was charged with numerous family violence offences and intervention order breaches over multiple years, but principally in 2019 and 2020, in respect of his wife (the complainant) and their 2 young children. The alleged offending involved physical violence (including use of weapons and strangulation), exposing the children to family violence, animal abuse, threats to kill (including if the complainant failed to revoke a protection order), and repeated breaches of intervention orders. Due to the delays brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a real prospect that the applicant’s trial would not proceed until 2023.
Issues:
1.
Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether there was an unacceptable risk.
3.
Whether there would be a risk that the applicant would commit family violence if released on bail, and whether such risk might be mitigated.
Decision and reasoning: Application for bail was allowed on strict conditions.
At the outset, counsel for the respondent informed the court that “the children of the applicant are apparently petrified of him, and that Child Protection have indicated an intention of stepping in should the applicant make any attempt to have contact with them. She pointed out that the two children are eye witnesses to some of the offending, and that the risk of interference with them as well as with the complainant herself is a live concern.
Further, counsel for the respondent emphasised that the applicant’s conduct while incarcerated “showed his malevolence towards his wife and aggression towards some other individuals which would itself raise concerns about the safety of his family and others.” The charges were serious, “notwithstanding that no serious injuries had been caused. This was more by good luck than good management, and there was still the risk of psychological harm and ongoing consequences for the children. The seriousness of the offending was amplified by the constant undertone of family violence, encompassing control and actual violence.”
Exceptional circumstances existed. In particular, the possible period of remand due to the COVID-19 delay (2-3 years) would highly likely exceed any term of imprisonment. The obvious risk of the applicant endangering the safety and welfare of any person or committing an offence while on bail could be mitigated by stringent bail conditions so as not to be an unacceptable risk noting: “Any attempt to contact in any way, much less, harm, his wife or children, would have the inevitable consequence that he would be taken again into custody, with little hope of release until the resolution of the charges he faces.”
Re Application for Bail by Wilson [2021] VSC 22 (29 January 2021) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Mild traumatic brain injury’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No unacceptable risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Support services’
Charge: Murder.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female applicant killed her male domestic partner by stabbing him in the back during the course of a domestic dispute. At trial, the applicant intended to argue that she acted in self-defence and that she did not intend to cause death or really serious injury. The applicant had a history of drug addiction, mental illness, and had been in a car accident a few weeks prior to the offending, potentially resulting in a mild traumatic brain injury.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant was granted bail.
There were sufficient matters to establish exceptional circumstances. The two central issues that would arise at trial (self-defence and intent) were “live” and needed to be finely judged, in combination with the delay in the matter (which in itself would not be sufficient) and the circumstances of detention due to COVID-19 (unable to receive visits with her mother or daughter) ([45]-[48]).
The respondent had not demonstrated that the applicant was an unacceptable risk of endangering the community, offending whilst on bail or failing to answer bail. The applicant had a criminal record but this included relatively minor offences and the more serious conviction had no particular resonance in relation to the present offending. There was evidence that she would receive support with accommodation, and in relation to any ongoing problems of drug addiction and mental health from Women’s Housing Ltd. The applicant had further motivation in restoring her relationship with her mother and re-engaging with her young daughter, supported by the Department of Health and Human Services ([50]-[56]).
Re Chambers [2020] VSC 758 (17 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Compelling reason’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Past domestic and family violence’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Stringent bail conditions’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Reckless conduct endangering life x 2; Aggravated assault of a female x 6; Contravening a family violence intervention order (FVIO) x 1; Recklessly causing injury x 1; Making a threat to kill x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant man and complainant woman were in a domestic relationship, and she was 3 months pregnant with their child. The applicant was subject to two FVIOs, one involving his ex-wife and child, and one involving the complainant. The charged offending involved the application of pressure to the complainant’s neck until she lost consciousness on the first occasion, and until she sustained a fractured larynx on the second occasion. The applicant owned his own business, had no criminal history (but been the subject of a number of reports of family violence), and had a history of depression/anxiety and substance abuse issues.
Issues:
1.
Whether the applicant had demonstrated a “compelling reason” to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether the respondent had demonstrated that there was an “unacceptable risk”.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant was granted bail.
First, on “compelling reason”, the offending alleged was very serious. It involved a man in the context of an ongoing intimate relationship applying pressure on 2 occasions to the neck of his pregnant partner rendering her unconscious and fracturing her larynx. The case against the applicant was of reasonable strength in view of the objective evidence ([50]-[51]).
Nevertheless, his Honour was satisfied that a compelling reason existed to justify the grant of bail ([53]). The applicant had no prior convictions or adverse bail history, stable employment and accommodation, and the situation of the offending had ended. There was no evidence to suggest he would further attack the complainant, with a traumatic period in custody being a strong disincentive to do so. The applicant was seeking treatment for his drug problem. He also stood to spend significant time in custody in difficult circumstances in the absence of bail ([52]).
Second, the court was not satisfied that the risk posed by the applicant (that he would contact and possibly harm the complainant) was unacceptable. This was in light of the very stringent bail conditions imposed to mitigate the risk including a curfew, requirement to comply with a full FVIO that had been put in place concerning the complainant, prohibition on drug use (including testing), requirement to undergo drug treatment, and a broad geographical exclusion to further protect the complainant ([54]).
Application for bail by LP [2020] VSC 764 (16 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Attempts to dissuade victim’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol or drugs by perpetrator’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Perverting the course of justice’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Four groups of charges, including alternative charges. Group 1: Reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1; Unlawful assault x 1. Group 2: Intentionally causing injury x 2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Unlawful assault x 2. Group 3: False imprisonment x 1; Intentionally causing injury x 2; Recklessly causing injury x 2; Theft x 1; Unlawful assault x 2; Unlawful assault with a weapon x 1. Group 4: Common law assault x 1; Common law charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant man was charged with a number of family violence offences against the female complainant. The charges related to a series of incidents in November 2017 and subsequent text messages aimed at dissuading her from pursuing the complaints. At the time of the bail application, there were three Family Violence Intervention orders (FVIOs) in force (protecting the complainant, another former intimate partner, and the applicant’s further former partner/children). The applicant had expressed a desire to change submitting evidence of, inter-alia, the support of his sister and rehabilitative programmes undertaken in custody.
Issues:
1.
Whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify the grant of bail.
2.
Whether there was an unacceptable risk.
3.
Whether, if the applicant were released on bail, he would pose a risk of committing family violence and whether that risk could be mitigated by the imposition of bail conditions or the making of a FVIO.
Decision and reasoning: Bail refused.
While the matter was finely balanced, the applicant met the threshold of exceptional circumstances through a combination of factors namely, the death of his mother whilst in custody and deferral of her funeral until his release, the likely delays in the matter proceeding to trial, the legitimate criticism levelled at aspects of the prosecution case, and the overall delays in the matter being prosecuted which were not attributable to the applicant (at [78]-[80]).
Nevertheless, there was an unacceptable risk that that the applicant would endanger the safety or welfare of a person, commit offences on bail, interfere with a witness (the complainant), or fail to answer bail. The applicant’s most recent conduct on bail showed that despite awaiting court for family violence charges (including those alleged by the complainant) he was prepared to engage in very similar conduct towards another partner (at [81]-[84], [88]).
Further, the risks the applicant posed not only of committing further family violence but also of trying to dissuade the complainant from proceeding with her complaint could not be mitigated by FVIOs or additional bail conditions. The court noted: “Preventing family violence in the community can be difficult because victims are often reluctant to come forward and/or may be easily dissuaded from pursuing complaints” (at [86]). Risks could not be ameliorated with bail conditions given the applicant’s poor history of compliance with previous bail orders, CCOs, and other court orders, his family violence history committed against different partners and his persistent drug use and offending (at [87]).
OP v XY [2020] VSC 754 (16 November 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘18-year period for protection order’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Culturally and linguistically diverse (cald) people’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unborn child added to protection order’ – ‘Whether child in utero at the time of offending is a child who has been 'subjected to family violence'’
Proceedings: Application for judicial review.
Facts: In protection order proceedings in the County Court, XY (female partner) claimed that her husband OP (male partner) had committed numerous instances of family violence during their relationship. This ranged from physical violence and unwanted sex to psychological manipulation and humiliation.
[28] XY alleged that, over the course of the marriage, OP emotionally controlled her, isolated her (from others), and continually abused her — for example, by writing on a whiteboard numerous ways in which she was a bad wife and stepmother. She claimed that OP made her sleep on the floor, limited her food intake and gave her no money. XY said that she felt pressured to have sex and that she could not say no as OP would say that she was a bad wife. She said she made numerous attempts to leave the relationship, but that OP would contact her and manipulate her to return. XY alleged that OP physically assaulted her on several occasions. He also ejected her from the home numerous times, including without shoes. He abused her for being selfish and using money on herself instead of the children. [Also see paragraphs [47]-[51] and [57]].
While OP denied these claims, and made his own against XY, he ultimately consented (without admissions) to a protection order. OP’s claims against XY included ‘falsified and exaggerated claims of being assaulted by her’ [29], also see [79]-[80]. The magistrate made mutual protection orders against OP and XY for a period of two years. OP filed a notice of appeal against the protection order made against him. XY did not appeal the order made against her. On appeal, her Honour extended the length of the DFV protection order against OP from a two-year term to one of 18 years’ duration. Her Honour also added XY’s child to the order on the basis that the child had been subjected to family violence in utero. OP now applies to this court for judicial review of the judge’s decisions and orders.
Decision and reasoning: Application for judicial review dismissed.
The County Court judge’s reasons for extending the DFV protection order to 18 years’ duration and including the child in the order are set out at [221]. The applicant (self-represented) made submissions with respect to, but was unable to demonstrate, actual or apprehended bias, a denial of procedural fairness, inadequacy of the judge’s reasons, Wednesbury unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality in the judge’s decision, and a failure to apply the Briginshaw test to the serious claims of DFV made against him [373].
[17] The difficulty for OP, however, is that this application is not an appeal of the kind in which I am entitled or required to substitute my views on the evidence for those of the County Court judge. Instead, this Court’s jurisdiction on an application for judicial review is merely supervisory, not appellate, and is strictly confined in consequence. In exercising this jurisdiction, I am not to assess the merits of the decision, but must consider only whether the court below exceeded its jurisdiction and whether it observed the law in reaching the relevant decisions. Perhaps counter-intuitively, as I have already intimated, even if the judge below erred, but did so within jurisdiction, still there would be no relief by way of judicial review.
[18] In my opinion, while aspects of the judge’s decision are very close to being afflicted with Wednesbury unreasonableness, illogicality or irrationality, in the end, those high hurdles for relief are not cleared. Nor am I satisfied that OP’s claims of actual or apprehended bias are established, whether examined with or without the fresh evidence. Instead, I am persuaded by [counsel for the complainant] that the asserted errors (except perhaps one) are not established or are otherwise within jurisdiction. While it is, I think, plain that the judge exceeded her jurisdiction by including the child in the order by reliance on a power that was not available on the evidence, that order is supported by another power which turns upon OP’s lack of opposition, and the consent XY implicitly gave, at the hearing.
…
[449] I do not accept that, for the purposes of the first limb of s 77(2) (or its later equivalent), it can be said that the child [in utero] “has been subjected to family violence”. While, as I have said, strictly, I need not decide whether there ever could be a case in which a child-to-be in utero may come within the provision, I very much doubt it. Indeed, given that a “child” is “a person who is under the age of 18 years” and that the words “has been subjected to family violence” connote the present tense, I think it is extremely unlikely that the definition of family violence in s 5(1)(b) could extend to behaviour directed at or experienced solely by the mother when the child-to-be is in utero.
Re Busari [2020] VSC 572 (7 September 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Child’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Reckless conduct endangering life x 1; Reckless conduct endangering serious injury x 1; Aggravated assault x 1; Common law assault x 1; Unlawful assault x 1.
Proceedings: Bail application.
Facts: The complainant is the male applicant’s female partner. It is alleged that the present charges occurred against a background of long-term, largely unreported domestic violence by the applicant against the complainant. In March 2018, the applicant is alleged to have threatened to burn down the family home resulting in the issuing of a protection order (the applicant is alleged to have breached the DFV protection order on numerous occasions, but these breaches were not reported at the time). In June 2020, the applicant is alleged to have been aggressive and verbally abusive. In July 2020, the applicant is alleged to have verbally abused the complainant. Later, he is alleged to have become increasingly aggressive and assaulted the complainant in front of their child, including pulling chunks of her hair out before allegedly strangling her. After a ‘prolonged period of strangulation’, the complainant managed to free herself and escape. The applicant is alleged to have been intoxicated during the various offences. Bail was previously refused on the basis that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of committing an offence while on bail.
Issues: Whether risk can be mitigated by imposition of condition.
Decision and reasoning: Bail granted.
[56] There is no question that the applicant does pose a risk of contacting the complainant, and interfering with her as a witness and exposing her to danger. The question is whether there are conditions of bail which could be imposed so as to mitigate that risk so that it is not unacceptable.
…
[60] Taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that the applicant poses an unacceptable risk of any of the matters prescribed in s 4E of the Act. He does certainly pose a risk but I believe that the risk can be ameliorated to an acceptable level by the imposition of the stringent conditions [including residential requirements, curfew, prohibition against drugs or alcohol, mental health care plan, no-contact order for the protection of the complainant and their daughter and compliance with an interim DFV protection order].
R v Sturt [2020] VSC 317 (10 June 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘- people affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Cannabis-induced psychosis’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘History of sexual violence’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Mitigating and aggravating circumstances’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Personality disorders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Suffocation’
Charges: Murder x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The accused murdered his long-term intimate partner by suffocating and strangling her while he was in a cannabis-induced psychosis. He surrendered himself to police the same day as the killing, made a full confession and pleaded guilty to murder at the first available opportunity. The offence was not an isolated instance of domestic violence, as the accused had been physically and sexually violent towards the deceased in the past. He had also been previously admitted to a psychiatric unit, on which occasions the deceased reported that his mental state had deteriorated in the context of substance abuse, and that he had tried to strangle her in her sleep. He also assaulted the deceased in 2010.
Issue: Whether the voluntary drug taking was an aggravating circumstance; whether his Schizotypal Personality Disorder was a mitigating circumstance.
Held: After an assessment, a forensic psychiatrist made several observations about the accused, including that he used various coercive behaviours, such as violence and threats of violence and suicide, to mitigate the persistent likelihood of the deceased abandoning him. It appeared that the fatal attack was motivated by delusional beliefs. The psychiatrist also found that notwithstanding his prior history of domestic violence, the killing would not have occurred in the absence of the psychotic episode ([26]). In the police interview, the accused described his childhood as "troubled". His stepfather physically and emotionally abused his mother, and the accused used cannabis for many years, and has "dabbled" with other drugs ([52]-[58]).
The Court did not accept the prosecution’s submission that the accused’s cannabis use was an aggravating feature, as it could not be established beyond reasonable doubt that he knew that he was likely to become violently psychotic from the cannabis use during the relevant period ([27]-[30]). Further, his moral culpability was not reduced by his psychosis at the time of the offending, because he had voluntarily taken the cannabis in the knowledge that it might make him violently psychotic ([32]). His forensic psychiatrist considered that his Schizotypal Personality Disorder indirectly contributed to his offending because (1) his problems with social anxiety and depression predisposed him to the heavy use of cannabis, and (2) it lowered the threshold for developing psychosis following ingestion of psychotogenic substances ([37]). The defence counsel’s submission that his personality disorder was a mitigating circumstance was also rejected by the Court ([40]). Cannabis was not the only way to deal with his anxiety. The accused should have undertaken a drug rehabilitation program instead, particularly since he was aware that cannabis might cause him to become violently psychotic ([39]).
Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the deceased was the accused’s long-term intimate partner, she was murdered in her own home, and the offence was not a "one-off instance of domestic violence". The fatal conduct, however, was not motivated by the same considerations which led to the earlier domestic violence instances, and was not planned ([45]-[50]). Mitigating circumstances included the accused’s cooperation with authorities, remorse, and his reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, given his excellent insight into his psychological issues and his positive response to medication while in custody ([65]-[71]). Consequently, he was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 16 years.
R v Cameron [2020] VSC 334 (5 June 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Drug misuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suicide threats by perpetrator’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Murder x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship for three months and lived together. The couple argued in the days leading up to the offending and the victim appeared nervous and scared to those she met. She told several friends that she could not leave, even though the offender had choked her. On the night prior to the offending, the victim visited her friend after a fight with the offender. The victim received text messages from the offender saying that he would kill himself if the victim did not come back. The offender went to the friend’s house and spoke to the victim, but the victim said she was not ready to come back home now but would come soon. The offender left the house and travelled to the house of a friend. On the way, he slashed his right forearm repeatedly; the friend wrapped the offender’s arm in a tea towel. In the meantime, the victim returned home but did not find the offender there, so she texted her friend, indicating that she thought she would be okay. A text message exchange then occurred between the offender and the victim in which the offender asked the victim if he could come home and told her that he loved her, but the victim said she did not want to talk and that "If you love someone you would not harm them and control them". The victim exchanged text messages with other people but these ceased abruptly around 4:55am.
At this time, the offender returned home and stabbed the victim numerous times to the face, scalp, neck and arms with a kitchen knife while she was on her bed. She died quickly after this attack. The offender tried to clean the scene with bleach and hid the body and bloody sheets under the bed. He then tried to burn down the house by lighting a fire in a cabinet next to the bed, but this only smouldered as the cabinet was closed and the fire was starved of oxygen. The offender went to his friend’s place and told him that he had killed the victim, but only because she had attacked him in his sleep. He repeated this account of events to police, claiming that the victim had attacked him when he refused to get her more ice.
Judgment: The judge sentenced the offender to 29 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 23 years. His Honour noted that the offender’s "crime of murder is a very serious example of that always serious crime" [118]. In addressing the offender, his Honour emphasised the aggravating features of the offending: "In the context of an ongoing domestic relationship which left your partner strongly fearing you, at least in the days leading up to her death, for reasons which have not in any honest way been explained by you, you took to her with a dangerous knife while she was in the sanctuary of her own bed in her own home … You ignored her futile and desperate attempts to ward off your blows. Having killed her, you showed your lack of regard for her by hiding her under her bed, conducting a cursory clean-up, then setting the fire in the cabinet intent on burning the crime scene. Then you left her, dead on the floor, covered in blood" [118]. And further, "Yours was a sustained and outrageously violent attack upon a helpless woman," such that his Honour held that the lack of planning or premeditation "said nothing about its seriousness" [121]. His Honour further stated that "You were in a position of trust where she was concerned. She should have been able to look to you for love and protection. You chose, however, to kill her by extravagant, protracted and shocking acts of violence. Each single act of stabbing her entailed serious danger to the welfare of your helpless victim. You carried out many such individual acts" [123] and that "Your breach of trust and lack of normal human decency are simply stunning" [140].
His Honour held that rehabilitation would have little part to play in the sentence, because the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation were "exceedingly dim," given he had not honestly acknowledged his crime nor dealt with his drug and other issues [131]. Instead, just punishment, denunciation, general deterrence, specific deterrence and protection of the community were important to the sentence [141]. His Honour noted that "The sentence of this Court must make it perfectly clear that the Court deplores violent crimes of this sort, especially against a domestic partner" and that "the sentence I pass must bring it clearly home to any person who might be minded to inflict extreme violence upon a domestic partner, for whatever reason, that such conduct will be met with strong punishment" [141]. His Honour was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the physical altercation did not commence as the offender claimed and that his account was a complete fabrication; that is, it did not begin with the victim attacking the offender because the victim was evidently very scared of the offender and "would have known that to [attack the offender] would only serve to inflame [the offender] and might trigger a violent reaction from a person of whom she was in fear" [50], [51], [55]. In rejecting the offender’s claim, his Honour held that there was no explanation for the shocking crime [56].
His Honour rejected that the plea of guilty was made at a reasonably early stage, having been made 16 months after the offending [59], but noted that there was still a significant utilitarian benefit to the plea, which would constitute a mitigating factor [61]. His Honour also rejected that the offender was remorseful [64], taking into account his conduct after the offending (in attempting to clean the scene and hide the body), his false assertions of the victim attacking the offender first, and his obvious sorrow for his own position, not the death of the victim. His Honour accepted that the offender had a substantial history of methylamphetamine use, and that the offender was using that drug at the time of offending [80]. However, his Honour also noted that the offender had an extensive criminal history for matters of violence, dishonesty, weapons and driving, and that he had been imprisoned numerous times and received numerous community-based dispositions which were frequently breached [83]. His Honour was not convinced that the offender actually suffered from PTSD and noted that even if he did, this would not result in any term of imprisonment weighing more heavily on the offender than a person in normal health [102]. His Honour therefore held that the principle enunciated in the fifth limb of R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 did not have any application in this case [103].
Re Brzezowski [2020] VSC 294 (28 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Compelling reasons’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Sexual assault’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Offences: Common assault x 2; Unlawful assault x 2; Sexual assault x 2; Criminal damage; Threaten to commit a sexual offence; False imprisonment; Contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO) x 4; Persistent contravention of a FVIO; Committing an indictable offence whilst on bail; Contravening condition of bail.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Whether compelling reasons exist justifying the grant of bail.
Facts: The applicant and complainant commenced a ‘romantic’ relationship in August 2019. The applicant moved into the complainant’s home which she shared with her 23-year-old daughter. On the day of the offending, the complainant came home from work and found the applicant intoxicated. They argued before the applicant told the complainant to join him in the shower. The complainant initially refused but eventually agreed to appease the applicant who appeared angry. The applicant suggested they have sexual intercourse but the complainant refused. The applicant became violent towards her, pushing her into the shower door. The complainant tried to leave the shower but the applicant pushed her onto the bed, held her wrists above her head and thrust his knee into her thigh. The complainant kicked the applicant in the genitals. The applicant then punched the complainant in the abdomen about ten times. The applicant left the house but came back shortly later, yelling "Right, time for round two". The complainant attempted to leave in her car but was initially blocked in by the applicant’s car. She managed to leave but returned to the house to collect her dogs as she was fearful the applicant would harm them.
The complainant went to the toilet when she arrived but found the applicant in there. The applicant rubbed faeces over the complainant’s face and hair, then pushed her up against a wall using his forearm under her chin. She broke free and called 000, while the applicant began hitting things in the house. The applicant grabbed the complainant, threw her onto the bed, pushed his forearm to her throat and punched her in the abdomen, stating he was going to give her anal with his clenched fist. The applicant got off the complainant when she grabbed his genitalia with her fingernails. She cancelled the police request but asked her sister to come and help her. The complainant’s sister and daughter arrived, followed by police.
A full and final non-contact FVIO was granted after this incident which the applicant breached by texting and calling the complainant. On one occasion though, the complainant visited the applicant at a motel room for about five minutes.
Judgment: The judge granted bail on the applicant’s own undertaking with strict conditions (including he: provide a $3000 surety, reside at his parent’s residence, abide by a curfew, comply with the FVIO, not contact any prosecution witness, not enter the suburb the complainant lives in, not consume alcohol or drugs), finding that the applicant had established that a compelling reason exists to justify the granting of bail, despite the offending being "serious and distasteful" [65]. The applicant argued that the following were compelling reasons to justify bail: the applicant’s limited criminal history (he has only come before court twice); his first time in custody; weakness of the prosecution case (the complainant’s credibility is likely to be successfully challenged); delay (one year on remand); implications of the COVID-19 pandemic (lockdowns and the possibility the virus could enter prisons); availability of stable accommodation with the applicant’s parents; his ties to the jurisdiction, including his parents and children; $3000 surety from his mother; other conditions to reduce the magnitude of risk (for example, imposition of a curfew) [32].
His Honour noted that the applicant conceded that the offending was serious, finding that "the offending alleges multiple acts of family violence committed by a more powerful male upon a relatively vulnerable female who would have been entitled to look to him for protection, rather than physical violence and threatening conduct" [49] and that the applicant "flagrantly breached requirements" of the FVIO [50]. While his Honour did accept that the complainant’s credit "will be subject to strong and justifiable attack", he found that the prosecution case could not be described as weak due to other things supporting the complainant’s account [52]-[53].
His Honour further found that the applicant’s criminal history included a finding of guilt for an assault upon a previous domestic partner and that the applicant had "deliberate and flagrant disregard" for previous grants of bail. As such, his Honour held that there was a "real concern as to [the applicant’s] willingness to abide by conditions of bail" that might be imposed in the future [57]. Furthermore, his Honour noted the existence of the FVIO and that the complainant was very frightened of the applicant and dreaded his release on bail [60].
His Honour accepted that a full year on remand would be a significant period of time for a case which would remain in the summary stream [61] and that such a period would be particularly significant in light of the onerous conditions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic [62]. Additionally, his Honour held that the applicant was likely to receive a sentence lower than the period of time he would spend on remand if not bailed [63]. In considering the "unacceptable risk" test, his Honour noted that there was a legitimate concern that the applicant would try to contact the complainant again, but that, since his arrest, the applicant had not attempted to contact the complainant and had not been violent towards her. His Honour considered that the risk posed by the applicant could be ameliorated with imposition of strict bail conditions.
Re Ilpola [2020] VSC 578 (21 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Allegations of family violence’ – ‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of orders’ – ‘Charges of schedule 2 offences while subject to community corrections order for schedule 2 offences’ – ‘Community corrections order for schedule 2 offences’ – ‘Covid-19’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sexual abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Bail application.
Charges: attempted rape, sexual assault, persistent contravention of FVIO, making a threat to inflict serious injury x 3, false imprisonment, intentionally causing injury, common law assault.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant had been married and had one daughter together but were separated at the time of the offending. A protection order was in place prohibiting the applicant from contacting the complainant or their daughter, or coming within 100m of them or 200m of their home.
The offences predominantly arose on one day. It was alleged the applicant first telephoned the complainant while she was at home with her son and threatened them, following which they left the house. When the complainant returned home later that day, the applicant was inside her house and grabbed her, punching her head and face, and later attempting to anally penetrate her. The following day he returned to her house and was further verbally abusive. The complainant reported the incident to the police.
The applicant denied all the allegations apart from having attended the complainant’s residence on three occasions. At the time of the offending he was subject to a 12-month CCO following convictions for recklessly causing injury, contravening an FVIO, intentionally damaging property and failing to answer in relation to the same complainant.
Reasoning and decision: Lasry J had regard to the serious nature of the attempted rape offence, his view that the strength of the prosecution case was not compromised by his dependence on the complainant’s evidence, the accused’s criminal history and existence of the CCO at the time of the offending, the lack of evidence of the availability of treatment opportunities and his view that if bail were refused the applicant would not be likely to spend more time in custody than the likely sentence.
Exceptional circumstances were found to exist in the substantial delay of the trial of two and a half to three years, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Lasry J found that there was an unacceptable risk of reoffending and that this risk would not be sufficiently mitigated by imposing bail conditions. Given that the applicant had been subject to a CCO for similar offences at the time of the incident and a protection order had already been put in place seeking to protect the complainant, it was concluded that bail was not acceptable.
Re Mazzitelli [2020] VSC 288 (21 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnancy of victim’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’ – ‘Weapons’
Offences: Intentionally cause injury x 3; Common assault x 8; Making a threat to inflict serious injury x 2; Attempt to pervert the course of justice x 2; Being a prohibited person in possession of an imitation firearm x 2
Proceedings: Bail application
Issues: Whether exceptional circumstances exist justifying the granting of bail; Whether there is an unacceptable risk that the applicant would reoffend or endanger the community if released.
Facts: The male applicant and female complainant were in a relationship from November 2017 until September 2018, during which there were a number of separations and reconciliations. From February 2018, there were numerous instances of violence by the applicant towards the complainant. These included: using a chain like a whip to hit the complainant; pushing her out of the car; splashing hot wax on her hair, face and arms; tasering her; hitting her on the back of the head; throwing drinking glasses at her; kicking her hard in the stomach when she was pregnant; burning her on her back with a blow torch; and hitting her with a metal pole. The applicant also made several threats towards the complainant, including: a threat to cut her hands off; threatening to kill her (while holding a gun); threatening to shoot different limbs; threatening her so that she would recant her testimony to police. The applicant’s sister told the complainant that she had to tell police that she made up the allegations, and the complainant later made a statutory declaration to this effect. However, she maintained the allegations at the committal hearing and explained why she made the statutory declaration.
Judgment: The judge refused the bail application, holding that the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances existed that justified the granting of bail and even if this had been established, the risk posed by the applicant of reoffending or endangering the community if released would be unacceptable. The applicant relied on the following matters as proof of exceptional circumstances: delay (about two years from arrest until trial), onerous nature of remand due to the COVID-19 pandemic, weakness of the prosecution case, absence of any contact with the complainant while on bail, availability of support through CROP (a drug intervention program), family support and stable accommodation, modest criminal history (no convictions for violence), first time in custody, no pending matters other than the trial, and the applicant’s medical condition [43]-[44].
His Honour found that the applicant did not challenge the proposition that the offending was serious, noting that "Whilst not anywhere near the higher end of the range of seriousness of offences of family violence, the alleged attacks by the applicant upon his then partner were repeated, nasty, and had some disturbing elements to them, including the use of weapons and the infliction of a kick to the abdomen of a pregnant woman" [58]. His Honour considered that the complainant was scared of the applicant and a FVIO was in place with her as a protected person [71].
His Honour also found that the prosecution case was not weak, the applicant’s criminal history "reveal[ed] some signs of a lack of respect by the applicant for the orders of the court", and the applicant had already been imprisoned in the past for failing to answer bail. His Honour noted that the applicant’s conduct in respect of bail "paint[ed] a picture of a person who is entirely unwilling to comply with the requirements of bail when they do not suit him" and that this was an important consideration when assessing exceptional circumstances [67].
While his Honour accepted that the applicant had an extensive history of illicit drug use as a form of pain relief for an accident the applicant suffered eight years ago, his Honour held that it was completely unacceptable for the applicant to do this, particularly where the applicant knew this would breach his bail conditions [69]. Furthermore, his Honour held that the provision of family support was "not an important matter in the overall mix of circumstances in this case" where the applicant had family support in the past but still offended [70]. His Honour noted that the applicant was likely to spend 17 months on remand before trial, but that this "is not, on its own, or in combination with other factors, exceptional" [72]. In any event, any sentence imposed was likely to exceed this period anyway [73].
Re Sepehrnia [2020] VSC 247 (6 May 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Extensive criminal history’ – ‘Firearm’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Relevance of covid-19 to bail application’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Step-children in home’ – ‘Substance abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Rape x 2; Infliction of injury; Threats; Damaging property.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Do exceptional circumstances exist justifying the grant of bail; does the applicant pass the unacceptable risk test.
Facts: The male applicant threatened to kill and physically harm his female ex-partner, MZ, on multiple occasions, including by pointing a firearm at her and threatening to throw acid in her face. Following an argument between the couple, the applicant punched MZ in the face and kicked her in the middle of her back, before pushing her on the bed, covering her face with a pillow and stating that he was going to rape her. He removed the pillow and grabbed MZ around the throat before raping her. The assault lasted several minutes before the applicant left MZ alone at his house. MZ reported the assault (but not the rape). When the applicant learnt of this, he threatened to kill MZ’s family. A Family Violence Intervention Order (‘FVIO’) was issued to protect MZ.
The applicant also threatened to kill and physically harm another female ex-partner, SB, and her children, and frequently damaged her property. On a number of occasions, the applicant slapped, spat on, choked, scratched, pulled SB’s hair and threw her to the ground. He also physically assaulted SB’s 16-year-old daughter and one of SB’s friends, and detained SB in her home on one occasion. SB ended the relationship, but the applicant continued to abuse her until he was remanded for other matters. After his release, the applicant attended SB’s house, forced her onto her bed, threatened to kill her if she was ever with another guy, and raped her.
The applicant applied for bail twice in relation to the charges arising out of these events, but both applications were refused as the applicant failed to establish exceptional circumstances and there was an unacceptable risk of further offending.
Held: The judge refused to grant bail as the applicant failed to establish that exceptional circumstances existed justifying bail and if the applicant were released, there was a high risk that he would endanger the safety of the public, commit offences while on bail, interfere with witnesses and/or fail to answer bail. The applicant contended that various matters, when considered together, constituted exceptional circumstances. These included: delay (his trial was unlikely to occur until next year because of the COVID-19 pandemic and he already spent 252 days in custody); the onerous circumstances of his custody (he has been held in protection due to physical attacks upon him and receives no visitors due to COVID-19 restrictions); lack of strength of the prosecution case; his criminal history occurred in the context of drug use; he has used his time in custody well (by completing courses and maturing); the availability of stable residence, employment and family supports; and the availability of a surety of $500,000 [33].
His Honour held that the offending was very serious [47], the cases against the applicant were not weak [48], his criminal history (violence, dishonesty and weapons offences, breaches of FVIOs, failing to answer bail) rose questions as to his character and ability to abide by any court orders [49], he had previously been convicted for failing to answer bail [50], at the time of offending he was already subject to bail and CCOs [51], he was very unlikely to be willing and able to comply with any bail conditions [52], there were already several FVIOs against the applicant [53], the proposed living arrangements if he were to be released were unsatisfactory as the applicant has committed family violence against his mother and sister in the past (with whom it was proposed he should live) [54], there was no evidence he had taken major steps towards dealing with his drug issues [55], both victims were frightened of the applicant [56], and he would receive a much longer term of imprisonment if convicted for even one rape offence than he would on remand [57].
His Honour also noted the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, but approved Re Tong [2020] VSC 141 in which the court held that the pandemic is "simply part of the surrounding circumstances required to be taken into account in a consideration" of steps in the bail process. His Honour therefore was "far from satisfied that the applicant … discharged the onus resting on him to establish the existence of exceptional circumstances" [59].
Even if the applicant had established exceptional circumstances, His Honour concluded that the risk of the applicant harming the victims and/or their families was so high that His Honour would have refused bail in any event [62].
Re Bertucci [2020] VSC 88 (2 March 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Children present’ – ‘Contravention of protection orders’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘No exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Uncharged acts’
Charges: Various offences, including contraventions of FVIO, recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault, failing to answer bail and committing an indictable offence on bail
Case type: Application for bail
Facts: On 19 April 2019, the applicant man was charged with contravention of a FVIO and persistent contravention of a FVIO (‘the informant Sidorovska matter’). He was released on bail, however, after failing to appear in the Sunshine Magistrates’ Court, an order was made forfeiting his bail and a further bench warrant was issued for his arrest. On 2 October 2019, the applicant was charged with recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault (x 2), contravention of a FVIO, failing to answer bail and committing an indictable offence on bail (‘the informant McKay matter’). The applicant had been refused bail twice in the Sunshine Magistrates’ Court in relation to both sets of charges.
The applicant and complainant woman were in a relationship and have 3 children together. At the time of the relevant alleged offending in the informant Sidorovska matter, the applicant and complainant were separated and a final no-contact FVIO was in place against the applicant, listing the complainant and the children as the affected family members. In relation to the informant McKay matter, the applicant allegedly assaulted the complainant woman by striking her to the leg with an implement, as well as to the head. This occurred in contravention of a FVIO and in close proximity to the children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify bail and whether the previous history of family violence towards the complainant not resulting in findings of guilt should be taken into account.
Held: The Court refused bail as the applicant failed to discharge the onus to prove the existence of exceptional circumstances to justify his release on bail ([64]). In considering the submissions for a finding of exceptional circumstances, the Court found that:
•
the decision on bail would not interfere long-term with the prospects of the family being reunited ([49]);
•
allowing the applicant to live with the complainant and children would do nothing to mitigate the risk of reoffending as such a living environment was ‘far-from stable’ ([50]);
•
the applicant’s two-months of part-time employment leading up to the date of the contested hearing was relatively insignificant ([51]);
•
the prosecution’s case in respect of the two sets of charges was not weak ([52]);
•
the multiple breaches of the intervention order indicated a deliberate disregard and lack of respect for the court order imposed to protect his partner and children from him ([53]); and
•
striking a female with an implement cannot be described as trivial offending ([54]).
Although the applicant’s criminal history was not lengthy, it was deemed highly significant. For example, he had previous convictions for persistent contravention of a FVIO, and had previously acted with violence towards another female partner, both of which resulted in imprisonment ([57]). This indicated that he had not been adequately deterred and showed a lack of regard for court-imposed sanctions and for the importance of bail ([63]). There had also been a number of alleged incidents of family violence towards the complainant, which did not result in findings of guilt. The Court considered these matters as relevant to whether the applicant posed a risk of future endangerment to the complainant and her children ([58]-[59]).
R v Eckersley [2020] VSC 22 (30 January 2020) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children exposed’ – ‘Controlling behaviour’ – ‘Domestic homicide’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Misuse of drugs and alcohol’ – ‘Mitigating circumstances’ – ‘Moral culpability significantly reduced by psychosis’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Verdins principles’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a domestic relationship from 2001 until the victim was killed in July 2018. They had three children together. There was a history of controlling behaviour by the offender towards the victim. The offender’s mental health had deteriorated in the lead up to the offence, with his GP recording that the offender was "struggling with depression due to a loss of income and employment, and that [he] had been self-medicating with alcohol and cannabis but had stopped consuming these substances" [9]. The GP did not observe any homicidal ideations or psychosis symptoms at the time.
The morning of the offence, the neighbours heard a large argument ensuing within the offender’s home. The offender threw food and cleaning products into the rubbish and damaged items in the kitchen with a hammer before suddenly attacking the victim by punching her in the face. The victim fell to the ground and was kicked by the offender before he grabbed a knife and stabbed her in the head, neck, chest and upper body. The attack was witnessed by two of their children, one of whom unsuccessfully tried to stop the attack. The offender then proceeded to set fire to a near-by fabric couch and applied the lighter flame to the older daughter’s shoulder. He then forced the children and family dog into a car and drove away. Police later found the offender and children unharmed.
The offender suffered from ‘severe, acute and transient’ drug-induced psychosis at the time of offending [62]. The offender’s psychosis meant that his degree of moral culpability was of significant dispute.
Held: Eckersley was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
The judge provided that ordinarily, "a drug-induced psychosis does not commonly result in the application of the Verdins principles and a mitigatory outcome" [88]. However, as the offender was prescribed the drug by his GP and was not aware that they could cause psychotic symptoms, the judge was satisfied of the offender’s low moral culpability [92]. This lower culpability lessened denunciation and deterrence as sentencing factors, however the judge noted that this did not "take away from the fact that the killing of an intimate partner is an inherently terrible act" [108]. The judge also noted that while the murder did not occur in the context of a history of family violence, "the killing of an intimate partner is a most serious form of offending which must again be tragically emphasised by the Court" [112].
In sentencing Eckersley, Justice Champion considered the children witnessing the offence, the offender’s destruction of the victim’s body and fleeing the scene as aggravating factors. The unreasonable delay in sentencing was also accounted for.
Re Rodgers [No 2] [2019] VSC 760 (20 November 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: 33 offences, including strangulation
Case type: Bail application
Facts: The applicant was charged with 33 offences, 32 of which arose out of incidents alleged to have occurred over 3 days. The other charge involved the contravention of an undertaking given to the Magistrates’ Court. The primary complainant was the applicant’s wife, however, the alleged offending also involved the complainant’s children. It was alleged, among other things, that the applicant grabbed the complainant’s throat and pushed her head through a wall, while threatening her that he would ‘drain’ their bank account and take their daughters to the United States ([6]).
The applicant was refused bail in August 2019, and applied for bail again ([3]-[4]). The applicant contended that a compelling reason to justify a grant of bail could be established based on his personal and financial circumstances, the strength of the charges against him, the likely delay until determination of the charges, and the lawful sentencing range open to the sentencing court. He also submitted that, without being granted bail, he was likely to spend a significantly longer period of time on remand ([11]-[12]). On the issue of unacceptable risk, the respondent pointed to the applicant’s ‘history of contravention of court orders’ and his addiction to illicit substances which appeared ‘to be linked to his offending and violence against the complainant and [her] children’ ([17]-[21]).
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine whether a ‘compelling reason’ existed in favour of bail.
Held: The applicant was admitted to bail on strict conditions. In the Court’s view, bail conditions, such as daily reporting to police, prohibition from approaching the vicinity of the complainant’s residence and curfews, would sufficiently mitigate any risk posed by the applicant ([33]). The applicant was 33 years of age, and had a limited prior criminal history and no prior criminal history involving violence. He had no prior convictions for breaching court orders, however, he previously admitted to breaching a family violence order ([26]-[27]). The applicant ran a trucking business, which would likely suffer financially if he was not granted bail. Factors militating against the applicant included the seriousness of the allegations of strangulation and the fact that the complainant was afraid of him. Nevertheless, the Court found that the applicant had established a compelling reason to justify the grant of bail, given his lack of a negative bail history, the modesty of his criminal history, his personal and financial circumstances, the time already spent in custody, the period of any likely sentence and the material and recommendations in the CISP Remand Outreach Program (CROP) report ([30]).
The Queen v Karatzas [2019] VSC 658 (26 September 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Depression’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Past domestic violence’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The accused and victim were married. After an argument with the victim, the accused strangled her with an electrical extension cord until she collapsed and fled the scene. Expert evidence that the accused was suffering from a major depressive episode at the time of the offence ‘which may have clouded [his] thought processes and [his] appreciation of the consequences of [his] actions’ [24] was accepted at trial along with evidence that the accused loved his wife and had been violent to her before.
Issues: Appropriate sentence
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 11 years.
The court accepted that the fact the accused was suffering from a major depressive episode significantly reduced the accused’s moral culpability [24]. Beale J said ‘[d]omestic violence murders are often upper range examples of the offence of murder, particularly where there has been a history of domestic violence. This is not your case. The fact that you killed your wife of nearly 50 years was a gross breach of trust which elevates the seriousness of your offending but, having regard to all circumstances, and particularly your mental illness, I find that yours is a mid-range example of the offence of murder’ [25]. The other mitigating factors considered by his Honour include the accused’s: remorse; previous good character; excellent prospects of rehabilitation; age; and ‘the punishment [the accused will] continue to experience knowing you killed your beloved wife’ as other mitigating circumstances [54].
The Queen v Bufton [2019] VSC 621 (13 September 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Controlling, possessive, jealous behaviour’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’
Charge: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The female offender was found guilty following trial of the murder of her male domestic partner, her various offers of a guilty plea to negligent manslaughter, then dangerous driving causing death (following the death of the sole living witness to the offence), and then again negligent manslaughter having been rejected. The pleas offered appeared to relate to the Crown’s perceived prospects of proving their case with the evidential difficulties occasioned by the death of the witness.
The offender and victim had a turbulent relationship involving many arguments and periods of separation from January 2016 until his death in October 2017. The victim was attempting to remove his caravan from the offender’s property when the offender became verbally abusive and refused to let the victim move it. The victim walked away to call police for assistance but was followed by the victim in her car and struck by the vehicle. The call to 000 remain connected during the accident and picked up the ensuing conversation between the offender and a witness in which the offender claimed that the victim jumped in front of her car and she was unable to avoid him. This false story was later repeated to police.
The offender was 68 years of age and had no prior criminal convictions. She had been diagnosed with cancer. She was subject to an intervention order prohibiting the commission of family violence against the victim at the time of offending.
Held: Bufton was sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
The Court treated this protection order as an aggravating feature along with the use of a dangerous weapon and noted that the ‘crime occurred in the context of [Bufton] having been in a domestic relationship with [the victim], and of [Bufton] having acted out of anger and frustration at the state of the relationship [36]. Her persistence in the false account of events and the fluctuating pleas were considered to be indicative of a lack of contrition or remorse[46-52]. Assistance rendered by the offender to the accused was conduct which could be explained by the crime being carried out in full view of the witness[53]. The judge said at [52]:
"For completeness, I make it clear that you are not to be punished for your refusal to admit what you had actually done, or for pleading not guilty to murder. Rather, these facts point to the absence of a possible mitigating feature of your crime which would have existed were you to have been willing to accept the true criminality of your conduct."
Just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence were treated as the most important sentencing purposes, with the significance of specific deterrence being reduced in light of Bufton’s age and cancer diagnosis.
Re Rodgers [2019] VSC 553 (20 August 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Intervention order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Charges: Multiple charges of causing injury intentionally and recklessly, a charge of recklessly causing serious injury, charges of reckless conduct endangering life and endangering person, a charge of making a threat to kill, drugs charges, a charge of criminal damage, and numerous breaches of Family Violence Intervention Orders (FVIO)
Case type: Bail application
Facts: The applicant applied for bail on a number of charges, which arose out of family violence related incidents. The complainants include his former wife and children.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine whether a ‘compelling reason’ existed in favour of bail.
Held: The Court refused the bail application as there would be an unacceptable risk that the applicant would endanger the safety and welfare of the complainant and her children, or commit further offences while on bail ([65]). The nature and seriousness of the offending was considered to be the most important matter for the Court. Tinney J described the offending as ‘quite disturbing, with a significant and worrying risk of causing serious injury or death’ ([51]). Some of the alleged violence occurred in the presence of one or more of the children, and occurred in the family home ([54]). Although the applicant’s criminal history was limited, he had been found guilty of assaulting the complainant in the past. Further, he was on an adjourned bond for that assault ([56]), and was also subject to a FVIO at the time of the alleged offending ([57]).
There were many personal circumstances favourable to the applicant. For example, he had a supportive family and was the operator of a company which, in his absence, struggled financially ([58]). According to Tinney J, the applicant’s prolonged drug use had a significant impact on the alleged offending, and would increase the risk of failure to comply with his bail conditions ([59]). The complainant’s attitude to bail was also a relevant consideration. She was afraid of the applicant and did not want him to be released on bail ([60]). His Honour concluded that there were sufficiently compelling reasons to deny the applicant a grant of bail ([63]).
Additional matters of concern included ([64]):
•
The applicant allegedly repeatedly and violently assaulted his wife;
•
The offending allegedly occurred in the context of ongoing drug use by both the applicant and the complainant;
•
The offending occurred despite there being an intervention order in place and the fact that he was subject to an adjourned bond for a previous assault on the complainant; and
•
If bail was granted, the conditions imposed on the applicant would not have sufficiently reduced the risks to a level where they would be acceptable.
Note: An appeal against this decision to refuse bail was rejected by the Victorian Court of Appeal - Rodgers v The Queen [2019] VSCA 214 (26 September 2019)
The Queen v Solmaz [2019] VSC 530 (12 August 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Arranged marriage’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Lack of remorse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: 1 x murder
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty (shortly before the trial was due to commence) to the murder of his former wife, with whom he entered into an arranged marriage when he was 18 years of age. They had 2 children. The murder occurred in the context of an unhappy relationship which had subsisted for many years leading up to her death. The offender claimed that the deceased attacked him with a broken leg of a table and that he took the piece of wood from her and hit her repeatedly. He then used an extension lead to strangle her ([10]). In the aftermath, the offender left the deceased dead on the floor and went to his step-sister’s home where he confessed to the killing. He then fled Melbourne, and was intercepted by Queensland police two days after the killing.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: The Court sentenced the offender to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years. The offender was 60 years of age and was born in Bulgaria. He had one prior conviction of unlawful assault, but this had limited significance to his case ([33]). Medical evidence indicated that he was diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder, and was likely depressed at the time of the deceased’s death. One expert considered that his Adjustment Disorder contributed to his offending by diminishing his ability to reason and make sound judgment ([45]). The Court, however, noted several deficiencies in this expert’s evidence, such as the fact that he heavily relied on the truthfulness of the offender’s account to him about his relationship with the deceased and that it conflicted with other expert evidence ([86]-[94]). Consequently, the Court did not accept this expert evidence and rejected the defence’s submissions in respect of the Verdins principles to reduce the sentence, other than for the purpose of the hardship of imprisonment ([95], [99]). According to the Court, the offender’s conduct could not be connected to any defect in his reasoning abilities or be characterised as an impulsive crime. He inflicted multiple, forceful blows to the deceased. The ‘shocking and protracted nature of the crime’ indicated that any impairment to mental functioning was not causally connected to the offending, and that he intended to kill her ([96]-[97]). The crime was described as one of ‘extravagant and drawn-out violence committed against a physically weaker person whom [the offender] apparently detested and who had offered some provocation to [him] by striking [him] with the leg of the table’ ([97]).
While the offending was not premeditated, the Court considered it to be at the high end of the range of seriousness. The crime was an extreme overreaction to modest provocation by the deceased and the challenges of their ‘sad and troubled relationship’ ([102]). The Court also found that the offender had not exhibited true remorse ([111]). His prospects of rehabilitation, however, were found to be good ([117]).
Relevant sentencing principles included just punishment, denunciation and general deterrence. The Court found it necessary to make ‘perfectly clear’ that it deplores violent crimes of this nature, particularly those committed against domestic partners. The deceased’s life was ‘precious’, and was brutally and deliberately taken away by the offender as a result of his anger, resentment and frustration. He had full knowledge of the severity and criminality of his actions ([121]-[122]).
R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Exposing children’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of abuse’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Separation’
Offences: Murder
Proceedings: Sentencing
Issue: Appropriate sentence
Facts: The male victim and female offender (Stone) had been married for 22-years and had five children together. Evidence tendered during trial was that the male victim had reported an incident of the offender chasing him from the house with a knife. Neighbours also reported sounds of arguing and physical violence coming from the home prior to the incident that lead to the victim’s death. There was evidence that the victim told members of his extended family that he intended to leave the relationship the day of the incident that lead to his death.
The Crown case was that Stone doused the victim with highly flammable enamel thinner and set him on fire. While none of the children saw the victim committing the offence, one of the daughters saw their father engulfed in flames and heard him say that he was going to die. Another daughter saw the trail of debris left by the victim as he ran to the bathroom after being set alight.
The victim was found conscious by paramedics despite sustaining burns to 95% of his body, including his airways. He was placed on life-support and interviewed but did not recover. Both the victim and Stone gave false versions of the events, claiming that the victim had been attacked by three men. Stone provided the names of the alleged offenders but failed to identify them during police interviews and was subsequently arrested herself.
Held: The accused was sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years. The Court provided that murder is "the ultimate act of family violence", with the offender’s ‘vicious and barbarous’ conduct constituting a "a violation of the security of the sanctity of the home and a massive breach of trust" [32]. With the offender’s conduct being ‘a most serious example of murder’, the Court found the objective gravity of the offence and offender’s moral culpability to be ‘extremely high’. As such, denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing considerations along with protection of the community [42].
Note: Subsequent applications for leave to appeal against conviction (on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding the applicant’s alleged lies were reasonably capable of amounting to ‘incriminating conduct’; (2) the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; and (3) a substantial miscarriage of justice occurred because of the failure of the prosecution to disclose telephone records); and sentence on the ground that the sentence was manifestly excessive were dismissed: Stone v The Queen [2021] VSCA 186 (24 June 2021) – Victorian Court of Appeal.
See also R v Stone (Ruling No 1) [2018] VSC 625 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court and R v Stone (Ruling No 2) [2018] VSC 626 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court.
R v Willis [2019] VSC 398 (20 June 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘History of family violence’ – ‘Murder of parent’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verdins’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to the murder of his mother. The case raises important community issues and the connection between drugs, mental health and family violence. The evidence showed that the offender and his mother had significant mental health issues, which strained their relationship and ultimately led him to stab her to death ([2]). The offender admitted to killing his mother to police, and made further admissions to his father and former partner. Lasry J described the murder as ‘grave and tragic’. The victim was vulnerable and defenceless in the face of the attack, and her death was the culmination of a lengthy history of hostility and family violence between them ([17]).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Lasry J noted the offender’s personal circumstances at [21]-[25], and the issue of mental health and substance abuse at [26]-[33]. He started using drugs as a teenager, however remained drug free for several years. His deteriorating mental health and increasing drug use led to the breakdown of his relationship with his former partner and the loss of his job. The offender had also been diagnosed with Delusional Disorder and subject to various treatment orders. A forensic psychiatrist gave evidence of the offender’s long history of major mental disorder and substance misuse, but noted that he had no history of being violent or anti-social other than when he was psychotic or affected by drugs. The offender also suffered from paranoid schizophrenia which was likely precipitated by his cannabis use and aggravated by his methamphetamine use.
The offender pleaded guilty at a relatively early stage of the proceedings. An element of remorse was identified in his post-offence conduct; however his Honour noted that the offender’s hostility towards his mother had not completely abated ([41]-[43]).
Further, the offender had no criminal history and made efforts to improve himself while in custody through education and work opportunities. Lasry J was satisfied that there was some evidence that he was capable of leading a law-abiding and productive life, and that his prospects of rehabilitation depended on his compliance with treatment for his mental health and substance misuse ([44]-[45]).
Lasry J was satisfied that the principles arising from Verdins meant that the offender’s moral culpability was significantly reduced. Community protection was not a significant sentencing consideration provided that his serious mental health issues were properly managed ([53]). The offender was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.
R v Considine & Anor [2019] VSC 386 (31 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘History of abuse of accused’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to murdering the victim. The offender’s partner of around 9 years, Hogan, pleaded guilty to assisting him. The relationship between the offenders involved homelessness, drug use and domestic violence. In 2015, while the offender, Considine, was serving a term of imprisonment, Hogan and the victim met on Facebook and commenced an intimate relationship. When the offender was released from prison, Hogan and the victim ended their relationship, but resumed social media communication in 2017. The offender, Considine, became aware of this relationship. Considine and Hogan arranged a threesome with the victim. The offender became jealous of the sexual activity between Ms Hogan and the victim, and strangled the victim to death. Ms Hogan assisted the offender to dispose of the body.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: The offender, Considine, began consuming alcohol and taking drugs as a teenager. A forensic psychiatrist diagnosed the offender with Borderline Personality Disorder and believed that he likely had an acquired brain injury (ABI). He therefore concluded that it was likely the offender was experiencing severely impaired impulse control at the time of the offending due to his intoxication with multiple substances and Borderline Personality Disorder and probable ABI ([49]). Champion J accepted this opinion at [71]. The offender also had an extensive criminal history, however very few of his convictions involved violence ([52]). The offender’s moral culpability was reduced by various factors, including his intellectual impairment and personality disorder ([71]). The offender’s guilty plea showed a willingness to accept responsibility for the victim’s death and spared the victim’s family and friends from the traumatic effects of a contested trial ([73]). His Honour also accepted that the offender was remorseful for having killed the victim, even though this took some time to develop ([76]). The offender was sentenced to 21 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 16 years ([115]).
Ms Hogan also commenced using drugs at an early age and had a minor criminal history ([56]-[57]). It was submitted that her role in the offending could not be separated from the nature of her relationship with the offender which was ‘marred by domestic violence, control and drug use’. It was also submitted that these circumstances reduced her culpability ([86]). Champion J considered that her experience of domestic violence was a factor relevant to the establishment of her state of mind, and mitigated the circumstances of her offending to some extent ([90]). She also decided to cooperate with the police and offered to plead guilty at an early stage ([94]). His Honour accepted that she was genuinely remorseful for the victim’s death ([96]). Ms Hogan was sentenced to one year and 10 months’ imprisonment ([118]).
R v Davsanoglu [2019] VSC 332 (24 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suicide pact’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentencing.
Facts: The accused ‘[inflicted] his will on a woman [the deceased] by the use of fatal violence in her home’. They had maintained a relationship over several years, which ended as a result of her family’s disapproval. The deceased later remarried and had a child. The accused and the deceased later re-established their relationship, but it was ‘marked by periods of instability’ [8]. In 2017, the deceased became engaged to another man. On 13 July 2017, the accused visited the deceased’s residence, where they ‘apparently had a sexual encounter’ while her child was asleep [10]. The accused killed the deceased by holding her underwater in a bath. The accused then removed her body from the bath, partially dressed her in clothes, and placed the body in his car. He drove the deceased’s body from Melbourne to South Australia, as he intended to deposit it in the ocean. He also purchased 2 knives and inflicted superficial incisions to his wrist. The accused decided to return to Melbourne where he deposited the body in the garage of an unoccupied property that he had previously leased. He confessed to killing the deceased to his friends and family, but said that she had told him to kill her and that he had tried to kill himself. At the police station, the accused gave conflicting evidence on his feelings about the deceased’s relationships with other men.
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence in the circumstances.
Held: Lasry J inferred that the appellant’s self-inflicted injuries were not a genuine attempt to suicide, but a means of explaining his involvement in the killing by reference to a ‘suicide pact’ ([14]). By reference to Ron Felicite v The Queen [2011] VSCA 274, his Honour noted that the seriousness of the offending required the imposition of significant punishment ([27]). It represented the accused’s endeavour, through the use of fatal violence, to control the deceased, and to overpower her rejection of their relationship ([23]). Relevant sentencing principles included general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment. His Honour also noted aggravating circumstances, including the fact that the killing occurred in the deceased’s home while her child was asleep in the nearby room, and that he abandoned the child when he drove off with the deceased’s body ([26]).
Lasry J also considered the peculiarity of the accused’s guilty plea. It was given in circumstances which made it difficult for his Honour to determine whether it was a sign of genuine remorse over the deceased’s death. The accused would have derived a greater benefit had he pleaded guilty at an earlier time ([31]-[34]). Personal circumstances of the accused were also considered. He was born in Turkey, raised in an environment of domestic violence, lived in foster homes, did not receive any formal education in Australia, maintained employment since the age of 18, and had no prior convictions for violence ([35]-[37]). The accused’s steady employment throughout his adulthood and lack of prior criminal convictions indicated positive rehabilitation prospects ([38]). The sentence was also determined in light of victim impact statements ([28]-[30]).
His Honour sentenced the accused to 23 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years ([42]). He allowed some discount for the accused’s guilty plea. As his Honour was not satisfied that the accused’s guilty plea reflected significant remorse or acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, only a small discount was made ([44]).
DPP v Jensen [2019] VSC 327 (17 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Binge drinking’ – ‘Intentionally causing serious injury’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Attempted murder x 2; intentionally causing serious injury x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender had maintained an incestuous relationship with his sister since he was 17 years old, and they have a child together. While they were still living together, but after their relationship ended, his sister began an intimate relationship with the first victim. The offender, while intoxicated, entered the first victim’s house which he shared with his mother. The offender found the first victim and his sister asleep in bed together, and stabbed them both repeatedly and also stabbed the first victim’s mother who intervened. The offender pleaded guilty to 3 offences: the attempted murder of the first victim (charge 1) and his own sister (charge 2), and intentionally causing serious injury to the first victim’s mother (charge 3).
Issue: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offences in the circumstances.
Held: Beale J sentenced the offender to 19 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 14 years. The offender was sentenced as a Serious Violent Offender on charges 2 and 3 pursuant to the Sentencing Act 1991.
Notwithstanding the offender’s relative youth, good work history, limited prior convictions and guilty plea, his Honour could not accept the submission that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation. The violence was extreme and sustained, and the offender had a history of binge drinking. Even though his intimate relationship with his sister had ended, his ability to cope with any future relationship difficulties and to control his drinking was uncertain ([48]).
The offender’s personal history is discussed at [29]-[41]. He was born in the Cook Islands and raised by his grandparents after his parents abandoned him as an infant. He moved to Australia in 2009 with his parents and his sister. Beale J noted the possibility that he would be deported from Australia at the end of his sentence. This was a relevant factor in determining the sentence ([52]).
The mitigating factors of the case were summarised at [56]-[64]. The offender had a difficult childhood which partly caused him to develop an incestuous relationship with his sister. A lack of parental supervision when they were teenagers was also found to be a contributing factor. The offender pleaded guilty at a relatively early stage, showed remorse, is relatively young, and has a limited criminal history and no violent antecedents.
Aggravating circumstances, noted at [65]-[70], were that the offending involved a ‘terrifying’ home invasion; the attack with knives was not momentary, but sustained; the offending against his sister was an instance of domestic violence given their long-term incestuous relationship; the injuries inflicted on his sister and the first victim were life-threatening; and the offender had a prior conviction for incest, which clearly did not lead him to end his intimate relationship with his sister.
A useful table of summaries of various sentencing cases in respect of attempted murder is also annexed to the judgment. In addition to these cases, his Honour also had regard to the Judicial College of Victoria Sentencing Manual’s attempted murder case collection and the Court of Appeal overview regarding intentionally causing serious injury ([54]).
DPP v Gibson [2019] VSC 328 (16 May 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Dementia’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Life expectancy’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘No prior convictions’ – ‘People with mental illness’
Charges: 1 x murder
Case type: Sentencing
Facts: The accused pleaded guilty to the murder of his wife to whom he had been married for 44 years. The accused was 65 years old and had retired. He had four children with the victim, as well as grandchildren. The accused regarded his relationship with the victim as having ‘broken down’. He shot her twice in the head and then attempted to kill himself. The accused’s sister and their grandson were present at the time of the offending.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Held: To determine the appropriate sentence, Coghlan JA took into account the accused’s personal circumstances. He suffered from depression and anxiety since he was a teenager ([27]). He had stopped working a few years prior to the offending, and experienced financial difficulties ([28]). He was resentful of the amount of time his wife was spending with her parents ([6]), and over time, he started to scrutinise her spending habits, including the cost of caring for their grandchildren and her parents ([29]). Further, the accused and victim had made significant contributions to their local community ([30]-[31]).
The accused’s mental health was a major consideration for the Court. There was medical evidence indicating that he suffered recurrent depressive disorder of moderate severity ([38]), and that aspects of his processing speed, working memory, complex new learning skills, executive and language skills, and impulse control had deteriorated ([40]). There were suggestions by medical professionals that he might have suffered from either frontotemporal dementia or Alzheimer’s related dementia. Another expert suggested that his frontal lobe might have been damaged as a result of his attempted suicide ([43]). It was important to determine the precise cause of the brain damage as his life expectancy differed depending on his diagnosis ([45]). His Honour sentenced the accused on the basis that he had been diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia, which had a life expectancy of 8 years ([51]). This diagnosis affected the weight to be attributed to sentencing principles, such as just punishment, denunciation and deterrence ([52]). As a result of the accused’s ‘complex medical condition’, there was a significant delay in sentencing ([2]), which was also taken into account ([3]).
Coghlan JA was satisfied that the accused’s mental condition would render his prison sentence more onerous than it would for a prisoner without his condition ([54]), and that his moral culpability and the need for denunciation, general and specific deterrence were reduced ([53]). The accused pleaded guilty, had no prior convictions and was found to have led a ‘worthwhile and…blameless life’ ([56]). Taking into account all relevant matters, the accused was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years.
R v Eustace [2019] VSC 189 (26 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim met while visiting Australia from India, and eventually married. Three months later, the offender killed the victim in a knife attack in their shared home ([3]). On the night of the murder, the offender and victim argued, which ultimately resulted in the offender obtaining a knife and stabbing the victim ([9]-[14]). She suffered 12 wounds to her chest, abdomen, arm and leg. The offender’s actions were described as ‘sustained, purposeful and ruthlessly determined’. Even after the offender was restrained in a head lock and dragged from the bedroom by a man with whom they lived, he returned to the room to resume the attack ([15]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence of murder in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Taylor J took into account the offender’s personal circumstances at [26]-[31]. He was 43 at the time of the offending and his work history showed him to be ‘a man of industry’ ([29]). However, his father was an aggressive alcoholic ([28]). Prior to meeting the victim, he had been in two significant relationships, one of which was an arranged marriage ([31]).
The offending was found to be ‘self-evidently extremely serious’, as the killing of a domestic partner violates a fundamental principle underpinning society, namely, that all persons have the right to safety, respect and trust in intimate relationships. Whether or not the marriage was one of convenience, his Honour noted that the offender had voluntarily entered into a relationship in which he owed the victim kindness and safety. Rather, the offender betrayed her trust and the expectation that, even where issues in family relationships arise, violence is not tolerated. Even if the offender was fearful, angry, intoxicated or frustrated, he should have just walked away ([33]). Women should not fear or suffer physical harm because their partner loses their temper. The offender’s actions were found to be at the extreme end of the scale of ‘abominable acts’ ([34]). Aggravating circumstances included the fact that the victim was his wife, that she was murdered in their home, that a knife was used, and that despite the number of wounds already inflicted, the offender continued his attack, even after being physically restrained by another person ([35]-[36]). The public has an interest in matters involving family violence. Principles of general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment are relevant to sentencing ([35]). The objective gravity of the offending and the moral culpability of the offender was also found to be very high ([38]).
The offender pleaded guilty after the committal hearing, demonstrating a willingness to facilitate the course of justice ([39]). He also surrendered himself to the police station and admitted the killing. His remorse was further expressed in a letter of apology to the victim’s family ([40]).
Taylor J sentenced the offender to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years ([46]). After the expiry of his sentence, it was noted that the offender would be deported to India. Knowledge of this deportation was said to make imprisonment more burdensome ([41]). Taylor J also noted that the offender would be isolated in custody ([42]). The offender’s prospects for rehabilitation were found to be good, as a result of some positive references indicating his good character and hardworking nature ([43]).
DPP v Ristevski (Ruling No 1) [2019] VSC 165 (15 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Children’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Ruling as to evidence.
Facts: The prosecution alleged that the accused killed the deceased at their home on the morning of 29 June 2016, put her body in the boot of her car and drove it to Macedon Regional Park where he concealed it between 2 logs in a forest. It was discovered approximately 8 months later. The accused and deceased had been married for over 20 years and had a daughter. There was no prior history of physical violence on the part of the accused. However, he admitted to pushing the deceased on occasions if she ‘got in his face’ during arguments ([34]). The prosecution conceded that the evidence at most supported an inference that their financial difficulty was significant and may have fuelled an argument between them ([24]).
Issue: Whether the prosecution was entitled to rely on evidence of post-offence conduct to prove not only an unlawful killing but also murderous intent.
Held: Beale J noted some similarities with R v Baden-Clay [2016] HCA 35. However his Honour found that the differences between the two cases were ‘more striking’. At [37], his Honour stated -
‘First, there was compelling evidence of a motive for Baden-Clay to kill his wife – a desire to be rid of her so he could be with his lover. Second, the post-offence conduct in that case included lies and other conduct directed at concealing his ongoing extra-marital affair. In other words, the post-offence conduct was intertwined with his motive to kill and thus it is easy to see how the High Court, viewing the post-offence conduct on the basis of the evidence as a whole, reached the conclusion that it did.’
In the present case, the prosecution submitted that the accused’s post-offence conduct was inconsistent with his having unintentionally killed the deceased, as one would expect him to report the incident, and not bundle her body into the boot of a car, drive to a remote location, conceal the body and lie about the circumstances of her disappearance to family, friends and investigators ([35]). Counsel for the accused submitted that he could well have feared that the unlawful killing of the deceased would attract a substantial prison term and cause permanent damage to his relationship with his daughter ([36]). Beale J found that those submissions made it difficult to see how a jury could properly find that the only reasonable explanation for the post-offence conduct was that the accused was conscious of having killed his wife with murderous intent ([36]).
Beale J held that while the evidence of post-offence conduct referred to in the prosecution’s amended Notice of Incriminating Conduct could be relied on as evidence that the accused killed his wife, it could not be relied on to prove that the accused did so with murderous intent ([31]–[39]).
R v Robertson [2019] VSC 145 (6 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Social abuse’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant pleaded guilty to murder of his partner (the deceased) with whom he fathered a daughter. After their daughter’s birth, their relationship became strained. The defendant resented the deceased’s change of employment and her being around other men. He became jealous and constantly concerned about possible infidelity. The deceased’s behaviour became more obsessive and paranoid. He even set up a fake Facebook and Instagram account to contact the deceased’s work colleagues under the fake name to establish if anything was happening between the deceased and her male colleagues ([3]-[11]). After a heated argument in which the deceased expressed her desire to end the relationship, the defendant picked up a dumbbell bar and hit her multiple times to her face and head. The blows, forceful and vicious, killed her immediately. After committing the offence, the deceased rang his mother and admitted to his actions. His mother rang the police ([12]-[19]).
Issues: The Court determined the appropriate sentence for the offence of murder in the circumstances.
Decision and reasoning: Champion J sentenced the defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment, taking into account general and specific deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation and protection of the community. His Honour considered the defendant’s personal circumstances at [39]-43]. The defendant grew up in a close, supportive and loving family. Through his job he was able to buy a home for himself, thus demonstrating his independence and self-sufficiency. Friends and family observed that he became agitated and alienated after his daughter was born.
Champion J did not accept a complete lack of premeditation even though the defendant committed the offence in a highly emotional state. The ‘savagery’ of the assault affected the sentencing. The act in question was terrible and grossly violent. It was not fleeting and involved multiple deliberate blows to the face and head. His Honour noted the defendant’s intention to kill. An aggravating feature was the fact that she was his intimate partner ([65]-[66]). Champion J therefore concluded that his offending was a grave example of murder and above the middle range of seriousness ([67]). However, it was noted that the extreme violence was out of character as there was no evidence of previous domestic violence incidents ([90]).
Champion J discussed his culpability and degree of responsibility at [68]-[73]. The offending occurred in the context of the defendant being extremely jealous, possessive and controlling. At [73] Champion J stated: ‘I note that these features of jealousy, the need to possess, and uncontrollable rage associated with extreme violence emerge too frequently in cases of the murder of an intimate female partner.’ The attack was described as grievously inappropriate and a wildly disproportionate response to the situation. Therefore, his culpability and degree of responsibility was within the higher range. A mitigating factor was the fact that the defendant admitted to killing the deceased very soon after the act, and thus his Honour found that it he should receive the full benefit of that early plea as it facilitated the course of justice and relieved the deceased’s family and friends from having to give evidence and endure the trauma of a trial ([76]). With these factors in mind, his Honour accepted that the defendant has positive prospects of rehabilitation.
The Queen v Samaras [2019] VSC 120 (1 March 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Firearm’ – ‘Guilty plea’ – ‘Misuse of alcohol’ – ‘Physical harm and violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Manslaughter
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: Before moving to Australia from America, the victim sent four packages containing firearms to the accused’s parents’ address in Australia. Three of these packages were intercepted by the Australian Border Force. ‘The [female] victim and [male] accused were charged with the importation and possession of firearms and were bailed’ [10]. They decided to ‘go on the run’, packing their belongings and purchasing a caravan to escape in. Arrest warrants were issued after the pair failed to appear in court, but they managed to evade the police [11].
The couple lived in the caravan for a couple of weeks prior to the incident. On the night of the shooting, both the accused and the victim were intoxicated and were arguing. The accused physically assaulted the victim during the argument while the victim was in possession of the loaded firearm. The two struggled for the weapon, with the accused eventually gaining possession and deliberately pulling the trigger. The accused did not aim the weapon or deliberately shoot the victim, although ‘there is no suggestion the firearm was defective in anyway’ [17].
The accused later pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
Issue: The issue for the Court was to determine the appropriate sentence for the offence.
Decision and reasoning: The accused was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment with a fixed non-parole period of 8 years. Relevantly, the sentencing judge observed at [48]:
The sentence I pass must make it perfectly clear that the Court deplores the use of firearms, all the more so against women in a setting of domestic violence…… The sentence of this Court should bring it clearly home to any person in our community who might be minded to inflict violence of any sort against a domestic partner, particularly with the use of a weapon, that such conduct will be met with strong punishment.
DPP v Freeburn [2018] VSC 616 (14 December 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Murder x 1
Facts: The offender met the deceased, a 29 year old woman with a mild intellectual disability, on an internet dating site. The deceased was particularly vulnerable as she was guarded about her relationships and sometimes did not inform her family as to her whereabouts. Her parents obtained a guardianship order at VCAT because of their concern that she was unable to protect her own interests. The deceased had told her family and friends of the offender’s violent behaviour towards her. The offender often exhibited jealousy, anger and verbal aggression when the deceased interacted with other men. The deceased’s body was found in the offender’s room three days after she was reported missing, with restraint marks on her wrists, bruising to her face and upper body, and a ‘tram track’ mark on her back. She also sustained brain injuries, indicating multiple blows to the head. Her wrists were bound and her neck and face were wrapped in tape. An autopsy revealed that she consumed the drug GHB prior to her death. It was entirely plausible that the deceased was alive, albeit unconscious, when the offender left the premises.
Issues: Sentencing
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 20 years. The jury rejected the offender’s defence that the deceased’s death was caused solely by her consumption of GHB. At the time of the incident, the offender regularly abused drugs, and suffered from personalty disorder and long-term anger management problems which may have affected his judgment and ability to make calm and rational decisions ([24]). The deceased was also in a particularly vulnerable position due to her intellectual disability. His Honour considered the offender’s personal circumstances which included his parent’s separation, his upbringing which was characterised by substance abuse and family violence, his experience in several foster placements in which he exhibited violent behaviour, and his diagnoses of ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder and conduct disorder. His involvement in the criminal justice system began when he was a minor, and his violent offending included numerous convictions of assault. Given his history of mental health problems and violent prison incidents, his Honour accepted that he should remain in conditions more restrictive than those of other prisoners.
Re Mongan [2018] VSC 638 (24 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Charges including false imprisonment, recklessly causing injury, unlawful assault, aggravated burglary, theft and threat to kill.
Proceeding type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant and complainant were married for 13 years and have three children. The complainant claimed that the marriage ended because of the applicant’s controlling and intimidating behaviour. From the time of the separation, a series of interim and final Family Violence Intervention Orders (FVIOs) were in place restraining the applicant from contacting the complainant. The applicant breached many of the FVIOs. It was alleged that the applicant, armed with items intended to incapacitate the complainant, unlawfully entered her premises, interfered with a CCTV camera which might have recorded his subsequent conduct, and then waited for her. He grabbed her from behind, forced her to the ground, sought to bind her wrists and gag her, pushed her into her own home, and again forced her to the ground, binding her ankles. He threatened her in a graphically and frightening manner whilst she was bound and helpless. The children returned home from school and heard the complainant screaming. The complainant eventually escaped ([46]). The applicant submitted that a combination of a number of matters demonstrated a compelling reason that justified a grant of bail (see [34]).
Issues: Whether bail should be granted; Whether there was a compelling reason why the applicant’s detention in custody was not justified; Whether the applicant presented an unacceptable risk of committing further offences, endangering the safety or welfare of the complainant and interfering with witnesses.
Decision and reasoning: Section 4AA of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) sets out circumstances in which a two-step test applies to the consideration of a grant of bail. Step 1 requires the existence of exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons. Step 2 mandates that the Court must apply the unacceptance risk test. In considering whether or not the applicant established compelling reasons that justified the grant of bail, the Court must take into account the surrounding circumstances (see s 4C and s 3AAA of the Act). The Court was required to assess ‘the nature and seriousness of the alleged offending, including whether it is a serious example of the offence’ (see s 3AAA(1)(a)).
There was no question that the offending alleged was serious. It was pre-meditated and involved the use of equipment to incapacitate the complainant. Only the escape of the complainant prevented a continuation of the offending. The Court found that the applicant’s lawyer’s reliance of an ‘arguable defence’ was ‘somewhat optimistic’ ([48]). The Court also considered the applicant’s criminal history and the extent of compliance with conditions of earlier grants of bail. Although his criminal history was limited and there was nothing to indicate previous breaches of bail, the Court noted two factors, namely, that the applicant failed to accept the breakdown of his marriage, and that he refused to respect the orders of the Magistrate Court in relation to the complainant. A significant matter was the fact that, at the time of the alleged offending, the applicant was approximately six weeks into a six month adjourned bond which he received for his multiple breaches of the FVIOs. Matters pursuant to s 3AAA(1)(g), (j), (k), (l) were also considered.
At [57], his Honour noted that the risk of further violence or intimidation by the applicant towards the complainant was significant and entirely unacceptable (see s 4E of the Act). The application for bail was therefore refused as the applicant failed to establish a compelling reason that would justify the grant of bail. The circumstances suggested that the applicant should be held in custody pending trial.
R v Stone (Ruling No 2) [2018] VSC 626 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Incriminating conduct’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-offence conduct’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: The accused allegedly murdered the victim by dousing him with fuel thinner and setting fire to him. Their relationship spanned approximately 25 years. The accused claimed that a Mr Baxter murdered the victim. The question before the Court was whether the accused was the murderer. The Prosecution filed a Notice, pursuant to s 19 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), of its intention to adduce evidence of incriminating conduct, namely, the lies told by the accused in describing the circumstances of the deceased’s death, and the accused’s authorship of a letter purporting to be under the hand of Amanda Thatcher and which implicated Mr Baxter in the death of the deceased.
Issues: Whether the evidence of the conduct is reasonably capable of being viewed by the jury as evidence of incriminating conduct.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could be satisfied that the accused’s multi-faceted statement as to how the incident took place was deliberately false. The conduct relied on by the prosecution was much more than a bare denial of guilt, and amounted to a detailed account of the deceased’s death. Therefore, the jury could conclude that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence was that the accused believed that she committed the offence. Accordingly, the prosecution was allowed to rely on the conduct specified in its notice, namely the lies told by the accused describing the circumstances of the deceased’s death, as evidence of incriminating conduct ([24]-[27]).
Note: The accused was convicted and sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years: R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court.
R v Stone (Ruling No 1) [2018] VSC 625 (19 October 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Proceeding type: Ruling as to the admissibility of evidence.
Facts: The accused allegedly murdered the victim (her defacto partner) by dousing him with fuel thinner and setting fire to him. Their relationship spanned approximately 25 years. The accused claimed that a Mr Baxter murdered the victim. The question before the Court was whether the accused was the murderer. The prosecution sought to lead evidence from the deceased’s mother as to the nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased. That evidence included 1) that the mother observed instances of verbal and physical abuse between the deceased and accused over a number of years; 2) that in 2010, the mother observed a particular argument between the deceased and the accused in which the accused physically assaulted the deceased before the deceased’s brother intervened; and 3) that in November 2016, the mother received a phone call from the deceased, claiming that he was fearful for his own life. The prosecution filed a Hearsay Notice with respect to the ‘November 2016 incident’. Sections 65(2)(b) and 66A of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) were relied upon as the path to admissibility.
Issues: Whether the deceased’s mother’s observations of instances of verbal and physical abuse between the accused and the deceased were admissible; Whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused; Whether the representations made by the deceased to his mother concerning an earlier incident with the accused are admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The prosecution argued that the deceased’s mother’s evidence was admissible as relationship and context evidence in that evidence of the poor relationship between the accused and the deceased could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the question in issue, namely whether the accused killed the deceased. The accused argued that the relationship evidence was not relevant and that the evidence of the November 2016 incident failed to satisfy the tests specified in s 65(2)(b) and s 66A of the Act ([7]).
On an analysis of the particular evidence, Taylor J made the following observations:
•
Evidence of the general poor relationship between the accused and the deceased was relevant to the probability of the existence of the question in issue. However, owing to the vagueness of the general relationship evidence, its probative value was low and was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. Therefore, such evidence was excluded under s 137 of the Act.
•
The evidence of the 2010 incident was irrelevant and was therefore excluded by the operation of s 56(2) of the Act. The lack of relevance was a result of the fact that the accused was claimed to have threatened the deceased’s brother with a knife, rather than the deceased herself.
•
The evidence regarding the November 2016 incident, although hearsay, was admissible pursuant to s 65(2)(b). It was sufficiently proximate to the alleged incident and revealed the state of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, as well as the deceased’s fear of the accused in the months preceding her death. It was ‘extremely unlikely that the representation was a fabrication’ ([31]). The evidence was also admissible pursuant to s 66A of the Act.
Note: The accused was convicted and sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 28 years: R v Stone [2019] VSC 452 (12 July 2019) – Victorian Supreme Court.
Re application for bail by Roberts [2018] VSC 554 (21 September 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk and best interests’
Charges: Charges include rape, unlawful assault, contravention a Family Violence Intervention Order, persistent contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order, attempt to commit an indictable offence, property damage and use a carriage service for child pornography material
Proceeding type: Application for bail
Facts: The complainant was the former partner of the applicant. They have three children. The applicant was charged with 64 offences including rape, unlawful assault, contravention a Family Violence Intervention Order, persistent contravention of a Family Violence Intervention Order, attempt to commit an indictable offence, property damage and use a carriage service for child pornography material.
Issues: Whether bail should be ordered; Whether the applicant discharged his onus of showing compelling reasons why his continued detention is not justified.
Decision and reasoning: The applicant’s application for bail was refused as he failed to show compelling reasons why his continued detention was not justified. Taylor J noted that if he had been satisfied that a compelling reason existed justifying the grant of bail, he must apply the unacceptable risk test. In considering s 5AAAA(2)(a) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic), Taylor J considered that there was a risk that, if released on bail, the applicant would commit family violence. His blatant disregard of the court orders and the effect of his behaviour on the complainant, was exemplified by the 1200 text messages he had sent to the complainant between September 2017 and March 2018. His preparedness on two occasions to continue a sexual offence notwithstanding his knowledge that his actions were being audio-recorded further indicated a complete indifference to the complainant, as well as a sense of entitlement ([57]). His prior convictions for matters of family violence demonstrated continuous disregard for the authority of the court and the complainant’s safety and wellbeing. If released on bail, the risk of family violence would not be able to be sufficiently mitigated by the imposition of a bail condition requiring compliance with existing FVIOs ([59]).
Smith v State of Victoria [2018] VSC 475 (27 August 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Duty of care owed by police’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Negligence’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Negligence claims.
Case type: Application for summary dismissal.
Facts: The plaintiffs, a woman and her three children (who identify as Aboriginal), were the victims of family violence by the children’s father. They alleged that police officers and senior officers owed duties of care to them as victims of family violence, and that they suffered psychological harm as a result of breaches of those duties. The plaintiffs also asserted that the officers acted in breach of the plaintiffs’ human rights and obligations as public authorities under the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) ([40]). The defendant submitted that the alleged duties cannot arise at law and that the proceedings should be summarily dismissed ([41]). Alternatively, the defendant sought a strike out of the allegations of a common law duty of care pleaded in certain paragraphs of the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim on the basis that no cause of action had been disclosed ([3]). The plaintiffs contended that the current law in Australia regarding the application of duties of care to police officers is ‘in a state of development’ and that, as a result, the court ought not summarily dismiss the proceedings ([87]).
Issue: The State of Victoria sought either a summary dismissal of the case or that the Court strike out the claims alleging that a common law duty of care was owed.
Held: Dixon J dismissed the application, stating that the defendant’s contention that the proposed duties of care have no real prospect of succeeding had not been established ([174]). Dixon J held that a summary dismissal is an ‘extreme measure’ and would ‘forever shut out’ the plaintiffs from seeking to prove their claim at trial ([169]). Although the case was ‘fact rich and fact intensive’, the defendant did not persuade his Honour that no duty of care could arise ([171]).
Duty of care
Dixon J stated at [170]:
‘Australian common law has not affirmatively recognised that a police officer can never owe a duty of care… In no case has a court determined that no duty of care was owed in circumstances that demonstrate the degree of proximity between the plaintiffs and the police that is likely to be demonstrated on the evidence in this case at trial and in the legislative and policy framework that prevail in respect of domestic violence at the relevant time.’
As outlined in Kuhl v Zurich Finance Services Australia Ltd [2010] HCA 11, the existence of a duty of care is determined by considering reasonable foreseeability and the salient features of the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant ([168]). The plaintiffs argued that the police officers owed them a duty of care to prevent breaches of several Intervention Orders (IVOs) by the father due to the existence of a relationship of proximity between the police officers and the plaintiffs, arising from various salient features, including that:
•
It was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiffs required protection from breaches of the extant IVOs by the father;
•
The police officers had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms of the extant IVOs;
•
The police officers exercised control with respect to the compliance by the father with the terms of the extant IVOs;
•
The Victorian police represented, through the terms of its family violence policies, that police officers would protect women and children from family violence. As a result of these representations, the plaintiffs relied on the police officers to enforce compliance by the father with the extant IVOs; and
•
There were no countervailing policy reasons that negated the imposition of a duty of care on the police officers to prevent breaches of IVOs ([49]).
The defendant argued that some of the pleadings in the plaintiffs’ amended statement of claim were too broad. The submission was that these duties were that, ‘every’ police officer owed a duty to ‘every’ affected family member named in any and ‘every’ extant IVO ([53]). In response, the plaintiffs argued that the duties were ‘owed by police officers at stations local to the plaintiffs’ homes, by reason of their status as family violence victims’ or, alternatively, as ‘victims of a recidivist family violence offender known to police’ ([58]). Dixon J accepted the plaintiffs’ submission that the duty was not pleaded in unnecessarily broad terms ([59]).
Salient Features
Dixon J noted that as the existence of a novel duty of care was alleged, the court must apply the salient features approach in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee[1999] HCA 59 ([90]). A determination of the existence of a duty of care requires ‘[a] close analysis of the facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the putative tortfeasor by reference to the salient features or facts affecting the appropriateness of imputing a legal duty to take reasonable care to avoid harm or injury’ ([91]).
The plaintiffs submitted that the salient features of foreseeability, knowledge, control and responsibility applied ([129]). They challenged the defendant’s reliance on Hill’s Case [1989]AC 53, emphasising that the salient features of proximity, knowledge and control were absent in Hill’s Case. Dixon J held that Hill’s Case was distinguishable, even if it was good law in Australia ([94]-[95]). The plaintiffs also emphasised the dissenting judgment in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, which viewed proximity as the determinative factor ([102]). The plaintiffs submitted that NSW v Spearpoint [2009] NSWCA 233 was analogous, and that it was persuasive authority for their submission that the proceedings could not be summarily dismissed ([114]-[115]).
In relation to the factor of control, Dixon J accepted that the relevant focus was on control of the risk not the offender, and that the issue of control is ‘fact sensitive and a matter for evidence’ ([135]). The plaintiffs suggested that the police officers exercised control by having the father in a police vehicle and dropping him within the zone identified in one of the IVOs ([137]).
R v Jones [2018] VSC 415 (31 July 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Pregnant people’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter based on an unlawful and dangerous act x 1
Proceeding type: Sentence to be imposed
Facts: The female offender was in a relationship with the male victim, with a history of illicit drug use and domestic violence. In April 2015, the victim grabbed the offender around the throat and threatened to harm and kill her. In October 2015, the victim pushed the offender. She armed herself with a knife and returned to the bedroom to confront him. He grabbed her by the throat, and verbally and physically assaulted her. She was pregnant at the time with his child. In December 2016, there had been a heated verbal argument between the parties. She stabbed him in the chest with a kitchen knife. The offender pleaded guilty.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Taylor J took into account victim impact statements ([20]-[21]), and the offender’s prior criminal history ([22]-[26]) and personal history ([27]-[41]). The offender had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a charge of recklessly causing injury by punching and stabbing a former partner. She had experienced trauma at an early age as she was raped by two of her brother’s friends. She was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and excoriation disorder. Her psychological condition did not warrant the application of the principles in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102. Her Honour accepted that there had been a history of domestic violence at the hands of the victim and that, on the balance of probabilities, physical violence had occurred the morning of the victim’s death. The gravity of her offending was to be assessed in the context of her history of family violence and her perception of a physical threat. At [48], her Honour stated –
‘Family violence is insidious. It need not find expression in physical violence to be described as grave or create a mindset in its victims of fear and helplessness. That mindset arises from all forms of violence experienced by victims and is not triggered only at the time of a physical assault…’
Her Honour accepted that her plea of guilty was an expression of genuine remorse, and that her time in custody would be more burdensome due to the separation from her children, as well as her diagnosed psychiatric illnesses. Specific deterrence was considered a significant sentencing factor, as well as general deterrence and denunciation. At [58], her Honour acknowledged that ‘This Court must pass a sentence that denounces your behaviour and deters others from resorting to the use of knives or other sharp objects during conflicts.’ The offender was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years.
The Queen v Donker [2018] VSC 210 (11 May 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘People affected by drug misuse’ – ‘Sentence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Manslaughter.
Matter: Sentence.
Facts: Ms Donker and Mr Powell were in a violent, volatile and toxic relationship [5]. Mr Powell’s violence was fuelled by ice use, he would become violent in the course of arguments, was controlling and suspicious of Ms Donker, and, even during Ms Donker’s first pregnancy, would grab her around the throat and push her around.
Ms Donker lied to protect Mr Powell whenever the police were called. Ms Donker was also violent towards Mr Powell in retaliation, which would make Mr Powell more angry and more violent. Mr Powell’s violence had caused their children to be removed from Ms Donker’s care and them both to be evicted.
In January 2017 Mr Powell woke Ms Donker when she was asleep in her car in a kindergarten carpark by him dragging her from the car by her hair. She had parked there for the night as it was close to where her children were living with Mr Powell’s extended family. In response to Mr Powell’s assault she repeatedly manoeuvred her car so as to threaten and taunt Mr Powell. She did not intend to physically hurt him. However, on the fourth instance of reversing away from and driving towards Mr Powell, she struck a pole which bent and fell so as to strike Mr Powell’s head, killing him instantly.
Decision and reasoning: Five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
Croucher J accepted that:
[23] ….after years of Mr Powell’s violence; after numerous unsuccessful attempts at defending herself; after losing her recently hard-won gains – including her home, her job and, most importantly, the care of her children; after being forced to live in a car; after being choked and having her eyebrow split by him again the night before; after being viciously dragged out of her car by the hair as she tried to sleep…
Ms Donker ‘could take no more and finally snapped’.
Having outlined a history of controlling and violent behaviour by the deceased towards the accused at [5]-[9] and the physical violence to which the accused was subjected immediately prior to the instant offending Croucher J noted:
[72] While the law in this State does not excuse anyone – whether of uncommonly sturdy or brittle disposition – from criminal liability for otherwise unlawful actions based on provocation alone, the same law does not demand that victims of abuse of the kind and extent to which Ms Donker was subjected be super-resilient before provocation can operate in mitigation of sentence. Rather, the law attempts to strike a balance that recognizes human frailty in the face of extremely difficult circumstances, and allows that moral culpability may be reduced in such cases. This is such a case. As I say, I think it is very likely that any ordinary person, facing the circumstances which confronted Ms Donker and fixed with her history of exposure to family violence by Mr Powell, would lose self-control and act in a violent manner towards him.
Re Kele [2018] VSC 159 (10 April 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Perpetrator interventions’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Show cause’
Charges: Contravention of family violence intervention order x 1; Intending to cause harm or fear x 1; Unlawful assault x 2; Home invasion x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Theft x 2.
Case type: Application for bail.
Facts: The applicant was arrested for a family violence incident and an unrelated home invasion ([1]). The family violence incident occurred between the applicant and the victim, who were in a relationship for 4 years and had a 22-month-old son ([7]). The applicant accused the victim of changing his Centrelink account details and cheating on him. He grabbed the victim by her arms, pushed her to the ground, and hit her face, head and hands. The victim left the house and called for help with a payphone ([8]-[9]). The applicant pleaded guilty to one charge of assault and one charge of breaching a family violence intervention order.
Issues: Whether bail should be granted. Because the home invasion charge involved the use of an offensive weapon, the applicant was required to show cause why his detention in custody is not justified, pursuant to s 4(4)(c) of the Bail Act 1977 ([23]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted.
Champion J considered the following factors in favour of the applicant:
•
the applicant’s youth, being 21 years old ([44]);
•
the applicant’s relative lack of criminal history ([45]);
•
limited instances of domestic violence ([46]);
•
the defence submitted that the likely penalty for the family violence incident would be higher than the time the applicant has already spent in custody ([48]);
•
the likely of up to 12 months delay in having the matter heard in the County Court ([50]);
•
the victim had moved to a secret location ([54]); and
•
if the applicant was remanded in custody, he would not be able to access a men’s behaviour change program ([54]).
Champion J considered the following factors against the applicant:
•
the prosecution submitted that the penalty for the breach of domestic violence order would include imprisonment, because it was a serious breach and occurred in front of their child ([56]); and
•
the applicant did not have accommodation ([61]).
Champion J considered that the applicant has shown cause why his detention in custody is not justified ([62]). His Honour remarked that while the level of violence towards the victim was unacceptable, it did not involve the use of a weapon, threats to kill or the infliction of significant physical injury ([64]).
DPP v Lo (Ruling No 3) [2018] VSC 149 (29 March 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship, context, tendency and coincidence evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Ruling on relevancy of evidence.
Facts: The female accused Lo was charged with murder and perjury. It is alleged that AB shot the deceased and that the accused Lo assisted, encouraged and directed AB in those actions. The accused was a Chinese national living with the deceased prior to the murder.
The central issue of this trial was whether the evidence provided by a marriage celebrant was relevant. The marriage celebrant provided evidence that he visited the deceased’s home in relation to proposed plans for him and the accused to marry. The Defence submitted that this confused the jury, and that it was counter-intuitive to the Crown’s case. It was also submitted that if the evidence was put before the jury, there would be a risk that the jury would be misled into thinking that the deceased wanted to marry the accused because he loved and cared for her. This would require the Defence to adduce evidence to show an alternative scenario that the deceased had been actively seeking to marry a young Asian woman and had told others of his willingness to facilitate such a person getting an Australian visa through such an arrangement ([3]-[6]). The Defence submitted that consideration of this issue would be time-consuming and distracting for the jury, and the evidence of the marriage celebrant was not sufficiently relevant to allegations of the accused’s complicity in the murder ([7]).
Issues: The Court was required to determine whether the evidence of the marriage celebrant was relevant.
Decision and reasoning: Under the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), evidence is prima facie admissible if it is relevant. In order to exclude the evidence, the defendant bears the onus of showing that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value. Dixon J held that the marriage celebrant’s evidence was relevant and admissible as context and relationship evidence ([22]), and that the Defence should be entitled to adduce evidence supporting a counter-narrative that the deceased had been interested in marriages with other women prior to the murder ([27]). Her Honour was of the view that evidence as to the events in the house the night before the murder, and evidence of the complex nature of the accused’s and deceased’s relationship was relevant. Any unfair prejudice arising from the jury learning about a planned marriage of convenience between the accused and deceased did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence ([25]). The marriage celebrant’s evidence was found to have significant relevance to the issues in the trial ([27]), and to be admissible relationship evidence.
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Walker [2018] VSC 83 (28 March 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Perpetrator a battered woman’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and deceased were in a relationship for 2 years. There was a history of arguments, physical violence and cannabis and methylamphetamine use ([2]-[7]). On the day of the offence, the defendant and deceased argued for 3 hours, during which the defendant tried to leave the house, and the deceased dragged her back inside ([9]). The defendant stated in later interviews that the deceased would not let the defendant leave and goaded her into stabbing him ([25]). By the time the police attended, the defendant had stabbed the deceased ([11]-[12]).
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Hollingworth J imposed a head sentence of 7 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 4 years ([50]).
Her Honour had regard to the fact that the defendant had a limited criminal history and displayed some evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder ([40]). Her Honour also reduced the sentence for the defendant’s early guilty plea: the defendant was charged with murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter a month before her trial was due to begin ([43], [50]). The defendant displayed remorse for her actions ([45]) and had begun counselling in custody ([46]).
Re Williams [2018] VSC 76 (23 February 2018) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Application for bail’ – ‘Challenge to complainant's evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Show cause’ – ‘Word-on-word case’
Charges: Intentionally causing injury x 3; Recklessly causing injury x 5; Unlawful assault x 3; Contravening family violence intervention order x 3.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant and the complainant had been in a relationship for 10 years and had 2 children ([2]). The complainant alleged three events forming the basis of the charges. First, the applicant kicked and punched her, drove her to the hospital, dragged her from the car and left her at the entrance. Second, the applicant chased her in his car, dragged her out of her car, and punched her. Third, the applicant forced his way into her house, urinated on her, and punched her ([14]-[22]).
Issues: The applicant was required to ‘show cause why his detention was not justified’, under s 4(4)(ba)(i) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was refused.
The applicant argued that he was entitled to bail because he had stable accommodation, was willing to comply with strict bail conditions, and that the prosecution case was not strong because it relied mostly upon the complainant’s evidence. The applicant intended to challenge the credibility of the complainant ([24]). The prosecution argued that the applicant had a lengthy criminal history including violence, has shown disregard for previous family violence intervention orders, and has committed offences while on bail ([47]-[48]).
Justice Champion at [57]-[59] discussed the applicant’s contention that the prosecution case is weak because it relies on the complainant’s evidence:
… the prosecution points out that cases involving family violence frequently involve ‘word on word’ evidence and that this is often the very nature of these types of cases. The prosecution submits that this circumstance does not of itself warrant the prosecution case as being regarded as weak, or without merit.
It is clear enough that the case will be strongly defended, and that there are arguable issues to be decided. That said, it was not submitted to me that the case should be regarded as inherently weak.
From what I have been able to glean in this application I cannot conclude that the prosecution case is weak.
DPP v Paulino (Sentence) [2017] VSC 794 (21 December 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Current sentencing practices’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victorian systemic review into family violence deaths unit’ – ‘Women’
Charges: Murder x 1.
Appeal type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and victim were estranged. The defendant made open threats to kill the deceased, sought to commit a character assassination of her by alleging that she was promiscuous and by making spurious allegations about her involvement in pornography, nuisance-calling her at work, and following her and her new boyfriend. The deceased took out a protection order against the defendant. Shortly before a Family Court hearing, she was stabbed by the defendant, and was found dead by her sons ([7]). At a pre-trial hearing, relationship evidence was admitted (see DPP (Victoria) v Paulino (Ruling No 1) [2017] VSC 343 (17 June 2017)). After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty.
Justice Bell referred the case to the Victorian Systemic Review into Family Violence Deaths unit at the Coroners Court. The function of the unit includes identifying risks associated with deaths resulting from family violence. His Honour highlighted features of this case, including that:
•
the murder was preceded by threats to kill, assassination and blaming directed towards the deceased that were open and persistent;
•
there was an intervention order on foot, which was not a sufficient deterrent;
•
Family Court proceedings, initiated by the deceased, had reached a critical stage;
•
the parties had separated; and
•
the deceased had expressed a fear that her husband would kill her.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to a period of 30 years with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Justice Bell placed importance on the fact that current sentencing practices being more condemnatory of men murdering women ([25]), the circumstances of stalking and breaches of intervention orders leading up to the murder ([27]), and the murder was premeditated ([29]).
The accused’s acts in relation to the victim — namely the character assassination and other harassment — were found not to be ‘random measures’. Instead, Bell J found that they represented a ‘pattern of coercive control’. Her right to ‘personal dignity and autonomy’ was violated by the accused, whose conduct led to a situation in which she no longer had a life to live. This, Bell J explains, ‘was the culmination of a pattern of behaviour aimed at preventing her from living the life she chose’. [27]
Re Kumar [2017] VSC 742 (6 December 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Bail’ – ‘Bail conditions not sufficient’ – ‘Bail refused’ – ‘Immigration detention’ – ‘Past breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Show cause’
Charges: Contravention of a family violence safety notice intending to cause harm or fear for safety x 1; Destroying or damaging property x 1; Aggravated burglary x 1; Attempted murder x 1; Intentionally causing serious injury x 1; and Recklessly causing serious injury x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: The applicant attended the house of his former partner and her new partner (the victim), and forced his way in by breaking the window ([7]-[8]). The applicant stabbed the victim’s head and hands with a piece of broken glass, leaving him with permanent injuries ([9]).
Issues: The applicant was required to ‘show cause why his detention was not justified’, under various sub-sections of s 4(4) of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic). For example, the appellant was charged with contravening a family safety notice in which he was alleged to have used violence and, in the previous 10 years, had been found guilty of the same charge (s 4(4)(ba)(i)) ([12]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was refused.
The applicant had argued that because he has been given notice that he is an unlawful non-citizen, he would be put straight into immigration detention and therefore would not pose a risk of committing another offence ([14]).
Priest JA held that there was an unacceptable risk that the applicant would commit further offences against his former partners. Most importantly, the applicant had a history of breaching family violence orders ([20]). Therefore, the risk of the applicant committing further violence could not be mitigated by strict bail conditions ([21]). Furthermore, there was no guarantee that the applicant would be put straight into immigration detention ([17], [20]).
Re Easson [2017] VSC 565 (20 September 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Bail’ – ‘Firearms’ – ‘Kidnapping’ – ‘Show cause’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Strict conditions’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Intentionally causing injury x 1; Recklessly causing injury x 1; Unlawful imprisonment x 1; Unlawful assault x 3; Unlawful assault using an instrument x 2; Unlawful assault by kicking x 1; Threatening to inflict serious injury x 1; Unlawful assault with a weapon (a steak knife) x 1; Making a threat to kill x 2; Kidnapping x 1; Common law assault x 2; Reckless conduct placing a person in danger of death x 1.
Case type: Bail application.
Facts: All charges related to one 12-hour period, where the applicant allegedly assaulted his wife by: banging her head on the floor and striking her with an iron; punching, kicking and strangling her with a lamp cord; and threatening to take her somewhere to be raped, and threatening to kill her while holding a steak knife ([6]).
Issues: Since the applicant was charged with an indictable offence involving the use of a weapon, the issue was whether he could ‘show cause’ why his detention was not justified (s 4(4)(c) Bail Act 1977 (Vic)) ([3]).
Decision and Reasoning: Bail was granted, with strict conditions. Significant factors against granting the applicant bail included: the charges are serious; and it could not be said granting bail would pose no risk to the complainant ([14]). On the other hand, significant factors in favour of granting bail to the applicant were: he had no criminal history; and the risk to the complainant could be ameliorated by strict conditions such as requiring him to reside with his mother, engage in drug treatment, and removing his access to firearms ([14], set out in full at [17]). Justice Beach stated: ‘There is considerable merit (and potential benefit for both the applicant and the wider community) in addressing the applicant’s drug, and any mental health, issues now rather than later’ ([15]).
Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) v Turner [2017] VSC 358 (23 June 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Respect of women’ – ‘Role of sentencing’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1; Breach of domestic violence order x 1.
Case type: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant and deceased had been in a relationship. After consuming alcohol and methamphetamines, the defendant beat the deceased in their home with punches, kicks, and hit the soles of her feet with a hammer ([5]). The deceased was discharged from hospital, but died of internal bleeding the next day ([8]-[9]). The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: Bell J imposed a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 9 years. His Honour considered that the contravention of a domestic violence order made it a serious example of manslaughter ([32]).
Bell J at [33]:
“Denunciation and specific and general deterrence are sentencing principles through which the law gives effect to the fundamental purpose of protecting individuals and the community from crime. Ms Cay and all other women have an inviolable human right to life, to equality – not just the appearance of equality but to real equality, to physical and emotional integrity, to respect for their dignity and personal autonomy, to loving relationships with children and others, and to freedom from fear of physical or mental harm. They look to the law for protection from men who would perpetrate crimes of assault or homicide upon them in a domestic setting by reason of failing to control their anger, aggression and rage. While the police cannot be present in every home on every occasion of risk, the values and standards of human behaviour that the criminal law demands are omnipresent. The courts must respond appropriately through the sentencing process when those standards are severely or seriously breached, as they have been in this case, for this vindicates the individual interests of victims in seeing that perpetrators are brought to justice, as well as the general interests of the community in seeing that justice is so done, and also performs the important educative function of positively influencing how the community, and especially men, value, respect and treat women.”
His Honour thought that the defendant had good prospects of rehabilitation, but the defendant’s efforts to stop drinking was not a mitigating factor ([27-[28]).
DPP (Victoria) v Paulino (Ruling No 1) [2017] VSC 343 (17 June 2017) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Admissibility’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Pre-trial hearing.
Facts: The defendant and deceased had been in a relationship, and had two children ([3]). They separated acrimoniously in 2010 ([3]). The defendant was accused of murdering the deceased. The prosecution wished to lead evidence relating to the relationship between the accused and deceased ([4]) in order to establish that the accused’s enmity and hatred towards the deceased was the motive for the murder ([5]). The evidence included: threats made by the defendant; relationship evidence; the fact that the accused had an intervention order taken out against him by the deceased; and the accused’s actions in relation to a pornographic video allegedly depicting the deceased.
Issues: Whether the ‘relationship evidence’ should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Bell set out the relevant principles in relation to the Court’s mandatory duty to exclude evidence where the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused (see [33]-[36]). In this context, evidence of a poor relationship between the accused and deceased has been admitted where that evidence may be relevant to whether the accused killed the deceased and whether the accused had a motive to do so ([37]).
Threats
The deceased’s statements about her fear of the accused (for example, that if something happened to her, it would be because of the accused) were not admissible. In deciding the admissibility of a victim’s fear of the accused perpetrator, the issue is ‘whether the evidence of the deceased’s fear of the accused was relevant to the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, usually whether the accused had a motive for killing, and actually did kill, the deceased’ ([57]). However, the statements were merely evidence of her subjective state of mind, not the accused’s ([70]). Further, the content and volume of evidence would be highly prejudicial to the accused ([71]).
By contrast, evidence of threats made by the accused to kill the deceased and her family were admissible, because it was relevant to the accused’s state of mind towards the deceased ([76]).
Relationship evidence
Evidence of the defendant’s feelings of hatred and enmity towards the deceased was admissible ([42]-[43]). However, most the evidence of the state of their marriage before 2010 was not relevant ([41], [51]). Bell J held that the jury should be told generally that the marriage was unhappy ([85]-[87]), but not the precise details of the aggressive behaviour of the accused ([88]).
Intervention order
Evidence of the intervention order was admissible as a feature of the relationship leading up to the death of the deceased ([91]). There was a danger of unfair prejudice to the accused, but that could be mitigated by proper instruction ([92]).
Pornographic video
The accused had alleged that the deceased had participated in a pornographic video, and had shown his colleagues and the deceased’s family ([94]). Evidence of the video and the accused’s actions were admissible to demonstrate the extremely negative attitude of the accused towards the deceased ([96]).
DPP v McDermott (Rulings Nos 10 & 11) [2016] VSC 822 (27 April 2016) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Anti-tendency warning’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Prejudicial evidence’ – ‘Propensity evidence jury discharge’
Charges: Murder.
Case type: Application to discharge jury.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for stabbing his former partner. His son gave evidence that the defendant usually carried a knife. Defence counsel applied to discharge the jury on the ground that the ‘propensity evidence’ was highly inflammatory and could not be cured by a direction ([2]). The next day, a newspaper article was published about the son’s evidence ([35]-[36]).
Issues: Whether the jury should be discharged.
Decision and Reasoning: Jane Dixon J declined to discharge the jury ([31], [45]). Her Honour considered that any prejudice to the accused could be cured by a direction to the jury ([31]). Her Honour gave two anti-tendency warnings ([35], [43]), and intended to give another curative direction in her Honour’s final address ([44]).
The Queen v Cook [2015] VSC 406 (19 August 2015) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence.
Facts: The victim was the male offender’s de facto wife. After drinking 15 beers at their house party, the offender started punching and pushing the victim. A friend tried to intervene but was pushed away. He then picked up a steel-framed chair and hit the victim with such force that that one of the legs went through her skin and bone and penetrated her brain.
Decision and Reasoning: Elliot J sentenced the offender to 21 years and six months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years and six months. In passing this sentence, His Honour made some general observations on domestic violence at [28]-[30]:
‘The courts clearly recognise that they must forcefully condemn domestic violence (See, e.g., R v Earl [2008] VSCA 162, [23]). When domestic violence manifests in murderous conduct, that conduct must be denounced in the strongest terms (Felicite v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 329, [20]; Portelli v The Queen [2015] VSCA 159, [30]).
Moreover, general and specific deterrence have special significance in cases involving domestic violence. In such circumstances, general deterrence is more important as “[t]he victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities” (Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97, [57]).
Also, specific deterrence is often more important, as it is in this case, because “women who are killed by their husband, boyfriend or de facto partner have frequently been assaulted by them many times previously”’ (Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97, [53]).
DPP v Williams [2014] VSC 304 (27 June 2014) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Defensive homicide’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert evidence - academic’ – ‘History of violence’ – ‘Lack of disclosure of family violence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Defensive Homicide.
Hearing: Sentence.
Facts: The defendant was charged with murdering her de facto partner but was found guilty of defensive homicide. She struck the deceased to the head 16 times with an axe. She buried the deceased’s body in the backyard and lied about his whereabouts to family and friends for more than four years, claiming that he had gone interstate. The defendant gave an account of a violent fight which led to the deceased’s death which included the deceased taunting and goading the defendant. She attested to a long history of family violence by the deceased.
Issue/s: The appropriate sentence to be imposed.
Decision and Reasoning: The defendant was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years. In finding the defendant guilty of defensive homicide, the jury had to be satisfied that the killing took place in the context of a serious history of family violence. Hollingworth J noted at [20] that, while there was no evidence that the defendant or her children had ever complained about family violence, this is not uncommon.
The deceased was the dominant person in the relationship. He had a long history of violence and drank heavily. His behaviour towards the defendant ‘over many years, was abusive, belittling and controlling, and involved both physical and psychological abuse’ ([26]). Her Honour noted, ‘The final act or acts of the deceased may well be relatively minor, if looked at in isolation; but what happens in such cases is that the victim of family violence finally reaches a point of explosive violence, in response to yet another episode of being attacked. In such a case, it is not uncommon for the accused to inflict violence that is completely disproportionate to the immediate harm or threatened harm from the deceased’ ([32]).
The Court heard (largely unchallenged) expert evidence from Professor Patricia Easteal regarding the complex dynamics of family violence, the reasons why women often do not leave violent partners and the use of weapons by female victims of family violence against male partners ([33]-[34]). Given this evidence, Her Honour noted that while ordinarily, striking 16 blows with an axe in response to a minor physical and verbal attack by an unarmed attacker would seem disproportionate, this may not be the correct conclusion in family violence cases involving a female offender ([36]). However, aggravating factors included the defendant’s deceit and a lack of remorse. Her offending had a large impact on the deceased’s family.
DPP v Bracken [2014] VSC 94 (12 February 2014) – Victorian Supreme Court
*Note: this case was decided under now superseded legislation however the case contains relevant statements of principle.
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Social framework evidence’
Charges: Murder.
Proceeding: Pre-trial hearing.
Facts: The defendant was on trial for the murder of his de facto partner. He argued that he shot his de facto partner in self-defence. He alleged that his partner perpetrated psychological and physical violence against him over the course of the relationship. He successfully argued that the killing was in self-defence and was thus acquitted.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether evidence of family violence or ‘social framework’ evidence within the meaning of the then s 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) was admissible.
Decision and reasoning: The evidence was admitted. Maxwell P held that family violence was alleged as required by the section. As such, evidence such as ‘the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a family member of (family) violence’ was relevant in determining whether self-defence was made out. Significantly, his Honour held that, ‘There will be no basis for an objection on grounds of relevance…’, though there could be other available grounds of objection (see at [16]).
DPP v Neve [2013] VSC 488 (13 September 2013) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intentionally causing injury’ – ‘Make threat to kill’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reckless conduct endangering life’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Criminal damage, make threat to kill x 2, reckless conduct endangering life, intentionally causing injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and the complainant were married. After an argument, the offender fatally shot the complainant’s dog. He then reloaded the rifle and began chasing the complainant as she ran towards the road yelling, ‘I’m going to fucking kill you…You’re fucked’. The complainant stopped running and tried to negotiate with the offender. She managed to grab hold of the gun and forced the applicant to fire both of the shots from the rifle. The offender then pushed her over and started punching her repeatedly in the head and chest, trying to reach other cartridges he had in his pocket. The complainant managed to get up and flag the attention of a passerby.
Decision and Reasoning: The offender was sentenced to a total effective sentence of four years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two and a half years. In passing sentence, Bell J noted at [67]:
‘Denunciation of your crimes and general deterrence are powerful sentencing considerations in your case, leading to an immediate sentence of imprisonment. Ms Fuller was your wife. You are guilty of committing appalling domestic violence towards her. Many of your actions were not only violent but calculated to belittle and demean her and place her in abject fear. The double barrel shotgun was a common feature of all five charges and it was loaded when the first four offences were committed. This criminal conduct deserves the strongest condemnation of the court. Others must be made to appreciate the consequences of committing crimes of this nature’.
DPP v Huynh [2010] VSC 37 (19 February 2010) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Denunciation’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Forcible confinement’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Violation of trust between husband and wife’
Charge/s: Intentionally causing serious injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and the victim, his wife, came to Australia from Vietnam on tourist visas. After the offender became suspicious the victim was seeing another man, he stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest and abdomen.
Decision and Reasoning: In sentencing the offender, Curtain J took into account the offender’s plea of guilty, his lack of prior criminal history, the fact that the offender would be separated from his children for a number of years, and that the offender was remorseful and distressed by his conduct. Her Honour also accepted that the offender’s prospects for rehabilitation were favourable. However, in opposition to these factors, Curtain J held at [42]-[43]:
‘Against these matters stand the nature and gravity of the offence here committed. This is a serious example of a serious offence. It involves the infliction of serious violence upon your wife which is a gross breach of the trust which reposes between husband and wife. I take into account also the need to pass a sentence which will act in denunciation of your conduct and serve to punish you and also give due weight to special and general deterrence.
Although such considerations are to be sensibly moderated, nonetheless, the sentence imposed must signal to the community that acts of violence, including domestic violence, are not tolerated and warrant condign punishment’.
In the circumstances, a sentence of seven years imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years was appropriate.
R v Gojanovic [2005] VSC 97 (27 January 2005) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: After being in an ‘on and off relationship’ for some years, the male offender and the female victim separated. One evening, the offender entered the victim’s home and battered her repeatedly on the head with a rubber headed mallet. He then took a dressing gown cord and strangled her to death.
Decision and Reasoning: Osborn J noted that while the killing was not premeditated and it occurred in a state of high emotion arising out of the disintegration of the offender’s relationship with the victim, there were nevertheless five seriously aggravating circumstances associated with this crime. First, the killing was brutal, protracted and vicious. Second, the killing was selfishly callous. The offender knew he was not only taking the life of another individual but also taking away the mother of four innocent children. Third, the killing took place in what should have been the safety of the deceased’s own home. Four, a substantial penalty was warranted in light of the need for general deterrence. As per His Honour at [31]:
‘The Court and the community which it represents cannot tolerate resort to violence, let alone homicidal violence, in circumstances of this kind. The Court must send a clear message to estranged parents that they cannot act as you did and expect to receive other than a penalty which affirms the sanctity of individual human life and condemns in the strongest terms the deliberate taking of another life even in circumstances of strong emotion’.
Finally, the offender displayed a total lack of remorse for his conduct. The offender was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
See also R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (14 August 2007).
R v Kibble [2002] VSC 52 (1 March 2002) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Intentionally cause serious injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relevance of prior relationship’ – ‘Right to leave a relationship’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Intentionally cause serious injury.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The female victim ended her relationship with the male offender and gave him money to fly back to London, where he was from. Upon returning to England, the offender felt humiliated and angry and decided to return to Australia to punish the victim. He purchased a rubber mallet to break into the victim’s house and a roll of duct tape. When the victim arrived home, the offender started stabbing her with a knife. She managed to fight him off and called the police.
Decision and Reasoning: This offence was serious. As per Gillard J at [57]:
‘A person in a relationship with another has every right to terminate the relationship and walk away without fear of reprisal. Too often, upon the termination of a relationship, the physically stronger person pursues a course of conduct of harassment and violence towards the other person. That is what has happened here. Your conduct was serious and has had a long-lasting, emotional effect upon the victim. The Legislature views any offence under s16 as serious. The circumstances surrounding the commission of this offence supports that conclusion and you are guilty of a high level of criminality’.
There were a number of factors that aggravated the offending namely that the conduct was premeditated, the offender waited for the victim in her home, his conduct caused the victim terror and fear, and the conduct had a long-lasting emotional effect on the victim. His Honour was satisfied that specific deterrence was not warranted on the facts but that general deterrence was important i.e. the sentence had to send a message to those who are like-minded to use their superior physical strength to punish a partner in a relationship after it has terminated.
His Honour also took into account a number of mitigating factors namely, the offender frankly admitted his involved, he pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, there was no criminal history, the physical injuries were at the lower end of the scale, the sentence would be onerous because the offender was English, the offence was out of character, it was unlikely he would reoffend, and his prospects for rehabilitation were good. The offender was sentenced to six years imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years.
DPP v Williamson [2000] VSC 115 (31 March 2000) – Victorian Supreme Court
‘Murder’ – ‘Parents who kill children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship killings’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Hearing: Sentence hearing.
Facts: The offender and a young woman, Ms Park, had been in a relationship and had a child together, the victim. This relationship was characterised by the offender’s jealousy and possessiveness towards Ms Park and the victim. Eight months after the victim was born, Ms Park left the relationship. The offender resented his obligation to financially support the child and began to deeply resent Ms Park. Four months before the victim’s death, the offender began telling people he was going to kill himself and his son, to take him away from Ms Park. One night, the offender took the child to a hotel and smothered him. He then wrote a letter to Ms Park telling her he had killed the victim.
Decision and Reasoning: In sentencing, Cummins J took into account, as mitigating factors, the offender’s poor family situation, the burdensome quality of imprisonment to the offender, his age, his lack of prior convictions and the rehabilitative courses he undertook while in custody. However, His Honour stated at [25]:
‘Of all the rights of the child, the most fundamental right of all is the right to life. It is necessary that parents and others in charge of children unmistakably understand that child abuse will be met by the full force of the law. The intentional killing of a child by a person without psychiatric illness or other significantly mitigating factor will ordinarily be met with life imprisonment of the offender’.
Cummins J also noted the significant importance of condemnation, punishment, general deterrence and specific deterrence. The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 24 years.
County Court
DPP v Walker [2024] VCC 374 (26 March 2024) – Victorian County Court
‘social abuse’ – ‘contravening a protection order’ – ‘kidnapping’ – ‘threats’ – ‘deportation’ – ‘perpetrator programs’
Charges: 1 x kidnapping; 2 x common law assault; 1 x contravening a family violence order; 4 x summary offences.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: On 20 December 2021 a final family violence intervention order was made. Its duration was three years. It contained only two conditions, including a condition prohibiting the respondent /offender from committing family violence against his wife (the protected person). At incident one the victim and offender were living together. The offenders used abusive language towards the victim and dragged her out of the house when she decided to smoke (2 x summary offences- assault and contravening the intervention order). The police attended an a further condition was included in the intervention order – that the respondent/offender remain at least 200 m away from the victim/protected person’s home. Incident 2 involved the offender going to the victim’s house, dragging her out of bed, removed the charger from her phone, strapped her into the car, and hit her. The offender told the victim he would take her where no one would find her (1 x kidnapping; 1 x common assault; 1 x summary offence). The offender was later arrested regarding drink driving matters (summary offences).
Decision and reasoning: The sentencing judge considered a range of factors including the plea of guilty, the issue of possible deportation (the offender was from New Zealand) and the fact that the offender had completed programs while in custody. The total effective sentence ordered was 61 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 40 months' imprisonment. Judge Lauritsen discusses research about the effectiveness of domestic violence perpetrator programs observing that some research ‘shows the effectiveness of such programmes in changing behaviour’ [79] –[80].
Judge Lauritsen observes: ‘The kidnapping is a particularly nasty aspect of those events, accompanied as it was with distinct assaults upon her. Rendering her phone unworkable and your statement which was reasonably interpreted by your wife as threatening to kill her.’ [54]
DPP v Lee [2023] VCC 2008 (02 November 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘text messages’ – ‘contravening a protection order’ – ‘bail’
Charges: 11 x persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order, 3 x common law assault; 1 x criminal damage; 2 x committing an offence on bail; 1 x trespass.
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The offender pleaded guilty to all offences. There were two victims. The offender had previously been in a defacto relationship with the primary victim and had a child with her. The offender was the respondent to a final intervention order with the primary victim the protected person. The secondary victim was the primary victim’s current partner. Around 2am on day of offending the offender went to the primary victim’s home and broke a glass window (criminal damage) and climbed through (trespass). The offender headbutted the secondary victim (assault). The primary victim called police and they attended and arrested the offender. A search of the offender’s mobile phone revealed that he had sent the victim 2,110 text messages on one occasion; 435 text messages on another and made 59 calls to her in breach of the intervention order. Further interviews with the primary victim revealed his attendances at the primary victim’s home (persistent contraventions of a family violence intervention order).
Decision and reasoning: Blair J took into account the offender’s pleas of guilty and his remorse, the gravity of the offending and the family violence context in which the offending occurred, the offender’s mental impairments, and the offender’s own history of abuse. Blair J placed the offender on a Community Correction Order for a period of 16 months with various conditions.
[The primary victim and those she] ‘chose to have at her home, were entitled to feel safe and secure. Your offending occurred late at night, where you were not welcome at the address. Further, you assaulted … and frightened [the primary and secondary victims] … and no doubt your daughter … also.’
Although your breaches of intervention order were persistent, protracted and occurred over the better part of a year, I consider them to have occurred in the context of the breakdown and attempted reconciliation with your former partner…. Further, I accept that at the time of the offending … you were at a particularly low ebb in your life having attempted suicide approximately one month prior.’
DPP v Chirnside [2023] VCC 1221 (29 June 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘text messages’ – ‘emotionnal and psychological abuse’ – ‘bail ’ – ‘contravene protection order’
Charges: 2 x attempt to pervert the course of justice; 1 x threat to kill; 1 x common assault; 2 x contravene a family violence intervention order intending to cause harm or fear for safety; 2 x persistent contravention of a family violence intervention order
AND
3 x unlawful assault; 2 x contravention of a family violence intervention order which has a two year maximum penalty; 4 x commit an indictable offence on bail; 1 x contravening a condition of bail
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The charges arise out of a nine-month relationship the offender had with the victim. On various occasions the offender verbally abused and threw things at the victim and assaulted her. The victim obtained an intervention order. The offender sent text messages to the victim telling her to ‘tell them to drop the order’ and to lie to her lawyer [22]- [24]. He subjected her to a ‘barrage of obscene and derogatory verbal abuse and abusive conduct in person and via text’ [29]
Decision and reasoning:
Judge Hassan considered early plea total effective sentence: 18 months’ imprisonment in combination with a two year community correction order [99]. (The sentences are set out from [93]). The judge commented:
‘You subjected [the victim] to behaviour which was relentless, oppressive, degrading, threatening and at times involved physical violence. Your conduct must have worn her down and left her feeling helpless and frightened. You paid scant regard for orders and on two occasions manipulated [the victim] in an attempt to get her to withdraw complaints to police against you… While I accept the submission made by your counsel that this is not a case of family violence involving a high level of violence, and the attempt to pervert the course of justice charges do not involve threats or acts of overt intimidation, nevertheless your abuse of [the victim] is objectively serious offending and your moral culpability is high.’ [84]-[86]
DPP v Forrest (a pseudonym) [2023] VCC 2172 (22 November 2023) – Victorian County Court
‘coercive control’ – ‘strangulation’ – ‘economic and financial abuse ’ – ‘following, harassing and monitoring’
Charges: 10 x common law assault; 1 x threat to kill; 1 x stalking
Proceedings: Sentence.
Facts: The offender and victim began living together in an intimate relationship in 2008. Initially the offender gave many gifts to the victim but then began to control and manipulate her, behaving aggressively and ultimately isolating her from her friends and family. From 2011 the offender began pulling the victim’s hair, ripping some out. The offender and victim had a baby in 2012 and a second child in 2017. The victim began to run a business, but the offender took over, the offender made threats about the business and made the victim write out lines saying she was an idiot and needed to behave [10]. In 20212 the offender and victim married. The offender made the victim sleep in the laundry locking her out of the house. Specific assaults the subject of the offences are explained at [16] –[24] but involved hitting, kicking and punching her, dragging her by the hair, various threats, grabbing her around the neck [25] and numerous calls. She obtained an intervention order. After separating the offender monitored the activities of the victim and accessed her bank statements.
Decision and reasoning:
Individual sentences set out at a [186]; total effective sentence of 5 years and 2 months' imprisonment, and to serve 2 years 10 months before becoming eligible for parole. [188]
Judge Cannon observed: ‘your offending is serious and deserves a punishment which is just in all of the relevant circumstances. Your conduct must be firmly denounced. Your behaviour towards the complainant was monstrous and repugnant. You assaulted her on 10 separate occasions over a prolonged period of time in the context of a controlling and abusive relationship where you appear to have behaved in any way you wished at a whim. In saying this, I make it clear that you are only to be sentenced for the offences on the indictment rather than in relation to the contextual information, but that contextual information is relevant.’ [93]
Judge Cannon quotes from the victim impact statement: ‘She said that by the time she had fled you, she felt like she had no identity at all, and she continued to struggle in finding out who she was. She spoke of you devaluing her as a person and that the effects on her broken confidence and self-belief continued to permeate her daily life and interactions with others. She said that she would never know whether you would be Dr Jekyll or Mr Hyde from one day to the next, and that she felt she had to behave in a way that would protect herself from your violence. She continued to be hypervigilant because of this. She said that your actions had left lifelong scars on her mental and emotional wellbeing, stripping her of her confidence and ability to function on a day-to-day basis, questioning all that she said and did because she never felt she was worthy as a person …She spoke of her sense of isolation because of your offending and control over her….’ [114]-[118]
DPP v Buck [2021] VCC 759 (11 June 2021) – Victorian County Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Weapons and threats to kill’
Charges: Criminal damage; Common assault; Conduct endangering serious injury; Intentionally cause injury; Threat to kill; Trespass; Indictment offence on bail; Persistent Breach of Family Violence Intervention Order.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender and female victim had been in a relationship for approximately four months. The offender ripped her clothes off and hit the back of her head with a hair dryer multiple times. He punched her five or six times to the face, and stomped on her head and chest several times. He strangledher, threatening to kill her, and she felt unable to breathe. At one point, the offender chased the victim into the street and threatened to kill her while brandishing a knife. He also caused property damage and assaulted the victim’s housemate (who tried to intervene). The victim’s children were present at the time of the offending. The victim sustained many injuries, including exposing her bone and skull. A Family Violence Intervention Order was imposed and, despite the order, the offender telephoned the victim from custody on 12 occasions, but desisted once the victim told him to stop.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A sentence of 3 years 5 months imprisonment with a non-parole period 2 years was imposed.
Assessed in the context of an intimate relationship, this was a reasonably serious example of causing intentional injury for the following reasons:
•
It was an assault on the offender’s partner who was entitled to his care.
•
The offending occurred in the victim’s home, where she should have felt safe.
•
The offender used a household item as a weapon, hitting the victim to her head repeatedly to a point where she was feeling dizzy. The victim said she felt unable to stand up, had blood in her eyes and her head was throbbing. The physical injury to her head was a result of those repeated strikes. The offender continued to assault her, despite her state and her pleading with him to stop.
•
The assault was protracted, moving between various rooms in the house, out onto the street and back into the house.
•
The acts of violence against the offender’s partner “were not only physically violent, resulting in her injuries, but they were degrading, including stripping her naked. One neighbour refers to her running naked in the street, bloodied and bruised.”
•
As part of the episode, the offender choked her. The victim described feeling unable to breathe and wondering whether she would be able to do so again. There were marks around her neck from that part of this event. During that event, he made the threat to kill her which must have been terrifying given the context of that threat. He later made a threat when brandishing a knife.
•
The offender continued to attack the victim, despite the intervention of the victim’s housemate.
•
The acts occurred in the presence and hearing of the victim’s children, which was most disturbing. As his Honour noted: “The fact that a 12 year old had to call police because you were violently assaulting her mother is reprehensible. [The victim’s] daughter was extremely courageous and showed wisdom beyond her years in doing what she could to try and get police to the scene.”
•
The offender’s assault on the victim’s housemate demonstrated the offender’s level of aggression.
•
“Despite the fact I have not received a victim impact statement, I can well anticipate that Ms Brewer suffered distress, humiliation and fear during this offending, and that she is likely to have experienced some ongoing trauma as a result. Those matters would only be exacerbated in my view, by the presence of her two daughters and her feelings of concern for them.”
The principles from Bugmy v The Queen were applicable in this case (disadvantage and events during his formative years) and somewhat reduced the offender’s moral culpability. He pleaded guilty. There was an intervention order protecting the victim and the offender had shown no desire to try and contact her now.
DPP v Vickers (a pseudonym) [2021] VCC 445 (16 April 2021) – Victorian County Court
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Detention for a sexual purpose’ – ‘Low cognitive functioning’ – ‘Moral culpability’ – ‘Objective seriousness’ – ‘Offender in relationship with victim from under the age of 16’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Suicide threat’ – ‘Young people’
Charges: Rape (rolled up charge, 3 separate incidents) x 1; Detention for a sexual purpose x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male offender was 23 years old at the time of the offending and the female victim, his partner, was 32 years old. The offender had been groomed by the victim since he was a child, with sexual and then de facto marital relationship commencing when he was a child.
Issues: Sentence to be imposed.
Decision and reasoning: A total effective sentence of 6 years and 9 months was imposed, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months.
The court noted the seriousness of rape as an offence. The objective gravity of the offender’s offending (as rolled-up charges) was high.
The court noted at [41] that: “This case is an example of controlling and violent conduct borne out of an inability to accept and negotiate the end of the relationship – culminating in the heinous and devastating offence of rape. It is reprehensible conduct of the highest order and must be deterred and denounced.” And at [42]: “The impact upon the victim also needs to be given proper weight in the exercise of my sentencing discretion. Your victim states that she has had suicidal thoughts, has been diagnosed with anxiety, depression and PTSD, and is having counselling. The offending has also impacted the children, who are anxious and withdrawn.”
Age disparity between the offender and victim alone would have had limited impact in assessing the circumstances of the offending and offender’s moral culpability. But, in combination with the following factors, the circumstances of the relationship were more significant:
•
The offender was diagnosed with ADHD in Grade 3;
•
He had difficulties at school and is dyslexic;
•
He suffers hearing impairment, requiring hearing aids;
•
He has low intellectual functioning;
•
He became a father when he was a child and by 20 was working to support a house of three children;
•
To some degree, the offender was subject to some manipulation/control in the form of managing his medication and access to hearing aids, particularly leading up to the offending;
•
The relationship was his first sexual relationship. It was his “only experience of a relationship and your attitudes and strategies for dealing with conflict have been shaped within a relationship that commenced when you were a child.”
The offender required specific deterrence, treatment and programs to ensure he did not repeat this offending. Denunciation and general deterrence were also important sentencing considerations: “All potential perpetrators who may feel aggrieved within a domestic relationship and who lack the skills, intelligence, maturity and emotional control to relate to a partner or ex-partner in anything other than a violent and controlling way – must be deterred” at [55].
DPP v Senior (a pseudonym) [2020] VCC 1380 (2 September 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Arson’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Contravention of a DFV protection order x 1; Arson x 1.
Proceedings: Sentencing.
Facts: The male perpetrator plead guilty to breach of a protection order by threatening to kill his female former partner and arson. After an argument the offender called his former partner and threatened to ‘come to her house and blow her and her family up’. He entered her home, and despite his father’s atempts to calm him, threw thinner over the couch and lounge room floor, stating he would burn the house down with his former partner in it. Some of the thinner (accidentally) caught fire on the gas heater causing an explosion. The offender and his father escaped the fire; however, the house was destroyed.
Issues: Sentencing.
Decision and reasoning: Sentenced to time served, followed by a community corrections order for 12 months with conditions designed to continue rehabilitation by way of supervision, mental health and programs to reduce reoffending.
[16] You are fortunate that your vile threats of harm did not cause further injury or damage to your son and his mother. Arson is a very serious offence. In the circumstances of this case, you allowed your rage and anger to get the better of you in a situation in which you recklessly used an accelerant which you well knew and believed would probably result in damage or destruction to property. It is important in your case, as the learned prosecutor made clear very fairly during the course of the plea, that two factors need to be recognised.
[17] The first is that this was not a case in which you burnt down a property either to damage it intentionally or to prevent or deny another its enjoyment or ownership, and that having properly classified and understood the modus in which the fire started in a seemingly accidental way which nevertheless carries the inference of intention, and secondly, that your intention at the time was to hurt yourself by fire, even endangering your own father; intent which should be also noted you put into effect, not by arming yourself with an accelerant fuel but because your work made it available to you through a thinner which you already had available to you.
[18] The circumstances significantly reduce in my view the gravity of the offending and your moral culpability. You have, by your plea, accepted responsibility legally and I accept you are remorseful for your actions.
DPP v Jenkins [2020] VCC 749 (4 June 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Covid-19 pandemic’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Guilty plea at commencement of trial’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Lengthy procedural history’ – ‘Obsessive and controlling behaviour’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Persistent offending’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rape’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Sex offender registration’ – ‘Significant criminal history’ – ‘Stalking’
Charges: 11 charges, including rape x 2; destroying or damaging property x 1; causing injury intentionally or recklessly x 1; threats to kill x 3; assault x 3; stalking x 1
Case type: Sentence
Facts: The majority of offending was committed against Ms Burgess (the victim), with whom the male accused was in an intimate relationship ([12]). Their relationship was marred by excessive drug and alcohol consumption, physical and sexual violence and stalking. The accused regularly argued with the victim about his paranoid suspicions concerning her infidelity ([13]). The controlling and obsessive behaviour became more severe over time. On one occasion, the victim threatened to stab him before self-harming, demonstrating the level of stress she was suffering at the time ([17]). The accused’s controlling behaviour continued. He checked her emails and social media accounts, accessed her phone without permission and tracked her location. He also broke her phone after she refused to give it to him ([18]-[20]).
On 5 October 2017, he raped ([23]-[24]) and physically abused the victim ([25], [27]) and threatened to cut her throat ([26]). A week later, he pushed the victim to the ground after she had told him that their relationship was over and demanded him to leave the premises ([29]). After this incident, the accused was arrested, and released on bail with conditions prohibiting contact with the victim ([30]). Despite this order, he continued to text and ring the victim, track her location and loiter near her home. One evening, the victim allowed the accused to enter her house, where he accused her of sleeping with other people, physically assaulted her and grabbed her phone ([34]-[40]). The accused continued to contact the victim, causing further distress and fear, and later threatened to cut the victim’s and a police officer’s throat ([41]-[43]).
There was a significant delay in resolving the matter, and the accused was unrepresented for most of the proceeding, including the plea hearing. His guilty pleas were entered at the commencement of trial ([51]-[52]). The Court held that "the fairest and most appropriate course" was to ensure that he was not punished for adopting a "somewhat uncooperative approach" ([56]), and that his guilty pleas still entitled him to a sizeable reduction in sentence ([57]).
Held: The accused’s personal circumstances and criminal history are discussed at paragraphs [58] to [75]. He abused alcohol and drugs from an early age, and had previously seen doctors for drug dependency, depression, drug psychosis and attempted suicides. Although he had suffered numerous head injuries, a neuropsychologist concluded that he did not have an acquired brain injury ([64]-[65]). He also has a significant criminal history, including past convictions for recklessly causing injury, indecent assault, contravening a family violence intervention order, and making threats to kill ([69]-[70]). He has also been convicted of a number of offences against former intimate partners and has breached a family violence safety notice on several occasions ([71]-[73]).
The Court found that the accused’s conduct was "absolutely appalling". He had "gained [the victim’s] trust and formed an intimate relationship with her only to go on to degrade and demean her at the whim of [his] paranoid obsessions". The rape, assaults and threats to kill demonstrated the kind of behaviour to which she was subject for the duration of their relationship ([85]). The rape was particularly serious, because it was committed in the context of an initially trusting and intimate relationship, and involved the use of force and violence ([86]). The charge of stalking was also serious as the accused went to great lengths to control and abuse the victim in a "pathologically unfeeling" manner. He also knowingly disregarded court orders intended to protect the victim from his conduct ([87]). The Court assessed his moral culpability for the offending as "very high", and accepted the prosecutor’s submission that the physical and sexual violence he inflicted on his partner requires just punishment and strong denunciation ([88]). Further, the accused had prior convictions, indicating a tendency to treat intimate partners violently ([89]). The accused appeared to have some "incipient insight" into his conduct and the necessary steps to address his drug problem and attitude towards women ([92]). Whilst he apologised for his behaviour, the Court did not place a great deal of weight on that assertion as there was no evidence that indicated that he was genuinely remorseful for the harm caused to the victim. The Court was also not confident of his prospects for rehabilitation, but took into account that any sentence imposed must not be crushing ([93]).
Consequently, the Court granted the Crown’s application to have the accused report under the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 for the "rest of [his] life" as he poses a real risk to the sexual safety of women ([95]-[101]). He was convicted of all charges (except one count of rape), and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years ([115]).
Director of Public Prosecutions v Linton [2020] VCC 515 (28 April 2020) – Victorian County Court
‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘History as victim of family and domestic violence as child’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Substance misuse’ – ‘Verdins principles’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Recklessly causing serious injury x 1; Possessing drug of dependence x 1
Proceedings: Sentencing
Facts: The female offender and male victim had been in a relationship that ended six months prior to the offending, but had started spending time together one to two months before the offending. One night, the offender picked up the victim from a pub and they visited the victim’s cousin’s house where they played pool and used drugs. The offender and the victim left around 2am and returned to the offender’s bungalow where an argument broke out. The offender stabbed the victim on the left side of his chest with a pair of scissors. The victim left the bungalow and called emergency services. The offender sent text messages to the victim asking him if he was alright, but the focus of the messages was very much on the offender’s own needs. The victim suffered a left haemopneumothorax, haemopericardium, a punctured lung and fluid overload, and was admitted to the ICU. The victim initially attempted to protect the offender by not telling police she was the one who caused the injuries, and the offender feigned ignorance when questioned by police, but later the victim told police what had really happened.
Judgment: The sentencing judge ordered that the offender be placed on a community corrections order for three years during which the offender was to complete 300 hours of community work and participate in rehabilitation programs for drug use and mental health issues. The judge also ordered that the offender be subject to judicial monitoring. Her Honour held that "a community corrections order can be punitive, achieve deterrence, and may be suitable even in cases of relatively serious offences such as this, which might have previously attracted a medium term of imprisonment" [72].
Her Honour held that the offender "committed a serious criminal offence with serious consequences" for the victim by inflicting an injury when the victim "had little, if any, chance to know what was happening", using a hidden weapon [19]. However, her Honour accepted that the act was impulsive, without premeditation, and that the actual consequences of the attack were "probably unintended" [20].
Her Honour emphasised the need to give significant weight to general deterrence, as the offence was committed in a domestic violence setting [21]. However, she noted several factors that impacted on the weight to be given to general deterrence in this case. Specifically, the offender’s young age, the offender suffered physical and emotional abuse from her former stepfather (and witnessed her mother being subjected to this too) and older brother, the offender abused drugs, the offender had an unstable and volatile upbringing, and the offender had a long history of mental health issues. Her Honour accepted that the offender had committed to positive change and had engaged in a variety of alcohol and drug treatment programs. She also accepted that the offender had personality difficulties which, when combined with her use of ice and other drugs, resulted in difficulty thinking clearly and rationally and impaired her judgment at the time of the offence [43]. Her Honour accepted that there was therefore a basis for limited reduction to moral culpability for the offences [44].
Her Honour somewhat applied limbs 5 and 6 of the decision in R v Verdins & Ors [2007] QSCA 102. Limb 5 refers to the existence of a condition at the date of sentencing which may mean that a given sentence would weigh more heavily on an offender than a person in normal health. Limb 6 refers to a serious risk of the imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on mental health. The judge noted the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the offender if she were to be imprisoned, particularly in light of her mental health issues and her strong family support base (which she would be unable to access if imprisoned).
Her Honour held that less weight needed to be given to specific deterrence and protecting the community from the offender because of her lack of criminal history. A discount was given to recognise the utilitarian benefit of the offender’s early guilty plea.
Magistrates' Court
DPP v Cope (a pseudonym) [2021] VMC 014 (17 September 2021) – Magistrates’ Court of Victoria
‘Honest and reasonable mistake of fact’ – ‘Mens rea’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Statutory interpretation’
Charges: Contravention of family violence intervention order x 1.
Proceedings: Judgement.
Issues: Whether section 123(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (‘the Act’) was a strict liability offence.
Facts: The accused was charged with beaching a family violence intervention order, an offence pursuant to s 123(2) (‘the offence’) of the Act, by being within 200m of the victim’s workplace. Magistrate Foster accepted that the address was unknown to the accused and not specified by the order. However, the prosecution argued that proof of mens rea was not required, because s 123(2) was an offence of strict liability. The prosecution also argued that the accused had not made out the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact.
Decision and Reasoning: The charges were dismissed.
Applying He Kaw Teh v The Queen [1985] HCA 43; (1985) 157 CLR 523, Magistrate Foster found that the presumption of mens rea had not been displaced. The aggravated versions of the offence explicitly required proof of a mens rea element ([45]). Therefore, it would be inconsistent with the structure and operation of the act for the offence to be one of strict liability. All three offences carried considerable terms of imprisonment. His Honour highlighted that ‘a strong presumption exists that proof of mens rea is necessary where an offence carries serious sanctions’ [57]. ‘The serious nature of… family violence and… serious consequences for all three… offences strongly suggests that the presumption of mens rea has not been displaced’ [48]. Furthermore, the absence of a mens rea element would not assist with the enforcement of the offence (see [59]). It would be counter intuitive and ‘contrary… to the spirit of the act’ [71] to require the accused to take steps to remain aware of the details of victim’s workplace, which was not specified by the order. His Honour found that it was not necessary to address whether the accused had proven the defence of mistaken fact, but explained that the defence would have been established due to evidence that the accused had no reason to believe that the victim worked within 200ms of the café (see [82]-[84] and [97]).
Civil and Administrative Tribunal
ZHC v Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal (Review and Regulation) (Corrected) [2022] VCAT 333 (30 March 2022) – Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
‘Administrative review’ – ‘Application for assistance’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Decision not to pursue charges’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘People affected by trauma’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Pregnant victim’ – ‘Reasonable assistance’ – ‘Reasonable time’ – ‘Special circumstances’ – ‘Threats to kill’ – ‘Victims of crime assistance act 1996’
Proceedings: Review of decision to strike out the victim’s application for assistance pursuant to section 52 of the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (‘the VOCA Act’).
Issue: Was the act of violence reported within a reasonable time?
Facts: Under Section 52 of the VOCA Act, an award of assistance must be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that an act of violence was not reported to police within a reasonable time, or that the applicant failed to provide reasonable assistance to investigators. The section does not apply if the Tribunal considers a delay in reporting, or lack of assistance, to be the result of the applicant’s ‘special circumstances’ [3]. In May 2021, the victim’s application was refused on the basis that she had failed to report acts of violence by her former partner within a reasonable time. While the victim had reported a protection order breach in December 2020, materials provided to the Tribunal alleged a history of family violence commencing in 2016 [4].
Decision and reasoning: The Tribunal was not satisfied that the victim’s application ought to be refused under section 52 of the VOCA Act. The Tribunal found that the acts of violence were reported to police within a reasonable time. The Tribunal highlighted paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of section 53 of the VOCA Act, which provide that in considering whether an act of violence was reported within a reasonable time, the Tribunal may consider:
(c) ‘whether the person who… is alleged to have committed, the act of violence was in a position of power, influence or trust in relation to the victim’
(d) whether the victim was threatened or intimidated by the person who… is alleged to have committed, the act of violence’
(e) ‘the nature of the injury alleged to have been suffered by the victim’ [12]-[14].
Considering paragraph (c), the Tribunal noted that the victim’s former partner exerted power and influence her through acts of physical violence, which escalated during her pregnancy, and by controlling her finances. Considering paragraph (d), the victim felt intimidated and threatened by her former partner. This was evidenced by a protection order application, and evidence that the victim’s former partner had made threats to harm or kill the victim or their child if she left the relationship. Considering paragraph (e), the victim sustained serious physical injuries due to her former partner’s assaults, including cuts, broken teeth, and post-traumatic stress disorder [15]-[19].
The Tribunal was not required to consider whether the victim had provided ‘reasonable assistance’, or whether ‘special circumstances’ existed. However, the Tribunal explained that a decision not to pursue charges or provide a statement to assist police to arrest, investigate or prosecute does not amount to a failure to provide reasonable assistance [30]-[31].
Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the facts exemplified ‘special circumstances’ [43]. Due to the nature of the violence perpetrated against the victim, the fact that the couple lived together, and the applicant’s repeated contravention of protection orders, the victim was unlikely to make immediate reports to police [44]. Rather, the victim prioritised ‘more effective mechanisms that would keep her safe’, such as a protection order [45]-[48].
Western Australia
Court of Appeal
Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 8 (15 January 2025) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Guilty pleas’ – ‘ Relevance of forensic prejudice’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate discounts’ – ‘ Aggregate sentence reflecting overall criminality’
Proceedings: appeal against sentence.
Charges: Persistently engage in family violence (x1), aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm in a family relationship (x2), act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety (x3), be armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear (x1).
Facts: The appellant and the victim were in a relationship from 2014 to 2020. During their relationship, the complainant and her children lived between the appellant’s farm and a house in Geraldton.
In relation to count 1 (persistently engage in family violence), the appellant committed six incidents of family violence against the complainant between 26 March 2015 and 1 November 2020. The violence involved punching, pushing, dragging, hitting the complainant with an implement (spatula), and grabbing her by the throat.
In relation to counts 2 and 3 (aggravated assaults occasioning actual bodily harm), count 2 involved the appellant pressing a working drill spindle into the complainant’s back, causing a burn. Count 3 involved the appellant elbowing the complainant to the face, causing a swollen, bruised eye.
In relation to count 4 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety), the appellant pushed the complainant to the chest, causing her to fall to the ground. He then jumped onto her, straddled her chest and used both hands to squeeze her throat. The complainant struggled to breathe and lost consciousness.
In relation to count 5 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, life, health or safety), the appellant threw a glass tumbler at the complainant’s face, causing numerous cuts. The complainant suffered swelling and severe pain, which continued afterwards when trying to eat.
In relation to count 6 (act of being armed with a dangerous weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear), the appellant and the complainant had been arguing. During the argument, the appellant picked up a shotgun and cocked it. The appellant then dry-fired the gun while pointing it away from the complainant.
In relation to count 7 (act endangering, or likely to endanger, health, life or safety), the complainant was walking to the kitchen when the appellant pushed her to the floor. She landed face down. The appellant at on her back, straddling her. He then grabbed her hair and used it to slam her head onto the ground. She managed to escape and ran to her car.
Grounds of appeal: The appellant relied on three grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant’s pleas to counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 were not entered at the first reasonable opportunity, by failing to take into account the existence of relevant forensic prejudice to the appellant had he pleaded guilty or indicated a plea of guilty any earlier.
2.
The discount afforded by the sentencing judge under s 9AA(2) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) to each of counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 76 was manifestly inadequate.
3.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing an aggregate sentence that did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant’s conduct having regard to all relevant circumstances including those referable to the appellant personally.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1 was dismissed on the basis that an offender will not act reasonably (within the concept of “first reasonable opportunity” to plead guilty in s 9AA) in delaying the entry or indication of a plea of guilty to a charged offence if the object/effect of the delay is to secure a forensic advantage/to avoid a forensic disadvantage in relation to other charged offences [81]. Leave to appeal on ground 1 was dismissed.
Ground 2 was also dismissed. While the Court acknowledged that there were utilitarian benefits to the state, the complainant and other witnesses [93]. The appellant had initially pleaded not guilty with the case being listed for a 5-day trial. It was on the first day of the trial that the appellant pleaded guilty. At that point, witnesses had been summonsed, and some had already travelled to Geraldton to give evidence. The complainant had suffered anxiety and uncertainty preparing to give evidence [95]. The primary judge gave rational and coherent reasons for the discounts he allowed for the guilty pleas in relation to counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. Leave to appeal on ground 2 was refused [97].
Ground 3 was also dismissed. The Court noted that the legal principles applicable to a claim that an aggregate sentence breaches the totality principle are well known and are summarised in Kabambi v Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 at [21], [192]. The Court found that having regard to the maximum penalties, the circumstances of the offences, the appellant’s personal circumstances and the limited assistance provided by comparable cases, it was not reasonably arguable that the total effective sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust [206].
Purmah v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 88 (31 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Image-based abuse’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Online relationship’ – ‘ sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘ coercive control’
Case type: appeal against sentence
Charges: making a threat with intent to compel the complainant to do an act that she was lawfully entitled to abstain from doing (x3)
Facts: In 2017, the appellant was a 27-year-old Mauritian citizen studying in Perth on a student visa. The complainant was a 22-year-old woman residing in Mauritius. In May 2016, the pair commenced an online relationship.
At the appellant's request, the complainant provided nude photographs of herself. When the relationship broke down, the appellant threatened to send the photographs to her family and friends and publish them more broadly unless she complied with his demands. Those demands included that she completes his university assignments, that she gives him money when she did any work and that she not bring any legal proceedings against him.
Threats were made on three occasions via WhatsApp and email between May and June 2018. He also sent messages urging the complainant to commit suicide and falsely made it appear the images had been posted online. He was arrested in 2019, denied knowing the complainant and pleaded not guilty at trial. He was convicted after trial and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment on each count (concurrent), with eligibility for parole.
Ground of appeal
1.
The individual sentences (on each count) were manifestly excessive having regard to the circumstances of the offense and the personal circumstances of the appellant.
2.
The Judge overlooked or made a mistake about the appellant’s personal circumstances
3.
Other sentences were reasonably open such as a suspended sentence.
Decision: The Court (Miocevich DCJ) refused the application to extend time, refused leave to appeal on all grounds and dismissed the appeal.
Reasoning:
Ground 2 (Error regarding remorse and hardship): The Court held that it is plainly not the case that the sentencing judge overlooked the appellant's letter or the contents of the pre‑sentence report. His Honour referred to both of those documents in some detail. There was no failure on the part of the sentencing judge to understand the purport of those documents. Nor is there any reason to think that he failed to take them into account and give them such weight as he considered appropriate [40]. It was plainly open to the sentencing judge to come to the conclusion that notwithstanding the appellant's expressions of remorse in the letter, he was not genuinely remorseful [41]. While the appellant expressed regret, the judge found his remorse was not genuine due to ongoing victim-blaming and contradictory claims [41]. The judge also did not overlook the reference to potential hardship in custody but correctly concluded it did not warrant a different sentence [43]. The Court held there was no merit in ground 2 [44].
Ground 1 (Manifestly excessive sentence):
The Court held there was no merit in the claim that the sentence was manifestly excessive [58]. The offending in this case was serious because it involved the making of threats to effectively destroy the reputation of the complainant if she did not do things that the appellant wanted her to do [47]. Although the images were not distributed, the appellant falsely suggested they had been, and he urged the complainant to commit suicide, causing significant psychological harm [48]. The offending was not isolated but part of a pattern of abuse within a coercive relationship [49].
The appellant provided no comparable cases, and although Singh v The Queen was cited, it was distinguished as it involved a different offence with a lesser maximum penalty (5 years cf 7 years), a guilty plea and actual distribution of images [53]–[56]. Given the maximum penalty, seriousness of the offending, and lack of mitigating factors, the 18-month sentence was well within range and not plainly unjust or unreasonable [57].
Ground 3 (Suspended sentence not considered):
The Court rejected the claim that the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a suspended sentence [62]. Per the sentencing principles set out in div 1 of pt 2 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), a sentencing judge must be positively satisfied that immediate imprisonment is appropriate, having considered all relevant sentencing principles [59]. While different sentencing outcomes may be open in borderline cases, the discretion to refuse suspension is not limited to rehabilitation. it can be based on the objective seriousness of the offence [59]. Here, the seriousness of the offences, the repeated nature of the threats and the lack of any real mitigating factors, justified that conclusion that a suspended sentence was inappropriate [61]. The Court confirmed that the judge’s discretion was properly exercised and the sentence was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust.
Clinch v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 92 (31 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Family violence restraining order’ – ‘ Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘ Whether sentencing judge had erred in characterising offending as ‘prolonged’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Jealousy’
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal sentence.
Charges: Aggravated home burglary x1
Facts: The applicant arrived at the home of the complainant, his former partner, who had previously had a family violence restraining order against him. He was angry and yelling because he believed that the complainant was seeing another man. The complainant locked the front door, but the applicant entered the house forcibly by kicking in another door. He demanded that the complainant produce the man he believed was there. He then assaulted the complainant by grabbing her around the jaw and squeezing hard, pushing her against a door, punching her on her arm, torso and shoulder, throwing his car keys at her, and hitting her on the shoulder. The complainant called the police, but the applicant left before they arrived [1].
Grounds of appeal: The applicant relied upon two grounds of appeal [32]. The first ground alleged that the sentencing judge had made an error of fact in finding that the applicant had committed a prolonged and persistent series of assaults. The second ground alleged that the sentence of 4 years imprisonment was manifestly excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused, and the appeal was dismissed [50].
Regarding the first ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal accepted that on a fair reading of the sentencing judge’s remarks, her Honour characterised the applicant’s violence against the complainant as ‘prolonged’ [38]. In doing so, the sentencing judge had compared the violence to a ‘one-off momentary slap’ [37]. The Court did not find that the sentencing judge made the alleged error (characterising the violence as ‘prolonged’ when it had not been), but even if she had, the Court would not grant the appeal, as it was not reasonably arguable that the Court should impose a different sentence if it were to re-exercise the sentencing discretion [39].
Regarding the second ground of appeal, the Court found that having regard to the maximum penalty for the offence (20 years’ imprisonment), the seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances of the applicant and sentences imposed in comparable cases (of which the Court cited many), it was not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment was plainly unreasonable or unjust [49].
The State of Western Australia v Winch [2024] WASCA 79 (3 July 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Protection order’ – ‘ Persistently engaging in domestic violence’
Case type: State appeal against sentence.
Charges: Persistently engaging in family violence (x1).
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: Over an eight-year period (2011-2019), the respondent repeatedly assaulted and threatened his wife in the context of a long-term marriage. The violence occurred regularly, especially when the respondent was intoxicated. Generally, the respondent would apologise to the victim the next day and he would tell her it would never happen again. The abuse included physical assaults, verbal abuse, threats to kill, property damage and controlling behaviour.
The offending included:
•
Common assault (2012): Threw a meat pie in the victim’s face.
•
Threat to kill (2013): Held a kitchen knife to the victim’s throat, stating she no longer had a choice whether she lived.
•
Threat to harm & property damage (2013): Spat at the victim, smashed photos and her phone, locked the door and paced while holding an axe.
•
Threat to kill with speargun (2014): Pointed a speargun at the victim, said he would kill her and then himself.
•
Previously charged offending (2015): Punched the victim while she was recovering from surgery and swung a coffee table at her.
•
Assault occasioning bodily harm (‘AOBH’) (2017): Forcefully grabbed the victim’s arm, causing bruising.
•
Act likely to endanger and common assault (2019): Told the victim there would be “murders” if she left him, then strangled her and said he would slit her throat and smear her blood on the wall.
•
Common assault and act likely to endanger (2019): Struck the victim with a sandal and berated her.
Police were called on multiple occasions. The respondent was subject to violence restraining orders, which were repeatedly breached. Despite some reconciliations, the abuse persisted until the final separation in late 2019.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
Error of fact: Sentencing judge wrongly found that custody would be more onerous due to alcohol detoxification.
2.
Manifestly inadequate sentence: Disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence, personal circumstances, and deterrence purposes.
Decision: The Court (Mitchell, Hall and Vandongen JJA) allowed the appeal and set the sentence aside. The respondent was resentenced to 5 years and 8 months' imprisonment, backdated to 31 January 2024, with parole eligibility.
Reasoning:
Ground 2 (Manifestly inadequate):
The Court held that the sentence of 2 years and 3 months was manifestly inadequate, given the seriousness of the offence and the limited mitigation [116]–[117].
Section 300 of the Criminal Code (WA) reflects Parliament’s serious view of persistent family violence, with a maximum penalty of 14 years [95]; [116]. The offending spanned eight years, involved verbal and physical abuse, strangulation, and threats with weapons including a knife, axe and speargun [98]–[101].
The abuse followed a cyclical pattern, with episodes of violence followed by apologies and reconciliation [99]. Some of the acts of family violence that were specifically relied on by the State were extremely serious [100]. Although it is true that the victim did not suffer from any very serious physical injuries, this is to be expected given the limited range of acts of family violence that can constitute an offence contrary to s 300. Nevertheless, the victim experienced significant psychological harm [104]–[105]. The offending amounted to a gross breach of trust and the respondent did not change his ways even after earlier convictions and a restraining order [106]. The nature of many of the respondent’s acts of persistent family violence were such as to be likely to make it very difficult for the victim to leave the relationship. They appear to have been designed to make the victim terrified of the potential consequences of attempting to leave the respondent [107]. The only substantive mitigating factor was a 12% guilty plea discount, entered on the morning of trial [108]–[109]. The judge’s finding that detox in custody would be “more onerous” (than being in community) was noted, but even accepting that, the sentence remained manifestly inadequate [110]–[111]. The Court emphasised the need for general and specific deterrence in domestic violence sentencing [114]–[115].
The Court concluded the sentence failed to reflect the gravity of the offending and the limited mitigation. A significantly higher sentence should have been imposed. Ground 2 upheld [116]-[117].
Ground 1 (Error of fact):
The Court declined to determine Ground 1, as the appeal was allowed on Ground 2 and the Court proceeded to resentence the respondent independently of the alleged error [118].
MYB v State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 53 (13 May 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’
Charges: strangulation x 1; intent to cause bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence
Facts: The male appellant strangled the female complainant, his de factor partner of three years, in the presence of their 9 month old child. [12] This incident was followed by an onslaught of physical abuse, and threats to kill made towards the complainant, which was all committed in the presence of their child. [13]–[17] The male appellant pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. [5]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The sentence of five years’ imprisonment on count 2 (intent to cause bodily harm) was manifestly excessive individual sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
2.
The sentence on count 2 infringed the totality principle [7]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal dismissed. The Court (Mazza, MItchell and Vandongen JJA) dismissed ground one, holding the appellant’s submission to ‘substantially downplay the seriousness’ of their actions which involved ‘sustained and persistent violence’. [67] In reaching this conclusion, the Court’s emphasised the following aggravating features of the appellant’s actions: the acts were committed in the presence of the appellant’s child, the acts have and will continue to have severe psychological consequences on the complainant (and the child), and the acts included the particularly serious offence of strangulation:
Strangulation, which is commonly reported by women who have experienced domestic violence, can be distinguished from other forms of family and domestic violence on the basis that it often leaves very few marks or signs; even in cases where the strangulation was life-threatening. The fact that this type of offending is more likely to go undetected makes strangulation a particularly dangerous form of domestic violence, and recent studies have consistently shown that it is both a predictive risk factor for future severe domestic violence and a relatively common cause of domestic violence-related homicide [64]
The Court also dismissed ground two, finding the ground to have no merit. [94] The sentencing judge’s findings that the appellant ‘had not fully accepted responsibility for his conduct’ indicated a significant need for personal deterrence and denunciation. [95]
State of WA v Riley [2024] WASCA 11 (2 February 2024) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘ Totality principle’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Breach of protection order’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ History of domestic and family violence’
Charges: Aggravated threat to kill x 1; aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; aggravated deprivation of liberty x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 24-year-old male respondent had a ‘lengthy history of violent offending’ against the female complainant, his former partner and mother to his three children [7]. In 2021, the respondent was declared a ‘serial family violence offender’ as a consequence of this offending. In May 2022, the respondent was released from prison, after serving 10 months for breaching a protection order in which the complainant was a protected person [8].
Upon release, the respondent knowingly breached this order by attending the complainant’s home and demanding that she and the children come to his family home. When she refused, the respondent branded a knife, threatened to ‘kill’ the complainant and hit her (without rupturing her skin) ([12]–[14]). Their children were present during this exchange ([16]). The complainant complied with the demand and got into the car with her children. While parked at a petrol station to purchase alcohol, the respondent was arrested by police for breaching the prevention order ([19]–[20]). The respondent was sentenced to 2 years and 2 months’ immediate imprisonment [3].
Grounds of Appeal: The State appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
Each individual sentence was manifestly inadequate; and
2.
The total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle (ie, sentences be proportionate to the gravity of the offence).
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The Court (Buss P, Mazza and Hall JJA) resentenced the respondent to a total effective sentence of four years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
In relation to ground one, the Court held that original sentence did not properly reflect the numerous aggravating factors of the offending: the offending constituted breaches of a restraining order and was committed in ‘the presence of young children’ and in ‘the context of a family relationship’ [53]. Further, the respondent was ‘intoxicated, agitated and armed with a knife’ and ‘clearly intended to intimidate and terrify’ the complainant by threatening to kill her in the same manner as her father did her mother [54]–[55].
This case clearly required that significant weight be given to personal deterrence. The respondent has a deplorable history of offending against AB. He has shown disregard, if not frank contempt, for court orders put in place to protect AB. He is driven by a misplaced sense of entitlement that puts the continued safety of AB at real risk. That risk was confirmed by the assessment in the presentence report [66]
General deterrence also looms large in cases of this type. Domestic violence is a scourge on society. Awareness of this type of offending and concern to prevent it have grown markedly in recent years. Persistent violence and intimidation in the context of family relationships must be strongly discouraged by appropriate sentences [67]
Domestic violence can include physical injury, psychological injury and emotional trauma. It affects mainly women and children. In the present case, the respondent physically, psychologically and emotionally abused AB. The abuse occurred in the context of an obvious imbalance of power. The respondent's offending included behaviour that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control AB. Denunciation of the respondent's criminal conduct, in addition to personal and general deterrence, was an importance sentencing consideration [68]
With respect to ground two, the Court held that the original sentences were manifestly inadequate. Public interest in ‘maintaining appropriate sentencing standards’ for serious offending of the type committed by the respondent weighed strongly against the Court’s exercise of residual discretion (ie, discretion to not interfere with a primary judge’s exercise of sentencing discretion) ([76]; [79]).
State of WA v LSM [2023] WASCA 132 (1 September 2023) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘ Strangulation’ – ‘ Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘ Coercive control’ – ‘ Attempting to pervert the course of justice’
Charges: Deprivation of liberty x 1; threat to kill x2; aggressive sexual penetration without consent x 2; attempting to pervert the course of justice x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In October 2020, the male respondent subjected the female complainant, his wife, to ‘a prolonged episode of physical and sexual violence that demonstrated a complete disregard for her humanity’ [1]. During the complainant’s birthday celebrations, the respondent became jealous and accused the complainant of being unfaithful. The respondent forced the complainant into their car, drove dangerously and threatened to crash the car and kill them both [2]. The complainant escaped the car on two occasions and managed to contact emergency services before being forcibly pulled back in ([2]; [95]–[96]). Over the course of two hours at their apartment, the respondent deprived the complainant of her liberty, repeatedly raped and strangled her [3].
In November 2021, the respondent pleaded guilty to seven offences and sentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment [7].
Grounds of Appeal: The State appealed the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The sentencing judge erred in reducing the head sentence by 25% for the respondent’s pleas of guilty, which were not offered at the first reasonable opportunity;
2.
The individual sentences for the four offences of aggravated sexual penetration without consent were manifestly inadequate; and
3.
The total effective sentence failed to adequately reflect the overall criminality of the offenses [8]
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal allowed. The discount for the respondent’s pleas of guilty was reduced to 15% [31], and the total effective sentence increased to 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment [33].
In relation to ground one, Quinlan CJ, Buss P and Mazza JA observed that the respondent conceded that his pleas of guilty ‘were not made at the first reasonable opportunity’ ([10]; [52]; [127]).
In relation to ground two, Quinlan CJ held that ‘none’ of the individual sentences reflected the objective seriousness of the offences, nor the ‘actual violence’ of the respondent and his intention to ‘violate, hurt, demean and humiliate’ the complaint ([15]–[16]):
First, each offence was committed in circumstances of aggravation, being the familial relationship between the respondent and the victim … The circumstance of aggravation in this case reflects the recognition by the Parliament and the courts of the seriousness of the offences involving family violence, including by reason of the significant breach of trust and exploitation of vulnerability involved in such offending. These matters make clear the importance of general deterrence in sentencing for offences involving violence by men on vulnerable victims (mostly women) with whom they are in domestic relationships [14]
[T]he offences were accompanied by actual violence (beyond the violence inherent in the act of sexually penetrating a person without their consent), including the forceful nature of the penetration … and the respondent squeezing the victim’s neck and throat. As to the latter, the particular dangers associated with offences involving non-fatal strangulation and the role they play in cases of intimate and family violence are well recognised [16]
Finally, the offences were committed in the victim’s own home. Not only was the victim with a ‘person’ with whom she should have been safe (her husband), she was in a ‘place’ in which she was entitled to feel safe. The respondent betrayed her on both fronts [17]
President Buss similarly characterised the nature and quality of the respondent’s ‘violence’ as particularly ‘serious’:
Domestic and sexual violence can involve physical injury, sexual assault, psychological injury and emotional trauma. Domestic and sexual violence is a major concern in Australia. It affects mainly women and children. In the present case, the respondent physically, sexually, psychologically and emotionally abused F. The abuse occurred in the context of a patent imbalance of power. The respondent's offending included behaviour that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control F. Denunciation of the respondent's criminal conduct and personal and general deterrence were important sentencing considerations [59]
In relation to ground three, Quinlan CJ held that all of the offences ‘involved the coercive control by the respondent of his wife’, demonstrating a degree of criminality not captured by the original sentence [23].
This ‘pattern of abuse’ was also identified by Buss P as being inadequately reflected in the overall criminality of the respondent’s offences [71]. For Buss P, the respondent’s attempt to ‘manipulate’ the complainant into withdrawing her complaints was a ‘continuation of his abusive conduct’, as too ‘the physical abuse … the infliction of emotional trauma’ [70]–[71]:
All of those counts manifested behaviour by the respondent that was calculated to intimidate, coerce and control [the complainant] [71]
Justice of Appeal Mazza emphasised the domestic context in which the offending took place as particularly warranting a heavier sentence:
It cannot be overlooked that the entire offending occurred in the context of a domestic setting. The respondent, grossly in this case, abused the trust his wife placed in him, using his greater physical strength to overcome any resistance and to dominate, terrify and humiliate [the complainant]. [The complainant] was a highly vulnerable victim who could not readily extricate herself from the position into which the respondent forced her. It is the duty of courts to impose a proper sentence that is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending in order to, as far as courts can, protect victims of domestic violence and to denounce such conduct [146]
Gomboc v State of WA [2023] WASCA 115 (24 July 2023) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Aggravated assault’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘ Totality principle’ – ‘ People with mental illness’ – ‘ Strangulation’ – ‘ People affected by substance misuse’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 2; threat to harm x 7; doing an act endangering life, safety or health with intent x 1; threat to kill x 6; aggravated unlawful wounding x 1; wilful damage to property x 1; being armed likely to cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant began a domestic relationship in 2014 that lasted till 2018. Throughout ‘almost the entirety of the relationship’, the appellant subjected the complainant to ‘regular physical and verbal abuse’ (eg, strangulation, kicking, punching, and making threats to kill) ([2]; [19]; [24]–[110]). The complainant consequently suffered severe anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder [2]. In July 2022, the male appellant was convicted of 19 offences and sentenced to 11 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant advanced an appeal against the sentence on three grounds:
1.
The total effective sentence failed to ‘bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of his conduct’;
2.
The trial judge erred in failing to find that imprisonment would weigh more heavily on the appellant due to his mental health condition; and
3.
The trial judge erred in not making a positive finding as the appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation [5]
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground one. The total effective sentence was reformulated to 9 years and 6 months’ imprisonment.
The Court (Quinlan CJ, Mazza and Hall JJA) identified the appellant’s pleas of guilty, mental health issues, character references and prospects of rehabilitation as factors militating towards the conclusion that the original sentence was high ([9]; [199]; [202]; [220]).
In our view, this is truly one of those cases when the metaphor of taking one ‘last look at the total, just to see whether it looks wrong’ is apt. And when we take a last look at the sentence of almost 12 years, in light of the appellant’s pleas of guilty and such potential for rehabilitation … the sentence looks wrong [220]
It was observed that the appellant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder and poly-substance misuse disorder (cannabis and alcohol) arising from the appellant’s time in military service with the Australian Army. [120]
However, the Court maintained the need to strongly denounce this type of offending:
The appellant’s steps to begin addressing his perceptions, attitudes and behaviours towards domestic and family violence are encouraging. Nevertheless … the persistent, callous and menacing nature of his offending required a long term of imprisonment. Offending of this kind must be denounced by severe penalties [223]
The Court dismissed the second ground of appeal, finding insufficient evidence before the sentencing judge to support the conclusion that imprisonment would weigh more heavily on the appellant due to his mental health condition ([6]; [164]).
The Court also dismissed the third ground of appeal, observing the appellant’s insufficient insight into his behaviour and the ‘entrenched’ nature of his violent attitude in the domestic setting ([7]; [172]–[181]).
State of WA v Williams [2022] WASCA 105 (11 August 2022) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Appeal against refusal to make declaration offender is a serial domestic family violence offender’ – ‘Criminal law’ – ‘Family violence legislation reform act 2020 (wa)’ – ‘Whether declaration can be made following conviction for family violence offence committed prior to commencement of legislation’ – ‘Whether legislation operates retrospectively’
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to make a declaration that offender is a serial domestic family violence offender.
Facts: The Family Violence Legislative Reform Act 2020 (WA) by s 29 inserted s 124E into the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). The amendment commenced on 1 January 2021. It provides that where an offender has been convicted of at least three prescribed offences, with at least three of them having been committed on different days, a judge may declare the offender to be a serial family violence offender, consequences of which include a presumption against the grant of bail, and specific sentencing options.
In September 2021 the offender was convicted of three offences, including one prescribed offence, committed on 14 November 2020. He had a prior record of 11 prescribed offences committed against Ms C. The trial judge did not declare him to be a serial family violence offender on the basis that to do so would infringe the presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes. The State appealed the decision not to declare Williams a serial family violence offender.
Grounds: The primary judge erroneously concluded that s 124E(l) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) did not apply to the 'family violence offences' for which the respondent had been convicted because those offences occurred prior to the commencement of that statutory provision, and that to hold otherwise would infringe the presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes. The discretionary power in s 124E should have been exercised to declare the respondent to be a serial family violence offender.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal granted; appeal allowed; matter remitted to consider whether to make declaration.
The Court held that s124E could apply to offences committed before its commencement. First, the section conferred a discretion on a court to make such a declaration [45]. The ‘trigger’ for the discretion is the ‘convicting’ of an offender by the court, which ‘speaks prospectively, that is, it only applies to a ‘conviction’ occurring after the commencement of the section’ [46]. Secondly, while the statutory preconditions required to enliven the discretion might include events that occurred before the section commenced, ‘that does not give the section a retrospective operation’ [47]. Thirdly, where a court makes a declaration, the consequences only affect an offender’s rights in the future [48]. Finally, even the disqualification from being authorized to use firearms or explosives is ‘prospective only; it does not make any such licence, permit, approval or authorisation invalid at any time in the past’ [52].
CEG v Wright [2022] WASCA 42 (1 April 2022) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Audio recording evidence’ – ‘Child protection’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Use of extended family’ – ‘Victim credibility’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issues: Whether it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.
Facts: The female complainant and male appellant were married for 10 years and had 4 children.
The couple’s fourth child died in May 2019, approximately 6 weeks after being born prematurely. In July 2019, the couple’s remaining children were removed from their care. During an argument about child custody proceedings, the appellant slapped and attempted to suffocate the complainant. An audio recording of the incident was captured by a listening device. The appellant was found guilty following jury trial and appealed on the ground that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence. The appellant argued that the complainant lacked credibility by making submissions about inconsistencies in her evidence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court rejected the appellant’s submissions and affirmed the findings of the primary judge. The Court stated that ‘the recordings provided irrefutable, independent evidence that strongly supported the prosecution case’ and the complainant’s oral evidence. The Court stated that the audio recording contained ‘sounds… consistent with the impact of a hand to the face or head’, and a record of the complainant crying, complaining of being hit, and ‘pleading with the appellant not to hit her again’ [21]. Furthermore, the recording contained ‘muffled sounds consistent with the complainant being forced down into pillows or bedding’, a record of the appellant threatening to kill the complainant several times, and the complainant saying ‘get off me’ [23]. The Court found that any inconsistencies or omissions in the complainant’s evidence were minor and did not ‘justify a conclusion that the complainant was a generally untruthful or unreliable witness’. Moreover, the Court stated that complainant’s poor memory of the incident did not detract from her evidence, which ‘was strongly supported by the audio recording’ of the argument, and an audio recording in which the appellant made references to having hit the complainant [76]. Furthermore, the Court considered the fact that English was the complainant’s second language and found that a statutory declaration signed by the complainant, which stated that the appellant had not physically harmed her, had been signed ‘at the behest of her father-in-law without’ the complainant having understood them.
Turner v State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 158 (3 September 2021) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Defense of insanity’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Jury directions’ – ‘Misdirection or non-direction’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Reasonable doubt’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Unsound mind’
Charges: Murder.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant killed the female victim, his former partner with a kitchen knife at the conclusion of a pre-trial conference held at the Joondalup Courthouse in relation to legal proceedings the appellant had brought in the Magistrates Court claiming a debt from the victim. The parties had been in a relationship for 6 years and had two primary school aged children and were engaged in child custody and property settlement disputes. The circumstances and cause of the victim’s death were uncontested [1]-[15]. At trial, the appellant unsuccessfully raised the defence of unsound mind on the basis that he had suffered from a dissociative seizure when he stabbed the victim [23]. The appellant was found guilty of murder.
Grounds: The appellant appealed on the ground ‘that there was a miscarriage of justice when the learned trial Judge failed to direct or adequately direct the jury that evidence going to insanity, but not establishing it, was relevant and admissible on the issue of specific intent’ [20], [53]. This evidence ‘should have caused the jury to doubt that the appellant was capable of forming’ an ‘intent to cause death’ or ‘intent to cause bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger, or to be likely to endanger, the life of the person killed’ [51]. The evidence related to the nature of the stab wounds, the knife used, the location of the incident, and aspects of appellant’s account that were consistent with expert evidence on dissociative seizures [52].
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Justices Buss, Mitchell and Morrison stated that:
…the directions were adequate. Taken as a whole, the trial Judge's direction conveyed to the jury that they were to have regard to the whole of the evidence, including the evidence referred to [in the appellant’s submissions] in deciding whether the State had proven the requisite intention beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the trial Judge's direction had not done so, it would not have given rise to any miscarriage of justice… because the evidence… considered in light of other evidence led at trial, was not capable of giving rise to any reasonable doubt as to the appellant's capacity to form the requisite intent, or as to whether he did form the requisite intent [52]-[55].
Their Honours continued:
…[i]n our view, the only reasonable inference open on the whole of the evidence, considered in light of the presumption of sanity, was that the appellant was acting purposefully, with a requisite intention for murder, and he could not have killed Ms Thomas while in a dissociative seizure. No miscarriage of justice could arise from any failure of the trial Judge to give a more specific direction about the jury having regard to evidence when considering the issue of intent, when the relevant evidence was not capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant intended to kill Ms Thomas, or inflict an objectively life-threatening injury upon her [108].
Noi v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 84 (18 May 2021) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Unlawful damage’
Charges: Aggravated home burglary x 1; Unlawful damage x 2.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim were former de facto partners, and have 2 children. They had been separated for approximately 8 years. Shortly after a three-day order protecting the victim expired, the appellant attended the victim’s residence to show the victim and their son “who was the boss”. He kicked in the front door, and wilfully destroyed the television. He said: “you can get a restraining order that lasts for two years, it’s not going to make any difference”, and smashed the victim’s phone as she tried to call 000. The appellant was arrested and pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 2 years immediate imprisonment, with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
A miscarriage of justice occurred when the sentencing judge “adopted the matters set out in the pre-sentence report” and found the offences indicated that the appellant “harboured feelings of entitlement consistent with being a domestic violence perpetrator”.
2.
Sentences of immediate imprisonment were manifestly excessive as to type and the sentencing judge should have imposed conditionally suspended sentences.
3.
2 years’ immediate imprisonment for the aggravated home burglary offence was manifestly excessive as to length.
Held: Application for leave to appeal on ground 1 was dismissed. Leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 was also refused and the appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: No reasonable prospect of success.
The finding the offending was “a form of domestic violence” was based on the sentencing judge’s own assessment of the circumstances, rather than the impugned pre-sentence report/feelings of entitlement.
“[45]… the sentencing judge was plainly correct to characterise the offending as a form of domestic violence. The victim was the appellant’s former de facto partner and the mother of his two children (the children being co-parented by the appellant and the victim). The appellant violently forced entry into the victim’s home, when he knew she was present, by kicking in the front door. This occurred shortly after the expiry of a police order protecting the victim. The appellant wilfully damaged her property, including a mobile phone which was a means of seeking help, while threatening that the victim obtaining a 2 year restraining order would make no difference. He was clearly using violence to intimidate his former partner with whom he shared the care of their two children. The pre-sentence report was not required to conclude that the offending was a form of domestic violence. Additionally, the report was not actually relied upon by the sentencing judge for the purposes of reaching that conclusion. Even if the pre-sentence report had been relied upon for that purpose, there would be no miscarriage of justice as, in our view, it could not reasonably be contended that the offending in this case did not constitute a form of domestic violence.”
Finding that the appellant intended to intimidate the victim was inevitable, given the admitted conduct constituting the offence.
Grounds 2 and 3: The sentences were not arguably unreasonable or plainly unjust. The offending was serious, as the sentencing judge observed:
“As I’ve explained, the offending here is serious and included forced entry and the offending being carried out with an intent to intimidate and to assert control over your ex-partner. The offending also instilled fear in her, which it was intended to do.”
JLD v The State of WA [2020] WASCA 156 (18 September 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravated rape’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against refusal to grant bail’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Immolation’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’
Charges: Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1; Common assault in circumstances of aggravation x 1; Threats to injure, endanger or harm any person x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against refusal to grant bail.
Facts: The male appellant and female complainant were married in 2015. The complainant first reported domestic violence to relevant services in October 2019. The complainant reported that the appellant was emotionally abusive, jealous and controlling, including requiring the complainant to disclose her Facebook password to him, ‘monitor[ing] and question[ing] her on every expenditure on their bank statement’ and telling the complainant there was a ‘hidden camera in the house’ [22]-[23].
In February 2020, during an argument, the appellant made threats against the complainant including: ‘[y]ou and your daughter deserved to be burned alive like the Queensland family’ and accused the complainant of infidelity.
In March 2020, the complainant was recovering from surgery at home. The appellant demanded that the complainant have sex with him. When she refused, he forced her legs open and slapped her in the face saying ‘I’m still your husband and you’re bound to do it’ before raping her. A DFV protection order was made against the appellant to protect the complainant and her daughter.
Grounds: The primary judge erred in finding that the appellant posed a significant risk of interfering with the complainant such that there were no conditions that could be imposed on bail that could sufficiently protect the complainant.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
The primary judge was entitled to receive and take into account the information in the bail risk assessment report (prepared by a family violence worker).
[69] The risk assessment report, and the information on which the report was based, raised issues of serious concern in relation to the appellant’s psychological or psychiatric state and the safety and welfare of the complainant and her daughter if the appellant were to be granted bail. There were reasonable grounds, based on that information, for apprehending that the appellant may have engaged in an escalating process of serious family violence of a sexual character, including threats of greater violence, and may attempt to interfere with the complainant as a witness.
The primary judge was correct to reject the appellant’s submission that the nature of the complainant’s employment indicated that she had support in the community and was not vulnerable:
[26(c)] Her Honour rejected the appellant’s submission that the nature of the complainant’s employment indicated that she had support in the community and was not vulnerable. Her Honour said that offences of domestic violence are not confined to offences against unemployed women at home and that serious domestic violence against women occurs at all levels of society and affects all occupations (ts 4 - 5).
…
[80] Her Honour was obliged to have regard to matters favourable to the appellant’s application, including the presumption of innocence, the absence of a prior criminal record, the fact that the appellant had not actually interfered with the complainant (or any other person) as a witness, his stable and well-paid employment, his need to work to obtain revenue to meet his expenses including the cost of legal representation for his trial, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the time that would elapse before his trial could be listed for hearing.
We are satisfied that her Honour had regard to all matters which militated in favour of a grant of bail.
However, the nature and extent of the relevant risk justified her Honour’s decision to refuse bail.
The State of Western Australia v Clark [2020] WASCA 103 (25 June 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Home burglary’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-harm’ – ‘State appeal against sentence’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Unlawful assault whilst in the place of another person without that person’s consent x 1; attempted murder committed in the course of an aggravated home burglary x 1
Case type: State appeal against sentence
Facts: The respondent was convicted after trial and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on the count of attempted murder in the course of an aggravated home burglary and to 3 years’ 6 months' imprisonment for unlawful assault, to be served concurrently such that the total effective sentence was 15 years.
The respondent man and his female ex-partner had been in a relationship for approximately 10 years and had 4 children. They separated in 2017. The respondent had difficulty accepting the end of the relationship, particularly the prospect of his ex-partner dating other men. On the night before the offending the respondent fabricated an incident by texting himself purporting to be from a man who recently had sex with her. The next morning, the respondent broke in to her house and asked her to reconcile. She declined and told him that another man was in her bed (the victim). The respondent took a knife from the kitchen and threw it across the room then left.
Later than morning he returned armed with a knife, assaulted the victim and slashed him across the face causing life-threatening injuries. He also attacked the victim with a screwdriver. The respondent left the house with the knives and began to cut his own wrist with one of them.
The trial judge made the following findings of fact: (1) the respondent did not act in self-defence, but attacked the victim with dangerous weapons; (2) the respondent entered the bedroom with the intention of killing the victim, and this intention was not only momentary; (3) the attack on the victim was premeditated - after leaving the house on the first occasion, he returned with a weapon and entered the house without consent and with an intention to attack the victim; (4) the attack was persistent and violent; (5) the attack resulted in a very serious injury to the victim’s face and was likely to have endangered his life without medical treatment. The victim now has permanent facial disfigurement; (6) the respondent fled the scene and rendered no assistance to the victim; (7) the offending likely traumatised his ex-partner; (8) the respondent did not accept responsibility for his offending and sought to blame the victim; and (9) the respondent displayed limited remorse and victim empathy ([34]).
The respondent had a prior criminal record, including a conviction for domestic violence in relation to his ex-partner so was not a person of previous good character ([36]). He had used drugs since he was 18 years old, experienced marked issues with emotional arousal and regulation, and was diagnosed with ADD as a child. Further, longstanding issues with trust, impulsivity, a sense of betrayal, being made a fool of, perceived injustices and poorly developed decision making and coping skills were relevant factors in his offending. The trial judge did not accept that the respondent's health issues, including ADD and epilepsy, reduced his moral culpability for the offending or reduced the necessity for general deterrence.
Issue: The appellant sought leave to adduce further evidence and appealed his conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the entirety of the evidence. He also submitted that the evidence against him was unreliable, inconsistent and not capable of supporting a verdict of guilty on Count 3, and that there was no corroborative evidence in relation to the complainant’s allegations as to how the strangulation occurred. The Crown argued that whilst there were weaknesses in the complainant’s evidence in terms of her reliability, those factors were fairly outlined by the trial judge in the summing up, and that the complainant’s evidence was able to be supported by other evidence.
Ground: The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Held: The Court allowed the appeal, and imposed a total effective sentence was 17 years’ imprisonment ([86]). The Court considered the maximum penalty, the statutory minimum penalty, the facts, circumstances and seriousness of the offending (including the victim’s vulnerability and circumstances), the importance of appropriate punishment and personal and general deterrence as sentencing considerations, and all aggravating and mitigating factors. It held that the sentence of 15 years' imprisonment was not commensurate with the seriousness of the respondent's offending, and was substantially less than the sentencing outcome that was properly open to the trial judge ([77]).
S 283(2) Criminal Code was introduced "to ensure that burglars who commit numerous home invasions, which can involve serious violent offences, are incarcerated for longer periods; to deter such offenders; to ensure that such offenders are kept out of circulation longer; and to reflect community abhorrence of such offending" ([56]). Section 6(1) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that a sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence ([59]). The respondent’s offending was a serious example of offending of this type. The attack was premeditated, persistent, and was carried out with weapons. The respondent’s intention to kill the victim was not held only momentarily, but was present while he was inflicting the injuries. After attacking the victim, he fled the scene and rendered no assistance to him ([70]). Although his prior criminal record did not aggravate the seriousness of the offending, it indicated that he was not entitled to leniency on the ground that he was of previous good character ([72]). He did not take responsibility for his actions and denied criminal responsibility ([74]). Mitigating circumstances were limited: he had a difficult and problematic childhood, made appropriate concessions at trial which facilitated the administration of justice, showed some remorse and victim empathy, and completed a number of courses and had positively responded to his incarceration ([76]).
The State of Western Australia v Radovic 2020 WASCA 46 (8 April 2020) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Attempted murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Possessing an offensive weapon in circumstances likely to cause fear to other persons x1; Attempted murder x1;
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence
Grounds: The sentence for the charge of attempted murder was manifestly inadequate having regard to:
•
The maximum penalty for the offence;
◦
The person the respondent intended to kill was a police officer;
◦
The respondent knew the victim was a police officer before he struck;
◦
The respondent came to the premises armed with a sword which he knew was sharp and which he was adept at using;
◦
The respondent used the sword to strike to victim in an vulnerable area which was likely to result in fatal injury;
◦
The offence was committed in front of witnesses; and
◦
The offence was committed in breach of the respondent’s VRO and community based order;
•
The serious nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed, including:
•
The serious impact of the offence on the victim and his family;
•
The personal circumstances of the respondent;
•
The importance of personal deterrence considering the respondent’s criminal history; and
•
The importance of general deterrence and punishment for offences of this nature.
Facts: The respondent man pleaded guilty to the charge of possessing an offensive weapon and was convicted following trial of the charge of attempted murder. He was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment for possession of an offensive weapon and 9 year’s imprisonment for attempted murder. The sentences were backdated to the day of offending and ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of 9 years’ imprisonment. The ground of appeal relates to the sentence imposed on the charge of attempted murder.
At the time of offending the respondent was the subject of a violence restraining order (‘VRO’) which prevented the respondent from contact or communicating with his former wife (Radovic) or any of their three children. The day before the offending, the respondent made an application seeking to vary the terms of the VRO. The former wife was opposed to the changes and the matter was adjourned. The next day, the respondent attended the workplace of Radovic’s brother armed with a samurai sword. Radovic’s brother was not there at the time. Later that day, the respondent went to the unit Radovic’s brother and sister shared, banged on the door and shouted threats to kill them. The Respondent did not know that Radovic and her children lived in the unit adjacent to her siblings’. Some of the children witnessed the display and police were called to the scene. The officers arrived in a marked vehicle and attended Radovic’s unit to take the children’s statements. Radovic arrived shortly after.
The Respondent returned to the unit while police were still there with the samurai sword and began to brandish his sword in a manner that caused fear to those present, constituting the first charge, while threatening to kill them. A witnesses alerted the police and the officers left the unit and approached the respondent. The respondent rushed towards one of the officers with the sword raised, prompting the officer to discharge his taser at the respondent, to no effect. The respondent then swung the sword and forcefully struck the officer’s head. This action formed the basis of the attempted murder charge and caused two lacerations. The respondent was eventually subdued and arrested.
Judgment: The sentence for attempted murder was manifestly inadequate and the respondent was re-sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment.
None of the previous cases concerned truly comparable offending [60]. There is no tariff or usual sentencing range for a charge of attempted murder, sentences are variable and while all offences are very serious each case will turn on its own facts [61]. This was a very serious example of offending [62]. The Court found the fact that the fact that the victim was a police officer executing his duties was a "profoundly aggravating feature" [64]. They noted that "[p]olice officers are often required to place their safety at risk in carrying out their duty to protect the public. It is vital that the courts impose significant custodial sentences upon offenders who intentionally cause serious injury to police officers acting in the course of their duties" [63]. Personal and general deterrence were thought to have particular importance especially in light of the respondent’s criminal history [66]. In light of the limited mitigation available to the respondent, it was found that the sentence was "substantially less than the sentence open on a proper exercise of the sentencing discretion" [72] because of the seriousness of the offence and aggravating features.
Larsen v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 181 (15 November 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Application for leave to adduce additional evidence’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction following guilty pleas’ – ‘Burglary’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Mandatory minimum sentence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Being armed in a way that may cause fear x 1; aggravated home burglary x 1; act intended to cause grievous bodily harm or prevent arrest committed in the course of an aggravated home burglary x 1.
Case type: Applications for leave to adduce additional evidence, application for leave to appeal against conviction following guilty pleas
Grounds:
1.
The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice in relation to Count 3 because he pleaded guilty to the charge without understanding its nature.
2.
There was an abuse of process by reason of the amendment of the indictment on the morning of the appellant's sentencing.
3.
The appellant suffered a miscarriage of justice by failing to apply for an adjournment of the proceedings in respect of Counts 2 and 3 following the amendment of the indictment.
Facts: The appellant was convicted on his guilty pleas of being armed with a dangerous instrument, namely a knife, in circumstances likely to cause fear to any person (Count 1), aggravated home burglary (Count 2), and unlawful wounding with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or do some grievous bodily harm in the course of the aggravated home burglary, contrary to s 294(1) and (2) Criminal Code (Count 3). On Count 3, the appellant was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, and received concurrent terms of imprisonment with respect to the other offences. Count 3 on the indictment was amended on the day of the appellant's sentencing. The appellant claimed that he had not been advised of the nature of the amended charge or that the amended charge carried a mandatory 15 year sentence of imprisonment.
The circumstances of the offending are as follows. In 2016, the appellant and victim met through an online website, and commenced an intimate relationship. Their relationship eventually broke down, and a violence restraining order protecting the victim was served on the appellant in late-2016. In 2017, the appellant breached the restraining order by attempting to communicate with the victim via mobile. He called the victim 243 times in an attempt to contact her. The appellant continued to breach the order by following the victim to her sister’s unit. Once inside the unit, he slashed and stabbed the victim with a knife in a frenzied and concerted attempt to seriously injure her. The victim feared that she was going to die. Family, neighbours and other members of the public intervened in the appellant’s assault, and he was eventually restrained.
Held: Applications for leave to adduce additional evidence granted; application for leave to appeal on ground 1 granted, appeal dismissed; applications for leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 dismissed. It is difficult to set aside a conviction based on a guilty plea, because there is a strong public interest in the finality of proceedings. There are 3 well-recognised circumstances in which courts may set aside guilty pleas: (1) the appellant did not understand the nature of the charge or intend to admit guilt; (2) upon the admitted facts, the appellant could not, in law, have been guilty of the offence; or (3) the guilty plea was obtained by improper inducement, fraud or intimidation ([44]-[46]). The appellant alleged that he suffered a miscarriage of justice because had he been informed that he would be liable to be sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years' imprisonment, he would have pleaded not guilty ([50]).
Mazza and Beech JJA rejected the submissions that the appellant did not understand the element of intent in Count 3 ([88]) and the fact that if he pleaded guilty to Count 3, he would be liable to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment ([89]-[106]). The appellant understood the advice which he was given ([97]). Their Honours also dismissed the alleged abuse of process for two reasons: first, there was no abuse in the making of an application to amend the indictment, and second, the amendment was unnecessary and did not prejudice the appellant because he was liable to the minimum term stipulated in s 294(2) regardless of whether the indictment stated that the offence was committed in the course of a home burglary ([111]). After analysing the authorities, their Honours determined that the State was not required to plead that fact in order to make the offender liable to the mandatory minimum penalty in s 294(2) ([123]). Ground 3 was found to have no reasonable prospects of success, as the appellant did not suffer a miscarriage of justice as a result of his counsel failing to seek an adjournment of the sentencing principles ([128]-[129]).
Allanson J agreed with the orders and reasons of Mazza and Beech JJA, but believed that it was not necessary to decide whether the State was required to plead that the offence in Count 3 was committed in the course of conduct that constituted an aggravated home burglary in order to make the appellant liable to the mandatory minimum penalty in s 294(2) of the Code. That the appellant failed to show that he did not understand the indictment, as amended, or the advice given to him, was sufficient reason to refuse leave to appeal on Ground 2 ([133]).
The State of Western Australia v TLP [2019] WASCA 66 (24 April 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Manifestly inadequate’ – ‘Older people’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Aggravated grievous bodily harm x 1; Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1; Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 6; Attempted aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1.
Appeal type: Prosecution appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent attended his grandparents’ house. He attacked his grandmother and his half-sister. He punched his grandmother and threw her to the ground. He then attempted and committed acts of sexual penetration on his half-sister including inserting his finger and penis into her vagina and anus performing cunnilingus on her ([34]-[56]).
A circumstance of aggravation was that his relationship with both victims was a family and domestic relationship. In relation to his half-sister, another aggravating circumstance was that he threatened to kill her. In relation to his grandmother, another aggravating circumstance was that she was over the age of 60 ([27]).
The respondent pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years 6 months’ imprisonment ([1]-[2]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate; whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle by not reflecting the overall criminality.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was allowed. All three Justices agreed that the respondent should be resentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment but differed on the appropriate individual sentences.
Mazza and Beech JJA identified the mitigating factors identified by the trial judge (including his pleas of guilty, remorse, prior good record, relatively young age, negative familial experiences and previous bullying) entitled the respondent to some mitigation of his sentence ([93]). However, the individual sentences for each offence were judged to be manifestly inadequate having regard to the maximum sentences and the seriousness of the conduct. Their Honours would have imposed a total sentence of 15 years, but after having a ‘last look’ to ensure that the total sentence measures the respondent’s overall criminality, determined that a sentence of 12 years was appropriate ([115]-[116]).
Buss P would have imposed a total effective sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment without requiring a ‘last look’. His Honour imposed slightly different sentences for each individual count compared to Mazza and Beech JJA ([20]-[21]).
The State of Western Australia v Yamalulu [2019] WASCA 6 (14 January 2019) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Breaches of protection orders’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People with children’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Sentencing considerations’
Charges: Grievous bodily harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: In 2017, the respondent, a Walmajarri man, pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation. The respondent was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim and the offending occurred when he was in breach of a violence restraining order which prohibited him from contacting or being within 50 metres of the victim. The respondent and the victim had been in a relationship for approximately three or four years, and had one child aged three at the time of the offence. The relationship had ended due to various incidents of domestic violence. On the night of the offence, the respondent was heavily intoxicated. He found the victim engaging in sex with his brother and subsequently violently assaulted her by throwing her to the ground and jumping on her chest, legs and head. He made attempts to hide from the police and initially gave the police a false name. The victim sustained numerous serious injuries resulting in quadriplegia. The primary judge imposed a sentence of three years and 8 months’ immediate imprisonment.
Issues: It was submitted that the sentencing judge fell into error because the sentence was manifestly inadequate on the following grounds:
•
The maximum penalty for the offence;
•
The exceptionally serious nature of the injuries;
•
The serious nature of the offence and the circumstances in which it was committed;
•
The need for the sentence to reflect specific and general deterrence;
•
The respondent’s personal circumstances; and
•
The requirement that sentencing be consistent with the standards of sentencing set for offending of this nature.
Decision and reasoning: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge and re-sentenced the respondent. The Court found that the respondent committed ‘a frenzied, savage and relentless attack upon a vulnerable, unarmed and defenceless woman’ ([68]). He inflicted serious injuries despite the victim’s repeated pleas for him to stop attacking her. Their Honours also highlighted that the victim was left permanently disabled with limited prospects of improvement. The respondent had a significant prior criminal history including previous convictions for violent offending against the victim. This history of violence indicated that he should not be afforded any leniency on the ground that he was of good character. Mitigating factors included the respondent’s plea of guilty, his remorse and acceptance of responsibility and the adverse effects of his troubled upbringing ([72]). Although the ongoing effects of his childhood deprivation may have diminished his moral culpability, the consequences of his behaviour rendered him a serious threat to women with whom he is or has been in a relationship. Their Honours therefore held that the initial sentence was not merely ‘lenient’ or ‘at the lower end of the available range’, but was unreasonable and plainly unjust. A sentence of seven years six months’ imprisonment was imposed.
NPA v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 131 (2 August 2018) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Post-separation violence’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Social and psychological abuse’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 5; Attempted aggravated sexual penetration without consent x 1; Threat to harm x 1.
Appeal type: Defendant appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in an ‘on again, off again’ relationship. The appellant was controlling, manipulative, and required the complainant to change her mobile phone number so that her family and friends could not contact her. There were two main occasions of sexual offending. On the first occasion, at a time where they had broken up, the appellant was invited to the complainant’s house. He held the complainant down and inserted his penis into her vagina ([11]). On the second occasion, the appellant entered the house uninvited. Over the next 8 to 9 hours, the appellant repeatedly raped the complainant, choked her, and smashed a TV remote over her head ([17]-[26]).
The appellant was convicted of the charges and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 12 years’ 6 months imprisonment ([1]).
Issues: Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle by not reflecting the overall criminality.
Decision and reasoning: The Court held that the sentence did reflect the overall criminality. The Court referred to serious and aggravating factors including the maximum sentences, the repeated nature of the offences, the prolonged nature of the second occasion, the appellant using degrading and insulting threats towards the complainant and the appellant’s refusal to accept the complainant’s ending of the relationship ([52]).
Salkilld v State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 168 (15 September 2017) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Remorse’
Charges: Making a threat unlawfully to kill x 1; Stealing x 1; Breach of protective bail conditions x 7; Breach of bail x 1; Breach of violence restraining order (VRO) x 8; Possession of property reasonably suspected to be stolen x 1; Fraud x 1; Breach of police order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship for about 3 weeks ([4]). The appellant had come home to find the complainant having sex with another man, which sparked a confrontation. The police issued the appellant with a police order preventing the appellant from approaching the property and complainant ([5]). The appellant returned to the property the same day and tried to force his way in ([6]). The complainant obtained a violence restraining order (VRO) against the appellant ([7]). Over a period of two days, the appellant called the complainant many times and sent text messages of a frightening nature, including threats to kill her ([15]-[19]). This conduct constituted a breach of the VRO subject of the appeal. The following day, the complainant repeatedly rode his motorcycle past the house while the complainant was inside ([21]). This conduct constituted a breach of the protective bail conditions subject of the appeal.
The sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment ([45]).
Issues: There were 4 grounds of appeal:
1.
the sentence of 9 months’ imprisonment for the breach of VRO was manifestly excessive;
2.
the sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment for the breach of protective bail conditions was manifestly excessive;
3.
the head sentence infringed the principle of totality; and
4.
the judge erred in finding that the appellant was not remorseful
Decision and Reasoning: All four grounds were dismissed for the following reasons.
For ground 4, the appellant bore the burden of proof in establishing remorse on the balance of probabilities ([58]). While the appellant had expressed some level of responsibility for his actions, he displayed minimal victim empathy ([59]). It was open to the sentencing judge to find that the appellant demonstrated no remorse for the impact of his offending on the victim ([57]).
For ground 1, the breach was a sustained course of conduct and the messages were intended to terrify the complainant ([63]).
For ground 2, the breach was not an isolated breach and was intended to intimidate the complainant ([72]).
For ground 3, the sentence was well within the acceptable range ([87]).
Liyanage v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112 (22 June 2017) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Risk’ – ‘Social context evidence’ – ‘Social worker’
Charges: Manslaughter x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the deceased were married. The appellant killed the deceased by striking him with a mallet [1]. The appellant gave evidence that the deceased was violent and controlling, and regularly sexually assaulted her [2]. She had no memory of the night on which she killed the deceased [47]. At trial, she was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter [4]. She was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment [5].
Issues: The appellant appealed on several grounds including that the trial judge should not have excluded evidence from a social worker about domestic violence [7].
Decision and Reasoning:
All grounds of appeal were dismissed.
Social worker’s risk assessment evidence
The social worker’s risk assessment evidence was in relation to the psychological impact of prolonged exposure to domestic violence (popularly known as ‘battered women’s syndrome’). The evidence was based on a risk assessment which used actuarial risk assessment tools and clinical guides, including the ‘Power and Control Wheel’ (see Chapter 4 Context Statement) ([108]). The Court held that: the evidence did not explain the appellant’s state of mind ([123]-[129]); that the evidence did not quantify the extent of the risk, and did not specifically address the question of the risk of homicide ([130]-[148]); and the actuarial tools had not ‘been accepted by the relevant scientific community’ as defining the risk of homicide ([149]-[154]).
Social context evidence
The Court remarked that there is a body of academic literature that is supportive of ‘social context evidence’ in family violence cases ([160]). This may include evidence about the history of the parties’ relationship, the defendant’s culture, the non-psychological impediments to leaving a violent relationship ([160]-[165]). However, the Court emphasised that in order for contextual evidence to be admitted, counsel must ‘explain precisely and specifically how it is relevant to the issues which the jury are required to decide’ ([166]).
The social worker gave evidence in relation to the dangers of leaving a domestic violence relationship ([169]-[177]) and the exercise of power and control which characterises domestic and family violence ([178]-[183]). The Court held that the evidence was too general, and would not assist the jury beyond the knowledge and inferences able to be drawn by a reasonable person ([177],[183]).
McCoombe v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 227 (20 December 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Blaming the victim’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Public protection’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 4.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant, an Indigenous man, and the female partner (‘D’) had been in a domestic relationship. Counts 1-3 involved the appellant, who was jealous of the victim, punching her, strangling her, striking her with a chair in the back of the head, and striking her several times with a crate. Count 4 occurred when the appellant again became jealous of the victim. He verbally abused her and poured a kettle full of boiling water down her back, causing second and third degree burns. He then punched and kicked her. The appellant prevented the victim seeking medical treatment for several days. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on count 4, 1 year and 2 months imprisonment on counts 1 and 3, and 1 year imprisonment on count 2. The sentences on counts 1 and 4 were to be served cumulatively.
Issue/s: The sentence imposed on count 4 was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Newnes and Mazza JJA noted the circumstances in which count 4 was committed at [33]:
‘The pouring of a kettle of boiling water on D was a particularly cruel and senseless act which was plainly capable of causing very serious injuries. In the spectrum of physical injuries constituting bodily harm sustained by D, they were severe. The offence entailed an abuse of the relationship of trust which existed between the appellant and D. D was in a vulnerable position by reason of the greater physical strength of the appellant and the degree to which he had intimidated her by his past acts of violence: as to which we respectfully adopt Mitchell J's statement in Bropho v Hall [2015] WASC 50[16], which was approved by this court in Gillespie v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 216[48]’.
Their Honours referred to the fact that this was ‘part of a pattern of serious and ongoing domestic violence against D’. The appellant had no insight into his offending and sought to justify what he did by blaming the victim. His criminal history was poor and showed that he posed a high risk of further serious violent offending against domestic partners. Retribution, deterrence and public protection were important factors on sentence here (see [34]-[35]).
While acknowledging the severity of the sentence imposed on count 4, Newnes and Mazza JJA concluded that, in light of all the relevant circumstances noted above (including the appellant’s plea of guilty and his criminal history), count 4 was an offence of the ‘utmost gravity of its kind’. The sentence could not be said to be manifestly excessive (see [36]).
The State of Western Australia v Smith [2016] WASCA 153 (31 August 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Cruelty to animal’ – ‘Defensive injury’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Aggravated grievous bodily harm, aggravated unlawful wounding, assaulting a public officer, cruelty to animal.
Appeal Type: Crown appeal against sentence.
Facts: The State appealed against a total effective sentence of 2 years and 2 months imprisonment imposed on the respondent in respect of a number of offences. The most significant offences occurred on 5 August 2015 while the respondent was subject to a suspended imprisonment order. The respondent attacked his former female de facto partner and a police officer using a claw hammer. He pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding and causing grievous bodily harm. He also pleaded guilty to assaulting a public officer and cruelty to the officer’s police dog.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentence imposed for grievous bodily harm and unlawful wounding was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Buss J (Mazza JA agreeing) held that the sentence of six months imprisonment imposed for the unlawful wounding offence was manifestly inadequate. This was in light of a number of factors including: the maximum penalty (7 years imprisonment); the seriousness of the offending (including the vulnerability of the victim – his former de facto partner); the general pattern of sentencing for offences of this kind; the importance of appropriate punishment and personal and general deterrence; the respondent’s unfavourable personal circumstances and antecedents (including a prior history of family violence offences); and all mitigating factors (see [27]-[32]).
Buss J also held that 18 months imprisonment for grievous bodily harm was also manifestly inadequate in light of the seriousness of the offending (especially the injuries the victim sustained in trying to defend herself and the fact that the respondent was significantly larger and more powerful than the victim) and all other relevant factors (see [39]-[40]).
In a minority judgment, Mitchell JA also upheld the appeal. This was in light of a number of factors including that His Honour found that the respondent’s offending was a serious example of grievous bodily harm. It was particularly significant that the injury sustained by the victim was a defensive wound, the level of violence was high, the victim did not provoke the attack and she was no threat to the respondent. Mitchell JA also noted that it was a significant aggravating factor that the offence occurred in a family and domestic relationship (see [95]-[96]).
Conomy v Maden [2016] WASCA 30 (18 February 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Following harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Interim violence restraining order’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge/s: Stalking.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal from Supreme Court’s decision to refuse leave to appeal.
Facts: The appellant and the complainant went on six dates. The complainant made it clear she did not want to see the appellant again. The appellant repeatedly sent her emails, letters and text messages. She took steps to discourage further communication including obtaining an interim violence restraining order which prohibited contact. But the appellant persisted. The appellant was charged with a stalking offence and fined $3000. Leave to appeal against sentence and conviction was refused in the Supreme Court.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in finding that none of the grounds of appeal against conviction had any reasonable prospect of success.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. None of the many and detailed grounds of appeal that the appellant advanced had any reasonable prospect of success. Some of the reasons for this finding included that the magistrate was correct in treating the existence and breach of the interim violence restraining order as relevant to the complainant’s subjective fear and apprehension and assessing whether the communication could reasonably be expected to cause fear or apprehension in the complainant (See ‘Primary Ground 5B/Appeal Ground 6’ [96]).
Additionally, the appellant argued that the objective element of the stalking offence was not satisfied because he could not reasonably have expected his actions to have intimidated a normal person. However, the question was not what the appellant could reasonably have expected but rather whether the manner of his communication with complainant could reasonably be expected to cause her fear or apprehension. Further, the magistrate did not give inordinate weight to the evidence of the complainant because the complainant’s evidence was central to questions of whether the communications occurred, and whether the manner of these communications subjectively caused her fear and apprehension (See ‘Primary Grounds 9A and 9B/Appeal Grounds 9 and 10’ [109] - [110]).
Finally, the magistrate did not err in assessing the complainant to be a reliable witness and did not err in refusing to permit the appellant to ask certain questions. The appellant, an unrepresented litigant, had a ‘tendency to become distracted by, and fixated on, issues not significant to the question of his guilt of the charged offence’. The appellant was entitled to ask questions of the complainant relevant to matters in issue at trial. However, the magistrate had a responsibility to ensure the appellant did not abuse this right by the manner and length of his cross-examination of the complainant (See ‘Primary Ground 16/Appeal Ground 12’ [115]-[118]).
‘The paramount responsibility which a judicial officer presiding over a criminal trial owes to the community is ensuring that the accused person receives a fair trial. However, the judicial officer also owes other concurrent responsibilities to the community. In a case such as the present they include a responsibility to see that the accused does not utilise the proceedings as a vehicle for harassment of the alleged victim. The exercise of that responsibility will require vigilance in confining an accused person to asking questions which are relevant to the issues raised for the court's determination’ (See ‘Primary Ground 16/Appeal Ground 12’ [117]).
Conomy v Western Australian Police [2016] WASCA 31 (18 February 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal from Supreme Court’s decision to refuse leave to appeal.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of breaching a violence restraining order by sending three text messages to the complainant. He was arrested and participated in a video-recorded interview. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against conviction and sentence was refused.
Issue/s: Whether the primary judge erred in refusing to grant leave to appeal against conviction. The appellant was self-represented. The grounds were interpreted as raising issues including that:
1.
The DVDs of the recorded police interview should not have been admitted in circumstances where the discs served to the appellant were labelled differently and were blank.
2.
The magistrate erred by basing his decision on the evidence of the recorded interview which was ‘not worthy of any significant weight’.
3.
The evidence was not capable of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the interim violence restraining order was still in force, and had not been amended, at the time of breach.
4.
The primary judge’s reasons were inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. In relation to ground 1 above, there was no substance to the appellant’s allegations. The labelling of the DVDs was immaterial and even if the discs were blank, the appellant made it clear at trial that he was aware of their contents. There was no issue about the authenticity of the recording, and no challenge as to its fairness (See [8]). Second, the magistrate based his decision on all the evidence before him and indicated that, even without reference to the recorded interview, there was a compelling case the appellant breached the order (See [9]). Third, it was open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the interim order was still in force at the time of breach. It was implicit in the complainant’s evidence that the interim order was still in force. The appellant made no suggestion to any witness in cross-examination that the interim order was not still in force. Statements in the recorded interview reflected the appellant’s understanding that the order was still in force. Nothing in the evidence suggested the order had been cancelled or amended (See [12]). Finally, the primary judge’s reasons clearly explained why he concluded that none of the grounds had any reasonable prospects of success (See [13]).
The State of Western Australia v Stoeski [2016] WASCA 16 (19 January 2016) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder (two counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The first victim was the respondent’s long term partner. He had an unfounded and delusional belief in her infidelity. He killed her by asphyxiation in their bedroom. After killing her he bound her head and neck with multiple layers of duct tape and wrote derogatory remarks across her forehead. The second victim was the respondent’s long-term male friend and associate. He had an unfounded and delusional belief that his friend was spreading rumours about him. He stabbed him three times and struck him repeatedly to the head with a chrome vehicle component. The respondent had a history of mental illness and had ingested a substantial amount of illicit drugs in the period leading up to the offences. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 21 years for each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole periods were manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
The Court held that these murders were at the upper end of the scale of seriousness. The killings were unprovoked and the first victim was extremely vulnerable as she was smaller in stature than the respondent and isolated in her bedroom. The respondent treated the first victim in a degrading manner and he made no attempt to seek medical assistance. The killing has deprived their children of their parents (see further at [153]). Mitigating factors included his plea of guilty, genuine remorse and good prospects of rehabilitation. However, these mitigating factors were outweighed by the brutal and sustained nature of the attack and the respondent’s entrenched drug abuse. The appellant’s rehabilitation prospects had to be understood in the context of the drug abuse and the difficulty of predicting rehabilitation progress for offenders of that kind. As such, the main sentencing considerations were just punishment and personal and general deterrence. The non-parole period on each count was increased to 27 years.
The State of Western Australia v Churchill [2015] WASCA 257 (23 December 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Male victims’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: State appeal against sentence.
Facts: The deceased was in a domestic relationship with the respondent. The day prior to the murder, the respondent approached the deceased with a broken bottle and threatened to kill him. The deceased told the respondent he wanted to leave her. The next day the respondent threw bottles at the deceased, threatened to kill him, and chased him wielding a bottle. Later, the respondent and the deceased drank alcohol together. An argument broke out in which the both the respondent and the deceased threatened to kill each other. At some time between that night and the next morning, both the respondent (who was intoxicated) and the deceased returned home. The respondent stabbed the deceased with two knives and assaulted him with an electric frypan, causing his death. In total, there were 14 stab injuries and 26 incised injuries. The respondent cleaned up the premises, changed out of her clothes, and went to a neighbour’s place saying she had found the deceased injured. ‘[The deceased] had been the victim of sustained physical abuse at the hands of the respondent, who the sentencing judge described as bigger and stronger than the 'weak and vulnerable' [deceased]. This case confirms the experience of those who work in the criminal justice system in this State that, particularly in alcohol and/or other drug fuelled dysfunctional relationships and communities, it is not uncommon for a male to be a victim of domestic violence’ (See [15]). The respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years.
Issue/s: The non-parole period was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the respondent resentenced to a non-parole period of 21 years. The nature and extent of the respondent’s very significant prior record of violent offending underscored the need to give significant weight to the sentencing objectives of punishment, protection of the public and personal deterrence (See [35]). The circumstances of the respondent’s offence placed it at the high end of the scale of seriousness of the offence of murder – she intended to kill the deceased, engaged in a ‘sustained, prolonged, frenzied attack’, used multiple weapons, and went to considerable lengths to cover up the murder. Her long standing alcoholism contributed to the crime. However, of greater significance, was ‘her inability to control her volcanic eruptions of anger, and the regularity and normalisation of her use of violence’ (See [37]). The only mitigating factor was the respondent’s disadvantaged and dysfunctional upbringing.
Rimington v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 102 (29 May 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Criminal damage by fire’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Criminal damage by fire (4 counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had recently separated from his wife and had commenced discussion relating to the distribution of assets. The appellant lit three fires. Count 1 related to the destruction by fire of the contents of business premises effectively owned and controlled by the appellant and his former wife. Count 2 related to damage caused by the same fire to a neighbouring unit and common property. Count 3 concerned a separate fire causing extensive damage to an investment property owned by the appellant's former wife. Count 4 related to a third fire causing extensive damage to the former family home and a car.’ The total damage was worth approximately $1.5 million. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment, taking into account various orders of concurrency and cumulation.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the sentencing judge sufficiently took into account the appellant’s depression as a mitigating factor.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge placed excessive weight on general deterrence.
3.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, as it infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
A psychiatrist’s report expressed the view that the appellant’s acute depression and adjustment problems relating to his separation mitigated against the seriousness of his actions and affected his capacity for sound judgment and self-control. The appellant’s intoxication was also relevant (see at [30]). While the sentencing judge made a factual error by concluding that the appellant was taking anti-depressants, this error was not material. The sentencing judge expressly referred to the psychiatric report, and more specifically, the error did not affect the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s good prospects of rehabilitation.
2.
The sentencing judge observed that general deterrence was the dominant sentencing factor in arson cases. The appellant submitted that this statement was in error because ‘no one purpose of sentencing can be said to have the dominant role’ as sentencing requires a ‘sensitive approach’ which involves weighing the purposes of punishment and all the relevant circumstances of each case (see at [41]). Beech J (with whom Buss JA and Mazza JA agreed) rejected this argument and confirmed that there is a consistent line of authority that general deterrence is the dominant sentencing consideration in cases of arson.
3.
The Court found that this was a serious example of arson because the appellant lit three fires over 1 hour, the offending involved a degree of preparation and the offending was founded on the appellant’s anger towards his former wife. The offences were founded on the appellant's anger towards his ex-wife and his intention was to destroy the properties so as to defeat her claim to them. That context aggravated the offending. The sentencing judge did take into account various mitigating factors including the appellant’s remorse, good character, good rehabilitation prospects, low risk of re-offending and the fact he was suffering from depression when he committed the offences. Furthermore, the sentencing judge did consider issues of totality by ordering the sentences on counts 1 and 2 to be concurrent because they related to the same fire and ordered that the sentences on counts 3 and 4 be partially concurrent. As such, the Court found that the sentence imposed did bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offending.
X v Y [2015] WASCA 70 (13 April 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Expert witness’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Social worker’
Appeal type: Appeal against parenting orders.
Facts: The appellant father and respondent mother were in a de facto relationship. They separated when the appellant attacked the respondent’s father. The Family Court of Western Australia made parenting orders granting the appellant no time with the children. The appeal centred upon the report of a ‘single expert witness’, a social worker. The expert’s report stated that the children did not wish to spend time with the father due to his violence towards their grandfather and his verbal abuse towards the children themselves ([25]).
Issues: Whether the magistrate erred in law by failing to take into account relevant matters and finding that the single expert witness was qualified as a witness.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court summarised the principles applicable to Family Court appeals at [61]-[64]. In relation to the evidence of the social worker, the Court held that it was open to the magistrate to admit the evidence: “[although] he was not a clinical psychologist, the nature of his expertise was known to the parties when the court ordered, by consent, that he be the single expert witness in the proceedings” [126].
Oxenham v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 30 (18 February 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm (GBH) with intent, aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (aggravating factor – the appellant was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a de facto relationship for 8 years. After they separated, his former partner commenced a new relationship with a work colleague and the appellant reacted poorly. The appellant attended his former partner’s home and pleaded to recommence the relationship. The appellant went with his former partner to their children’s bedroom. In the presence of their children, he demanded to see her phone. He read through her text massages, threatened to kill her and repeatedly kicked her in the shins. He then used his former partner’s phone to lure her new partner to the house. When her new partner arrived, the appellant attacked him by punching him in the face and continued to kick and punch him while he lay on the ground, again in the presence of their child. He dragged her new partner outside. He taunted his former partner and children to look at the injuries that he was inflicting. The appellant forced his former partner to kiss her new partner while he was unresponsive on the ground and used substantial force to do this. He photographed her new partner’s injuries and sent it to her friend. The injuries sustained by his former partner were relatively superficial, but her new partner sustained extremely serious injuries. The appellant had favourable antecedents with no relevant criminal history and was regarded generally as a person of good character. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment for both offences (six years’ imprisonment for the GBH offence committed against the new partner and 18 months’ imprisonment for the assault offence committed against his former partner).
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the offence imposed for GBH was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The attack against his former partner’s new partner was extremely serious and left permanent injuries. There were elements of premeditation and deception. The attack was not provoked and committed in the presence of children. The offending was at the upper end of the scale of criminality for offences of a similar character. See in particular at [34] where Martin CJ (Buss JA and Mazza JA agreeing) noted at [34], ‘The breakdown of personal relationships is an inevitable aspect of contemporary society, and often causes anger, frustration and jealousy. (The appellant) responded to those emotions with particular brutality…The community rightly expects the courts to denounce conduct of this kind in the clearest of terms, and to impose a sentence which reflects the community's abhorrence of serious offences of domestic violence of this character.’
2.
The appellant submitted that the total effective sentence of 7 years and 6 months’ imprisonment did not bear a proper relationship to the criminality involved in the two offences. Martin CJ (Buss JA and Mazza JA agreeing) held that while both offences were related and stemmed from the same motive, they were separate and required distinct punishments. In those circumstances, and also considering the various mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Court held that the sentence was not disproportionate to the overall criminality involved.
Hill v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 17 (22 January 2015) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Accident’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Manslaughter’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’
Charge/s: Manslaughter.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant and the deceased knew each other for 25 years prior to her death. At one stage, the relationship broke down (at which point the deceased obtained a restraining order against the appellant) but it later improved to the extent that the appellant began to live in a bus on land nearby the deceased’s property. Following a series of escalating arguments (involving the appellant doing things such as throwing objects at the deceased and threatening to kill her), a neighbour found the deceased’s body.
Issue/s: Whether the trial judge’s directions to the jury with respect to the defence of accident (under section 23B of the Criminal Code (WA)) were adequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Hall J (with whom McLure P and Mazza JA agreed) held that the trial judge made sufficient reference to the evidence of a medical expert. He adequately explained that the jury must have regard to that evidence in considering the severity of the injuries to determine whether the death was foreseeable for the purposes of the defence of accident. In considering that defence, the jury was also obliged to consider the whole of the evidence including that the appellant knew the deceased was vulnerable and the previous history of violence and threats of violence (see at [62]).
Hansen v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 229 (11 December 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault causing bodily harm, grievous bodily harm.
Appeal type: Application for an extension of time to appeal and appeal against sentence.
Facts: One of the victims, Ms Lee, was in a family and domestic relationship with the appellant, an Indigenous man. She had previously been in a relationship with the other victim, Mr Hill, and they had 2 children together. Count 1 related to an occasion where Ms Lee, Mr Hill and their children were out walking. The appellant, who had followed them, struck Mr Hill with a stick out of anger and jealousy. Mr Hill suffered bruising to his elbow, a fracture to the ulna bone, bruising to the back and loin, and a laceration and bleeding in and around the kidney. Count 3 occurred when the appellant and Ms Lee were in Ms Lee’s bedroom and he asked her for sex. She refused and the appellant punched her seven to ten times to her face with a closed fist. Ms Lee underwent surgery to repair a fractured eye socket and sustained ongoing psychological trauma. In sentencing, to accommodate the totality principle, His Honour reduced the individual sentence he would have imposed on each offence by six months. The total effective sentence was 6 years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: The total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle namely, ‘the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally’ (See [22]).
Decision and Reasoning: The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed. The total effective sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment properly reflected the appellant’s overall criminality having regard to all the circumstances of the case (See [27]). These offences were serious examples of their type. The offences were ‘brutal, sustained and completely without justification’. The victims were defenceless and the injuries they sustained were significant. In count 1, the appellant used a weapon capable of causing serious harm. In count 3, the appellant beat his domestic partner who was in bed and therefore vulnerable. The sentencing judge was correct to emphasise the need for general deterrence. There was very little that could be said by way of mitigation (See [24]).
McCardle v McCardle [2014] WASCA 129 (15 July 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Appellant a legal practitioner’ – ‘Application for violence restraining order’ – ‘Delay’ – ‘Family law matters’ – ‘Following harassing, monitoring’
Appeal type: Extension of time within which to commence the appeal, appeal against decision dismissing application for violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant originally obtained a restraining order against the respondent in Adelaide in March 2010 which expired in March 2012. The appellant then obtained an ex parte interim violence restraining order (VRO) in Western Australia on 11 July 2012. This was obtained on the basis that the appellant had received telephone calls from the respondent on at least 33 occasions in mid-2012. Prior to final orders being given in relation to the ex parte VRO, the respondent made an application to strike out proceedings on the basis that they were an abuse of process in light of the determination of family law matters in the Federal Magistrates Court. The Magistrate made orders cancelling the July 2012 order in March 2013.
In June 2013, the appellant appealed to the District Court. The respondent brought an interlocutory application seeking orders to have the appeal struck out. The respondent’s application was allowed. His Honour noted, amongst other things, that the appellant (herself a legal practitioner) had chosen not to seek a fresh restraining order on the basis of any actions since July 2012. There was no suggestion that the respondent had telephoned the appellant since July 2012. It was accepted that the original grounds of the 2012 interim VRO were ‘stale’ and ‘sufficiently minor’ so as to not justify the costs of the appeal.
Issue/s: Whether the appellant should be given an extension of time within which to commence the appeal against the decision of the District Court?
Decision and Reasoning: The application for an extension of time within which to appeal was dismissed. In terms of prospects of success, it was arguable that the judge erred by ‘understating the degree of domestic and family violence' evidenced by the 'blocked number' telephone calls, the alleged verbal abuse of the appellant from the respondent in the call she answered, and the failure to take into account incidents which allegedly occurred after July 2012’ (See [34]). However, it was nevertheless not in the interests of justice to grant the extension of time. The Court of Appeal was unable to make orders for the application for a VRO to be heard by a magistrate. Instead the matter would have to be returned to the District Court for a rehearing of that appeal (See [39]-[40]). The length of delay that would result was not minimal. The appellant’s stated reasons for not filing an appeal notice on time were unsatisfactory for a legal practitioner (See [37]). Further, there was no impediment to the appellant seeking a fresh violence restraining order, particularly in relation to any events since July 2012 (See [41]).
Baron v Walsh [2014] WASCA 124 (18 June 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Act of abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence not previously adduced’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Fresh evidence’ – ‘Legally available procedures’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Appeal Type: Appeal from the District Court which upheld the respondent’s appeal against the imposition of a violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant and respondent were in a relationship for six months. The respondent sent offensive text messages which led the appellant to apply for an interim violence restraining order (VRO). This was made a final order. The respondent successfully appealed to the District Court against the imposition of the order. The District Court judge held that the text messages from the respondent to the appellant did not contain any threats, and, more specifically, ‘threats to take, and/or the pursuit of, “legally available procedures” were incapable of constituting acts of abuse’ (under s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997) (see at [46]). The only messages capable of constituting acts of abuse were four offensive text messages, which were not repeated and the appellant apologised for them.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the respondent’s use of ‘legally available procedures’ is capable of amounting to an act of abuse within the meaning of s 11A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997.
2.
Whether the District Court judge erred by admitting affidavit evidence that was not adduced or admitted at the final restraining order hearing in the Magistrates’ Court.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
1.
The respondent’s use of ‘legally available procedures’ included making complaints to the appellant’s employer’s regulator (she was employed as a nurse) regarding her professionalism, commencing minor claim proceedings, making multiple interlocutory applications in the VRO application and making a perjury complaint to police. McLure P, (with whom Mazza JA and Chaney J agreed), noted that the use of legally available procedures, of itself, will not normally amount to an ‘act of abuse’. However, if legally available procedures are used or threatened with an improper intent or purpose, this could amount to a tort (such as malicious prosecution or abuse of process) or a criminal offence. Her Honour gave the following examples at [63] –
‘a threat made with intent to cause or compel a person to settle an action is a criminal offence under s 338A of the Code: Tracey v The Queen [1999] WASCA 77[11] - [16]. See also The Queen v Jessen [1996] QCA 449; (1996) 89 A Crim R 335. Further, the commencement or maintenance of legal proceedings for an improper collateral purpose is a tort: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34;(1992) 174 CLR 509; Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 773; (1999) 163 ALR 744. A knowingly frivolous and vexatious claim is also an abuse of process.’ Her Honour went on at [65] – ‘To threaten and/or take detrimental action against a person to achieve a collateral outcome is improper (at least) and is to behave in a manner that is intimidating, even if the action involves a person availing himself of legally available procedures. I do not intend to suggest that this is an exhaustive statement of behaviour that is intimidating.’
The Court held that the Magistrate was correct in finding that the respondent’s behaviour of using legally available procedures was intimidating and noted that the excuses given by the District Court judge for the respondent’s behaviour ‘underscore the failure to recognise the impropriety of the respondent’s conduct’ (See at [68]). The respondent’s conduct therefore amounted to an ‘act of abuse’.
2.
This ground was also upheld. The relevant evidence concerned the relationship of the parties and what the appellant could have reasonably expected from the break up. Its use led the District Court judge to conclude that the purpose of the Act is not to ‘protect a person from the fallout of a failed relationship’. This was incorrect, the purpose of the Act is, ‘to protect people from acts of abuse in appropriate circumstances whether or not they occur in the fallout of a failed relationship’ (see at [78]). This evidence was used notwithstanding that it was not adduced at the final hearing in the Magistrates’ Court and it was not substantially litigated by the parties at the hearing. The judge was in error in using this evidence.
Cramphorn v Bailey [2014] WASCA 60 (21 March 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Cross-examination’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Unrepresented litigant’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: Assault, breach of police order.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The prosecution case was that the appellant and her de facto partner, the complainant, were travelling in a vehicle when the appellant punched the complainant in the mouth. The appellant stopped the vehicle in the middle of the road and a further altercation occurred between them in which the appellant clawed at the complainant’s face. Police issued the appellant with a 24-hour police order which the appellant breached by sending the complainant two abusive text messages. The appellant was convicted after trial in the Magistrates Court of unlawful assault, and breaching a police order. At trial, the appellant was entitled to the protection of a previously imposed violence restraining order issued against the complainant. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court but the appeal was dismissed. At every stage of proceedings, the appellant represented herself.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the trial in the Magistrates Court was unfair to the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction was dismissed. Although the proceedings before the magistrate were not in respect of the violence restraining order issued against the complainant, the existence of the order was relevant to the proceedings because there was likely to be considerable antipathy between the appellant and the complainant, and there was a risk that the presence might intimidate the unrepresented appellant (See [88]). The trial posed difficulties for the unrepresented appellant, particularly with respect to her having to directly cross-examine the complainant (See [90]). However, having regard to the whole of the trial record, the trial was conducted fairly. The magistrate explained the trial process to the appellant. He controlled the complainant and the appellant, intervening when required during cross-examination and when the complainant interrupted the appellant’s evidence (See [91]). Despite arguing to the contrary, the appellant was permitted by the magistrate to cross-examine the complainant about the history of the domestic violence relationship. She declined to do so (See [92]). Further, the appellant was not entitled to use an intermediary for cross-examination. These provisions are only for the benefit of the person being cross-examined (See [104]-[106]).
Beins v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2014] WASCA 54 (12 March 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Drug and alcohol programs’ – ‘Parity’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant had been in an off and on relationship with the male complainant. Prior to this, the appellant had been in a relationship with her co-offender. The appellant and the complainant had been arguing and the argument became violent. The appellant contacted her co-offender and they formed a plan to assault the complainant. They went to the complainant’s premises and the appellant’s co-offender struck the complainant with a pole approximately 15 times. Amongst other findings, the sentencing judge found that the appellant was not the victim of entrenched domestic violence and could not claim any degree of diminished responsibility. Her co-offender had a history of severe domestic violence against him, his brother and their mother. The appellant was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months’ immediate imprisonment. Her co-offender was sentenced to 2 years and 8 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the sentence breached the parity principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. McLure P held that the totality of sentencing considerations could not justify the imposition of different types of sentence. The offenders were broadly comparable in terms of their personal circumstances, involvement with the police, and remorse and rehabilitation. McLure P noted that the sentencing judge cast the appellant as a ‘siren’ who manipulated and knowingly misused her ‘childlike’ co-offender and found that this was not justified by the evidence. The sentencing judge incorrectly concluded that the co-offender’s rehabilitation required the incarceration of the appellant (See [48]). Pullin JA also upheld the appeal but for different reasons. His Honour found that the existence of extraordinary disparity in sentences breached the parity principle (See [82]). Mazza JA also provided his own reasons. Mazza JA noted that the disparity in sentences could not be rationally explained by differences in the circumstances of offending or of the offenders. The offences were not markedly different, their personal circumstances were similar, and both were amenable to programmatic intervention for their therapeutic needs (See [113]-[116]).
Rosewood v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 21 (29 January 2014) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a domestic relationship with the deceased for 12 months prior to the offence and had a 3-month old child. On the day of the offence, the appellant and deceased were drinking alcohol and an argument occurred. The appellant then stabbed the deceased in the chest. The deceased turned away and the appellant stabbed her twice in the back. The appellant witnessed ‘chronic and acute’ (see at [7]) domestic violence in his childhood. He had several prior domestic violence convictions against the deceased and other partners. The appellant was convicted on a plea of guilty. The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant was a high risk of violence in respect of intimate partners and a moderate risk in respect of other people. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. McLure P (with whom Newnes JA and Mazza JA agreed) held that this was a serious example of offending of this kind. The deceased was unarmed. While the attack was impulsive and not premediated, this meant that the deceased and other people in the house had limited ability to defend her. The offence was committed in front of the deceased’s family including young children. In relation to intoxication, her Honour noted at [15] – ‘The fact that the appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time is not mitigatory. The sentencing objectives of personal and general deterrence weigh heavily in relation to acts of domestic violence that are committed when drunk or sober.’
Tunney v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 286 (17 December 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Trespass’ – ‘Wilfully and unlawful destroying or damaging property’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm, wilfully and unlawfully destroying or damaging property, aggravated burglary, breach of a police order, trespass, breach of bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in an ‘on and off’ domestic relationship with the victim for about three years. The aggravated assault charge involved the appellant standing over the victim who was on the floor of their living room. The appellant kicked her in the groin, which caused her to cry out and curl up into the foetal position in agony. The damaging property offence occurred the next day. While driving, the victim noticed the appellant was following her in his truck. He called her and sent her text messages as she drove to a shopping centre. She entered the shopping centre. When she returned to her car she found that two tyres had been deflated.
Some months later, the victim arrived home to find the appellant inside. He began shouting at her. She fled and the appellant took a bag containing her passport and other belongings. He was issued with a 72-hour police order. He then breached that order the next day by making numerous phone calls to the victim at her work. The trespass charge involved the appellant entering the victim’s home using a set of keys that he had cut without the victim’s knowledge. The aggravated burglary charge occurred when the victim arrived home, again finding the appellant in the house. He attempted to kiss her and refused to leave. At one point, the appellant threw her onto a bed, ripped a necklace from her neck, struck her to the face and hit her on the head with his knees. Later the appellant entered into a bail undertaking in relation to these matters, which he breached by contacting the victim and asked her to look after him because he was sick. He insisted that she take him back to her home, where he remained until he was taken into custody. The total effective sentence imposed was 3 years 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence infringed the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The Court found that notwithstanding the appellant’s ‘favourable’ antecedents, he was not truly remorseful, and considerations of personal and general deterrence remain important. The offending was sustained and designed to intimidate the victim physically and psychologically. He was not deterred from further offending notwithstanding the imposition of police orders and bail conditions. As such, the Court held that the total effective sentence did bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved, having regard to all the relevant circumstances. A substantial period of imprisonment was required.
Silva v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 278 (4 December 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage to the deceased was marred by ongoing arguments. There had been prior minor assaults. The appellant then discovered the deceased was having an affair. The appellant became obsessed about the deceased’s fidelity, was jealous of her friendships with work colleagues and he demanded that she resign from her employment, which she refused. The appellant became aware that the deceased remained friends with the man with whom she had an affair. Before her death, the deceased took leave from work and the appellant monitored her phone calls and prohibited her from returning to work. His unhappiness with the deceased was increased because of her failure to participate in the family’s morning prayer ritual. The appellant then killed the deceased in the living room by hitting her on the right side of a head on at least three occasions with a hammer that he had bought that morning. Mitigating factors included the appellant’s early plea of guilty and good character. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 17-year non-parole period.
Issue/s: Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Buss JA (with whom Mazza JA agreed) found that the seriousness of the offence was demonstrated by (among other things), the brutality and repetitive nature of the attack, the appellant’s intent to kill the deceased, the fact the appellant confronted the deceased when she was alone and vulnerable and the history of domestic violence inflicted by the appellant on the deceased (see further at [40]). The Court upheld the following statement by the sentencing judge in relation to general deterrence –
‘The law is clear that disputes between partners, no matter how emotionally hurtful, must be resolved peacefully. People must understand that marriage is not a licence to treat a spouse as a chattel and violence in the course of a marriage breakdown will be met with deterrent sentences. It is obvious that the minimum term must recognise the high value that the Western Australian community places on a person's life and a person's right to live without violence from their partner. Domestic violence continues to be a significant cause of violent death and serious injury in our community. The courts must impose sentences which continue to reflect the community's abhorrence and intolerance of such offending, particularly where it results in the death of the victim’ (see at [42]).
The State of Western Australia v Naumoski [2013] WASCA 215 (18 September 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The respondent and the victim were married and had a young daughter. Their relationship ended. When the respondent returned to the victim’s unit to retrieve his property, the victim called police due to his behaviour. He left before police arrived. He then returned to the unit. The victim again called police who issued the respondent with a 24-hour move-on notice. The following evening, the respondent entered the unit using his own key, confronted the victim, struck her on the top of her head, placed his hands around her neck then stabbed her multiple times. The victim managed to exit the unit while the respondent chased after her and continued to stab her in the back. The victim almost died and suffered extremely serious injuries and is disfigured for life. She lost the use of one hand and use of her thumb on the other hand and could no longer look after her daughter on her own. The mental effects were also severe – she became depressed, highly dependent on others, unemployed and ‘cannot stand the sight of herself’ (see at [11]). The appellant had a previous conviction for violence and the sentencing judge noted that he was intoxicated at the time of the offence and had a propensity for violence whilst intoxicated. He was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. McLure P (with whom Buss JA and Mazza JA agreed) noted that the offending was premediated, with the respondent having waited more than an hour for the victim to return home. He acted ‘out of hate related to his wife’s attempt to take control of her own life’ (see at [21]). See in particular at [25]-[41] where McLure P provided summaries of all comparable cases. Her Honour described this offending as ‘high on the scale of seriousness just short of the worst category’, noting its premeditated nature, ferocity, the nature and extent of the harm and the tragic effect on the victim. A further aggravating factor was that the respondent intended not only to do her grievous bodily harm but to disfigure her body. This made the sentence manifestly inadequate notwithstanding the mitigating factors and the respondent was resentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with no change of parole eligibility.
Her Honour discussed the prevalence of domestic violence and the fact that is often connected with conduct in a relationship that, ‘understandably generates high emotion, volatility and associated loss of control.’ Notwithstanding, the fact that violence occurs in a domestic relationship is not a mitigating factor (see at [43]). As to whether it would be an aggravating factor, her Honour stated at [41]– ‘I am not persuaded that the sentencing subtleties are appropriately conveyed by characterising the domestic relationship (whether past, existing or anticipated) setting as itself aggravating the offending’ and at [43], ‘Deterrence is called for in relation to all offences involving serious violence, domestic and otherwise.’
Abfahr v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 87 (5 April 2013) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Failing to report car accident’ – ‘Failing to stop after car accident’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Orders affecting children’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, failing to stop after a car accident, failing to report a car accident to police.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the victim for 16 years. They had two children. Both parties claimed to have been the subject of threats and violence by the other. The appellant was served with an interim violence restraining order. He received a call from his children who said that their mother was not home and requested food. While claiming to be driving to a supermarket to purchase food for his children, he saw the victim at a bus stop. Once the victim had alighted from the bus, the appellant drove onto the footpath and struck her with the middle of the bonnet. She was thrown into the air and landed on the pavement, causing serious injuries. He continued without stopping – he claimed he saw her attempt to get up and assumed she was okay. A psychologist’s report indicated that the appellant showed no empathy or remorse, and that rehabilitation would be difficult. Another psychologist’s report indicated that the victim had significant mental health issues and serious difficulties in providing adequate care for her children. A total effective sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in failing to suspend the term of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that in not suspending the term of imprisonment, the trial judge erroneously concluded that the inability of the victim to care for her children was due to the appellant’s conduct. This argument was rejected. The trial judge’s conclusions were that the victim was unable to care for her children due to her mental illness and that the appellant also contributed to her incapacity because of his having caused her grievous bodily harm.
2.
In noting the ‘egregious’ nature of the offending, Buss JA (with whom McLure P and Mazza JA agreed) held that the sentence was appropriate. Punishment and deterrence (both personal and general) were the relevant considerations, in the absence of any significant mitigating factors and the appellant’s lack of remorse and prospects of rehabilitation. While the sentence will cause the children to suffer ‘hardship and distress’ (see at [80]), his Honour was not persuaded that this amounted to an ‘extreme or exceptional case’ or that the hardship would be severe enough to warrant a lesser sentence.
McLaughlin v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 204 (12 October 2012) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Arson’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Possess weapon’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, making a threat to kill (two counts), arson, possessing a weapon.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: After consuming alcohol, an argument between the appellant and his current partner ensued. He threw an ashtray which hit her in the back. He used a knife to cut the cord to a vacuum cleaner that she was using. Later, he spat on, grabbed and shook her. He then used the knife to smash a coffee table and stab walls while threatening to kill her, her son and others. He prevented her from leaving the lounge room. She was fearful of him and remained awake all night. After being arrested and released on bail for these offences (assault and threat to kill), the appellant broke into the home of his estranged wife, ignited a lounge chair and again made threats to kill by leaving voice messages on her mobile phone. The appellant had a history of violent offending against his partner and his estranged wife. A psychologist described him as having ‘deep seated rejection fears’ attributable to his traumatic childhood. The total effective sentence imposed was four years eight months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused. The Court noted the extremely serious nature of arson and the fact that the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) provided a summary of sentencing patterns for arson at [48]-[58]. The fire had a potential to destroy the house. His Honour also noted the threats to kill against his partner, ‘occurred in the context of a persistent course of conduct designed to denigrate and humiliate (her) and cause her intense fear and anxiety’ (See at [68]). As such, the sentence was not disproportionate.
Wongawol v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 222 (17 October 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Community protection’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Traditional Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander punishment’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On the day of the offence, the appellant (an Aboriginal man) was intoxicated and had been smoking cannabis. He returned home and an argument ensued relating to his partner’s confession that she had been ‘sexually misbehaving’ (see at [4]). The appellant became angry and attacked her with a knife. The blows were struck mainly in the region of her legs. The sentencing judge held that the fact he mainly stabbed her in the legs, as opposed to, (for example) in the chest was not particularly relevant to establishing the requisite intention – the appellant struck a considerable number of blows randomly with the intention of causing serious harm. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentencing judge failed to recognise the significance of the stabbing being in the legs when making conclusions with respect to the intention with which the blows were inflicted.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that he was a traditional full-blood tribal Aboriginal man and was familiar with the concept of spearing or stabbing in the legs as punishment. The sentencing judge found that the appellant intended to hurt the deceased severely by punishing her for sexual misbehaviour. In the past, the appellant had self-harmed by stabbing himself and the deceased in the thigh. The appellant submitted that this was relevant to the sentencing judge’s conclusion with respect to intention. This argument was rejected – McLure P (with whom Buss JA and Mazza J agreed) held that the number and distribution of the wounds ‘reflect the frenzied nature of the appellant's attack on the deceased and more than adequately support the sentencing judge's finding’ (see at [30]).
2.
The appellant had a long history of violent offending. He was described as being ‘aimless’ and as having a problem of habitual intoxication and use of cannabis. The appellant submitted that the sentencing judge placed too much weight on these ‘lifestyle issues’ and grossly dysfunctional background. This argument was rejected – a psychologist’s report confirms that the appellant uses violence in order to solve conflict. Further, his substance abuse contributed to his offending and he had limited insight into his problems. His prospects of rehabilitation were poor. As McLure P noted at [39] –
‘This is a case where the protection of the community in which the appellant lives and both personal and general deterrence are very weighty sentencing considerations. The incidence of alcohol and drug fuelled violence within Aboriginal communities is distressingly high. A new generation of children are scarred. The cycle continues. Having regard to all relevant sentencing factors, there is no merit in the claim that the minimum period of 14 years is manifestly excessive.’
Evans v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 182 (5 September 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Alcohol’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: During an altercation, the male appellant slashed his fiancee's arm with a knife (the first injury). Realising the seriousness of the injury, the appellant dropped the knife and applied a tourniquet to her arm. The deceased further goaded the appellant to kill her. The appellant slashed her twice in the neck, causing her death (the second and third injuries). The deceased was a person who frequently consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. During the months prior to the death, the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was characterised by frequent incidents of domestic violence, with the appellant usually being the victim. A few hours after the killing, the appellant was taken into custody and admitted to killing the deceased in a recorded interview. In the 8 years prior to the killing and thereafter, the appellant was admitted to psychiatric hospitals. It was accepted that he suffered psychotic episodes from time to time.
Issue/s:
1.
The trial judge made material errors of law in his direction to the jury on the provocation defence resulting in a substantial miscarriage of justice.
2.
The verdict of the jury was unsafe or unsatisfactory on the ground that the jury should have found the appellant insane at the time of the killing.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld on ground 1 and a retrial was ordered. The State conceded that the trial judge made an error of law in his direction to the jury on provocation but argued that the error did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice because the evidence was incapable of supporting the defence of provocation. McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) found that the evidence was capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant was provoked to cause all three injuries. There was a resulting miscarriage of justice (See [142]-[143]). Pullin JA in dissent found that while the trial judge erred in directing the jury as to provocation (See [231]), there was no miscarriage of justice as provocation should not have been left as an issue to be decided by the jury. The appellant was no longer deprived of self-control when he caused the third injury (See [238]-[239]).
Ground 2 was dismissed. McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) held that it was reasonably open to the jury to fail to be persuaded on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was deprived of the capacity to know he ought not to kill the deceased. There was evidence in the police interview that the appellant was thinking rationally before and after the deceased’s death (See [125]-[126]). Pullin JA, in a separate judgment, also held that while there was unanimous evidence from psychiatrists that the appellant suffered from a mental illness and that suffered from psychotic episodes, whether he was psychotic on the night of the killing and whether he lacked the capacity to know the act of slashing in the neck was wrong was a matter of controversy. Pullin JA was unable to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant lacked the relevant capacity (See [219]-[220]). See also Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34 (26 February 2010) and The State of Western Australia v Evans [No 2] [2012] WASC 366 (9 October 2012).
O’Driscoll v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 175 (10 August 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Evidence’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Remoteness of evidence’
Charge/s: Murder
Appeal Type: Application for extension of time for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of his de facto partner.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased, particularly statements made by the deceased as to the nature of the relationship and previous violence she suffered at the hands of the appellant.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The prosecution relied on common law principles in relation to admissibility of the evidence. Martin CJ (with whom Pullin JA and Hall J agreed) at [25] – [41] considered various High Court decisions on the correct test to apply including Wilson v The Queen (1970) 123 CLR 334 and Walton v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 283. The Court held firstly that the evidence was not hearsay, because it was only used to establish the deceased’s state of mind. The jury could then draw an inference as to the nature of the relationship. The crucial issue was the way the evidence was used. If the jury had regarded the evidence as facts asserted by the deceased and then went onto conclude that the appellant was prone to violence, it would have been prejudicial to the accused. However, the prosecution did not use the evidence in this way and the trial judge directed accordingly. An argument that statements made by the deceased earlier than one or two weeks prior to her death was ‘too remote in point of time’ to be admissible was also rejected. The Court held that while it may be possible for evidence to be so distant as to be inadmissible, this was not the case here. The relationship was relatively short and the statements that were made completely spanned this period. This increased rather than reduced its probative value.
MJS v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 112 (9 May 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Evidence of character’ – ‘Indecent assault in family or domestic relationship’ – ‘Indecent dealing with lineal relative under 16 years’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Sexual penetration of a lineal relative under 16 years’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: 18 charges of a sexual nature relating to the appellant’s two biological daughters.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was charged with various sexual acts relating to his two daughters (see at [22]). He was convicted by a jury of 11 offences of indecent dealing, 4 offences of indecent assault and acquitted of three charges. There was previously an interim violence restraining order (VRO) in place against the appellant. The appellant later breached this order. Evidence of this breach and his subsequent imprisonment for a weekend was inadvertently admitted at trial after one of the complainants mentioned it during cross-examination.
Issue/s: Some of the issues in the appeal against conviction concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge should have discharged the jury after one of the complainants gave evidence during cross-examination of a prior breach of a VRO in place against the appellant.
2.
Whether the directions of the trial judge in respect of this evidence were sufficient.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against sentence was upheld but the appeal against conviction was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the admission of the interim VRO evidence was inadmissible and so prejudicial it required the trial judge to discharge the jury. The appellant also submitted that this failure to discharge the jury led to further inadmissible evidence concerning other VROs and alleged breaches which compounded the initial prejudice. Mazza J (with whom Buss JA and McLure P agreed) held that the only basis upon which this evidence could be admissible was with respect to the appellant’s character. Generally, evidence of bad character is inadmissible but can be admissible where an accused puts their character in issue, in which case the prosecution is able to call evidence of bad character in rebuttal (see at [144]). In this case, the accused asserted that he was of good character. As such, the prosecution was entitled to adduce rebuttal evidence. The evidence of the VROs could only be admissible for that purpose.
The Court held that in isolation, the making of an interim VRO was not of relevance to an accused’s character. However, the evidence also included the alleged breach of the VRO. Mazza J held that a breach of a VRO ‘amounts to deliberate disobedience of a court order’ and ‘is conduct which is prima facie inconsistent with the usual behaviour of a person of good character. It is evidence capable of rebutting an assertion of good character’ (see at [153]). As such, it was admissible. However, the evidence that he had spent a weekend in jail was not relevant to character and thus inadmissible, but capable of being dealt with by judicial direction. Furthermore, even if the VRO evidence was inadmissible, it was general in nature – ‘There was no detail as to when the VRO was made, who was the protected person, what was the basis for the order and what the appellant did to breach it’ (see at [157]). As such, any potential prejudice could be dealt with by judicial direction.
2.
The Court held that while the trial judge’s directions in relation to this evidence could have been ‘fuller’, they were sufficient. It would have been desirable for him to ‘use the authority of his office to confirm that a court had not determined on its merits whether a final VRO should be made’. However, the judge explained to the jury the ex parte nature of an interim order. While the judge did not explicitly tell the jury that it could only take the breaches into account for the purposes of character, he did tell the jury that the State’s case was that these breaches were relevant to character and that the ex parte VROs and the time spent in jail were irrelevant. This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to understand that the evidence was only relevant in relation to the appellant’s character.
The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deprivation of liberty’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Fines’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Reconciliation’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Deprivation of liberty (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, threatening unlawfully to kill.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The first victim (K) was the respondent’s former partner, with whom he had a 2-year old child. The second female victim (C) commenced an intimate relationship with K. The respondent believed that the relationship between K and C had begun before he had separated with K. After the separation, the respondent asked K and C to meet at his home to discuss their relationship with each other. The respondent then left with K, at which point an argument developed. The respondent refused to permit K to leave his car and detained her while he drove her back home. He prevented her from escaping the house. He then armed himself with a spear gun and loaded it with a barbed spear. C then returned to the respondent’s home, whereupon the respondent pointed the spear gun at her, forced her to enter the house and prevented her from leaving. C refused to give the respondent her car keys. In response, the respondent punched C hard in the left cheek which knocked her down. He then picked her up by the throat and lifted her from the ground. He made a number of threats to kill C. C was left with severe injuries and the mental effect has been ‘profound’. She was in fear of her life (see at [47]-[53]). He later reconciled with K. There was no evidence of domestic violence by the respondent towards K before he became suspicious about her relationship with C. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended for 18 months) for both counts of deprivation of liberty, fined $1000 for assault occasioning bodily harm and sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment (conditionally suspended for 18 months) for threatening to kill. These terms (as well as a fine for unrelated offending) were imposed concurrently which resulted in a total effective sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for 18 months and a $2000 fine.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the fine imposed for assault occasioning bodily harm was manifestly inadequate.
2.
Whether the sentencing judge erred in suspending the terms of imprisonment by not having sufficient regard to the seriousness of the conduct and the impact on the victims
3.
Whether ordering the sentences be suspended resulted in a sentence that was manifestly inadequate.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues 1 and 3.
1.
Buss JA (Mazza J agreeing) noted that the assault against C was serious, unprovoked, committed against an unarmed victim who offered no resistance and part of a prolonged episode of intimidation. The fact that the respondent was armed with a spear gun was likely to have increased the victim’s fear. The context of the assault (the breakdown of the domestic relationship between the respondent and K and the new relationship between K and C) made personal and general deterrence relevant. This made a $1000 fine manifestly inadequate notwithstanding the respondent’s personal circumstances, including that he was suffering from a mental illness. McLure P agreed and noted that a fine cannot be justified on totality grounds and ‘falls well short of appropriately recognising the degree, effect and context of the physical violence inflicted by the respondent on C’ (see at [1]).
2.
Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) held that the remarks of the sentencing judge did sufficiently refer to the seriousness of the conduct and the impact on the victims, as he noted that the issue of suspension required him to consider all aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the objective features of the offence (see at [89]).
3.
Buss JA (Mazza JA agreeing) noted that the deprivation of liberty and threat to kill offences were objectively very serious. His Honour disagreed with the sentencing judge and noted that a matrimonial breakdown, reconciliation and the presence of a child in the relationship cannot be regarded as mitigating factors. However, the fact that the respondent’s mental state has improved following therapy could indicate progress towards rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the offending and the associated need for deterrence outweighed other factors such as rehabilitation and mercy. McLure P noted that C suffered greater actual and threatened violence than K, such that it was difficult to understand the sentencing judge’s explanation for suspending the deprivation of liberty and threat to kill sentences.
See also her Honour’s remarks at [3] – ‘The circumstances to which the sentencing judge referred are neither unique nor mitigatory. The hallmark of domestic or relationship related violence is the readiness of many victims to return to, or remain in, a relationship with the perpetrator of the violence. The otherwise appropriate penalty should not be reduced because there is a return to the status quo that existed prior to the breakdown of the relationship which precipitated the violence. It is also circular to rely on the return to the relationship status quo as the route to rehabilitation. Moreover, the emphasis on the domestic context marginalises the actual and threatened violence inflicted by the respondent on C.’
As such, these offences warranted immediate imprisonment. A total effective sentence of 18 months’ immediate imprisonment was imposed.
Papas v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated burglary’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Criminal damage’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Obstructing a public officer’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Separation’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary (two counts), assault occasioning bodily harm, criminal damage, obstructing a public officer, breaching protective bail.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the father of the appellant’s former partner. The appellant attended the complainant’s house and obtained entry. He was confronted by the complainant who demanded he leave. A verbal altercation occurred, at which point the appellant’s former partner came to the aid of the complainant. The appellant then grabbed her by the hand and bent her middle finger which caused it to fracture. One another day, the appellant again obtained entry to the house, this time by throwing a pot plant through a door. His former partner was inside and she barricaded herself and her 2-year-old son in a bedroom with a chest of drawers. The appellant rammed the door with a table which enabled him to unlock the door. She managed to flee the bedroom and the appellant was detained by a neighbour until police arrived. The appellant suffered from depression and anxiety and was intoxicated on both occasions. He had no relevant criminal history. A total effective sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in failing to find that the appellant’s depression and anxiety reduced his moral culpability and the need for general deterrence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
McLure P (with whom Mazza J agreed) held that the appellant’s mental impairment did not impair his functioning to the extent that his culpability or the need for general deterrence should be reduced. Instead, the offending can be attributed to his level of intoxication.
2.
The Court held that the seriousness of this offending was heightened by the extent of the actual and threatened violence committed by the appellant, and as McLure P (Mazza J agreeing) noted – ‘The seriousness of the offending is not reduced because it occurred in the context of a failed or failing domestic relationship. It is necessary to protect actual and potential victims of domestic violence’ (see at [16]). The mitigating factors, such as the appellant’s remorse and good character were given sufficient weight by the sentencing judge.
Austic v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 110 (11 June 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Circumstantial evidence’ – ‘Directions and warnings for/to jury’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Offender character references’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the murder of the deceased; with whom he had been in a casual sexual relationship for 12 months. The deceased was 22 weeks pregnant with the appellant’s child at the time of her death. The appellant was intoxicated, attended the deceased’s home and stabbed her 21 times in her bedroom. He then walked back to his home, threw away the knife and left the deceased. He destroyed evidence that could implicate him in the murder. The prosecution’s case relied purely on circumstantial evidence. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 25 years.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge erred by not directing the jury that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of certain facts because these facts were indispensable links in the chain of reasoning towards a finding of guilt.
2.
Whether the non-parole period was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The Court held that there was a very strong circumstantial case against the appellant and the trial judge’s directions were sufficient for the jury to understand that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the opportunity to and in fact did kill the deceased.
2.
The appellant submitted that the 25-year non-parole period was excessive given various comparable cases, the objective seriousness of the crime and the appellant’s personal circumstances. He also submitted that the fact that the crime did not involve multiple victims or multiple offences and the lack of any lengthy premeditation was significant. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was previously in a de facto relationship which did not involve violence, had two daughters and had numerous references attesting to his good character. The appellant’s increasing alcohol consumption had been a factor in the breakdown of the relationship. He had been suffering from depression for which he was receiving psychological treatment. However, the Court found the non-parole period was not manifestly excessive. A significant aggravating factor was the deliberate killing of the unborn child. While a psychologist’s report indicated that the appellant was a low risk of re-offending, he refused to admit guilt or show remorse. Further, the crime was committed ‘in a calculated and savage manner and for a shallow and appalling motive’ (see at [186]) such that little weight could be afforded to the appellant’s antecedents.
Heijne v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 86 (11 May 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Intention’ – ‘Motive’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘People who are gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant and the male deceased had been in an intimate personal relationship for nearly 25 years. The prosecution case was that this relationship deteriorated particularly because of the development of a relationship between the appellant and a younger man (Mr X). The prosecution argued that the appellant strangled the deceased. The defence case was that the evidence did not exclude that the deceased died of a heart attack not strangulation. The defence further asserted that the State failed to prove the appellant had a motive to kill or intention to kill the deceased. The defence also relied on self-defence against an unprovoked assault. The appellant asserted that the deceased struck his face with the back of his right hand before the strangulation occurred.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether there was material on which the jury acting reasonably could fail to be satisfied that the prosecution had excluded the application of self-defence against unprovoked assault.
2.
There was insufficient evidence to enable the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause some form of injury, of whatever kind, falling within the definition of grievous bodily harm.
3.
The trial judge erred in directing the jury as to causation.
4.
The trial judge gave inadequate directions with respect to the intent necessary to sustain a charge of murder.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, there was no basis in the evidence for the jury to have entertained the possibility that the appellant reasonably apprehended that he faced death or grievous bodily harm. Assaults committed by the deceased on the appellant in the past were not of a kind to cause apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm, and the deceased striking the appellant with the back of his hand would similarly not be of a kind to cause such fear (See [44]-[49]). Further, the jury could not have entertained the possibility that the only practical means of averting the threat was through application of force to the deceased’s throat. Other options open to the appellant included brushing the deceased off or punching him in the head (See [50]).
Second, there was ample evidence sustaining the inference that the appellant intended to cause some form of injury within the definition of grievous bodily harm. This included the pathological evidence given in relation to the extent of the deceased’s injuries, the evidence of animosity in the relationship, the appellant’s description of the struggle preceding the killing, the appellant’s evidence that when he realised the deceased was dead he thought he must have strangled him, the appellant’s conduct before and after the killing, the appellant’s admissions to Mr X and another man, and a witness’s evidence of lies told by the appellant (See [71]).
Third, the trial judge did not err in his approach to the issue of causation in his direction to the jury. He reminded the jury of the most pertinent evidence on the subject and clearly identified the issue they had to resolve and the manner in which they should resolve it (See [81]-[85]).
Finally, the trial judge specifically referred the jury to all the evidence that was relevant to the intent of the appellant at the time of the death. The evidence was relevant to both the question of intent required to sustain the charge of wilful murder, and the intent required to sustain the charge of murder. The difference between those two intentions was made abundantly clear to the jury (See [106]-[107]).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Hellings v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 255 (27 April 2005)).
Atherden v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 33 (26 February 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Effect of guilty plea’ – ‘Intention’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Non-parole period’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Violence restraining order’ – ‘Vulnerable - women’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been in a relationship with the deceased for some three and a half years before the relationship ended. The deceased obtained a violence restraining order against the appellant which prohibited him from coming within 100m of her home or work and within 20m of her person. The appellant went to the deceased’s house for the purpose of discussing the restraining order – he wanted to ask the deceased to remove the restraining order because it would be difficult to renew his licence as a car dealer with the restraining order in place. When she yelled at him to get off the property, he hit her with a rubber mallet multiple times until she lost consciousness. He then hit her with a brick. She sustained severe head injuries and she later died. The appellant did not seek medical attention for the deceased. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 16 years. The appellant had some history of domestic violence – an ex-partner had obtained a violence restraining order against him after he stalked her and punched her several times.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the original sentence was within range of comparable sentences and whether the trial judge gave sufficient weight to the prosecution’s concession that the appellant only intended to cause grievous bodily harm, not death.
2.
Whether the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the early plea of guilty in combination with the long non-parole period.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of ground 2.
1.
This argument was dismissed. Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA and McLure P agreed) firstly accepted that given the value which the community places on human life, it is likely that (generally) killing with intention to cause death will be more seriously regarded than killing with the intention to cause grievous bodily harm. However, this will not always be the case, and intention is only one of a range of relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence (see at [30]-[31]). Indeed, there were other aggravating factors which were relevant in this case. These included – ‘the brutality of the attack on a defenceless woman, the fact that two weapons were used, the stalking behaviour which occurred in the months leading up to the attack, the presence of the violence restraining order, and the appellant's callous disregard for the victim's obvious need for medical attention’ (see at [48]).
2.
The trial judge did not state that the guilty plea was a mitigating factor for which some reduction in sentence should be made. Furthermore, both parties accepted that that a non-parole period of 16 years was severe for an offence involving no premeditation and a relatively brief (albeit violent) attack. Wheeler JA stated that where an early plea can be regarded as a mitigating factor, sentencing judges should expressly state in open court that a reduction in sentence has been made for that reason (see at [45]). The non-parole period was reduced to 14 years.
Evans v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 34 (26 February 2010) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Accident’ – ‘Alcohol’ – ‘Hearsay evidence’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charge/s: Murder.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant and the deceased woman had been in a seven-month relationship. The police had been involved on at least five occasions including an incident in which the appellant broke the deceased’s hand. The deceased, an alcoholic, was not inclined to cooperate with police and declined to provide a statement on these occasions. The appellant convinced police that he was the victim of the deceased’s aggression. On 13 November 2007, the appellant caused the deceased knife wounds to her right arm, her neck, and her chest near her armpit. After cutting her neck, the appellant pressed on the deceased’s chest, accelerating her blood loss and her death. During an interview with police, the appellant admitted that he killed the deceased. The appellant had a history of mental health problems from August 1999. At trial, evidence was adduced from Ms Maton about conversations she had with the deceased regarding acts of violence perpetrated upon her by the appellant. The two broad issues at trial were whether the State negated the defence of accident and whether the appellant had established the defence of insanity.
Issue/s: Some of the issues included that –
1.
The trial judge erred in her directions on accident.
2.
The trial judge erred in her directions on insanity.
3.
The trial judge erred in directing the jury as to the use that could be made of out-of-court statements made by the deceased.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA agreed) found it unnecessary to deal with ground 1. The respondent accepted that the trial judge erred in her classification of the infliction of the fatal wound as an ‘event’ for the purposes of applying the defence of accident. The appeal would have to be allowed unless there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. Wheeler JA found it unnecessary to undertake such analysis because the appeal was allowed on other grounds (See [46]). On ground 1, McLure P found there had been a substantial miscarriage of justice (See [15]-[17]).
Wheeler JA (with whom Owen JA agreed) allowed the appeal on ground 2. The trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury that the appellant could be found not guilty by reason of insanity, even if the appellant knew what he was doing was contrary to law (See [57]-[58]). Further, the trial judge failed to direct the jury that, when considering whether the appellant was deprived of the capacity to know he ought not to do the act, the issue was whether the appellant was incapable of reasoning with some moderate degree of calmness as to the wrongness of the act or of comprehending the nature or significance of the act of killing (See [61]-[62]). McLure P held that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that a person can lack the relevant capacity even if they know the act is unlawful (See [24]-[27]).
The appeal was also allowed on ground 4. Wheeler JA (with whom McLure P and Owen JA agreed) noted that the evidence of Ms Maton was provided in graphic and striking detail, and had the potential to be significantly prejudicial to the appellant. Not only was the evidence admitted but the trial judge invited the jury to treat the account given by Ms Maton as evidence of the truth of the matters recounted to her. This direction was plainly erroneous (See [72]-[74]). A retrial was ordered. See Evans v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 182 and The State of Western Australia v Evans [No 2] [2012] WASC 366 (9 October 2012).
The State of Western Australia v Bennett [2009] WASCA 93 (26 May 2009) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Damaging property’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Stealing motor vehicle’ – ‘Threat to kill’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Wilful damage by fire’
Charge/s: Stealing a motor vehicle, wilful damage by fire, threat to kill.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: On a number of occasions, the male respondent threatened the female complainant who he was in a relationship with. The respondent put his face against her, and said aggressively, ‘I’ll do 25 over you. If I can’t have you, no one will have you’. A few days later, the complainant told the respondent she was leaving him, and he said to her, ‘If you think you’re going to walk away I will kill you’. A few days after that, the intoxicated respondent grabbed the complainant’s throat and said, ‘I am going to kill you. If I can’t have you, no one can’. Afraid, the complainant left for a few days. The drunk respondent then stole a motor vehicle and crashed it into a wall at the front of the house. He spread petrol through the house and lit it on fire. The sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to 15 months’ imprisonment on the arson offence, 6 months’ imprisonment for stealing a motor vehicle, and 9 months’ imprisonment for the threat to kill. Her Honour recognised that the offence of threatening to kill took place on a different occasion but thought all sentences should be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds included –
1.
The sentences imposed on the offences of arson and threat to kill was manifestly inadequate.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in her application of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The respondent was resentenced to an aggregate sentence of 4 years and 9 months’ imprisonment. The sentence of imprisonment was manifestly inadequate. The arson offence required the imposition of a deterrent sentence. The respondent’s personal circumstances carried less weight because this was a case of arson but regardless these did not provide much by way of mitigation. The appellant was a mature age, had an extensive criminal record, and his substance abuse problem could only be offered as an explanation rather than an excuse for his behaviour. This was a very serious case of arson ‘because the respondent’s offending was apparently motivated by revenge, it caused the destruction of a residential building, and it was against the background of a violent domestic relationship’ (See [48]-[51]). Further, the threat to kill was a very serious one. It was made against a history of domestic violence, and the complainant was afraid of the respondent (See [54]-[56]).
Miller JA additionally held that the sentencing judge erred in her application of the totality principle. There was nothing crushing about imposing a cumulative sentence on the threat to kill offence. The sentence on the offence of threat to kill should instead have been lowered to reflect the totality principle (See [58]-[62]).
Gilmour v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 42 (28 February 2008) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, attempting to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: After the marriage between the male appellant and female complainant ended, the complainant noticed the appellant following her around. Several items went missing from her home. The appellant then damaged the property of a complainant’s male friend resulting in the imposition of a violence restraining order (VRO). The appellant subsequently breached this VRO. An altercation between the appellant and complainant led to the appellant being charged with assault and damage to property. He was acquitted on the assault charge. The appellant continued to follow the complainant around, telephoned her and would not speak, and made noises around her property at night. The complainant obtained a VRO. Notwithstanding this, the appellant changed a white light bulb at the complainant’s home to a red bulb. Cameras she installed at her property also detected the appellant wearing a gorilla mask and holding a knife in his hand. The appellant also attempted to pervert the course of justice in relation to this incident by requesting his neighbours provide him with an alibi. He received a term of 4 years' imprisonment in respect of the aggravated stalking and 10 months in respect of the attempt to pervert the course of justice, to be served cumulatively. That produced a total effective sentence of 4 years 10 months' imprisonment.
Issue/s:
1.
The sentence in respect of the aggravated stalking offence was manifestly excessive, particularly in view of the appellant’s antecedents.
2.
The sentencing judge erred in imposing cumulative sentences.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The sentence was not manifestly excessive. The personal circumstances favourable to the appellant (being only the absence of a prior record) could have limited weight in the circumstances, having the regard to the absence of remorse and a clear need for personal and general deterrence. This was determined and persistent pursuit of the complainant, in circumstances where she had obtained a restraining order and where he had been charged with offences arising out of his conduct towards her (See [12]-[13], [16]). Wheeler JA further held that the sentencing judge did not err in making the sentence of attempting to pervert the course of justice cumulative. This was more serious offending than the giving of a false name to police or entering a false recognisance. It was an attempt to pervert the course of justice in relation to an offence of a relatively serious nature and involved the use of innocent and unconnected third parties to engage in criminal conduct (See [17]-[19]). See Gilmour v State of Western Australia [2005] WASC 243 (8 November 2005).
Lydon v Lydon [2008] WASCA 8 (8 February 2008) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Elder abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Expert evidence’ – ‘Meaning of emotional abuse’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sibling abuse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Proceedings: Protection order appeal.
Facts: The appellant man was the respondent to a protection order protecting his mother and sister. The appellant resided in a shed adjacent to the mother’s home, which his sister frequently visits. All parties are in dispute in relation to the deceased father/husband’s estate, discussions in relation to which resulted in the allegations of emotional abuse upon which the protection order was granted. The brother stood in his sister’s way, blocking her from leaving, got in her face, poked her in the chest and shouted at her and her mother. There was an allegation that on at least one occasion he made a threat to kill his sister. The order included terms that the appellant not contact the other parties or enter the house.
Issue: Whether provocation defence applies to application for restraining order; Whether finding of emotional abuse requires supportive expert testimony.
Decision and Reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
The argument that provocation was required to be considered was misconceived as the Magistrate’s decision was founded on emotional abuse.
Le Miere AJA held that:
[49] Emotional abuse is not defined in the Act. Emotional abuse involves improper or inappropriate behaviour, verbal or non-verbal, that adversely impacts upon another person's emotional wellbeing. Emotional abuse improperly excites strong unwelcome feelings in another. Emotional abuse may involve coercion by intimidation, inducing fear, stalking, or harassment, that is words, conduct or action, usually repeated or persistent that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms or causes substantial emotional distress to that person.
[50] There are two aspects to emotional abuse. The first is the adverse impact upon another person's emotional wellbeing. The second is the behaviour that causes the negative impact upon the emotional wellbeing of another.
And:
[57] It is open to the court to be satisfied that a person has behaved in an ongoing manner that is emotionally abusive towards another person without the benefit of any psychiatric or psychological evidence. Behaviour that is emotionally abusive is behaviour that is reasonably capable of adversely impacting upon another person's emotional wellbeing. This does not require psychological or other expert evidence.
Iveson v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 25 (23 February 2005) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Throttle’ – ‘Unlawful detention’
Charge/s: Unlawful detention, assaults occasioning bodily harm (x 2), breach of restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male applicant struck the female complainant, his de facto partner, across her back with a pole (the first assault). The applicant retrieved a knife from the kitchen but did not use it. The complainant tried to escape out the front door but the applicant prevented this. He began to throttle her (the second assault). The complainant tried to attract attention through the open front door but the applicant shut the door (unlawful detention). The complainant passed out. When she came to, she was again choked by the applicant and lost consciousness. The complainant obtained an interim violence restraining order which the applicant subsequently breached by telephoning her. The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence of 4 years and 10 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
1.
The total criminality of the applicant’s conduct did not justify the imposition of a cumulative sentence for the second, more serious assault. The conduct of the unlawful detention merged with the throttling of the complainant.
2.
The proper application of the totality principle would lead to the conclusion that the aggregate term of 4 years and 10 months was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. First, the individual sentences were well within the discretion of the sentencing judge. The two assaults were of a different character to each other and were further distinguishable from the unlawful detention offence because this did not cause her bodily harm. The decision to order the sentence on the second assault (throttling) to be cumulative was also appropriate in recognition of its particular seriousness and additional criminality (See [25]-[26]). Second, the aggregate term was not manifestly excessive. Although the applicant was a young man, his criminal history was not as bad as it might have been, he was remorseful, and appreciated that his conduct was largely driven by the effects of his drug abuse, the offences were very serious. The second assault was ‘about as serious an example of this offence as it would be possible to find’. The applicant endeavoured to throttle the victim, she lost consciousness twice, he renewed his attack, he persisted in the attack even after she tried to escape, and he obtained a knife (which he did not use, to his credit). Further, he ignored the terms of the violence restraining order (See [31]).
Brown v Roe [2004] WASCA 210 (16 September 2004) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Conditions of orders’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: State appeal against dismissal of charges of violence restraining order.
Facts: The protected person (the former de facto wife of the respondent) obtained a violence restraining order (VRO). The respondent was charged with three offences of breaching the VRO by communicating or attempting to communicate with the protected person. There was no dispute that the protected person had contact with the respondent during the period the VRO was in place. However, there was a dispute between the parties as to how many times there was contact and whether it was made with the consent of the protected person. The magistrate dismissed the charges because he considered all the evidence showed the protected person, by her actions prior to the contact alleged, had consented to the contact.
Issue/s:
1.
The magistrate erred in law in finding that the protected person’s earlier course of conduct could create a continuing general consent entitling the respondent to thereafter breach the restraining order.
2.
The magistrate erred in fact in finding that the protected person consented to the respondent’s breaches of the restraining order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed on ground 2. Counsel for the appellant argued that there could not be ‘continuing general consent’ given by a protected person to a person bound by a VRO. Barker J noted that this proposition was probably right ‘but whether or not consent has been given to any particular contact must be decided on the facts of each case’ (See [14]). In relation to ground 2, Barker J held that the magistrate erred in finding that the protected person consented to the respondent’s breaches. The evidence did not support such a conclusion (See [57]-[59]). Barker J further stated that, ‘it is not appropriate for a Court, while a VRO is in place, effectively to suspend the operation of a VRO by taking the view that a person protected is inclined to use the VRO as a "walking stick", as the Magistrate in this case suggested’(See [46]). As the protected person explained, it was sometimes easier to tolerate the applicant’s presence and other times it was necessary to call police and enforce the terms of the order (See [42]).
‘It may be recognised that, in many circumstances, the continuing relationship between persons who were once in a close personal relationship will be strained, especially after a VRO has been granted by a Court. Nonetheless, a person who is bound by a VRO must take all appropriate steps to ensure that the terms of the order are complied with. It may well be that, on some occasions, by virtue of a course of conduct, a person bound by the order may feel entitled to approach physically or telephone a protected person. It may be that a prior course of conduct in some cases implies a consent to approach the protected person in that way, at least initially. But if the protected person makes it plain that she or he does not consent to that contact or that initial contact continuing, then it behoves the person bound by the order to back off and strictly comply with the order’ (See [44]).
The State of Western Australia v Anderson [2004] WASCA 157 (29 July 2004) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Parole eligibility order’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Remorse’ – ‘Threat to kill’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, threat to kill.
Appeal Type: State appeal against sentence.
Facts: While intoxicated, the respondent, an Aboriginal man, found the complainant (his de facto partner) in bed asleep with another man. The respondent slapped and punched the complainant which woke her. The respondent then pulled her from her bed and dragged her 200m down a street, at which point he hit her repeatedly with a steel stake and ripped her bra off. He then grabbed her throat, threatened to kill her repeatedly and pinned her to the ground. She was in genuine fear for her life. The respondent’s criminal history included serious incidents of domestic violence committed against his former partner and other offences of violence. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for each offence, to be served concurrently. A parole eligibility order was not made.
Issue/s: Whether the sentencing judge erred in reducing the length of the sentence to allow for the fact that he did not make a parole eligibility order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court held that the sentencing judge erred by reducing the sentence on account of not making a parole eligibility order. Jenkins J (with whom Murray and McLure JJ agreed) noted that the sentence imposed at trial was significant, given the respondent’s plea of guilty and the maximum penalties. However, the Court noted the seriousness of the offence and described it at [26] as ‘close to the worst category of cases of this kind’. The offending was aggravated by the repeated use of a weapon and the complainant being humiliated by the removal of her bra which rendered her half naked during the beating. The context in which the respondent found the complainant amounted to ‘some mitigation’ but this was ‘not significant’, given the respondent’s history of domestic violence and having previously undergone counselling in anger management and substance abuse (see at [28]). Indeed, an exchange with the sentencing judge showed that it was unlikely his plea was indicative of true remorse (see at [14]). The sentence was increased to two years’ imprisonment.
Hellings v The Queen [2003] WASCA 208 (3 September 2003) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Parole’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Propensity evidence’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Threat with intent’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (x 2), threat with intent to prevent the complainant doing an act she was lawfully entitled to do.
Appeal type: Appeals against conviction and sentence.
Facts: While in a relationship with the male applicant, the female complainant were in a relationship obtained two restraining orders. The relationship ended and she obtained another violence restraining order. The applicant was charged with two counts of aggravated stalking. Further, he was charged with making a threat with intent to prevent the complainant doing an act she was lawfully entitled to do because of a 10-page letter he sent to the complainant. This was ‘abusive in the extreme’ and threatened violence against the complainant if she participated in the court action. The applicant was acquitted of the indictable offence for the first aggravated stalking charge and convicted of the alternative simple offence. He was found guilty in two other trials for the second indictable aggravated stalking offence and for the threatening letter. The complainant gave evidence of the relationship between her and the applicant. On occasions, her answers were unresponsive to questions and rambling but neither counsel made any effort to prevent the complainant answering questions in that way. The applicant was sentenced respectively to 6 and a half years’ imprisonment and 5 years’ imprisonment, cumulative. The applicant sought leave to appeal against these latter two convictions and sentences.
Issue/s: Some of the issues included –
1.
A miscarriage of justice arose because evidence of the relationship should have been deemed inadmissible or should have been excluded on discretionary grounds in both the stalking and threatening letter trials.
2.
In the stalking trial, the trial judge erred by failing to give adequate directions to the jury as the relevance of the ‘context’ or ‘relationship’ evidence and to the extent they could use it in their deliberations.
3.
The trial judge erred in not making a parole eligibility order.
4.
The sentences were manifestly excessive in all circumstances concerning their commission and, when accumulated, the total term of 11 and a half years’ imprisonment is disproportionate to the total offending behaviour.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed. First, while some of the complainant’s evidence in both the stalking and threatening letter trials was inadmissible or might have been objected to on discretionary grounds, there was no resulting miscarriage of justice (See [34]-[36] and [60]-[63]). The evidence that was inadmissible or might have been excluded was insignificant having regard to the evidence that was admissible relating to relevant aspects of violence and harassment in the relationship (See [34]-[36]).
Second, a direction to the jury regarding the use of the complainant’s relationship evidence as ‘propensity evidence’ was not necessary here. ‘Such a direction will be very necessary in cases where there is a danger that the jury might reason that because an accused person has conducted himself in a particular way in the past towards his victim he might be found to have done so again at the time alleged by the indictment’ (See [39]). This was not the case here as there was no real dispute that the applicant breached the violence restraining order or that his actions fell within the meaning of pursuit (See [37]-[39]).
Third, the discretion not to order parole eligibility did not miscarry in this case. The applicant remained beset by a deep-seated psychological disorder. His aggression was unchecked and his past behaviour showed that if parole eligibility was ordered he would be likely to reoffend (See [85]-[87]).
Finally, the sentences were not manifestly excessive. The stalking offence was of a very serious kind. The offending occurred when the applicant was already charged with an offence of aggravated stalking, he failed to appear on the date for trial, and was eluding authorities. The nature of the stalking itself was serious and persistent with 160 calls over a 22-day period and overt threats being made (See [92]-[97]). Further, in relation to the threatening letter offending, the threats were credible, and ‘serious and graphic’. The purpose of the threat, to prevent a person engaging in lawful activities, significantly aggravated the offending (See [98]-[99]). In terms of totality, the total sentence was not disproportionate to the offending given the persistent nature of the applicant’s conduct, the period of time over which it took place and the serious nature of the offending (See [101]).
Note: the High Court refused special leave to appeal (see Hellings v The Queen [2005] HCATrans 255 (27 April 2005)).
Owen v Jilba [2002] WASCA 283 (17 October 2002) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of misconduct restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Lawful conduct’
Charge/s: Breach of misconduct restraining order.
Appeal Type: State appeal against dismissal of charge.
Facts: A misconduct restraining order was in place against the respondent which prevented him from behaving in an ‘intimidatory or offensive manner’ towards the complainant. He was charged with breaching that order by intimidating the complainant. The alleged intimidatory conduct included the respondent driving past the complainant’s house and staring at her such that she felt intimidated. At trial, the Magistrate accepted a no case submission made by the respondent’s counsel. The Magistrate concluded that an order which restrained the respondent from behaving in an ‘intimidatory or offensive’ way was not authorised by the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (the Act). The Magistrate concluded that the respondent’s alleged conduct would constitute an offence under the Police Act 1892. As such, because the Act only provides for the restraint of ‘lawful’ activities, an order which purported to restrain ‘unlawful’ conduct would fall outside the scope of the section. The Magistrate was also concerned with the subjective nature of the alleged intimidation. The order appears to prevent conduct which is objectively intimidatory, but the evidence referred to the subjective experience of the protected person.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate was correct in concluding that the purported intimidatory behaviour was not ‘objectively intimidating’ within the meaning of the order.
2.
Whether it is open for restraining orders to restrain unlawful conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
Wheeler J agreed with the Magistrate’s concerns and held that while conduct that is subjectively intimidating will often coincide with conduct that is objectively intimidating, ‘it is self-evident that not all conduct which is experienced by a person as intimidating will be regarded as intimidatory from the point of view of an objective observer. The person who feels intimidated may be hypersensitive or may simply misunderstand the nature of the conduct’ (see at [6]). In this case, the Court found that given there was little context or background before the Magistrate (such as acts of prior violence, property damage or threats), merely driving near someone’s house and staring at them for a ‘relatively short period’ is difficult to perceive as intimidatory. While the respondent’s conduct may have upset and intimidated the protected person subjectively, it could not objectively be regarded as intimidatory.
2.
Wheeler J concluded that it was unlikely that the purpose of the Act was to substitute the sanctions of the criminal law or provide another means for deterring and punishing the commission of offences. However, her Honour then held that the Magistrate erred in finding, ‘that the mere fact that conduct which was alleged to be in breach of a restraining order was at the same time conduct which might be punishable under some other legislation took it outside the scope of the order, or alternatively meant that the order was not a "proper" order as applicable to such conduct’ (see at [17]). Rather, the power to impose restraints of ‘lawful activities and behaviour’ under the Act should be read as granting a power to impose restraints on broadly lawful behaviour. Her Honour gave the example of an order purporting to restrain ‘threatening’ behaviour which could be lawful or unlawful behaviour, depending on the context. On the other hand, an order which restrains a person from murdering another would fall outside the scope of the Act. As such, depending on the circumstances and context, conduct in breach of a restraining order could be conduct which contravenes other legislation, and should not for that reason be determined to be outside the scope of the Act.
Ugle v The Queen [2001] WASCA 268 (31 August 2001) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘High risk’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Unlawful wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm, unlawful wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was in a de facto relationship with the complainant and had 1 child. The assault offence occurred after the couple split up. The applicant repeatedly called the complainant. He approached the complainant as she walked to a shopping centre. He then grabbed her by the hair and punched her to the back and head. The applicant made numerous threats to kill the complainant during the assault and she attempted to run away but he dragged her back. The unlawful wounding offence involved the applicant forcing his way into the complainant’s house. He stabbed her numerous times in the chest, back and neck and also attempted to stab her in the face. She pretended to be dead so as to stop the attack. While he was in remand, police officers made a number of telephone calls on the applicant’s behalf indicating that he wished her to visit him. She did not do so and moved into a refuge after her release from hospital. However, her whereabouts was discovered by members of the applicant’s family so she was forced to move. The complainant suffered lasting psychological injuries and her daughter was severely traumatised as the events occurred in her presence. The applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the assault offence and 9 years’ imprisonment for the wounding offence, to be served cumulatively such that the total effective sentence was 12 years, with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was granted and the appeal was upheld.
The appellant submitted that the 9-year sentence imposed for the unlawful wounding offence was excessive. Malcom CJ (with whom Steytler J and Burchett AUJ agreed) held that this was a vicious, pre-meditated attack which put the complainant’s life in danger. Nevertheless, the sentencing judge’s starting point for the wounding offence (before the applicant’s guilty plea) was 12 years, which the Court held was excessive and that a starting point of 9 years would have been appropriate. It was noted at trial that the appellant remained a high risk of reoffending and prison based alternatives to violence programs to develop more appropriate strategies for resolving conflicts in relationships were recommended. This recommendation was not disapproved by the Court of Appeal. The appellant was re-sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment for the wounding charge, which resulted in a total effective sentence of 7 years and 4 months.
Sandle v Crofts [2001] WASCA 106 (30 March 2001) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Provocation’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant arrived home late at night and asked his wife if she had had anyone in the house while he was overseas. She said no, at which point he punched her in the face. She then told him she did have a man in the house. He then started hitting her in the face and head with closed fists. He pulled her by the hair to a chair. He then hit her again and kicked her in the side while on the floor which caused her to black out. She was awoken by her son calling for her. Fearing for her life, she jumped off the balcony which was about three metres off the ground. The appellant tried to drag her up the stairs by the ankles which she resisted. She sustained severe injuries. The defence case was that the complainant’s injuries were as a result of self-harm and she jumped off the balcony by choice. The appellant had no criminal history. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the conviction was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive and whether the Magistrate gave insufficient weight to the ‘mitigating circumstances of great provocation’ leading up to the incident.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [28]-[50].
2.
McKechnie J found that this offence was ‘a vicious assault by a husband upon his wife without reason or provocation’ (see at [52]) and that in cases of domestic violence a sentence encompassing general and personal deterrence is called for. The Court then held that a 12-month term of imprisonment was called for given the circumstances of the offence. However, the Court did acknowledge that given this was the appellant’s first offence (he had no history of violence), it may have been appropriate for the sentence to be suspended for two years so as to provide for rehabilitation. However, ultimately the 12-month sentence was within the discretion of the Magistrate.
Mead v Couper [2000] WASCA 345 (10 November 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had been told (untruthfully) that his de facto wife of six years had been sleeping with another man. The appellant accused her of doing so and then punched her in the face with a clenched fist multiple times. The complainant fell to the ground and the appellant kicked her in the back. He then grabbed her and carried her to a nearby yard. After the complainant yelled at the appellant to let her go, he released her and raised a wooden fence post above his head in a threatening way. The complainant suffered a broken jaw, facial swelling, various cuts and a sore back. The appellant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment with parole edibility.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or should have been suspended.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in rejecting a supervision order coupled with an anger management course as a suitable penalty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that: he had no prior convictions involving violence; he had favourable prospects of rehabilitation; he demonstrated remorse and entered an early plea of guilty; his wife did not want him to be sent to prison and a prison sentence would have a harsh effect upon his wife and children. The Court rejected these arguments. Steytler J held that the assault was ‘vicious’ and caused serious injuries. His Honour also upheld previous authorities which indicate there is a general public concern with domestic violence (see at [13]).
2.
The sentencing Magistrate commented that some in the community would view a supervision order coupled with an anger management course as a ‘soft option’. Steytler J held that the Magistrate was simply concluding that the offence was so serious as to justify only a period of imprisonment and that general deterrence was of paramount concern. His Honour held that general deterrence is an important consideration in cases of domestic violence and that it was open for the Magistrate to conclude that general deterrence would not sufficiently be met by anything other than a sentence of imprisonment.
Bartlett v Scantlebury [2000] WASCA 234 (29 August 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Assault.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a de facto relationship with the complainant. On Christmas Day 1999, the appellant was heavily intoxicated. An argument occurred. The appellant then assaulted the complainant by squeezing her arms and pulling her hair while she attempted to leave the house. The Magistrate also accepted that the appellant had engaged in intimidatory and threatening conduct over the previous two days. The appellant’s evidence differed substantially. The Magistrate found that the appellant’s evidence was contrived and manipulative and sought to paint his actions without fault. The Magistrate noted the protracted and serious nature of the offending. The complainant was left with no substantial physical injuries but there was a significant mental impact. The Magistrate also noted the fact that domestic violence cases are insidious, difficult to detect and have significant implications for the parties and the general community (see at [8]). The appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
Miller J disagreed with the Magistrate’s conclusions that deterrence outweighed all other sentencing considerations and that the seriousness of the offence meant that the only justifiable sentence was imprisonment. His Honour noted that this case concerned only one assault, which was the combination of seizing the complainant by the arm and pulling her hair. The Court also held that the Magistrate had placed undue weight on the events leading up to the assault and noted that the appellant had only been charged with one offence. While it was appropriate to take into account the traumatic effect of the assault on the complainant and correct that assaults involving domestic violence call for deterrent sentences, ‘this assault could not be categorised as being of the most serious kind’ and the description of it as such was an ‘over-reaction to the facts of the case’ (see at [17]). Miller J therefore set aside the sentence of imprisonment and fined the appellant $6000.
McCormack v The Queen [2000] WASCA 139 (25 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Deterrence’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Grievous bodily harm with intent’ – ‘Intent’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Relationship evidence’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Grievous bodily harm with intent, attempted murder.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and his wife began conversing together with a man online. After some time, the appellant’s wife’s conversations with this man became ‘more flirty and intimate’ and eventually his wife agreed to stop using the internet. She said goodbye to this man and she refused to tell her husband what they discussed in this conversation. The next day, after attempting to discuss the issue with his wife, he stabbed her in the upper back while she was in bed either asleep or attempting to sleep. He then stabbed her again as she attempted to flee. He then unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide. The appellant was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of grievous bodily harm with intent and was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could use evidence of the relationship between the appellant and his wife in the months leading up to the attack for the purposes of determining intention.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
1.
The appellant submitted that the judge had misdirected the jury in allowing them to use evidence of disagreements between the appellant and his wife about her use of the internet and the breakdown of their relationship to infer the presence of intent. Kennedy J (with whom Pidgeon and Ipp JJ agreed) rejected this argument and held that the relationship was clearly admissible evidence which the jury could take into account in considering the appellant’s intention when he attacked his wife (see at [19]).
2.
The sentencing judge took into account various mitigating factors including the appellant’s high degree of emotional distress arising from his childhood which left him with a ‘dependent personality disorder, chronic depression and anxiety’. The sentencing judge also took into account the victim impact statement, which described the devastating effect of the attack on the appellant’s wife and children. The sentencing judge also correctly noted the need for personal and general deterrence in domestic violence cases and that no form of domestic violence is acceptable, especially when it includes the use of a weapon. Kennedy J (Pidgeon J and Ipp J agreeing) held that although the sentence imposed was high, it was within the range of the sentencing discretion and correctly weighed the mitigating factors (see at [27]) and the need for general deterrence.
Dawes v Coyne [2000] WASCA 134 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Proceeding: Violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal from decision of magistrate to place appellant on violence restraining order.
Facts: The female appellant and the male respondent had been in a relationship for six years. The appellant obtained an interim violence restraining order against the respondent. The respondent was subsequently charged with one offence of unlawful assault and four offences of breaching a violence restraining order. The magistrate dismissed the charge of assault and two charges of breach of the violence restraining order but convicted the respondent of two charges of breach. No penalty was imposed in respect of these breaches. Without warning, the magistrate also placed the appellant on a violence restraining order.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in placing the appellant on a violence restraining order.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed and the violence restraining order set aside. The magistrate’s actions were in every way a complete breach of the Act. The magistrate ‘gave no indication of what it was that he intended to do, failed to alert the appellant to the possibility that an order might be made against her, and made no invitation to her to respond in any way’ (See [10]).
Miller J also noted that the magistrate ‘started by stating that it was a tragedy that ‘domestic matters of this sort get into the criminal court’ and made the observation that ‘both parties had been causing trouble for the police who do not want to be involved in these sort of things’’. These observations were ‘entirely inappropriate’ (See [6]). See also Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135.
Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Importance of appropriate penalties’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Technical or trivial breach’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The female appellant and the male respondent had been in a relationship for six years. The appellant obtained an interim violence restraining order against the respondent. The respondent was charged with one offence of unlawful assault and four offences of breaching a violence restraining order. The magistrate dismissed the charge of assault and two charges of alleged breach of a violence restraining order. He convicted the respondent of two charges of breach for going into the bedroom of the complainant in the early hours of the morning and communicating with her by telephone on the same morning. The magistrate gave no real reasons for either the acquittals or the convictions he recorded (See [6]). The magistrate also decided to impose no penalty, without giving any reasons for doing so (See [7]).
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in law and in fact in imposing no penalty or sentence.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The magistrate made no reference to the provisions of the section of the Act allowing for the imposition of no penalty if certain preconditions are met. This constituted sufficient grounds for allowing the appeal. Further, this section also had no relevance in this case. The circumstances of the offence were neither trivial or technical (See [9]-[12]), and it was not unjust to impose a sentence in light of the fact that respondent was 42 years of age, employed with a regular income, and had a prior record of convictions (See [13]). Miller J also noted the clear social importance of the Restraining Orders Act 1997. His Honour provided, ‘protected persons in the community generally must have confidence that restraining orders will be obeyed and complied with … [When] they are not, there must be significant consequences to support the fact that restraining orders mean something … [The] courts [must] ensure that their orders are not ignored’ (See [13]-[15]). Fines of $750 and $250 were substituted. See also Dawes v Coyne [2000] WASCA 134.
Vickers v Bailey [2000] WASCA 136 (19 May 2000) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Assault’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Assault (eight counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the appellant’s de facto partner. After returning home intoxicated, the appellant ‘lost the plot’ after discovering that the cat had defecated on the bed. He assaulted the complainant. The following day, there was a further altercation and the appellant assaulted the complainant several times, including by squeezing her throat, throwing coffee and the contents of an ashtray over her and ‘(pushing) up her chin and started spitting into her face’ in the presence of their children. The complainant then obtained a restraining order against the appellant but was unable to particularise many of the assaults due to the length and nature of the incident. The appellant conceded that the assaults were a build-up of frustrations over the last 12 months of the relationship and submitted that he suffered from depression, was remorseful and had never previously been violent towards the complainant. The appellant was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that notwithstanding the seriousness of the offending, a sentence of imprisonment was not the only option. Counsel for the respondent submitted that while each assault in isolation may have warranted a lesser penalty, the combination of all the counts and the time period over which they were committed aggravated the circumstances of the offence. The respondent also submitted that cases of domestic violence call for a sentence of personal and general deterrence.
Miller J agreed but emphasised that regard must be had to the individual circumstances of the case – ‘I entirely agree with the submissions of counsel for the respondent that in general terms, a deterrent sentence for domestic violence offences will be called for. Much, however, depends upon the extent of the violence. Whilst here there were multiple offences and offences committed over a period of time, the complainant fortunately appears to have escaped injury. Further, seven of the offences appear to have occurred as one group of offences. Additionally, the appellant does not appear to have ever assaulted his de facto in the past, there being no allegation to that effect in the pre-sentence report, statement of facts or elsewhere and there being no victim impact statement from the complainant’ (see at [12]). Miller J noted the pre-sentence and psychological report which suggested the appellant needed counselling in relation to anger. The appellant himself initiated contact with a domestic violence program and was proposing to participate in that program. As such, the Court found that the appellant should have been given the opportunity of a suspended sentence as an inducement for him to reform.
Gallegos v R [1999] WASCA 191 (6 October 1999) – Western Australia Court of Appeal
‘Complainant and applicant ex-lovers’ – ‘Complainant pregnant at time of assault’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Sentence not excessive’
Charge/s: Aggravated burglary and assault occasioning bodily harm
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: the applicant and complainant shared a brief sexual relationship, but did not live together. The applicant saw the complainant in a night club in Fremantle. He spat on her and wiped faecal material on her face. She went home. He followed her, without permission. At the house, he punched her repeatedly and kicked her. He also threatened her with a knife. The assault caused significant injuries to the complainant. The applicant pleaded guilty and, at first instance, was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: Application refused. The applicant was self-represented. Chief Justice Malcolm considered that the way in which the earlier assault at the night club had preceded the aggravated burglary showed some persistence in the offending. It also exhibited an element of premeditation. The seriousness of the offending was elevated by the fact that the applicant knew that the complainant was pregnant at the time and the nature of the attack was such that no regard was paid to the safety of the foetus. His Honour said at [28]:
“It is now clear that in cases of domestic violence a sentence which gives effect to both personal and general deterrence will normally be called for. The circumstances may be such as to justify a substantial sentence of imprisonment”.
Supreme Court
Read v DPP (WA) [2024] WASC 10 (19 January 2024) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Manifestly excessive’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Damaging property’ – ‘ Mitigating factors’ – ‘ Suspended sentence’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 1; aggravated criminal damage x 1; aggravated strangulation x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim were in a de facto relationship for approximately two years, residing together six months prior to the offending. At random, the appellant physically assaulted the victim, punching, kicking and strangling her as she returned home one night. The victim was able to contact the police before the appellant destroyed her phone. [11]–[14] In August 2023, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced to immediate 15 months’ imprisonment.
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence, raising the following grounds of appeal:
1.
The Magistrate erred in failing to properly regard the principles to suspend a term of imprisonment;
2.
The total effective sentence was manifestly excessive.
3.
The Magistrate erred in failing to give adequate weigh to the appellant’s personal circumstances (e.g., PTSD-diagnosis and persistent depressive and attachment disorder)
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
Justice Whitby upheld the Magistrate’s decision not to suspend the term of imprisonment imposed on the appellant. [41] Justice Whitby acknowledged significant mitigating factors present in the appellant’s case, including the appellant’s good character and rehabilitative prospects and the anomalous nature of the offending. [42] However, the appellant’s offending occurred in an intimate relationship, whereby ‘general deterrence is an important sentencing consideration’: [45]
The nature of the offending was extremely serious, as recognised and referred to by the learned Magistrate. In such circumstances, the need for denunciation of this type of offending and general deterrence looms large. In determining the appropriate sentencing option, there is the need to demonstrate the condemnation of the community for offences of this kind. It means that the personal circumstances of the offender carry less weight [46]
Accordingly, it was reasonably open to the Magistrate to be positively satisfied that a suspended imprisonment sentence was not appropriate. [47]
Having regard to the totality principle, Whitby J upheld the total effective sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive:
The learned Magistrate, correctly in my view, recognised the seriousness of the appellant’s offending. The appellant kicked and stomped on the victim and repeatedly applied pressure to the victim’s throat [63]
Lastly, Whitby J dismissed the appellant’s third ground of appeal, finding the Magistrate to have properly considered the role of the appellant’s mental health disorder in the context of his offending. [79] According to Whitby J, the appellant was a person ‘clearly able to exercise control and judgment in the past’ such that his mental health was not the cause of his offending.
Supljeglav v DPP (WA) [2023] WASC 453 (29 November 2023) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against sentence’ – ‘ Strangulation/choking’ – ‘ Physical violence and harm’ – ‘ Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘ Inconsistent verdict’
Charges: Assault occasioning bodily harm x 2; common assault x 1; endangering the life, health or safety of a person x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: In May 2023, the male appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment for assaulting his wife. [1] The appellant was acquitted of common assault and endangerment, following the Magistrates’ concerns with inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence. [2]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the sentence on two grounds:
1.
The guilty verdicts with respect to assault occasioning bodily harm are inconsistent with the not guilty verdict with respect to the common assault and endangering life charges
2.
The guilty verdicts were unreasonable and not supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused. Appeal dismissed.
With respect to ground one, Justice Tottle reviewed the relevant legal test concerning inconsistent verdicts: ‘whether the inconsistency is of such a character that the verdicts cannot stand together as an exercise in fact finding based on logic and reasonableness’. [31] In so doing, Tottle J upheld the Magistrates’ treatment of the complainant’s evidence; namely, the Magistrates’ rejection of certain aspects of the complainant’s evidence and acceptance/reliance on others [38] finding that the consequent inconsistency in the verdicts did not meet the ‘high hurdle’ raised by this ground of appeal.
With respect to ground two, Justice Tottle upheld the Magistrates’ approach to fact-finding. Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the case was not one in which ‘the Magistrate must have entertained a doubt about the appellant’s guilt’. [48]
Arkeveld v DPP (WA) [2023] WASC 264 (17 July 2023) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘ Appeal against conviction’ – ‘ Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘ Breach of protection order’ – ‘ Miscarriage of Justice’
Charges: Breaching a protection order x 6; aggravated stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to six charges of breaching a protection order and a single charge of aggravated stalking in the Magistrates’ Court. The offending occurred between April and October 2021, against the appellant’s former female partner (‘complainant’). The complainant ended the relationship in March 2020, and obtained a protection order against the appellant in June 2020. [5] The appellant breached this order, contacting the complainant via social media and phone calls. [8]
Grounds of Appeal: The appellant appealed the convictions by reason of ‘coercive influence, unsound mind and unsounded legal advice’. Justice Lundberg collectively interpreted these ground as constituting an allegation of a miscarriage of justice. [3]
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal refused and appeal dismissed.
Justice Lundberg found ‘no evidence … to support an assertion that the appellant was coerced or pressured into entering’ guilty pleas. [49] Equally, Lunberg J found no medical evidence to demonstrate that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of entering guilty pleas: [50]
But even assuming, favourably to the appellant, that the appellant was suffering from these illnesses at the time, it remains for the appellant to demonstrate that his pleas entered on 12 April 2022 were somehow influenced by these matters or that he was unable to understand the effect of entering such pleas. There is no positive assertion made by the appellant to this effect. Nor could one sensibly be put. The charges were not complex and were constituted by the conduct described in the proceedings before the magistrate. There is no indication on the transcript that the appellant was confused about the conduct or the charges. And there was no doubt the appellant was bound by the [protection order] which was identified in the charges [52]
Kritskikh v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 130 (21 April 2022) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Admissibility of evidence’ – ‘Appeal against conviction’ – ‘Body-worn camera footage’ – ‘Credibility’ – ‘Evidence act 1906 (wa) ss 37 and 39g’ – ‘Failure to consider family violence provisions’ – ‘Failure to have regard to the dynamics of family violence’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Intoxication’ – ‘Previous incident of family violence’ – ‘Self defence’ – ‘Self-defence’ – ‘Significance of being first reporter of incident’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against conviction.
Issues:
1.
Whether the court’s reasoning was consistent with how a jury would be directed in respect of the family violence provisions
2.
Whether evidence relevant to the appellant’s degree of intoxication was wrongly excluded
Facts: The female appellant and Mr Williams were in a de facto relationship [19]. On the night of 1 December 2020, after the appellant and Mr Williams had attended a work function, Mr Williams formed the view that he ought to drive the appellant home because she was intoxicated, and carried her to his car. While Mr Williams was driving, the appellant allegedly attempted to take hold of the steering wheel, before punching and kicking Mr Williams. In response, Mr Williams repeatedly pushed the appellant away forcefully, making contact with her face. Mr Williams then called the police, who took photos of his injuries [4]-[8]. The appellant was found guilty by a Magistrate, and appealed on the following grounds:
1.
Firstly, that the learned magistrate erred by excluding relevant evidence.
2.
Secondly, that the magistrate erred by reasoning in a manner that was inconsistent with the family violence provisions of the Evidence Act 1906.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed, with orders setting aside the convictions and ordering a retrial.
Justice Hall found that grounds 3, 4 and 5 were made out because the Magistrate ‘failed to address the issue of self-defence and reasoned in a way that was inconsistent with the family violence provisions’ [126]. ‘The circumstances of this case required that express consideration be given to self-defence and that, in dealing with that issue, the reasons be consistent with s 39E and s 39F.’
His Honour stated that self-defence was an issue due to ‘evidence of the appellant being forced against her will into the car, the evidence of the significant injuries sustained by the appellant during the incident and the evidence of the prior incident of family violence’ [112].
In considering the credibility and reliability of the evidence given by the appellant and Mr Williams, the Magistrate made the following findings:
1.
Because Mr Williams had called the police in relation to both the current and previous altercations between the couple, his credibility was enhanced, and it was less likely that he had been the aggressor on those occasions.
2.
‘[T]he claim by the appellant that she had previously been the victim of domestic violence lacked credibility because she had not made a complaint about that earlier incident until after she was charged with the present charges’ [122].
The Court found that in making these findings the magistrate failed to have regard to the dynamics of family violence (s 39F). In particular, the fact that victims of family violence often do not make reports to police. Instead, ‘the magistrate relied on the delay in the appellant reporting the earlier incident of family violence to impugn’ her credit [115]. Therefore, the magistrates’ findings were inconsistent with s 39F [124].
In respect of the second ground of appeal, Justice Hall stated:
‘The body worn camera footage was potentially cogent evidence of the appearance and condition of the appellant close in time to the alleged incident. The relevance of that evidence was that it went to the question of how intoxicated the appellant was. This was, as the magistrate noted, a matter of significance both to the likelihood that the appellant had behaved in the way alleged and in regard to the reliability of her memory of the events’ [134]. Therefore, ‘the magistrate was in error in excluding it’ [136].
Sellenger v Turner [2021] WASC 308 (7 September 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Economic and financial abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Totality principle’
Charges: Breach of protection order x 2, stalking x 1.
Proceedings: Applications for extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The 29-year-old male appellant and female victim had been in a relationship for 6 months. When the relationship ended, police protection orders were served on the appellant with a condition that the appellant not go within 100m of where the protected person lives or works. In contravention of the orders, the appellant followed the victim while driving and made repeated attempts to contact her via phone. The appellant also attended the victim’s workplace. The appellant also deposited small amounts of money in the victim’s bank account. He was charged with breaches of the orders and with stalking. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment. The appellant appealed on the ground that the sentence imposed infringed the first limb of the totality principle [4].
Decision and Reasoning: Applications for extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence allowed, appeal dismissed.
Justice Strk found that the breach of the protection order was serious, occurring within 24 hours of the order having been served, by deliberate and repeated conduct. Her Honour noted that the victim felt intimidated by the appellant’s behaviour including his deposits of money in the victim’s bank account after their separation [100]. Her Honour explained that because the offences had not overlapped, it was not inconsistent with the totality principle that the sentences be served cumulatively [97], [105], [107]. Her Honour noted the appellant’s ‘troubling history of similar offending… which made personal deterrence a significant factor in sentencing’ [108], and the fact that the appellant’s guilty plea was the only mitigating factor [109]. Her Honour repeated the sentencing Magistrate’s remarks on the victim impact statement, which detailed the significant and lasting psychological impact of the offending on the victim and her 10-year-old daughter [40].
Pedrochi v Brown [2021] WASC 81 (25 March 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Manifest excess’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant strangled his female partner until it was hard for her to breathe, and punched her in the face, causing significant bleeding from her left eye. He told her: “You did this. I didn’t do this.” The appellant was convicted, following trial, and sentenced to 2 years and 6 months imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
The magistrate erred in her calculation of the date on which the appellant's sentence was to be backdated (out by 4 days).
Held: Application for leave to appeal granted on both grounds but appeal only allowed in part to correct a mathematical error in sentencing (vary date of commencement from 21 to 17 August 2019).
Ground 1 alleging manifest excess was rejected. While the sentence was at the top of the range of appropriate sentences, it was not unreasonable or plainly unjust. The offence was extremely serious: “unprovoked, sustained and vicious.” Little could be said by way of mitigation, with the applicant’s complete lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility. General deterrence is an important sentencing consideration in family violence offences. In particular at [62]-[63]:
“It is characteristic of offences of this kind that they involve significant power imbalances (as the offence in this case did), that they are committed behind closed doors (as the offence in this case was) and that they are accompanied by lies and gas lighting (as the offence in this case undoubtedly was).
These features underscore the need for the courts, in imposing sentences commensurate with the seriousness of the offence in each case and applying all relevant sentencing principles, to send a strong signal that violence of this kind is intolerable and will be dealt with accordingly. The “firming up” of sentences for such violence, referred to in Duncan v The Queen [2018] WASCA 154, reflects that need.”
In addition, the court emphasised at [64] that:
“offences involving strangulation are particularly serious. As [the magistrate] said “a case of non-fatal strangulation … is extremely serious” and that “the courts now recognise how serious that action is.” In my view, her Honour can here be taken to be referring to the growing appreciation of the particular dangers associated with offences involving strangulation and with the role they play in cases of intimate and family violence. That recognition has, of course, led to legislative action, introducing a specific offence of suffocation or strangulation. That offence was, of course, not in existence at the time of the appellant’s offending against Ms Hallam. Nevertheless, as the learned Magistrate recognised, the recognition of the seriousness and danger of non fatal strangulation predated those legislative reforms and was a relevant sentencing consideration.”
Ground 2 upheld but only to correct the date from which the sentence commenced from 21 August 2019 to 17 August 2019.
Hill v Tomkin [2021] WASC 54 (3 March 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Act causing bodily harm’ – ‘Appeal against sentence’ – ‘Glassing’ – ‘Imprisonment’
Charges: Act causing bodily harm x 1.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The male appellant and the female victim had been in a domestic relationship but had lived separately for 7 months. The appellant and the victim had a verbal argument through the glass window pane of a side door. The appellant punched the glass window pane, causing the glass to break and strike the victim on her face, resulting in injuries requiring medical attention including stitches. The appellant pleaded guilty on the first morning of trial and was sentenced to 10 months immediate imprisonment, with eligibility for parole.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The magistrate erred in the calculation of the discount afforded for the guilty plea.
2.
The magistrate erred in failing to take into account any factor in mitigation other than the guilty plea.
3.
The magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment when a sentence of last resort was not warranted.
4.
The magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of immediate imprisonment when it was not inappropriate to suspend the sentence.
Held: Appeal was upheld on grounds 3 and 4, and the appellant re-sentenced by way of a community based order.
The injuries sustained by the complainant were severe but was not comparable to “glassing” distinguishing: “[a] glassing involves an intentional breaking of a glass into a person’s face with the obvious potential for very severe injury. The appellant’s act involved the appellant breaking a window in a momentary loss of control with no intention of causing harm to the complainant.”
Ground 4: The term of immediate imprisonment was manifestly excessive having regard to sentences imposed in other cases and factors mitigating the seriousness of the offence (absence of weapons and intention to cause injuries suffered, impulsivity and lack of foresight of the consequences, no threats of violence, and isolated nature of the act). The appellant was also remorseful, had no history of violence or violent offending and had positive antecedents. Further, on Ground 3: It was not open to impose a sentence of imprisonment. A term of imprisonment greater than 6 months would not have been appropriate.
Dickerson v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASC 425 (18 November 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Bail application’ – ‘Exceptional circumstances’ – ‘Female perpetrator’ – ‘Protection order’ – ‘Rehabilitation’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful wounding x 1; Breach of protective bail conditions x 1.
Proceedings: Application for bail.
Facts: The female applicant was awaiting trial for an aggravated unlawful wounding charge against her male ex-partner, the complainant, intending to argue she acted in self-defence. She had pleaded guilty to and was awaiting sentence for a breach of protective bail conditions charge. These conditions had prevented the applicant having any contact with the complainant but she submitted he had forced her to see him. While remanded in custody, the applicant’s ex-partner had tried to contact her, but she had refused. She had obtained a Family Violence Restraining Order protecting her from the complainant. She had taken steps towards rehabilitation, including drug and alcohol rehabilitation following an earlier breach of bail conditions for consuming alcohol.
Issues:
1.
Whether there were exceptional reasons why the accused should not be kept in custody.
2.
Whether the grant of bail would otherwise be proper, having regard to other factors the court must consider under cl 1 and cl 3 of Sch 1 Pt C of the Bail Act 1982 (WA).
Decision and reasoning: Bail granted.
Issue 1: There were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody. The breach of protective bail conditions charge was towards the lower end of seriousness for offending of its kind, particularly so “if it is accepted, in due course, that the applicant felt under pressure to go with the complainant. It was, in any event, the complainant who initiated the contact on that occasion”. There was no suggestion that the applicant was violent or intending to interfere with the complainant as a witness ([90]-[93]).
Further, the applicant had demonstrated a concerted effort to engage in rehabilitation. It was particularly significant that she had engaged in alcohol and drug rehabilitation after she was sentenced for an earlier breach of bail due to consuming alcohol ([94]-[95]).
In addition, it was significant that the applicant had refused to have contact with the complainant while remanded in custody, even though she was permitted to do so. The court noted at [96]:
“It is an irony in matters of this kind that a person who is remanded in custody for having breached a condition that prevented contact with a complainant is not prohibited from having contact with the complainant once they are in custody”.
And continued at [97]:
“Of course, in circumstances in which the applicant is well aware that she may put her prospects of being released on bail at risk if she were to have contact with the complainant, one might understand that she would exercise caution in that regard. However, the applicant has gone further. She has made an application and been granted the FVRO to prevent the complainant, Mr N, from having contact with her or approaching her. In other words, she has taken positive steps to give effect to the purpose to which cl 2(c) and (d) of sch 1 pt D of the Act are directed. That, it seems to me, is an unusual situation which, in combination with the applicant’s steps towards rehabilitation and the hardship that she will be required to endure if she remains in custody in the metropolitan area while her mother and her young child remain in Carnarvon, does amount to exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody”.
Issue 2: The conditions outlined at [100]-[108] were sufficient to guard against the risk that the applicant would commit a further offence or would either endanger or interfere with the complainant as a witness in these proceeding ([109]).
S v Barnes [2020] WASC 327 (11 September 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against conviction’ – ‘Defence of provocation’ – ‘Domestic violence’ – ‘Social media confession’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Charges: Aggravated common assault x 1.
Proceedings: Application for leave to appeal against conviction.
Facts: The male appellant admitted to assaulting his female partner; the sole issue at trial was whether the assault was unlawful. The complainant and appellant had a ‘prolonged and heated argument’ regarding the complainant buying plants and because the appellant refused to leave the TV room so that the children could watch TV. The context proceeding the assault included: the complainant slapping the appellant and trying to pull him off the couch where he was sitting; the complainant threatening to smash a hard disk drive unless the appellant left the TV room and when he did not leave throwing the hard disk drive against the wall; the complainant threatening to smash a PlayStation device and, when the appellant refused to leave the room, smashing it on the floor; the complainant kicking the appellant to try and force the appellant off the couch and allegedly saying ‘If you don’t do as I say, you’ll never see your son again’.
The appellant then grabbed the complainant around the neck with his right hand and squeezed her throat. The complainant collapsed and lost consciousness. The appellant’s evidence was that after she regained consciousness, she immediately started hitting him again. The complainant’s evidence was that she left the room but returned some minutes later and punched the appellant in the face. The appellant recounted these events two months after the incident in an extended Facebook post.
Grounds: (1) In making an assessment of the severity of the provocation, the magistrate failed to assess the totality of the complainant’s conduct.
Decision and reasoning: Leave to appeal refused.
It is clear from the magistrate’s reasons as a whole, and particularly the following passages, that the magistrate considered the totality of the complainant’s conduct:
[60] “To say to a person in the course of an argument, ‘You will never see your child again’ if it was said, and I’m assuming that it was, is an unpleasant thing to say, and I would expect that it would have an effect on any father. It would make anybody angry, in my view, or perhaps more angry than they already were. But applying what was said in paragraph 35 of the Hart case which is been brought to my attention, I do not accept that saying that would be sufficient to cause a reasonable person to lose control to such an extent as to choke the person who said it into unconsciousness.
Many things get said in the course of heated domestic arguments; I don’t consider that it can be said to justify such an extreme response. Although there is no medical evidence on the subject, I am sure that to choke a person into unconsciousness requires a considerable force and sustained over a period of time. It’s a requirement of provocation defences the force used must not be disproportionate to the provocation which is offered, and my view, this force which I have been talking about clearly is disproportionate.
[61] … So at the end of the day, I am satisfied that the conduct of the complainant may well have provoked the accused to some extent, that it may well have provoked him to lose control and act on the sudden. But I do not consider that her conduct was sufficiently provocative in all of the circumstances to justify an assault of this magnitude and of this seriousness. And I am of the view that choking her into unconsciousness was clearly disproportionate to any provocation that she may have offered.
Had I concluded that the magistrate had erred in any of the respects alleged by ground 1, I would have granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the basis that there had no substantial miscarriage of justice. In my judgment looking at the totality of the evidence and, for the purpose of the objective element of the defence of provocation, attributing to the ordinary reasonable person each of the characteristics identified by the appellant in ground 1, the prosecution discharged the burden on it to negative the defence of provocation. Faced with the provocation offered by the complainant as described by the appellant in the Facebook post, an ordinary reasonable person would not have ‘choked out’ the complainant.”
Stockley v Bailey [2020] WASC 193 (8 June 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated home burglary’ – ‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breaches of protection order’ – ‘Controlling, jealous, obsessive behaviour’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Guilty pleas’ – ‘History of domestic violence’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Weapon’
Charges: Breaching a family violence restraining order x 6; possessing a controlled weapon x 1; aggravated home burglary x 1; deprivation of liberty x 1
Case type: Appeal against sentence
Facts: In February 2020, the applicant man was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment following his conviction after guilty pleas to 6 offences of breaching a family violence restraining order (FVRO) and one offence of possessing a controlled weapon. Three days earlier the applicant was sentenced, following a guilty plea, to 3 years’ imprisonment in relation to a charge of aggravated home burglary and deprivation of liberty. These offences occurred at the same time as one of the FVRO offences and the possession of the controlled weapon, and the day before another two of the FVRO offences.
The applicant man and female victim were in a relationship which ended around April 2019. On 26 May 2019, the applicant was served with the FVRO which prohibited him from, among other things, communicating or attempting to communicate with the victim. Approximately 2 hours after being served, the applicant sent a series of 88 text messages to the victim. He was arrested, charged with breaches of the FVRO and released on bail. Several days later the applicant entered the victim’s house, pointed a replica pistol at her, forced her into his car and handcuffed her. That night, the pair discussed their relationship and had consensual sex. The applicant continued calling the victim and told her that he had entered her house again and accessed her Facebook account. He also repeatedly approached the victim on her commute home, including getting into her vehicle with her. The applicant was eventually arrested near the victim’s home, and police searched his premises and located the replica firearm. The applicant had a modest criminal record, including convictions for breaching restraining orders and assault.
Grounds:
1.
7 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive; and
2.
the total sentence of 3 years, 7 months was disproportionate to the overall criminality involved and the total sentence was crushing.
It was also argued that the learned magistrate failed to give sufficient weight to his early guilty pleas, his lack of a relevant record and reasonably good antecedents, his efforts at rehabilitation, and his mental health at the time of his offending, which had been treated at the time of sentencing.
Held: Leave to appeal granted, appeal dismissed.
Ground 1 was not established. The applicant’s breaches of the FVRO were not minor or technical. Rather, he repeatedly refused to obey the order which was imposed for the victim’s protection, and flagrantly disregarded both the authority of the court and the rights of the victim ([56]). The offences were serious as they involved the applicant entering the victim’s home on two separate occasions (one of which involved a replica pistol and handcuffs), and following her on the train home. These breaches were terrifying for the victim who believed that she was going to be murdered. The offences were further aggravated by the fact they were committed when the applicant was on bail for earlier breaches of the FVRO ([57]). However, Hill J noted that the Magistrate did not comply with s 9AA(5) Sentencing Act by failing to state the extent of the reduction given for his guilty plea ([70], [85]), but this did not result in the applicant’s sentences being overturned ([71]). Hill J also found that the Magistrate took the applicant's antecedents and mental health issues into account. It was clear that the Magistrate considered that the applicant’s mental health issues were not such that he was an unsuitable vehicle for personal and general deterrence ([74]-[75]).
In relation to Ground 2, Hill J found that the total effective sentence was neither unreasonable nor plainly unjust, and was not crushing ([82]-[84]). Any error made by the Magistrate did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice ([91]).
Hosking v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASC 167 (20 May 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail application’ – ‘Controlling behaviours’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Risk of reoffending’ – ‘Separation’ – ‘Step-child in the family’ – ‘Weapon’
Offences: Breach of Police Order x 1; Common assault x 1; Assault causing bodily harm x 1; Being armed in a way that may cause fear x 1.
Proceedings: Bail application
Issue: Whether the applicant might reoffend if released from custody; whether there were conditions that could be reasonably imposed if bail were granted to ameliorate the risk of reoffending.
Facts: The male applicant and female victim were married for 11 years and had three children. The victim also had another child (Ryan) from a previous relationship. One night at the family residence, the applicant pushed Ryan in the chest, causing him to stumble backwards, then punched him in the face. A 72-hour police order was served on the applicant following this incident which prohibited him from entering or remaining within 10 metres of the residence, from going within 10 metres of the victim, and from acting in a violent or intimidating manner towards her. The night following the incident, the applicant entered the residence. An altercation ensued in which the applicant pushed the victim to the ground, punched her in the head and kneed her in the head and body, for which she required medical attention. A Mr Ledgerton was at the residence and intervened to protect the victim. The victim left the house. The applicant then armed himself with a knife and went out to the front drive where he threatened Mr Ledgerton and a neighbour with the knife.
The applicant plead guilty to breaching the police order but not guilty to the remaining charges and was remanded in custody. The applicant applied for bail for the charged offences, but this was refused by the Magistrate on grounds of the seriousness and nature of the alleged offending, the fact that the applicant had breached a police order shortly after it was made, and fears by the victim (and concerns by the police) that the applicant posed a risk to the victim and her children. The applicant subsequently applied for bail again after the victim visited him in custody, but the Magistrate again refused on the basis that the prosecution case was strong and no conditions could be imposed that would ameliorate the risk of offending in a violent manner or interfering with witnesses. The applicant then applied for bail a third time.
Judgment: The judge granted bail subject to several conditions which His Honour stated would "sufficiently remove the possibility of the applicant reoffending" [8]. These conditions included: curfew and reporting conditions; conditions to protect the victim, Ryan, Mr Ledgerton and the neighbour from contact by the applicant; and conditions regulating the applicant’s conduct with his children [20].
The respondent opposed the bail application because there was a risk the applicant would reoffend if released [8]. However, the victim submitted an affidavit to the court stating that she wanted the applicant to be released on bail [7]. The affidavit provided that: the victim did not resile from any of the allegations made; during the relationship, the applicant engaged in controlling behaviours that caused the victim distress; and the applicant continued to telephone her while in custody causing her more stress [16]. However, the affidavit also provided that the applicant’s alleged conduct was out of character and the victim wanted bail to be granted because she was concerned that the applicant’s continued detention would adversely affect his relationship with his children and make it more difficult for her to establish a new life [16].
His Honour had reservations about the victim’s change in attitude [7] but granted bail due to a number of factors including: accommodation and employment arrangements that had been made for the applicant; the likely length of any sentence that would be imposed if he were convicted; the likely time until trial (next year); the incentive he had to abide by his bail undertakings (ie: access to his children); the time since the alleged offending occurred; the victim’s attitude (she expressed a wish that the applicant be granted bail and had visited him in custody with two of her children); and evidence concerning the applicant’s behaviour at the time of the offending (the behaviour occurred in a particular context that no longer prevailed – the applicant now accepted that the relationship was over) [7], [12].
Riddoch v Chiera [2020] WASC 114 (7 April 2020) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Non-fatal strangulation’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Charges: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm x1;
Appeal type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence
Grounds:
1.
The magistrate's conduct during the sentencing hearing did not allow defence counsel to make full submissions as to the appellant's personal circumstances and the nature of the relationship between the appellant and complainant, which hindrance resulted in a miscarriage of the sentencing exercise; and
2.
The type of sentence imposed was manifestly excessive as it was reasonably open to His Honour, in all the circumstances, to suspend the term of imprisonment imposed. Particulars:
1.
The plea of guilty and the relevance of the discount for that plea;
2.
The appellant's antecedents;
3.
Sentences imposed in, broadly, comparable cases;
4.
The prosecution's concession as to the type of sentence open to the Court.
3.
The learned Magistrate erred when he failed to adequately consider the imposition of a type of sentence less than one of immediate imprisonment.
Facts: The male appellant and female victim had been in a domestic relationship for six years and had a child together. At the time of offending, the victim and appellant were arguing in a car while the child was in the backseat. During the argument, the victim pulled over to the side of the road out of fear of the appellant and ask him to get out of the car. The appellant then punched the victim to the upper-left arm and grabbed her and squeezed her arm. He then "punched the victim to her left breast and the left side of her stomach". The appellant continued to assault the victim until he hit her head against a window and strangled her until she could not breathe.
The appellant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment. The magistrate declined to suspend the term.
Judgment: The first ground was dismissed; as the Magistrate was not discourteous and did not prevent the plea from being made, the contention was without foundation. McGrath J observed that “His Honour directly challenged counsel as to whether a submission was effectively being made that the victim was to blame. Counsel then positively engaged with the judicial officer, clarifying the submission.” [26]
The second ground of appeal was also dismissed; it was noted that the sentencing judge "carefully reviewed all relevant sentencing factors" and only after doing so correctly concluded that imprisonment was the only appropriate punishment [37-8].
The third ground was also dismissed. McGrath J found the domestic relationship and presence of young children to be aggravating factors and thought the 15% discount afforded for the guilty plea by the sentencing judge was appropriate. After placing minimal weight on the offender’s personal circumstances, such as his age, as mitigating factors, the Court concluded that the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Clarke v Cantatore [2019] WASC 385 (28 October 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravating factor’ – ‘Assault’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Mitigating factors’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Aggravated administration of a noxious thing to another person x 1; Aggravated common assault.
Proceedings: Appeal against sentences
Facts: The appellant and the complainant had, at the time of the allegations, been in a relationship for approximately five years and were engaged to be married. The appellant verbally abused the complainant and threw her onto the bed. The complainant managed to kick the appellant off her and the appellant threw items around the room. The complainant’s attempt to use pepper spray to keep the appellant away only angered him further. He picked the complainant up by her neck and jaw before throwing her back a couple of metres into the fridge. The accused hit the complainant against the fridge again, causing her to drop to the ground in pain. When she stood up again the accused sprayed the back of her neck with pepper spray.
The appellant was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issues: The appellant appealed on grounds the sentences were manifestly excessive and that the magistrate erred in ordering the sentences be served cumulatively and that the total sentences should not be suspended.
Decision and reasoning: Jenkins J held that the magistrate had correctly balanced the appellant’s personal circumstances including the domestic relationship with the complainant and repeated significant force against any aggravating factors and that the sentences were therefore not manifestly excessive. The total effective sentence was held to be plainly unjust given the offending was close in time and in one incident, the appellant had good prospects of rehabilitation, and had never been sentenced to imprisonment or convicted of violent offending previously. There was no error in choosing not to suspend the sentences.
RE Magistrate G Benn; EX Parte Gethin [2019] WASC 380 (15 October 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for review order’ – ‘Cyber stalking’ – ‘Interim fvro’
Case type: application for review of an interim FVRO
Facts: The respondent was granted an interim FVRO based on allegations in an application, affidavit and oral evidence that his sister(the applicant) was communicating in an intimidating and abusive manner by phone calls, text messages and emails in a manner consistent with the meaning of ‘cyber-stalking’. The communications related to the way in which he was caring for their father, who was in a nursing home. The applicant submitted that the magistrate applied the wrong meaning of the term ‘family violence’ and there was no evidence of any act that could arguably constitute ‘family violence’ within the correct definition under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), arguing that the magistrate therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the FVRO, or alternately that her application be treated as an appeal.
Issue: Did the magistrate apply the wrong meaning of ‘family violence’
Held: The magistrate did not make an error in jurisdiction by applying the wrong definition and the application for review was dismissed. The application, supporting affidavit and oral evidence heard all disclosed matters that were within the definition of "cyber stalking". In any event if the matter were to be reviewed the final hearing on the FVRO would need to be vacated and the matter would be more quickly dealt with by way of final hearing.
[Summary prepared by Lily Philp for Western Australian Magistrates Court]
Howell v Davies [2019] WASC 220 (27 June 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Application for leave to appeal against sentence’ – ‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Court safety’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Intimidation’ – ‘Repeated breaches’
Charges: 1 x breach of restraining order
Case type: Application for leave to appeal out of time and leave to appeal against sentence
Facts: The appellant man pleaded guilty to a charge of breaching a family violence restraining order. He breached the order by approaching his female former partner outside court immediately following the restraining order final hearing for which he had failed to appear and asking "when am I going to see my kids?" He was sentenced to 7 months' imprisonment. He sought leave to appeal against that sentence. The application for leave to appeal was lodged 12 days after the last date for filing an appeal. An application for expedited hearing had already been granted.
Ground: The learned magistrate erred in finding that it would be necessary to find 'unjust circumstances' in order to suspend the term of imprisonment ([24]).
Held: The breach in question did not involve any actual or expressly threatened violence, however Hall J noted that ‘protected persons can feel intimidated or threatened by being contacted or approached by the person they fear’. The orders intended to provide protection from such fear, as well as the risk of physical harm ([31]).
In assessing the gravity of the offence, Hall J listed relevant factors:
•
The breach occurred in the surroundings of a court, where the protected person was entitled to feel secure;
•
The appellant attended court for a hearing in relation to the order, so its requirements must have been known to him;
•
The approach was physical, and it is more likely that fear would be caused to a protected person in such a case;
•
This was the third breach of the same order within a 4-month period, demonstrating a persistent disregard for court orders and the appellant’s failure to be deterred by previous prison sentences;
•
The breach occurred just over 10 days after the appellant was released after serving, concurrently, 2 months for previous breaches (aggravating feature);
•
This was the eleventh offence of this nature over a 5-year period. The appellant had clearly shown contempt for authority on previous occasions, which thereby increased the need for specific deterrence.
These factors, as well as the appellant’s explanation for and nature of the breach, his early guilty plea and the risk of institutionalisation, led his Honour to find that it would have been inappropriate to suspend the term of imprisonment. Accordingly, there was no substantial miscarriage of justice and the appeal was dismissed ([39]).
Goodacre v Lumbers [2019] WASC 184 (27 May 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Appeal against conviction - guilty plea’ – ‘Breach of fvro’ – ‘Meaning of fvro term’
Charge/s: 1 x breach of FVRO
Case Type: Application for extension of time to appeal, appeal against conviction following plea of guilty
Facts: On 29 December 2018 the appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court on his plea of guilty to one offence of breaching a FVRO contrary to s 61(1) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). The appellant applied for an extension of time to appeal and for leave to appeal against conviction. The appellant appeals the conviction on the ground that he could not in law, on the basis of the admitted facts, have been guilty of the offence. The appellant was said to have breached the FVRO by ‘harass[ing] the Person Protected by any electronic means, including by using the internet and any social network application (such as ‘Facebook’) to depict or refer in any manner to the person protected’, and appeals on the basis that he was dealt with in the Magistrates Court on the basis that he referred to the person protected and not on the basis he harassed her.
Issue: Is a reference to a protected person in a SMS message not sent to the protected person a breach of the FVRO? Is it a mere reference via electronic means that constitutes a breach, or is it actual harassment?
Held: Application allowed and leave granted. A breach occurs if the person subject to the order ‘harasses’ the person protected. The reference to ‘including by using the internet and any social network application (such as ‘Facebook’) to depict or refer in any manner to the person protected’ serves only as an example of what could constitute harassment, and was not intended by parliament to mean that any electronic reference to the person protected constitutes a breach.
[Summary prepared by Lily Philp for Western Australian Magistrates Court]
Masoud v Dhaliwal [2019] WASC 56 (1 March 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Fines’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Security officer’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Strangulation’
Charges: Assault in circumstances of aggravation x 1.
Case type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was convicted on his plea of one offence of assault in circumstances of aggravation. The relevant circumstance of aggravation was that the appellant and the victim, the appellant's wife, were in a family relationship. The assault comprised of the appellant hitting the victim, grabbing her by the throat, and holding her around five seconds until other family members intervened ([6]). At the time of the offence, the appellant held a security officer’s licence and worked as a security officer. The licence was suspended and he resigned from his job before the sentencing hearing ([7]). Having regard to the seriousness of the offence and mitigating factors, the magistrate imposed a fine of $1200 and made a spent conviction order ([1]).
Issues: The appellant appealed the sentence. Submissions included that:
•
The appellant's counsel did not make submissions about the amount of the fine or the possible impact of a fine on the appellant's ability to continue to hold a security licence, and therefore the magistrate did not consider such implications.
•
The sentence would lead to a loss of employment, hardship and a loss of financial security.
•
The imposition of a fine under $500 would be within the range of an appropriate exercise of the sentencing discretion given the circumstances of the offence and relevant mitigating factors (appellant's age and evident remorse, absence of any prior offending, the fact that the appellant is the main financial provider for his family).
Decision and reasoning: The Court was not satisfied that there was any substantial miscarriage of justice and dismissed the appeal. At [29]-[32], Tottle J noted numerous issues with the appellant’s case. First, as the respondent submitted, reducing the fine imposed on the appellant under $500 would undermine the operation of the Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA). His Honour accepted that this was a case involving a nexus between the offending and the appellant's occupation as a security officer. Security officers must often exhibit self-restraint in the performance of their duties. The offending was contrary to this. Second, there was force to the respondent's submission that the appellant's argument does not rest on the proposition that the fine should be reduced because of the extra-curial punishment constituted by the financial hardship resulting from the loss of the appellant's security officer's licence, but that the fine should be reduced to avoid that extra-curial punishment with the result that the appellant is doubly advantaged in relation to mitigation. Third, the maximum penalty for the offence of common assault in circumstances of aggravation is a $36,000 fine or 3 years’ imprisonment, or both. A fine of less than $500 would not constitute an appropriate sentence. Although the offence was considered to be 'towards the lower end of the scale’, there is no single correct sentence for any offence, and his Honour held that a fine of less than $500 would not be adequate given the seriousness of the offending.
Smartt v Sloane [2019] WASC 35 (5 February 2019) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Coercive and controlling’ – ‘Cumulation’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charges: Breaches of a restraining order and a protective bail condition, stalking.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant breached a Family Violence Restraining Order (FVRO) which restrained him from communicating or attempting to communicate with the victim (his former partner) by any electronic means. He was also charged with an offence of stalking, based on repeated calls he made to the victim which had the effect of intimidating her. He also failed to comply with a protective bail condition ([3])-[12]). He pleaded guilty to all the offences and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. The Magistrate noted that the appellant’s conduct was coercive and controlling, causing fear to his former partner. His behaviour was ‘persistent and intimidatory’, and the breaches showed a repeated disregard of the court orders ([16]).
Issues: The appellant sought to appeal his sentence on the ground that the Magistrate’s sentencing discretion miscarried, and that the sentence was manifestly excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Decision and reasoning: The Court found that the appellant’s breaches of the restraining order could not be described as ‘minor or technical’ ([33]). Although the breaches did not involve actual or threatened violence, his repeated acts showed a refusal to accept the authority of the order imposed for the protection of the victim. The Court was satisfied that the term imposed for the offences was manifestly long so as to show an error in principle ([35]). The Court considered the personal circumstances of the appellant – he was 36 years old, a self-employed businessman, and had previous convictions for serious breaches of a VRO against the same victim for which he was sentenced to imprisonment ([37]). Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and resentenced the appellant. A cumulative sentence was found to be appropriate to reflect the additional element of intimidation. The head sentence was reduced to 8 months, and the appellant was eligible for parole ([40]-[41]).
Bryant v Witts [2018] WASC 194 (27 June 2018) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Disclosure’ – ‘Manifestly excessive’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charges: Aggravated unlawful assault x 2; Aggravated unlawful assault causing bodily harm x 4; Cruelty to an animal causing it unnecessary harm x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a de facto relationship. On multiple occasions over 2 years, the appellant punched or struck the complainant, causing a broken arm ([25]) and a split lip ([26]). On the occasions where he struck her with a hairbrush and mobile phone, her head split open and she required stitches ([18]-[21], [24]). The appellant also kicked her small dog, causing it to become paralysed and die ([29]). Her children were present on most of the occasions. The assaults were unprovoked. While the police were sometimes called by witnesses, the complainant did not feel safe enough to tell the police about all the assaults until she had left the relationship ([31]).
The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 22 months’ imprisonment ([48]).
Issues: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive; whether the sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle; whether a suspended sentence should have been imposed.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed.
Derrick J found that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. His Honour stated that “over an extended period of time the appellant engaged in a serious course of criminal conduct comprised of subjecting the vulnerable complainant to a number of significant acts of domestic violence. The fact that the offences were committed in a domestic setting increases the seriousness of what the appellant did” ([73]). Factors such as the appellant’s relative youth and relatively limited prior record provided some mitigatory value.
For largely the same reasons, Derrick J considered that imposing an immediate term of imprisonment, compared to a suspended sentence, was not outside the range of the magistrate’s sentencing discretion ([94]).
Re Magistrate G Mignacca-Randazzo; Ex parte Chown [2018] WASC 157 (11 May 2018) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Adjournments and timely decision making’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘Family violence restraining order’ – ‘Judicial review’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’
Case type: Application for review of Magistrate’s decision not to make a final family violence restraining order and application for stay of proceedings.
Facts: The applicant made an application for a family violence restraining order pursuant to s 24A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (‘Restraining Orders Act’) against her former partner ([9]). The Court made an interim family violence restraining order ([10]). The respondent objected to the interim order ([11]). The next hearing was listed as a 'Restraining Order Final Order Directions Hearing'. The respondent did not attend at that hearing. The Magistrate did not make a final order, and adjourned the hearing ([14]-[17]).
The applicant applied for a review order under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) ([2]), to review the Magistrate’s decision not to make a final restraining order. The applicant also applied for a stay of the substantive hearing.
Issues: Whether the applications should be granted.
Decision and Reasoning: Tottle J granted the review order and the stay of proceedings.
Tottle J set out the principles governing judicial review under s 36of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) at [4]-[8]. His Honour set out the principles governing when a final order must be made under s 42 of the Restraining Orders Act at [20]-[24]. Tottle J held that it was irrelevant that the hearing was described as a 'Restraining Order Final Order Directions Hearing' even though no hearing of that nature is contemplated or provided for by the Restraining Orders Act (discussing Kickett v Starr [2013] WADC 52) ([27]-[32]). Tottle J was satisfied that the Magistrate made a jurisdictional error by not exercising the jurisdiction conferred on him by the Restraining Orders Act ([33]).
Tottle J set out the principles governing when a stay ought to be granted at [40]. Tottle J granted a stay of the proceedings on the grounds that the applicant’s medical conditions and stress would be exacerbated by having to face the respondent in a contested hearing ([41]-[42]). Tottle J noted that s 10B of the Restraining Orders Act requires courts to have regard to the possibility of re-traumatisation during the proceedings ([43]).
Labriola v Morgan [2017] WASC 256 (30 August 2017) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Animal abuse’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Control’ – ‘Domestic violence incident report’ – ‘Factors affecting risk’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘Frequency of abuse’ – ‘Jealousy’ – ‘Risk assessment’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Strangulation’ – ‘Threats to kill’
Charges: Obstructing a police officer x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was convicted of obstructing two police officers by resisting arrest ([2]). The appellant was arrested on suspicion of committing an offence by breaching a violence restraining order ([2]). The breach occurred when the appellant attended a dog training class when he allegedly knew the victim would be there ([56]). The victim later reported the incident and the incident was recorded with a Domestic Violence Incident Report (‘DVIR’):
•
‘Prior family domestic violence incidents between the involved parties? Yes
•
Is the victim frightened? Yes
•
Is the abuse happening more often? Yes
•
Is the abuse getting worse? Yes
•
Financial issues? Yes (Issues surrounding the ownership of the two dogs)
•
Does the perpetrator try to control everything the victim does? Yes
•
Is the perpetrator excessively jealous? Yes
•
Does the perpetrator constantly text, call contact, follow, stalk or harass the victim? Yes
•
Has the perpetrator ever threatened to hurt or kill the victim? Yes
•
Has the perpetrator eve attempted to strangle/choke/suffocate/drown the victim? Yes
•
Other information: [the appellant] has grabbed [the complainant] by the throat in Dec 2014 and has tried to strangle one of the two dogs in the past’ ([57]).
Issues: One issue was whether the police could form a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had breached a violence restraining order by relying on a DVIR ([61](iv))
Decision and Reasoning: Justice Tottle concluded that the officer’s ‘suspicion of a breach of the order by the appellant was reasonable. The narrative section of the incident report read in the context of the DVIR section of the report (that is the allegation of breach assessed against what had allegedly taken place in the past) provide a basis for a suspicion that the appellant had breached the order’ ([70]).
Dennis v Lanternier (No 2) [2017] WASC 5 (12 January 2017) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing and monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing-protection of victims’ – ‘Threats’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order (VRO) x 20.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and the victim were married for 14 years but were separated at the time of the offences ([13]). A VRO was granted with the victim as the protected person ([13]). The appellant was prohibited from contacting the respondent except to arrange for contact with his son ([15]). The appellant breached the VRO over a period of 7 months by making a significant number of phone calls to the victim and sending text messages and letters beyond the bounds of the VRO ([18]-[53]). In some instances, the messages included threats to kill the victim and himself. The Magistrate imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment.
Issues: There were 6 grounds of appeal:
1.
the total sentence was manifestly excessive;
2.
the Magistrate did not properly take into account the appellant's pleas of guilty which were entered at an early opportunity;
3.
the Magistrate failed to consider totality when determining the aggregate sentence;
4.
the Magistrate overlooked the appellant's personal circumstances including his wife's breaches of the Family Court consent orders and the appellant's mental state at the time of the offences;
5.
the Magistrate made an error of fact by taking into account an untrue submission made by the prosecutor that the appellant had threatened his child; and
6.
there was an error in recording the appellant's aggregate sentence as 18 months' imprisonment rather than 15 months' imprisonment ([3]).
Decision and Reasoning: Jenkins J dealt with the grounds of appeal in the following manner:
1.
Dismissed ([142]-[175]).
2.
Error made out. Jenkins J held that the Magistrate failed to correctly apply s 9AA(5) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) by failing to state the extent of reduction given to the pleas of guilty for each head sentence ([122]-[124]).
3.
Dismissed ([125]-[127]).
4.
Dismissed ([128]-[137]).
5.
Not possible to decide because part of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court had not been recorded. Jenkins J did not take this fact into account in deciding the appeal ([138]-[141]).
6.
Dismissed. It was clear that the Magistrate meant to impose an aggregate sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment ([109]-[110]).
While Jenkins J accepted that ground 2 was made out, the appeal was dismissed because the error did not result in a substantial miscarriage of justice ([184]).
Jenkins J referred to the role of the Restraining Orders Act in deterring domestic violence at [152]:
The long title of the Restraining Orders Act reflects Parliament's intention for the Act to provide for orders to 'restrain people from committing acts of family or domestic or personal violence by imposing restraints on their behaviour and activity'. In order for the Act to be effective, offenders must appreciate that if they breach a VRO they will receive a significant penalty. The community and the courts have [an] intolerance and abhorrence of violence and threatened violence in domestic and former domestic relationships. The penalties imposed for breaches of VROs must reflect that intolerance and abhorrence, in the hope that the penalties deter offenders and protect victims.
Bindai v Armstrong [2016] WASC 341 (20 October 2016) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘Notice of application’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order (‘VRO’) x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: There was a final VRO in place protecting the applicant’s partner. The applicant’s partner applied for a variation of that order. The applicant was not served with notice of the application to vary the VRO ([10]). The Magistrate granted the application to vary the VRO even though the appellant was not present ([11]). The appellant pleaded guilty to breaching the VRO ([1]).
Issues: Whether the appellant’s conviction upon his own plea was a miscarriage of justice.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed ([30]). The variation to the restraining order was a nullity ([16], [22]). It was an essential condition of the jurisdiction to hear the application to vary the VRO under s 48(2) of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) that the Court be satisfied that the appellant was served with the summons ([23]). Since the Court was not so satisfied, the VRO had no legal force. It was a miscarriage of justice for the appellant to be convicted of breaching the order ([24]).
BV (on behalf of M, N and O) v TP [2016] WASC 228 (28 July 2016) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Evidence issues’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Victim experience of court processes’ – ‘Violence restraining order’
Case type: Application for leave to appeal against Magistrate’s decision not to grant final violence restraining order (FVO).
Facts: The appellant, BV, and the respondent, TP, were married but separated. BV obtained an interim FVO against TP in the Children’s Court. The FVO was to protect BV and TP’s three daughters, M, N and O ([1]-[2]). At the final order hearing, after BV had given her evidence in chief, the Magistrate interrogated TP’s counsel about the likely content of further evidence proposed to be given by the children. The Magistrate expressed a strong disinclination against exposing the children to cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel. The Magistrate summarily dismissed BV’s application for a final order VRO on the basis that even if their evidence was accepted, it would not be enough to justify an FVO being granted ([7]-[8], [45]).
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in law by summarily dismissing the proceedings.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Kenneth Martin J held that the Magistrate was correct in expressing concern for the children’s welfare if they were cross-examined ([118]). His Honour held that the Magistrate had the power to summarily dismiss the final order VRO application ([133]-[143]) and that the Magistrate’s discretionary exercise of power to dismiss the proceedings was justifiable ([144]-[147]).
His Honour discussed the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in the circumstances that the interim order was made in the Children’s Court at [21], [46]-[90] and [149]-[161]. His Honour discussed the principles applicable to children giving evidence in VRO proceedings at [99]-[119].
Bacchelli v Merchant [2015] WASC 205 (9 June 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Insanity’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Plea of guilty’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to breaching a violence restraining order in favour of his wife and was fined $500 with costs. The breach arose out of the appellant’s attendance at his wife’s home to retrieve some of his property. He claimed he had misunderstood the terms of the violence restraining order and that if he had known that the order did not permit him to attend the house, he would have attended the police station and asked officers to accompany him while he retrieved the property. The appellant had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had tendered medical records to the Magistrate.
Issue/s: Whether there was a miscarriage of justice because when the appellant pleaded guilty he was unaware he had an arguable defence of unsoundness of mind.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld and a retrial was ordered. The appellant’s affidavit on appeal stated that he was suffering a relapse of his bipolar disorder when he pleaded guilty to the charge. A psychiatrist’s affidavit indicated that it was more likely than not that the appellant was, ‘in such a state of mental impairment so as to deprive him of the capacity to know that he ought not to assault someone or return to his house’ (see at [36]). However, at the time he pleaded guilty, he was not aware that his mental state was not normal. As such, the evidence indicates that he may have had an arguable insanity defence at the time of the guilty plea. Furthermore, when the appellant consulted with a solicitor, there was no discussion in relation to a possible insanity defence, even though the solicitor knew of the appellant’s history of mental illness. There was no available evidence at the time that the lawyer should have considered the availability of a mental impairment defence. Nevertheless, Beech J held that, ‘through no fault of his own, Mr Bacchelli had no practical opportunity to raise the possible defence of insanity, or the facts relevant to it, with his lawyer’ (see at [54]). The appellant had an arguable defence but had no way of knowing of that defence, such that his plea was fundamentally not an informed one. Beech J noted that this does not mean a plea will always be set aside in these circumstances but in this case, the nature of the appellant’s ignorance of the defence resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Bernard v Williams [2015] WASC 182 (30 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Consent’ – ‘Immediate imprisonment’ – ‘Repeated breaches of a restraining order’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to two breaches of a violence restraining order. He breached the order by living with the protected person and by being within a hundred metres of the protected person (in the same house as her). At the same time, the appellant was also dealt with for an earlier breach alleging that he was within a hundred metres of the protected person (attending and remaining at the protected person’s address). This was a ‘third strike’ case in which the magistrate was required to impose a penalty that is or includes imprisonment. The magistrate imposed a term of imprisonment for six months for each offence. A sentence of six months or less may not be imposed (Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s86). The day before the hearing of this appeal, the Magistrates Court recalled the sentence and imposed a sentence of 6 months and 1 day.
Issue/s: One of the issues was that the sentence contravened the Sentencing Act.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. If it was not for the error in imposing a sentence of six months, the decision of the magistrate to impose a sentence that included imprisonment would have been within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion. The appellant had breached a VRO repeatedly (See Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 at [13]-[15]). The correction of the sentence to 6 months and 1 day was not made in compliance with s 37(2) of the Sentencing Act as the magistrate did not give the appellant the opportunity to be heard. The appellant fell to be resentenced.
A sentence of suspended imprisonment would have been appropriate but for the fact that the appellant had already served 6 weeks in prison. The term of imprisonment was set aside and the appellant fined $1,500. The court took into account a number of factors including that the protected person expressed no fear of the appellant at the time of appeal; it was important to demonstrate to the appellant that he could not disregard the order of the court with impunity; the consent of the protected person was not a mitigating factor but it was relevant in considering the circumstances of the offence; and although there had been repeated breaches of the order, there was nothing to suggest actual violence or threat of violence (See [25]-[28]). His Honour also cited Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 where his Honour Miller J described the Restraining Orders Act as social legislation of the utmost importance:
‘…protected persons in the community generally must have confidence that restraining orders will be obeyed and complied with … [When] they are not, there must be significant consequences to support the fact that restraining orders mean something … [The] courts [must] ensure that their orders are not ignored [14].’
Wallam v Grosveld [2015] WASC 145 (24 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was subject to a violence restraining order (VRO) in favour of his former partner which prevented him from approaching her and from being within a nominated distance of her premises. He attended her premises in breach of the order. He claimed that he and the protected person were ‘back in a relationship’. His had a history of breaching restraining orders in place against the same protected person. He was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether it was reasonably open for the Magistrate to conclude that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was the only appropriate sentencing option.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. It seemed that the protected person invited the applicant back to her premises to collect his clothes. Notwithstanding, any breach of a VRO is serious. Justice Kenneth Martin commented on the penalties for the offence and then noted at [78]:
‘Those significant statutory penalties speak loudly as to the seriousness of a breach of a restraining order and dictate how closely and carefully the underlying circumstances of such an offence must be assessed in every case. In the past there have, of course, been well referenced instances where terrible crimes of violence have been committed in the community against protected persons by individuals otherwise bound by a restraining order, but who chose to ignore it. Plainly, the statutory right to apply for a VRO is meant to assist the more vulnerable to protect themselves from violence, especially (but not solely) women who are the victims of domestic violence. Thus, issues of general and specific deterrence concerning offenders are more than usually important in this arena.’
In this case, there had been no threatening or intimidatory behaviour. While an adverse inference could be drawn from the apparent fact that the applicant was hiding when police arrived, the applicant’s actions cannot be seen as a ‘calculated and flagrant’ contempt of the VRO – ‘Ignorance about the strict workings of a VRO, in the face of periods of separation and reconciliation and then heavy alcohol consumption at the end of a long-term relationship, are a more viable explanation for his misconduct, in my view’ (see at [80]).
His Honour expressly stated that he was not meaning to convey that for some VRO breaches which include a ‘flagrant disregard’ for court orders, ‘a term of immediate imprisonment will not present as the only appropriate sentencing option’ (see at [81]). However, in this case the circumstances (including that the penalties imposed upon him for his prior breaches were only fines and the benign nature of the breach) meant that an escalation in punishment from these pecuniary penalties up to a term of 8 months’ imprisonment, was not within the discretion open to the Magistrate. (Note: this position would be altered if s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) applied, which provides for a requirement of imprisonment after 2 discrete offences within a 2-year period).
2. This argument was also upheld.
Rogers v Hitchcock [2015] WASC 120 (7 April 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of police order’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of police order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was at a caravan park with his wife and two-year-old child. The appellant and his wife were drinking heavily when a disagreement occurred and police attended. Police issued a 72-hour order under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) which prevented the appellant from communicating with his wife or approaching within 100 metres of her. The next day, police attended to check on the appellant’s wife and discovered the appellant hiding in the house. The appellant had a minor but relevant criminal history involving two breaches of prior police orders made in favour of his wife. He pleaded guilty, was granted bail and was placed on a ‘domestic violence behaviour change programme’ under the supervision of a Family Violence Court. He completed the majority of the program but was unable to complete it because he was remanded in custody after attending his wife’s home in breach of bail. A progress report about his participation in the program was provided to the Magistrate, which stated that he generally ‘reported as directed and engaged well’ but that he ‘had made no identifiable treatment gains during the programme and was not considered suitable for a further community based disposition’ (see at [16]). He was sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred in sentencing the appellant to a term of imprisonment.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in failing to suspend the term.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred in failing to backdate the sentence of imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of ground 3 – the Magistrate erred by not backdating the sentence to give credit for time already spent in custody.
1.
The issue of imprisonment was decided in the context of s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), which provides for a presumption of imprisonment for repeat offenders under the Act. Hall J held that while there was no actual or threatened violence involved in the current or prior breaches, the appellant had deliberately refused the authority of the orders. See in particular at [46] – ‘Deliberate breaches of court orders or police orders made under the Act undermine the efficacy of such orders. Deterrence both personal and general must play a significant role when orders are breached. If those who are the subject of such orders believe that they can breach them without suffering any real consequence then there will be little incentive to be compliant.’
2.
The Court held that it was within the Magistrate’s discretion to refuse to suspend the sentence.
Given error was demonstrated by the failure to backdate the sentence, it was appropriate to resentence the appellant. In that regard, Justice Hall took into account some further steps that the appellant had taken towards rehabilitation, including drug and alcohol programs. Given these circumstances and the time already spent in custody, the prison sentence was set aside and the appellant was fined $1500.
Weston v Cartmell [2015] WASC 87 (16 March 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of bail’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Trespass’
Charge/s: Trespass, Breach of bail (numerous counts).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant’s marriage with his wife (the complainant) ended. The complainant had purchased a new house and the appellant climbed the fence and walked around the property for some time. He had some property including vehicles at the house. The appellant then forced entry and was restrained by the complainant’s male friend who was at the home before police arrived. After being released on bail with conditions that he not contact or attempt to contact the complainant, he breached this bail by attempting to contact her via email 153 times. He also made 126 phone calls or text messages. These communications occurred while the appellant was living in New Zealand. The appellant and the complainant had shared business interests. The appellant also had an interest in the complainant’s home because part of the deposit for the home had been paid from a bank account in which the appellant had an interest. The prosecution accepted that many of the communications related to these business matters. A total effective sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was imposed.
Issue/s: Whether the total effective sentence did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The appellant submitted that the sentence should have been suspended.
Hall J noted that while the large number of breaches of bail made this offending serious, the personal circumstances of the appellant were exceptional. Given that many of the communications related to business issues, it is difficult to conclude that the communications were intimidatory. As his Honour noted at [39] – ‘The number of the communications could not be viewed in isolation from their purpose and subject matter. There was no evidence that any of the communications were harassing or threatening in tone, content or nature. There was no information regarding communications being at inconvenient times or being deliberately repetitive.’
Furthermore, the evidence indicated that the conduct was out of character. The appellant had previous good character, a solid employment history, surrendered himself to police and fully cooperated. This indicated an acceptance of responsibility and remorse. He was at minimal risk of re-offending so specific deterrence was not significant. While general deterrence is important in sentencing breaches of bail and ‘Compliance is likely to be undermined if breaches are dealt with by derisory penalties’ (see at [43]), this did not mean that the term of imprisonment could not be suspended in this case. As such, the total effective sentence was suspended for 12 months.
Bropho v Hall [2015] WASC 50 (9 February 2015) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated common assault’ – ‘Breach of protective bail condition’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated common assault, breach of a protective bail condition.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant, a male Aboriginal man, was in a domestic and family relationship with the female victim. The appellant and the victim had been drinking alcohol with three friends. Their two children were also present. The appellant took exception to a comment made by the victim about his behaviour towards one of her female friends. He grabbed the victim by the T-shirt, causing scratches to the side of her neck. They continued shouting at each other. The appellant punched the victim in the face, causing bruising and swelling to her left eye. The victim moved away but was followed by the appellant and he delivered a further blow to the side of her head. The appellant stopped hitting the victim after their two children told him to stop. The appellant was arrested and entered into a bail undertaking with protective conditions. He breached those bail conditions by attending and remaining at the home of him and the victim. The appellant was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for the aggravated assault and 2 months’ imprisonment for the breach of protective bail condition, served cumulatively.
Issue/s: One of the grounds of appeal was that the sentences imposed for the aggravated assault and breach of protective bail conditions were manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The case represented a relatively serious example of the offence of common aggravated assault involving domestic violence, falling within the midrange of these types of cases (See [24]). It involved two circumstances of aggravation. First, the appellant was in a family or domestic relationship with the victim. Mitchell J provided:
‘The fact that the aggravated assault occurred in a domestic setting is a significant aggravating factor of the offence. An offence of this nature generally involves an abuse of the trust which one partner places in another, often where the victim is in a vulnerable position by reason of greater physical strength of the offender. The vulnerability of the victim is generally increased by the difficulty which she (it is usually a she) may have in extricating herself from the situation. As McLure P has noted, the readiness of many victims to return to, or remain in, a relationship with the perpetrator is a hallmark of domestic violence. Recognising that common feature, it remains important for a court sentencing an offender for that kind of offence to take account of the need to protect persons in that vulnerable position, so far as the courts can do so by the imposition of a sentence, bearing a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offence, which has a deterrent effect and, in an appropriate case, removes the offender to a place where there is no opportunity to violently attack their partner’ (See [16]).
The second circumstance of aggravation was that children were present when the offence was committed. Mitchell J noted:
‘The facts of this case illustrate a tragic cycle of violence with which the courts are depressingly familiar. A person exposed to domestic violence in his early life goes on as an adult to perpetrate the violence to which he was exposed as a child, damaging members of his community in the same way he was damaged as a child. For that reason, the fact that the appellant's offence was committed in the presence of children was a significant aggravating factor’ (See [18]).
However, following an examination of cases, Mitchell J held that cases where a sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment had been imposed involved a significantly greater level of violence than committed by the appellant here. The sentence was manifestly excessive (See [23], [35]-36]). The appellant was resentenced to an intensive supervision order.
The State of Western Australia v Carlino [No 2] [2014] WASC 404 (31 October 2014) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Battered woman syndrome’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Expert testimony’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Murder’ – ‘Opinion evidence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Self-defence’
Charge/s: Murder.
Proceeding: Application to adduce certain expert evidence.
Facts: The accused and the deceased were both male. They lived together, but it was not a sexual relationship. The accused was the deceased's assistant and helped with the deceased's drug dealing activities. The accused admitted killing the deceased by shooting the deceased to the head while the deceased was sleeping. The main issue at trial was to be whether he acted in self-defence. The accused sought to call evidence of a psychologist regarding his state of mind. The psychologist was to give evidence, ‘that the accused was in a compromised mental state at the time as a result of being in an abusive relationship with the deceased. The accused is said to have felt powerless in relation to (the deceased), and to have thought that the only way out of the relationship was to kill (the deceased)’ (see at [2]). The State objected to the admission of this evidence on the basis that it was not a recognised psychological condition and that it was not analogous to cases falling within the ‘battered woman syndrome’ (BWS). The state further submitted that the matters to be the subject of the evidence from the psychologist were not outside the ordinary experience of jurors.
The accused described himself as a ‘lackey’, the deceased as ‘possessive’ and that the deceased would threaten violence and control his ‘movements, communications and finances’. The psychologist’s evidence was that the relationship was consistent with the learned helplessness associated with BWS. The psychologist also stated that the syndrome was not confined to females or sexual relationships, and that this relationship was of a sufficient duration to be consistent with the syndrome.
Issue/s: Whether the evidence of the psychologist should be admitted.
Decision and Reasoning: The application was refused. This did not preclude a claim to self-defence, but was relevant to the issue of whether the accused believed his actions were necessary. Hall J held that the psychologist’s evidence was opinion evidence and admissible only if it met the requirements of expert evidence (see at [15]). His Honour noted that BWS is widely accepted as an area of specialised knowledge, but that it is important to pay close attention to what is actually recognised as BWS. He referred to Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316 where Kirby J stated that the syndrome should extend beyond females as victims. Hall J held that this relationship differed from a typical ‘battering’ relationship – it was not a long term marriage relationship and was not characterised by ‘recognisable cycles of tension, violence and reconciliation’ (see at [25]). While there were similarities in the ‘assertion of increasing control, emotional volatility and increasing feelings of helplessness’ (see at [25]), his Honour held that the differences between these circumstances and other BWS cases required that, ‘the application of the syndrome to a situation like this is accepted by the majority of experts in the field of psychology’ (see at [26]). There was no evidence of majority acceptance of experts. As such, the evidence was inadmissible. Evidence of the violent and controlling behaviour of the deceased could still be considered by the jury in order to assess whether the accused’s actions were necessary to prevent the deceased from harming him (see at [31]).
Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 292 (19 August 2014) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Appeal type: Bail application.
Facts: On 4 October 2013, the applicant was charged with assaulting his former de facto partner. He was released on bail. The bail undertaking included a condition that he was not to contact or attempt to contact the victim by any means. While on bail, the applicant committed a further assault on the victim causing her bodily harm. He was arrested and charged with that assault and with failing to comply with a protective bail condition. Bail could not be granted again unless the applicant showed there were exceptional reasons he should not be kept in custody. The applicant’s criminal history showed that he had two prior convictions for breach of protective bail conditions in 2012 and 2013. The applicant was also alleged to have breached protective bail conditions on another occasion but this had not been the subject of prosecution.
Issue/s: Whether there were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody.
Decision and Reasoning: The application for bail was refused. There were not exceptional reasons why the applicant should not have been kept in custody. The applicant had breached protective bail conditions on multiple occasions in the past. While the victim had a conviction for assaulting the applicant, this did not justify the applicant’s failure to comply with protective bail conditions (See [29]-[30]). Although the prosecution case against the applicant could not be said to be overwhelming, it could not be said to be particularly weak. ‘A less than overwhelming case does not provide exceptional reasons to grant bail. If the prosecution case was particularly weak one or there was a high probability of acquittal the position might be different: Bertolami v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASC 269’ (See [32]). Based on the offending conduct, the judge could not accept the applicant’s argument that if he was convicted and imprisoned, the minimum term of any such sentence would be likely to be equal to or less than the time already spent in custody (See [33]). There was a risk that the applicant would commit further offences if released on bail, in particular by breaching any protective bail condition in regard to contacting the victim (See [34]).
Sturt v Ball [2013] WASC 343 (9 September 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Definition of 'approach'’ – ‘Protection order’
Charges: Breach of violence restraining order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: The appellant was subject to a violence restraining order which provided that the appellant must not approach within 20 metres of the protected person ([4]). The evidence was that the protected person walked up to the appellant ([6]-[8]).
The magistrate convicted the appellant on the basis that even though the appellant did not ‘approach’ the protected person, it was incumbent upon the appellant to immediately walk away ([12]).
Issues: Whether the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld, and the conviction quashed. Beech J held that the charge should have been dismissed once the Magistrate was satisfied that the appellant did not approach the protected person ([16]). The word “approach” should be construed in its ordinary meaning: “to come nearer or near to (someone or something) in distance or time” ([14]). An obligation to walk away from a protected person cannot be implied into a violence restraining order ([17]).
Mills v Hawley [2013] WASC 261 (3 July 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant had previously been in a relationship with the protected person and they had a 2-year-old child. He sent about 49 text messages and made 31 phone calls on a daily basis in breach of a violence restraining order (VRO). He claimed he was attempting to make arrangements to see his child. He had one prior conviction for breaching the same VRO. The prosecution accepted that the text messages were not threatening and the phone calls were not answered. However, the seriousness of the offence was increased because it occurred immediately after he had been dealt with by the Court for the previous breach. The appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of breaching a VRO. He was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment and failing to reduce the sentence to take account of the appellant’s early plea of guilty.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
Under s 61A of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), ‘ if a person has committed and been convicted of at least two offences within the period of two years before the conviction of the offence for which he or she is to be sentenced, the person is to be sentenced for a 'repeated breach'’ (see at [12]). This did not apply to the appellant. As such, under s 6(4) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) the Court cannot impose a sentence of imprisonment unless it concludes that it is justified by the seriousness of the offence or the protection of the community. This offence was serious (see at [4]). However, Allanson J concluded that a sentence of imprisonment was not the only appropriate penalty. His Honour noted (at [19]) various mitigating factors including the appellant’s youth ([19]) and the fact that no violence nor threats of violence were involved in the offending. Therefore, it could not be said that the protection of the community or the protected person required a sentence of imprisonment. The Magistrate also did not refer to the plea of guilty as a mitigating factor. The sentence was set aside and sent back to the Magistrates’ Court for re-sentencing and his Honour stated at [23] that a community based order may be appropriate.
Brown v Bluett [2013] WASC 189 (14 May 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Repeated breaches of a restraining order’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm, breach of violence restraining order (x 3).
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: A violence restraining order was obtained by the female victim against the male, Aboriginal appellant. This included conditions prohibiting the appellant from communicating or attempting communication with the victim, from remaining on premises where the victim lived or worked and from remaining within 10 metres of the victim. The first breach of the restraining order occurred at a Native Title meeting where the appellant spoke to the victim. He also assaulted her by hitting her on the back of the head with a jaffle iron. The second breach occurred when the appellant went to the victim’s home and persuaded her to take him to Meekatharra. Finally, the appellant breached the order by ringing the victim on 52 occasions and also by persuading the victim to drive him to Bondini Reserve. In sentencing, the magistrate noted that the appellant had pleaded guilty immediately and was entitled to a reduction of a maximum of 25% as provided for by s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. Her Honour took the maximum penalties as a starting point and reduced these by 25% in imposing sentences. This resulted in a head sentence of 27 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: The magistrate erred in the application of the Sentencing Act in particular by construing it as requiring a (potentially) significant increase in the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed and a starting point being the maximum penalty open to the court.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The respondent conceded that the magistrate's interpretation of s 9AA was erroneous and that the appeal ought to be allowed. That concession was properly made. The magistrate’s application of the Sentencing Act was erroneous and the error resulted in a sentence beyond the range of sentences customarily imposed for offences of this type. The appellant was resentenced.
In resentencing the appellant, Allanson J noted that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was the only penalty appropriate in light of repeated violations of a restraining order and one act of significant violence. His Honour provided:
‘The law is limited in the manner in which it can respond to domestic violence. One important part of that response is by the issue of violence restraining orders. It is essential that those orders are not ignored. When they are repeatedly breached, the need for general and individual deterrence will ordinarily outweigh subjective and other mitigating considerations’ (See [16]).
The offence of assault was a serious example of its kind as it involved a blow to the victim’s head and was committed with an object capable of causing serious injury (See [17]-[18]). The breaches of the restraining order did not in themselves involve acts of violence but it was particularly serious that in each of the last two offences the appellant was breaching the order soon after appearing in court in relation to the first breach (See [19]). The appellant had made some attempt to turn his life around but the mitigating weight of this factor was limited by the nature of the offending and the need to emphasise the importance of complying with the restraining order (See [21]-[22]). Taking these factors into account and with the full benefit of the 25% reduction, Allanson J imposed a head sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment.
Hamlett v Whitney [2013] WASC 100 (22 March 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Breach of bail (x 2), breach of protective conditions.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was on bail for a charge of common assault in circumstances of aggravation namely, that the appellant was in a domestic relationship with the female complainant. The appellant’s bail was subject to a number of conditions including that he was not to contact or attempt to contact the complainant, he was not to approach within 20 metres of an address at which the complainant was living, and he was not to behave in a provocative or offensive manner to residents at that house. The applicant was subsequently charged with breach of protective bail conditions when he verbally abused and threatened the complainant at Centrelink offices. He was further charged with a number of offences of stealing and aggravated burglary and failed to appear in Court after being released on bail. He was charged with two breach of bail offences.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the breach of protective bail conditions and the two other charges of breach of bail. In sentencing, the magistrate noted: ‘Protective bail is placed on people for a purpose and that is to protect the victim, the person who is protected by the protective bail; and people who breach protective bail, like people who breach restraining orders, in a manner that you did, that is, actually threatening the protected persons, in my view ought be sentenced to a term of imprisonment […] These three offences, in my view, show a total disregard for court orders. There really is nothing that can be said by way of mitigation in relation to this offending. Ms Svanberg has pressed upon me that when you breached your protective bail you were intoxicated, but being intoxicated may explain why you breached your protective bail and why you breached your normal bail undertakings but it doesn't excuse your behaviour. The fact of the matter is you were on protective bail for a reason and you breached it’ (See [17]). The appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 6 months and 1 day.
Issue/s: The appellant did not suggest that the 4-month sentence for the breach of protective bail conditions was excessive. The sentences of imprisonment for the other two offences were manifestly excessive. Further, the total effective sentence was disproportionate to the total criminality and therefore offends the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was refused. In light of the maximum penalties available, the seriousness of the offences, and the personal circumstances of the appellant the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The total effective sentence was also not disproportionate to the total offending (See [35]).
Rowe v Gaunt [2013] WASC 90 (20 March 2013) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Expiration of restraining order’ – ‘Miscarriage of justice’
Charge/s: Breach of restraining order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction.
Facts: An interim violence restraining order was granted which prohibited the appellant from approaching within 5m of any premises where the protected person lived or worked. This order was later made final. The appellant was charged with breaching the order by going to the house of the protected person and placing a letter in the letterbox. She pleaded guilty and was convicted. However, the police later became aware that the order had expired when the offence occurred.
Issue/s: Whether the conviction should be set aside.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld. The Court set aside the conviction because the conviction amounted to a miscarriage of justice. Hall J noted the following at [13] –
‘I am compelled to note that this is the second occasion in recent times on which I have been called upon to set aside a conviction for breach of a violence restraining order where the alleged breach has occurred after the order has expired. See Topic v Lynch [2012] WASC 446.It is of course a necessary element of an offence under s 61 of the Act that there be a restraining order in force at the time the breach is alleged to have occurred. It is always possible that a protected person may complain to the police on the basis of a mistaken belief that a restraining order is still in force. Care must be taken to ensure that that is the case.’
Cramphorn v Bailey [2012] WASC 462 (30 November 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of protection order’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’ – ‘Whether police restraining order must be served on the protected person’
Charges: Aggravated assault x 1; Breaching a police order x 1.
Appeal type: Appeal against convictions.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with a Mr Michalaros. While driving her car, the appellant punched Mr Michalaros in the face. There was evidence that Mr Michalaros was the subject of a restraining order in favour of the appellant.
The police attended and issued the appellant with a police order, with one of the conditions to not contact Mr Michalaros for a 24-hour period. Mr Michalaros alleged that she sent him threatening text messages in breach of the order.
The appellant was convicted following a trial and was fined a total of $1,300 and granted a spent conviction order.
Issues: Multiple grounds, including that the restraining order was invalid because the police did not serve Mr Michalaros with a copy.
Decision and reasoning: The appellant was a self-represented litigant. The judge rejected all grounds of appeal. In relation to the argument that the police order was invalid the judge stated:
It would be contrary to the purposes of the ROA (Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)) if the validity of an order depended upon service on the protected person. There could be circumstances where the police have grounds to issue a police order but where the protected person cannot be located or it is impractical to serve a copy upon him or her. Given the shortness of time for which such orders remain current and the urgent circumstances in which they must often be made, it would produce consequences that are contrary to the purposes of the ROA if an order only became effective when a copy was served on the protected person. This is a procedural requirement only and not one upon which the validity of an order depends.
Harrison v Hunter [2012] WASC 166 (30 April 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Interests of child’ – ‘Perpetrator intervention program’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Subsequent engagement in family violence programme’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant and complainant were in a relationship for almost three years. They had a daughter. The complainant and daughter were financially and emotionally dependent on the appellant. The appellant returned from work intoxicated. An argument developed. The appellant struck the complainant to the face with a closed fist. No injuries were caused by the blow. The matter was resolved by a plea of guilty, at the earliest reasonable opportunity. When his Honour, Chief Justice Martin, considered the seriousness of the offence he noted at [27]:
“The offence committed by the appellant in this case was serious. Domestic violence is an offence that rightly provokes community condemnation and rightly requires courts to respond to the community abhorrence of such offending by imposing sentences that are commensurate with the seriousness with which the community rightly regards this type of offence.”
Despite those observations, his Honour considered that the 8 month term of imprisonment could be suspended for 12 months for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was in the best interests of the complainant and her child, cohabiting with the appellant, that he not be imprisoned: [33]. Secondly, the appellant had attended eight sessions of a family violence programme: [38]. His Honour stated that the offence was not in the upper range of seriousness: [15].
Kjellgren v Cameron [2012] WASC 80 (1 March 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with the complainant for about four months. The appellant was intoxicated and following a dispute, he was arrested and ordered not to approach the caravan park where the complainant was residing. After being released, he knocked on the door of the complainant’s caravan and verbally abused her, threatened her and punched her to the face multiple times. He then knocked her to the ground. He stopped her from escaping. She was left with serious injuries. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and was made eligible for parole.
Issue/s: Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
McKechnie J acknowledged the seriousness of the offence especially considering it amounted to a deliberate breach of a police order. This type of violence to women cannot be condoned and as such a sentence of immediate imprisonment was appropriate. However at [11]-[16], his Honour considered various comparable cases and came to the conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive. His Honour especially had regard to Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63 where it was held that an 18-month sentence for aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (including other charges) was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending. Nevertheless, general and specific deterrence and the significant injuries that the complainant suffered remained important considerations. The appellant was re-sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Messiha v Plaucs [2012] WASC 63 (24 February 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault’ – ‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Character’ – ‘Criminal history’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat to injure’ – ‘Totality’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault, threat to injure, three counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (circumstances of aggravation: that the appellant was in a family or domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant engaged in a verbal argument with his wife. The appellant punched and grabbed the side of her face. She attempted to escape, at which point he threatened to kill her, grabbed her around the neck and stabbed her with a screwdriver. She feared for her life. The appellant then bit her twice and told his son who was attempting to stop the assault to get away several times. The appellant had a serious drug problem and the offending occurred while he was under the influence of drugs. He had prior convictions for violent offences but they did not involve domestic violence. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 18 months’ imprisonment for all offences.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the total aggregate sentence infringed the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
The Court firstly noted that the offending was sustained, premediated and ferocious. It occurred in the family home in the presence of two young children.
The appellant submitted inter alia that the sentences should have been made concurrent because they constituted a single course of conduct. The Court rejected this argument and held that the so called ‘one transaction rule’ is a general rule and the operative question is whether the total effective sentence properly reflects the overall criminality involved. In this case, the course of conduct had distinct features which increased in seriousness over time so it was open to the Magistrate to impose some cumulative penalties.
The appellant also submitted that the Magistrate erred by giving the appellant’s criminal record undue weight, given it did not involve domestic violence. This argument was rejected – the Magistrate correctly stated that the record showed a lack of mitigation in that the appellant did not have past good character. Hall J was of the view that there is little merit in distinguishing past violent offending as irrelevant if it is not committed in domestic circumstances. These offences do have relevance, not necessarily as showing a tendency but in showing ‘an absence of mitigation as to past good character’ (see at [31]).
Another issue concerned whether the Magistrate erred by not having sufficient regard to the appellant’s longstanding relationship with his wife, the fact they have dependent children as well as his wife’s wishes. His wife filed an affidavit on appeal indicating that the appellant’s imprisonment was causing her extreme hardship. Her mortgage was in arrears. If the appellant was released, she claimed that there would be the prospect that the appellant would obtain employment so the arrears could be paid. The appellant and his wife were migrants and she had no wider family in Australia. The Court referred to McLure P’s remarks in The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) and held that the wishes of victims of domestic violence for reconciliation has to be seen in context. Offenders cannot expect leniency because their punishment impacts others. While this issue could be relevant in some cases, it should not have been given much weight in this case.
The appellant also submitted that the fact he had successfully completed three community based orders should have been afforded more weight by the Magistrate. This argument was rejected – the Court held that the mitigatory effect of past completion of community orders can be diminished by reoffending. Reoffending can put into doubt whether the order was successful in bringing about attitudinal and behavioural change (see at [37]).
In relation to the presence of the children at the time of the offending, while it was not included as a formal circumstance of aggravation, it was open to take these facts into account (see at [41]).
The Court then noted that there was no history of domestic violence but the offending was serious and justified immediate imprisonment. In applying comparable cases, the Court concluded that the aggregate sentence was particularly high and did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the offending. In noting that the appellant had apologised, expressed remorse, expressed a wish to assist his wife with the mortgage and children and that he had his wife’s support, the total aggregate sentence was reduced to 15 months’ imprisonment with eligibility for parole.
Musgrove v Millard [2012] WASC 60 (22 February 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Stalking’ – ‘Unlawful installation of a tracking device’
Charge/s: 113 offences including: Stalking, unlawful installation of a tracking device, breach of violence restraining order (104 counts), breaching a protective bail condition (7 counts).
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant was served with an interim restraining order prohibiting him from communicating with his former partner in any way. In breach of this order, he attended her address and/or workplace, sent her a number of text messages and unlawfully installed a tracking device on her vehicle. This conduct also comprised the stalking offence. Later, the applicant called his for partner 80 times. The Magistrate noted that there were a significant number of offences committed over an extended period which had a considerable impact on the victim. A total effective sentence of 16 months’ imprisonment was imposed which comprised of 8 months’ imprisonment for stalking, 4 months’ imprisonment for unlawfully installing the tracking device (to be served cumulatively on the sentence for stalking) and 4 months’ imprisonment for 15 convictions including breaching bail conditions and the restraining order. All the other convictions for breaching the restraining order were to be served concurrently for the stalking offence.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in making the sentence for unlawfully installing a tracking device cumulative upon the sentence imposed for stalking - the conduct which formed the basis of the stalking charge including the installation of the tracking device, such that a cumulative sentence resulted in the applicant being punished twice for the same conduct.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave was granted and the appeal was upheld.
The Court noted the ‘complexities’ involved in this issue and found it was not necessary to be resolved directly because of the application of the ‘common elements principle’ which states ‘when two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements… it would be wrong to punish that offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common’ (see, for example Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610). This principle applied directly to this case. The facts indicated that the conduct which formed the basis of the tracking device charge was the same conduct, ‘which was part of the conduct relied upon to support the stalking charge’ (see at [40]). This falls directly within the common elements principle.
The Court found that there was a substantial miscarriage of justice caused by this error. The application of the common elements principle means that there could have been no additional punishment for the unlawful installation of the tracking device. As such, the 4-month sentence for the surveillance device offence was made concurrent, which resulted in the overall sentence being reduced to 12 months.
Stokes v Auckland [2012] WASC 2 (10 January 2012) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘substance abuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Victim’
Charge/s: Assault occasioning bodily harm.
Appeal Type: Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Facts: The appellant, (an Aboriginal man) engaged in an argument with his de facto partner. He punched her in the head multiple times until she fell over. He dragged her by the hair to a nearby tap to wash the blood off her. The appellant was very intoxicated at the time. He had a significant history of alcohol and drug abuse and violence including prior convictions for violent offences against the complainant. In fact, the offending was committed while he was subject to three suspended sentences relating to offences committed against the complainant. The complainant wished to continue her relationship with the appellant and at one stage indicated that she did not want to proceed with the charges. However, the appellant pleaded guilty at an early stage and was sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment. He was also re-sentenced for the suspended sentences which resulted in a total effective sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned –
1.
Whether the plea of guilty was made under duress and did not reflect his acceptance of the facts alleged by the prosecution.
2.
Whether the sentence of 16 months for the latest assault was manifestly excessive and whether the total effective sentence was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.
1.
This argument was dismissed – see at [23]-[32].
2.
Hall J accepted the Magistrate’s conclusion with respect to the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct. His Honour then noted that the attack was ‘prolonged’, instigated by the appellant and aggravated by the fact that it was committed notwithstanding previous court orders imposed for similar offending. This showed a disregard for the law and a need for a personal deterrent. Hall J noted that other than the early plea of guilty, there was little by way of mitigation. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant was intoxicated when the offence was committed was not mitigatory, as the appellant was ‘acutely aware that alcohol was a risk factor in respect of his past offending behaviour’ (see at [41]). In relation to the complainant’s wishes for reconciliation, his Honour noted McLure P’s remarks in The State of Western Australia v Cheeseman [2011] WASCA 15 (19 January 2011) and held that, ‘An otherwise appropriate penalty should not be reduced on account of an expression of willingness on the part of the complainant, for whatever reason, to forgive the offender and continue a relationship with him’ (see at [43]).
As such, the Court held that while the one-month sentence was at the higher end of the range for offences of this kind, it was within the Magistrate’s discretion, having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the need for personal and general deterrence. In relation to totality, the Court held that the earlier offences were separate and unrelated to the latest assault. It was appropriate to activate these suspended sentences and orders of cumulation did not make the total effective sentence disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending.
Corrigan v Kirkman [2011] WASC 254 (11 July 2011) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated common assault’ – ‘Breach of protective bail conditions’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Temporary protection order’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Aggravated commons assault, breaches of violence restraining orders, breaches of protective bail conditions.
Appeal type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The offences related to a female complainant, with whom the appellant had been in a domestic relationship with. The appellant committed 29 breaches of a violence restraining order which prohibited the appellant, amongst other things, from communicating with the complainant. He did so by communicating with her by mobile phone (the ‘VRO offences’). He also committed four offences of breach of protective bail conditions by being 50-100 metres of the complainant on three occasions and by sending her a text message on one occasion (the ‘bail offences’). Finally, the applicant committed one offence of common assault in circumstances of aggravation at the same time as one of the bail offences. The magistrate sentenced the appellant to a total effective term of 12 months’ imprisonment, made up as follows: on aggravated assault 8 months’ imprisonment, one of the bail offences 4 months’ imprisonment (concurrent), 2 of the bail offences 4 months’ imprisonment (cumulative), one of the bail offences 2 months’ imprisonment (concurrent), and VRO offences 6 months’ imprisonment concurrent.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the total sentence was contrary to the first limb of the totality principle.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was allowed. The total effective sentence in this case was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending behaviour. The aggravating circumstances in respect of the assault offence, i.e. the breaches of the VRO and protective bail conditions, called for concurrency between the sentence on that offence and all other sentences. There should have been partial concurrency or a reduction in the length of sentence to avoid multiple punishment for these acts (See [97]-[99]).
Isenhood v Green [2011] WASC 70 (10 February 2011) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Exposing a child’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Hearsay’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Prejudicial material in victim impact statement’ – ‘Programs for perpetrators’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threats to injure’ – ‘Victim impact statement’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order, making threats to injure.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The complainant was the ex-partner of the appellant’s current partner. There was one daughter of that relationship. The appellant’s partner remained principally responsible for the welfare of the daughter. This meant that the appellant and the complainant often had contact with each other. Events at the complainant’s home prompted the complainant to seek a violence restraining order (VRO) on behalf of his daughter against the appellant, to prevent the appellant from committing an act of abuse against his daughter and from ‘behaving in a way that could reasonably be expected to cause fear that the child will be exposed to an act of family and domestic violence’ (see at [4]). The complainant then later obtained another VRO which prevented the appellant from communicating in any way with him. The appellant then made repeated telephone calls to the complainant and threatened to kill him and his daughter, which constituted both the breach and threat to injure charges. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment on each of the charges, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred by taking into account hearsay and irrelevant material in the victim impact statement.
3.
Whether the Magistrate erred by taking into account prior property damage offences in concluding that the appellant has the potential to act violently in the future.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issues one and two.
1.
Firstly, Jenkins J noted that the breach offence was not at the upper range because it did not involve any physical contact or actual violence. However, it was not trivial and included a threat of actual violence. Furthermore, there were no significant mitigating factors – the appellant had six prior convictions for breaching a VRO, was not remorseful and the previous penalties imposed had clearly not been effective as a personal deterrent. Notwithstanding, there were no attempts to carry through with the threats and no indication that the appellant intended to do so. Also, the appellant was no longer in a relationship with his partner and had ceased contact with the complainant’s daughter.
2.
The victim impact statement detailed the history of the dispute between the appellant and complainant from the complainant’s point of view. The appellant described it as ‘inflammatory’ and Jenkins J agreed with that description. The appellant was not given an opportunity to respond to the matters in the statement. The respondent conceded that the Magistrate should not have taken these matters into account. The Magistrate needed to make clear that these matters were not taken into account.
3.
Jenkins J held that it was ‘drawing too long a bow’ to suggest that the appellant’s violent attack on an ATM machine was reason to believe that he may attack people in the future. However, this of itself was not cause to allow the appeal as no substantial miscarriage of justice occurred.
The appellant was re-sentenced to a 12-month intensive supervision order which included programs to address anger management and alcohol abuse.
Morgan v Kazandzis [2010] WASC 377 (10 December 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Aggravated assault causing bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Pregnancy’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Vulnerable groups’ – ‘Women’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault causing bodily harm (x 2).
Appeal type: Appeals against conviction and sentence.
Facts: One of the appeals concerned two occasions where the appellant, an aboriginal man, unlawfully assaulted the victim who he was in a family and domestic relationship with. They were living at the Oombulgurri Aboriginal Community, and the victim was pregnant to the appellant. On both occasions, the victim, bleeding, with multiple injuries to her face and head, sought assistance from the police at the police facility. The victim told the police she was afraid of the appellant and wanted to get away from Oombulgurri. The police arranged for an aeroplane to take the victim to another centre for a time. The appellant was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment and 15 months’ imprisonment on each charge respectively. In light of the nature and seriousness of the offences, the Magistrate determined an immediate sentence of imprisonment was required.
Issue/s: Some of the grounds of appeal included –
The learned magistrate erred by failing to suspend the terms of imprisonment imposed, when:
1.
the learned magistrate failed to give consideration to whether the terms ought to be suspended; and
2.
a suspension of the sentence was open in all of the circumstances.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. These were serious offences committed by the appellant, who had two recent convictions of aggravated assault causing bodily harm. The violent conduct towards the victim was repeated less than five weeks later and the victim had a well-founded fear of the appellant. The victim was vulnerable as she was much younger than the appellant, had been in a relationship with him and was pregnant (see at [69], [72]).
‘Violent treatment of women in this fashion cannot be tolerated anywhere in the State, but it is of particular importance that in isolated communities such as Oombulgurri that the punishment of an offender who commits such offences in a short space of time should be such as to demonstrate to all members of the community that that conduct is unlawful and that effective punishment will be imposed in order to deter the general community from the use of violence. Specific deterrence of the individual offender was, in this case, also a necessary and essential ingredient of the sentence’ [72].
A longer term of imprisonment was warranted on the second offence because it was more serious in that it was a repetition of the same unlawful conduct, and it was an unrelated offence.
Baudoeuf v Venning [2010] WASC 322 (17 November 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Extenuating circumstances’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Suspended sentence’
Charge/s: Breach of violence restraining order, breach of suspended imprisonment order.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant (aged 24) was the subject of a violence restraining order (VRO) in favour of the protected person (aged 52). They had been living together in an ‘off and on’ de facto relationship for about 18 months. The protected person had unsuccessfully applied to the Magistrates’ Court to have the order withdrawn. The breach occurred when the appellant had been living with the protected person for three days. An argument occurred, the police were called and the appellant was arrested. There was a history of violence in the relationship and the order had been breached four times in the past. According to a psychiatric report, the appellant presented with a ‘schizo-affective disorder, an ADHD history, personality disorders and mental retardation’ (see at [11]). Despite the orders being in place, it was the protected person who repeatedly invited the appellant back to live with her which constituted the repeated breaches. The breach of the VRO also constituted a breach of a suspended imprisonment order which had been imposed in relation to a prior breach in respect of the same protected person. He was sentenced to 7 months’ imprisonment for both offences, to be served concurrently.
Issue/s: Whether the Magistrate erred in imposing immediate sentences of imprisonment.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld.
At trial, the Magistrate concluded that the psychiatric evidence did not support a conclusion that the appellant’s mental illness or disturbance led to the commission of the offences. She concluded that the ‘non-aggressive resumptions of cohabitation’ (by the appellant) were ‘part of a course of conduct over which the appellant could and should have exercised restraint and control in obedience to the VRO’ (see at [42]). Em Heenan J held that this amounted to an error of fact and that his breaches could ‘to a material degree’ be explained by his history of mental illness (see at [44]). The appellant’s mental health problems, in combination with significant personal stress related to his relationship with the victim ‘impaired his ability to exercise appropriate judgment and his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, so contributing causally to the commission of the offence’ (see at [48]). This reduction in culpability could lead to a reduction in the severity of the sentence and this was not sufficiently taken into account by the Magistrate. The appellant was re-sentenced as follows – no punishment was imposed in relation to the earlier breach. A conditional period of suspended imprisonment for 7 months (wholly suspended for 9 months) was imposed for the later breach.
Lutey v Jacques [2010] WASC 78 (28 April 2010) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Emotional abuse’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Threat of self-harm’
Charge/s: Breach of a violence restraining order (VRO).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of breaching a VRO. Only the second count was the subject of the appeal. The appellant’s relationship with the complainant had recently ended. He was served with a VRO which prohibited him from contacting her by any means and from entering or being within 200m of any place where she lived or worked. The second breach of the order (the subject of the appeal) occurred when the appellant attended the Karratha Women’s Refuge (where the complainant was staying) and wrote in the dust on the rear window of her car – ‘I am a dead man walking’. He later returned to rub the message off. The appellant had no relevant criminal history. He was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 2 years.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the Magistrate erred by failing to adequately consider sentences other than imprisonment.
2.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 2.
1.
The Court held that the Magistrate did sufficiently have regard to the possibility of other sentencing options, such as an intensive supervision order or a fine.
2.
Simmonds J firstly noted that the maximum penalty for breaching a restraining order had been increased which indicates Parliament’s intention is that the courts regard these offences more seriously. At [53]-[61], his Honour provided a summary of relevant authorities. He stated at [61] that these authorities (decided before the increase in penalty) take the following approach in sentencing breaches of VROs –
‘The approach is one recognising that the Act is social legislation of the utmost importance as part of the legal response to domestic violence: Pillage v Coyne [2000] WASCA 135 [13] (Miller J); it is essential the courts ensure their orders are not ignored: Kenny v Lewis (Unreported, WASC, Library No 990113, 12 March 1999) (Kennedy J) 10; and violence restraining orders are notoriously difficult to enforce, and the need for general and individual deterrence will ordinarily outweigh subjective or other mitigating considerations: Dominik v Volpi [2004] WASCA 18[80] (Roberts-Smith J).’
However, this does not mean that a custodial sentence will be appropriate in all cases. Simmonds J found that there are various circumstances which made this offence of a less serious kind. The appellant was surprised that the relationship had ended. There was no indication of any ‘offence or serious misconduct’ that led to the making of the VRO. Furthermore, the appellant made no attempt to enter the refuge and there was no threatening or intimidatory conduct. However, the complainant had recently been hospitalised for heart treatment. The respondent submitted that this as well as the fact that she was living in a refuge was relevant to assessing the seriousness of the offence. Simmonds J found that while these factors would make the offence more serious, evidence of the subjective impact on the complainant would be needed (see at [70]).
The respondent also submitted that the message left on the car might indicate a potential for the appellant to self-harm. His Honour then referred to the equivalent Victorian legislation which defines ‘emotional abuse’ (see at [71]) and accepted that a threat of self-harm intending to or producing the effect of causing distress or hurt to someone is a factor capable of aggravating the offence of breaching a VRO. However, in this case there was no evidence pointing to a threat of self-harm made with that intention or effect. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant’s counsel referred to the protected person as the ‘complainant’ at trial did not of itself show that she suffered distress or hurt (see at [72]). In fact, the Court accepted that this potential for self-harm indicated the presence of a mental condition which contributed to the offending, notwithstanding the absence of a report from any mental health professional. This lessened the weight to be assigned to general and specific deterrence (see at [93] – [94]).
The respondent submitted that the offences occurred in the remote Pilbara region which had the second highest rates of violence against women in the state. There was data before the Court indicating that remote areas have about five times the rate of domestic violence compared to capitals. His Honour responded to this submission at [81] –
‘I accept without deciding that I can take judicial notice of these matters, and that I should regard them as going to the prevalence of offences of domestic violence to which the Restraining Orders Act is part of the legal response. On the relevance of the prevalence of offending of a particular type, see Yates v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 144[55] (Steytler P), [94] (McLure JA). I also accept without deciding that sentences for the same offending committed in different parts of the state may be affected by differences in the prevalence of that offence in those parts of those magnitudes.’
This could result in the offence being viewed more seriously than otherwise. However, given that there was no element of physical threat or intimidation, the offence remained less serious (see at [82]). The Court held that the main mitigating factor was the appellant’s plea of guilty. Given this and the mental condition as discussed above, the Court concluded that the sentence was manifestly excessive and stated that a community based order was likely to be appropriate.
Sakkers v Thornton [2009] WASC 175 (22 June 2009) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Breach of restraining order’ – ‘Concurrency’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy and other charges’ – ‘Double punishment’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Possession of firearm’ – ‘Suspended sentence’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking (circumstance of aggravation – that the offence was committed in breach of a violence restraining order), breach of violence restraining order (12 counts), possession of firearm with circumstances of aggravation.
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in a relationship with the complainant for three years which ended. The appellant then continually sent emails and text messages to the complainant (including at her workplace) and made threats to kill her. The complainant obtained a violence restraining order (VRO) which prevented the appellant from communicating with her by any means. His conduct then continued in breach of the order. He was arrested and Police found a firearm and ammunition at his home. The appellant was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for the stalking charge, a global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment for the breach offences (cumulative on the sentence for stalking) and 7 months and 2 weeks’ imprisonment for the possession of firearm offence.
Issue/s: Some of the issues concerned -
1.
Concurrency: Whether the sentence imposed for the breach offences should have been made concurrent with the sentence for the stalking offence because both offences involved the same acts.
2.
Totality: Whether the Magistrate failed to have proper regard to the totality principle.
3.
Whether the sentences were manifestly excessive.
4.
Whether the sentence should have been suspended.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of issue 1.
1.
The prosecution conceded that the appeal on the issue of concurrency must succeed. Section 11(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 provides that a person is not to be sentenced twice on the same evidence. Simmonds J stated at [22] – ‘Here the offence of aggravated stalking was constituted by the course of conduct whose constituents were the 12 breaches of the violence restraining order. The sentences for the 12 breaches of violence restraining order, globally, are the same as the sentence for the aggravated stalking.’ As such, the global sentence for the breach offences was set aside.
2.
The appellant submitted that a total effective sentence (without the sentence for the breach offences) of 19 months and 2 weeks was a crushing sentence and was not a just measure of the criminality involved. Simmonds J acknowledged that the Magistrate failed to recognise an overlap in the criminality between the stalking and breach offences, in that he did not have regard to the issue of double punishment, as noted above. However, this did not result in the sentence infringing the totality principle.
3.
An argument that the sentences for the aggravated stalking and firearms offences were manifestly excessive was dismissed. The appellant had some modest criminal history which did not involve violence. While he pleaded guilty, he showed minimal insight into his actions or empathy towards the victim. Simmonds J also noted the seriousness of the offending. In comparing analogous cases (see [70]-[72] for summaries) his Honour concluded that the sentence was within range.
4.
The Magistrate did not suspend the sentence because he was concerned that a suspended sentence would act as a sufficient deterrent to the appellant and would not provide adequate protection for the victim, as well as other matters. This approach was appropriate and this ground was dismissed.
Paskov v Hull [2008] WASC 163 (28 July 2008) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Double jeopardy in sentencing’ – ‘People affected by substance abuse’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Proximity of offences’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Totality’
Charge/s: Two counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (aggravating factor: that the applicant was in a domestic relationship with the victim), escaping from lawful custody, failure to comply with bail conditions.
Appeal Type: Application for leave to appeal against sentence.
Facts: The applicant had an argument with the complainant (his de facto partner). The applicant then pushed the back of her head into a window which caused the window to smash and the complainant to fall on the ground. He then dragged her out of a door and kicked and punched her multiple times which caused her head to hit a railing, at which point she passed out. The applicant then evaded arrested for some days. After being granted bail, he phoned the complainant in breach of protective bail conditions. The second assault occurred 6 months later. The applicant became aggressive and dropped the complainant onto the ground and kicked her repeatedly in the rib area. He also used a ring on his left hand to gouge her left eye, resulting in a bruised and swollen eye and a cut to the eyeball. He had long standing problems with drug and alcohol abuse. His criminal history included a violent offence in a previous de facto relationship. He was sentenced to an effective term of 2 years and 2 months’ imprisonment. The sentences for the escaping custody and second aggravated assault offences were made cumulative.
Issue/s:
1.
Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
2.
Whether the Magistrate erred in making the sentences for the second count of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm and escaping custody cumulative because the offences occurred on the same day.
Decision and Reasoning: Leave to appeal was refused.
1.
Hasluck J noted that the offences were particularly serious. The Magistrate gave appropriate consideration to this as well as to personal and general deterrence. This was, ‘apt in respect of a severe attack on a defenceless woman who was in a relationship with the applicant, especially when the attacks were sustained and persistent’ (see at [52]). As such, the sentences could not be described as manifestly excessive.
2.
The Court held that there was a separation in time between the offences and they were of a different kind. Hasluck J referred to the ‘common elements principle’ and acknowledged that it would be wrong two punish an offender twice where ‘there is essentially one transaction or commonality is evident’ but that this did not arise on the facts (see at [51]).
Elliot v Blanchard [2007] WASC 289 (14 November 2007) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Assault occasioning bodily harm’ – ‘Deterrence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Sentencing’ – ‘Verbal abuse’
Charge/s: Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm (circumstance of aggravation: that the appellant was in a family and domestic relationship with the victim).
Appeal Type: Appeal against sentence.
Facts: The appellant was in an intimate personal relationship with the complainant after meeting on the internet. The appellant was intoxicated. An argument occurred and the appellant verbally abused the complainant. He then pushed her into a chair, threatened to kill her and grabbed her around the throat almost to the point of making her lose consciousness. He repeatedly slapped her face and choked her for several minutes. He threw her into a bed before dragging her by the arms into another room. The appellant then calmed down and stated that the complainant was free to leave but informed her that he was in possession of two firearms. The complainant made him dinner to pacify him and eventually managed to escape. The appellant later left a message on her phone in which he apologised for hitting her. She sustained various injuries including bruising and swelling. The appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment with parole eligibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues concerned whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was upheld in respect of other issues such as the weight given to the plea of guilty and the time already spent in custody and the sentence was reduced by 1.5 months. In relation to the issue of manifest excess, the appellant emphasised the effect of alcohol and prescribed medication which he was taking as well as his prior good character, remorse and progress in rehabilitation. However, McKechnie J held that the Magistrate was not in error. While this was the appellant’s first violent offence, he had a number of previous offences of driving while intoxicated and on the day of the offending he had been fined $8000 for other offences which he had committed while intoxicated. The Magistrate did sufficiently take the appellant’s remorse into account. His Honour also noted that there is no offence of domestic violence. It is a term which ‘euphemistically describes serious criminal conduct’ (see at [10]). In this case, the offending was particularly serious. The sentence was appropriate, taking into account the public interest in general deterrence and just punishment.
Gilmour v State of Western Australia [2005] WASC 243 (8 November 2005) – Western Australia Supreme Court
‘Aggravated stalking’ – ‘Attempt to pervert the course of justice’ – ‘Bail’ – ‘Breach of violence restraining order’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Following, harassing, monitoring’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Systems abuse’ – ‘Temporary protection order’
Charge/s: Aggravated stalking, breach of violence restraining order, attempt to pervert the course of justice.
Appeal type: Appeal against refusal of bail.
Facts: The decision concerned a bail application arising from three charged offences following the estrangement of the applicant from his second wife. The first alleged offence was the theft of mail from the complainant by the applicant. The second alleged offence was the commencement of a series of events said to amount to stalking. Some of these events included the applicant damaging the property of the complainant’s male friend, and the male friend obtaining a violence restraining order which the applicant subsequently breached. The applicant also became involved in an altercation with the complainant and she obtained a violence restraining order against him. The applicant stole items of women’s clothing from the complainant’s home, stole a security camera the complainant had installed, and was seen in the complainant’s backyard disguised with a mask and carrying a knife. The third offence occurred when the applicant asked his neighbours to provide him with a false alibi for the evening he was seen in the complainant’s yard wearing a mask and carrying a knife.
Issue/s: Whether there were exceptional reasons why the applicant should not be kept in custody.
Decision and Reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. The applicant had not made out exceptional reasons for the grant of bail in this case. The character of factors pointing towards the grant of bail, namely, hardship to the applicant, the applicant’s antecedents, and the likely time before trial, were not sufficient to establish exceptional reasons. This was particularly so when weighed against the strength of the State’s case, the adverse effects on protected persons of a release on bail, the concern for the failure of achievement of the purposes of protection orders in this case, and any difficulties in proving any future breach of a protective order (See [69]). See also Gilmour v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 42 (28 February 2008).
Family Court
Ahmed and Gupta [2020] FCWA 140 (31 August 2020) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Coercive control’ – ‘Financial abuse’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Imprisonment’ – ‘Interim orders’ – ‘Isolation’ – ‘Monitoring’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Technology facilitated abuse’ – ‘Threats to extended family’ – ‘Use of threats by extended family’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Issue: What is the appropriate parenting arrangement for the children of Mr Ahmed and Ms Gupta?
Facts: Ahmed and Gupta are the mother and father of Child A and Child B, two girls aged four and three years respectively. Both parents are from Country A where they had an arranged marriage in 2013. After the birth of Child A, the mother and Child A moved to Perth to join the father in 2016. Less than a year later the parties separated. Child B was born after separation. The mother alleges a history of sexual and physical violence and controlling and coercive behaviour by the father. The mother alleged the father locked her in the house and only allowed her to leave once a week in company with him. Both parties alleged that the other’s extended families had engaged in threatening behaviours and legal proceedings towards each other’s extended families in country A and there was dispute as to whether these proceedings were ongoing. The father strongly denies the mother's allegations. Against the background of these contested allegations and other family and cultural issues, the Court is asked to determine the parenting arrangements for the children. Currently the children live with the mother and spend a few hours each fortnight with the father.
Decision and Reasoning: The Court considered the mother’s allegations that she was subjected to controlling and isolating behaviour by the father. The mother alleged there was a hidden camera in the home and that the father or Mr B always listened to her conversations. The mother alleged Mr B was violent towards her and at times she was alone in the house with him.
The Court, while unable to make findings on each finding of family violence, was satisfied that the mother has been the victim of family violence as defined in s 4AB(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). It was accepted that the father controlled and coerced the mother, that he controlled her financially and isolated her from others, and that the father's behaviour towards the mother caused her to be fearful of him.
It was ordered on the basis of this coercive relationship that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the long-term care, welfare and development of the children, the children reside with the mother and the father have contact, and there were also orders for a review of the orders in twelve months.
Shelley and Dickens [2020] FCWA 52 (3 April 2020) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family law’ – ‘History of domestic and family violence’ – ‘Victim as (alleged) perpetrator’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: Ms Shelley (mother) and Mr Dickens (father) had a short relationship which ended when G (their child) was 18 days old. Since that point, G has lived with the mother and spent limited time with the father. The mother and father each seek an order that G live with them.
The mother’s case is that the father has physically, sexually and emotionally harmed G and he poses an unacceptable risk of harm. She says the father has perpetrated significant and sustained family violence towards her during their relationship. The father’s case is that the mother has emotionally and psychologically harmed G, by fabricating and repeatedly raising false allegations against him, by failing to comply with orders to facilitate G’s relationship with him and through her failure to adequately provide for G’s needs in terms of her education and health. He alleges he was the victim of family violence perpetrated by the mother.
The parties agree that their relationship involved family violence, but largely deny the allegations of the other.
Decision and reasoning: It was accepted that the child, G, is at risk of psychological harm — as well as exposure to physical violence — both with the mother and the father.
Orders were made to the effect that:
•
All previous parenting orders in relation to [G] born [in] 2011 be discharged.
•
The mother and father are to communicate by way of email in relation to [G], with all emails to be copied onto the ICL.
•
[G] live with the mother.
•
G spend time with her father as specified in the orders (at [306]).
The Court was satisfied that the father was the perpetrator of physical violence, which included the mother suffering significant injuries including two broken teeth and two broken wrists. During the parties’ arguments, particularly on the yacht, there were occasions when the fights escalated and the father physically restrained the mother, to protect himself and prevent her from assaulting him. In doing so, the mother suffered injuries and property belonging to her was damaged. The father’s reactions to the mother were physically abusive and aggressive.
The father was also found to have behaved in a controlling and coercive manner, which falls within the definition of family violence. For example, he prevented the mother talking to her family by removing the telephone from her on the yacht; he demanded the mother answer his calls when in hospital after G’s birth and suggested the maternal grandmother required his permission to provide assistance with meals after G was born.
The Court was also satisfied that the mother has perpetrated acts of family violence against the father. For instance, she has yelled, sworn and called him names. She has hit him and kicked him. She has instigated arguments and attempted to prevent him from leaving. It was accepted that the father suffered injuries including bruises and a bloodied lip, and had property damaged by the mother.
Orders were made to the effect that:
•
All previous parenting orders in relation to [G] born [in] 2011 be discharged.
•
The mother and father are to communicate by way of email in relation to [G], with all emails to be copied onto the ICL.
•
[G] live with the mother.
•
G spend time with her father as specified in the orders (at [306]).
Breckenridge & Kudrna [2019] FCWA 9 (10 January 2019) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disability and impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Psychological harm’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children and sought parenting orders. The mother maintained that she and the children now suffered significant mental health issues because of the father’s alleged physical and psychological abuse. The father denied these allegations and instead claimed that the mother’s own serious mental health issues have harmed, and continue to harm, the children. Each parent sought orders according sole responsibility of the children and allowing the other parent to have limited supervised visits.
The mother’s mental health issues created evidential gaps and several contradictions in the evidence she provided. Sutherland J was satisfied that the mother and the children’s psychologist had effectively coached the children to corroborate her story given their impressionable age.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate in the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Sutherland J’s reasoning was guided by Part 5 of the Family Court Act 1997 (‘the Act’)and the Full Court’s decision in Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 and consequently concerned the underlying presumption that ‘it is in the best interest of the child that the child’s parents have equal shared parental responsibility, subject to the qualifications set out in the relevant section’. Sutherland J provided in relation to this presumption:
‘should I make an order for equal shared parental responsibility then I must also consider the obligations placed upon me by s 89AA of the Act which requires me to then consider whether the child should spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent.
In determining the outcome of these parenting matters, I must, pursuant to s 66A of the Act, consider the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration. In determining what is in a child’s best interests, I must consider the matters set out in s 66C of the Act.’ [197]-[198]
Sutherland J ordered that the father was to have sole parental responsibility for the children, for Child A to receive continued therapeutic support from Child A’s psychologist, and for the mother to eventually be allowed supervised visits. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply for the following reasons: (1) Sutherland J was not satisfied that the mother experienced any family violence and/or abuse from the father; and (2) the children suffered significant, ongoing psychological harm while in the mother’s sole care and were at risk of further harm if they remain in her sole care.
Janz & Bagley [2018] FCWA 210 (8 November 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The parties had one child and sought parenting orders. The mother sought sole parental responsibility and that the child live with her. She also proposed that the child should not spend any time with the father. The father sought orders that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility; that the child live with the mother while gradually increasing the time she spent with the father; injunctions as to the parties’ alcohol consumption; and non-denigration orders. The father was a self-represented litigant while the mother and ICL were represented by counsel.
The parties had a history of family violence and the father had used explicit photos of the mother to blackmail her throughout their relationship. The child was exposed to some of this violence during the relationship and to the father’s denigration of and threats towards the mother after the parties’ separation.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Reasons: The child had a meaningful relationship with the mother and a close and loving relationship with the father. However, the child was at risk of physical and/or psychological harm while in the father’s care. Duncanson J also found that this, along with the child possibly ‘absorbing’ the father’s negative and unhealthy beliefs and confrontational behaviour, formed an unacceptable risk that could not be managed by mere supervision. With the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility being displaced by the family violence between the parties, Duncanson J ordered the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the child live with the mother. It was also ordered that the child spend no time with the father as he posed an unacceptable risk of harm.
Byrne & Krilly [2018] FCWA 158 (23 August 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parental orders’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father had one child and sought parenting orders and the mother sought relocation orders. Each party sought sole parental responsibility for the child while the ICL proposed the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for him. The mother and ICL proposed that the mother be able to relocate the child to Europe.
The father had mental health issues and was violent towards the mother. This violence caused the mother to develop severe trauma and a desire to return to her home country to receive the support of her family. The mother described her future in Australia as ‘bleak’ and was of the view her employment prospects would be better back in Europe.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: While the child was exposed to family violence during the parties’ relationship and when they were separated, the father addressed the issues causing his abusive behaviour. As such, Duncanson J found that the child did not need to be protected from harm in the care of either parent at the time of proceedings. This, coupled with the findings that the child had a meaningful and loving relationship with both of his parents which was in the child’s best interests to maintain, led Duncanson J to order that the child must spend time with the father despite relocating overseas. As the mother had been the child’s primary caregiver up until proceedings, Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility; the child live with her; and that the mother can relocate the child to Europe. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the history of family violence.
Hobbs & Roth [2018] FCWA 163 (21 August 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’ – ‘Children’ – ‘Damaging property’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘People living in regional, rural and remote communities’ – ‘Relocation orders’ – ‘Technology-facilitated abuse’ – ‘Undefended proceedings’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father have one child. The mother was granted leave to proceed on an undefended basis. The mother sought sole parental responsibility for the child and that he live with her. The mother also sought permission to relocate the child to another town; injunctions relating to non-denigration of herself and her sister; and injunctions restraining the father from consuming alcohol while with the child.
At the time of the proceedings, the child lived with the mother and spent time with the father. The child was exposed to family violence – primarily directed towards the mother – and to problems of excessive alcohol consumption while living in the same town as his father. The father was controlling and abusive. He had slashed the tyres of the mother’s car and threatened to place intimate pictures of her on social media. The mother wished to remove the child from this environment and wanted to relocate due to fear for her own safety.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Although ‘it is to [the child’s] benefit to have a meaningful relationship with the father, this must be balanced against the need to protect [the child] from harm’ [28]. Given the history of family violence and the family violence of the father towards his new partner, there was a need to protect the child from harm while in the father’s care. There is no need to protect the child from harm while in the mother’s care.
The history of family violence rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility being in the best interests of the child. Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the child; that the child live with the mother and that she is permitted to relocate him to another town as the mother had been the primary caregiver up until proceedings; and that the child spend time with the father at such times and on such terms and conditions that the mother thought fit.
Trigg & Rowland [2018] FCWA 136 (26 July 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The parties had one child and sought parenting orders and orders regarding the child’s living arrangements. The mother wished to leave the town where they had lived as a family lived and return to her home town. The father, having come from another country, wished to remain in the town as that was were his only connections in Australia were. The father sought orders for sole parental responsibility and proposed that the child live with him four nights a week and with the mother the remaining three provided that the mother can meet all the child’s needs. The mother sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility and orders permitting her to relocate to her hometown. She also proposed that the child predominately live with her.
There was evidence of domestic violence. The parties were also unable to agree on a form of communication at the time of the proceedings.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting and relocation orders for the circumstances?
Reasons: The presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply due to the issues of family violence. Thackray CJ, however, still ordered equal shared parental responsibility - with the exception that the mother have sole parental responsibility for issues concerning the child’s physical health – as the child had a meaningful relationship with both parties and was found not to be at risk of harm in either parties’ care. Thackray CJ also ordered that for the next few years the child live with both parents on a ‘5-2-2-5’ roster before eventually transitioning to a week-about arrangement.
In regard to the sought relocation orders, Thackray CJ found that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in the parties’ current town. Thackray CJ considered the dysfunction within the mother’s family in her hometown, the child’s current stability, and the possibility of separating the child from the father to be the main factors supporting this decision.
Kazi & Kazi [2018] FCWA 61 (13 April 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children to family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father have four children and sought parenting orders. The mother proposed that the children continue to live with her and have no communication or contact with the father. The father sought orders that the children spend time with him. The mother’s proposal was based on the parties’ history of family violence and fear of the children’s well-being. The ICL proposed ‘that the children live with the mother who should have sole parental responsibility for them, although the mother should keep the father informed of all significant health issues’ [36]. The ICL also proposed that the two older children spend time with and communicate with the father as they wished while the younger child spend time with him in accordance with their wishes in consultation with a therapist.
The parties’ relationship was characterised by family violence inflicted upon the mother and the children from the time of their marriage. The mother deposed that the violence directed towards her was both physical and emotional, with the father also often forcing her to have sex against her will. The father was physically abusive towards the children, who were eventually terrified of him. This fear caused psychological harm to the children.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The children had a meaningful relationship with the mother and it was to their benefit that it continued. The children did not have a relationship with the father at the time of proceedings and did not wish to. While there was no need to protect the children from harm in the mother’s care, there was a need to protect them from physical and psychological harm in the father’s care.
The family violence rebutted the presumption that it is in the children’s best interests that their parents have equal shared parental responsibility. Duncanson J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the children live with her, but that she inform the father of all significant health issues affecting the children. He found that the mother has the capacity to provide for the children’s needs including their emotional and intellectual needs. Duncanson J also ordered that the father eventually be able to contact the children provided he undertook psychological assessment and subject to the children’s wishes.
May and Blackthorn & Anor [2018] FCWA 23 (16 February 2018) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Issues of welfare of children and stability’ – ‘Living arrangements’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: Prior to proceedings, the child lived with her paternal grandmother. The child had very limited, if any, contact with the parents. The paternal grandmother sought sole responsibility of the child and for the child to live with her. The orders sought also permit overseas travel, orders for the provision of information and a non-denigration order, and for the child to occasionally spend time with the parents. Prior to the proceedings and the parents’ separation, the father physically assaulted the mother on several occasions, exposing the child to family violence when she lived with them.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The proceedings were determined under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The objects in Part VII ‘ensure that the best interest of the children are met’ [37]. Given the circumstances, Duncanson J paid specific attention to s 60CC(2) which sets out the primary considerations of the ‘benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both the child’s parents and the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm’ [42]. Attention was also given to s 60CC(2A) which ‘provides that in applying the above considerations, the Court is to give greater weight to the need to protect the child from harm’ [40].
In reaching his decision, Duncanson J considered that: (1) the child had neither communicated nor seen either parent for a considerable period of time; and (2) while ‘there was not a need to protect the child from harm in the care of the paternal grandmother’, there was ‘a need to protect [the child] in the care of the father, by reason of drug and alcohol use, and his violent and aggressive behaviour towards others’ [42]. There was also a need to protect the child from the mother’s unstable circumstances. Duncanson J consequently affirmed the orders sought by the paternal grandparent as it was in the best interests of the child.
Headley & Steners [2017] FCWA 169 (30 November 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Economic abuse’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disabilities and impairments’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother sought sole parental responsibility for the children; an injunction restraining the father from approaching either her or the children within 50 metres; and an injunction restraining the father from communication with the mother and children by any means. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility; an order that the children live with the mother; and that the children spend time with the father.
The parties’ relationship was ‘characterised by significant family violence perpetrated by the father against the mother’ [2], with the father also negatively influencing the mother’s financial position post-separation. The father’s behaviour was partially attributed to the effects of a traumatic head injury which caused loss of inhibitory control, irritability, frustration and verbal aggression.
Issues: What parenting orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply given the parties’ history of family violence. It was open to the judge to make an order for equal shared parental responsibility if, and only if satisfied that despite the presumption not applying it remained in the best interests of the children that such an order should be made [187]. This led Moncrieff J to turn to the primary and additional considerations set out in s 60CC(3) (Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)). ‘The very real difference between the two classes of considerations is that the additional considerations do not all necessarily apply to each and every case whilst the primary considerations do’ [189]. From these considerations, Moncrieff J concluded that ‘the father is incapable of controlling his behaviour and as such the children remain at risk of psychological harm, if not physical harm, and of being exposed to physical abuse of the mother by the father’ [201] and ordered that there should be no contact between the children and their father. It was ordered that the children consequently live with the mother; the mother have sole parental responsibility; and the father be restrained and an injunction be granted restraining the father from approaching the mother or children within 50 metres.
Peak & Cleary [2017] FCWA 166 (24 November 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People affected by substance misuse’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceeding: Parenting and relocation orders.
Facts: The mother and father had one child and sought parenting and, in the mother’s case, relocation orders. The mother sought sole parenting responsibility and for the child to live with her, proposing for the father to be allowed limited visits. The mother also sought an order permitting her to relocate the child to another country. The father proposed equal shared parenting responsibility and for visitation while the child lived with the mother. Both parties sought orders regarding the cost and conditions of travel.
‘During the [parents’] relationship the father was overbearing and aggressive and violent. The mother coped by drinking alcohol and was often intoxicated. The parties’ relationship was marred by incidents of violence mostly perpetrated by the father upon the mother. Both parties abused drugs and alcohol. [The child] was exposed to family violence between his parents.’ [130]
Issues: What would be the appropriate parenting, spend-time and relocation orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: When dealing with the issue of parental responsibility, Duncanson J found that the child had a meaningful relationship with both of his parents. It was to his benefit that it continues. However, the history of family violence between the parties rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, with Duncanson J finding that it would be in the child’s best interests for the mother to have sole parental responsibility. Duncanson J subsequently ordered that the child live with the mother.
Turning to the issue of relocation, Duncanson J considered that while the child did have a meaningful relationship with his father, he had a much deeper relationship with and dependency on his mother. Although it may be initially distressing for the child to be separated from the father if permitted to relocate to another country, the separation would minimise the risk of exposing the child to harm and be in his best interests. The father will still be able to spend time with the child several times a year and will be able to communicate with him electronically.
Richey & Morty [2017] FCWA 113 (19 September 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Self-represented litigant’
Proceeding: Parenting and financial orders.
Facts: The parties had two children and sought parenting and financial orders. The father sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility; the children live with both parents on a week about basis; regular telephone communication with the children; and injunctions restraining the parties from denigrating each other. The father also proposed that each party retain their own property and superannuation and for payments from the mother. The mother sought orders ‘apportioning’ parental liability 80%:20% in her favour. She also proposed that the children predominately live with her and sought orders to alter her property interests such that she received half of the father’s superannuation, child support payments and cash payment for the parties’ shared car.
The mother was a self-represented litigant. O’Brien J was satisfied she understood his explanation of the trial’s processes and his obligations.
There were two separate violent incidents between the parties’ post-separation, however there was no evidence to suggest a history of family violence while the parties were married.
Issues: What parenting and financial orders are appropriate for the circumstances?
Reasons: O’Brien J first dealt with the parenting orders sought by the parties and provided that the presumption that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child is rebutted if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child was exposed to family violence.
‘The phrase “reasonable grounds to believe” is not unimportant. The legislation does not require that abuse or family violence be proven for the statutory presumption to be displaced; it is sufficient for there to be reasonable grounds to believe that a party has engaged in abuse or family violence. [59]
O’Brien J found that the presumption did not apply because the two children were exposed to family violence during the second of the two separate violent incidents that occurred post-separation. Despite this, O’Brien J also found that the children were not at any risk of physical or psychological harm in the care of either party. Upon also finding that both parties have the capacity to provide for all of the children’s needs, O’Brien J ordered equal shared parental responsibility and that the children spend equal time with each parent.
In turning to the competing financial orders sought by the parties, O’Brien J stated that
‘the court has a wide discretion conferred by s 79(1) of the Act. That discretion is to be exercised in accordance with legal principle, and without assuming that the parties’ interests in assets, or responsibilities for liabilities, are or should be different from those determined by common law and equity. The court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable to make an order adjusting existing property interests, including equitable interests. That requirement is readily satisfied in most cases, including this one…In determining what orders will be just and equitable, the court’s power is not confined by any ‘steps’ or ‘stages’, let alone a prescribed sequence of such.’ [135]
The parties were found to have a total net pool of -$3,932.00, with most of the liabilities being the joint responsibility of the parties. It was also found that ‘neither party retain[ed] reliable assets of any real value’. O’Brien J consequently ordered that ‘the only just and equitable outcome achievable’ was that each party retained their assets and, considering the mother being currently unemployed, that the father retain responsibility for the liabilities.
O’Brien J then considered the child support orders sought be the mother. O’Brien J declined to provide the orders sought as the mother did not provide sufficient evidence to justify them.
Finton & Kimble [2017] FCWA 106 (24 August 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Family violence’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Presumption of equal parental responsibility’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father and mother had two children and sought parenting orders. The father sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility and for the children to live with their mother while also spending time with him. The mother sought orders for sole parental responsibility, the children to live with her, for the children to not spend time with the father and for the issuing of passports to the children without the father’s consent. The Independent Children’s lawyer (ICL) submitted that the orders which best meet the children’s interests were as set out by the mother.
The children’s parents separated when the children were very young. ‘The relationship between the parties has been described as one of significant conflict and domestic upheaval. Their separation was surrounded by allegations of violence, abuse and aggressive and erratic behaviour, levelled against the husband in particular’ [6]. ‘In the period following separation, the husband’s life descended into turmoil and conflict. There is evidence of significant hostility, anger and threatening behaviour directed by the husband towards a wide range of people and institutions’ [9].
The children were in the mother’s care after the parties separated and had limited opportunity to form a relationship with their father.
Issues: Should the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Decision and reasoning:
Walters J provided that
‘[t]he Court’s paramount consideration is the welfare or best interests of two very young girls. The history of this case and the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the parents are matters which must be taken into account – but it is the children’s future, welfare and best interests upon which the Court must concentrate. The Court is responsible for determining what orders best meet their needs and advance their interests – including the need to be protected from the risk of harm… The Court has no interest in or enthusiasm for rewarding one party or punishing the other. Its preoccupation is with, and concentration is on, the best interests of the children…Generally speaking, what parties do, how they behave and the attitudes that they display towards their roles as parents or carers are far more relevant to the decision process in a parenting case, and of much greater significance, than the vague and often highly complex emotion known as love.’ [59]-[105]
Here, the father demonstrated ‘an “entrenched pattern of abusive behaviour over a significant period of time”…The husband seems to have been oblivious to or unconcerned about the real or potential harm he caused or could have caused others’ [109]. Any spend time orders or orders allowing the children to communicate with the father were determined likely to cause the mother ‘significant psychological detriment – and in turn, psychological harm to the children’ [120]. This, coupled with the fact that the mother was deemed to have the capacity to sufficiently provide for the physical, emotional and intellectual needs of the children led Walters J to decide that ‘[i]t [was] not in the children’s best interests to spend any time with the husband’ despite his belief that ‘it is a grave and far-reaching step for a Court to deprive children of a relationship with a parent – or, put another way, to deprive a father of a relationship with his children’ [191]-[192]. Stemming from this belief, Walters J noted that
‘[p]arenting orders are not ordinarily regarded as “final” and immutable. If circumstances change significantly, and in a manner that relates to the best interests of the children, then there is a possibility that the orders I propose to make can be revisited – and, if required in the children’s best interests, varied’ [195].
Vieri & Vieri [2017] FCWA 101 (9 August 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with disability or impairment’ – ‘People with mental illness’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders and property settlement orders.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children and sought parenting and property orders. For the parenting orders, the mother sought sole parental responsibility, for the children to live with her, and proposed that the father be allowed to spend time with the children. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and for the children to live with both parties on a fortnightly cycle.
For the property orders, the mother sought an order that the father transfer his interest in the former matrimonial home to her and she would refinance the mortgage to Bankwest into her sole name. She also sought to have a car transferred to her, proposing a 7:3 division in her favour. The father proposed to transfer the above home to the mother and refinance the mortgage into her sole name contemporaneously with the transfer. The father also sought for the mother to pay him $250,000 from the transfer. Both parties sought to retain all other assets and superannuation. The property pool was estimated to be around $900,000.
Both children have been diagnosed with medical conditions. The parties did not communicate well and the mother did not keep the father informed of important issues regarding the children’s health. The mother frequently denied the father’s requests to see the children and had a Violence Restraining Order against the father.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning:
Parenting Orders
The presumption that it is in the child’s best interests for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child ‘does not apply in circumstances where there is abuse or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the Court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.’ Notwithstanding this presumption, [Duncanson J was] of the view that it is in the children’s best interests that their parents have shared parental responsibility for most, but not all long-term issues. In all but medical issues, I think both parties should jointly make the decisions.’ This decision was based on Duncanson J’s findings that the children had a meaningful relationship with both of their parents and it was to their benefit that it continued. The children were not at risk of harm in the care of either parent - although they had previously been exposed to conflict between the parties - and both parties have the capacity to provide for the children’s needs.
Duncanson J ordered an increase in the time the children spent with the father, but predominantly live with the mother during school terms. Keeping in mind the children’s disabilities and anxiety, this increase was to be implemented incrementally.
Property Orders
The proceedings were governed by s 79 of the Act and the decision in Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108. Having regard to the mother’s care of the children, the father’s superior earning capacity and the father’s property entitlement comprising significant superannuation benefits, Duncanson J divided the property in favour of the mother, ordering a 6:4 division.
Rhodes & Lewington [2017] FCWA 75 (6 June 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘People with mental illness * psychological harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property settlement’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceeding: Parenting and financial orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children and sought parenting and financial orders. The proceedings primarily concerned whether the children should have any contact with their father. The mother sought sole parental responsibility and orders that the children live with her. The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and shared care of the children.
The father often deceived and manipulated the mother, children and people around him during the parties’ relationship, feigning several severe and terminal illnesses. Through this deception, he spent large sums of the parties’ money for personal use (such as travel and accommodation) under the guise of paying for medical treatment. The father also frequently threatened the mother and occasionally their children, leading the mother to apply for a Violence Order.
Issues: What parenting and financial orders are appropriate given the circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the father’s psychological abuse of the children. Walters J found that that the father’s psychological abuse of the children displaced the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility. He also found that the father’s behaviour amounted to an unacceptable risk to the children’s psychological and emotional wellbeing. As such, Walters J ordered that the mother have sole parental responsibility and that the children not have any contact with the father.
The parties had a net property pool of $970,381. Upon considering the father’s spending while deceiving the mother along with his limited contributions towards household expenses and the children while the parties were together, Walters J ordered that the mother receive 84% of the net property and superannuation.
Dempsey & Brahms [2017] FCWA 59 (12 May 2017) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Children’ – ‘Coercive control’ – ‘Family violence’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Property damage’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceeding: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father have two children and sought parenting orders. The father proposes that the older child decides where he lives with a week-about arrangement for the younger children (save for the holidays when they would spend up to two weeks with each parent). The mother sought sole parental responsibility; for the children to live with her; and for the children to only spend time with the father subject to her consent. The ICL proposed that the mother have sole parental responsibility.
The father sought to undermine the children’s relationship with the mother and after the parties’ separation threatened the mother on several occasions. The father’s negative attitude towards the mother influenced the oldest child’s opinion of and behaviour around her, with the child eventually mimicking some of the father’s negative behaviours. While the oldest child did leave the mother’s home to live with the father for two years, he eventually returned and had a hostile relationship with the father until the time of proceedings.
Issues: What are the appropriate parenting orders in these circumstances?
Decision and reasoning: Thackray CJ ordered the mother have sole parental responsibility for the three children; the children live with the mother; and that the children only spend such time with the father as the mother deemed appropriate.
Thackray CJ ‘did not doubt’ that there were great benefits to the children having a meaningful relationship with their mother. ‘She [was] focused on their well-being and has been their primary caregiver. She [was] a stable and steadying influence’ [109]. On the other hand, the father’s conduct towards the mother and children was damaging. ‘[T]he benefit to the children of having a meaningful relationship with their father [was] outweighed by the importance of protecting them from the harm that often arises when they spend time with him’ [110]. Thackray CJ provided that the presence of family violence rebutted the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and that it was inappropriate for the parents to share responsibility given their inability to communicate.
Thackray CJ found (at [15]) that the father was: an ‘aggressive, controlling and manipulative man’ with a propensity to bend the truth, skilled at turning accusations against him back onto the accuser, that he demonstrated no insight into the way that he made the lives of the mother and her adult sons (and to a slightly lesser extent his own children) a complete misery and that he was quite oblivious to the harm his violent, abusive and controlling behaviour has caused.
Thakray CJ held (at [111]) that the father has engaged in coercive, controlling and abusive behaviour towards the mother and children and that he has damaged every vehicle the mother has ever owned (sometimes when children have been in the vehicle and sometimes when they have been observing). His Honour accepted that “the mother remained in the relationship for as long as she did because of the father’s manipulative behaviour and because she considered this was the best way to keep her and the children safe. The father’s manipulation has included his efforts to drive a wedge between the mother and her friends and between the mother and the children.” [113]
Arthur and Joyner [2015] FCWAM 197 (4 September 2015) – Family Court of Western Australia (Magistrates Decisions)
‘Interim parenting orders’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’
Proceedings: Interim parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and father had two children. Both parties had criminal histories, mental health issues and problems with drugs and alcohol. The mother previously obtained an interim violence restraining order and a family violence offence had been reported to the police against the father but both matters were dropped. Before the hearing, the parenting arrangements were that the children live with the mother and spend supervised time with the father once a week. The father sought orders for unsupervised time with the children. At the end of the hearing, the Court made immediate orders for unsupervised time between the father and the children.
Issue/s: What ought to be the extent of ongoing time between the children and the father?
Reasoning/Decision: The strict and comprehensive guidelines for determining an interim parenting application were set out in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286 (see [27]). Magistrate Kaeser cited the Full Court of the Family Court’s decision in Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36, which provided guidance on the application of these principles. The Court in Banks stated at [48]-[50]:
‘It should also be said that in parenting proceedings, as in all civil litigation, it will be the issues that are joined that will dictate which s60CC factors are relevant. By their nature, interim parenting proceedings should be confined to those issues which, in the best interests of the child, require determination prior to a proper determination at a trial [emphasis in original]. The fact such disputes are commonly dealt with in overcrowded Court lists makes it even more desirable to identify with precision those issues which can, or should, be resolved on an interim basis.
[…]
When it is obvious that the findings made as to some of the s60CC factors will be determinative of the child’s best interests on an interim basis, it is a sterile and unnecessary exercise to address other factors. Moreover, it would be a sterile exercise to determine whether or not particular facts are disputed if they are relevant only to one of the nondeterminative s60CC considerations. Properly understood, we do not interpret what was said in Goode as meaning that in an interim case, each and every fact must be characterised as disputed or not; and that each s60CC factor must be traversed where it is obvious on the facts and issues joined that there are only one or two decisive factors’.
Magistrate Kaeser affirmed the orders that the father ought to have unsupervised contact with the children. The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply given that there was reasonable grounds to believe there had been family violence in the relationship. In these circumstances, the issue of equal time or substantial and significant time did not need to be determined. It was reasonable for the children to spend one overnight occasion with their father every fortnight (see [33]-[44]).
Sampson and North [2014] FCWA 75 (25 November 2014) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Court management’ – ‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Exposing children’ – ‘Fair hearing and safety’ – ‘No contact orders’ – ‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Questioning witnesses’ – ‘Self-represented litigants’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’ – ‘Unacceptable risk’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The father was verbally, physically and emotionally abusive towards the mother throughout their relationship. He assaulted her, forced her to have sex against her will, posted comments on Facebook referring to kill her and threatened to kill her. After their first child was born, a safety plan was put in place by the Department of Child Protection (DCP) specifying that the father have no unsupervised contact with the child. Their second child was born. The mother left the home with the children. She obtained a violence restraining order and a filed a Notice of Abuse with the DCP.
Issue/s: What parenting orders were appropriate in the circumstances?
Reasoning/Decision: This case raised significant issues relating to case management in circumstances where the father was a self-represented litigant. The father’s behaviour at trial soon was unmanageable, despite several requests from the court that he refrain from using foul language and despite warnings regarding his conduct. The mother was cross-examined by the father and kept her composure in extremely difficult circumstances (see [43]-[44]). Likewise, counsel for the mother questioned the father in a calm and measured way, despite his behaviour.
Following threats made in the courtroom by the father, the Court took the unusual step of asking counsel for the mother and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to his chambers. He informed them that the trial could not safely proceed with the father present in court. Upon the resumption of the trial the Court made an order that the father attend trial from an alternative venue by way of video link (see [47]-[48]). The father’s behaviour did not improve throughout the rest of the hearing. The Court warned the father on several occasions that if he continued to use foul language the Court would switch on the mute button. After several disruptions, the Court activated the mute button (see [51]-[67]).
Duncanson J stated here at [68] that: ‘The trial was conducted in the most difficult circumstances by reason of the father’s conduct, threats and appalling language. Both the ICL and counsel for the mother conducted themselves properly throughout and are to be commended for their perseverance and tolerance. An order sought by the mother was that the children spend no time with the father. In these circumstances it was important that the relevant evidence be provided to the court and properly tested by cross-examination to ensure that the Court is able to determine all issues and make orders which are in the best interests of the children. It was also important that the Court not allow the father to distract it from those issues’.
In making parenting orders, Duncanson J held that the presumption of shared equal parental responsibility did not apply here because of family violence committed by the father. The mother was given sole parental responsibility for the children. It was also in the best interests of the children that they live solely in the care of their mother as the children would be placed at an unacceptable risk of harm in the care of their father.
Finally, the Court held that the father have no contact with the children. This was appropriate in circumstances where ‘the children’s relationship with the father is not a meaningful one and as such will not be of benefit to them in the future. The children are at risk of both physical and psychological harm in the care of the father. His unrelenting denigration, criticism and vitriol towards the mother could undermine the children’s relationship with her and impact upon her parenting of the children in the future’ (see [184]-[197]).
Eddon and Eddon [2012] FCWA 104 (6 November 2012) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Emotional and psychological abuse’ – ‘Parenting orders and impact on children’ – ‘Relocation orders’
Proceedings: Relocation and parenting orders.
Facts: The mother was born in England and the father was born in Australia. They had one child together. The mother sought orders to have sole parental responsibility for the child and permission to relocate the child to the UK. Her case revolved around the claim that the father’s sustained emotional abuse towards her transformed her from a strong, independent woman into a nervous wreck who needed the support of her family in the UK (see evidence [31]-[80]). The father sought equal shared parental responsibility and that the child live with the mother in Australia.
Issue/s: What parenting and relocation orders were appropriate in the circumstances?
Reasoning/Decision: First, in relation to the issue of allocating parental responsibility, Thackray CJ noted that the presumption in favour of shared parental responsibility did not apply because of the father’s violence. In the circumstances, it was appropriate for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the child. His Honour was satisfied that the mother would seek to involve the father in any important decisions about the child and that she would make the right choices for the child (see [157]-[160]).
Second, Thackray CJ turned to the issue of the planned relocation. His Honour noted that this case involved choosing the least bad alternative, as neither of the proposed outcomes was in any way satisfactory. If the mother relocated, the child would effectively be denied a meaningful relationship with his father, at least for some years until the father could afford to see him more regularly. If the mother was not permitted to relocate, there was a serious risk that she would fall into a state of depression, leading to the likelihood of a damaged attachment with her child. This would be extremely damaging to the child in the long term. In His Honour’s view, this factor was of far greater importance than the ‘significant, but not sever grief’, the child would face if not permitted to see his father regularly. The mother was therefore permitted to relocate to the UK to obtain support from her family to recover from the abuse she suffered.
His Honour concluded at [166]-[167]:
Although not a factor I need to take into account, there is potential for the outcome of cases such as the present to have a salutary impact on the behaviour of other parents. Unless the best interests of the child demand otherwise, it cannot reasonably be expected that one party to a relationship can behave in an abominable fashion, cause severe emotional harm to the other party, and then insist that they continue to live nearby so that they can continue to have a close relationship with their child. The strong emphasis given by our law to the importance of protection from violence would be undermined if any different message were conveyed.
Notwithstanding his past conduct, it is impossible not to feel some sympathy for the father who I consider not only has gained some appreciation of the consequences of his behaviour, but wants to do the best he can for his son. His behaviour has been much improved, and he should be commended for that. But, unfortunately, as was put to him in cross-examination, it is a case of “too little, too late”. The damage has been done. All the father can do now, which I am satisfied he wants to do, is to make amends. It is not too late for him to be a good father, but he will have to achieve that by allowing the mother time to recover, which I am persuaded she can only do if she is permitted to go home’.
P and J [2010] FCWA 53 (9 March 2010) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’
Proceedings: Parenting orders.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children together, Jack and Helen. The father breached a violence restraining order on four occasions and had been convicted of assaulting the mother. The father sought orders for shared parental responsibility for major long term issues concerning the children. The mother proposed that she have sole parental responsibility for issues concerning the children’s health, education and Jack’s speech and language therapy requirements, but otherwise agreed that there ought to be shared parental responsibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues was should the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Reasoning/Decision: In relation to the issue of shared parental responsibility, Thackray CJ was satisfied that the father had engaged in family violence and therefore the presumption of equal shared responsibility did not apply. His Honour noted that just because the presumption did not apply, did not mean that it could not be in the best interests of the children for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. However, in the circumstances, equal shared parental responsibility was not an option. The parents had shown no capacity to come to any agreements in relation to significant matters concerning the children and any order requiring them to consult would fail.
His Honour concluded that the mother have sole parental responsibility for all major long term issues concerning the children. This was appropriate in circumstances where she was also to have primary care responsibility for the children and further, she was more in tune with the children’s needs and was better equipped than the father to make decisions for the children’s long term welfare (see [75]-[81]).
W and W [2006] FCWA 103 (6 October 2006) – Family Court of Western Australia
‘Parenting orders’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility’ – ‘Rebutting the presumption’
Proceedings: Parenting proceedings.
Facts: The mother and the father had two children together and sought parenting orders. The mother proposed that she be given sole responsibility for decisions concerning the children’s welfare while the father sought orders for shared parental responsibility.
Issue/s: One of the issues was whether the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for the children?
Reasoning/Decision: The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility did not apply here because the father assaulted the mother. However, Thackray J went on to state at [23]-[24]:
‘The fact the presumption does not apply is by no means the end of the matter. Judges in this Court have long taken the view that it is generally appropriate for both parents to have an equal say in major decisions about their children. This is particularly true of cases where the parents have a shared-care arrangement. The fact there has been family violence is clearly an important factor in determining whether it is appropriate for the parents to share parental responsibility; however, the nature of the violence needs to be assessed to determine whether it should have any impact.
It is my assessment that the nature of the violence here was not such, in itself, as to have any real impact on the allocation of parental responsibility. However, I consider there are other reasons why it would not be in the best interests of the children for their parents to be left with shared parental responsibility’.
His Honour held that the mother ought to be given sole parental responsibility in circumstances where the parties had an extremely poor relationship, they did not communicate with each other than by email (which the father used to abuse, annoy and denigrate the wife) and the father was extremely controlling, argumentative and pedantic (see [25]).
District Court
Re AB [2023] WADC 28 (17 March 2023) – Western Australia District Court
‘Child abuse’ – ‘Compensation’ – ‘Corroboration’ – ‘Criminal injuries compensation’ – ‘Criminal injuries compensation act 2003 (wa)’ – ‘Finding of child abuse’ – ‘Sexual abuse’
Proceeding: Appeal pursuant to s55 and s56(1) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) from a decision of the chief assessor refusing an application for compensation for harm suffered as a result of incidents of sexual abuse allegedly committed against the appellant by her former partner W.
Issue: Whether compensation should be ordered for injuries arising from sexual assaults (x2) and other abuse.
Facts: The appellant made an application for compensation for injuries arising from alleged emotional/verbal and physical/sexual abuse between 1999 and 2015 and two separate alleged sexual assaults in 2015 allegedly committed by her former de facto partner, W. At first instance, the chief assessor refused compensation.
The appellant had been in a de facto spousal relationship with the alleged offender between 1999 and 2015. After leaving him she made a formal complaint to police of two occasions of non-consensual anal penetration, which she later advised police she did not wish to proceed with. The appellant later asked police to reopen their investigation into her earlier complaint alleged that her ex-partner had also been physically and verbally abusive during their relationship and had threatened self-harm and suicide when she tried to leave him. Police decided not to charge the alleged offender with any offence as there was not evidence to corroborate her account, despite corroboration not being required to prove an offence of sexual assault.
The chief assessor found the sexual abuse of the appellant was not non-consensual. There was evidence of contact with medical and mental health practitioners including reports of non-consensual anal sex and a 17 year history of sexual assault by her de facto partner. J, a child who the appellant cared for pursuant to Family Court orders, was successful in a criminal injuries compensation claim as both a secondary victim of W’s abuse of the appellant and primary victim of other abuse by W, and reasons subsequently published by the assessor of J’s claim reversed the finding that W’s abuse of the appellant constituted an offence and found that although the incidents of anal penetration of the appellant by W while she was crying and W had his hands around her neck were not non-consensual the appellant and AB and W committed an offence by exposing J to the incidents.
Reasoning and decision: Appeal allowed, awarding the appellant $120,000 for non-pecuniary loss and $1,846 for reimbursement of expenses.
Staude DCJ was satisfied that the two offences of aggravated sexual penetration without consent had been committed and were not isolated offences. The appellant’s statements were consistent with her reports to police and other agencies, and the judge accepted that she had been stuck in an abusive relationship and too embarrassed to report the incidents in more detail. He was not able to be satisfied that the other offences had occurred.
Staude DCJ found that the appellant had suffered injury as a consequence of the offences and assessed the injury in context of the harmful relationship. It was determined that the sexual assaults had materially contributed to the appellant’s diagnosed depression, anxiety and functional impairments and had led to her loss of self-esteem and confidence. However, some of the injury was not considered compensable as it was attributed to other abuse in the relationship and would therefore have been suffered regardless of the offences.
The judge was highly critical of the assessor of J’s claim’s findings that the appellant had committed an offence under s 101 of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 by exposing her son to abuse.
DB v RB [2020] WADC 93 (29 June 2020) – Western Australia District Court
‘Damaging property’ – ‘Evidence’ – ‘Exposing children to domestic and family violence’ – ‘Physical violence and harm’ – ‘Protection orders’ – ‘Sexual and reproductive abuse’
Proceedings: Appeal from magistrate’s decision to make final Family Violence Restraining Order (Final Order) pursuant to Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (‘the RO Act’).
Facts: The magistrate was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that DB had committed acts of family violence against his wife (RB): a sexual assault, letting down RB’s car tyres (controlling behaviour), and two physical assaults. The magistrate was also satisfied that RB had reasonable grounds to apprehend he would commit acts of family violence against her. In relation to their daughter, TB, the magistrate found that DB had committed acts of family violence against her, exposed her to family violence, and she had reasonable grounds to apprehend further family violence/exposure to family violence. The magistrate made the Final Order protecting RB and her eldest daughter (TB) for a term of two years.
Grounds of appeal:
1.
The magistrate did not accord DB procedural fairness in refusing to grant leave to call overseas witnesses.
2.
The magistrate erred in relying on his finding that TB was a credible witness to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that incidents of family violence had occurred.
3.
Text messages sent by RB to her sister that she had been raped, shortly after the incident occurred, were inadmissible as they were sent to an unknown number.
4.
The magistrate disregarded one instance where DB was not the aggressor.
5.
The decision the magistrate made was excessive.
Decision and reasoning: Appeal dismissed.
Ground 1: Evidence of the two proposed overseas witnesses was irrelevant as they had only observed the relationship in the past. Evidence was also inadmissible as it was only intended to bolster the credibility of DB.
Ground 2: The magistrate’s finding as to TB’s credibility (a child witness) was open to make based on his assessment of the way she gave evidence, and in light of all of the evidence.
Ground 3: While the probative value of/weight given to the text messages may have been an issue for the magistrate to consider, the magistrate did not err admitting them into evidence. They were relevant to the matters to which he was required to have regard. The court also noted that s 44A(i) of the RO Act provides that the court is not bound by the evidence in a final order hearing and the court may inform itself on any matter in such a manner as it considers appropriate.
Ground 4: The magistrate did not rely on this incident as one of the acts of family violence he was satisfied DB committed. In any event, the fact that DB may not have been the instigator of the events described did not detract from the fact that DB acknowledged he acted violently towards his wife in the course of that incident.
Ground 5: The magistrate correctly applied the test set out in s 10D(1) of the RO Act that a final order must be made where the magistrate is satisfied of the matters set out in s 10D(1)(a) or s 10D(1)(b), unless special circumstances exist.
Potschick v Bruce [2018] WADC 107 (31 August 2018) – Western Australia District Court
‘Protection orders’ – ‘Summary of considerations’
Charges: The Magistrate was satisfied that the respondent committed two acts of abuse against the appellant.
Appeal type: Appeal from a decision of the Magistrate refusing to make a final violence restraining order.
Facts: The appellant appealed a decision of the Magistrate to refuse to make a final violence restraining order against the respondent. The appeal was conducted by way of a rehearing of the application.
Issues: Whether the Magistrate erred in fact in finding that the respondent was not likely, in the future, to commit an act of abuse against the appellant.
Decision and reasoning: The appeal was dismissed. Before the Court’s power to grant a Final Violence Restraining Order (VRO) is enlivened, it must be satisfied that the respondent committed an act of abuse against the appellant and that he is likely to commit such an act again. The Court noted that the Magistrate was not satisfied to the requisite standard that the respondent was likely to commit an act of abuse against the appellant again, or that the granting of either a Family Violence Restraining Order FVRO of an Misconduct Restraining Order (MRO) was justified. As the Court was not prepared to disturb the Magistrate’s finding as to the respondent’s likely future conduct, there was no statutory basis on which the Court could order an MRO (there being no family relationship between the appellant and respondent). Having regard to the issue of the respondent’s likely future conduct in relation to the appropriateness of granting a Final VRO or a MRO, there was no utility in undertaking a consideration of a hypothetical question of whether the Magistrate erred in exercising his discretion to refuse an order in the event that the finding was overturned and the jurisdiction to make an order enlivened ([36]).