The cases identified here provide examples of the way judicial officers have dealt with some of the issues raised in the context statement.

Click on the citation to be directed to a summary of the case in the Case Database.

  • R v NQ [2015] ACTSC 308 (14 October 2015) – Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court
    Robinson AJ at [15]: ‘I have come to the view that only a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate to the level of offending in this case. There is a need to punish this offending and to send a clear message by way of general deterrence to others that participation in sexual behaviour is a matter of choice not subjugation’.
  • R v Aumash [2020] NSWDC 168 (1 May 2020) – New South Wales District Court

    "Placing men in gaol, an intrinsically violent environment is an ineffective way of addressing the underlying causes of crimes against women. But the need for community protection, supported by growing community perceptions about the impact of domestic violence, requires that men who commit such offences, particularly those who do so repeatedly, be removed from the community" [62].

  • R v Wilkinson [2008] SASC 172 (4 July 2008) – South Australia Supreme Court
    Gray J at [27]: ‘Although imposing longer and longer terms of imprisonment does remove perpetrators from the community, domestic violence continues and its incidence increases. The imposing of sentences of imprisonment is a blunt instrument that does not adequately address the underlying causes of domestic violence in any real way’.
  • Pasinis v The Queen [2014] VSCA 97 (22 May 2014) – Victorian Court of Appeal
    Kyrou AJA at [57]: ‘General deterrence is of fundamental importance in cases of domestic violence. The victims of such violence are often so enveloped by fear that they are incapable of either escaping the violence or reporting it to the authorities. The key to protection lies in deterring the violent conduct by sending an unequivocal message to would-be perpetrators of domestic violence that if they offend, they will be sentenced to a lengthy period of imprisonment so that they are no longer in a position to inflict harm’.
  • DPP v Neve [2013] VSC 488 (13 September 2013) – Victorian Supreme Court
    Bell J at [67]: ‘Denunciation of your crimes and general deterrence are powerful sentencing considerations in your case, leading to an immediate sentence of imprisonment. Ms Fuller was your wife. You are guilty of committing appalling domestic violence towards her. Many of your actions were not only violent but calculated to belittle and demean her and place her in abject fear. The double barrel shotgun was a common feature of all five charges and it was loaded when the first four offences were committed. This criminal conduct deserves the strongest condemnation of the court. Others must be made to appreciate the consequences of committing crimes of this nature’.
  • Pedrochi v Brown [2021] WASC 81 (25 March 2021) – Western Australia Supreme Court

    The applicant’s application for leave to appeal against a sentence of 2 years and 6 months imprisonment was allowed only insofar as to correct the commencement date by 4 days. It was noted at [62]-[63]:

    “It is characteristic of offences of this kind that they involve significant power imbalances (as the offence in this case did), that they are committed behind closed doors (as the offence in this case was) and that they are accompanied by lies and gas lighting (as the offence in this case undoubtedly was).

    These features underscore the need for the courts, in imposing sentences commensurate with the seriousness of the offence in each case and applying all relevant sentencing principles, to send a strong signal that violence of this kind is intolerable and will be dealt with accordingly. The “firming up” of sentences for such violence, referred to in Duncan v The Queen [2018] WASCA 154, reflects that need.”

    In addition, the court emphasised at [64] that:

    “offences involving strangulation are particularly serious. As [the magistrate] said “a case of non-fatal strangulation … is extremely serious” and that “the courts now recognise how serious that action is.” In my view, her Honour can here be taken to be referring to the growing appreciation of the particular dangers associated with offences involving strangulation and with the role they play in cases of intimate and family violence. That recognition has, of course, led to legislative action, introducing a specific offence of suffocation or strangulation. That offence was, of course, not in existence at the time of the appellant’s offending against Ms Hallam. Nevertheless, as the learned Magistrate recognised, the recognition of the seriousness and danger of non fatal strangulation predated those legislative reforms and was a relevant sentencing consideration.”