Facts: The appellant man was convicted of choking the female complainant in a domestic setting (domestic violence offence) (count 1) and common assault (domestic violence offence) (count 2) after trial before a jury in the District Court. He was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months on count 1 to be suspended after serving 15 months’ imprisonment for an operational period of three years. He was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment for count 2.
The appellant often stayed at the complainant’s home where she lived with her five children; the appellant was the father of the youngest child. The appellant and his dog were staying at the complainant’s home when the appellant’s dog urinated on the floor and the complainant asked her son to tell the appellant.
The complainant’s evidence in chief was that:
Medical records included a note: "the patient states her partner pushed her onto the bed and strangled her with both hand pushing downwards then made multiple blows with fists to the shoulder and head. Patient unsure if knocked out."
In the complainant’s video record of interview he said there was a struggle for the phone. "He then sat down, gave her a big hug and got her to calm down. He denied choking her or trying to do that. He thought his thumb may have made contact with her during the struggle for the phone."[20]
Against the objection of defence counsel [21] the jury were given both a handout and direction in the terms: "‘Choked’ is an English word that bears its ordinary, everyday meaning – that is – ‘to hinder or stop the breathing of a person’."[20] Defence counsel argued there was only one definition given to the jury whereas dictionaries gave various definitions. [23]
Grounds: The grounds of appeal against conviction were:
Held:
1. Appeal against conviction dismissed.
Ground 1: Mullins JA considered the construction of s 315A Criminal Code (Qld) in light of s14A Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the purpose given for the introduction of the offence in the relevant Bill Explanatory Notes referring to recommendation 120 of the Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence (Queensland) in its Report Not Now, Not Ever: Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland.
"In order to amount to choking, there must be some pressure that results at least in the restriction of the victim’s breathing. As the evidence in this trial illustrated, there were overt signs in the consequences the complainant described of her struggle to breathe, her inability to speak, the black dots in her vision, the pain in her chest, and her feeling disoriented from which it could be inferred there was some restriction of her breathing, as a result of the appellant’s hand around her neck. The consequence of the restriction of the complainant’s breathing was not a separate element of the offence, but the evidence required to prove the act of choking."
The direction given by the trial judge on the meaning of "choked" was correct. It was a direction on the law. The meaning of the word "choked" for the purpose of count 1 was a matter of legal interpretation and it was appropriate that the judge directed the jury to apply the meaning "to hinder or stop the breathing of a person"." [58]-[59]
Ground 2: The appellant’s argument was that as the particulars specified alternative conduct for each count they failed to sufficiently inform him of the case against him (Count 1: "stopped and/or hindered [the complainant’s] breathing and, in doing so, choked her"; Count 2: "shook and/or applied force to [the complainant’s] shoulders and, in doing so, he unlawfully assaulted her" [60]). The complaint re Count 1 was resolved by the conclusion as to meaning of "choke" re ground 1; it was sufficient that the jury be satisfied the complainant putting his hand around her neck hindered her breathing [62]. There was no substance to the complaint re Count 2 [63].
Ground 3: The jury were given extensive and appropriate directions that they could not convict unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was "a reliable and truthful witness"… "that she was choked by the [appellant] by him placing his right hand around her throat and squeezed in the way that she described" and similar directions were given re Count 2 [65]. The jury’s verdicts were not unreasonable [66].
2. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted.
3. Appeal against sentence allowed.
The trial judge considered the sentencing decisions in R v MCW [2018] QCA 241 and R v MDB [2018] QCA 283. Mullins JA said: "Objectively, the appellant’s offending was less serious than the offending in MCW and MDB. The appellant also was younger than those offenders and without the relevant prior criminal history. It was therefore surprising that the prosecutor at the trial submitted to the trial judge that a sentence in the order of three years and six months or four years’ imprisonment was appropriate. It does not assist a sentencing judge, when the prosecutor’s submissions propose a sentence that is outside the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion for the offending committed by the particular offender." [71]
4. Set aside the sentence imposed at first instance for count 1 and, in lieu, the appellant is sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years with the parole release date fixed at 5 June 2020.
5. The declaration as to pre-sentence custody and other orders made at first instance are confirmed.